


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
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The Complete Works of

JULIUS CAESAR

(100-44 BC)



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



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



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

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

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



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
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The Translations




Ruins in the Suburra district of Rome — Caesar's birthplace



Reconstructed view of the Suburra area



An artist's impression of Ancient Rome



Another proposed view of the ancient city

THE GALLIC WARS



Translated by W. A. MacDevitt and H. J. Edwards

Written as a third-person narrative, *De Bello Gallico* is Julius Caesar's account of the wars he waged in Gaul from 58 BC to 50 BC, describing in detail the battles and intrigues that took place during the nine year campaign. Due to its simple and direct prose style, the work has served as an important text in Latin studies for many centuries. The commentary is divided into eight Books, each varying in size from approximately 5,000 to 15,000 words. It is commonly believed that the eighth book was added later by Aulus Hirtius, one of Caesar's generals.

The work is a compilation made from notes jotted down in the tent or during a journey. In the commentary, Caesar describes his conflict with the Gallic tribe known as the Helvetii. The wealthiest man of the Helvetii, Orgetorix, convinced his countrymen that they should leave their homeland in modern day Switzerland, due to being too constricted by the surrounding rivers and mountains. They devised a plan to burn their homes and then depart their homeland. When Caesar learned of their plan to cross over a Roman province, he decided to attack the tribe, commencing the beginning of his conflict with the Gauls, eventually culminating with the Battle of Alesia in 52 BC. During this now legendary siege, the Roman legions found themselves not only besieging Gallic forces in Alesia of equal strength, but fighting a massive relief army sent to rescue their trapped comrades. Surrounded and out-numbered by as much as five

to one, Caesar was destined to achieve one of the most remarkable military victories in history, resulting with the dramatic capture and conquering of Vercingetorix, the Gallic leader.

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The statue of Vercingetorix now erected at the site of the Battle of Alesia



'Vercingetorix surrenders to Caesar after the Battle of Alesia' by Lionel Noel Royer, 1899

BOOK I

I. — All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are farthest from the civilisation and refinement of [our] Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them and import those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war; for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in valour, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said that the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae: it borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae rise from the extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun and the north star.

II. — Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incited by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and persuaded the people to go forth

from their territories with all their possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled all in valour, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are confined on every side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain which is [situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake of Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the Helvetii. From these circumstances it resulted that they could range less widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbours; for which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with great regret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.

III. — Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authority of Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary for their expedition — to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts of burden and waggons — to make their sowings as large as possible, so that on their march plenty of corn might be in store — and to establish peace and friendship with the neighbouring states. They reckoned that a term of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs; they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office of ambassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the son of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed the sovereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled “*friend*” by the senate of

the Roman people), to seize upon the sovereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, and he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and was exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives him his daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish their attempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself would obtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that the Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them that he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the sovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.

IV. — When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they, according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should await him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his cause, Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the court all his vassals to the number of ten thousand persons; and led together to the same place, and all his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a great number; by means of these he rescued himself from [the necessity of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was endeavouring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were mustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; and there is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having committed suicide.

V. — After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories.

When they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve — to their villages about four hundred — and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. They persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their neighbours, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their towns and villages, to set out with them: and they admit to their party and unite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the other side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, and assaulted Noreia.

VI. — There were in all two routes by which they could go forth from their country — one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one waggon at a time could be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so that a very few might easily intercept them); the other, through our Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of the Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the Helvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges, because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories. Having provided everything for the expedition, they appoint a day on which they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was

the fifth before the kalends of April [*i.e.* the 28th of March], in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B.C. 58].

VII. — When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make their route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city, and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a number of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one legion in Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors, the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius and Verudoctius held the chief place), to say “that it was their intention to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had” [according to their own representations] “no other route: — that they requested they might be allowed to do so with his consent.” Caesar, inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted; nor was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, he replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; if they wanted anything, they might return on the day before the ides of April [on April 12th].

VIII. — Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldiers who had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen [Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of sixteen feet, and a trench, from the lake of Geneva, which

flows into the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the ambassadors came, and they returned to him, he says that he cannot, consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant any one a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understand that, if they should attempt to use violence, he would oppose them. The Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage (some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed for the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the river was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night), but being kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse of the soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.

IX. — There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of the Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they send ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession they might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached to him by his kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair, and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each other — the Sequani

not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march — the Helvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage.

X. — It is again told Caesar that the Helvetii intend to march through the country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories of the Santones, which are not far distant from those boundaries of the Tolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If this took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these reasons he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of the fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the army in their march. After having routed these in several battles, he arrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province on the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither Province; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the first beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone.

XI. — The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as they could not defend themselves and their possessions against them, send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had at all times so well deserved of the Roman

people, that their fields ought not to have been laid waste — their children carried off into slavery — their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the same time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, apprise Caesar that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had been devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other side of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar and assure him that they had nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar, induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought not to wait until the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, should arrive among the Santones.

XII. — There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible slowness, that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction it flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined together. When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii had already conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but that the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set out from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them, encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed themselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was called the Tigurine; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four cantons. This single canton having left their country, within the recollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius the consul, and had made his army pass under the yoke [B.C. 107]. Thus, whether by chance, or by the design of

the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only the public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as Cassius himself.

XIII. — This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across the Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his sudden arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day what they themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, namely, the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him; at the head of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar: — that, “if the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be; but if he should persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought to remember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the characteristic valour of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that account to ascribe very much to his own valour, or despise them; that they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more on valour than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it to pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name, from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their army or transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity].”

XIV. — To these words Caesar thus replied: — that “on that very

account he felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done any wrong it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for that very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they aware that any offence had been given by them, on account of which they should be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid without cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in that they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their being astonished that they had so long committed their outrages with impunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him by them in order that he may be assured they will do what they promise, and provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages which they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them.” Divico replied, that “the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors that they were accustomed to receive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Roman people were witness.” Having given this reply, he withdrew.

XV. — On the following day they move their camp from that

place; Caesar does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and from the Aedui and their allies), to observe towards what parts the enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated with this battle because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six miles between the enemy's rear and our van.

XVI. — Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn which they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequence of the coldness (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards the north), not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was not in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he was unable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the river Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, had diverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day to day, and saying that it was being “collected — brought in — on the road.” When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers, — having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested with the chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the Vergobretus, and who is

elected annually, and has power of life and death over his countrymen), he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by them on so urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when [corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularly as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the war; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain of his being forsaken.

XVII. — Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what he had hitherto kept secret: — that “there are some whose influence with the people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than the magistrates themselves: that these by seditious and violent language are deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought to supply; [by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain the supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gauls than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men [said he] are our plans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that they could not be restrained by *him*: nay more, he was well aware that, though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent as long as he could.”

XVIII. — Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that these matters should be discussed while so many were present, he speedily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him when alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He [Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He

[Caesar] makes inquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovers that it is all true; that “Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring, in great favour with the people on account of his liberality, a man eager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the habit of contracting for the customs and all the other taxes of the Aedui at a small cost, because when *he* bids, no one dares to bid against him. By these means he has both increased his own private property and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains constantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among the neighbouring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he has himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his sister by the mother’s side and his female relations in marriage into other states; that he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii on account of this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own account, because by their arrival his power was weakened, and his brother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of influence and dignity: that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertains the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii, but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not only of royalty but even of that influence which he already has.” Caesar discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagement which had taken place a few days before, that the commencement of that flight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in command of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); that by their flight the rest of the cavalry was dismayed.

XIX. — After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions the most unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that hostages should be mutually given; that he had done all these things, not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's, but even without their [the Aedui] knowing anything of it themselves; that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the Aedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason why he should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing [however] stood in the way of all this — that he had learned by experience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman people, his great affection towards him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment of this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before he attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with him through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in everything; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and shows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own presence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to his feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so.

XX.-Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many tears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his brother; saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and that nobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did;

for when he himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home and in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on account of his youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power and strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus] popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced both by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if anything very severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think that it had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a place in Caesar's friendship; from which circumstance it would arise that the affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great that he forgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in his brother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him what he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he pardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he communicates.

XXI. — Being on the same day informed by his scouts that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, he sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back that it was easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and with those as

guides who had examined the road; he explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts.

XXII. — At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascertained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him — says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three miles from theirs.

XXIII. — The next day (as there remained in all only two days' space [to the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the

largest and best-stored town of the Aedui) he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined battle; or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut off from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began to pursue and to annoy our men in the rear.

XXIV. — Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in such a manner that he placed above him on the very summit the two legions which he had lately levied in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, having followed with all their waggons, collected their baggage into one place: they themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx, advanced up to our front line in very close order.

XXV. — Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. His soldiers, hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a

charge on them with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the (Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the buckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. At length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and as there was in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the first and second line to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field; the third to receive those who were just arriving.

XXVI. — Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and waggons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [*i.e.* 12 (noon) — 1 P.M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night, for they had set waggons in the way as a rampart, and from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some from

between the waggons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken. After that battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men, having stopped for three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist them with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assist them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After the three days' interval he began to follow them himself with all his forces.

XXVII. — The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sent ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him in the way and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone had with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await his arrival, in the place where they then were, they obeyed his commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things are being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000 men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by fear, lest, after delivering up their arms, they should suffer punishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed that, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves, *their* flight might either be concealed or entirely overlooked, having at night-fall departed out of

the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

XXVIII. — But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those through whose territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to bring them back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and considered them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all the rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, and deserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to return to their territories from which they had come, and as there was at home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the productions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did, chiefly on this account, because he was unwilling that the country, from which the Helvetii had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on account of the excellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories into those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gaul and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that they might settle the Boii, in their own (*i.e.* in the Aeduan) territories, as these were known to be of distinguished valour to whom they gave lands, and whom they afterwards admitted to the same state of rights and freedom as themselves.

XXIX. — In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old men, and the women, separately.

Of all which items the total was:-

Of the *Helvetii* [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000

Of the *Tulingi* 36,000

Of the *Latobrigi* 14,000

Of the *Rauraci* 23,000

Of the *Boii* 32,000

— —

The sum of all amounted to 368,000

Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92,000. When the *census* of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.

XXX. — When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the Helvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance, that spot for an abode which they should judge to be the most convenient and most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states as tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having been granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an

oath with each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations] except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the general assembly.

XXXI. — When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged and earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed than that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch as they saw that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to the greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:— “That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [*i.e.* of the Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and savage men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement and the abundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they had been routed and had sustained a great calamity — had lost all their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, both from their own valour and from the Roman people's hospitality and friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind

their state by an oath, that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid from the Roman people, nor refuse to be for ever under their sway and empire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui who could not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as hostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to the senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath nor hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than the vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settled in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be provided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would all be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the land of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on a level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took place at Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demand as hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on them every kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod or pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that the Helvetii had done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek another dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be disclosed to

Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he would inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his own influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name of the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from the outrages of Ariovistus.”

XXXII. — When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down, gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this conduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but silently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that— “the lot of the Sequani was more wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he were present; for, to the rest, despite of everything, there was an opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and whose towns were all in his power.”

XXXIII. — Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds of the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus, induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his oppression. After delivering this speech, he

dismissed the assembly; and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think that this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the senate “brethren” and “kinsmen,” were held in the thralldom and dominion of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That, moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw [would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged that wild and savage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they had possessed themselves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separated the Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he ought to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance that he was felt to be quite insufferable.

XXXIV. — He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state-business and matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything from Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anything from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of, nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together to one place; that to

him, moreover, it appeared strange what business either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he had conquered in war.

XXXV. — When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors to him a second time with this message “Since, after having been treated with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in his consulship [B.C. 59] been styled ‘king and friend’ by the senate), he makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz.] that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that it concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutual interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul; in the next place, that he restore the hostages which he has from the Aedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would accordingly do this,” [Caesar says] that “he himself and the Roman people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favour and friendship towards him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires], that he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso [B.C. 61] the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so consistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people) will not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui.”

XXXVI. — To this Ariovistus replied, that “the right of war was, that they who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in what manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman

people were wont to govern the nations which they had conquered, not according to the dictation of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he for his part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which they were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the Roman people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had tried the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, had become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him; that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not make war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by that which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they did *not* continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers' would avail them nought. As to Caesar's threatening him that he would not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one had ever entered into a contest with *him* [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feel what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond all others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could achieve by their valour."

XXXVII. — At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar, ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul, were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things, Caesar thought that he ought to use all

despatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus] might be less easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as he could, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced marches.

XXXVIII. — When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought to take the greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with a pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town, stations a garrison there.

XXXIX. — Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature, of incredible valour and practice in arms, that oftentimes they, on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the fierceness of their eyes) — so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar

from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in consequence of their fear.

XL. — When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely reprimanded them, “particularly for supposing that it belonged to them to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar’s] consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was persuaded that, when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms considered, he

would reject neither his nor the Roman people's favour. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of? — or why should they despair either of their own valour or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy; during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it, — inasmuch as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet cannot have been a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valour. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a pretence about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust

their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honour and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort." — This legion Caesar had both greatly favoured, and in it, on account of its valour, placed the greatest confidence.

XLI.—Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardour and eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most favourable opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavoured, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they had never either doubted or

feared, or supposed that the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, [he found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four and twenty miles distant from ours.

XLII. — Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to think that he was now returning to a rational state of mind, as he spontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him when requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own and the Roman people's great favours towards him, the issue would be that he would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference, [saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would not come on any other condition." Caesar, as he neither wished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided that it would be most expedient

to take away from the Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion said, not without a touch of humour, “that Caesar did more for them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion in place of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse.”

XLIII. — There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference. Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that they should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they were come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the senate’s favours towards him [Ariovistus], “in that he had been styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate — in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been bestowed in consideration of important personal services; that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the request, had obtained these honours through the kindness and munificence of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how just were the grounds of connexion that existed between themselves [the Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been passed in their favour, and how frequent and how

honourable; how from time immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even [said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and friends should lose none of their property, but be advanced in influence, dignity, and honour: who then could endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people, should be torn from them?" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the ambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon the Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that, if he could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, he should at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine.

XLIV. — Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; but expatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations and great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been given by their own good-will; that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and had encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it with

that expectation. But if through the Roman people the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire? — why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains? — that this was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if he were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we were unjust to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to the Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles which the Aedui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in Gaul; was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that unless he depart, and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would please many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance of that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase the favour and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to him the free

possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him.”

XLV. — Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: “why he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman people’s practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded — then was the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws.”

XLVI. — While these things are being transacted in the conference, it was announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said that they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference,

a much greater alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.

XLVII. — Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state “that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded”; [and to beg] that “he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or, if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his [officers] as an ambassador to him.” There did not appear to Caesar any good reason for holding a conference; and the more so as the day before the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He thought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one of his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed [therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germans would have no motive for committing violence; and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his army, “Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose of acting as spies?” He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast them into chains.

XLVIII. — The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill six miles from Caesar’s camp. The day following he led his forces past Caesar’s camp, and encamped two miles

beyond him; with this design — that he might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions which might be conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this. There were 6000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance farther: than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with their speed.

XLIX. — Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped, at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry; which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The camp being fortified,

he left there two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.

L. — The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even then come out [from their entrenchments], he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the reason — that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and divination whether it were expedient that the battle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, “that it was not the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new moon.”

LI. — The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that [thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and waggons, that no hope might be left in

flight. On these they placed their women, who, with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

LII. — Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry — as he was more disengaged than those who were employed in the fight — sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

LIII. — Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying on their strength, endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procured their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a small vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom he had brought with him from

home; the other a Norican, the sister of king Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had not diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by his destruction. He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots had been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time: that by the favour of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and brought back to him [Caesar].

LIV. — This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. He appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.

BOOK II

I. — While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a third part of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people, and giving hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacy were these — first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul was subdued, our army would be led against them; secondly, because they were instigated by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the one hand] they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer in Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the Roman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and others of them, from a natural instability and fickleness of disposition, were anxious for a revolution; [the Belgae were instigated] by several, also, because the government in Gaul was generally seized upon by the more powerful persons and by those who had the means of hiring troops, and they could less easily effect this object under our dominion.

II. — Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions in Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul. He himself, as soon as there began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. He gives a commission to the Senones and the other Gauls who were neighbours of the Belgae, to learn what is going on amongst them [*i.e.* the Belgae], and inform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that troops were being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place. Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding towards them, and having

provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about fifteen days arrives at the territories of the Belgae.

III. — As he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than any one anticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic] Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of] the principal persons of the state, as their ambassadors: to tell him that they surrendered themselves and all their possessions to the protection and disposal of the Roman people: and that they had neither combined with the rest of the Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman people: and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him into their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things; that all the rest of the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on this side the Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and that so great was the infatuation of them all that they could not restrain even the Suessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights, and the same laws, and who have one government and one magistracy [in common] with themselves, from uniting with them.

IV. — When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what they could do in war, he received the following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung from the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their territories; the effect of which was that, from the recollection of those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters. The

Remi said that they had known accurately everything respecting their number, because, being united to them by neighbourhood and by alliances, they had learnt what number each state had in the general council of the Belgae promised for that war. That the Bellovaci were the most powerful amongst them in valour, influence, and number of men; that these could muster 100,000 armed men, [and had] promised 60,000 picked men out of that number, and demanded for themselves the command of the whole war. That the Suessiones were their nearest neighbours and possessed a very extensive and fertile country; that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus, the most powerful man of all Gaul, had been king; who had held the government of a great part of these regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at present was Galba; that the direction of the whole war was conferred by the consent of all upon him, on account of his integrity and prudence; that they had twelve towns; that they had promised 50,000 armed men; and that the Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them, and are situated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; the Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapu, 9000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many; the Aduatuci, 19,000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans, [had promised], they thought, to the number of 40,000.

V. — Caesar, having encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children of their chief men to be brought to him as hostages; all which commands they punctually performed by the day [appointed]. He, addressing himself to Divitiacus the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points out how much it concerns the republic and their

common security, that the forces of the enemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to engage with so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might be effected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the territories of the Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these instructions he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived that all the forces of the Belgae, which had been collected in one place, were approaching towards him, and learnt from the scouts whom he had sent out, and [also] from the Remi, that they were not then far distant, he hastened to lead his army over the Aisne, which is on the borders of the Remi, and there pitched his camp. This position fortified one side of his camp by the banks of the river, rendered the country which lay in his rear secure from the enemy, and furthermore ensured that provisions might without danger be brought to him by the Remi and the rest of the states. Over that river was a bridge: there he places a guard; and on the other side of the river he leaves Q. Titurus Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with a rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth.

VI. — There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant from this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack with great vigour. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the wall has been stript of its defenders, [then], forming a testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were casting stones and darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon the wall. When night had put an

end to the assault, Iccius, who was then in command of the town, one of the Remi, a man of the highest rank and influence amongst his people, and one of those who had come to Caesar as ambassador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers to him, [to report] “That, unless assistance were sent to him, he could not hold out any longer.”

VII. — Thither immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian slingers as a relief to the townspeople, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with the hope of [making good their] defence was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste the country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they could approach had been burnt, they hastened with all their forces to the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of it]; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than eight miles in breadth.

VIII. — Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on account of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished reputation for valour: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain by frequent trials what the enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and suitable for marshalling an army (since the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the space which the marshalled army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in front gradually sank to the plain), on either side

of that hill he drew a cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of that trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after he had marshalled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which they had brought out of the camp.

IX. — There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this; our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the meantime battle was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse [proving] favourable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has been stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavoured to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge; but, if they could not do that, they should lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great use to us in carrying on the war, and might hinder our men from foraging.

X. — Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens towards them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a

great part of them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over their bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for each to return to his country, and resolved to assemble from all quarters to defend those into whose territories the Romans should first march an army; that they might contend in their own rather than in a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provisions which they possessed at home. Together with other causes, this consideration also led them to that resolution, viz.: that they had learnt that Divitiacus and the Aedui were approaching the territories of the Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay any longer, or to deter them from conveying succour to their own people.

XI. — That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at the second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambushade, because he had not yet discovered for what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered T.

Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they were fleeing; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded.

XII. — On the day following, before the enemy could recover from their terror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of the Suessiones, which are next to the Remi, and having accomplished a long march, hastens to the town named Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it by storm on his march, because he heard that it was destitute of [sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry it by assault, on account of the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall, though few were defending it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began to bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever things were necessary for the storm. In the meantime, the whole body of the Suessiones, after their flight, came the next night into the town. The vineae having been quickly brought up against the town, a mound thrown up, and towers built, the Gauls, amazed by the greatness of the works, such as they had neither seen nor heard of before, and struck, also, by the despatch of the Romans, send ambassadors to Caesar respecting a surrender, and succeed in consequence of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones] might be spared.

XIII. — Caesar, having received as hostages the first men of the state, and even the two sons of king Galba himself; and all the arms in the town having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who, when they had conveyed themselves and all their possessions into the town called Bratuspantium, and Caesar with his army was about five miles distant from that town, all the old men, going out of the town, began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and to intimate by their voice that they would throw themselves on his protection and power, nor would contend in arms against the Roman people. In like manner, when he had come up to the town, and there pitched his camp, the boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched hands, after their custom, begged peace from the Romans.

XIV. — For these Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of the Belgae, having dismissed the troops of the Aedui, he had returned to Caesar). “The Bellovaci had at all times been in the alliance and friendship of the Aeduan state; that they had revolted from the Aedui and made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto by their nobles, who said that the Aedui, reduced to slavery by Caesar, were suffering every indignity and insult. That they who had been the leaders of that plot, because they perceived how great a calamity they had brought upon the state, had fled into Britain. That not only the Bellovaci, but also the Aedui, entreated him to use his [accustomed] clemency and lenity towards them [the Bellovaci]: which if he did, he would increase the influence of the Aedui among all the Belgae, by whose succour and resources they had been accustomed to support themselves whenever any wars occurred.”

XV. — Caesar said that on account of his respect for Divitiacus and the Aeduans, he would receive them into his protection, and

would spare them; but, because the state was of great influence among the Belgae, and pre-eminent in the number of its population, he demanded 600 hostages. When these were delivered, and all the arms in the town collected, he went from that place into the territories of the Ambiani, who, without delay, surrendered themselves and all their possessions. Upon their territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character and customs when Caesar inquired he received the following information: — That “there was no access for merchants to them; that they suffered no wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported; because they thought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courage impaired: that they were a savage people and of great bravery: that they upbraided and condemned the rest of the Belgae who had surrendered themselves to the Roman people and thrown aside their national courage: that they openly declared they would neither send ambassadors, nor accept any condition of peace.”

XVI. — After he had made three days’ march through their territories, he discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp: that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbours, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

XVII. — Having learnt these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great

many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learnt from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can), in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbours if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them.

XVIII. — The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and open from about 200 paces at the lowest part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy

to see through it into the interior. Within those woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet.

XIX. — Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van] six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the meantime the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage-train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp and to those who were employed in the

works.

XX. — Caesar had everything to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill and experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive information from others; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever appeared proper.

XXI. — Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever quarter fortune carried him to animate the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no further speech than that “they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valour, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy”; as the latter were not farther from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing battle. And having gone to another quarter for the purpose of encouraging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was the shortness of the time, and so determined was

the mind of the enemy on fighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing the military insignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off the covers from the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from the works (in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the time for fighting.

XXII. — The army having been marshalled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than as the method and order of military matters required; whilst the legions in the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavourable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed.

XXIII. — The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them), who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavouring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the

river. But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened towards that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment.

XXIV. — At the same time our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had been with those who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; and the camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate and from the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to flight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the baggage-train; and they (affrighted) were carried some one way, some another. By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri were much alarmed (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, the camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train.

XXV. — Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed,

and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion, P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand], though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up; having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, whilst every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked.

XXVI. — Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with a double front; which having been done, since they brought assistance the one

to the other, nor feared lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. In the meantime, the soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learnt from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the commander were involved, left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch.

XXVI. — By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leant on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour blot out the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen between [the armies]; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had

rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult.

XXVIII. — This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii being almost reduced to annihilation, their old men, whom together with the boys and women we have stated to have been collected together in the fenny places and marshes, on this battle having been reported to them, since they were convinced that nothing was an obstacle to the conquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, sent ambassadors to Caesar by the consent of all who remained, and surrendered themselves to him; and in recounting the calamity of their state, said that their senators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60,000 men they [were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that he might appear to use compassion towards the wretched and the suppliant, most carefully spared; and ordered them to enjoy their own territories and towns, and commanded their neighbours that they should restrain themselves and their dependants from offering injury or outrage [to them].

XXIX. — When the Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battle being reported to them, they returned home after they were on the march; deserting all their towns and forts, they conveyed together all their possessions into one town, eminently fortified by nature. While this town had on all sides around it very high rocks and precipices, there was left on one side a gently ascending approach, of not more than 200 feet in width; which place they had fortified with a very lofty double wall: besides, they had placed stones of great weight and sharpened stakes upon the walls. They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, when they were marching into our province and Italy, having deposited on this side the river Rhine such of their baggage-trains as they could not drive or convey with

them, left 6000 of their men as a guard and defence for them. These having, after the destruction of their countrymen, been harassed for many years by their neighbours, while one time they waged war offensively, and at another resisted it when waged against them, concluded a peace with the consent of all, and chose this place as their settlement.

XXX. — And on the first arrival of our army they made frequent sallies from the town, and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes: afterwards, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet [in height], and fifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves within the town. When, vineae having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed that a tower also was being built at a distance, they at first began to mock the Romans from their wall, and to taunt them with the following speeches. “For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed at so great a distance?” “With what hands,” or “with what strength did they, especially [as they were] men of such very small stature” (for our shortness of stature, in comparison with the great size of their bodies, is generally a subject of much contempt to the men of Gaul), “trust to place against their walls a tower of such great weight.”

XXXI. — But when they saw that it was being moved, and was approaching their walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed sight, they sent ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace; who spoke in the following manner: “That they did not believe the Romans waged war without divine aid, since they were able to move forward machines of such a height with so great speed, and thus fight from close quarters: that they resigned themselves and all their possessions to [Caesar’s] disposal: that they begged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if perchance, agreeably to his clemency and

humanity, which they had heard of from others, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he would not deprive them of their arms; that all their neighbours were enemies to them and envied their courage, from whom they could not defend themselves if their arms were delivered up: that it was better for them, if they should be reduced to that state, to suffer any fate from the Roman people, than to be tortured to death by those among whom they had been accustomed to rule.”

XXXII. — To these things Caesar replied, “That he, in accordance with his custom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if they should surrender themselves before the battering-ram should touch the wall; but that there was no condition of surrender, except upon their arms being delivered up; that he should do to them that which he had done in the case of the Nervii, and would command their neighbours not to offer any injury to those who had surrendered to the Roman people.” The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said that they would execute his commands. Having cast a very large quantity of their arms from the wall into the trench which was before the town, so that the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and the rampart, and nevertheless having retained and concealed, as we afterwards discovered, about a third part in the town, the gates were opened, and they enjoyed peace for that day.

XXXIII. — Towards evening Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to go out of the town, lest the townspeople should receive any injury from them by night. They [the Aduatuci], by a design before entered into, as we afterwards understood, because they believed that, as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss their guards, or at least would keep watch less carefully,

partly with those arms which they had retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark or interwoven wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins (as the shortness of time required) in the third watch, suddenly made a sally from the town with all their forces [in that direction] in which the ascent to our fortifications seemed the least difficult. The signal having been immediately given by fires, as Caesar had previously commanded, a rush was made thither [*i.e.* by the Roman soldiers] from the nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the enemy as vigorously as it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope of safety, in a disadvantageous place, and against those who were throwing their weapons from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety depended on their courage alone. About 4000 of the men having been slain, the rest were forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breaking open the gates, which there was no one then to defend, and sending in our soldiers, sold the whole spoil of that town. The number of 53,000 persons was reported to him by those who had bought them.

XXXIV. — At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are maritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic] ocean, that all these nations were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.

XXXV. — These things being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so high an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians, that ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations who dwelt beyond the Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and execute his commands. Which embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italy and Illyricum, ordered to return

to him at the beginning of the following summer. He himself, having led his legions into winter-quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, which states were close to those regions in which he had waged war, set out for Italy; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was decreed for those achievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an honour] which before that time had been conferred on none.

BOOK III

I. — When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, the Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges, and the lake of Geneva, and the river Rhone to the top of the Alps. The reason for sending him was, that he desired that the pass along the Alps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel with great danger, and under great imposts, should be opened. He permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba having fought some successful battles, and stormed several of their forts, upon ambassadors being sent to him from all parts and hostages given and a peace concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to winter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by a river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.

II. — When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had ordered corn to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scouts that all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town which he had given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hung over it were occupied by a very large force of the Sedani and Veragri. It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the design of renewing the war and cutting off that

legion. First, because they despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and that not quite full (two cohorts having been detached, and several individuals being absent, who had been despatched for the purpose of seeking provision); then, likewise, because they thought that on account of the disadvantageous character of the situation, even their first attack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To this was added, that they were indignant that their children were torn from them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite those parts to the neighbouring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the passes, but also as a constant possession.

III. — Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of the winter quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was sufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions (since, as a surrender had been made, and hostages received, he had thought he need entertain no apprehension of a war), speedily summoning a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council, since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the general expectation, and almost all the higher places were seen already covered with a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops come to their relief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [by the enemy]; safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this sort were delivered; that, “leaving their baggage, and making a sally, they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had come thither.” To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving that measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and to

defend the camp.

IV. — A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from all parts, and discharged stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men at first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were over-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went out of the action, and others with fresh strength came in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing to the smallness of their number; and not only was permission not given to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been stationed, and recover.

V. — When they had now been fighting for more than six hours, without cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men, and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last extremity, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we have related to have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagement with the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man of great skill and valour, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only hope of safety lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon, assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders to the soldiers to discontinue the fight a short time, and only collect the weapons flung [at them], and

recruit themselves after their fatigue, and afterwards, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, and place in their valour all their hope of safety.

VI. — They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from all the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowing what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking a turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had entertained the hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more than the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men (which number of the barbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flight the rest when panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even upon the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp and fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was unwilling to tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come into winter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with a different state of affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of corn and provision, having the next day burned all the buildings of that village, he hastens to return into the province; and as no enemy opposed or hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the [country of the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there wintered.

VII. — These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae being overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a knowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in

Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border upon the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in those parts, sent out some officers of cavalry and several military tribunes amongst the neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn and provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent amongst the Esubii; M. Trebius Gallus amongst the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, with T. Silius, amongst the Veneti.

VIII. — The influence of this state is by far the most considerable of any of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti both have a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed to sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and experience of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in possession, they hold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their detaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that they should recover by their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus. The neighbouring people, led on by their influence (as the measures of the Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same motive; and quickly sending ambassadors, by means of their leading men, they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by general consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the other states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they had received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. All the sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send a common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], “If he wished to receive back his officers, let him send back to them their hostages.”

IX. — Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the meantime on the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from the province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being quickly executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits, hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other states also, being informed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great a crime they had committed, in that the ambassadors (a character which had amongst all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been detained and thrown into prison, resolve to prepare for a war in proportion to the greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those things which appertain to the service of a navy; with the greater confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situation. They knew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that the approach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of the localities, [and] the small number of the harbours, and they trusted that our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on account of the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all these things should turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in their navy. They, well understood that the Romans neither had any number of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbours, or the islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; and that navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in the vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify their towns, convey corn into them from the country parts, bring together as many ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on the war. They unite to themselves as allies for that war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the

Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and send for auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated over against those regions.

X. — There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, in carrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that war; the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Roman knights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt after hostages were given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally, lest if [the conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nations should think that the same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since he reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by nature, love liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to divide and more widely distribute his army, before more states should join the confederation.

XI. — He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to the Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit the Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance and repel the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae to their aid) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a great number of the cavalry, lest auxiliaries should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations be united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with three legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to take care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest. He appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vessels which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni, and the other provinces which remained at

peace; and commands him to proceed towards the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens thither with the land forces.

XII. — The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed on extreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had an approach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which always happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed upon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance, was the storming of their towns rendered difficult; and if at any time perchance the Veneti, overpowered by the greatness of our works (the sea having been excluded by a mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal in height to the walls of the town), had begun to despair of their fortunes, bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a very great quantity, they carried off all their property and betook themselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended themselves by the same advantages of situation. They did this the more easily during a great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms, and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea, with its strong tides and its harbours far apart and exceedingly few in number.

XIII. — For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. The keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows were raised very high, and in like manner the sterns were adapted to the force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb; the anchors were secured fast by iron

chains instead of cables, and for sails they used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either through their want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, or for this reason, which is more probable, that they thought that such storms of the ocean, and such violent gales of wind could not be resisted by sails, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enough managed by them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships was of such a nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of the oars; other things, considering the nature of the place [and] the violence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted on their side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their beaks (so great was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weapon easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readily locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began to rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the storm more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the tide feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things was much to be dreaded by our ships.

XIV. — Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much labour was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not be prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be done them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully equipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailed forth from the harbour, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that damage could not be done by their beaks; and

that, although turrets were built [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our] lower position with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When the ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the masts were caught by them and pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarily fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire management of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest of the contest depended on courage; in which our men decidedly had the advantage; and the more so because the whole action was carried on in the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little more valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and higher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea, were occupied by our army.

XV. — The sail-yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being brought down, although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded each one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board the ships of the enemy: and, after the barbarians observed this taking place, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for that evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the wind blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could not move out of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune for finishing

the business; for our men gave chase and took them one by one, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by the intervention of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lasted almost from the fourth hour till sunset.

XVI. — By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more advanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in that battle; and they had collected in that one place whatever naval forces they had anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had no place to retreat to, nor means of defending their towns. They accordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the more severely, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors might be more carefully respected, by barbarians: having, therefore, put to death all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves.

XVII. — While these things are going on amongst the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in the territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and held the chief command of all those states which had revolted: from which he had collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and the Sexovii, having slain their senate because they would not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [against us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude besides of desperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from husbandry and their daily labour. Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything; while

Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even to the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the following reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with so great a force, especially while he who held the chief command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favourable circumstance presented itself.

XVIII. — After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and promises to go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished to be done. Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed from this — that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for the purpose of carrying [him] assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together that an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not to be thrown away; that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things persuaded the Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want of provisions, for a supply of which they had not taken the requisite precautions; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and [also] because in most cases men willingly believe what they wish.

Influenced by these things, they do not discharge Viridovix and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission from them to take up arms and hasten to [our] camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.

XIX. — The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed (in order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates [of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by the unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of our soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could not stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs: and our men with full vigour followed them while disordered, and slew a great number of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.

XX. — About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania (which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul), understanding that he was to wage war in these parts,

where a few years before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant, had been killed, and his army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used by him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that border on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their strength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly display their infantry forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men [while] disordered, and renewed the fight.

XXI. — The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates, relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valour; [and] our men, on the other hand, desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without their general and without the other legions, under a very young commander; at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the [principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a sally, at another forming mines to our rampart and vineae (at which the Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places amongst them there are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could be gained by these operations through the perseverance of our men, they send ambassadors to

Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up their arms, comply.

XXII. — And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devoted followers, whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association are these, — that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitous happen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them, or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been found any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavouring to make a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of the fortification, and a fierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into the town, yet he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the same terms of surrender [as the other inhabitants].

XXIII. — Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the barbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified by the nature of the place and by art had been taken by us in a few days after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on whose arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole period [of his war in Spain] and were supposed to have very great skill in military matters, are chosen

leaders. These, adopting the practice of the Roman people, begin to select [advantageous] places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on account of their small number, could not safely be separated; that the enemy both made excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard for their camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not very conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.

XXIV. — Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and marshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the centre, and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They, although on account of their great number and their ancient renown in war, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safely fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any wound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. This measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and by the reputation [*i.e.* for cowardice arising thence] had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks of all were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made in going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of the

enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.

XXV. — There, while some were filling up the ditch, and others, by throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from the rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not much rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the soldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance and character of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were fighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from their higher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone round the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had an easy approach.

XXVI. — Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to animate their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what he wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having brought out the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a somewhat longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy, when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly arrived at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, having demolished these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen by them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a shout being heard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited (which usually occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight more vigorously. The enemy, surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs being despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over the ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued over the very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of the number of

50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp.

XXVII. — Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was at hand, neglected to do this.

XXVIII. — About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past, yet since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. When Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begun to fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the meantime seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuing them too far through those intricate places.

XXIX. — During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed

together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage-train were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all their country, [and] having burnt their villages and houses, Caesar led back his army and stationed them in winter-quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.

BOOK IV

I.-The following winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls), those Germans [called] the Usipetes, and likewise the Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Rhine, not far from the place at which that river discharges itself into the sea. The motive for crossing [that river] was that, having been for several years harassed by the Suevi, they were constantly engaged in war, and hindered from the pursuits of agriculture. The nation of the Suevi is by far the largest and the most warlike nation of all the Germans. They are said to possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they yearly send from their territories for the purpose of war a thousand armed men: the others who remain at home, maintain [both] themselves and those engaged in the expedition. The latter again, in their turn, are in arms the year after: the former remain at home. Thus neither husbandry nor the art and practice of war are neglected. But among them there exists no private and separate land; nor are they permitted to remain more than one year in one place for the purpose of residence. They do not live much on corn, but subsist for the most part on milk and flesh, and are much [engaged] in hunting; which circumstance must, by the nature of their food, and by their daily exercise and the freedom of their life (for having from boyhood been accustomed to no employment, or discipline, they do nothing at all contrary to their inclination), both promote their strength and render them men of vast stature of body. And to such a habit have they brought themselves, that even in the coldest parts they wear no clothing whatever except skins, by reason of the scantiness of which a great portion of their body is bare, and besides they bathe in open rivers.

II. — Merchants have access to them rather that they may have persons to whom they may sell those things which they have taken in war, than because they need any commodity to be imported to them. Moreover, even as to labouring cattle, in which the Gauls take the greatest pleasure, and which they procure at a great price, the Germans do not employ such as are imported, but those poor and ill-shaped animals which belong to their country; these, however, they render capable of the greatest labour by daily exercise. In cavalry actions they frequently leap from their horses and fight on foot; and train their horses to stand still in the very spot on which they leave them, to which they retreat with great activity when there is occasion; nor, according to their practice, is anything regarded as more unseemly, or more unmanly, than to use housings. Accordingly, they have the courage, though they be themselves but few, to advance against any number whatever of horse mounted with housings. They on no account permit wine to be imported to them, because they consider that men degenerate in their powers of enduring fatigue, and are rendered effeminate by that commodity.

III. — They esteem it their greatest praise as a nation that the lands about their territories lie unoccupied to a very great extent, inasmuch as [they think] that by this circumstance is indicated that a great number of nations cannot, withstand their power; and thus on one side of the Suevi the lands are said to lie desolate for about six hundred miles. On the other side they border on the Ubii, whose state was large and flourishing, considering the condition of the Germans, and who are somewhat more refined than those of the same race and the rest [of the Germans], and that because they border on the Rhine, and are much resorted to by merchants, and are accustomed to the manners of the Gauls, by reason of their proximity to them.

Though the Suevi, after making the attempt frequently and in several wars, could not expel this nation from their territories, on account of the extent and population of their state, yet they made them tributaries, and rendered them less distinguished and powerful [than they had ever been].

IV. — In the same condition were the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri (whom we have mentioned above), who for many years resisted the power of the Suevi, but being at last driven from their possessions, and having wandered through many parts of Germany, came to the Rhine, to districts which the Menapii inhabited, and where they had lands, houses, and villages on either side of the river. The latter people, alarmed by the arrival of so great a multitude, removed from those houses which they had on the other side of the river, and having placed guards on this side the Rhine, proceeded to hinder the Germans from crossing. They, finding themselves, after they had tried all means, unable either to force a passage on account of their deficiency in shipping, or cross by stealth on account of the guards of the Menapii, pretended to return to their own settlements and districts; and, after having proceeded three days' march, returned; and their cavalry having performed the whole of this journey in one night, cut off the Menapii, who were ignorant of, and did not expect [their approach, and] who, having moreover been informed of the departure of the Germans by their scouts, had without apprehension returned to their villages beyond the Rhine. Having slain these, and seized their ships, they crossed the river before that part of the Menapii, who were at peace in their settlements over the Rhine, were apprised of [their intention]; and seizing all their houses, maintained themselves upon their provisions during the rest of the winter.

V. — Caesar, when informed of these matters, fearing the fickle

disposition of the Gauls, who are easily prompted to take up resolutions, and much addicted to change, considered that nothing was to be entrusted to them; for it is the custom of that people to compel travellers to stop, even against their inclination, and inquire what they may have heard, or may know, respecting any matter; and in towns the common people throng around merchants and force them to state from what countries they come, and what affairs they know of there. They often engage in resolutions concerning the most important matters, induced by these reports and stories alone; of which they must necessarily instantly repent, since they yield to mere unauthorised reports; and since most people give to their questions answers framed agreeably to their wishes.

VI. — Caesar, being aware of their custom, in order that he might not encounter a more formidable war, sets forward to the army earlier in the year than he was accustomed to do. When he had arrived there, he discovered that those things, which he had suspected would occur, had taken place; that embassies had been sent to the Germans by some of the states, and that they had been entreated to leave the Rhine, and had been promised that all things which they desired should be provided by the Gauls. Allured by this hope, the Germans were then making excursions to greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri. After summoning the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretend ignorance of the things which he had discovered; and having conciliated and confirmed their minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised, resolved to make war against the Germans.

VII. — Having provided corn and selected his cavalry, he began to direct his march towards those parts in which he heard the

Germans were. When he was distant from them only a few days' march, ambassadors come to him from their state; whose speech was as follows:— "That the Germans neither make war upon the Roman people first, nor do they decline, if they are provoked, to engage with them in arms; for that this was the custom of the Germans handed down to them from their forefathers, to resist whatsoever people make war upon them and not to avert it by entreaty; this, however, they confessed, — that they had come hither reluctantly, having been expelled from their country. If the Romans were disposed to accept their friendship, they might be serviceable allies to them; and let them either assign them lands, or permit them to retain those which they had acquired by their arms; that they are inferior to the Suevi alone, to whom not even the immortal gods can show themselves equal; that there was none at all besides on earth whom they could not conquer."

VIII. — To these remarks Caesar replied in such terms as he thought proper; but the conclusion of his speech was, "That he could make no alliance with them, if they continued in Gaul; that it was not probable that they who were not able to defend their own territories, should get possession of those of others, nor were there any lands lying waste in Gaul which could be given away, especially to so great a number of men, without doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if they were desirous, settle in the territories of the Ubii; whose ambassadors were then with him, and were complaining of the aggressions of the Suevi, and requesting assistance from him; and that he would obtain this request from them."

IX. — The ambassadors said that they would report these things to their countrymen; and, after having deliberated on the matter, would return to Caesar after the third day, they begged that he would

not in the meantime advance his camp nearer to them. Caesar said that he could not grant them even that; for he had learned that they had sent a great part of their cavalry over the Meuse to the Ambivariti, some days before, for the purpose of plundering and procuring forage. He supposed that they were then waiting for these horse, and that the delay was caused on this account.

X. — The Meuse rises from mount Le Vosge, which is in the territories of the Lingones; and, having received a branch of the Rhine, which is called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi, and not more than eighty miles from it it falls into the ocean. But the Rhine takes its course among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and is carried with a rapid current for a long distance through the territories of the Sarunates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, and when it approaches the ocean, divides into several branches; and, having formed many and extensive islands, a great part of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous nations (of whom there are some who are supposed to live on fish and the eggs of sea-fowl), flows into the ocean by several mouths.

XI. — When Caesar was not more than twelve miles distant from the enemy, the ambassadors return to him, as had been arranged; who meeting him on the march, earnestly entreated him not to advance any farther. When they could not obtain this, they begged him to send on a despatch to those who had marched in advance of the main army, and forbid them to engage; and grant them permission to send ambassadors to the Ubii, and if the princes and senate of the latter would give them security by oath, they assured Caesar that they would accept such conditions as might be proposed by him; and requested that he would give them the space of three days for negotiating these affairs. Caesar thought that these things tended to

the self-same point [as their other proposal]; [namely] that, in consequence of a delay of three days intervening, their horse which were at a distance might return; however, he said, that he would not that day advance farther than four miles for the purpose of procuring water; he ordered that they should assemble at that place in as large a number as possible the following day, that he might inquire into their demands. In the meantime he sends messengers to the officers who had marched in advance with all the cavalry to order them not to provoke the enemy to an engagement, and if they themselves were assailed, to sustain the attack until he came up with the army.

XII. — But the enemy, as soon as they saw our horse, the number of which was 5000, whereas they themselves had not more than 800 horse, because those which had gone over the Meuse for the purpose of foraging had not returned, while our men had no apprehensions, because their ambassadors had gone away from Caesar a little before, and that day had been requested by them as a period of truce, made an onset on our men, and soon threw them into disorder. When our men, in their turn, made a stand, they, according to their practice, leaped from their horses to their feet, and stabbing our horses in the belly and overthrowing a great many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove them forward so much alarmed that they did not desist from their retreat till they had come in sight of our army. In that encounter seventy-four of our horse were slain; among them, Piso, an Aquitanian, a most valiant man, and descended from a very illustrious family; whose grandfather had held the sovereignty of his state, and had been styled friend by our senate. He, while he was endeavouring to render assistance to his brother who was surrounded by the enemy, and whom he rescued from danger, was himself thrown from his horse, which was wounded under him, but still

opposed [his antagonists] with the greatest intrepidity, as long as he was able to maintain the conflict. When at length he fell, surrounded on all sides and after receiving many wounds, and his brother, who had then retired from the fight, observed it from a distance, he spurred on his horse, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed.

XIII. — After this engagement, Caesar considered that neither ought ambassadors to be received to audience, nor conditions be accepted by him from those who, after having sued for peace by way of stratagem and treachery, had made war without provocation. And to wait till the enemy's forces were augmented and their cavalry had returned, he concluded, would be the greatest madness; and knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he felt how much influence the enemy had already acquired among them by this one skirmish. He [therefore] deemed that no time for converting measures ought to be afforded them. After having resolved on these things and communicated his plans to his lieutenants and quaestor in order that he might not suffer any opportunity for engaging to escape him, a very seasonable event occurred, namely, that on the morning of the next day, a large body of Germans, consisting of their princes and old men, came to the camp to him to practise the same treachery and dissimulation; but, as they asserted, for the purpose of acquitting themselves for having engaged in a skirmish the day before, contrary to what had been agreed and to what, indeed, they themselves had requested; and also if they could by any means obtain a truce by deceiving him. Caesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into his power, ordered them to be detained. He then drew all his forces out of the camp, and commanded the cavalry, because he thought they were intimidated by the late skirmish, to follow in the rear.

XIV. — Having marshalled his army in three lines, and in a short

time performed a march of eight miles, he arrived at the camp of the enemy before the Germans could perceive what was going on; who being suddenly alarmed by all the circumstances, both by the speediness of our arrival and the absence of their own officers, as time was afforded neither for concerting measures nor for seizing their arms, are perplexed as to whether it would be better to lead out their forces against the enemy, or to defend their camp, or seek their safety by flight. Their consternation being made apparent by their noise and tumult, our soldiers, excited by the treachery of the preceding day, rushed into the camp: such of them as could readily get their arms for a short time withstood our men, and gave battle among their carts and baggage-waggons; but the rest of the people, [consisting] of boys and women (for they had left their country and crossed the Rhine with all their families), began to fly in all directions; in pursuit of whom Caesar sent the cavalry.

XV. — The Germans when, upon hearing a noise behind them, [they looked and] saw that their families were being slain, throwing away their arms and abandoning their standards, fled out of the camp, and when they had arrived at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, the survivors despairing of farther escape, as a great number of their countrymen had been killed, threw themselves into the river and there perished, overcome by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the stream. Our soldiers, after the alarm of so great a war, for the number of the enemy amounted to 430,000, returned to their camp, all safe to a man, very few being even wounded. Caesar granted those whom he had detained in the camp liberty of departing. They however, dreading revenge and torture from the Gauls, whose lands they had harassed, said that they desired to remain with him. Caesar granted them permission.

XVI. — The German war being finished, Caesar thought it expedient for him to cross the Rhine, for many reasons; of which this was the most weighty, that, since he saw the Germans were so easily urged to go into Gaul, he desired they should have their fears for their own territories when they discovered that the army of the Roman people both could and dared pass the Rhine. There was added also, that that portion of the cavalry of the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri, which I have above related to have crossed the Meuse for the purpose of plundering and procuring forage, and was not present at the engagement, had betaken themselves, after the retreat of their countrymen, across the Rhine into the territories of the Sigambri, and united themselves to them. When Caesar sent ambassadors to them, to demand that they should give up to him those who had made war against him and against Gaul, they replied, “That the Rhine bounded the empire of the Roman people; if he did not think it just for the Germans to pass over into Gaul against his consent, why did he claim that anything beyond the Rhine should be subject to his dominion or power?” The Ubii also, who alone, out of all the nations lying beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to Caesar, and formed an alliance and given hostages, earnestly entreated “that he would bring them assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by the Suevi; or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of the commonwealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; that that would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope for the future; that so great was the name and the reputation of his army, even among the most remote nations of the Germans, arising from the defeat of Ariovistus and this last battle which was fought, that they might be safe under the fame and friendship of the Roman people.” They promised a large number of

ships for transporting the army.

XVII. — Caesar, for those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved to cross the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither deemed to be sufficiently safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people. Therefore, although the greatest difficulty in forming a bridge was presented to him, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river, he nevertheless considered that it ought to be attempted by him, or that his army ought not otherwise to be led over. He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined together at the distance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little at the lower end, and proportioned in length to the depth of the river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the river, and fixed them at the bottom, and then driven them in with rammers, not quite perpendicularly, like a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so as to incline in the direction of the current of the river; he also placed two [other piles] opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down, fastened together in the same manner, but directed against the force and current of the river. Both these, moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams two feet thick (the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at their extremities between two braces on each side; and in consequence of these being in different directions and fastened on sides the one opposite to the other, so great was the strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials, that in proportion as the greater body of water dashed against the bridge, so much the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams were bound together by timber laid over them in the direction of the length of the bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and hurdles; and in addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at the lower side of

the bridge, and these serving as buttresses, and being connected with every portion of the work, sustained the force of the stream: and there were others also above the bridge, at a moderate distance; that if trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river by the barbarians for the purpose of destroying the work, the violence of such things might be diminished by these defences, and might not injure the bridge.

XVIII. — Within ten days after the timber began to be collected, the whole work was completed, and the whole army led over. Caesar, leaving a strong guard at each end of the bridge, hastens into the territories of the Sigambri. In the meantime ambassadors from several nations come to him, whom, on their suing for peace and alliance, he answers in a courteous manner, and orders hostages to be brought to him. But the Sigambri, at the very time the bridge was begun to be built, made preparations for a flight (by the advice of such of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes as they had amongst them), and quitted their territories and conveyed away all their possessions, and concealed themselves in deserts and woods.

XIX. — Caesar, having remained in their territories a few days, and burnt all their villages and houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded into the territories of the Ubii; and having promised them his assistance, if they were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned from them these particulars: that the Suevi, after they had by means of their scouts found that the bridge was being built, had called a council, according to their custom, and sent orders to all parts of their state to remove from the towns and convey their children, wives, and all their possessions into the woods, and that all who could bear arms should assemble in one place; that the place thus chosen was nearly the centre of those regions which the Suevi possessed; that in this

spot they had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle there. When Caesar discovered this, having already accomplished all those things on account of which he had resolved to lead his army over, namely, to strike fear into the Germans, take vengeance on the Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spent altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had advanced far enough to serve both honour and interest, he returned into Gaul, and cut down the bridge.

XX. — During the short part of summer which remained, Caesar, although in these countries, as all Gaul lies towards the north, the winters are early, nevertheless resolved to proceed into Britain, because he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls succours had been furnished to our enemy from that country; and even if the time of year should be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it would be of great service to him if he only entered the island, and saw into the character of the people, and got knowledge of their localities, harbours, and landing-places, all which were for the most part unknown to the Gauls. For neither does any one except merchants generally go thither, nor even to them was any portion of it known, except the sea-coast and those parts which are opposite to Gaul. Therefore, after having called up to him the merchants from all parts, he could learn neither what was the size of the island, nor what or how numerous were the nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they followed, nor what customs they used, nor what harbours were convenient for a great number of large ships.

XXI. — He sends before him Caius Volusenus with a ship of war, to acquire a knowledge of these particulars before he in person should make a descent into the island, as he was convinced that this

was a judicious measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly examine into all matters, and then return to him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds to the Morini with all his forces. He orders ships from all parts of the neighbouring countries, and the fleet which the preceding summer he had built for the war with the Veneti, to assemble in this place. In the meantime, his purpose having been discovered, and reported to the Britons by merchants, ambassadors come to him from several states of the island, to promise that they will give hostages, and submit to the government of the Roman people. Having given them an audience, he after promising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country, and [despatches] with them Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he had created king there, a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who he thought would be faithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those countries. He orders him to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to embrace the protection of the Roman people, and apprise them that he would shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed the localities as far as means could be afforded one who dared not leave his ship and trust himself to barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, and reports what he had there observed.

XXII. — While Caesar remains in these parts for the purpose of procuring ships, ambassadors come to him from a great portion of the Morini, to plead their excuse respecting their conduct on the late occasion; alleging that it was as men uncivilised, and as those who were unacquainted with our custom, that they had made war upon the Roman people, and promising to perform what he should command. Caesar, thinking that this had happened fortunately enough for him, because he neither wished to leave an enemy behind him, nor had an

opportunity for carrying on a war, by reason of the time of year, nor considered that employment in such trifling matters was to be preferred to his enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number of hostages; and when these were brought, he received them to his protection. Having collected together and provided about eighty transport ships, as many as he thought necessary for conveying over two legions, he assigned such [ships] of war as he had besides to the quaestor, his lieutenants, and officers of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships of burden which were prevented, eight miles from that place, by winds, from being able to reach the same port. These he distributed amongst the horse; the rest of the army he delivered to Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to lead into the territories of the Menapii and those cantons of the Morini from which ambassadors had not come to him. He ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to hold possession of the harbour, with such a garrison as he thought sufficient.

XXIII. — These matters being arranged, finding the weather favourable for his voyage, he set sail about the third watch, and ordered the horse to march forward to the farther port, and there embark and follow him. As this was performed rather tardily by them, he himself reached Britain with the first squadron of ships, about the fourth hour of the day, and there saw the forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all the hills. The nature of the place was this: the sea was confined by mountains so close to it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore. Considering this by no means a fit place for disembarking, he remained at anchor till the ninth hour, for the other ships to arrive there. Having in the meantime assembled the lieutenants and military tribunes, he told them both what he had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wished to

be done; and enjoined them (as the principle of military matters, and especially as maritime affairs, which have a precipitate and uncertain action, required) that all things should be performed by them at a nod and at the instant. Having dismissed them, meeting both with wind and tide favourable at the same time, the signal being given and the anchor weighed, he advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationed his fleet over against an open and level shore.

XXIV. — But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom it is their practice to make great use in their battles, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to prevent our men landing. In this was the greatest difficulty, for the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on account of their great size, could be stationed only in deep water; and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, with their hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy weight of armour, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amidst the waves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, or advancing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs, in places thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weapons and spur on their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not all exert the same vigour and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground.

XXV. — When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the appearance of which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and the motion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from the transport vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be stationed towards the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be beaten off

and driven away with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great service to our men; for the barbarians being startled by the form of our ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which was strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. And while our men were hesitating [whether they should advance to the shore], chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, he who carried the eagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the gods that the matter might turn out favourably to the legion, exclaimed, "Leap, fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." When he had said this with a loud voice, he leaped from the ship and proceeded to bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one another that so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from the ship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followed and approached the enemy.

XXVI. — The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men, however, as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from another assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown into great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by one, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; many surrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of the ships of war and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and sent them up to the succour of those whom he had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as they made good their footing on dry ground, and all their comrades had

joined them, made an attack upon the enemy, and put them to flight, but could not pursue them very far, because the horse had not been able to maintain their course at sea and reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success.

XXVII. — The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, as soon as they recovered after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors to Caesar to negotiate about peace. They promised to give hostages and perform what he should command. Together with these ambassadors came Commius the Atrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been sent by Caesar into Britain. Him they had seized upon when leaving his ship, although in the character of ambassador he bore the general's commission to them, and thrown into chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent him back, and in suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon the common people, and entreated that it might be pardoned on account of their indiscretion. Caesar, complaining that after they had sued for peace, and had voluntarily sent ambassadors into the continent for that purpose, they had made war without a reason, said that he would pardon their indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a part of whom they gave immediately; the rest they said they would give in a few days, since they were sent for from remote places. In the meantime they ordered their people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembled from all quarters, and proceeded to surrender themselves and their states to Caesar.

XXVIII. — A peace being established by these proceedings four days after we had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to which reference has been made above, and which conveyed the cavalry, set sail from the upper port with a gentle gale; when, however, they were approaching Britain and were seen from the camp, so great a storm

suddenly arose that none of them could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken back to the same port from which they had started; — others, to their great danger, were driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west; which, however, after having cast anchor, as they were getting filled with water, put out to sea through necessity in a stormy night, and made for the continent.

XXIX. — It happened that night to be full moon, which usually occasions very high tides in that ocean; and that circumstance was unknown to our men. Thus, at the same time, the tide began to fill the ships of war which Caesar had provided to convey over his army, and which he had drawn up on the strand; and the storm began to dash the ships of burden which were riding at anchor against each other; nor was any means afforded our men of either managing them or of rendering any service. A great many ships having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having lost their cables, anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, a great confusion, as would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army; for there were no other ships in which they could be conveyed back, and all things which are of service in repairing vessels were wanting, and corn for the winter had not been provided in those places, because it was understood by all that they would certainly winter in Gaul.

XXX. — On discovering these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come up after the battle was fought to perform those conditions which Caesar had imposed, held a conference, when they perceived that cavalry, and ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans, and discovered the small number of our soldiers from the small extent of the camp (which, too, was on this account more limited than ordinary because Caesar had conveyed over his legions without baggage), and thought that the best plan was to renew the war, and cut off our men

from corn and provisions and protract the affair till winter; because they felt confident that, if they were vanquished or cut off from a return, no one would afterwards pass over into Britain for the purpose of making war. Therefore, again entering into a conspiracy, they began to depart from the camp by degrees and secretly bring up their people from the country parts.

XXXI. — But Caesar, although he had not as yet discovered their measures, yet, both from what had occurred to his ships, and from the circumstance that they had neglected to give the promised hostages, suspected that the thing would come to pass which really did happen. He therefore provided remedies against all contingencies; for he daily conveyed corn from the country parts into the camp, used the timber and brass of such ships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the rest, and ordered whatever things besides were necessary for this object to be brought to him from the continent. And thus, since that business was executed by the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the loss of twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest.

XXXII. — While these things are being transacted, one legion had been sent to forage, according to custom, and no suspicion of war had arisen as yet, and some of the people remained in the country parts, others went backwards and forwards to the camp, they who were on duty at the gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than was usual was seen in that direction in which the legion had marched. Caesar, suspecting that which was [really the case], — that some new enterprise was undertaken by the barbarians, ordered the two cohorts which were on duty to march into that quarter with him, and two other cohorts to relieve them on duty; the rest to be armed and follow him immediately. When he had advanced

some little way from the camp, he saw that his men were overpowered by the enemy and scarcely able to stand their ground, and that, the legion being crowded together, weapons were being cast on them from all sides. For as all the corn was reaped in every part with the exception of one, the enemy, suspecting that our men would repair to that, had concealed themselves in the woods during the night. Then attacking them suddenly, scattered as they were, and when they had laid aside their arms, and were engaged in reaping, they killed a small number, threw the rest into confusion, and surrounded them with their cavalry and chariots.

XXXIII. — Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers in the meantime withdraw some little distance from the battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of horse, [together with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily practice and exercise attain to such expertness that they are accustomed, even on a declining and steep place, to check their horses at full speed, and manage and turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand on the yoke, and thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity to their chariots again.

XXXIV.-Under these circumstances, our men being dismayed by the novelty of this mode of battle, Caesar most seasonably brought assistance; for upon his arrival the enemy paused, and our men recovered from their fear; upon which, thinking the time

unfavourable for provoking the enemy and coming to an action, he kept himself in his own quarter, and, a short time having intervened, drew back the legions into the camp. While these things were going on, and all our men engaged, the rest of the Britons, who were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in for several successive days, which both confined our men to camp and hindered the enemy from attacking us. In the meantime the barbarians despatched messengers to all parts and reported to their people the small number of our soldiers, and how good an opportunity was given for obtaining spoil and for liberating themselves for ever, if they should only drive the Romans from their camp. Having by these means speedily got together a large force of infantry and of cavalry, they came up to the camp.

XXXV. — Although Caesar anticipated that the same thing which had happened on former occasions would then occur — that, if the enemy were routed, they would escape from danger by their speed; still, having got about thirty horse, which Commius the Atrebatian, of whom mention has been made, had brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp. When the action commenced, the enemy were unable to sustain the attack of our men long, and turned their backs; our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength permitted, and slew a great number of them; then, having destroyed and burnt everything far and wide, they retreated to their camp.

XXXVI. — The same day, ambassadors sent by the enemy came to Caesar to negotiate a peace. Caesar doubled the number of hostages which he had before demanded; and ordered that they should be brought over to the continent, because, since the time of the equinox was near, he did not consider that, with his ships out of

repair, the voyage ought to be deferred till winter. Having met with favourable weather he set sail a little after midnight, and all his fleet arrived safe at the continent, except two of the ships of burden which could not make the same port which the other ships did, and were carried a little lower down.

XXXVII. — When our soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out of these two ships, and were marching to the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar, when setting forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, excited by the hope of spoil, at first surrounded them with a small number of men, and ordered them to lay down their arms, if they did not wish to be slain; afterwards however, when they, forming a circle, stood on their defence, a shout was raised and about 6000 of the enemy soon assembled; which being reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as a relief to his men. In the meantime our soldiers sustained the attack of the enemy, and fought most valiantly for more than four hours, and, receiving but few wounds themselves, slew several of them. But after our cavalry came in sight, the enemy, throwing away their arms, turned their backs, and a great number of them were killed.

XXXVIII. — The day following Caesar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with those legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had revolted; who, as they had no place to which they might retreat, on account of the drying up of their marshes (which they had availed themselves of as a place of refuge the preceding year), almost all fell into the power of Labienus. In the meantime Caesar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into the territories of the Menapii, having laid waste all their lands, cut down their corn and burnt their houses, returned to Caesar because the Menapii had all concealed themselves

in their thickest woods. Caesar fixed the winter quarters of all the legions amongst the Belgae. Thither only two British states sent hostages; the rest omitted to do so. For these successes, a thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by the senate upon receiving Caesar's letter.

BOOK V

I. — Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar when departing from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomed to do yearly, commands the lieutenants whom he appointed over the legions to take care that during the winter as many ships as possible should be built, and the old repaired. He plans the size and shape of them. For despatch of lading, and for drawing them on shore, he makes them a little lower than those which we have been accustomed to use in our sea; and that so much the more, because he knew that, on account of the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the purpose of transporting little and a great number of horses, [he makes them] a little broader than those which we use in other seas. All these he orders to be constructed for lightness and expedition, to which object their lowness contributes greatly. He orders those things which are necessary for equipping ships to be brought thither from Spain. He himself, on the assizes of Hither Gaul being concluded, proceeds into Illyricum, because he heard that the part of the province nearest them was being laid waste by the incursions of the Pirustae. When he had arrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and orders them to assemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been reported [to them], the Pirustae send ambassadors to him to inform him that no part of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assert that they were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries [inflicted]. Caesar, accepting their defence, demands hostages, and orders them to be brought to him on a specified day, and assures them that unless they did so he would visit their state with war. These being brought to him on the day which he had

ordered, he appoints arbitrators between the states, who should estimate the damages and determine the reparation.

II. — These things being finished, and the assizes being concluded, he returns into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the army. When he had arrived there, having made a survey of the winter quarter, he finds that, by the extraordinary ardour of the soldiers, amidst the utmost scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described above, and twenty-eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from that state that they might be launched in a few days. Having commended the soldiers and those who had presided over the work, he informs them what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships to assemble at port Itius, from which port he had learned that the passage into Britain was shortest, [being only] about thirty miles from the continent. He left what seemed a sufficient number of soldiers for that design; he himself proceeds into the territories of the Treviri with four legions without baggage, and 800 horse, because they neither came to the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his commands, and were, moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans beyond the Rhine.

III. — This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and has great forces of infantry, and as we have remarked above, borders on the Rhine. In that state, two persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were then contending with each other for the supreme power; one of whom, as soon as the arrival of Caesar and his legions was known, came to him; assures him that he and all his party would continue in their allegiance, and not revolt from the alliance of the Roman people, and informs him of the things which were going on amongst the Treviri. But Indutiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, and make preparations for war, having

concealed those who by reason of their age could not be under arms in the forest Arduenna, which is of immense size, [and] extends from the Rhine across the country of the Treviri to the frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some of the chief persons of the state, both influenced by their friendship for Cingetorix, and alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began to solicit him privately about their own interests, since they could not provide for the safety of the state; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should be abandoned by all, sends ambassadors to Caesar, to declare that he absented himself from his countrymen, and refrained from coming to him on this account, that he might the more easily keep the state in its allegiance, lest on the departure of all the nobility the commonalty should, in their indiscretion, revolt. And thus the whole state was at his control; and that he, if Caesar would permit, would come to the camp to him, and would commit his own fortunes and those of the state to his good faith.

IV. — Caesar, though he discerned from what motive these things were said, and what circumstance deterred him from his meditated plan, still, in order that he might not be compelled to waste the summer among the Treviri, while all things were prepared for the war with Britain, ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When these were brought, [and] among them his son and near relations whom he had demanded by name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continue in his allegiance; yet, nevertheless, summoning to him the chief men of the Treviri, he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix: this he both thought should be done by him in justice to the merits of the latter, and also judged that it was of great importance that the influence of one whose singular attachment towards him he had fully seen, should

prevail as much as possible among his people. Indutiomarus was very much offended at this act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished among his countrymen; and he, who already before had borne a hostile mind towards us, was much more violently inflamed against us through resentment at this.

V. — These matters being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with the legions. There he discovers that forty ships which had been built in the country of the Meldi, having been driven back by a storm, had been unable to maintain their course, and had returned to the same port from which they had set out; he finds the rest ready for sailing, and furnished with everything. In the same place, the cavalry of the whole of Gaul, in number 4000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of all the states; he had determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whose fidelity towards him he had clearly discerned, and take the rest with him as hostages; because he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should be absent.

VI. — There was together with the others, Dumnorix, the Aeduan, of whom we have made previous mention. Him in particular he had resolved to have with him, because he had discovered him to be fond of change, fond of power, possessing great resolution, and great influence among the Gauls. To this was added that Dumnorix had before said in an assembly of Aeduans, that the sovereignty of the state had been made over to him by Caesar; which speech the Aedui bore with impatience and yet dared not send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either rejecting or deprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from his own personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreaty that he should be left in Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed to sailing, he feared the sea; partly, because he said he was prevented by divine admonitions.

After he saw that this request was firmly refused him, all hope of success being lost, he began to tamper with the chief persons of the Gauls, to call them apart singly and exhort them to remain on the continent; to agitate them with the fear that it was not without reason that Gaul should be stript of all her nobility; that it was Caesar's design to bring over to Britain and put to death all those whom he feared to slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his honour to the rest, to ask for their oath that they would by common deliberation execute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul. These things were reported to Caesar by several persons.

VII. — Having learned this fact, Caesar, because he had conferred so much honour upon the Aeduan state, determined that Dumnorix should be restrained and deterred by whatever means he could; and that, because he perceived his insane designs to be proceeding farther and farther, care should be taken lest he might be able to injure him and the commonwealth. Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five days in that place, because the north wind, which usually blows a great part of every season, prevented the voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his allegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his measures: having at length met with favourable weather, he orders the foot soldiers and the horse to embark in the ships. But, while the minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to take his departure from the camp homewards with the cavalry of the Aedui, Caesar being ignorant of it. Caesar, on this matter being reported to him, ceasing from his expedition and deferring all other affairs, sends a great part of the cavalry to pursue him, and commands that he be brought back; he orders that if he use violence and do not submit, that he be slain: considering that Dumnorix would do nothing as a rational man while he himself was absent, since he had disregarded

his command even when present. He, however, when recalled, began to resist and defend himself with his hand, and implore the support of his people, often exclaiming that "he was free and the subject of a free state." They surround and kill the man as they had been commanded; but the Aeduan horsemen all return to Caesar.

VIII. — When these things were done [and] Labienus, left on the continent with three legions and 2000 horse, to defend the harbours and provide corn, and discover what was going on in Gaul, and take measures according to the occasion and according to the circumstance; he himself, with five legions and a number of horse, equal to that which he was leaving on the continent, set sail at sunset and [though for a time] borne forward by a gentle south-west wind, he did not maintain his course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried on too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left. Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged on with the oars that he might make that port of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer that there was the best landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of our soldiers was very much to be extolled; for they with the transports and heavy ships, the labour of rowing not being [for a moment] discontinued, equalled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day; nor was there seen a [single] enemy in that place, but, as Caesar afterwards found from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had assembled there, yet being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more than eight hundred of which, including the ships of the preceding year, and those private vessels which each had built for his own convenience, had appeared at one time, they had quitted the coast and concealed themselves among the higher points.

IX. — Caesar, having disembarked his army and chosen a convenient place for the camp, when he discovered from the prisoners in what part the forces of the enemy had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts and 300 horse at the sea, to be a guard to the ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third watch, fearing the less for the ships for this reason, because he was leaving them fastened at anchor upon an even and open shore; and he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the ships. He himself, having advanced by night about twelve miles, espied the forces of the enemy. They, advancing to the river with their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground, began to annoy our men and give battle. Being repulsed by our cavalry, they concealed themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war; for all entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees. They themselves rushed out of the woods to fight here and there, and prevented our men from entering their fortifications. But the soldiers of the seventh legion, having formed a *testudo* and thrown up a rampart against the fortification, took the place and drove them out of the woods, receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursue them in their flight any great distance; both because he was ignorant of the nature of the ground, and because, as a great part of the day was spent, he wished time to be left for the fortification of the camp.

X. — The next day, early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and horse in three divisions on an expedition to pursue those who had fled. These having advanced a little way, when already the rear [of the enemy] was in sight, some horse came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to report that the preceding night, a very great storm

having arisen, almost all the ships were dashed to pieces and cast upon the shore, because neither the anchors and cables could resist, nor could the sailors and pilots sustain the violence of the storm; and thus great damage was received by that collision of the ships.

XI. — These things being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions and cavalry to be recalled and to cease from their march; he himself returns to the ships: he sees clearly before him almost the same things which he had heard of from the messengers and by letter, so that, about forty ships being lost, the remainder seemed capable of being repaired with much labour. Therefore he selects workmen from the legions, and orders others to be sent for from the continent; he writes to Labienus to build as many ships as he could with those legions which were with him. He himself, though the matter was one of great difficulty and labour, yet thought it to be most expedient for all the ships to be brought up on shore and joined with the camp by one fortification. In these matters he employed about ten days, the labour of the soldiers being unremitting even during the hours of night. The ships having been brought up on shore and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same forces which he did before as a guard for the ships; he sets out in person for the same place that he had returned from. When he had come thither, greater forces of the Britons had already assembled at that place, the chief command and management of the war having been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose territories a river, which is called the Thames, separates from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea. At an earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and the other states; but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons had placed him over the whole war and the conduct of it.

XII. — The interior portion of Britain is inhabited by those of

whom they say that it is handed down by tradition that they were born in the island itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over from the country of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war; almost all of whom are called by the names of those states from which being sprung they went thither, and having waged war, continued there and began to cultivate the lands. The number of the people is countless, and their buildings exceedingly numerous, for the most part very like those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brass or iron rings, determined at a certain weight, as their money. Tin is produced in the midland regions; in the maritime, iron; but the quantity of it is small: they employ brass, which is imported. There, as in Gaul, is timber of every description, except beech and fir. They do not regard it lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the goose; they, however, breed them for amusement and pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, the colds being less severe.

XIII. — The island is triangular in its form, and one of its sides is opposite to Gaul. One angle of this side, which is in Kent, whither almost all ships from Gaul are directed, [looks] to the east; the lower looks to the south. This side extends about 500 miles. Another side lies towards Spain and the west, on which part is Ireland, less, as is reckoned, than Britain by one-half; but the passage [from it] into Britain is of equal distance with that from Gaul. In the middle of this voyage is an island, which is called Mona; many smaller islands besides are supposed to lie [there], of which islands some have written that at the time of the winter solstice it is night there for thirty consecutive days. We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascertained nothing, except that, by accurate measurements with water, we perceived the nights to be shorter there than on the continent. The

length of this side, as their account states, is 700 miles. The third side is towards the north, to which portion of the island no land is opposite; but an angle of that side looks principally towards Germany. This side is considered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the whole island is [about] 2000 miles in circumference.

XIV. — The most civilised of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the Gallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but live on milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. All the Britons, indeed, dye themselves with wood, which occasions a bluish colour, and thereby have a more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their hair long, and have every part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and even twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers among brothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any issue by these wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whom respectively each was first espoused when a virgin.

XV. — The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men were conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men were off their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed out of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first of two legions, when these had taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the unusual mode of battle, the

enemy broke through the middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q. Laberius Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The enemy, since more cohorts were sent against them, were repulsed.

XVI. — In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took place under the eyes of all and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the weight of their arms, inasmuch as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse also fought with great danger, because they [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat and those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed [in different parts], and then the one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded the wearied.

XVII. — The following day the enemy halted on the hills, a distance from our camp, and presented themselves in small parties, and began to challenge our horse to battle with less spirit than the day before. But at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions, and all the cavalry with C. Trebonius, the lieutenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew upon the foragers suddenly from all quarters, so that they did not keep off [even] from the standards and the legions. Our men making an attack on them vigorously, repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them until the horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drove the enemy precipitately

before them, and, slaying a great number of them, did not give them the opportunity either of rallying or halting, or leaping from their chariots. Immediately after this retreat, the auxiliaries who had assembled from all sides, departed; nor after that time did the enemy ever engage with us in very large numbers.

XVIII. — Caesar, discovering their design, leads his army into the territories of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which river can be forded in one place only, and that with difficulty. When he had arrived there, he perceives that numerous forces of the enemy were marshalled on the other bank of the river; the bank also was defended by sharp stakes fixed in front, and stakes of the same kind fixed under the water were covered by the river. These things being discovered from [some] prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending forward the cavalry, ordered the legions to follow them immediately. But the soldiers advanced with such speed and such ardour, though they stood above the water by their heads only, that the enemy could not sustain the attack of the legions and of the horse, and quitted the banks, and committed themselves to flight.

XIX. — Cassivellaunus, as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] of battle being laid aside, the greater part of his forces being dismissed, and about 4000 charioteers only being left, used to observe our marches and retire a little from the road, and conceal himself in intricate and woody places, and in those neighbourhoods in which he had discovered we were about to march, he used to drive the cattle and the inhabitants from the fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the sake of plundering and ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among the fields, he used to send out charioteers from the woods by all the well-known roads and paths, and, to the great danger of our horse, engage with them; and this

source of fear hindered them from straggling very extensively. The result was that Caesar did not allow excursions to be made to a great distance from the main body of the legions, and ordered that damage should be done to the enemy in ravaging their lands and kindling fires only so far as the legionary soldiers could, by their own exertion and marching, accomplish it.

XX. — In the meantime, the Trinobantes, almost the most powerful state of those parts, from which the young man Mandubratius embracing the protection of Caesar had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him (whose father, Imanuentius, had possessed the sovereignty in that state, and had been killed by Cassivellaunus; he himself had escaped death by flight), send ambassadors to Caesar, and promise that they will surrender themselves to him and perform his commands; they entreat him to protect Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send to their state some one to preside over it, and possess the government. Caesar demands forty hostages from them, and corn for his army, and sends Mandubratius to them. They speedily performed the things demanded, and sent hostages to the number appointed, and the corn.

XXI. — The Trinobantes being protected and secured from any violence of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, sending embassies, surrender themselves to Caesar. From them he learns that the capital town of Cassivellaunus was not far from that place, and was defended by woods and morasses, and a very large number of men and of cattle had been collected in it. (Now the Britons, when they have fortified the intricate woods, in which they are wont to assemble for the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an enemy, with an entrenchment

and a rampart, call them a town.) Thither he proceeds with his legions: he finds the place admirably fortified by nature and art; he, however, undertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy, having remained only a short time, did not sustain the attack of our soldiers, and hurried away on the other side of the town. A great amount of cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.

XXII. — While these things are going forward in those places, Cassivellaunus sends messengers into Kent, which, we have observed above, is on the sea, over which districts four several kings reigned, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, and commands them to collect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm the naval camp. When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally, slaying many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leader named Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this battle was reported to him, as so many losses had been sustained, and his territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all by the desertion of the states, sends ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about a surrender through the mediation of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar, since he had determined to pass the winter on the continent, on account of the sudden revolts of Gaul, and as much of the summer did not remain, and he perceived that even that could be easily protracted, demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute Britain should pay each year to the Roman people; he forbids and commands Cassivellaunus that he wage not war against Mandubratius or the Trinobantes.

XXIII. — When he had received the hostages, he leads back the army to the sea, and finds the ships repaired. After launching these, because he had a large number of prisoners, and some of the ships

had been lost in the storm, he determines to convey back his army at two embarkations. And it so happened, that out of so large a number of ships, in so many voyages, neither in this nor in the previous year was any ship missing which conveyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent back to him from the continent empty, as the soldiers of the former convoy had been disembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had taken care to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest were driven back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some time in vain, lest he should be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch as the equinox was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiers the more closely, and, a very great calm coming on, after he had weighed anchor at the beginning of the second watch, he reached land at break of day and brought in all the ships in safety.

XXIV. — The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of the Gauls held at Samarobriua, because the corn that year had not prospered in Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his army in its winter-quarters, differently from the former years, and to distribute the legions among several states: one of them he gave to C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the Morini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. Roscius, into those of the Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus among the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationed three in Belgium; over these he appointed M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion which he had raised last on the other side of the Po, and five cohorts, he sent amongst the Eburones, the greatest portion of whom lie between the Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the government of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. He

ordered Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take the command of these soldiers. The legions being distributed in this manner, he thought he could most easily remedy the scarcity of corn; and yet the winter-quarters of all these legions (except that which he had given to L. Roscius to be led into the most peaceful and tranquil neighbourhood) were comprehended within [about] 100 miles. He himself in the meanwhile, until he had stationed the legions and knew that the several winter-quarters were fortified, determined to stay in Gaul.

XXV. — There was among the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very high rank, whose ancestors had held the sovereignty in his state. To him Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in consideration of his prowess and attachment towards him, because in all his wars he had availed himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies had killed him when in the third year of his reign, many even of his own state being openly promoters [of that act]. This event is related to Caesar. He fearing, because several were involved in the act, that the state might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to proceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter there, and arrest and send to him the persons by whose instrumentality he should discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the meantime, he was apprised by all the lieutenants and questors to whom he had assigned the legions, that they had arrived in winter-quarters, and that the place for the quarters was fortified.

XXVI. — About fifteen days after they had come into winter-quarters, the beginning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and Cativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom, and had conveyed

corn into our winter-quarters, induced by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, excited their people, and after having suddenly assailed the soldiers, engaged in procuring wood, came with a large body to attack the camp. When our men had speedily taken up arms and had ascended the rampart, and sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors in a cavalry action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off their troops from the assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men should go forward to a conference, [alleging] that they had some things which they desired to say respecting the common interest, by which they trusted their disputes could be removed.

XXVII. — C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and with him Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who already on previous occasions had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference: before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed that for Caesar's kindness towards him he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbours; and because his own son and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, when sent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in slavery and in chains; and that he had not done that which he had done in regard to the attacking of the camp, either by his own judgment or desire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that his government was of that nature, that the people had as much of authority over him as he over the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the war was this — that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the Gauls; that

he could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution of Gaul; that that day was appointed for the storming of all Caesar's winter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to the relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, especially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their common freedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism [he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that he warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to consult for his and his soldiers' safety; that a large force of the Germans had been hired and had passed the Rhine; that it would arrive in two days; that it was for them to consider whether they thought fit, before the nearest people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers when drawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other rather more; that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give them a safe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was both consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from the winter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his obligations."

XXVIII. — Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had heard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those things were spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to be disregarded; and they were especially influenced by this consideration, that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble state of the Eburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their own accord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a great controversy arises among them. L.

Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion “that nothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from the camp without Caesar’s orders”; they declared, “that any forces of the Germans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter-quarters; that this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the first assault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting many wounds upon them; that they were not distressed for corn; that in the meantime relief would come both from the nearest winter-quarters and from Caesar”; lastly, they put the query, “what could be more undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting the most important affairs on the authority of an enemy?”

XXIX. — In opposition to those things Titurius exclaimed, “That they would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disaster had been received in the neighbouring winter-quarters; that the opportunity for deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the measure of slaying Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us; that he did not regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the Rhine was near; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that after having received so many defeats she was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters being extinguished.” Lastly, “who would persuade himself of this, that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds? That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing very formidable, they

would go without danger to the nearest legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in despatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was.”

XXX. — This discussion having been held on the two sides, when opposition was offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers, “Prevail,” said Sabinus, “if so you wish it”; and he said it with a louder voice, that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him; “nor am I the person among you,” he said, “who is most powerfully alarmed by the danger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if any thing disastrous shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at your hands; these, who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hence with the nearest winter-quarters, may encounter the common condition of war with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated far from the rest, perish either by the sword or by famine.”

XXXI. — They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that “they do not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension and obstinacy; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought and approved of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the other hand, they saw no security in dissension.” The matter is prolonged by debate till midnight. At last Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent; the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will march at day-break; the remainder of the night is spent without sleep, since every soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carry with him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, he would be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why they could not stay

without danger, and how that danger would be increased by the fatigue of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day they quit the camp, in a very extended line and with a very large amount of baggage, in such a manner as men who were convinced that the advice was given by Ambiorix, not as an enemy, but as most friendly [towards them].

XXXII. — But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of their intended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiring to rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a suitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for the arrival of the Romans; and when the greater part of the line of march had descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presented themselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass the rear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a place exceedingly disadvantageous to our men.

XXXIII. — Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothing beforehand, was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging his troops; these very things, however, he did timidly and in such a manner that all resources seemed to fail him: which generally happens to those who are compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, who had reflected that these things might occur on the march, and on that account had not been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the common safety in no respect; both in addressing and encouraging the soldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle those of a soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easily perform everything by themselves, and provide what was to be done in each place, by reason of the length of the line of march, they ordered [the officers] to give the command that they should leave the baggage and form

themselves into an orb, which measure, though in a contingency of that nature it was not to be condemned, still turned out unfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of our soldiers and rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared that this was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides that happened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the most part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from the baggage whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled with uproar and lamentation.

XXXIV. — But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the ranks “that no man should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them consider that all things depended on their victory.” Our men were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valour, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, orders the command to be issued that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again.

XXXV. — Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort had quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled very precipitately. In the meantime, that part of the Roman army, of necessity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their open flank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from

which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreated and by those who stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wished to keep their place, neither was an opportunity left for valour, nor could they, being crowded together, escape the weapons cast by so large a body of men. Yet, though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and] having received many wounds, they withstood the enemy, and, a great portion of the day being spent, though they fought from day-break till the eighth hour, they did nothing which was unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before had been chief centurion, a brave man and one of great authority, is pierced with a javelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, is slain while he assists his son when surrounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, is wounded full in the mouth by a sling.

XXXVI. — Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he had perceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and his soldiers. He, when addressed, replied, “If he wished to confer with him, it was permitted; that he hoped what pertained to the safety of the soldiers could be obtained from the people; that to him however certainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to that effect.” He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it would appear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying] that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers’ safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in that perseveres.

XXXVII. — Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at the time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to

follow him, and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw down his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to do the same. In the meantime, while they treat upon the terms, and a longer debate than necessary is designedly entered into by Ambiorix, being surrounded by degrees, he is slain. Then they according to their custom shout out "Victory," and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men, break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together with the greater part of the soldiers; the rest betake themselves to the camp from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petrosidius, the standard bearer, when he was overpowered by the great number of the enemy, threw the eagle within the entrenchments and is himself slain while fighting with the greatest courage before the camp. They with difficulty sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they all to a man destroy themselves in the night. A few escaping from the battle, make their way to Labienus at winter-quarters, after wandering at random through the woods, and inform him of these events.

XXXVIII. — Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves for ever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them"; [he tells them] "that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly assaulted; he declares himself ready to co-operate in that design." He easily gains

over the Nervii by this speech.

XXXIX. — Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith despatched to the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero, the report of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him which was the consequence of a necessary work, — that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatuci and all their allies and dependants, begin to attack the legion: our men quickly run together to arms and mount the rampart: they sustained the attack that day with great difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope in despatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors for ever.

XL. — Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All the passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During the night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible despatch out of the timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification: the things which seemed necessary to the work are completed. The following day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same manner as the day before: this same thing is done afterwards during the remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not even to the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whatever things are required for

resisting the assault of the next day are provided during the night: many stakes burnt at the end, and a large number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built up, battlements and parapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was in very weak health, did not leave himself the night-time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement and entreaties of the soldiers.

XLII. — Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him. When permission was granted, they recount the same things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, “that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters of Caesar and of the others were attacked.” They report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining credence; “they are mistaken,” say they, “if they hoped for any relief from those who distrust their own affairs; that they bear such feelings towards Cicero and the Roman people that they deny them nothing but winter-quarters and are unwilling that this practice should become constant; that through their [the Nervii’s] means it is possible for them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and to proceed without fear into whatever parts they desire.” To these Cicero made only one reply: “that it is not the custom of the Roman people to accept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay down their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and send ambassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar’s] justice, they would obtain the things which they might request.”

XLIII. — Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarters with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen

feet in depth. These military works they had learnt from our men in the intercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our army prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from which circumstance the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference; and during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, and grappling irons, and mantlets, which the same prisoners had taught them.

XLIII. — On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind having sprung up, they began to discharge by their slings hot balls made of burnt or hardened clay, and heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after the Gallic custom, were thatched with straw. These quickly took fire, and by the violence of the wind, scattered their flames in every part of the camp. The enemy following up their success with a very loud shout, as if victory were already obtained and secured, began to advance their towers and mantlets, and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was the courage of our soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that though they were scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast number of weapons, and were aware that their baggage and their possessions were burning, not only did no one quit the rampart for the purpose of withdrawing from the scene, but scarcely did any one even then look behind; and they all fought most vigorously and most valiantly. This day was by far the most calamitous to our men; it had this result, however, that on that day the largest number of the enemy was wounded and slain, since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and the hindmost

did not afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated a little, and a tower having been brought up in a particular place and touching the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort retired from the place in which they were standing, and drew off all their men: they began to call on the enemy by gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but none of them dared to advance. Then stones having been cast from every quarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their tower set on fire.

XLIV. — In that legion there were two very brave men, centurions, who were now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. Varenus. These used to have continual disputes between them which of them should be preferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost animosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously before the fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, “Why do you hesitate, Varenus? or what [better] opportunity of signalling your valour do you seek? This very day shall decide our disputes.” When he had uttered these words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the enemy which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus remain within the rampart, but respecting the high opinion of all, follows close after. Then, when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio throws his javelin at the enemy, and pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while the latter was wounded and slain, the enemy cover him with their shields, and all throw their weapons at the other and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pulfio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This circumstance turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to draw his sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. His rival runs up to him and succours him in this emergency.

Immediately the whole host turn from Pulvio to him, supposing the other to be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword and carries on the combat hand to hand, and having slain one man, for a short time drove back the rest: while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulvio brings relief; and both having slain a great number, retreat into the fortifications amidst the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with both in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succour and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the two appeared worthy of being preferred to the other.

XLV. — In proportion as the attack became daily more formidable and violent, and particularly because, as a great number of the soldiers were exhausted with wounds, the matter had come to a small number of defenders, more frequent letters and messengers were sent to Caesar; a part of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in the sight of our soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by name Vertico, born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of the blockade had deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades his slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, to convey a letter to Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin, and mixing among the Gauls without any suspicion by being a Gaul, he reaches Caesar. From him they received information of the imminent danger of Cicero and the legion.

XLVI. — Caesar having received the letter about the eleventh hour of the day, immediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus, questor there, whose winter-quarters were twenty-five miles distant from him. He orders the legion to set forward in the

middle of the night and come to him with despatch. Crassus set out with the messenger. He sends another to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth his legion into the territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew his march must be made. He writes to Labienus to come with his legion to the frontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the advantage of the commonwealth: he does not consider that the remaining portion of the army, because it was somewhat farther distant, should be waited for; but assembles about 400 horse from the nearest winter-quarters.

XLVII. — Having been apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at about the third hour, he advances twenty miles that day. He appoints Crassus over Samarobriua and assigns him a legion, because he was leaving there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, the public documents, and all the corn, which he had conveyed thither for passing the winter. Fabius, without delaying a moment, meets him on the march with his legion, as he had been commanded. Labienus, having learnt the death of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all the forces of the Treviri had come against him, beginning to fear lest, if he made a departure from his winter-quarters, resembling a flight, he should not be able to support the attack of the enemy, particularly since he knew them to be elated by their recent victory, sends back a letter to Caesar, informing him with what great hazard he would lead out his legion from winter-quarters; he relates at large the affair which had taken place among the Eburones; he informs him that all the infantry and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a distance of only three miles from his own camp.

XLVIII. — Caesar, approving of his motives, although he was disappointed in his expectation of three legions, and reduced to two,

yet placed his only hopes of the common safety in despatch. He goes into the territories of the Nervii by long marches. There he learns from some prisoners what things are going on in the camp of Cicero, and in how great jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he induces a certain man of the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he sends written in Greek characters, lest the letter being intercepted, our measures should be discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if he should be unable to enter, to throw his spear with the letter fastened to the thong inside the fortifications of the camp. He writes in the letter, that he having set out with his legions, will quickly be there: he entreats him to maintain his ancient valour. The Gaul apprehending danger, throws his spear as he had been directed. It by chance stuck in a tower, and, not being observed by our men for two days, was seen by a certain soldier on the third day: when taken down, it was carried to Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an assembly of the soldiers, and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of the fires was seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubt of the arrival of the legions.

XLIX. — The Gauls, having discovered the matter through their scouts, abandon the blockade, and march towards Caesar with all their forces: these were about 60,000 armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being now afforded, again begs of that Vertico, the Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to perform his journey warily; he writes in the letter that the enemy had departed and had turned their entire force against him. When this letter was brought to him about the middle of the night, Caesar apprises his soldiers of its contents, and inspires them with courage for fighting: the following day, at the dawn, he moves his camp, and, having proceeded four miles, he espies the forces of the

enemy on the other side of a considerable valley and rivulet. It was an affair of great danger to fight with such large forces in a disadvantageous situation. For the present, therefore, inasmuch as he knew that Cicero was released from the blockade, and thought that he might, on that account, relax his speed, he halted there and fortifies a camp in the most favourable position he can. And this, though it was small in itself, [there being] scarcely 7000 men, and these too without baggage, still by the narrowness of the passages, he contracts as much as he can, with this object, that he may come into the greatest contempt with the enemy. In the meanwhile, scouts having been sent in all directions, he examines by what most convenient path he might cross the valley.

L. — That day, slight skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near the river, both armies kept in their own positions: the Gauls, because they were awaiting larger forces which had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see] if perchance by pretence of fear he could allure the enemy towards his position, so that he might engage in battle, in front of his camp, on this side of the valley; if he could not accomplish this, that, having inquired about the passes, he might cross the valley and the river with the less hazard. At day-break the cavalry of the enemy approaches to the camp and joins battle with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to give way purposely, and retreat to the camp: at the same time he orders the camp to be fortified with a higher rampart in all directions, the gates to be barricaded, and in executing these things as much confusion to be shown as possible, and to perform them under the pretence of fear.

LI. — Induced by all these things the enemy lead over their forces and draw up their line in a disadvantageous position; and as our men also had been led down from the ramparts, they approach nearer, and

throw their weapons into the fortification from all sides, and sending heralds round, order it to be proclaimed that, if “any, either Gaul or Roman, was willing to go over to them before the third hour, it was permitted; after that time there would not be permission”; and so much did they disregard our men, that the gates having been blocked up with single rows of turf as a mere appearance, because they did not seem able to burst in that way, some began to pull down the rampart with their hands, others to fill up the trenches. Then Caesar, making a sally from all the gates, and sending out the cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, so that no one at all stood his ground with the intention of fighting; and he slew a great number of them, and deprived all of their arms.

LII. — Caesar, fearing to pursue them very far, because woods and morasses intervened, and also [because] he saw that they suffered no small loss in abandoning their position, reaches Cicero the same day with all his forces safe. He witnesses with surprise the towers, mantlets, and [other] fortifications belonging to the enemy: the legion having been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth soldier had not escaped without wounds. From all these things he judges with what danger and with what great courage matters had been conducted; he commends Cicero according to his desert and likewise the legion; he addresses individually the centurions and the tribunes of the soldiers, whose valour he had discovered to have been signal. He receives information of the death of Sabinus and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly being held the following day, he states the occurrence; he consoles and encourages the soldiers; he suggests that the disaster, which had been occasioned by the misconduct and rashness of his lieutenant, should be borne with a patient mind, because by the favour of the immortal gods and their

own valour, neither was lasting joy left to the enemy, nor very lasting grief to them.

LIII. — In the meanwhile the report respecting the victory of Caesar is conveyed to Labienus through the country of the Remi with incredible speed, so that, though he was about sixty miles distant from the winter-quarter of Cicero, and Caesar had arrived there after the ninth hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, by which shout an indication of the victory and a congratulation on the part of the Remi were given to Labienus. This report having been carried to the Treviri, Indutiormarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus the following day, flies by night and leads back all his forces into the country of the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to his winter-quarters; he himself determines to winter with three legions near Samarobriva in three different quarters, and, because such great commotions had arisen in Gaul, he resolved to remain during the whole winter with the army himself. For the disaster respecting the death of Sabinus having been circulated among them, almost all the states of Gaul were deliberating about war, sending messengers and embassies into all quarters, inquiring what further measure they should take, and holding councils by night in secluded places. Nor did any period of the whole winter pass over without fresh anxiety to Caesar, or without his receiving some intelligence respecting the meetings and commotions of the Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L. Roscius, the lieutenant whom he had placed over the thirteenth legion, that large forces of those states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricae, had assembled for the purpose of attacking him and were not more than eight miles distant; but intelligence respecting the victory of Caesar being carried [to them], had retreated in such a

manner that their departure appeared like a flight.

LIV. — But Caesar, having summoned to him the principal persons of each state, in one case by alarming them, since he declared that he knew what was going on, and in another case by encouraging them, retained a great part of Gaul in its allegiance. The Senones, however, which is a state eminently powerful and one of great influence among the Gauls, attempting by general design to slay Cavarinus whom Caesar had created king among them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty at the period of the arrival of Caesar in Gaul, and whose ancestors had also previously held it) when he discovered their plot and fled, pursued him even to the frontiers [of the state], and drove him from his kingdom and his home; and, after having sent ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of concluding a peace, when he ordered all their senate to come to him, did not obey that command. So far did it operate among those barbarian people, that there were found some to be the first to wage war; and so great a change of inclinations did it produce in all, that except the Aedui and the Remi, whom Caesar had always held in especial honour, the one people for their long standing and uniform fidelity towards the Roman people, the other for their late service in the Gallic war, there was scarcely a state which was not suspected by us. And I do not know whether that ought much to be wondered at, as well for several other reasons, as particularly because they who ranked above all nations for prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they had lost so much of that reputation as to submit to commands from the Roman people.

LV. — But the Treviri and Indutiomarus let no part of the entire winter pass without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, importuning the states, promising money, and asserting that, as a

large portion of our army had been cut off, a much smaller portion remained. However, none of the German states could be induced to cross the Rhine, since “they had twice essayed it,” they said, “in the war with Ariovistus and in the passage of the Tenchtheri there; that fortune was not to be tempted any more.” Indutiomarus disappointed in this expectation, nevertheless began to raise troops, and discipline them, and procure horses from the neighbouring people and allure to him by great rewards the outlaws and convicts throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he already acquired for himself in Gaul by these means, that embassies were flocking to him in all directions, and seeking, publicly and privately, his favour and friendship.

LVI. — When he perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; that on the one side the Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by their consciousness of guilt, on the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci were preparing war against the Romans, and that forces of volunteers would not be wanting to him if he began to advance from his own territories, he proclaims an armed council (this according to the custom of the Gauls is the commencement of war) at which, by a common law, all the youth were wont to assemble in arms; whoever of them comes last is killed in the sight of the whole assembly after being racked with every torture. In that council he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the other faction, his own son-in-law (whom we have above mentioned, as having embraced the protection of Caesar, and never having deserted him) an enemy and confiscates his property. When these things were finished, he asserts in the council that he, invited by the Senones and the Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul, was about to march thither through the territories of the Remi, devastate their lands, and attack the camp of Labienus: before he does that, he informs them of what he desires to

be done.

LVII. — Labienus, since he was confining himself within a camp strongly fortified by the nature of the ground and by art, had no apprehensions as to his own and the legion's danger, but was devising that he might throw away no opportunity of conducting the war successfully. Accordingly, the speech of Indutiomarus, which he had delivered in the council, having been made known [to him] by Cingetorix and his allies, he sends messengers to the neighbouring states and summons horse from all quarters: he appoints to them a fixed day for assembling. In the meantime, Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, nearly every day used to parade close to his [Labienus's] camp; at one time, that he might inform himself of the situation of the camp; at another time, for the purpose of conferring with or of intimidating him. Labienus confined his men within the fortifications and promoted the enemy's belief of his fear by whatever methods he could.

LVIII. — Since Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp with greater defiance, all the cavalry of the neighbouring states which he [Labienus] had taken care to have sent for, having been admitted in one night, he confined all his men within the camp by guards with such great strictness, that that fact could by no means be reported or carried to the Treviri. In the meanwhile Indutiomarus, according to his daily practice, advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the day there: his horse cast their weapons, and with very insulting language call out our men to battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemy when they thought proper, depart towards evening in a disorderly and scattered manner, Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by two gates; he gives this command and prohibition, that, when the enemy should be terrified and put to flight (which he

foresaw would happen, as it did), they should all make for Indutiomarus, and no one wound any man before he should have seen him slain, because he was unwilling that he should escape, in consequence of gaining time by the delay [occasioned by the pursuit] of the rest. He offers great rewards for those who should kill him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to the horse. The issue justifies the policy of the man, and, since all aimed at one, Indutiomarus is slain, having been overtaken at the very ford of the river, and his head is carried to the camp: the horse, when returning, pursue and slay all whom they can. This affair having been known, all the forces of the Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled, depart; and for a short time after this action, Caesar was less harassed in the government of Gaul.

BOOK VI

I. — Caesar, expecting for many reasons a greater commotion in Gaul, resolves to hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, his lieutenants: at the same time he requested of Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was remaining near the city invested with military command for the interests of the commonwealth, he would command those men whom when consul he had levied by the military oath in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceed to him; thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinion which the Gauls would entertain for the future, that the resources of Italy should appear so great, that if any loss should be sustained in war, not only could it be repaired in a short time, but likewise be further supplied by still larger forces. And when Pompey had granted this to the interests of the commonwealth and the claims of friendship, Caesar having quickly completed the levy by means of his lieutenants, after three legions had been both formed and brought to him before the winter [had] expired, and the number of those cohorts which he had lost under Q. Titurius had been doubled, taught the Gauls, both by his dispatch and by his forces, what the discipline and the power of the Roman people could accomplish.

II. — Indutiomarus having been slain, as we have stated, the government was conferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They cease not to importune the neighbouring Germans and to promise them money: when they could not obtain [their object] from those nearest them, they try those more remote. Having found some states willing to accede to their wishes, they enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath, and give hostages as a security for the money: they

attach Ambiorix to them by an alliance and confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he saw that war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine were under arms, that the Senones did not assemble according to his command, and were concerting measures with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states, that the Germans were importuned by the Treviri in frequent embassies, thought that he ought to take measures for the war earlier [than usual].

III.-Accordingly, while the winter was not yet ended, having concentrated the four nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, and before they could either assemble, or retreat, after capturing a large number of cattle and of men, and wasting their lands and giving up that booty to the soldiers, compelled them to enter into a surrender and give him hostages. That business having been speedily executed, he again led his legions back into winter-quarters. Having proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning of the spring, as he had been accustomed [to do], when the deputies from the rest, except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come, judging this to be the commencement of war and revolt, that he might appear to consider all things of less consequence [than that war], he transfers the council to Lutetia of the Parisii. These were adjacent to the Senones, and had united their state to them during the memory of their fathers, but were thought to have no part in the present plot. Having proclaimed this from the tribunal, he advances the same day towards the Senones with his legions and arrives among them by long marches.

IV. — Acco, who had been the author of that enterprise, on being informed of his arrival, orders the people to assemble in the towns; to

them, while attempting this and before it could be accomplished, news is brought that the Romans are close at hand: through necessity they give over their design and send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of imploring pardon; they make advances to him through the Aedui, whose state was from ancient times under the protection of Rome. Caesar readily grants them pardon and receives their excuse at the request of the Aedui; because he thought that the summer season was one for an impending war, not for an investigation. Having imposed one hundred hostages, he delivers these to the Aedui to be held in charge by them. To the same place the Carnutes send ambassadors and hostages, employing as their mediators the Remi, under whose protection they were: they receive the same answers. Caesar concludes the council and imposes a levy of cavalry on the states.

V. — This part of Gaul having been tranquillized, he applies himself entirely both in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. He orders Cavarinus to march with him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest any commotion should arise either out of his hot temper, or out of the hatred of the state which he had incurred. After arranging these things, as he considered it certain that Ambiorix would not contend in battle, he watched his other plans attentively. The Menapii bordered on the territories of the Eburones, and were protected by one continued extent of morasses and woods; and they alone out of Gaul had never sent ambassadors to Caesar on the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie of hospitality subsisted between them and Ambiorix: he also discovered that the latter had entered into an alliance with the Germans by means of the Treviri. He thought that these auxiliaries ought to be detached from him before he provoked him to war; lest he, despairing of safety, should

either proceed to conceal himself in the territories of the Menapii, or should be driven to coalesce with the Germans beyond the Rhine. Having entered upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the territories of the Treviri and orders two legions to proceed to him: he himself proceeds against the Menapii with five lightly-equipped legions. They, having assembled no troops, as they relied on the defence of their position, retreat into the woods and morasses, and convey thither all their property.

VI. — Caesar, having divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. Crassus, his questor, and having hastily constructed some bridges, enters their country in three divisions, burns their houses and villages, and gets possession of a large number of cattle and men. Constrained by these circumstances, the Menapii send ambassadors to him for the purpose of suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages, assures them that he will consider them in the number of his enemies if they shall receive within their territories either Ambiorix or his ambassadors. Having determinately settled these things, he left among the Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian with some cavalry as a guard; he himself proceeds toward the Treviri.

VII. — While these things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri, having drawn together large forces of infantry and of cavalry, were preparing to attack Labienus and the legion which was wintering in their territories, and were already not further distant from him than a journey of two days, when they learn that two legions had arrived by the order of Caesar. Having pitched their camp fifteen miles off, they resolve to await the support of the Germans. Labienus, having learned the design of the enemy, hoping that through their rashness there would be some opportunity of

engaging, after leaving a guard of five cohorts for the baggage, advances against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large body of cavalry, and, leaving the space of a mile between them, fortifies his camp. There was between Labienus and the enemy a river difficult to cross and with steep banks: this neither did he himself design to cross, nor did he suppose the enemy would cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was daily increasing. He [Labienus] openly says in a council that “since the Germans are said to be approaching, he would not bring into uncertainty his own and the army’s fortunes, and the next day would move his camp at early dawn. These words are quickly carried to the enemy, since out of so large a number of cavalry composed of Gauls, nature compelled some to favour the Gallic interests. Labienus, having assembled the tribunes of the soldiers and principal centurions by night, states what his design is, and, that he may the more easily give the enemy a belief of his fears, he orders the camp to be moved with greater noise and confusion than was usual with the Roman people. By these means he makes his departure [appear], like a retreat. These things, also, since the camps were so near, are reported to the enemy by scouts before daylight.

VIII. — Scarcely had the rear advanced beyond the fortifications when the Gauls, encouraging one another “not to cast from their hands the anticipated booty, that it was a tedious thing, while the Romans were panic stricken, to be waiting for the aid of the Germans, and that their dignity did not suffer them to fear to attack with such great forces so small a band, particularly when retreating and encumbered,” do not hesitate to cross the river and give battle in a disadvantageous position. Labienus suspecting that these things would happen, was proceeding quietly, and using the same pretence of a march, in order that he might entice them across the river. Then,

having sent forward the baggage some short distance and placed it on a certain eminence, he says, "Soldiers, you have the opportunity you have sought: you hold the enemy in an encumbered and disadvantageous position: display to us your leaders the same valour you have oftentimes displayed to your general: imagine that he is present and actually sees these exploits." At the same time he orders the troops to face about towards the enemy and form in line of battle, and, despatching a few troops of cavalry as a guard for the baggage, he places the rest of the horse on the wings. Our men, raising a shout, quickly throw their javelins at the enemy. They, when, contrary to their expectation, they saw those whom they believed to be retreating, advance towards them with threatening banners, were not able to sustain even the charge, and, being put to flight at the first onslaught, sought the nearest woods: Labienus pursuing them with the cavalry, upon a large number being slain, and several taken prisoners, got possession of the state a few days after; for the Germans who were coming to the aid of the Treviri, having been informed of their flight, retreated to their homes. The relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the promoters of the revolt, accompanying them, quitted their own state with them. The supreme power and government were delivered to Cingetorix, whom we have stated to have remained firm in his allegiance from the commencement.

IX. — Caesar, after he came from the territories of the Menapii into those of the Treviri, resolved for two reasons to cross the Rhine; one of which was, because they had sent assistance to the Treviri against him; the other, that Ambiorix might not have a retreat among them. Having determined on these matters, he began to build a bridge a little above that place, at which he had before conveyed over

his army. The plan having been known and laid down, the work is accomplished in a few days by the great exertion of the soldiers. Having left a strong guard at the bridge on the side of the Treviri, lest any commotion should suddenly arise among them, he leads over the rest of the forces and the cavalry. The Ubii, who before had sent hostages and come to a capitulation, send ambassadors to him, for the purpose of vindicating themselves, to assure him that “neither had auxiliaries been sent to the Treviri from their state, nor had they violated their allegiance”; they entreat and beseech him “to spare them, lest, in his common hatred of the Germans, the innocent should suffer the penalty of the guilty: they promise to give more hostages, if he desire them.” Having investigated the case, Caesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent by the Suevi; he accepts the apology of the Ubii, and makes minute inquiries concerning the approaches and the routes to the territories of the Suevi. X. — In the meanwhile he is informed by the Ubii, a few days after, that the Suevi are drawing all their forces into one place, and are giving orders to those nations which are under their government to send auxiliaries of infantry and of cavalry. Having learned these things, he provides a supply of corn, selects a proper place for his camp, and commands the Ubii to drive off their cattle and carry away all their possessions from the country parts into the towns, hoping that they, being a barbarous and ignorant people, when harassed by the want of provisions, might be brought to an engagement on disadvantageous terms: he orders them to send numerous scouts among the Suevi, and learn what things are going on among them. They execute the orders, and, a few days having intervened, report that all the Suevi, after certain intelligence concerning the army of the Romans had come, retreated with all their own forces and those of their allies, which they had assembled, to the

utmost extremities of their territories: that there is a wood there of very great extent, which is called Bacenis; that this stretches a great way into the interior, and, being opposed as a natural barrier, defends from injuries and incursions the Cherusci against the Suevi, and the Suevi against the Cherusci: that at the entrance of that forest the Suevi had determined to await the coming up of the Romans.

XI. — Since we have come to this place, it does not appear to be foreign to our subject to lay before the reader an account of the manners of Gaul and Germany, and wherein these nations differ from each other. In Gaul there are factions not only in all the states, and in all the cantons and their divisions, but almost in each family, and of these factions those are the leaders who are considered according to their judgment to possess the greatest influence, upon whose will and determination the management of all affairs and measures depends. And that seems to have been instituted in ancient times with this view, that no one of the common people should be in want of support against one more powerful; for none [of those leaders] suffers his party to be oppressed and defrauded, and if he do otherwise, he has no influence among his party. This same policy exists throughout the whole of Gaul; for all the states are divided into two factions.

XII. — When Caesar arrived in Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of one faction, the Sequani of the other. Since the latter were less powerful by themselves, inasmuch as the chief influence was from of old among the Aedui, and their dependencies were great, they had united to themselves the Germans and Ariovistus, and had brought them over to their party by great sacrifices and promises. And having fought several successful battles and slain all the nobility of the Aedui, they had so far surpassed them in power, that they brought over, from the Aedui to themselves, a large portion of their

dependants and received from them the sons of their leading men as hostages, and compelled them to swear in their public character that they would enter into no design against them; and held a portion of the neighbouring land, seized on by force, and possessed the sovereignty of the whole of Gaul. Divitiacus urged by this necessity, had proceeded to Rome to the senate, for the purpose of entreating assistance, and had returned without accomplishing his object. A change of affairs ensued on the arrival of Caesar, the hostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored, and new acquired through Caesar (because those who had attached themselves to their alliance saw that they enjoyed a better state and a milder government), their other interests, their influence, their reputation were likewise increased, and in consequence, the Sequani lost the sovereignty. The Remi succeeded to their place, and, as it was perceived that they equalled the Aedui in favour with Caesar, those, who on account of their old animosities could by no means coalesce with the Aedui, consigned themselves in clientship to the Remi. The latter carefully protected them. Thus they possessed both a new and suddenly acquired influence. Affairs were then in that position, that the Aedui were considered by far the leading people, and the Remi held the second post of honour.

XIII. — Throughout all Gaul there are two orders of those men who are of any rank and dignity: for the commonality is held almost in the condition of slaves, and dares to undertake nothing of itself and is admitted to no deliberation. The greater part, when they are pressed either by debt, or the large amount of their tributes, or the oppression of the more powerful, give themselves up in vassalage to the nobles, who possess over them the same rights without exception as masters over their slaves. But of these two orders, one is that of

the Druids, the other that of the knights. The former are engaged in things sacred, conduct the public and the private sacrifices, and interpret all matters of religion. To these a large number of the young men resort for the purpose of instruction, and they [the Druids] are in great honour among them. For they determine respecting almost all controversies, public and private; and if any crime has been perpetrated, if murder has been committed, if there be any dispute about an inheritance, if any about boundaries, these same persons decide it; they decree rewards and punishments if any one, either in a private or public capacity, has not submitted to their decision, they interdict him from the sacrifices. This among them is the most heavy punishment. Those who have been thus interdicted are esteemed in the number of the impious and the criminal: all shun them, and avoid their society and conversation, lest they receive some evil from their contact; nor is justice administered to them when seeking it, nor is any dignity bestowed on them. Over all these Druids one presides, who possesses supreme authority among them. Upon his death, if any individual among the rest is pre-eminent in dignity, he succeeds; but, if there are many equal, the election is made by the suffrages of the Druids; sometimes they even contend for the presidency with arms. These assemble at a fixed period of the year in a consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, which is reckoned the central region of the whole of Gaul. Hither all, who have disputes, assemble from every part, and submit to their decrees and determinations. This institution is supposed to have been devised in Britain, and to have been brought over from it into Gaul; and now those who desire to gain a more accurate knowledge of that system generally proceed thither for the purpose of studying it.

XIV. — The Druids do not go to war, nor pay tribute together

with the rest; they have an exemption from military service and a dispensation in all matters. Induced by such great advantages, many embrace this profession of their own accord, and [many] are sent to it by their parents and relations. They are said there to learn by heart a great number of verses; accordingly some remain in the course of training twenty years. Nor do they regard it lawful to commit these to writing, though in almost all other matters, in their public and private transactions, they use Greek characters. That practice they seem to me to have adopted for two reasons; because they neither desire their doctrines to be divulged among the mass of the people, nor those who learn, to devote themselves the less to the efforts of memory, relying on writing; since it generally occurs to most men, that, in their dependence on writing, they relax their diligence in learning thoroughly, and their employment of the memory. They wish to inculcate this as one of their leading tenets, that souls do not become extinct, but pass after death from one body to another, and they think that men by this tenet are in a great degree excited to valour, the fear of death being disregarded. They likewise discuss and impart to the youth many things respecting the stars and their motion, respecting the extent of the world and of our earth, respecting the nature of things, respecting the power and the majesty of the immortal gods.

XV. — The other order is that of the knights. These, when there is occasion and any war occurs (which before Caesar's arrival was for the most part wont to happen every year, as either they on their part were inflicting injuries or repelling those which others inflicted on them), are all engaged in war. And those of them most distinguished by birth and resources, have the greatest number of vassals and dependants about them. They acknowledge this sort of influence and power only.

XVI. — The nation of all the Gauls is extremely devoted to superstitious rites; and on that account they who are troubled with unusually severe diseases and they who are engaged in battles and dangers, either sacrifice men as victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them, and employ the Druids as the performers of those sacrifices; because they think that unless the life of a man be offered for the life of a man, the mind of the immortal gods cannot be rendered propitious, and they have sacrifices of that kind ordained for national purposes. Others have figures of vast size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they fill with living men, which being set on fire, the men perish enveloped in the flames. They consider that the oblation of such as have been taken in theft, or in robbery, or any other offence, is more acceptable to the immortal gods; but when a supply of that class is wanting, they have recourse to the oblation of even the innocent.

XVII. — They worship as their divinity, Mercury in particular, and have many images of him, and regard him as the inventor of all arts, they consider him, the guide of their journeys and marches, and believe him to have very great influence over the acquisition of gain and mercantile transactions. Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva; respecting these deities they have for the most part the same belief as other nations: that Apollo averts diseases, that Minerva imparts the invention of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses the sovereignty of the heavenly powers; that Mars presides over wars. To him when they have determined to engage in battle, they commonly vow those things they shall take in war. When they have conquered, they sacrifice whatever captured animals may have survived the conflict, and collect the other things into one place. In many states you may see piles of these things heaped up in their

consecrated spots; nor does it often happen that any one, disregarding the sanctity of the case, dares either to secrete in his house things captured, or take away those deposited; and the most severe punishment, with torture, has been established for such a deed.

XVIII. — All the Gauls assert that they are descended from the god Dis, and say that this tradition has been handed down by the Druids. For that reason they compute the divisions of every season, not by the number of days, but of nights; they keep birthdays and the beginnings of months and years in such an order that the day follows the night. Among the other usages of their life, they differ in this from almost all other nations, that they do not permit their children to approach them openly until they are grown up so as to be able to bear the service of war; and they regard it as indecorous for a son of boyish age to stand in public in the presence of his father.

XIX. — Whatever sums of money the husbands have received in the name of dowry from their wives, making an estimate of it, they add the same amount out of their own estates. An account is kept of all this money conjointly, and the profits are laid by: whichever of them shall have survived [the other], to that one the portion of both reverts, together with the profits of the previous time. Husbands have power of life and death over their wives as well as over their children: and when the father of a family, born in a more than commonly distinguished rank, has died, his relations assemble, and, if the circumstances of his death are suspicious, hold an investigation upon the wives in the manner adopted towards slaves; and if proof be obtained, put them to severe torture, and kill them. Their funerals, considering the state of civilization among the Gauls, are magnificent and costly; and they cast into the fire all things, including living creatures, which they suppose to have been dear to them when alive;

and, a little before this period, slaves and dependants, who were ascertained to have been beloved by them, were, after the regular funeral rites were completed, burnt together with them.

XX. — Those states which are considered to conduct their commonwealth more judiciously, have it ordained by their laws, that, if any person shall have heard by rumour and report from his neighbours anything concerning the commonwealth, he shall convey it to the magistrate and not impart it to any other; because it has been discovered that inconsiderate and inexperienced men were often alarmed by false reports and driven to some rash act, or else took hasty measures in affairs of the highest importance. The magistrates conceal those things which require to be kept unknown; and they disclose to the people whatever they determine to be expedient. It is not lawful to speak of the commonwealth, except in council.

XXI. — The Germans differ much from these usages, for they have neither Druids to preside over sacred offices, nor do they pay great regard to sacrifices. They rank in the number of the gods those alone whom they behold, and by whose instrumentality they are obviously benefited, namely, the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not heard of the other deities even by report. Their whole life is occupied in hunting and in the pursuits of the military art; from childhood they devote themselves to fatigue and hardships. Those who have remained chaste for the longest time, receive the greatest commendation among their people: they think that by this the growth is promoted, by this the physical powers are increased and the sinews are strengthened. And to have had knowledge of a woman before the twentieth year they reckon among the most disgraceful acts; of which matter there is no concealment, because they bathe promiscuously in the rivers and [only] use skins or small cloaks of deers' hides, a large

portion of the body being in consequence naked.

XXII. — They do not pay much attention to agriculture, and a large portion of their food consists in milk, cheese, and flesh; nor has any one a fixed quantity of land or his own individual limits; but the magistrates and the leading men each year apportion to the tribes and families, who have united together, as much land as, and in the place in which, they think proper, and the year after compel them to remove elsewhere. For this enactment they advance many reasons — lest seduced by long-continued custom, they may exchange their ardour in the waging of war for agriculture; lest they may be anxious to acquire extensive estates, and the more powerful drive the weaker from their possessions; lest they construct their houses with too great a desire to avoid cold and heat; lest the desire of wealth spring up, from which cause divisions and discords arise; and that they may keep the common people in a contented state of mind, when each sees his own means placed on an equality with [those of] the most powerful.

XXIII. — It is the greatest glory to the several states to have as wide deserts as possible around them, their frontiers having been laid waste. They consider this the real evidence of their prowess, that their neighbours shall be driven out of their lands and abandon them, and that no one dare settle near them; at the same time they think that they shall be on that account the more secure, because they have removed the apprehension of a sudden incursion. When a state either repels war waged against it, or wages it against another, magistrates are chosen to preside over that war with such authority, that they have power of life and death. In peace there is no common magistrate, but the chiefs of provinces and cantons administer justice and determine controversies among their own people. Robberies

which are committed beyond the boundaries of each state bear no infamy, and they avow that these are committed for the purpose of disciplining their youth and of preventing sloth. And when any of their chiefs has said in an assembly “that he will be their leader, let those who are willing to follow, give in their names”; they who approve of both the enterprise and the man arise and promise their assistance and are applauded by the people; such of them as have not followed him are accounted in the number of deserters and traitors, and confidence in all matters is afterwards refused them. To injure guests they regard as impious; they defend from wrong those who have come to them for any purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable; to them the houses of all are open and maintenance is freely supplied.

XXIV. — And there was formerly a time when the Gauls excelled the Germans in prowess, and waged war on them offensively, and, on account of the great number of their people and the insufficiency of their land, sent colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the Volcae Tectosages seized on those parts of Germany which are the most fruitful [and lie] around the Hercynian forest (which, I perceive, was known by report to Eratosthenes and some other Greeks, and which they call Orcynia) and settled there. Which nation to this time retains its position in those settlements, and has a very high character for justice and military merit: now also they continue in the same scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Germans, and use the same food and dress; but their proximity to the Province and knowledge of commodities from countries beyond the sea supplies to the Gauls many things tending to luxury as well as civilization. Accustomed by degrees to be overmatched and worsted in many engagements, they do not even compare themselves to the Germans in prowess.

XXV. — The breadth of this Hercynian forest, which has been referred to above, is to a quick traveller, a journey of nine days. For it cannot be otherwise computed, nor are they acquainted with the measures of roads. It begins at the frontiers of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and extends in a right line along the river Danube to the territories of the Daci and the Anartes: it bends thence to the left in a different direction from the river, and owing to its extent touches the confines of many nations; nor is there any person belonging to this part of Germany who says that he either has gone to the extremity of that forest, though he had advanced a journey of sixty days, or has heard in what place it begins. It is certain that many kinds of wild beasts are produced in it which have not been seen in other parts; of which the following are such as differ principally from other animals, and appear worthy of being committed to record.

XXVI. — There is an ox of the shape of a stag, between whose ears a horn rises from the middle of the forehead, higher and straighter than those horns which are known to us. From the top of this, branches, like palms; stretch out a considerable distance. The shape of the female and of the male is the same; the appearance and the size of the horns is the same.

XXVII. — There are also [animals] which are called elks. The shape of these, and the varied colour of their skins, is much like roes, but in size they surpass them a little and are destitute of horns, and have legs without joints and ligatures; nor do they lie down for the purpose of rest, nor, if they have been thrown down by any accident, can they raise or lift themselves up. Trees serve as beds to them; they lean themselves against them, and thus reclining only slightly, they take their rest; when the huntsmen have discovered from the footsteps of these animals whither they are accustomed to betake

themselves, they either undermine all the trees at the roots, or cut into them so far that the upper part of the trees may appear to be left standing. When they have leant upon them, according to their habit, they knock down by their weight the unsupported trees, and fall down themselves along with them.

XXVIII.-There is a third kind, consisting of those animals which are called uri. These are a little below the elephant in size, and of the appearance, colour, and shape of a bull. Their strength and speed are extraordinary; they spare neither man nor wild beast which they have espied. These the Germans take with much pains in pits and kill them. The young men harden themselves with this exercise, and practice themselves in this kind of hunting, and those who have slain the greatest number of them, having produced the horns in public, to serve as evidence, receive great praise. But not even when taken very young can they be rendered familiar to men and tamed. The size, shape, and appearance of their horns differ much from the horns of our oxen. These they anxiously seek after, and bind at the tips with silver, and use as cups at their most sumptuous entertainments.

XXIX. — Caesar, after he discovered through the Ubian scouts that the Suevi had retired into their woods, apprehending a scarcity of corn, because, as we have observed above, all the Germans pay very little attention to agriculture, resolved not to proceed any farther; but, that he might not altogether relieve the barbarians from the fear of his return, and that he might delay their succours, having led back his army, he breaks down, to the length of 200 feet, the farther end of the bridge, which joined the banks of the Ubii, and, at the extremity of the bridge raises towers of four stories, and stations a guard of twelve cohorts for the purpose of defending the bridge, and strengthens the place with considerable fortifications. Over that

fort and guard he appointed C. Volcatius Tullus, a young man; he himself, when the corn began to ripen, having set forth for the war with 40 Ambiorix (through the forest Arduenna, which is the largest of all Gaul, and reaches from the banks of the Rhine and the frontiers of the Treviri to those of the Nervii, and extends over more than 500 miles), he sends forward L. Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try if he might gain any advantage by rapid marches and the advantage of time, he warns him to forbid fires being made in the camp, lest any indication of his approach be given at a distance: he tells him that he will follow immediately.

XXX. — Basilus does as he was commanded; having performed his march rapidly, and even surpassed the expectations of all, he surprises in the fields many not expecting him; through their information he advances towards Ambiorix himself, to the place in which he was said to be with a few horse. Fortune accomplishes much, not only in other matters, but also in the art of war. For as it happened by a remarkable chance, that he fell upon [Ambiorix] himself unguarded and unprepared, and that his arrival was seen by the people before the report or information of his arrival was carried thither; so it was an incident of extraordinary fortune that, although every implement of war which he was accustomed to have about him was seized, and his chariots and horses surprised, yet he himself escaped death. But it was effected owing to this circumstance, that his house being surrounded by a wood, (as are generally the dwellings of the Gauls, who, for the purpose of avoiding heat, mostly seek the neighbourhood of woods and rivers) his attendants and friends in a narrow spot sustained for a short time the attack of our horse. While they were fighting, one of his followers mounted him on a horse: the woods sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended

much both towards his encountering and his escaping danger.

XXXI. — Whether Ambiorix did not collect his forces from cool deliberation, because he considered he ought not to engage in a battle, or [whether] he was debarred by time and prevented by the sudden arrival of our horse, when he supposed the rest of the army was closely following, is doubtful; but certainly, despatching messengers through the country, he ordered every one to provide for himself; and a part of them fled into the forest Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses; those who were nearest the ocean, concealed themselves in the islands which the tides usually form; many, departing from their territories, committed themselves and all their possessions to perfect strangers. Cativolcus, king of one-half of the Eburones, who had entered into the design together with Ambiorix, since, being now worn out by age, he was unable to endure the fatigue either of war or flight, having cursed Ambiorix with every imprecation, as the person who had been the contriver of that measure, destroyed himself with the juice of the yew tree, of which there is a great abundance in Gaul and Germany.

XXXII. — The Segui and Condrusi, of the nation and number of the Germans, and who are between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent ambassadors to Caesar to entreat that he would not regard them in the number of his enemies, nor consider that the cause of all the Germans on this side the Rhine was one and the same; that they had formed no plans of war, and had sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. Caesar, having ascertained this fact by an examination of his prisoners commanded that if any of the Eburones in their flight had repaired to them, they should be sent back to him; he assures them that if they did that, he will not injure their territories. Then, having divided his forces into three parts, he sent the baggage of all the

legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort. This is nearly in the middle of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had been quartered for the purpose of wintering. This place he selected as well on other accounts as because the fortifications of the previous year remained, in order that he might relieve the labour of the soldiers. He left the fourteenth legion as a guard for the baggage, one of those three which he had lately raised in Italy and brought over. Over that legion and camp he places Q. Tullius Cicero and gives him 200 horse.

XXXIII. — Having divided the army, he orders T. Labienus to proceed with three legions towards the ocean into those parts which border on the Menappii; he sends C. Trebonius with a like number of legions to lay waste that district which lies contiguous to the Aduatuci; he himself determines to go with the remaining three to the river Sambre, which flows into the Meuse, and to the most remote parts of Arduenna, whither he heard that Ambiorix had gone with a few horse. When departing, he promises that he will return before the end of the seventh day, on which day he was aware corn was due to that legion which was being left in garrison. He directs Labienus and Trebonius to return by the same day, if they can do so agreeably to the interests of the republic; so that their measures having been mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemy having been discovered, they might be able to commence a different line of operations.

XXXIV. — There was, as we have above observed, no regular army, nor a town, nor a garrison which could defend itself by arms; but the people were scattered in all directions. Where either a hidden valley, or a woody spot, or a difficult morass furnished any hope of protection or of security to any one, there he had fixed himself. These

places were known to those that dwelt in the neighbourhood, and the matter demanded great attention, not so much in protecting the main body of the army (for no peril could occur to them altogether from those alarmed and scattered troops), as in preserving individual soldiers; which in some measure tended to the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty was leading many too far, and the woods with their unknown and hidden routes would not allow them to go in large bodies. If he desired the business to be completed and the race of those infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of men must be sent in several directions and the soldiers must be detached on all sides; if he were disposed to keep the companies at their standards, as the established discipline and practice of the Roman army required, the situation itself was a safeguard to the barbarians, nor was there wanting to individuals the daring to lay secret ambuscades and beset scattered soldiers. But amidst difficulties of this nature as far as precautions could be taken by vigilance, such precautions were taken; so that some opportunities of injuring the enemy were neglected, though the minds of all were burning to take revenge, rather than that injury should be effected with any loss to our soldiers. Caesar despatches messengers to the neighbouring states; by the hope of booty he invites all to him, for the purpose of plundering the Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls might be hazarded in the woods rather than the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in order that a large force being drawn around them, the race and name of that state may be annihilated for such a crime. A large number from all quarters speedily assembles.

XXXV. — These things were going on in all parts of the territories of the Eburones, and the seventh day was drawing near, by which day Caesar had purposed to return to the baggage and the

legion. Here it might be learned how much fortune achieves in war, and how great casualties she produces. The enemy having been scattered and alarmed, as we related above, there was no force which might produce even a slight occasion of fear. The report extends beyond the Rhine to the Germans that the Eburones are being pillaged, and that all were without distinction invited to the plunder. The Sigambri, who are nearest to the Rhine, by whom, we have mentioned above, the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were received after their retreat, collect 2000 horse; they cross the Rhine in ships and barks thirty miles below that place where the bridge was entire and the garrison left by Caesar; they arrive at the frontiers of the Eburones, surprise many who were scattered in flight, and get possession of a large amount of cattle, of which barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by booty, they advance farther; neither morass nor forest obstructs these men, born amidst war and depredations; they inquire of their prisoners in what parts Caesar is; they find that he has advanced farther, and learn that all the army has removed. Thereon one of the prisoners says, "Why do you pursue such wretched and trifling spoil; you, to whom it is granted to become even now most richly endowed by fortune? In three hours you can reach Aduatuca; there the Roman army has deposited all its fortunes; there is so little of a garrison that not even the wall can be manned, nor dare any one go beyond the fortifications." A hope having been presented them, the Germans leave in concealment the plunder they had acquired; they themselves hasten to Aduatuca, employing as their guide the same man by whose information they had become informed of these things.

XXXVI. — Cicero, who during all the foregoing days had kept his soldiers in camp with the greatest exactness, and agreeably to the

injunctions of Caesar, had not permitted even any of the camp-followers to go beyond the fortification, distrusting on the seventh day that Caesar would keep his promise as to the number of days, because he heard that he had proceeded farther, and no report as to his return was brought to him, and being urged at the same time by the expressions of those who called his tolerance almost a siege, if, forsooth, it was not permitted them to go out of the camp, since he might expect no disaster, whereby he could be injured, within three miles of the camp, while nine legions and all the cavalry were under arms, and the enemy scattered and almost annihilated, sent five cohorts into the neighbouring cornlands, between which and the camp only one hill intervened, for the purpose of foraging. Many soldiers of the legions had been left invalided in the camp, of whom those who had recovered in this space of time, being about 300, are set together under one standard; a large number of soldiers' attendants besides, with a great number of beasts of burden, which had remained in the camp, permission being granted, follow them.

XXXVII. — At this very time, the German horse by chance come up, and immediately, with the same speed with which they had advanced, attempt to force the camp at the Decuman gate, nor were they seen, in consequence of woods lying in the way on that side, before they were just reaching the camp: so much so, that the sutlers who had their booths under the rampart had not an opportunity of retreating within the camp. Our men, not anticipating it, are perplexed by the sudden affair, and the cohort on the outpost scarcely sustains the first attack. The enemy spread themselves on the other sides to ascertain if they could find any access. Our men with difficulty defend the gates; the very position of itself and the fortification secures the other accesses. There is a panic in the entire

camp, and one inquires of another the cause of the confusion, nor do they readily determine whither the standards should be borne, nor into what quarter each should betake himself. One avows that the camp is already taken, another maintains that, the enemy having destroyed the army and commander-in-chief, are come thither as conquerors; most form strange superstitious fancies from the spot, and place before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta and Titurius, who had fallen in the same fort. All being greatly disconcerted by this alarm, the belief of the barbarians is strengthened that there is no garrison within, as they had heard from their prisoner. They endeavour to force an entrance and encourage one another not to cast from their hands so valuable a prize.

XXXVIII.-P. Sextius Baculus, who had led a principal century under Caesar (of whom we have made mention in previous engagements), had been left an invalid in the garrison, and had now been five days without food. He, distrusting his own safety and that of all, goes forth from his tent unarmed; he sees that the enemy are close at hand and that the matter is in the utmost danger; he snatches arms from those nearest, and stations himself at the gate. The centurions of that cohort which was on guard follow him; for a short time they sustain the fight together. Sextius faints, after receiving many wounds; he is with difficulty saved, drawn away by the hands of the soldiers. This space having intervened, the others resume courage, so far as to venture to take their place on the fortifications and present the aspect of defenders.

XXXIX. — The foraging having in the meantime been completed, our soldiers distinctly hear the shout; the horse hasten on before and discover in what danger the affair is. But here there is no fortification to receive them, in their alarm: those last enlisted and unskilled in

military discipline turn their faces to the military tribune and the centurions; they wait to find what orders may be given by them. No one is so courageous as not to be disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair. The barbarians, espying our standard in the distance, desist from the attack; at first they suppose that the legions, which they had learned from their prisoners had removed farther off, had returned; afterwards, despising their small number, they make an attack on them at all sides.

XL.-The camp-followers run forward to the nearest rising ground; being speedily driven from this they throw themselves among the standards and companies: they thus so much the more alarm the soldiers already affrighted. Some propose that, forming a wedge, they suddenly break through, since the camp was so near; and if any part should be surrounded and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest may be saved; others, that they take their stand on an eminence, and all undergo the same destiny. The veteran soldiers, whom we stated to have set out together [with the others] under a standard, do not approve of this. Therefore encouraging each other, under the conduct of Caius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been appointed over them, they break through the midst of the enemy, and arrive in the camp safe to a man. The camp-attendants and the horse following close upon them with the same impetuosity, are saved by the courage of the soldiers. But those who had taken their stand upon the eminence having even now acquired no experience of military matters, neither could persevere in that resolution which they approved of, namely, to defend themselves from their higher position, nor imitate that vigour and speed which they had observed to have availed others; but, attempting to reach the camp, had descended into an unfavourable situation. The Centurions, some of

whom had been promoted for their valour from the lower ranks of other legions to higher ranks in this legion, in order that they might not forfeit their glory for military exploits previously acquired, fell together fighting most valiantly. The enemy having been dislodged by their valour, a part of the soldiers arrived safe in camp contrary to their expectations; a part perished, surrounded by the barbarians.

XLI. — The Germans, despairing of taking the camp by storm, because they saw that our men had taken up their position on the fortifications, retreated beyond the Rhine with that plunder which they had deposited in the woods. And so great was the alarm, even after the departure of the enemy, that when C. Volusenus, who had been sent with the cavalry, arrived that night, he could not gain credence that Caesar was close at hand with his army safe. Fear had so pre-occupied the minds of all, that, their reason being almost estranged, they said that all the other forces having been cut off, the cavalry alone had arrived there by flight, and asserted that, if the army were safe, the Germans would not have attacked the camp: which fear the arrival of Caesar removed.

XLII. — He, on his return, being well aware of the casualties of war, complained of one thing [only], namely, that the cohorts had been sent away from the outposts and garrison [duty], and pointed out that room ought not to have been left for even the most trivial casualty; that fortune had exercised great influence in the sudden arrival of their enemy; much greater, in that she had turned the barbarians away from the very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all which events, it seemed the most surprising that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with this object, that they might plunder the territories of Ambiorix, being led to the camp of the Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable service.

XLIII. — Caesar, having again marched to harass the enemy, after collecting a large number [of auxiliaries] from the neighbouring states, despatches them in all directions. All the villages and all the buildings, which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was being driven off from all parts; the corn not only was being consumed by so great numbers of cattle and men, but also had fallen to the earth, owing to the time of the year and the storms; so that if any had concealed themselves for the present, still, it appeared likely that they must perish through want of all things, when the army should be drawn off. And frequently it came to that point, as so large a body of cavalry had been sent abroad in all directions, that the prisoners declared Ambiorix had just then been seen by them in flight, and had not even passed out of sight, so that the hope of overtaking him being raised, and unbounded exertions having been resorted to, those who thought they should acquire the highest favour with Caesar, nearly overcame nature by their ardour, and continually a little only seemed wanting to complete success; but he rescued himself by [means of] lurking-places and forests, and, concealed by the night, made for other districts and quarters, with no greater guard than that of four horsemen, to whom alone he ventured to confide his life.

XLIV. — Having devastated the country in such a manner, Caesar leads back his army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum of the Remi, and, having summoned a council of Gaul to assemble at that place, he resolved to hold an investigation respecting the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes, and having pronounced a most severe sentence upon Acco, who had been the contriver of that plot, he punished him after the custom of our ancestors. Some fearing a trial, fled; when he had forbidden these fire and water, he stationed in winter quarters two legions at the frontiers of the Treviri,

two among the Lingones, the remaining six at Agendicum, in the territories of the Senones; and, having provided corn for the army, he set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes.

BOOK VII

I. — Gaul being tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, sets out for Italy to hold the provincial assizes. There he receives intelligence of the death of Clodius; and, being informed of the decree of the senate [to the effect] that all the youth of Italy should take the military oath, he determined to hold a levy throughout the entire province. Report of these events is rapidly borne into Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls themselves add to the report, and invent what the case seemed to require, [namely] that Caesar was detained by commotions in the city, and could not, amidst so violent dissensions, come to his army. Animated by this opportunity, they who already, previously to this occurrence, were indignant that they were reduced beneath the dominion of Rome, begin to organize their plans for war more openly and daringly. The leading men of Gaul, having convened councils among themselves in the woods, and retired places, complain of the death of Acco: they point out that this fate may fall in turn on themselves: they bewail the unhappy fate of Gaul; and by every sort of promises and rewards, they earnestly solicit some to begin the war, and assert the freedom of Gaul at the hazard of their lives. They say that special care should be paid to this, that Caesar should be cut off from his army, before their secret plans should be divulged. That this was easy, because neither would the legions, in the absence of their general, dare to leave their winter quarters, nor could the general reach his army without a guard: finally, that it was better to be slain in battle than not to recover their ancient glory in war, and that freedom which they had received from their forefathers.

II. — Whilst these things are in agitation, the Carnutes declare

“that they would decline no danger for the sake of the general safety,” and promise that they would be the first of all to begin the war; and since they cannot at present take precautions, by giving and receiving hostages, that the affair shall not be divulged they require that a solemn assurance be given them by oath and plighted honour, their military standards being brought together (in which manner their most sacred obligations are made binding), that they should not be deserted by the rest of the Gauls on commencing the war.

III. — When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, under the command of Cotuatus and Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together at Genabum, and slay the Roman citizens who had settled there for the purpose of trading (among the rest, Caius Fusius Cita, a distinguished Roman knight, who by Caesar’s orders had presided over the provision department), and plunder their property. The report is quickly spread among all the states of Gaul; for, whenever a more important and remarkable event takes place, they transmit the intelligence through their lands and districts by a shout; the others take it up in succession, and pass it to their neighbours, as happened on this occasion; for the things which were done at Genabum at sunrise were heard in the territories of the Arverni before the end of the first watch, which is an extent of more than a hundred and sixty miles.

IV. — There in like manner, Vercingetorix the son of Celtillus the Arvernian, a young man of the highest power (whose father had held the supremacy of entire Gaul, and had been put to death by his fellow citizens, for this reason, because he aimed at sovereign power), summoned together his dependents, and easily excited them. On his design being made known, they rush to arms: he is expelled from the town of Gergovia by his uncle Gobanitio and the rest of the nobles,

who were of opinion, that such an enterprise ought not to be hazarded: he did not however desist, but held in the country a levy of the needy and desperate. Having collected such a body of troops, he brings over to his 30 sentiments such of his fellow citizens as he has access to: he exhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the general freedom, and having assembled great forces he drives from the state his opponents, by whom he had been expelled a short time previously. He is saluted king by his partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his interests the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, and all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferred on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demands hostages from all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers to be sent to him immediately; he determines what quantity of arms each state shall prepare at home, and before what time; he pays particular attention to the cavalry. To the utmost vigilance he adds the utmost rigour of authority; and by the severity of his punishments brings over the wavering: for on the commission of a greater crime he puts the perpetrators to death by fire and every sort of tortures; for a slighter cause, he sends home the offenders with their ears cut off, or one of their eyes put out, that they may be an example to the rest, and frighten others by the severity of their punishment.

V. — Having quickly collected an army by their punishments, he sends Lucterius, one of the Cadurci, a man of the utmost daring, with part of his forces, into the territory of the Ruteni; and marches in person into the country of the Bituriges. On his arrival, the Bituriges send ambassadors to the Aedui, under whose protection they were, to solicit aid in order that they might more easily resist the forces of the

enemy. The Aedui, by the advice of the lieutenants whom Caesar had left with the army, send supplies of horse and foot to succour the Bituriges. When they came to the river Loire, which separates the Bituriges from the Aedui, they delayed a few days there, and, not daring to pass the river, return home, and send back word to the lieutenants that they had returned through fear of the treachery of the Bituriges, who, they ascertained, had formed this design, that if the Aedui should cross the river, the Bituriges on the one side, and the Arverni on the other, should surround them. Whether they did this for the reason which they alleged to the lieutenants, or influenced by treachery, we think that we ought not to state as certain, because we have no proof. On their departure, the Bituriges immediately unite themselves to the Arverni.

VI. — These affairs being announced to Caesar in Italy at the time when he understood that matters in the city had been reduced to a more tranquil state by the energy of Cneius Pompey, he set out for Transalpine Gaul. After he had arrived there, he was greatly at a loss to know by what means he could reach his army. For if he should summon the legions into the province, he was aware that on their march they would have to fight in his absence; he foresaw too, that if he himself should endeavour to reach the army, he would act injudiciously, in trusting his safety even to those who seemed to be tranquillized.

VII. — In the meantime Lucterius the Cadurcan, having been sent into the country of the Ruteni, gains over that state to the Arverni. Having advanced into the country of the Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receives hostages from both nations, and, assembling a numerous force, marches to make a descent on the province in the direction of Narbo. Caesar, when this circumstance was announced to him,

thought that the march to Narbo ought to take the precedence of all his other plans. When he arrived there, he encourages the timid, and stations garrisons among the Ruteni, in the province of the Volcae Arecomici, and the country around Narbo which was in the vicinity of the enemy; he orders a portion of the forces from the province, and the recruits which he had brought from Italy, to rendezvous among the Helvii who border on the territories of the Arverni.

VIII. — These matters being arranged, and Lucterius now checked and forced to retreat, because he thought it dangerous to enter the line of Roman garrisons, Caesar marches into the country of the Helvii; although mount Cevennes, which separates the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked up the way with very deep snow, as it was the severest season of the year; yet having cleared away the snow to the depth of six feet, and having opened the roads, he reaches the territories of the Arverni, with infinite labour to his soldiers. This people being surprised, because they considered themselves defended by the Cevennes as by a wall, and the paths at this season of the year had never before been passable even to individuals, he orders the cavalry to extend themselves as far as they could, and strike as great a panic as possible into the enemy. These proceedings are speedily announced to Vercingetorix by rumour and his messengers. Around him all the Arverni crowd in alarm, and solemnly entreat him to protect their property, and not to suffer them to be plundered by the enemy, especially as he saw that all the war was transferred into their country. Being prevailed upon by their entreaties he moves his camp from the country of the Bituriges in the direction of the Arverni.

IX. — Caesar, having delayed two days in that place, because he had anticipated that, in the natural course of events, such would be

the conduct of Vercingetorix, leaves the army under pretence of raising recruits and cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man, in command of these forces; he gives him instructions that the cavalry should range as extensively as possible in all directions; that he would exert himself not to be absent from the camp longer than three days. Having arranged these matters, he marches to Vienna by as long journeys as he can, when his own soldiers did not expect him. Finding there a fresh body of cavalry, which he had sent on to that place several days before, marching incessantly night and day, he advanced rapidly through the territory of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, in which two legions were wintering, that, if any plan affecting his own safety should have been organised by the Aedui, he might defeat it by the rapidity of his movements. When he arrived there, he sends information to the rest of the legions, and gathers all his army into one place before intelligence of his arrival could be announced to the Arverni.

Vercingetorix, on hearing this circumstance, leads back his army into the country of the Bituriges; and after marching from it to Gergovia, a town of the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after defeating them in the Helvetian war, and had rendered tributary to the Aedui, he determined to attack it.

X. — This action caused great perplexity to Caesar in the selection of his plans; [he feared] lest, if he should confine his legions in one place for the remaining portion of the winter, all Gaul should revolt when the tributaries of the Aedui were subdued, because it would appear that there was in him no protection for his friends; but if he should draw them too soon out of their winter quarters, he might be distressed by the want of provisions, in consequence of the difficulty of conveyance. It seemed better,

however, to endure every hardship than to alienate the affections of all his allies, by submitting to such an insult. Having, therefore, impressed on the Aedui the necessity of supplying him with provisions, he sends forward messengers to the Boii to inform them of his arrival, and encourage them to remain firm in their allegiance, and resist the attack of the enemy with great resolution. Having left two legions and the luggage of the entire army at Agendicum, he marches to the Boii.

XI. — On the second day, when he came to Vellaunodunum, a town of the Senones, he determined to attack it, in order that he might not leave an enemy in his rear, and might the more easily procure supplies of provisions, and drew a line of circumvallation around it in two days: on the third day, ambassadors being sent from the town to treat of a capitulation, he orders their arms to be brought together, their cattle to be brought forth, and six hundred hostages to be given. He leaves Caius Trebonius, his lieutenant, to complete these arrangements; he himself sets out with the intention of marching as soon as possible to Genabum, a town of the Carnutes, who having then for the first time received information of the siege of Vellaunodunum, as they thought that it would be protracted to a longer time, were preparing a garrison to send to Genabum for the defence of that town. Caesar arrived here in two days; after pitching his camp before the town, being prevented by the time of the day, he defers the attack to the next day, and orders his soldiers to prepare whatever was necessary for that enterprise; and as a bridge over the Loire connected the town of Genabum with the opposite bank, fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by night from the town, he orders two legions to keep watch under arms. The people of Genabum came forth silently from the city before midnight, and

began to cross the river. When this circumstance was announced by scouts, Caesar, having set fire to the gates, sends in the legions which he had ordered to be ready, and obtains possession of the town so completely, that very few of the whole number of the enemy escaped being taken alive, because the narrowness of the bridge and the roads prevented the multitude from escaping. He pillages and burns the town, gives the booty to the soldiers, then leads his army over the Loire, and marches into the territories of the Bituriges.

XII. — Vercingetorix, when he ascertained the arrival of Caesar, desisted from the siege [of Gergovia], and marched to meet Caesar. The latter had commenced to besiege Noviodunum; and when ambassadors came from this town to beg that he would pardon them and spare their lives, in order that he might execute the rest of his designs with the rapidity by which he had accomplished most of them, he orders their arms to be collected, their horses to be brought forth, and hostages to be given. A part of the hostages being now delivered up, when the rest of the terms were being performed, a few centurions and soldiers being sent into the town to collect the arms and horses, the enemy's cavalry, which had outstripped the main body of Vercingetorix's army, was seen at a distance; as soon as the townsmen beheld them, and entertained hopes of assistance, raising a shout, they began to take up arms, shut the gates, and line the walls. When the centurions in the town understood from the signal-making of the Gauls that they were forming some new design, they drew their swords and seized the gates, and recovered all their men safe.

XIII. — Caesar orders the horse to be drawn out of the camp, and commences a cavalry action. His men being now distressed, Caesar sends to their aid about four hundred German horse, which he had determined, at the beginning, to keep with himself. The Gauls could

not withstand their attack, but were put to flight, and retreated to their main body, after losing a great number of men. When they were routed, the townsmen, again intimidated, arrested those persons by whose exertions they thought that the mob had been roused, and brought them to Caesar, and surrendered themselves to him. When these affairs were accomplished, Caesar marched to the Avaricum, which was the largest and best fortified town in the territories of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile tract of country; because he confidently expected that on taking that town, he would reduce beneath his dominion the state of the Bituriges.

XIV. — Vercingetorix, after sustaining such a series of losses at Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum, summons his men to a council. He impresses on them “that the war must be prosecuted on a very different system from that which had been previously adopted; but they should by all means aim at this object, that the Romans should be prevented from foraging and procuring provisions; that this was easy, because they themselves were well supplied with cavalry and were likewise assisted by the season of the year; that forage could not be cut; that the enemy must necessarily disperse, and look for it in the houses, that all these might be daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that the interests of private property must be neglected for the sake of the general safety; that the villages and houses ought to be fired, over such an extent of country in every direction from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable of scouring in their search for forage. That an abundance of these necessities could be supplied to them, because they would be assisted by the resources of those in whose territories the war would be waged: that the Romans either would not bear the privation, or else would advance to any distance from the camp with considerable danger; and that it

made no difference whether they slew them or stripped them of their baggage, since, if it was lost, they could not carry on the war. Besides that, the towns ought to be burnt which were not secured against every danger by their fortifications or natural advantages; that there should not be places of retreat for their own countrymen for declining military service, nor be exposed to the Romans as inducements to carry off abundance of provisions and plunder. If these sacrifices should appear heavy or galling, that they ought to consider it much more distressing that their wives and children should be dragged off to slavery, and themselves slain; the evils which must necessarily befall the conquered.

XV. — This opinion having been approved of by unanimous consent, more than twenty towns of the Bituriges are burnt in one day. Conflagrations are beheld in every quarter; and although all bore this with great regret, yet they laid before themselves this consolation, that, as the victory was certain, they could quickly recover their losses. There is a debate concerning Avaricum in the general council, whether they should decide that it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges threw themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, and entreat that they should not be compelled to set fire with their own hands to the fairest city of almost the whole of Gaul, which was both a protection and ornament to the state; they say that “they could easily defend it, owing to the nature of the ground, for, being enclosed almost on every side by a river and a marsh, it had only one entrance, and that very narrow.” Permission being granted to them at their earnest request, Vercingetorix at first dissuades them from it, but afterwards concedes the point, owing to their entreaties and the compassion of the soldiers. A proper garrison is selected for the town.

XVI. — Vercingetorix follows closely upon Caesar by shorter marches, and selects for his camp a place defended by woods and marshes, at the distance of fifteen miles from Avaricum. There he received intelligence by trusty scouts, every hour in the day, of what was going on at Avaricum, and ordered whatever he wished to be done; he closely watched all our expeditions for corn and forage, and whenever they were compelled to go to a greater distance, he attacked them when dispersed, and inflicted severe loss upon them; although the evil was remedied by our men, as far as precautions could be taken, by going forth at irregular times, and by different ways.

XVII. — Caesar pitching his camp at that side of the town which was not defended by the river and marsh, and had a very narrow approach, as we have mentioned, began to raise the vineae and erect two towers; for the nature of the place prevented him from drawing a line of circumvallation. He never ceased to importune the Boii and Aedui for supplies of corn; of whom the one [the Aedui], because they were acting with no zeal, did not aid him much; the others [the Boii], as their resources were not great, quickly consumed what they had. Although the army was distressed by the greatest want of corn, through the poverty of the Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the houses, to such a degree, that for several days the soldiers were without corn, and satisfied their extreme hunger with cattle driven from the remote villages; yet no language was heard from them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people and their former victories. Moreover, when Caesar addressed the legions, one by one, when at work, and said that he would raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too severely, they unanimously begged him “not to do so; that they had served for several years under his command in

such a manner, that they never submitted to insult, and never abandoned an enterprise without accomplishing it; that they should consider it a disgrace if they abandoned the siege after commencing it; that it was better to endure every hardship than not to avenge the manes of the Roman citizens who perished at Genabum by the perfidy of the Gauls.” They entrusted the same declarations to the centurions and military tribunes, that through them they might be communicated to Caesar.

XVIII. — When the towers had now approached the walls, Caesar ascertained from the captives that Vercingetorix, after destroying the forage, had pitched his camp nearer Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalry and light-armed infantry, who generally fought among the horse, had gone to lay an ambuscade in that quarter to which he thought that our troops would come the next day to forage. On learning these facts, he set out from the camp secretly at midnight, and reached the camp of the enemy early in the morning. They having quickly learned the arrival of Caesar by scouts, hid their cars and baggage in the thickest parts of the woods, and drew up all their forces in a lofty and open space: which circumstance being announced, Caesar immediately ordered the baggage to be piled, and the arms to be got ready.

XIX. — There was a hill of a gentle ascent from the bottom; a dangerous and impassable marsh, not more than fifty feet broad, begirt it on almost every side. The Gauls, having broken down the bridges, posted themselves on this hill, in confidence of their position, and being drawn up in tribes according to their respective states, held all the fords and passages of that marsh with trusty guards, thus determined that if the Romans should attempt to force the marsh, they would overpower them from the higher ground while

sticking in it, so that whoever saw the nearness of the position, would imagine that the two armies were prepared to fight on almost equal terms; but whoever should view accurately the disadvantage of position, would discover that they were showing off an empty affectation of courage. Caesar clearly points out to his soldiers, who were indignant that the enemy could bear the sight of them at the distance of so short a space, and were earnestly demanding the signal for action, “with how great loss and the death of how many gallant men the victory would necessarily be purchased: and when he saw them so determined to decline no danger for his renown, that he ought to be considered guilty of the utmost injustice if he did not hold their life dearer than his own personal safety.” Having thus consoled his soldiers, he leads them back on the same day to the camp, and determined to prepare the other things which were necessary for the siege of the town.

XX. — Vercingetorix, when he had returned to his men, was accused of treason, in that he had moved his camp nearer the Romans, in that he had gone away with all the cavalry, in that he had left so great forces without a commander, in that, on his departure, the Romans had come at such a favourable season, and with such despatch; that all these circumstances could not have happened accidentally or without design; that he preferred holding the sovereignty of Gaul by the grant of Caesar, to acquiring it by their favour. Being accused in such a manner, he made the following reply to these charges:— “That his moving his camp had been caused by want of forage, and had been done even by their advice; that his approaching near the Romans had been a measure dictated by the favourable nature of the ground, which would defend him by its natural strength; that the service of the cavalry could not have been

requisite in marshy ground, and was useful in that place to which they had gone; that he, on his departure, had given the supreme command to no one intentionally, lest he should be induced by the eagerness of the multitude to hazard an engagement, to which he perceived that all were inclined, owing to their want of energy, because they were unable to endure fatigue any longer. That, if the Romans in the meantime came up by chance, they [the Gauls] should feel grateful to fortune; if invited by the information of some one they should feel grateful to him, because they were enabled to see distinctly from the higher ground the smallness of the number of their enemy, and despise the courage of those who, not daring to fight, retreated disgracefully into their camp. That he desired no power from Caesar by treachery, since he could have it by victory, which was now assured to himself and to all the Gauls; nay, that he would even give them back the command, if they thought that they conferred honour on him, rather than received safety from him. That you may be assured," said he, "that I speak these words with truth; — listen to these Roman soldiers!" He produces some camp-followers whom he had surprised on a foraging expedition some days before, and had tortured by famine and confinement. They being previously instructed in what answers they should make when examined, say, "That they were legionary soldiers, that, urged by famine and want, they had recently gone forth from the camp, [to see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; that the whole army was distressed by a similar scarcity, nor had any one now sufficient strength, nor could bear the labour of the work; and therefore that the general was determined, if he made no progress in the siege, to draw off his army in three days." "These benefits," says Vercingetorix, "you receive from me, whom you accuse of treason

— me, by whose exertions you see so powerful and victorious an army almost destroyed by famine, without shedding one drop of your blood; and I have taken precautions that no state shall admit within its territories this army in its ignominious flight from this place.”

XXI. — The whole multitude raise a shout and clash their arms, according to their custom, as they usually do in the case of him whose speech they approve; [they exclaim] that Vercingetorix was a consummate general, and that they had no doubt of his honour; that the war could not be conducted with greater prudence. They determine that ten thousand men should be picked out of the entire army and sent into the town, and decide that the general safety should not be entrusted to the Bituriges alone, because they were aware that the glory of the victory must rest with the Bituriges, if they made good the defence of the town.

XXII. — To the extraordinary valour of our soldiers, devices of every sort were opposed by the Gauls; since they are a nation of consummate ingenuity, and most skilful in imitating and making those things which are imparted by any one; for they turned aside the hooks with nooses, and when they had caught hold of them firmly, drew them on by means of engines, and undermined the mound the more skilfully on this account, because there are in their territories extensive iron mines, and consequently every description of mining operations is known and practised by them. They had furnished, moreover, the whole wall on every side with turrets, and had covered them with skins. Besides, in their frequent sallies by day and night, they attempted either to set fire to the mound, or attack our soldiers when engaged in the works; and, moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of their own towers, they equalled the height of ours, as fast as the mound had daily raised them, and countermined our mines,

and impeded the working of them by stakes bent and sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch, and stones of very great weight, and prevented them from approaching the walls.

XXIII. — But this is usually the form of all the Gallic walls. Straight beams, connected lengthwise and two feet distant from each other at equal intervals, are placed together on the ground; these are mortised on the inside, and covered with plenty of earth. But the intervals which we have mentioned, are closed up in front by large stones. These being thus laid and cemented together, another row is added above, in such a manner that the same interval may be observed, and that the beams may not touch one another, but equal spaces intervening, each row of beams is kept firmly in its place by a row of stones. In this manner the whole wall is consolidated, until the regular height of the wall be completed. This work, with respect to appearance and variety, is not unsightly, owing to the alternate rows of beams and stones, which preserve their order in right lines; and, besides, it possesses great advantages as regards utility and the defence of cities; for the stone protects it from fire, and the wood from the battering ram, since it [the wood] being mortised in the inside with rows of beams, generally forty feet each in length, can neither be broken through nor torn asunder.

XXIV. — The siege having been impeded by so many disadvantages, the soldiers, although they were retarded during the whole time, by the mud, cold, and constant showers, yet by their incessant labour overcame all these obstacles, and in twenty-five days raised a mound three hundred and thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. When it almost touched the enemy's walls, and Caesar, according to his usual custom, kept watch at the work, and encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue the work for a moment: a

little before the third watch they discovered that the mound was sinking, since the enemy had set it on fire by a mine; and at the same time a shout was raised along the entire wall, and a sally was made from two gates on each side of the turrets. Some at a distance were casting torches and dry wood from the wall on the mound, others were pouring on it pitch, and other materials, by which the flame might be excited, so that a plan could hardly be formed, as to where they should first run to the defence, or to what part aid should be brought. However, as two legions always kept guard before the camp by Caesar's orders, and several of them were at stated times at the work, measures were promptly taken, that some should oppose the sallying party, others draw back the towers and make a cut in the rampart; and moreover, that the whole army should hasten from the camp to extinguish the flames.

XXV. — When the battle was going on in every direction, the rest of the night being now spent, and fresh hopes of victory always arose before the enemy: the more so on this account because they saw the coverings of our towers burnt away, and perceived that we, being exposed, could not easily go to give assistance, and they themselves were always relieving the weary with fresh men, and considered that all the safety of Gaul rested on this crisis; there happened in my own view a circumstance which, having appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought not to be omitted. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town, who was casting into the fire opposite the turret balls of tallow and fire which were passed along to him, was pierced with a dart on the right side and fell dead. One of those next him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the same office: when the second man was slain in the same manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third: nor was this

post left vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of the mound having been extinguished, and the enemy repulsed in every direction, an end was put to the fighting.

XXVI. — The Gauls having tried every expedient, as nothing had succeeded, adopted the design of fleeing from the town the next day, by the advice and order of Vercingetorix. They hoped that, by attempting it at the dead of night, they would effect it without any great loss of men, because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far distant from the town, and the extensive marsh which intervened was likely to retard the Romans in the pursuit. And they were now preparing to execute this by night, when the matrons suddenly ran out into the streets, and weeping cast themselves at the feet of their husbands, and requested of them, with every entreaty, that they should not abandon themselves and their common children to the enemy for punishment, because the weakness of their nature and physical powers prevented them from taking to flight. When they saw that they (as fear does not generally admit of mercy in extreme danger) persisted in their resolution, they began to shout aloud, and give intelligence of their flight to the Romans. The Gauls being intimidated by fear of this, lest the passes should be pre-occupied by the Roman cavalry, desisted from their design.

XXVII. — The next day Caesar, the tower being advanced, and the works which he had determined to raise being arranged, a violent storm arising, thought this no bad time for executing his designs, because he observed the guards arranged on the walls a little too negligently, and therefore ordered his own men to engage in their work more remissly, and pointed out what he wished to be done. He drew up his soldiers in a secret position within the vineae, and exhorts them to reap, at least, the harvest of victory proportionate to

their exertions. He proposed a reward for those who should first scale the walls, and gave the signal to the soldiers. They suddenly flew out from all quarters and quickly filled the wall.

XXVIII. — The enemy being alarmed by the suddenness of the attack, were dislodged from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge, in the market-place and the open streets, with this intention that, if an attack should be made on any side, they should fight with their line drawn up to receive it. When they saw no one descending to the level ground, and the enemy extending themselves along the entire wall in every direction, fearing lest every hope of flight should be cut off, they cast away their arms, and sought, without stopping, the most remote parts of the town. A part was then slain by the infantry when they were crowding upon one another in the narrow passage of the gates; and a part having got without the gates, were cut to pieces by the cavalry: nor was there one who was anxious for the plunder. Thus, being excited by the massacre at Genabum and the fatigue of the siege, they spared neither those worn out with years, women, or children. Finally, out of all that number, which amounted to about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who fled from the town when they heard the first alarm, reached Vercingetorix in safety: and he, the night being now far spent, received them in silence after their flight (fearing that any sedition should arise in the camp from their entrance in a body and the compassion of the soldiers), so that, having arranged his friends and the chiefs of the states at a distance on the road, he took precautions that they should be separated and conducted to their fellow countrymen, to whatever part of the camp had been assigned to each state from the beginning.

XXIX. — Vercingetorix having convened an assembly on the

following day, consoled and encouraged his soldiers in the following words:— “That they should not be too much depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their loss; that the Romans did not conquer by valour nor in the field, but by a kind of art and skill in assault, with which they themselves were unacquainted; that whoever expected every event in the war to be favourable, erred; that it never was his opinion that Avaricum should be defended, of the truth of which statement he had themselves as witnesses, but that it was owing to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and the too ready compliance of the rest, that this loss was sustained; that, however, he would soon compensate it by superior advantages; for that he would, by his exertions, bring over those states which severed themselves from the rest of the Gauls, and would create a general unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, the union of which not even the whole earth could withstand, and that he had it already almost effected; that in the meantime it was reasonable that he should prevail on them, for the sake of the general safety, to begin to fortify their camp, in order that they might the more easily sustain the sudden attacks of the enemy.”

XXX. — This speech was not disagreeable to the Gauls, principally, because he himself was not disheartened by receiving so severe a loss, and had not concealed himself, nor shunned the eyes of the people: and he was believed to possess greater foresight and sounder judgment than the rest, because, when the affair was undecided, he had at first been of opinion that Avaricum should be burnt, and afterwards that it should be abandoned. Accordingly, as ill success weakens the authority of other generals, so, on the contrary, his dignity increased daily, although a loss was sustained: at the same time they began to entertain hopes, on his assertion, of uniting the rest of the states to themselves, and on this occasion, for the first

time, the Gauls began to fortify their camps, and were so alarmed that although they were men unaccustomed to toil, yet they were of opinion that they ought to endure and suffer everything which should be imposed upon them.

XXXI. — Nor did Vercingetorix use less efforts than he had promised, to gain over the other states, and [in consequence] endeavoured to entice their leaders by gifts and promises. For this object he selected fitting emissaries by whose subtle pleading or private friendship each of the nobles could be most easily influenced. He takes care that those who fled to him on the storming of Avaricum should be provided with arms and clothes. At the same time, that his diminished forces should be recruited, he levies a fixed quota of soldiers from each state, and defines the number and day before which he should wish them brought to the camp, and orders all the archers, of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, to be collected and sent to him. By these means, the troops which were lost at Avaricum are speedily replaced. In the meantime, Teutomarus, the son of Ollovicon, the king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had received the appellation of friend from our senate, came to him with a great number of his own horse and those whom he had hired from Aquitania.

XXXII. — Caesar, after delaying several days at Avaricum, and finding there the greatest plenty of corn and other provisions, refreshed his army after their fatigue and privation. The winter being almost ended, when he was invited by the favourable season of the year to prosecute the war and march against the enemy, [and try] whether he could draw them from the marshes and woods, or else press them by a blockade; some noblemen of the Aedui came to him as ambassadors to entreat “that in an extreme emergency he should

succour their state; that their affairs were in the utmost danger, because, whereas single magistrates had been usually appointed in ancient times and held the power of king for a single year, two persons now exercised this office, and each asserted that he was appointed according to their laws. That one of them was Convictolitanis, a powerful and illustrious youth; the other Cotus, sprung from a most ancient family, and personally a man of very great influence and extensive connections. His brother Valetiacus had borne the same office during the last year: that the whole state was up in arms; the senate divided, the people divided; that each of them had his own adherents; and that, if the animosity would be fomented any longer the result would be that one part of the state would come to a collision with the other; that it rested with his activity and influence to prevent it.”

XXXIII. — Although Caesar considered it ruinous to leave the war and the enemy, yet, being well aware what great evils generally arise from internal dissensions, lest a state so powerful and so closely connected with the Roman people, which he himself had always fostered and honoured in every respect, should have recourse to violence and arms, and that the party which had less confidence in its own power should summon aid from Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this movement; and because, by the laws of the Aedui, it was not permitted those who held the supreme authority to leave the country, he determined to go in person to the Aedui, lest he should appear to infringe upon their government and laws, and summoned all the senate, and those between whom the dispute was, to meet him at Decetia. When almost all the state had assembled there, and he was informed that one brother had been declared magistrate by the other, when only a few persons were privately summoned for the

purpose, at a different time and place from what he ought, whereas the laws not only forbade two belonging to one family to be elected magistrates while each was alive, but even deterred them from being in the senate, he compelled Catus to resign his office; he ordered Convictolitanis, who had been elected by the priests, according to the usage of the state, in the presence of the magistrates, to hold the supreme authority.

XXXIV. — Having pronounced this decree between [the contending parties], he exhorted the Aedui to bury in oblivion their disputes and dissensions, and, laying aside all these things, devote themselves to the war, and expect from him, on the conquest of Gaul, those rewards which they should have earned, and send speedily to him all their cavalry and ten thousand infantry, which he might place in different garrisons to protect his convoys of provisions, and then divided his army into two parts: he gave Labienus four legions to lead into the country of the Senones and Parisii; and led in person six into the country of the Arverni, in the direction of the town of Gergovia, along the banks of the Allier. He gave part of the cavalry to Labienus, and kept part to himself. Vercingetorix, on learning this circumstance, broke down all the bridges over the river and began to march on the other bank of the Allier.

XXXV. — When each army was in sight of the other, and was pitching their camp almost opposite that of the enemy, scouts being distributed in every quarter, lest the Romans should build a bridge and bring over their troops; it was to Caesar a matter attended with great difficulties, lest he should be hindered from passing the river during the greater part of the summer, as the Allier cannot generally be forded before the autumn. Therefore, that this might not happen, having pitched his camp in a woody place opposite to one of those

bridges which Vercingetorix had taken care should be broken down, the next day he stopped behind with two legions in a secret place: he sent on the rest of the forces as usual, with all the baggage, after having selected some cohorts, that the number of the legions might appear to be complete. Having ordered these to advance as far as they could, when now, from the time of day, he conjectured they had come to an encampment, he began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles, the lower part of which remained entire. Having quickly finished the work and led his legions across, he selected a fit place for a camp, and recalled the rest of his troops. Vercingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went before him by forced marches, in order that he might not be compelled to come to an action against his will.

XXXVI. — Caesar, in five days' march, went from that place to Gergovia, and after engaging in a slight cavalry skirmish that day, on viewing the situation of the city, which, being built on a very high mountain, was very difficult of access, he despaired of taking it by storm, and determined to take no measures with regard to besieging it before he should secure a supply of provisions. But Vercingetorix, having pitched his camp on the mountain near the town, placed the forces of each state separately and at small intervals around himself, and having occupied all the hills of that range as far as they commanded a view [of the Roman encampment], he presented a formidable appearance; he ordered the rulers of the states, whom he had selected as his council of war, to come to him daily at the dawn, whether any measure seemed to require deliberation or execution. Nor did he allow almost any day to pass without testing in a cavalry action, the archers being intermixed, what spirit and valour there was in each of his own men. There was a hill opposite the town, at the very foot of that mountain, strongly fortified and precipitous on

every side (which if our men could gain, they seemed likely to exclude the enemy from a great share of their supply of water, and from free foraging; but this place was occupied by them with a weak garrison): however, Caesar set out from the camp in the silence of night, and dislodging the garrison before succour could come from the town, he got possession of the place and posted two legions there, and drew from the greater camp to the less a double trench twelve feet broad, so that the soldiers could even singly pass secure from any sudden attack of the enemy.

XXXVII. — Whilst these affairs were going on at Gergovia, Convictolitanis, the Aeduan, to whom we have observed the magistracy was adjudged by Caesar, being bribed by the Arverni, holds a conference with certain young men, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, who were born of a most noble family. He shares the bribe with them, and exhorts them to “remember that they were free and born for empire; that the state of the Aedui was the only one which retarded the most certain victory of the Gauls; that the rest were held in check by its authority; and, if it was brought over, the Romans would not have room to stand on in Gaul; that he had received some kindness from Caesar, only so far, however, as gaining a most just cause by his decision; but that he assigned more weight to the general freedom; for, why should the Aedui go to Caesar to decide concerning their rights and laws, rather than the Romans come to the Aedui?” The young men being easily won over by the speech of the magistrate and the bribe, when they declared that they would even be leaders in the plot, a plan for accomplishing it was considered, because they were confident their state could not be induced to undertake the war on slight grounds. It was resolved that Litavicus should have the command of the ten thousand which

were being sent to Caesar for the war, and should have charge of them on their march, and that his brothers should go before him to Caesar. They arrange the other measures, and the manner in which they should have them done.

XXXVIII. — Litavicus, having received the command of the army, suddenly convened the soldiers, when he was about thirty miles distant from Gergovia, and, weeping, said, “Soldiers, whither are we going? All our knights and all our nobles have perished. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, the principal men of the state, being accused of treason, have been slain by the Romans without even permission to plead their cause. Learn this intelligence from those who have escaped from the massacre; for I, since my brothers and all my relations have been slain, am prevented by grief from declaring what has taken place.” Persons are brought forward whom he had instructed in what he would have them say, and make the same statements to the soldiery as Litavicus had made: that all the knights of the Aedui were slain because they were said to have held conferences with the Arverni; that they had concealed themselves among the multitude of soldiers, and had escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The Aedui shout aloud and conjure Litavicus to provide for their safety. “As if,” said he, “it were a matter of deliberation, and not of necessity, for us to go to Gergovia and unite ourselves to the Arverni. Or have we any reasons to doubt that the Romans, after perpetrating the atrocious crime, are now hastening to slay us? Therefore, if there be any spirit in us, let us avenge the death of those who have perished in a most unworthy manner, and let us slay these robbers.” He points to the Roman citizens, who had accompanied them, in reliance on his protection. He immediately seizes a great quantity of corn and provisions, cruelly tortures them,

and then puts them to death, sends messengers throughout the entire state of the Aedui, and rouses them completely by the same falsehood concerning the slaughter of their knights and nobles; he earnestly advises them to avenge, in the same manner as he did, the wrongs which they had received.

XXXIX. — Eporedorix, the Aeduan, a young man born in the highest rank and possessing very great influence at home, and, along with Viridomarus, of equal age and influence, but of inferior birth, whom Caesar had raised from a humble position to the highest rank, on being recommended to him by Divitiacus, had come in the number of horse, being summoned by Caesar by name. These had a dispute with each other for precedence, and in the struggle between the magistrates they had contended with their utmost efforts, the one for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Of these Eporedorix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays the matter before Caesar almost at midnight; he entreats that Caesar should not suffer their state to swerve from the alliance with the Roman people, owing to the depraved counsels of a few young men, which he foresaw would be the consequence if so many thousand men should unite themselves to the enemy, as their relations could not neglect their safety, nor the state regard it as a matter of slight importance.

XL. — Caesar felt great anxiety on this intelligence, because he had always especially indulged the state of the Aedui, and, without any hesitation, draws out from the camp four light-armed legions and all the cavalry: nor had he time, at such a crisis, to contract the camp, because the affair seemed to depend upon despatch. He leaves Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with two legions to guard the camp. When he ordered the brothers of Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers that they had fled a short time before to the camp of the enemy. He

encouraged his soldiers “not to be disheartened by the labour of the journey on such a necessary occasion,” and, after advancing twenty-five miles, all being most eager, he came in sight of the army of the Aedui, and, by sending on his cavalry, retards and impedes their march; he then issues strict orders to all his soldiers to kill no one. He commands Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who they thought were killed, to move among the cavalry and address their friends. When they were recognized and the treachery of Litavicus discovered, the Aedui began to extend their hands to intimate submission, and, laying down their arms, to deprecate death. Litavicus, with his clansmen, who after the custom of the Gauls consider it a crime to desert their patrons, even in extreme misfortune, flees forth to Gergovia.

XLI. — Caesar, after sending messengers to the state of the Aedui, to inform them that they whom he could have put to death by the right of war were spared through his kindness, and after giving three hours of the night to his army for his repose, directed his march to Gergovia. Almost in the middle of the journey, a party of horse that were sent by Fabius stated in how great danger matters were; they inform him that the camp was attacked by a very powerful army, while fresh men were frequently relieving the wearied, and exhausting our soldiers by the incessant toil, since, on account of the size of the camp, they had constantly to remain on the rampart; that many had been wounded by the immense number of arrows and all kinds of missiles; that the engines were of great service in withstanding them; that Fabius, at their departure, leaving only two gates open, was blocking up the rest, and was adding breast-works to the ramparts, and was preparing himself for a similar casualty on the following day. Caesar, after receiving this information, reached the

camp before sunrise owing to the very great zeal of his soldiers.

XLII. — Whilst these things are going on at Gergovia, the Aedui, on receiving the first announcements from Litavicus, leave themselves no time to ascertain the truth of these statements. Some are stimulated by avarice, others by revenge and credulity, which is an innate propensity in that race of men to such a degree that they consider a slight rumour as an ascertained fact. They plunder the property of the Roman citizens, and either massacre them or drag them away to slavery. Convictolitanis increases the evil state of affairs, and goads on the people to fury, that by the commission of some outrage they may be ashamed to return to propriety. They entice from the town of Cabillonus, by a promise of safety, Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was on his march to his legion; they compel those who had settled there for the purpose of trading to do the same. By constantly attacking them on their march they strip them of all their baggage; they besiege day and night those that resisted; when many were slain on both sides, they excite a greater number to arms.

XLIII. — In the meantime, when intelligence was brought that all their soldiers were in Caesar's power, they run in a body to Aristius; they assure him that nothing had been done by public authority; they order an inquiry to be made about the plundered property; they confiscate the property of Litavicus and his brothers; they send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of clearing themselves. They do all this with a view to recover their soldiers; but being contaminated by guilt, and charmed by the gains arising from the plundered property, as that act was shared in by many, and being tempted by the fear of punishment, they began to form plans of war and stir up the other states by embassies. Although Caesar was aware

of this proceeding, yet he addresses the ambassadors with as much mildness as he can: "That he did not think worse of the state on account of the ignorance and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminish his regard for the Aedui." He himself, fearing a greater commotion in Gaul, in order to prevent his being surrounded by all the states, began to form plans as to the manner in which he should return from Gergovia and again concentrate his forces, lest a departure arising from the fear of a revolt should seem like a flight.

XLIV. — Whilst he was considering these things an opportunity of acting successfully seemed to offer. For, when he had come into the smaller camp for the purpose of securing the works, he noticed that the hill in the possession of the enemy was stript of men, although, on the former days, it could scarcely be seen on account of the numbers on it. Being astonished, he inquires the reason of it from the deserters, a great number of whom flocked to him daily. They all concurred in asserting, what Caesar himself had already ascertained by his scouts, that the back of that hill was almost level; but likewise woody and narrow, by which there was a pass to the other side of the town; that they had serious apprehensions for this place, and had no other idea, on the occupation of one hill by the Romans, than that, if they should lose the other, they would be almost surrounded, and cut off from all egress and foraging; that they were all summoned by Vercingetorix to fortify this place.

XLV. — Caesar, on being informed of this circumstance, sends several troops of horse to the place immediately after midnight; he orders them to range in every quarter with more tumult than usual. At dawn he orders a large quantity of baggage to be drawn out of the camp, and the muleteers with helmets, in the appearance and guise of horsemen, to ride round the hills. To these he adds a few cavalry,

with instructions to range more widely to make a show. He orders them all to seek the same quarter by a long circuit; these proceedings were seen at a distance from the town, as Gergovia commanded a view of the camp, nor could the Gauls ascertain at so great a distance what certainty there was in the manoeuvre. He sends one legion to the same hill, and after it had marched a little, stations it in the lower ground, and conceals it in the woods. The suspicions of the Gauls are increased, and all their forces are marched to that place to defend it. Caesar, having perceived the camp of the enemy deserted, covers the military insignia of his men, conceals the standards, and transfers his soldiers in small bodies from the greater to the less camp, and points out to the lieutenants whom he had placed in command over the respective legions, what he should wish to be done; he particularly advises them to restrain their men from advancing too far, through their desire of fighting, or their hope of plunder; he sets before them what disadvantages the unfavourable nature of the ground carries with it; that they could be assisted by despatch alone: that success depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. After stating these particulars, he gives the signal for action, and detaches the Aedui at the same time by another ascent on the right.

XLVI. — The town wall was 1200 paces distant from the plain and foot of the ascent, in a straight line, if no gap intervened; whatever circuit was added to this ascent, to make the hill easy, increased the length of the route. But almost in the middle of the hill, the Gauls had previously built a wall six feet high, made of large stones, and extending in length as far as the nature of the ground permitted, as a barrier to retard the advance of our men; and leaving all the lower space empty, they had filled the upper part of the hill, as far as the wall of the town, with their camps very close to one

another. The soldiers, on the signal being given, quickly advance to this fortification, and passing over it, make themselves masters of the separate camps. And so great was their activity in taking the camps, that Teutomarus, the king of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly surprised in his tent, as he had gone to rest at noon, with difficulty escaped from the hands of the plunderers, with the upper part of his person naked, and his horse wounded.

XLVII. — Caesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of the tenth legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers of the other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, because there was a very large valley between them, were however kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar's orders; but being animated by the prospect of speedy victory, and the flight of the enemy, and the favourable battles of former periods, they thought nothing so difficult that their bravery could not accomplish it; nor did they put an end to the pursuit, until they drew nigh to the wall of the town and the gates. But then, when a shout arose in every quarter of the city, those who were at a distance being alarmed by the sudden tumult, fled hastily from the town, since they thought that the enemy were within the gates. The matrons begin to cast their clothes and silver over the wall, and bending over as far as the lower part of the bosom, with outstretched hands beseech the Romans to spare them, and not to sacrifice to their resentment even women and children, as they had done at Avaricum. Some of them let themselves down from the walls by their hands, and surrendered to our soldiers. Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the eighth legion, who, it was ascertained, had said that day among his fellow soldiers that he was excited by the plunder of

Avaricum, and would not allow any one to mount the wall before him, finding three men of his own company, and being raised up by them, scaled the wall. He himself, in turn, taking hold of them one by one, drew them up to the wall.

XLVIII. — In the meantime those who had gone to the other part of the town to defend it, as we have mentioned above, at first, aroused by hearing the shouts, and, afterwards, by frequent accounts that the town was in possession of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry, and hastened in larger numbers to that quarter. As each first came he stood beneath the wall, and increased the number of his countrymen engaged in action. When a great multitude of them had assembled, the matrons, who a little before were stretching their hands from the walls to the Romans, began to beseech their countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion to show their dishevelled hair, and bring their children into public view. Neither in position nor in numbers was the contest an equal one to the Romans; at the same time, being exhausted by running and the long continuation of the fight, they could not easily withstand fresh and vigorous troops.

XLIX. — Caesar, when he perceived that his soldiers were fighting on unfavourable ground, and that the enemy's forces were increasing, being alarmed for the safety of his troops, sent orders to Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts quickly from the camp, and post them at the foot of the hill, on the right wing of the enemy; that if he should see our men driven from the ground, he should deter the enemy from following too closely. He himself, advancing with the legion a little from that place where he had taken his post, awaited the issue of the battle.

L. — While the fight was going on most vigorously, hand to hand,

and the enemy depended on their position and numbers, our men on their bravery, the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank, as Caesar had sent them by another ascent on the right, for the sake of creating a diversion. These, from the similarity of their arms, greatly terrified our men; and although they were discovered to have their right shoulders bare, which was usually the sign of those reduced to peace, yet the soldiers suspected that this very thing was done by the enemy to deceive them. At the same time Lucius Fabius the centurion, and those who had scaled the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were cast from the wall. Marcus Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, after attempting to hew down the gates, was overpowered by numbers, and, despairing of his safety, having already received many wounds, said to the soldiers of his own company who followed him: "Since I cannot save you as well as myself, I shall at least provide for your safety, since I allured by the love of glory, led you into this danger, do you save yourselves when an opportunity is given." At the same time he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and slaying two of them, drove back the rest a little from the gate. When his men attempted to aid him, "In vain," he says, "you endeavour to procure my safety since blood and strength are now failing me, therefore leave this, while you have the opportunity, and retreat to the legion." Thus he fell fighting a few moments after, and saved his men by his own death.

LI. — Our soldiers, being hard pressed on every side, were dislodged from their position, with the loss of forty-six centurions; but the tenth legion, which had been posted in reserve on ground a little more level, checked the Gauls in their eager pursuit. It was supported by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, which, being led from the smaller camp, had, under the command of Titus Sextius,

occupied the higher ground. The legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and faced the enemy. Vercingetorix led back his men from the part of the hill within the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred of the soldiers were missing.

LII. — On the next day, Caesar, having called a meeting, censured the rashness and avarice of his soldiers, “In that they had judged for themselves how far they ought to proceed, or what they ought to do, and could not be kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants;” and stated, “what the disadvantage of the ground could effect, what opinion he himself had entertained at Avaricum, when having surprised the enemy without either general or cavalry, he had given up a certain victory, lest even a trifling loss should occur in the contest owing to the disadvantage of position. That as much as he admired the greatness of their courage, since neither the fortifications of the camp, nor the height of the mountain, nor the wall of the town could retard them; in the same degree he censured their licentiousness and arrogance, because they thought that they knew more than their general concerning victory, and the issue of actions: and that he required in his soldiers forbearance and self-command, not less than valour and magnanimity.”

LIII. — Having held this assembly, and having encouraged the soldiers at the conclusion of his speech, “That they should not be dispirited on this account, nor attribute to the valour of the enemy what the disadvantage of position had caused;” entertaining the same views of his departure that he had previously had, he led forth the legions from the camp, and drew up his army in order of battle in a suitable place. When Vercingetorix, nevertheless, would not descend to the level ground, a slight cavalry action, and that a successful one, having taken place, he led back his army into the camp. When he had

done this, the next day, thinking that he had done enough to lower the pride of the Gauls, and to encourage the minds of his soldiers, he moved his camp in the direction of the Aedui. The enemy not even then pursuing us, on the third day he repaired the bridge over the river Allier, and led over his whole army.

LIV. — Having then held an interview with Viridomarus and Eporedorix the Aeduans, he learns that Litavicus had set out with all the cavalry to raise the Aedui; that it was necessary that they too should go before him to confirm the state in their allegiance. Although he now saw distinctly the treachery of the Aedui in many things, and was of opinion that the revolt of the entire state would be hastened by their departure; yet he thought that they should not be detained, lest he should appear either to offer an insult, or betray some suspicion of fear. He briefly states to them when departing his services towards the Aedui: in what a state and how humbled he had found them, driven into their towns, deprived of their lands, stripped of all their forces, a tribute imposed on them, and hostages wrested from them with the utmost insult; and to what condition and to what greatness he had raised them, [so much so] that they had not only recovered their former position, but seemed to surpass the dignity and influence of all the previous eras of their history. After giving these admonitions he dismissed them.

LV. — Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, advantageously situated on the banks of the Loire. Caesar had conveyed hither all the hostages of Gaul, the corn, public money, a great part of his own baggage and that of his army; he had sent hither a great number of horses, which he had purchased in Italy and Spain on account of this war. When Eporedorix and Viridomarus came to this place, and received information of the disposition of the state, that Litavicus

had been admitted by the Aedui into Bibracte, which is a town of the greatest importance among them, that Convictolitanis the chief magistrate and a great part of the senate had gone to meet him, that ambassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix to negotiate a peace and alliance; they thought that so great an opportunity ought not to be neglected. Therefore, having put to the sword the garrison of Noviodunum and those who had assembled there for the purpose of trading or were on their march, they divided the money and horses among themselves; they took care that the hostages of the [different] states should be brought to Bibracte, to the chief magistrate; they burnt the town to prevent its being of any service to the Romans, as they were of opinion that they could not hold it; they carried away in their vessels whatever corn they could in the hurry; they destroyed the remainder, by [throwing it] into the river or setting it on fire; they themselves began to collect forces from the neighbouring country, to place guards and garrisons in different positions along the banks of the Loire, and to display the cavalry on all sides to strike terror into the Romans, [to try] if they could cut them off from a supply of provisions. In which expectation they were much aided, from the circumstance that the Loire had swollen to such a degree from the melting of the snows, that it did not seem capable of being forded at all.

LVI. — Caesar on being informed of these movements was of opinion that he ought to make haste, even if he should run some risk in completing the bridges, in order that he might engage before greater forces of the enemy should be collected in that place. For no one even then considered it an absolutely necessary act, that changing his design he should direct his march into the Province, both because the infamy and disgrace of the thing, and the

intervening mount Cevennes, and the difficulty of the roads prevented him; and especially because he had serious apprehensions for the safety of Labienus whom he had detached, and those legions whom he had sent with him. Therefore, having made very long marches by day and night, he came to the river Loire, contrary to the expectation of all; and having by means of the cavalry found out a ford, suitable enough considering the emergency, of such depth that their arms and shoulders could be above water for supporting their accoutrements, he dispersed his cavalry in such a manner as to break the force of the current, and having confounded the enemy at the first sight, led his army across the river in safety; and finding corn and cattle in the fields, after refreshing his army with them, he determined to march into the country of the Senones.

LVII. — Whilst these things are being done by Caesar, Labienus, leaving at Agendicum the recruits who had lately arrived from Italy, to guard the baggage, marches with four legions to Lutetia (which is a town of the Parisii, situated on an island of the river Seine), whose arrival being discovered by the enemy, numerous forces arrived from the neighbouring states. The supreme command is entrusted to Camulogenus, one of the Aulerci, who, although almost worn out with age, was called to that honour on account of his extraordinary knowledge of military tactics. He, when he observed that there was a large marsh which communicated with the Seine, and rendered all that country impassable, encamped there, and determined to prevent our troops from passing it.

LVIII. — Labienus at first attempted to raise vineae, fill up the marsh with hurdles and clay, and secure a road. After he perceived that this was too difficult to accomplish, he issued in silence from his camp at the third watch, and reached Melodunum by the same route

by which he came. This is a town of the Senones, situated on an island in the Seine, as we have just before observed of Lutetia. Having seized upon about fifty ships and quickly joined them together, and having placed soldiers in them, he intimidated by his unexpected arrival the inhabitants, of whom a great number had been called out to the war, and obtains possession of the town without a contest. Having repaired the bridge, which the enemy had broken down during the preceding days, he led over his army, and began to march along the banks of the river to Lutetia. The enemy, on learning the circumstance from those who had escaped from Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia, and order the bridges of that town to be broken down: they themselves set out from the marsh, and take their position on the banks of the Seine, over against Lutetia and opposite the camp of Labienus.

LIX. — Caesar was now reported to have departed from Gergovia; intelligence was likewise brought to them concerning the revolt of the Aedui, and a successful rising in Gaul; and that Caesar, having been prevented from prosecuting his journey and crossing the Loire, and having been compelled by the want of corn, had marched hastily to the province. But the Bellovaci, who had been previously disaffected of themselves, on learning the revolt of the Aedui, began to assemble forces and openly to prepare for war; Then Labienus, as the change in affairs was so great, thought that he must adopt a very different system from what he had previously intended, and he did not now think of making any new acquisitions, or of provoking the enemy to an action; but that he might bring back his army safe to Agendicum. For, on one side, the Bellovaci, a state which held the highest reputation for prowess in Gaul, were pressing on him; and Camulogenus, with a disciplined and well-equipped army, held the

other side; moreover, a very great river separated and cut off the legions from the garrison and baggage. He saw that, in consequence of such great difficulties being thrown in his way, he must seek aid from his own energy of disposition.

LX. — Having, therefore, called a council of war a little before evening, he exhorted his soldiers to execute with diligence and energy such commands as he should give; he assigns the ships which he had brought from Melodunum to Roman knights, one to each, and orders them to fall down the river silently for four miles, at the end of the fourth watch, and there wait for him. He leaves the five cohorts, which he considered to be the most steady in action, to guard the camp; he orders the five remaining cohorts of the same legion to proceed a little after midnight up the river with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He collects also some small boats; and sends them in the same direction, with orders to make a loud noise in rowing. He himself, a little after, marched out in silence, and, at the head of three legions, seeks that place to which he had ordered the ships to be brought.

LXI. — When he had arrived there, the enemy's scouts, as they were stationed along every part of the river, not expecting an attack, because a great storm had suddenly arisen, were surprised by our soldiers: the infantry and cavalry are quickly transported, under the superintendence of the Roman knights, whom he had appointed to that office. Almost at the same time, a little before daylight, intelligence was given to the enemy that there was an unusual tumult in the camp of the Romans, and that a strong force was marching up the river, and that the sound of oars was distinctly heard in the same quarter, and that soldiers were being conveyed across in ships a little below. On hearing these things, because they were of opinion that the

legions were passing in three different places, and that the entire army, being terrified by the revolt of the Aedui, were preparing for flight, they divided their forces also into three divisions. For leaving a guard opposite to the camp and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum, with orders to advance as far as the ships would proceed, they led the rest of their troops against Labienus.

LXII. — By day-break all our soldiers were brought across and the army of the enemy was in sight. Labienus, having encouraged his soldiers “to retain the memory of their ancient valour, and so many most successful actions, and imagine Caesar himself, under whose command they had so often routed the enemy, to be present,” gives the signal for action. At the first onset the enemy are beaten and put to flight in the right wing, where the seventh legion stood: on the left wing, which position the twelfth legion held, although the first ranks fell transfixed by the javelins of the Romans, yet the rest resisted most bravely; nor did any one of them show the slightest intention of flying. Camulogenus, the general of the enemy, was present and encouraged his troops. But when the issue of the victory was still uncertain, and the circumstances which were taking place on the left wing were announced to the tribunes of the seventh legion, they faced about their legion to the enemy’s rear and attacked it: not even then did any one retreat, but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus met the same fate. But those who were left as a guard opposite the camp of Labienus, when they heard that the battle was commenced, marched to aid their countrymen and take possession of a hill, but were unable to withstand the attack of the victorious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with their own fugitives, such as the woods and mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces by our cavalry. When this battle was finished, Labienus returns to

Agendicum, where the baggage of the whole army had been left: from it he marched with all his forces to Caesar.

LXIII. — The revolt of the Aedui being known, the war grows more dangerous. Embassies are sent by them in all directions: as far as they can prevail by influence, authority, or money, they strive to excite the state [to revolt]. Having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar had deposited with them, they terrify the hesitating by putting them to death. The Aedui request Vercingetorix to come to them and communicate his plans of conducting the war. On obtaining this request they insist that the chief command should be assigned to them; and when the affair became a disputed question, a council of all Gaul is summoned to Bibracte. They come together in great numbers and from every quarter to the same place. The decision is left to the votes of the mass: all to a man approve of Vercingetorix as their general. The Remi, Lingones, and Treviri were absent from this meeting; the two former because they attached themselves to the alliance of Rome; the Treviri because they were very remote and were hard pressed by the Germans; which was also the reason of their being absent during the whole war, and their sending auxiliaries to neither party. The Aedui are highly indignant at being deprived of the chief command; they lament the change of fortune, and miss Caesar's indulgence towards them; however, after engaging in the war, they do not dare to pursue their own measures apart from the rest. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, youths of the greatest promise, submit reluctantly to Vercingetorix.

LXIV. — The latter demands hostages from the remaining states: nay, more, appointed a day for this proceeding; he orders all the cavalry, fifteen thousand in number, to quickly assemble here; he says that he will be content with the infantry which he had before,

and would not tempt fortune nor come to a regular engagement; but since he had abundance of cavalry, it would be very easy for him to prevent the Romans from obtaining forage or corn, provided that they themselves should resolutely destroy their corn and set fire to their houses, by which sacrifice of private property they would evidently obtain perpetual dominion and freedom. After arranging these matters he levies ten thousand infantry on the Aedui and Segusiani, who border on our province: to these he adds eight hundred horse. He sets over them the brother of Eporedorix, and orders him to wage war against the Allobroges. On the other side he sends the Gabali and the nearest cantons of the Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends the Ruteni and Cadurci to lay waste the territories of the Volcae Arecomici. Besides, by secret messages and embassies, he tampers with the Allobroges, whose minds, he hopes, had not yet settled down after the excitement of the late war. To their nobles he promises money, and to their state the dominion of the whole province.

LXV. — The only guards provided against all these contingencies were twenty-two cohorts, which were collected from the entire province by Lucius Caesar, the lieutenant, and opposed to the enemy in every quarter. The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in battle with their neighbours, are defeated, and Caius Valerius Donotaurus, the son of Caburus, the principal man of the state, and several others, being slain, they are forced to retire within their towns and fortifications. The Allobroges, placing guards along the course of the Rhine, defend their frontiers with great vigilance and energy. Caesar, as he perceived that the enemy were superior in cavalry, and he himself could receive no aid from the province or Italy, while all communication was cut off, sends across the Rhine into Germany to

those states which he had subdued in the preceding campaigns, and summons from them cavalry and the light-armed infantry, who were accustomed to engage among them. On their arrival, as they were mounted on unserviceable horses, he takes horses from the military tribunes and the rest, nay, even from the Roman knights and veterans, and distributes them among the Germans.

LXVI. — In the meantime, whilst these things are going on, the forces of the enemy from the Arverni, and the cavalry which had been demanded from all Gaul, meet together. A great number of these having been collected, when Caesar was marching into the country of the Sequani, through the confines of the Lingones, in order that he might the more easily render aid to the province, Vercingetorix encamped in three camps, about ten miles from the Romans: and having summoned the commanders of the cavalry to a council, he shows that the time of victory was come; that the Romans were fleeing into the province and leaving Gaul; that this was sufficient for obtaining immediate freedom; but was of little moment in acquiring peace and tranquillity for the future; for the Romans would return after assembling greater forces, and would not put an end to the war; Therefore they should attack them on their march, when encumbered. If the infantry should [be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and be retarded by doing so, the march could not be accomplished: if, abandoning their baggage, they should provide for their safety (a result which, he trusted, was more likely to ensue), they would lose both property and character. For as to the enemy's horse, they ought not to entertain a doubt that none of them would dare to advance beyond the main body. In order that they [the Gauls] may do so with greater spirit, he would marshal all their forces before the camp, and intimidate the enemy. The cavalry unanimously

shout out, "That they ought to bind themselves by a most sacred oath, that he should not be received under a roof, nor have access to his children, parents, or wife, who shall not twice have ridden through the enemy's army." LXVII. — This proposal receiving general approbation, and all being forced to take the oath, on the next day the cavalry were divided into three parts, and two of these divisions made a demonstration on our two flanks; while one in front began to obstruct our march. On this circumstance being announced, Caesar orders his cavalry also to form three divisions and charge the enemy. Then the action commences simultaneously in every part: the main body halts; the baggage is received within the ranks of the legions. If our men seemed to be distressed, or hard pressed in any quarter, Caesar usually ordered the troops to advance, and the army to wheel round in that quarter; which conduct retarded the enemy in the pursuit, and encouraged our men by the hope of support. At length the Germans, on the right wing, having gained the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy from their position and pursue them even as far as the river at which Vercingetorix with the infantry was stationed, and slay several of them. The rest, on observing this action, fearing lest they should be surrounded, betake themselves to flight. A slaughter ensues in every direction, and three of the noblest of the Audi are taken and brought to Caesar: Cotus, the commander of the cavalry, who had been engaged in the contest with Convictolitanis the last election, Cavarillus, who had held the command of the infantry after the revolt of Litavicus, and Eporedorix, under whose command the Aedui had engaged in war against the Sequani, before the arrival of Caesar.

LXVIII. — All his cavalry being routed, Vercingetorix led back his troops in the same order as he had arranged them before the

camp, and immediately began to march to Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii; and ordered the baggage to be speedily brought forth from the camp, and follow him closely. Caesar, having conveyed his baggage to the nearest hill, and having left two legions to guard it, pursued as far as the time of day would permit, and after slaying about three thousand of the rear of the enemy, encamped at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitring the situation of the city, finding that the enemy were panic-stricken, because the cavalry in which they placed their chief reliance were beaten, he encouraged his men to endure the toil, and began to draw a line of circumvallation round Alesia.

LXIX. — The town itself was situated on the top of a hill, in a very lofty position, so that it did not appear likely to be taken, except by a regular siege. Two rivers, on two different sides, washed the foot of the hill. Before the town lay a plain of about three miles in length; on every other side hills at a moderate distance, and of an equal degree of height, surrounded the town. The army of the Gauls had filled all the space under the wall, comprising the part of the hill which looked to the rising sun, and had drawn in front a trench and a stone wall six feet high. The circuit of that fortification, which was commenced by the Romans, comprised eleven miles. The camp was pitched in a strong position, and twenty-three redoubts were raised in it, in which sentinels were placed by day, lest any sally should be made suddenly; and by night the same were occupied by watches and strong guards.

LXX.-The work having been begun, a cavalry action ensues in that plain, which we have already described as broken by hills, and extending three miles in length. The contest is maintained on both sides with the utmost vigour; Caesar sends the Germans to aid our

troops when distressed, and draws up the legions in front of the camp, lest any sally should be suddenly made by the enemy's infantry. The courage of our men is increased by the additional support of the legions; the enemy being put to flight, hinder one another by their numbers, and as only the narrower gates were left open, are crowded together in them; then the Germans pursue them with vigour even to the fortifications. A great slaughter ensues; some leave their horses, and endeavour to cross the ditch and climb the wall. Caesar orders the legions which he had drawn up in front of the rampart to advance a little. The Gauls, who were within the fortifications, were no less panic-stricken, thinking that the enemy were coming that moment against them, and unanimously shout "to arms;" some in their alarm rush into the town; Vercingetorix orders the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be left undefended. The Germans retreat, after slaying many and taking several horses.

LXXI. — Vercingetorix adopts the design of sending away all his cavalry by night, before the fortifications should be completed by the Romans. He charges them when departing "that each of them should go to his respective state, and press for the war all who were old enough to bear arms; he states his own Merits, and conjures them to consider his safety, and not surrender him, who had deserved so well of the general freedom, to the enemy for torture; he points out to them that, if they should be remiss, eighty thousand chosen men would perish with him; that, upon making a calculation, he had barely corn for thirty days, but could hold out a little longer by economy." After giving these instructions he silently dismisses the cavalry in the second watch, [on that side] where our works were not completed; he orders all the corn to be brought to himself; he ordains capital punishment to such as should not obey; he distributes among

them, man by man, the cattle, great quantities of which had been driven there by the Mandubii; he began to measure out the corn sparingly, and by little and little; he receives into the town all the forces which he had posted in front of it. In this manner he prepares to await the succours from Gaul, and carry on the war.

LXXII. — Caesar, on learning these proceedings from the deserters and captives, adopted the following system of fortification; he dug a trench twenty feet deep, with perpendicular sides, in such a manner that the base of this trench should extend so far as the edges were apart at the top. He raised all his other works at a distance of four hundred feet from that ditch; [he did] that with this intention, lest (since he necessarily embraced so extensive an area, and the whole works could not be easily surrounded by a line of soldiers) a large number of the enemy should suddenly, or by night, sally against the fortifications; or lest they should by day cast weapons against our men while occupied with the works. Having left this interval, he drew two trenches fifteen feet broad, and of the same depth; the innermost of them, being in low and level ground, he filled with water conveyed from the river. Behind these he raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high: to this he added a parapet and battlements, with large stakes cut like stags' horns, projecting from the junction of the parapet and battlements, to prevent the enemy from scaling it, and surrounded the entire work with turrets, which were eighty feet distant from one another.

LXXIII. — It was necessary, at one and the same time, to procure timber [for the rampart], lay in supplies of corn, and raise also extensive fortifications, and the available troops were in consequence of this reduced in number, since they used to advance to some distance from the camp, and sometimes the Gauls endeavoured to

attack our works, and to make a sally from the town by several gates and in great force. On which Caesar thought that further additions should be made to these works, in order that the fortifications might be defensible by a small number of soldiers. Having, therefore, cut down the trunks of trees or very thick branches, and having stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened them into a point, he drew a continued trench everywhere five feet deep. These stakes being sunk into this trench, and fastened firmly at the bottom, to prevent the possibility of their being torn up, had their branches only projecting from the ground. There were five rows in connection with, and intersecting each other; and whoever entered within them were likely to impale themselves on very sharp stakes. The soldiers called these “cippi.” Before these, which were arranged in oblique rows in the form of a quincunx, pits three feet deep were dug, which gradually diminished in depth to the bottom. In these pits tapering stakes, of the thickness of a man’s thigh, sharpened at the top and hardened in the fire, were sunk in such a manner as to project from the ground not more than four inches; at the same time for the purpose of giving them strength and stability, they were each filled with trampled clay to the height of one foot from the bottom: the rest of the pit was covered over with osiers and twigs, to conceal the deceit. Eight rows of this kind were dug, and were three feet distant from each other. They called this a lily from its resemblance to that flower. Stakes a foot long, with iron hooks attached to them, were entirely sunk in the ground before these, and were planted in every place at small intervals; these they called spurs.

LXXIV. — After completing these works, having selected as level ground as he could, considering the nature of the country, and having enclosed an area of fourteen miles, he constructed, against an

external enemy, fortifications of the same kind in every respect, and separate from these, so that the guards of the fortifications could not be surrounded even by immense numbers, if such a circumstance should take place owing to the departure of the enemy's cavalry; and in order that the Roman soldiers might not be compelled to go out of the camp with great risk, he orders all to provide forage and corn for thirty days.

LXXV. — Whilst those things are carried on at Alesia, the Gauls, having convened a council of their chief nobility, determine that all who could bear arms should not be called out, which was the opinion of Vercingetorix, but that a fixed number should be levied from each state; lest, when so great a multitude assembled together, they could neither govern nor distinguish their men, nor have the means of supplying them with corn. They demand thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui and their dependents, the Segusiani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices; an equal number from the Arverni in conjunction with the Eleuteti Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni, who were accustomed to be under the command of the Arverni; twelve thousand each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes; ten thousand from the Bellovaci; the same number from the Lemovici; eight thousand each from the Pictones, and Turoni, and Parisii, and Helvii; five thousand each from the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges; the same number from the Aulerci Cenomani; four thousand from the Atrebates; three thousand each from the Bellocassi, Lexovii, and Aulerci Ebuovices; thirty thousand from the Rauraci, and Boii; six thousand, from all the states together which border on the Atlantic, and which in their dialect are called Armoricae (in which number are comprehended the Curisolites,

Rhedones, Ambibari, Caltes, Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did not contribute their number, as they said that they would wage war against the Romans on their own account, and at their own discretion, and would not obey the order of any one: however, at the request of Commius, they sent two thousand, in consideration of a tie of hospitality which subsisted between him and them.

LXXVI. — Caesar had, as we have previously narrated, availed himself of the faithful and valuable services of this Commius, in Britain, in former years: in consideration of which merits he had exempted from taxes his [Commius's] state, and had conferred on Commius himself the country of the Morini. Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls in asserting their freedom, and recovering their ancient renown in war, that they were influenced neither by favours, nor by the recollection of private friendship; and all earnestly directed their energies and resources to that war, and collected eight thousand cavalry, and about two hundred and forty thousand infantry. These were reviewed in the country of the Aedui, and a calculation was made of their numbers: commanders were appointed: the supreme command is entrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix the Aeduans, and Vergasillaunus the Arvernian, the cousin-german of Vercingetorix. To them are assigned men selected from each state, by whose advice the war should be conducted. All march to Alesia, sanguine and full of confidence: nor was there a single individual who imagined that the Romans could withstand the sight of such an immense host: especially in an action carried on both in front and rear, when [on the inside] the besieged would sally from the town and attack the enemy, and on the outside so great forces of cavalry and infantry would be

seen.

LXXVII. — But those who were blockaded at Alesia, the day being past on which they had expected auxiliaries from their countrymen, and all their corn being consumed, ignorant of what was going on among the Aedui, convened an assembly and deliberated on the exigency of their situation. After various opinions had been expressed among them, some of which proposed a surrender, others a sally, whilst their strength would support it, the speech of Critognatus ought not to be omitted for its singular and detestable cruelty. He sprung from the noblest family among the Arverni, and possessing great influence, says, “I shall pay no attention to the opinion of those who call a most disgraceful surrender by the name of a capitulation; nor do I think that they ought to be considered as citizens, or summoned to the council. My business is with those who approve of a sally: in whose advice the memory of our ancient prowess seems to dwell in the opinion of you all. To be unable to bear privation for a short time is disgraceful cowardice, not true valour. Those who voluntarily offer themselves to death are more easily found than those who would calmly endure distress. And I would approve of this opinion (for honour is a powerful motive with me), could I foresee no other loss, save that of life: but let us, in adopting our design, look back on all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our aid. What courage do you think would our relatives and friends have, if eighty thousand men were butchered in one spot, supposing that they should be forced to come to an action almost over our corpses? Do not utterly deprive them of your aid, for they have spurned all thoughts of personal danger on account of your safety; nor by your folly, rashness, and cowardice, crush all Gaul and doom it to an eternal slavery. Do you doubt their fidelity and

firmness because they have not come at the appointed day? What then? Do you suppose that the Romans are employed every day in the outer fortifications for mere amusement? If you cannot be assured by their despatches, since every avenue is blocked up, take the Romans as evidence that their approach is drawing near; since they, intimidated by alarm at this, labour night and day at their works. What, therefore, is my design? To do as our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, which was by no means equally momentous; who, when driven into their towns, and oppressed by similar privations, supported life by the corpses of those who appeared useless for war on account of their age, and did not surrender to the enemy: and even if we had not a precedent for such cruel conduct, still I should consider it most glorious that one should be established, and delivered to posterity. For in what was that war like this? The Cimbri, after laying Gaul waste, and inflicting great calamities, at length departed from our country, and sought other lands; they left us our rights, laws, lands, and liberty. But what other motive or wish have the Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle in the lands and states of those whom they have learned by fame to be noble and powerful in war, and impose on them perpetual slavery? For they never have carried on wars on any other terms. But if you know not these things which are going on in distant countries, look to the neighbouring Gaul, which being reduced to the form of a province, stripped of its rights and laws, and subjected to Roman despotism, is oppressed by perpetual slavery.”

LXXVIII. — When different opinions were expressed, they determined that those who, owing to age or ill health, were unserviceable for war, should depart from the town, and that themselves should try every expedient before they had recourse to

the advice of Critognatus: however, that they would rather adopt that design, if circumstances should compel them and their allies should delay, than accept any terms of a surrender or peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the town, are compelled to go forth with their wives and children. When these came to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they begged of the soldiers by every entreaty to receive them as slaves and relieve them with food. But Caesar, placing guards on the rampart, forbade them to be admitted.

LXXIX. — In the meantime, Commius and the rest of the leaders, to whom the supreme command had been intrusted, came with all their forces to Alesia, and having occupied the entire hill, encamp not more than a mile from our fortifications. The following day, having led forth their cavalry from the camp, they fill all that plain, which, we have related, extended three miles in length, and draw out their infantry a little from that place, and post them on the higher ground. The town Alesia commanded a view of the whole plain. The besieged run together when these auxiliaries were seen; mutual congratulations ensue, and the minds of all are elated with joy. Accordingly, drawing out their troops, they encamp before the town, and cover the nearest trench with hurdles and fill it up with earth, and make ready for a sally and every casualty.

LXXX. — Caesar, having stationed his army on both sides of the fortifications, in order that, if occasion should arise, each should hold and know his own post, orders the cavalry to issue forth from the camp and commence action. There was a commanding view from the entire camp, which occupied a ridge of hills; and the minds of all the soldiers anxiously awaited the issue of the battle. The Gauls had scattered archers and light-armed infantry here and there, among their cavalry, to give relief to their retreating troops, and sustain the

impetuosity of our cavalry. Several of our soldiers were unexpectedly wounded by these, and left the battle. When the Gauls were confident that their countrymen were the conquerors in the action, and beheld our men hard pressed by numbers, both those who were hemmed in by the line of circumvallation and those who had come to aid them, supported the spirits of their men by shouts and yells from every quarter. As the action was carried on in sight of all, neither a brave nor cowardly act could be concealed; both the desire of praise and the fear of ignominy, urged on each party to valour. After fighting from noon almost to sunset, without victory inclining in favour of either, the Germans, on one side, made a charge against the enemy in a compact body, and drove them back; and, when they were put to flight, the archers were surrounded and cut to pieces. In other parts, likewise, our men pursued to the camp the retreating enemy, and did not give them an opportunity of rallying. But those who had come forth from Alesia returned into the town dejected and almost despairing of success.

LXXXI. — The Gauls, after the interval of a day, and after making, during that time, an immense number of hurdles, scaling ladders, and iron hooks, silently went forth from the camp at midnight and approached the fortifications in the plain. Raising a shout suddenly, that by this intimation those who were besieged in the town might learn their arrival, they began to cast down hurdles and dislodge our men from the rampart by slings, arrows, and stones, and executed the other movements which are requisite in storming. At the same time, Vercingetorix having heard the shout, gives the signal to his troops by a trumpet, and leads them forth from the town. Our troops, as each man's post had been assigned him some days before, man the fortifications; they intimidate the Gauls by slings,

large stones, stakes which they had placed along the works, and bullets. All view being prevented by the darkness, many wounds are received on both sides; several missiles are thrown from the engines. But Marcus Antonius, and Caius Trebonius, the lieutenants, to whom the defence of these parts had been allotted, draughted troops from the redoubts which were more remote, and sent them to aid our troops, in whatever direction they understood that they were hard pressed.

LXXXII. — Whilst the Gauls were at a distance from the fortification, they did more execution, owing to the immense number of their weapons: after they came nearer, they either unawares empaled themselves on the spurs, or were pierced by the mural darts from the ramparts and towers, and thus perished. After receiving many wounds on all sides, and having forced no part of the works, when day drew nigh, fearing lest they should be surrounded by a sally made from the higher camp on the exposed flank, they retreated to their countrymen. But those within, whilst they bring forward those things which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for a sally, fill up the nearest trenches; having delayed a long time in executing these movements, they learned the retreat of their countrymen before they drew nigh to the fortifications. Thus they returned to the town without accomplishing their object.

LXXXIII. — The Gauls, having been twice repulsed with great loss, consult what they should do: they avail themselves of the information of those who were well acquainted with the country; from them they ascertain the position and fortification of the upper camp. There was, on the north side, a hill, which our men could not include in their works, on account of the extent of the circuit, and had necessarily made their camp in ground almost disadvantageous, and

pretty steep. Caius Antistius Reginus, and Caius Caninius Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with two legions, were in possession of this camp. The leaders of the enemy, having reconnoitred the country by their scouts, select from the entire army sixty thousand men; belonging to those states which bear the highest character for courage: they privately arrange among themselves what they wished to be done, and in what manner; they decide that the attack should take place when it should seem to be noon. They appoint over their forces Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the four generals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix. He, having issued from the camp at the first watch, and having almost completed his march a little before the dawn, hid himself behind the mountain, and ordered his soldiers to refresh themselves after their labour during the night. When noon now seemed to draw nigh, he marched hastily against that camp which we have mentioned before; and, at the same time, the cavalry began to approach the fortifications in the plain, and the rest of the forces to make a demonstration in front of the camp.

LXXXIV. — Vercingetorix, having beheld his countrymen from the citadel of Alesia, issues forth from the town; he brings forth from the camp long hooks, movable pent-houses, mural hooks, and other things, which he had prepared for the purpose of making a sally. They engage on all sides at once, and every expedient is adopted. They flocked to whatever part of the works seemed weakest. The army of the Romans is distributed along their extensive lines, and with difficulty meets the enemy in every quarter. The shouts which were raised by the combatants in their rear, had a great tendency to intimidate our men, because they perceived that their danger rested on the valour of others: for generally all evils which are distant most powerfully alarm men's minds.

LXXXV. — Caesar, having selected a commanding situation, sees distinctly whatever is going on in every quarter, and sends assistance to his troops when hard pressed. The idea uppermost in the minds of both parties is, that the present is the time in which they would have the fairest opportunity of making a struggle; the Gauls despairing of all safety, unless they should succeed in forcing the lines: the Romans expecting an end to all their labours if they should gain the day. The principal struggle is at the upper lines, to which, we have said, Vergasillaunus was sent. The least elevation of ground, added to a declivity, exercises a momentous influence. Some are casting missiles, others, forming a testudo, advance to the attack; fresh men by turns relieve the wearied. The earth, heaped up by all against the fortifications, gives the means of ascent to the Gauls, and covers those works which the Romans had concealed in the ground. Our men have no longer arms or strength.

LXXXVI. — Caesar, on observing these movements, sends Labienus with six cohorts to relieve his distressed soldiers: he orders him, if he should be unable to withstand them, to draw off the cohorts and make a sally; but not to do this except through necessity. He himself goes to the rest, and exhorts them not to succumb to the toil; he shows them that the fruits of all former engagements depend on that day and hour. The Gauls within, despairing of forcing the fortifications in the plains on account of the greatness of the works, attempt the places precipitous in ascent: hither they bring the engines which they had prepared; by the immense number of their missiles they dislodge the defenders from the turrets: they fill the ditches with clay and hurdles, then clear the way; they tear down the rampart and breast-work with hooks.

LXXXVII. — Caesar sends at first young Brutus, with six

cohorts, and afterwards Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with seven others: finally, as they fought more obstinately, he leads up fresh men to the assistance of his soldiers. After renewing the action, and repulsing the enemy, he marches in the direction in which he had sent Labienus, drafts four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, and orders part of the cavalry to follow him, and part to make the circuit of the external fortifications and attack the enemy in the rear. Labienus, when neither the ramparts or ditches could check the onset of the enemy, informs Caesar by messengers of what he intended to do. Caesar hastens to share in the action.

LXXXVIII. — His arrival being known from the colour of his robe, and the troops of cavalry, and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him being seen, as these low and sloping grounds were plainly visible from the eminences, the enemy join battle. A shout being raised by both sides, it was succeeded by a general shout along the ramparts and whole line of fortifications. Our troops, laying aside their javelins, carry on the engagement with their swords. The cavalry is suddenly seen in the rear of the Gauls: the other cohorts advance rapidly; the enemy turn their backs; the cavalry intercept them in their flight, and a great slaughter ensues. Sedulius the general and chief of the Lemovices is slain; Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, is taken alive in the flight, seventy-four military standards are brought to Caesar, and few out of so great a number return safe to their camp. The besieged, beholding from the town the slaughter and flight of their countrymen, despairing of safety, lead back their troops from the fortifications. A flight of the Gauls from their camp immediately ensues on hearing of this disaster, and had not the soldiers been wearied by sending frequent reinforcements, and the labour of the entire day, all the enemy's forces could have been destroyed.

Immediately after midnight, the cavalry are sent out and overtake the rear, a great number are taken or cut to pieces, the rest by flight escape in different directions to their respective states. Vercingetorix, having convened a council the following day, declares, "That he had undertaken that war, not on account of his own exigencies, but on account of the general freedom; and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself to them for either purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by his death, or surrender him alive." Ambassadors are sent to Caesar on this subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftains delivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of the camp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They surrender Vercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, their respective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to each soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.

XC. — After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country of the] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place ambassadors are sent by the Arverni, who promise that they will execute his commands. He demands a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winter quarters; he restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui and Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the] Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus Sempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from the Bellovaci in their neighbourhood. He sends Caius Antistius Reginus into the [country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius into the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus into those of the Ruteni,

with one legion each. He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo and Matisco on the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself determines to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days is decreed by the senate at Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's despatches.

BOOK VIII

CONTINUATION OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR ASCRIBED TO AULUS HIRTIUS.

PREFACE

Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in a most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my inability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation of the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be compared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; and recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactions in Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we see no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read them could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might the more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in presuming to intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all hands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it is not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published for the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that historians seem rather deprived of than furnished with materials. At which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed not only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war;

and though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and those which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, whilst I urge every apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the charge of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any one be put in competition with him. Farewell.

I. — Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged war incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers after so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought him that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile intentions, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason was assigned: namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able to resist the Romans with any force they could collect in one place; and hoped that if several states made war in different places at the same time, the Roman army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to prosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline any inconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay the rest should be enabled to assert their liberty.

II. — That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, in charge of his quarters, and set out himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of January, from the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he had stationed in the country of the Bituriges, not far from the territories of the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his army into the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who, possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be deterred, by a single legion quartered among them,

from making warlike preparation, and forming combinations.

III.-By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to an unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our horse, whilst cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before they had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's invasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns, was forbidden by Caesar's orders: lest if he advanced far, forage and corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as were able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to the neighbouring states, relying either on private friendship, or public alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them in every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safety of others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he both retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the wavering to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges, when they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to his friendship, and that the neighbouring states had given hostages, without incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection, they did the same.

IV.-Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labour and patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two hundred sesterii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given instead of plunder; and sending his legions back to quarters, he himself returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. Whilst he was dispensing justice there, the Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aid against the Carnutes, who they complained had made

war against them. Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen days in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of quarters on the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former Commentary to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he marches in pursuit of the Carnutes.

V. — When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the Carnutes, terrified by the sufferings of other states, deserted their villages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to meet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves against the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several towns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took up his quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in houses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the tents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he sends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not without effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The Carnutes, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of danger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they were driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighbouring states.

VI. — Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequence could be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius, with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: and being informed by frequent embassies

from the Remi, that the Bellovaci (who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and the neighbouring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and Comius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at a general rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the territories of the Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of the Remi: and moreover, considering that not only his honour, but his interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of the republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion out of quarters and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with his two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Trebonius for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his own toils.

VII. — As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops of horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders, bring him back word that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was general from all parts), but had been sent back to watch our motions. Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the Bellovaci were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all the Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along with them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and that they had chosen for their camp an elevated position, surrounded by a dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the

most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by Correus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the name of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left the camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come to a resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desire of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as was reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by ambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other necessities.”

VIII. — When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from the concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans which were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash resolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use every exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small force and come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguished valour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for experience and valour. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it the intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In order if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance of only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner: that

the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the baggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole train of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.

IX. — When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar, saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array; either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or with the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces before the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished to bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high, with breast-works built on it proportioned to its height; and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories high, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid across and covered over; which should be guarded in front by small parapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of soldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by their height, might throw their darts with more daring and to a greater distance; the other, which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on the rampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling on their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a considerable height.

X.—Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hoped that the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would

raise confidence in the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to make a distant excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be secured by the works with a very small force. In the meantime there were frequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out between the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on the other hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover there happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of private houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country were surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish hopes in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I said had gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry, and though the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated by their arrival.

XI.-Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within their camp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and that it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the place enclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote to Trebonius to send with all despatch for the thirteenth legion which was in winter-quarters among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants; and then to come to him by forced marches with the three legions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, and other states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard his foraging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack of the enemy.

XII. — As this continued for several days, and their vigilance was

relaxed by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), the Bellovaci, having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations of our horse, lie in ambush with a select body of foot in a place covered with woods; to it they sent their horse the next day, who were first to decoy our men into the ambuscade, and then when they were surrounded, to attack them. It was the lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whom that day had been allotted to perform this duty; for, having suddenly got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and despising their weakness, in consequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too eagerly, and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being by this means thrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usual in cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus, the governor of their state, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to sit on horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the custom of the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the command, nor would he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the barbarians were puffed up and inflated at the success of this battle, in killing the prince and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this loss, to examine the country, and post their guards with more caution, and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.

XIII. — In the meantime daily skirmishes take place continually in view of both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In one of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the Rhine, to fight intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed the marsh, and slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued the rest, so terrified them, that not only those who were attacked hand to hand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who were stationed at a greater distance to support them, fled

disgracefully; and being often beaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired into their camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled farther. Their danger drew their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult to judge whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage, or more dejected by a trifling calamity.

XIV. — After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with his legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night all who were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them their whole baggage. Whilst they are preparing their disorderly and confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast multitude of waggons, even when they have very light baggage), being overtaken by daylight, they drew their forces out before their camp, to prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage had advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it prudent to attack them when standing on their defence, with such a steep hill in their favour, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they could quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was divided from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he could not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by a small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his army across, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which was fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up his army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which he could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy.

XV. — The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their

position, though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to ascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties, lest they should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, and therefore remained in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that they persisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and, measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be fortified. Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the rampart and stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horses bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, and that they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the same place without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure a retreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks on which they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up in order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), of which they had great plenty in their camp, and piled them in the front of their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set them all on fire at one and the same time. The continued blaze soon screened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner happened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.

XVI. — Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that method to favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a party of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and that the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw our men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly. The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line of flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able to see their horses' heads, gave the

enemy free liberty to retreat, through fear of an ambuscade. Thus, by a flight, full at once of cowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles, and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerous ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to the Roman foragers.

XVII. — After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from a certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the Romans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance of corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drew out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of light infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as he could.

XVIII. — The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a level piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on every side by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they surrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good order to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and willing to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. On their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party and attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise in engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to themselves.

XIX. — When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of our men fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be

surrounded, the rest of the enemy broke out from the woods whilst Correus was engaged. The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigour, and continued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of foot gradually advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced our horse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before the legions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with the horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some time doubtful, but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first charge, became superior from this very circumstance that, though suddenly attacked from an ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the meantime the legions were approaching, and several messengers arrived with notice to our men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was near at hand, with his forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, our men, confiding in the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely, fearing, lest if they should be slow in their operations they should let the legions participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy lose courage and attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they were themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrap the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost the greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whithersoever chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but were vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the meantime, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of quarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our men, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him.

XX. — After this transaction, Caesar, having come up

immediately after the battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so great a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon their camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action, though he saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched his army over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, being informed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded men who having escaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after the defeat, and learning that everything had turned out unfavourable, that Correus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off, imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling a council in haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send ambassadors and hostages to Caesar.

XXI. — This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius the Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries for that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; and requested that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy, which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them before the engagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from his usual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power of the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousands of their choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to bring the fatal news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from the battle one advantage, of some importance, considering their loss; that Correus, the author of the rebellion, and agitator of the people, was slain: for that whilst he lived, the senate had never equal influence in the state with the giddy populace.

XXII. — Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these

supplications, that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, in conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that they had persevered the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and were not brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of the rest; that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easily transferred to the dead; but that no one person could have such influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raise a war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in opposition to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he was satisfied with the punishment which they had drawn upon themselves.

XXIII. — The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer to their countrymen, and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in from the other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the] Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all except Comius, whose fears restrained him from entrusting his safety to any person's honour. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius was tampering with the states, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar, thought he might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that he would not come to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put him on his guard by the attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with orders to have him put to death under pretence of a conference. To effect his purpose, he sent with him some chosen centurions. When they came to the conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had taken hold of Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprised at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented by the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the

first blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design to fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had received a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen, dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, it was said that Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of any Roman.

XXIV. — When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlike nations, perceived that there was now no state which could make preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing and fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved to detach his army into different parts of the country. He kept with himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius Fabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of Gaul, because it was rumoured that some states had risen in arms, and he did not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that country, was strong enough to protect it with two legions. He ordered Titus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the twelfth legion which had been under him in winter quarters, to Hither Gaul, to protect the Roman colonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of barbarians, similar to that which had happened the year before to the Tergestines, who were cut off by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself marched to depopulate the country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced to fly, but despaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought it most consistent with his honour to waste his country both of inhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of his countrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might be excluded from a return to his state for the calamities which he had brought on it.

XXV. — After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword, fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent Labienus with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from its vicinity to Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but little from the Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and never continued in its allegiance, except when awed by the presence of his army.

XXVI. — In the meantime Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received information by letters and messages from Duracius, who had always continued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his state had revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in the country of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he was approaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius was shut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the enemy with his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus, having notice of Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the legions, and prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spending several days in the attempt, and losing a considerable number of men, without being able to make a breach in any part of the works, he returned again to the siege of Limonum.

XXVII. — At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many states to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by taking hostages; he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of the proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bring assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus hearing of the approach of Fabius, and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be

forced to withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehension from the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place with all his forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently secure from danger, unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deep a river to pass except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet being informed of the nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it, he judged it most likely that the enemy would take that way, which he found they did take. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered his cavalry to advance no further before the legions, than that they could return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear, and attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having executed the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.

XXVIII. — The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with orders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself should come up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus Atius Varus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill, encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troops in convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. The enemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, and making a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battle was warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they had conquered the day before, and knowing that the legions were following them, animated both by the disgrace of retreating, and a desire of concluding the battle expeditiously by their own courage, fought most valiantly

against the foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forces would come against them, as they had experienced the day before, thought they had got a favourable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry.

XXIX.—After the conflict had continued for some time with great violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the foot should by turns assist the horse. Then the legions, marching in close order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this sight, the barbarian horse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that breaking through the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with a loud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little before had vigorously engaged them, whilst they made resistance, being elated with joy at their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured round them as they ran, and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, or their arms to give a blow, so long did they continue the slaughter of the enemy in that battle, and having killed above twelve thousand men in arms, or such as threw away their arms through fear, they took their whole train of baggage.

XXX. — After this defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian (who in the beginning of the revolt of Gaul, had collected from all quarters men of desperate fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty, called in the exiles of the whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers, and intercepted the Roman baggage and provisions), was marching to the province with five thousand men, being all he could collect after the defeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in a former commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in the first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caninius went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be incurred from the fears or

injuries done to the Province by the depredations of a band of desperate men.

XXXI. — Caius Fabius set off with the rest of the army to the Carnutes and those other states, whose forces he was informed had served as auxiliaries in that battle, which he fought against Dumnacus. For he had no doubt that they would be more submissive after their recent sufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they might be easily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. On this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious in recovering the states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed had never mentioned peace, submitted and gave hostages: and the other states, which lie in the remotest parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean, and which are called *Armoricae*, influenced by the example of the Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions, without delay comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own territories, wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself in the most remote parts of Gaul.

XXXII. — But Crapes in conjunction with Literius, knowing that Caninius was at hand with the legions, and that they themselves could not without certain destruction enter the boundaries of the province, whilst an army was in pursuit of them, and being no longer at liberty to roam up and down and pillage, halt in the country of the Cadurci, as Luterius had once in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence over the inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of new projects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his own and Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage to him and strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on the inhabitants to join him.

XXXIII. — After Caninius had rapidly marched to this place, and perceived that all parts of the town were secured by very craggy rocks, which it would be difficult for men in arms to climb even if they met with no resistance; and, moreover, observing that the town's people were possessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if they attempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could not escape our horse, nor even our legions; he divided his forces into three parts, and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intention of drawing lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the fatigue.

XXXIV. — When the townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by the recollection of the distress at Alesia, they began to dread similar consequences from a siege; and above all Luterius, who had experienced that fatal event, cautioned them to make provision of corn; they therefore resolve by general consent to leave part of their troops behind, and set out with their light troops to bring in corn. The scheme having met with approbation, the following night Drapes and Luterius, leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town with the rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some of whom were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable to prevent their taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes also attacks were made on our little forts by sallies at night. For this reason Caninius deferred drawing his works round the whole town, lest he should be unable to protect them when completed, or by disposing his garrisons in several places, should make them too weak.

XXXV. — Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn, occupy a position at about ten miles distance from the town, intending from it to convey the corn into the town by degrees. They

chose each his respective department. Drapes stayed behind in the camp with part of the army to protect it; Luterius conveys the train with provisions into the town. Accordingly, having disposed guards here and there along the road, about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by narrow paths through the woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their noise being heard by the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out, having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly with the ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the convoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled by different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived, they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single man to be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but did not return to the camp.

XXXVI. — After this success, Caninius learnt from some prisoners, that a part of the forces was encamped with Drapes, not more than ten miles off; which being confirmed by several, supposing that after the defeat of one general, the rest would be terrified, and might be easily conquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none of the enemy had fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice of the calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger in making the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot, men of great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among the three camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him. When he had advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he had sent before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom of barbarians, was pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that the higher grounds were unoccupied: but that the German horse

had made a sudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence, he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on a signal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession of the higher grounds. Upon this, the German horse observing the Roman colours, fought with great vigour. Immediately all the cohorts attack them on every side; and having either killed or made prisoners of them all, gained great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was taken prisoner.

XXXVII. — Caninius, having accomplished the business so successfully, without having scarcely a man wounded, returned to besiege the town; and, having destroyed the enemy without, for fear of whom he had been prevented from strengthening his redoubts, and surrounding the enemy with his lines, he orders the work to be completed on every side. The next day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and took upon him the siege of one side.

XXXVIII. — In the meantime, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country of the Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that the Belgae might have no opportunity of forming new plans in future. He himself visits the other states, demands a great number of hostages, and by his encouraging language allays the apprehensions of all. When he came to the Carnutes, in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that the war first broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt, they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state the sooner from its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of that treason, and the instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up to punishment. And though the latter did not dare to trust his life even to his own countrymen, yet such diligent search was made by them all, that he was soon brought to our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by the clamours of the

soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for they alleged that all the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought to be imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and his head cut off.

XXXIX. — Here Caesar was informed by numerous letters from Caninius of what had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and in what conduct the town's people persisted: and though he despised the smallness of their numbers, yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaul in general should adopt an idea that she did not want strength but perseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states, relying on the advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert their liberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his command was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold out for that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend. He therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants behind him, with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches. He hastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius.

XL. — Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation, and perceiving that the town was surrounded by the works, and that the enemy had no possible means of retiring from the assault, and being likewise informed by the deserters that the townsmen had abundance of corn; he endeavoured to prevent their getting water. A river divided the valley below, which almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on which Uxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground prevented his turning the current; for it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that no drains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. But the descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, the besieged could

neither come to the river, nor retire up the precipice without hazard of their lives. Caesar, perceiving the difficulty, disposed archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to the easiest descents, placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen from getting water at the river, which obliged them afterwards to go all to one place to procure water.

XLII. — Close under the walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out on that part, which for the space of nearly three hundred feet, was not surrounded by the river. Whilst every other person wished that the besieged could be debarred from this spring, Caesar alone saw that it could be effected, though not without great danger. Opposite to it he began to advance the vineae towards the mountain, and to throw up a mound, with great labour and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen ran down from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and wounded several of our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterred from moving forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity the difficulties of situation. At the same time they work mines, and move the crates and vineae to the source of the fountain. This was the only work which they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixty feet high was raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, not with the intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for that could not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of the spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that led to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger, not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but a great number of men also died of thirst.

XLII. — Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow, pitch, and dried wood; these they set on fire, and roll down on

our works. At the same time, they fight most furiously, to deter the Romans, by the engagement and danger, from extinguishing the flames. Instantly a great blaze arose in the works. For whatever they threw down the precipice, striking against the vine and agger, communicated the fire to whatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other hand, though they were engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and labouring under the disadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence of mind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of our army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every man faced the weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a manner as he could, that his valour might be the better known and attested.

XLIII. — Caesar, observing that several of his men were wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, under pretence of assailing the walls, to raise a shout: at which the besieged being frightened, and not knowing what was going on in other places, call off their armed troops from attacking our works, and dispose them on the walls. Thus our men, without hazarding a battle, gained time partly to extinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off the communication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinate resistance, and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces by drought, persevered in their resolution: At last the veins of the spring were cut across by our mines, and turned from their course. By this their constant spring was suddenly dried up, which reduced them to such despair that they imagined that it was not done by the art of man, but the will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at length submitted.

XLIV. — Caesar, being convinced that his lenity was known to all men, and being under no fears of being thought to act severely

from a natural cruelty, and perceiving that there would be no end to his troubles if several states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in different places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishment on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne arms against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said was taken by Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from his captivity, or through fear of severer punishments, abstained from food for several days, and thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, I have related, had escaped from the battle, having fallen into the hands of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for he frequently changed his quarters, and threw himself on the honour of several persons, as he saw that he dare not remain long in one place, and was conscious how great an enemy he deserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, a sincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any hesitation, a prisoner to Caesar.

XLV. — In the meantime, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry action among the Treviri; and, having killed several of them and of the Germans, who never refused their aid to any person against the Romans, he got their chiefs alive into his power, and, amongst them, Surus, an Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valour and birth, and was the only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time. Caesar, being informed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good success in all parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former campaigns, [Celtic] Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone in person to Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by Marcus Crassus, set out for it with two legions, designing to spend the latter part of the summer

there. This affair he executed with his usual despatch and good fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sent ambassadors to him and delivered hostages. These affairs being concluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry towards Narbo, and drew off his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four legions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two he detached to the Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influence throughout all Gaul. Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confines of the Carnutes, to keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering on the ocean; the other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices, at a small distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might be without an army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ran through all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes, and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good opportunity of learning how every person was disposed towards the republic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by the fidelity and assistance of the Province.

XLVII. — Having finished these affairs, he returned to his legions among the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna: there he got intelligence that Comius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement with his cavalry. For when Antonius had gone into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebates continued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which I before mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon every commotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them in the management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans, supported himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry, infested the roads, and

intercepted several convoys which were bringing provisions to the Roman quarters.

XLVIII. — Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed commander of the horse under Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to that valour which was pre-eminent in him, a great aversion to Comius, on which account he executed the more willingly the orders which he received. Having, therefore, laid ambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry and came off successful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus, through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him with a small party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn Volusenus to a considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden, appealed to the honour of all about him for assistance not to suffer the wound, which he had perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and, wheeling his horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to the commander. All his horse following his example, made a few of our men turn their backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thigh with great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longer hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy. When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death in striving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escaped this misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, being severely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of losing his life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having either gratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest part of his followers, sent

ambassadors to Antonius, and assured him that he would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever Antonius should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreated that this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not be obliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged that his request originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it and accepted his hostages.

* * * * *

Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year's transactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do, because the following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus were consuls, produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no person may be left in ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army were at that time, I have thought proper to write a few words in addition to this commentary.

* * * * *

XLIX. — Caesar, whilst in winter quarters in the country of the Belgae, made it his only business to keep the states in amity with him, and to give none either hopes of, or pretext for, a revolt. For nothing was further from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging in another war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing his army out of the country, any war should be left unfinished, which the Gauls would cheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger. Therefore, by treating the states with respect, making rich presents to the leading men, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjection lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessful battles) in obedience.

L. — When the winter quarters were broken up, he himself, contrary to his usual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the longest

possible stages, in order to visit the free towns and colonies, that he might recommend to them the petition of Marcus Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood. For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in favour of a man strongly attached to him, whom he had sent home before him to attend the election, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few men, who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's influence when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road, before he reached Italy, that he was created augur, yet he thought himself in honour bound to visit the free town and colonies, to return them thanks for rendering such service to Antonius by their presence in such great numbers [at the election], and at the same time to recommend to them himself, and his honour in his suit for the consulate the ensuing year. For his adversaries arrogantly boasted that Lucius Lentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip Caesar of all honour and dignity: and that the consulate had been injuriously taken from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior in votes and interest, because he was united to Caesar, both by friendship, and by serving as lieutenant under him.

LI. — Caesar, on his arrival, was received by the principal towns and colonies with incredible respect and affection; for this was the first time he came since the war against united Gaul. Nothing was omitted which could be thought of for the ornament of the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass. All the people with their children went out to meet him. Sacrifices were offered up in every quarter. The market places and temples were laid out with entertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph. So great was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranks of the people.

LII. — When Caesar had gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, he returned with the greatest haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and having ordered all his legions to march from winter quarters to the territories of the Treviri, he went thither and reviewed them. He made Titus Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might be the more inclined to support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself made such journeys, as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by change of air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited by his enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by the contrivance of a few, that the senate should interpose their authority to deprive him of a part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any story concerning Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do anything in opposition to the authority of the senate; for he thought that his cause would be easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For Caius Curio, one of the tribunes of the people, having undertaken to defend Caesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that if the dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey's authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both should resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city would be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed this, but of himself called upon the senate to divide on the question. But the consuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and regulating matters as they desired, they broke up the meeting.

LIII. — This testimony of the unanimous voice of the senate was very great, and consistent with their former conduct; for the preceding year, when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he proposed to the senate, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to dispose of Caesar's province, before the expiration of his


command, and when the votes were called for, and Marcellus, who endeavoured to advance his own dignity, by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate went over to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken by this, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interest by enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply with whatever they resolved on.

LIV. — After this a decree was passed by the senate, that one legion should be sent by Pompey, and another by Caesar, to the Parthian war. But these two legions were evidently drawn from Caesar alone. For the first legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if it belonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's province. Caesar, however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies, sent the legion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the senate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which was quartered in Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the thirteenth into Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had drafted the fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placed Caius Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached Caius Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would be most secure if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valour, and the Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe by his armies.


LV. — He himself set out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival, that the two legions sent home by him, and which by the senate's decree, should have been sent to the Parthian war, had been delivered over to Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul, and were retained in Italy. Although from this transaction it was evident to

every one that war was designed against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to any thing, as long as there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an equitable manner, rather than have recourse to arms.

APPENDIX I. MAPS




CAMPAIGN MAP



Edward Stanford, Ltd., London


APPENDIX II. DIAGRAMS

THE ROMAN *AGGER* AT AVARICUM (VII. 17, 24.) (After Colonel Stoffel)




At A . . . A, B . . . B, the *agger* is built up in inclined planes, on which towers (T, T) with battering-rams are pushed up to the wall: from the *vineae* here a covering fire is kept up to assist the operations. The area D . . . D is not built up, but left at the natural level; from it the troops move by steps, as at E, E to the level C, C.

ROMAN WORKS AT ALESIA (VII. 72, 73.) (After Colonel Stoffel)




PLUTEUS (VII. 73) is the whole screen made up of LORICA with PINNAE, with VALLUS behind.

SECTION



PLAN OF
A COURSE



ELEVATION



ROMAN SIEGE APPLIANCES



VINEA, mantlet: the sides were covered with skins or wickerwork when required.

The TESTUDO was similar to the VINEA, but squarer and more stoutly built, with a sloping roof or shutter on the side next the enemy's walls: it was covered over with hides or other non-inflammable substances.

The MUSCULUS was longer, lower, and narrower than the VINEA, forming a covered gallery, pushed up at right angles to the enemy's wall.



PLUTEUS, a screen of wickerwork on wheels, generally semicylindrical in form.

H. J. EDWARDS TRANSLATION, 1917

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BOOK I

[1] Gaul is a whole divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and a third by a people called in their own tongue Celtae, in the Latin Galli. All these are different one from another in language, institutions, and laws. The Galli (Gauls) are separated from the Aquitani by the river Garonne, from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. Of all these peoples the Belgae are the most courageous, because they are farthest removed from the culture and civilization of the Province, and least often visited by merchants introducing the commodities that make for effeminacy; and also because they are nearest to the Germans dwelling beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually at war. For this cause the Helvetii also excel the rest of the Gauls in valour, because they are struggling in almost daily fights with the Germans, either endeavouring to keep them out of Gallic territory or waging an aggressive warfare in German territory. The separate part of the country which, as has been said, is occupied by the Gauls, starts from the river Rhone, and is bounded by the river Garonne, the Ocean, and the territory of the Belgae; moreover, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, it touches on the river Rhine; and its general trend is northward. The Belgae, beginning from the edge of the Gallic territory, reach to the lower part of the river Rhine, bearing towards the north and east. Aquitania, starting from the Garonne, reaches to the Pyrenees and to that part of the Ocean which is by Spain: its bearing is between west and north.

[2] Among the Helvetii the noblest man by far and the most wealthy was Orgetorix. In the consulship of Marcus Messalla and Marcus Piso, his desire for the kingship led him to form a conspiracy

of the nobility, and he persuaded the community to march out of their territory in full force, urging that as they excelled all in valour it was easy enough to secure the sovereignty of all Gaul. In this he persuaded them the more easily, because the Helvetii are closely confined by the nature of their territory. On one side there is the river Rhine, exceeding broad and deep, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on another the Jura range, exceeding high, lying between Sequani and the Helvetii; on the third, the Lake of Geneva and the river Rhone, which separates the Roman Province from the Helvetii. In such circumstances their range of movement was less extensive, and their chances of waging war on their neighbours were less easy; and on this account they were greatly distressed, for they were men that longed for war. Nay, they could not but consider that the territory they occupied — to an extent of 240 miles long and 180 broad — was all too narrow for their population and for their renown of courage in war.

[3] Swayed by these considerations and stirred by the influence of Orgetorix, they determined to collect what they needed for taking the field, to buy up as large a number as they could of draught-cattle and carts, to sow as much corn^o as possible so as to have a sufficient supply thereof on the march, and to establish peace and amity with the nearest communities. For the accomplishment of these objects they considered that two years were sufficient, and pledged themselves by an ordinance to take the field in the third year. For the accomplishment of these objectives Orgetorix was chosen, and he took upon himself an embassy to the communities. In the course of his travels he persuaded Casticus, of the Sequani, son of Catamantaloedes, who had held for many years the kingship of the Sequani, and had been called by the Senate “the friend of the Roman

people,” to seize in his own state the kingship which his father had held before him; and Dumnorix also, of the Aedui, brother of Diviciacus, at that time holding the chieftaincy of the state and a great favourite with the common people, he persuaded to a like endeavour, and gave him his own daughter in marriage. He convinced them that it was easy enough to accomplish such endeavours, because he himself (so he said) was about to secure the sovereignty of his own state. There was no doubt, he observed, that the Helvetii were the most powerful tribe in all Gaul, and he gave a pledge that he would win them their kingdoms with his own resources and his own army. Swayed by this speech, they gave a mutual pledge, confirming it by oath; and they hoped that when they had seized their kingship they would be able, through the efforts of three most powerful and most steadfast tribes, to master the whole of Gaul.

[4] The design was revealed to the Helvetii by informers. In accordance with their custom they compelled Orgetorix to take his trial in bonds. If he were condemned, the penalty of being burnt alive was the consequence. On the day appointed for his trial Orgetorix gathered from every quarter to the place of judgment all his retainers, to the number of some ten thousand men, and also assembled there all his clients and debtors, of whom he had a great number, and through their means escaped from taking his trial. The state, being incensed at this, essayed to secure its due rights by force of arms, and the magistrates were bridging together a number of men from the country parts, when Orgetorix died, not without suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of suicide.

[5] After his death the Helvetii essayed none the less to accomplish their determination to march forth from their borders. When at length

they deemed that they were prepared for that purpose, they set fire to all their strongholds, in number about twelve; their villages, in number about four hundred, and the rest of their private buildings; they burnt up all their corn save that which they were to carry with them, to the intent that by removing all hope of returning homeward they might prove the readier to undergo any perils;^a and they commanded every man to take for himself from home a three months' provision of victuals. They persuaded their neighbours, the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, to adopt the same plan, burn up their strongholds and villages, and march out with them; and they received as partners of their alliance the Boii, who had been dwellers beyond the Rhine, but had crossed over into Noricum and attacked Noreia.

[6] There were two routes, and no more, by which they could leave their homeland. One lay through the territory of the Sequani, betwixt the Jura range and the river Rhone, a narrow route and a difficult, where carts could scarce be drawn up in single file; with an exceeding high mountain overhanging it, so that a very few men might easily check them. The other route, through the Roman Province, was far more easy and convenient, forasmuch as the Rhone flows between the borders of the Helvetii and the Allobroges (who had lately been brought to peace), and is in some places fordable. The last town of the Allobroges, the nearest to the borders of the Helvetii, is Geneva, from which a bridge stretches across to the Helvetii. These supposed that either they would persuade the Allobroges (deeming them not yet well disposed toward the Roman people), or would compel them perforce to suffer a passage through their borders. Having therefore provided all things for their departure, they named a day by which all should assemble upon the

bank of the Rhone. The day was the 28th of March, in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius.

[7] When Caesar was informed that they were endeavouring to march through the Roman Province, he made speed to leave Rome, and hastening to Further Gaul by as rapid stages as possible, arrived near Geneva. From the whole Province he requisitioned the largest possible number of troops (there was in Further Gaul no more than a single legion), and ordered the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii learned of his coming, they sent as deputies to him the noblest men of the state. Nammeius and Verucloetius held the chief place in the deputation, with instructions to say that their purpose was to march through the Province without any mischief, because they had no other route; and they asked that they might have leave so to do of his good will. Remembering that the consul Lucius Cassius had been slain, and his army routed and sent under the yoke, by the Helvetii, Caesar considered that no concession should be made; nor did he believe that men of unfriendly disposition, if granted an opportunity of marching through the Province, would refrain from outrage and mischief. However, to gain an interval for the assembly of the troops he had levied, he replied to the deputies that he would take a space of time for consideration; if they wished for anything, they were to return on the 13th of April.

In the meanwhile he used the legion which he had with him, and the troops which had concentrated from the Province, to construct a continuous wall, sixteen feet high, and a trench, from the Lake of Geneva, which flows into the river Rhone, to the Jura range, which separates the territory of the Sequani from the Helvetii, a distance of nineteen miles. This work completed, he posted separate garrisons, in entrenched forts, in order that he might more easily be able to stop

any attempt of the enemy to cross against his wish. When the day which he had appointed with the deputies arrived, and the deputies returned to him, he said that, following the custom and precedent of the Roman people, he could not grant anyone a passage through the Province; and he made it plain that he would stop any attempt to force the same. Disappointed of this hope, the Helvetii attempted, sometimes by day, more often by night, to break through, either by joining boats together and making a number of rafts, or by fording the Rhone where the depth of the stream was least. But they were checked by the line of the entrenchment and, as the troops concentrated rapidly, by missiles, and so abandoned the attempt.

[9] There remained one other line of route, through the borders of the Sequani, by which they could not march, on account of the narrow ways, without the consent of the Sequani. When they could not of their own motion persuade the Sequani, they sent deputies to Dumnorix the Aeduan, in order that they might attain their object through his intercession. Now Dumnorix had very great weight with the Sequani, for he was both popular and open-handed, and he was friendly to the Helvetii, because from that state he had taken the daughter of Orgetorix to wife; and, spurred by the desire of the kingship, he was anxious for a revolution, and eager to have as many states as might be beholden to his own beneficence. Therefore he accepted the business, and prevailed on the Sequani to suffer the Helvetii to pass through their borders, and arranged that they should give hostages each to other — the Sequani, not to prevent the Helvetii from their march; the Helvetii, to pass through without mischief or outrage.

[10] The news was brought back to Caesar that the Helvetii were minded to march through the land of the Sequani and the Aedui into

the borders of the Santones, which are not far removed from the borders of the Tolosates, a state in the Province. He perceived that this event would bring great danger upon the Province; for it would have a warlike tribe, unfriendly to the Roman people, as neighbours to a district which was at once unprotected and very rich in corn. For these reasons he set Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general, in command of the fortification which he had made, and himself hurried by forced marches into Italy. There he enrolled two legions, and brought out of winter quarters three that were wintering about Aquileia; and with these five legions made speed to march by the shortest route to Further Gaul, over the Alps. In that region the Ceutrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges, seizing points on the higher ground, essayed to stop the march of his army. They were repulsed in several actions; and on the seventh day he moved from Ocelum, the last station of Hither Gaul, into the borders of the Vocontii in Further Gaul. Thence he led his army into the borders of the Allobroges, and from thence into the country of the Segusiavi, the first tribe outside the Province, across the Rhone.

[11] By this time the Helvetii, having brought their own forces through the defiles and through the borders of the Sequani, had reached the borders of the Aedui, and were engaged in laying waste their lands. Unable to defend their persons and their property from the invaders, the Aedui sent deputies to Caesar to ask for aid. These pleaded that the Aedui had always deserved too well of the Roman people to merit the devastation of their lands, the removal of their children into slavery, and the capture of their towns, almost in sight of the Roman army. At the same time the Aedui Ambarri, close allies and kinsmen of the Aedui, informed Caesar that their lands had been laid waste, and that they could not easily safeguard their towns from

the violence of the enemy. The Allobroges also, who had villages and settlements across the Rhone, fleet to Caesar, affirming that they had nothing left to them save the bare ground. All these events drove Caesar to the decision that he must not wait till the Helvetii, having wasted all the substance of the Roman allies, should penetrate into the land of the Santoni.

[12] There is a river Arar (Saône), which flows through the borders of the Aedui and the Sequani into the Rhone: its sluggishness is beyond belief, for the eye cannot determine in which direction the stream flows. This river the Helvetii proceeded to cross by rafts and boats fastened together. When Caesar's scouts informed him that three-quarters of the Helvetian forces had actually crossed, and that about a quarter remained on the near side of the river Saône, he left camp in the third watch with three legions and came up to the division of the enemy which had not yet crossed. He attacked them unawares when they were heavily loaded, and put a great number of them to the sword; the remainder betook themselves to flight and hid in the nearest woods. The name of the canton was the Tigurine; for the whole state of Helvetia is divided into four cantons. In the recollection of the last generation this canton had marched out alone from its homeland, and had slain the consul Lucius Cassius and sent his army under the yoke. And so, whether by accident or by the purpose of the immortal gods, the section of the Helvetian state which had brought so signal a calamity upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty in full. Therein Caesar avenged private as well as national outrages; for in the same battle with Cassius the Tigurini had slain Lucius Piso, the general, grandfather of Lucius Piso, Caesar's father-in-law.

[13] This action over, he caused a bridge to be made over the Saône

and sent his army across thereby, in order to pursue the remainder of the Helvetian forces. Alarmed at his sudden approach — for they perceived that the business of crossing the river, which they themselves had accomplished with the greatest difficulty in twenty days, had been despatched by Caesar in a single one — the Helvetii sent deputies to him. The leader of the deputation was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in the campaign against Cassius. He treated with Caesar as follows: If the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii, they would go whither and abide where Caesar should determine and desire; if on the other hand he should continue to visit them with war, he was advised to remember the earlier disaster of the Roman people and the ancient valour of the Helvetii. He had attacked one canton unawares, when those who had crossed the river could not bear assistance to their fellows; but that event must not induce him to rate his own valour highly or to despise them. The Helvetii had learnt from their parents and ancestors to fight their battles with courage, not with cunning nor reliance upon stratagem. Caesar therefore must not allow the place of their conference to derive renown or perpetuate remembrance by a disaster to the Roman people and the destruction of an army.

[14] To these remarks Caesar replied as follows: As he remembered well the events which the Helvetian deputies had mentioned, he had therefore the less need to hesitate; and his indignation was the more vehement in proportion as the Roman people had not deserved the misfortune. If the Romans had been conscious of some outrage done, it would not have been hard to take precaution; but they had been misled, because they did not understand that they had done anything to cause them apprehension, and they thought that they should not feel apprehension without

cause. And even if he were willing to forget an old affront, could he banish the memory of recent outrages — their attempts to march by force against his will through the Province, their ill-treatment of the Aedui, the Ambarri, the Allobroges? Their insolent boast of their own victory, their surprise that their outrages had gone on so long with impunity, pointed the same way; for it was the wont of the immortal gods to grant a temporary prosperity and a longer impunity to make men whom they purposed to punish for their crime smart the more severely from a change of fortune. Yet, for all this, he would make peace with the Helvetii, if they would offer him hostages to show him that they would perform their promises, and if they would give satisfaction to the Aedui in respect of the outrages inflicted on them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges. Divico replied: It was the ancestral practice and the regular custom of the Helvetii to receive, not to offer, hostages; the Roman people was witness thereof. With this reply he departed.

[15] Next day the Helvetii moved their camp from that spot. Caesar did likewise, sending forward the whole of his cavalry, four thousand in number, which he had raised from the whole of the Province, from the Aedui, and from their allies, to observe in which direction the enemy were marching. The cavalry, following up the rearguard too eagerly, engaged in a combat on unfavourable ground with the cavalry of the Helvetii, and a few of ours fell. Elated by this engagement, because five hundred of their horsemen had routed so large a host of ours, the Helvetii began on occasion to make a bolder stand, and with their rearguard to provoke the Romans to a fight. Caesar kept his troops from fighting, accounting it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from plundering, foraging, and devastation. The march continued for about a fortnight with no more

interval than five or six miles a day between the rearguard of the enemy and the vanguard of the Romans.

[16] Meanwhile Caesar was daily pressing the Aedui for the corn that they had promised as a state. For by reason of cold weather (since Gaul, as has been said above, lies under the northern heaven) not only were the corn-crops in the fields unripe, but there was not even a sufficient supply of forage to be had. At the same time he was less able to use the corn-supply that he had brought up the river Saône in boats, because the Helvetii had diverted their march from the Saône, and he did not wish to lose touch with them. The Aedui put him off day by day, declaring that the corn was being collected, was being brought in, was at hand. He perceived that he was being put off too long, and that the day was close upon him whereon it was proper to issue the corn-ration to the troops: accordingly he summoned together the Aeduan chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Diviciacus and Liscus, who had the highest magnify, called Vergobret by the Aedui: the magistrate is elected annually, and holds the power of life and death over his fellow-countrymen. Caesar called them severely to account because they offered no relief in a time of stress, with the enemy close at hand, when corn could neither be purchased nor taken from the fields. And just because he had undertaken the war largely in response to their entreaties, he complained the more severely of their desertion.

[17] Then, and not till then, the remarks of Caesar induced Liscus to reveal a fact concealed before. There were, he said, certain persons, of paramount influence with the common folk, and of more power in their private capacity than the actual magistrates. These persons, by seditious and insolent language, were intimidating the

population against the collection of corn as required, on the plea that it was better for the Aedui, if they could not now enjoy the primacy of Gaul, to submit to the commands of Gauls rather than of Romans; for they did not doubt that, if the Romans overcame the Helvetii, they meant to deprive the Aedui of liberty, in common with the rest of Gaul. These, again, were the men, who informed the enemy of the Roman plans and all the doings of the camp; nor had he power to restrain them. Nay, more, he perceived with what risk he had acted in informing Caesar, under sheer force of necessity; and for that reason he had held his peace as long as he could.

[18] Caesar felt that Dumnorix, the brother of Diviciacus, was indicated in these remarks of Liscus; but as he would not have those matters threshed out in presence of a company, he speedily dismissed the meeting. He kept Liscus back, and questioned him separately on his statement in the assembly. Liscus now spoke with greater freedom and boldness. Caesar questioned others privately upon the same matters, and found that it was so — that Dumnorix was the man who, unequalled in boldness, and strong in the influence that his generosity gave him over the common folk, desired a revolution. For several years, it was said, he had contracted at a low price for the customs and all the rest of the Aeduan taxes, for the simple reason that when he made a bid none durst bid against him. By this means he had at once increased his own property and acquired ample resources for bribery; he maintained a considerable body of horse permanently at his own charges, and kept them about his person; not only in his own but even in neighbouring states his power was extensive. To secure this power he had given his mother in marriage to the noblest and most powerful man among the Bituriges, he had taken himself a wife from the Helvetii, and had married his half-

sister and his female relations to men of other states. This connection made him a zealous supporter of the Helvetii; moreover, he hated Caesar and the Romans on his own account, because their arrival had diminished his power and restored his brother Diviciacus to his ancient place of influence and honour. If anything should happen to the Romans, he entertained the most confident hope of securing the kingship by means of the Helvetii: it was the empire of the Roman people which caused him to despair not only of the kingship, but even of the influence he now possessed. Caesar discovered also in the course of his questioning, as concerning the unsuccessful cavalry engagement of a few days before, that Dumnorix and his horsemen (he was commander of the body of horse sent by the Aedui to the aid of Caesar) had started the retreat, and that by their retreat the remainder of the horse had been stricken with panic.

[19] All this Caesar learnt, and to confirm these suspicions he had indisputable facts. Dumnorix had brought the Helvetii through the borders of the Sequani; he had caused hostages to be given between them; he had done all this not only without orders from his state or from Caesar, but even without the knowledge of either; he was now accused by the magistrate of the Aedui. Caesar deemed all this to be cause enough for him either to punish Dumnorix himself, or to command the state so to do. To all such procedure there was one objection, the knowledge that Diviciacus, the brother of Dumnorix, showed the utmost zeal for the Roman people, the utmost goodwill towards himself, in loyalty, in justice, in prudence alike remarkable; for Caesar apprehended that the punishment of Dumnorix might offend the feelings of Diviciacus. Therefore, before attempting anything in the matter, Caesar ordered Diviciacus to be summoned to his quarters, and, having removed the regular interpreters, conversed

with him through the mouth of Gaius Valerius Procillus, a leading man in the Province of Gaul and his own intimate friend, in whom he had the utmost confidence upon all matters. Caesar related the remarks which had been uttered in his presence as concerning Dumnorix at the assembly of the Gauls, and showed what each person had said severally to him upon the same subject. He asked and urged that without offence to the feelings of Diviciacus he might either hear his case himself and pass judgment upon him, or order the state so to do.

[20] With many tears Diviciacus embraced Caesar, and began to beseech him not to pass too severe a judgment upon his brother. "I know," said he, "that the reports are true, and no one is more pained thereat than I, for at a time when I had very great influence in my own state and in the rest of Gaul, and he very little, by reason of his youth, he owed his rise to me; and now he is using his resources and his strength not only to the diminution of my influence, but almost to my destruction. For all that, I feel the force of brotherly love and public opinion. That is to say, if too severe a fate befalls him at your hands, no one, seeing that I hold this place in your friendship, will opine that it has been done without *my* consent; and this will turn from me the feelings of all Gaul." While he was making this petition at greater length, and with tears, Caesar took him by the hand and consoled him, bidding him end his entreaty, and showing that his influence with Caesar was so great that he excused the injury to Rome and the vexation felt by himself, in consideration for the goodwill and the entreaties of Diviciacus. Then he summoned Dumnorix to his quarters, and in the presence of his brother he pointed out what he had to blame in him; he set forth what he himself perceived, and the complaints of the state; he warned him to avoid all

occasions of suspicion for the future, and said that he excused the past in consideration for his brother Diviciacus. He posted sentinels over Dumnorix, so as to know what he did and with whom he spoke.

[21] On the same day his scouts informed him that the enemy had halted close under a height eight miles from the Roman camp. A party was sent to reconnoitre the height, and to see what kind of ascent a detour might afford: the report was that it was easy. Caesar ordered Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general and chief of the staff, to move in the third watch with two legions and the guides who knew the route, and to climb the topmost ridge of the height; and he showed him his own intention. He himself, starting in the fourth watch, marched speedily against the enemy by the same route which they had taken, sending forward the whole of the horse. Publius Considius, reputed a past master in the art of war, who had seen service in the army of Lucius Sulla and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, was sent forward with the scouts.

[22] At dawn Labienus was in possession of the summit of the height, and Caesar was no more than a mile and a half from the enemy's camp; and, as he learnt afterwards from prisoners, neither his own approach nor that of Labienus was discovered. At this moment Considius galloped back to him, saying that the mountain he had wished Labienus to seize was in possession of the enemy: he knew it by the Gallic arms and badges. Caesar withdrew his own troops to the nearest hill, and formed line of battle. Labienus had instructions from Caesar not to join battle unless his own troops appeared near the enemy's camp, so that a simultaneous assault might be made upon the enemy from all sides; accordingly, having seized the height, he awaited the main body and refrained from engaging. At length, when the day was far spent, Caesar learnt from

his scouts that the height was in possession of his own troops, and that the Helvetii had shifted their camp, and therefore that Considius in sheer panic had reported to him as seen that which he had not seen. On that day he followed the enemy at the customary interval, and pitched his camp three miles from theirs.

[23] On the morrow, as no more than two days remained before it was proper to issue the corn-ration to the troops, and as he was no more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and the best-provided of the Aeduan towns, he considered that he must attend to the corn-supply. He therefore turned his line of march away from the Helvetii, and made with all speed for Bibracte. The change was reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a troop-leader of the Gallic horse. Now the Helvetii may have supposed that the Romans were moving away from them because of sheer panic, the more so because on the day before they had not joined battle after seizing the higher ground; or they may have believed that the Romans could be cut off from their corn-supply. Whichever the reason, they changed their plan, altered their route, and began to pursue and to annoy the Roman rearguard.

[24] As soon as he remarked this, Caesar withdrew his troops to the nearest hill, and sent the horse to check the enemy's charge. Meanwhile he himself drew up his four legions of veterans in triple linea half-way up the hill: but he ordered the two legions which he had last enlisted in Nearer Gaul and all the auxiliary troops to be posted on the top of the ridge, so as to fill the hill-side entirely with men: in the meantime the packs were to be collected in one place, which was to be entrenched by the troops posted in line on the higher ground. The Helvetii followed with all their carts, and collected their baggage in one place: the fighting men, in a densely-crowded line,


repulsed the Roman horse, then formed massb and moved up against our first line.

[25] Caesar first had his own horse and then those of all others sent out of sight, thus to equalise the danger of all and to take away hope of flight. Then after a speech to encourage his troops he joined battle. The legionaries, from the upper ground, easily broke the mass-formation of the enemy by a volley of javelins, and, when it was scattered, drew their swords and charged. The Gauls were greatly encumbered for the fight because several of their shields would be pierced and fastened together by a single javelin-cast; and as the iron became bent, they could not pluck it forth, nor fight handily with the left arm encumbered. Therefore many of them preferred, after continued shaking of the arm, to cast off the shield and so to fight bare-bodied. At length, worn out with wounds, they began to retreat, retiring towards a height about a mile away. They gained the height; and as the Romans followed up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with some fifteen thousand men brought up the rear and formed the rearguard, turned from their march to attack the Romans on the exposed flank, and overlapped them. Remarking this, the Helvetii, who had retired to the height, began to press again and to renew the fight. The Romans wheeled, and advanced in two divisions, the first and second line to oppose the part of the enemy which had been defeated and driven off, the third to check the fresh assault.

[26] Thus the engagement became twofold, and the fight was fierce and long. When the enemy could no longer hold out against our attacks, one division continued to retire to the height, the other concentrated upon their baggage and carts. There was no rout, for throughout the action, though it lasted from the seventh hour to eventide, no one could have seen the back of an enemy. Even round

the baggage the fight was continued far into the night, as the enemy had constructed a rampart of carts, and from the higher ground they continued to hurl missiles upon our advancing lines, while some of them kept discharging native pikes and darts from underneath the carts and wheels, wounding our men. However, after a long fight, our troops gained possession of the baggage and the camp, where the daughter of Orgetorix and one of his sons were taken prisoners. Some 130,000 persons survived the action, and marched continuously the whole of that night; the march was not interrupted for any part of the night, and three days after they reached the borders of the Lingones; for our own troops had not been able to pursue them, having halted for three days to tend their wounds and to bury the dead. Caesar despatched letters and messages to the Lingones, ordering them not to give assistance by corn and otherwise, and affirming that, if they gave such assistance, he would treat them in the same fashion as the Helvetii. He himself, after the three days' interval, began to follow them with all his forces.

THE BATTLE AGAINST THE HELVETII



[27] The Helvetii were compelled by lack of all provision to send deputies to him to treat of surrender. These found him on the march, and, throwing themselves at his feet, in suppliant tones besought peace with tears. He bade them await his arrival in their present station, and they obeyed. Upon arrival there Caesar demanded the surrender of hostages and arms, and of the slaves who had deserted to them. While these were sought out and collected together night intervened; and about six thousand men of the canton called Verbigene — it may be in sheer panic, lest after the surrender of their arms they might be put to the sword; or else they were tempted by the hope of escape, and the thought that in so vast a multitude of

prisoners their own flight could be concealed or even unnoticed — left the Helvetian camp at nightfall and hastened to the Rhine and the borders of the Germans.

[28] So soon as Caesar came to know of this he commanded the inhabitants through whose borders they had marched to seek them out and bring them back, if they wished to clear themselves from complicity in his sight. When the runaways were brought back he treated them as enemies; all the remainder, upon delivery of hostages, arms, and deserters, he admitted to surrender. He commanded the Helvetii, Tulingi, and Latobrigi to return to their own borders, whence they had started; and as they had lost all their produce, and had no means at home of sustaining hunger, he required the Allobroges to give them a supply of corn. He also ordered them to restore with their own hands the towns and villages which they had burnt. His chief reason for so doing was that he did not wish the district which the Helvetii had left to be unoccupied, lest the excellence of the farmlands might tempt the Germans who dwell across the Rhine to cross from their own into the Helvetian borders, and so to become neighbours to the Province of Gaul and to the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui that they might establish the Boii, known to be of remarkable courage, in their own borders. The Aedui gave them farmlands, and afterwards admitted them to like measure of privilege and liberty with themselves.

[29] In the camp of the Helvetii were found, and brought to Caesar, records written out in Greek letters, wherein was drawn up a nominal register showing what number of them had gone out from their homeland, who were able to bear arms, and also separately children, old men, and women. On all these counts the total showed 263,000 persons of the Helvetii, 36,000 of the Tulingi, 14,000 of the

Latobrigi, 23,000 of the Rauraci, 32,000 of the Boii; of these there were about 92,000 able to bear arms. The grand total was about 368,000. Of those who returned home a census was taken in accordance with Caesar's command, and the number was found to be 110,000.

[30] Upon the conclusion of the Helvetian campaign deputies from well-nigh the whole of Gaul, the chief men of the various states, assembled in Caesar's camp to congratulate him. They perceived, they said, that, although Caesar had by the campaign required satisfaction of the Helvetii for past outrages suffered by the Roman people at their hands, the result had been as beneficial to the land of Gaul as to the Roman people; for the Helvetii had left their homes at a time of exceeding prosperity with the express design of making war upon the whole of Gaul and obtaining empire; they purposed from an ample field to select for their abode the spot which they judged to be the most convenient and the most productive in all Gaul, and to make the rest of the states tributary. The deputies asked that they might be allowed to announce — and that with Caesar's consent — a convention of all Gaul for a certain day, for they had certain petitions which, after general agreement, they wished to ask of him. Permission was given, and they appointed a day for the convention, pledging themselves by an oath that no man should publish its proceedings save the persons authorised by their general consent.

[31] The convention having been held and dissolved, the same chiefs of states as before returned to Caesar with a petition that they might be allowed to discuss with him apart, in private, the question of their own and the general welfare. The petition was granted, and they all threw themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, declaring that they were as anxious and as much concerned to prevent the publication of

their utterances as to obtain their desires; for he saw that publication must expose them to the most cruel vengeance. Diviciacus the Aeduan spoke on their behalf. "In all Gaul," he said, "there are two parties; in one of them the Aedui have the primacy, in the other the Arverni. For many years there was a vehement struggle between the two for the dominion; then it came about that the Arverni and the Sequani summoned the Germans to their aid for a price. About fifteen thousand of them crossed the Rhine in the first instance; then, when those fierce barbarians had got a liking for the farmlands, the civilization, and the wealth of the Gauls, more were brought over, and at the present time there are about 120,000 of them in Gaul.

"With them the Aedui and their dependents have repeatedly fought in battle: defeat has brought great disaster, the loss of all our nobility, our senate, and our knights. It is these battles and disasters that have broken the men who by their own valour, and by the courtesy and the friendship of Rome, were formerly paramount in Gaul, and have obliged them to give as hostages to the Sequani the noblest men of the state, and to bind the state by oath not to require the return of the hostages, not to entreat the assistance of Rome, nor to refuse eternal submission to the sway and sovereignty of the Sequani. I am the one man of all the state of the Aedui upon whom it has not been possible to prevail to take the oath or give his children as hostages. It was for that reason that I fled from the state and came to the Senate at Rome to demand assistance, because I was the only man not bound by oath or hostages. But a worse fate has befallen the victorious Sequani than the conquered Aedui: Ariovistus, king of the Germans, has settled within their borders and seized a third part of their territory, the best in all Gaul; and now he orders them to evacuate another third, because a few months since 24,000 of the

Harudes joined him, for whom he had to provide a settlement and a home. In a few years all the natives will have been driven from the borders of Gaul, and all the Germans will have crossed the Rhine; for there can be no comparison between the Gallic and the German territory, none between our usual scale of living and theirs. Having once conquered the forces of the Gauls in battle near Magetobriga, Ariovistus is exercising a proud and cruel tyranny, demanding as hostages the children of the greatest nobles, and perpetrating upon them all the direst forms of torture, if anything be not performed at his nod or at his pleasure. He is a passionate, a reckless barbarian: we can endure his tyrannies no longer. Unless some means of assistance is to be found in Caesar and in the Roman people, all the Gauls must needs do just what the Helvetii have done — emigrate, to seek another habitation, other abodes far from the Germans, and risk any fortune that may befall them. If these remarks of mine be reported to Ariovistus, I make no doubt that he will inflict the severest punishment on all the hostages in his keeping. You, Caesar, by your own and your army's influence, or by your late victory, or by the name of the Roman people, can prevent the crossing of a larger host of Germans over the Rhine, and defend the whole of Gaul from the outrage of Ariovistus."

[32] When Diviciacus had delivered this speech all who were present began with loud weeping to seek assistance from Caesar. He noticed, however, that of all the company the Sequani alone did not act like the rest, but with head downcast stared sullenly upon the ground. He asked them, wondering, what might be the cause thereof. The Sequani made no reply, but continued in the same sullen silence. When repeated questioning could extract not a word from them, Diviciacus the Aeduan made further reply. "The lot of the Sequani,"

he said, “is more pitiable, more grievous than that of the rest, inasmuch as they alone dare not even in secret make complaint or entreat assistance, dreading the cruelty of Ariovistus as much in his absence as if he were present before them. The rest, for all their suffering, have still a chance of escape; but the Sequani, who have admitted Ariovistus within their borders, and whose towns are all in his power, must needs endure any and every torture.”

[33] When he had learnt this Caesar comforted the Gauls with his words, promising that he would concern himself with this matter: he had, he said, great hope that by his good offices and his authority he would induce Ariovistus to put a stop to his outrages. With this speech he dissolved the convention. And straightway many considerations induced him to suppose that he must take thought and action in the matter. In the first place, he could see that the Aedui, often hailed by the Senate as brethren and kinsmen, were fast bound in slavery and subjection to the Germans, and he was aware that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani. This, considering the greatness of the Roman empire, he deemed to be an utter disgrace to himself and to the state. Next, he could see that the Germans were becoming gradually accustomed to cross over the Rhine, and that the arrival of a great host of them in Gaul was dangerous for the Roman people. Nor did he suppose that barbarians so fierce would stop short after seizing the whole of Gaul; but rather, like the Cimbri and Teutoni before them, they would break forth into the Province, and push on thence into Italy, especially as there was but the Rhone to separate the Sequani from the Roman Province. All this, he felt, must be faced without a moment’s delay. As for Ariovistus himself, he had assumed such airs, such arrogance, that he seemed insufferable.

[34] He resolved, therefore, to send deputies to Ariovistus to

request of him the choice of some half-way station between them for a parley, as it was his desire to discuss with him matters of state and of the highest importance to each of them. To the deputation Ariovistus made reply that if he had had need of aught from Caesar, he would have come to him, and if Caesar desired aught of him, he ought to come to him. Moreover, he did not venture without an army to come into those parts of Gaul which Caesar was occupying, and he could not concentrate his army without great exertion in the matter of supply. And he found himself wondering what business either Caesar or the Roman people might have in that Gaul which he had made his own by conquest in war.

[35] When this reply had been brought back to Caesar, he sent deputies again to him with the following message: Forasmuch as, after great kindness of treatment from Caesar himself and from the Roman people (for it was in Caesar's year of consulship that he had been saluted as king and friend by the Senate), he expressed his thanks to Caesar and the Roman people by reluctance to accept the invitation to come to a parley and by thinking it needless to say or learn anything as touching their mutual concerns, Caesar's demand of him was, first, that he should not bring any further host of men across the Rhine into Gaul; second, that he should restore the hostages he held from the Aedui and grant the Sequani entire freedom to restore to the Aedui with his full consent the hostages they held; further, that he should not annoy the Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies. If he did as requested, Caesar and the Roman people would maintain a lasting kindness and friendship towards him. If Caesar's request were not granted, then, forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messalla and Marcus Piso the Senate had decided that the governor of the Province of Gaul

should protect, as far as he could do so with advantage to the state, the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people, Caesar would not disregard the outrages suffered by the Aedui.

[36] To this Ariovistus replied as follows: It was the right of war that conquerors dictated as they pleased to the conquered; and the Roman people also were accustomed to dictate to those whom they conquered, not according to the order of a third party, but according to their own choice. If he, for his part, did not ordain how the Roman people should exercise their own right, he ought not to be hindered by the Roman people in the enjoyment of his own right. The Aedui, having risked the fortune of war and having been overcome in a conflict of arms, had been made tributary to himself. Caesar was doing him a serious injury, for his advance was damaging his revenues. He would not restore their hostages to the Aedui, nor would he make war on them nor on their allies without cause, if they stood to their agreement and paid tribute yearly; if not, they would find it of no assistance whatever to be called "Brethren of the Roman people." As for Caesar's declaration that he would not disregard outrages suffered by the Aedui, no one had fought with Ariovistus save to his own destruction. He might join issue when he pleased: he would learn what invincible Germans, highly trained in arms, who in a period of fourteen years had never been beneath a roof, could accomplish by their valour.

[37] At the same hour in which this message was brought back to Caesar, deputies arrived from the Aedui and the Treveri. The Aedui came to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul, were devastating their borders, and that they themselves had not been able to purchase peace from Ariovistus even by the delivery of hostages. The Treveri reported that one hundred cantons

of the Suebi had settled on the banks of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross the river, under the command of two brothers, Nasua and Cimberius. At this Caesar was exceedingly disquieted, and determined that he must make speed, for fear that, if the new company of Suebi joined the old forces of Ariovistus, resistance might be more difficult. Therefore he secured his corn^o-supply with all possible speed, and pushed on with forced marches to meet Ariovistus.

[38] He had advanced a three days' march when news was brought to him that Ariovistus with all his forces was pushing on to seize Vesontio (Besançon), the largest town of the Sequani, and had already advanced a three days' march from his own borders. Caesar considered that a great effort on his part was needed to prevent this occurrence. For there was in that town an abundant supply of all things needful for war, and the place was so well fortified by Nature as to afford great facilities for the conduct of a campaign. The river Dubis (Doubs), with a circuit that might have been traced by compasses, surrounds well-nigh the whole town: the remaining space of not more than sixteen hundred feet, where the river breaks off, is closed in by a height of great eminence, so placed that its foundations touch the river-bank on either side. This height is surrounded by a wall to form a citadel and join it with the town. It was to this place that Caesar pushed on with forced marches by night and day, and, seizing the town, posted a garrison in it.

[39] During a few days' halt near Vesontio for the provision of corn and other supplies, a panic arose from inquiries made by our troops and remarks uttered by Gauls and traders, who affirmed that the Germans were men of a mighty frame and an incredible valour and skill at arms; for they themselves (so they said) at meetings with

the Germans had often been unable even to endure their look and the keenness of their eyes. So great was the panic, and so suddenly did it seize upon all the army, that it affected in serious fashion the intelligence and the courage of all ranks. It began first with the tribunes, the contingent-commanders, and the others who had followed Caesar from Rome to court his friendship, without any great experience in warfare. Advancing various reasons which, according to their own statement, obliged them to depart, some sought his permission to leave; some were compelled by very shame to stay, to avoid the suspicion of cowardice. They were unable to disguise their looks, or even at times to restrain their tears; they hid in their tents to complain of their own fate, or to lament in company with their friends the common danger. Everywhere throughout the camp there was signing of wills. By the cowardly utterances of such as these even men who had long experience in the field, soldiers, centurions, and cavalry commanders, were gradually affected. Those of them who desired to be thought less timid would declare that they were not afraid of the enemy, but feared the narrow defiles and the vast forests which lay between themselves and Ariovistus, or a possible failure of proper transport for the corn-supply. Some had even gone so far as to declare to Caesar that when he gave the order for camp to be shifted and standards advanced the soldiers would not obey, and by reason of cowardice would not move forward.

[40] Remarking this, he convened a council of war, and summoned thereto the centurions of all grades. Then indignantly he reprimanded them, first and foremost because they thought it their business to ask or to consider in which direction or with what purpose they were being led. "Ariovistus," he said, "in my own consulship sought most eagerly the friendship of the Roman people. Why should anyone

conclude that he intends so recklessly to depart from his duty? For myself, I am persuaded that, when my demands are made known, and the fairness of my terms understood, Ariovistus will not reject the goodwill of myself or the Roman people. Even if, in a fit of rage and madness, he makes war, what, pray, have you to fear? Why do you despair of your own courage or of my competence? We have made trial of this foe in the time of our fathers, on the occasion when, in the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutoni by Gaius Marius, the army was deemed to have deserved no less praise than the commander himself. We have made further trial of late in Italy in the slave revolt, and yet the slaves had the practice and training which they had learnt from us to give them some measure of support. You may judge from this what profit there is in a good courage, for the very men whom you had feared without cause during a long time, when they had no arms, you subsequently subdued, though they had taken up arms and won victories. Finally, these are the selfsame men with whom the Helvetii have had frequent encounters, and they have often subdued them, not only in Helvetian territory but also in Germany; yet the Helvetii have not proved a match for *our* army. If there be any who are concerned at the defeat and flight of the Gauls, they can discover for the asking that when the Gauls were worn out by the length of the campaign Ariovistus, who had kept himself for many months within his camp in the marshes, without giving a chance of encounter, attacked them suddenly when they had at last dispersed in despair of a battle, and conquered them rather by skill and stratagem than by courage. Even Ariovistus himself does not expect that our own armies can be caught by tactics for which there was a chance against unskilled barbarians. Those persons who ascribe their own cowardice to a pretended anxiety for the corn-

supply or to the defiles on the route are guilty of presumption, for they appear either to despair of the commander's doing his duty or to instruct him in it. These matters are my own concern; corn is being supplied by the Sequani, the Leuci, the Lingones, and the corn-crops in the fields are already ripe; of the route you yourselves will shortly be able to judge. As for the statement that the soldiers will not obey orders nor move forward, I am not in the least concerned by that; in any cases where an army has not obeyed its general, either fortune has failed because of some actual blunder, or else some crime shall be discovered and a charge of avarice has been brought home. My own blamelessness has been clearly seen throughout my life, my good fortune in the Helvetian campaign. Accordingly I intend to execute at once what I might have put off to a more distant day, and to break camp in the fourth watch of this next night, to the intent that I may perceive at once whether honour and duty, or cowardice, prevail in your minds. Even if no one else follows, I shall march with the Tenth Legion alone; I have no doubt of its allegiance, and it will furnish the commander-in-chief's escort." Caesar had shown special favour to this legion, and he placed the greatest reliance in it because of its courage.

[41] By the delivery of this speech the spirit of all ranks was changed in a remarkable fashion; the greatest keenness and eagerness for active service was engendered, and the Tenth Legion was the first to express thanks to Caesar, through its tribunes, for the excellent opinion he had formed of it, and to affirm its complete readiness for active service. Then the remaining legions moved their tribunes and senior centurions to give satisfactory explanation to Caesar that they had felt neither doubt nor panic, and had regarded it as the commander's business, not their own, to decide the plan of

campaign. Their explanation was accepted, and through Diviciacus (the one person in whom Caesar had absolute confidence) a route was found out to lead the army through open country, by a detour of more than fifty miles. In the fourth watch, as Caesar had said, the march began. On the seventh day of continuous marching the scouts reported that the forces of Ariovistus were four-and-twenty miles away from our own.

[42] When he learnt of Caesar's approach Ariovistus sent deputies to him to announce that he was now ready to do what Caesar had before demanded as touching a parley, because he had come nearer, and Ariovistus believed that he could comply without risk. Caesar did not reject the proposal, and he was inclined to think that Ariovistus was at length returning to a proper frame of mind, inasmuch as of his own motion he proffered what he had previously refused on request. Moreover, he began to have a good hope that, in consideration of the signal benefits conferred upon him by Caesar and the Roman people, Ariovistus would abandon his obstinacy when he knew Caesar's demands. A day — the fifth after that — was appointed for the parley. Meanwhile there was continual sending of deputies to and fro between them; and Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should bring no infantry with him to the parley, as he was afraid Caesar might surround him by treachery; let each party, therefore, come with an escort of horse; otherwise he would not come at all. Caesar did not wish parley to be broken off upon an excuse thus interposed; at the same time he could not venture to entrust his personal safety to Gallic horse. He decided, therefore, that the best plan was to take the horses from Gallic troopers and mount upon them soldiers of the Tenth Legion, in which he had absolute confidence; thus, if there were need of action, he would have an

escort of the truest friends he could find. As the order was being carried out, one of the soldiers of the Tenth Legion remarked with some wit that Caesar was doing better than his promise; for he had promised to treat the Tenth Legion as the commander-in-chief's escort, and he was making new "cavalry" of them.

[43] There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable size. The place was about equally distant from the camps of Caesar and of Ariovistus. Thither, as agreed, they came for the parley. Caesar stationed the legion which he had brought on horseback two hundred paces from the mound. The horsemen of Ariovistus halted at an equal distance. Ariovistus demanded that they should parley on horseback, and that each should bring with him to the parley ten men besides himself. When they arrived at the spot Caesar began his speech by relating the benefits conferred upon Ariovistus by himself and by the Senate; the Senate had called him king and friend, and had sent gifts with a most lavish hand. This privilege, as he pointed out, had fallen to the lot of but few, and was usually granted in consideration of great personal services. Ariovistus, though he had no right to audience of the Senate, and no just cause of claim, had obtained the rewards in question by the favour and generosity of Caesar and of the Senate. He proceeded to show how long-established and how just were the reasons for a close relationship between Rome and the Aedui; the frequency and the distinction of the Senate's decrees in respect of them; the manner in which, even before they had sought the friendship of Rome, the Aedui had always held the primacy of all Gaul. It was the tradition of the Roman people to desire that its allies and friends should not only lose none of their possessions, but should enjoy increase of influence, dignity, and distinction; on the other hand, who, he asked, could

endure that they should be despoiled of what they had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people? He then made the same demands as those which he had given in his instructions to the deputies — that is to say, Ariovistus must not make war on the Aedui or on their allies; he must restore the hostages; and if he could not send back home any part of the Germans, at any rate he must not suffer any more to cross the Rhine.

[44] To the demands of Caesar Ariovistus replied in brief, but he dilated at length upon his own good qualities. He had crossed the Rhine, he said, not of his own desire, but upon the request and summons of the Gauls; not without great hope of great rewards had he left home and kindred; the settlements he occupied in Gaul were granted by the natives, the hostages had been given with the consent of the natives; the tribute he took was by right of war, as customarily enforced by conquerors upon conquered. He had not made war upon the Gauls, but they upon him; all the states of Gaul had come to attack him and had set up their camp against him; all their forces had been beaten and overcome by him in a single action. If they wished to try the issue again, he was prepared to fight it out again; if they wished to enjoy peace, it was unjust to refuse the payment of tribute which of their own consent they had paid hitherto. The friendship of the Roman people ought to be a distinction and a security to him, not a hindrance; and he had sought it with that hope. If through the agency of the Roman people the tribute were to be remitted and the surrendered persons withdrawn, he would refuse the friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As for the host of Germans that he was bringing over into Gaul, his object was to protect himself, not to attack Gaul; and the proof thereof was that he had not come except upon request, and that his warfare had been

defensive, not offensive. He had come into Gaul before the Roman people. Never heretofore had an army of the Roman people left the borders of the Province of Gaul. What did Caesar mean? Why did he come into his sphere of occupation? This was his province of Gaul, as the other was the Roman. As it was not right to give way to him, if he made an attack on Roman territory, so likewise the Romans were unjust in obstructing him in his own jurisdiction. As for Caesar's statement that the Aedui were called "brothers," Ariovistus was not such a barbarian, not so ignorant of affairs as not to know that neither in the last campaign against the Allobroges had the Aedui rendered assistance to the Romans, nor in the disputes of the Aedui with himself and the Sequani had they enjoyed the assistance of the Roman people. He was bound to suspect, in spite of pretended friendship, that Caesar had an army in Gaul for the purpose of crushing him. Unless, therefore, Caesar departed and withdrew his army from this locality, he would regard him, not as a friend, but as an enemy. And if he put Caesar to death, he would gratify many nobles and leaders of the Roman people: this he knew for certain from themselves, by the messengers sent on behalf of all whose favour and friendship he could purchase by Caesar's death. If, however, Caesar departed and resigned to him the uninterrupted occupation of Gaul, he would recompense him by a great reward, and would, without any exertion or risk on his part, execute any campaigns he might wish to be carried out.

[45] Caesar spoke at length for the purpose of showing why he could not give up the task in hand. His own practice, he said, and the practice of the Roman people did not suffer the abandonment of allies who had deserved so well, nor did he admit that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people. The Arverni and the

Ruteni had been subdued in a campaign by Quintus Fabius Maximus: the Roman people had pardoned them, and had not formed them into a province nor imposed a tribute. If priority of time was to be the standard, then the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul had complete justification; if the decision of the Senate was to be observed, Gaul should be free, for after conquest of the country the Senate had willed that it should continue to observe its own laws.

[46] During the progress of the parley Caesar was informed that the horsemen of Ariovistus were approaching nearer the mound, riding up to our troops, and discharging stones and darts at them. Caesar made an end of speaking, and, withdrawing to his own men, commanded them not to discharge a single dart against the enemy in reply. For, although he could see that a fight between the chosen legion and the horsemen would involve no danger, still he did not think proper, by so beating the enemy, to make possible the report that after pledge given they had been surrounded by him during a parley. As soon as the common soldiers learnt how arrogantly at the parley Ariovistus had forbidden all Gaul to the Romans, how his horsemen had attacked our troops, and how this action had broken off the parley, the army was inspired with far greater eagerness and enthusiasm for battle.

[47] Two days afterwards Ariovistus sent deputies to Caesar. He desired, he said, to discuss with him the matters which they had begun to discuss together but had not settled. Let him therefore again appoint a day for a parley, or, if he did not so wish, let him send to him one of his staff. Caesar thought there was no occasion for a parley, the more so as on the previous day the Germans could not be restrained from discharging darts upon our men. He thought it would be very dangerous to send one of his staff to him and so to expose a

man to the ferocious Germans. The best plan seemed to be to send to him Gaius Valerius Procillus, son of Gaius Valerius Caburus. He was a young man of exemplary courage and courtesy, and his father had been presented with the citizenship by Gaius Valerius Flaccus. Caesar selected him because of his fidelity and his knowledge of the Gallic tongue (which from long practice Ariovistus could now use freely), and also because the Germans had in his case no reason for outrage; and with him he chose Marcus Mettius, who enjoyed the intimacy of Ariovistus. He gave them instructions that they should ascertain and bring back to him the views of Ariovistus. But when Ariovistus saw them near him in his camp he called aloud in the presence of his army, "Why come you to me? To spy?" When they tried to speak he prevented them and flung them into chains.

[48] On the same day he advanced and pitched his camp under a hill-side six miles from Caesar's. The next day he led his forces past the camp of Caesar, and formed camp two miles beyond him, for the purpose of cutting Caesar off from the corn and supplies that were to be brought up from the borders of the Sequani and the Aedui. For five days in succession Caesar brought his own forces out in front of camp and kept them formed in line of battle, so that if Ariovistus wished to engage he might not lack the chance. On all these days Ariovistus kept his army in camp, but engaged daily in a cavalry encounter. The kind of fighting in which the Germans had trained themselves was as follows. There were six thousand horsemen, and as many footmen, as swift as they were brave, who had been chosen out of the whole force, one by each horseman for his personal protection. With them they worked in encounters; on them the horseman would retire, and they would concentrate speedily if any serious difficulty arose; they would form round any trooper who fell

from his horse severely wounded; and if it was necessary to advance farther in some direction or to retire more rapidly, their training made them so speedy that they could support themselves by the manes of the horses and keep up their pace.

[49] When Caesar observed that Ariovistus kept to his camp, to prevent further interruption of supplies he chose a suitable spot for a camp beyond that in which the Germans had pitched and about six hundred paces distant. Thither he marched in triple-line formation. The first and second line he ordered to keep under arms, the third to entrench a camp. The spot, as has been said, was about six hundred paces away from the enemy. Towards it Ariovistus sent some sixteen thousand light-armed troops with all the horse, as a force to frighten our men and to prevent their entrenching work. None the less Caesar kept to his previous decision, ordering two lines to drive back the enemy, the third to complete the work. When the camp was entrenched he left two legions there and a part of the auxiliaries; the remaining four he brought back to the larger camp.

[50] The next day, in accordance with his practice, Caesar moved out his forces from both camps, and, advancing a little from the larger camp, he formed line to give the enemy a chance of battle. Perceiving that they did not even come forth, he brought his army back to camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent a part of his own forces to attack the lesser camp, and both sides fought in spirited fashion till eventide. At sunset, when many blows had been dealt and taken, Ariovistus led his forces back to camp. By questioning the prisoners why Ariovistus did not fight a decisive action, Caesar found out the reason. It was a custom among the Germans that their matrons should declare by lots and divinations whether it was expedient or not to engage, and the matrons declared

that heaven forbade the Germans to win a victory, if they fought an action before the new moon.

[51] On the next day Caesar left what he deemed a sufficient garrison for each camp; in front of the lesser camp, in full view of the enemy, he posted all the allied troops, intending to use them for a demonstration, because the total strength of his legionary troops was none too great in view of the enemy's numbers. He himself, with triple line deployed, advanced right up to the enemy's camp. Then at last, compelled by necessity, the Germans led their own forces out of camp and posted them at equal intervals according to their tribes, Harudes, Marcomani, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi; and their whole line they set about with wagons and carts, to leave no hope in flight. Upon these they set their women, who with tears and outstretched hands entreated the men, as they marched out to fight, not to deliver them into Roman slavery.

[52] Caesar put the lieutenant-generals and the quartermaster-general each in command of a legion, that every man might have their witness of his valour. He himself took station on the right wing, having noticed that the corresponding division of the enemy was the least steady, and joined battle. Our troops attacked the enemy so fiercely when the signal was given, and the enemy dashed forward so suddenly and swiftly, that there was no time to discharge javelins upon them. So javelins were thrown aside, and it was a sword-fight at close quarters. But the Germans, according to their custom, speedily formed mass, and received the sword-attack. Not a few of our soldiers were found brave enough to leap on to the masses of the enemy, tear the shields from their hands, and deal a wound from above. The left wing of the enemy's line was beaten and put to flight, but their right wing, by sheer weight of numbers, was pressing our

line hard. Young Publius Crassus, commanding our cavalry, noticed this, and as he could move more freely than the officers who were occupied in and about the line of battle, he sent the third line in support of our struggling troops.

[53] So the battle was restored, and all the enemy turned and ran: nor did they cease in their flight until they reached the river Rhine, some five miles from that spot. There a very few, trusting to their strength, set themselves to swim across, or discovered boats and so won safety. Among these was Ariovistus, who found a skiff moored to the bank and escaped therein; all the rest of our cavalry caught and slew. There were two wives of Ariovistus, one of Suebian nationality, whom he had brought with him from home; the other a woman of Noricum, sister to King Voccio, and sent by him to be married to Ariovistus in Gaul. Both wives perished in the rout; of his two daughters one was slain, and the other taken prisoner. Gaius Valerius Procillus, bound with a threefold chain, was being dragged by his keepers in the rout, when he chanced to meet Caesar himself pursuing the enemy with the cavalry. And indeed it brought Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself, to see a most distinguished member of the Province of Gaul, his own close friend and guest, snatched from the hands of the enemy and restored to himself; and to feel that fortune had in no wise lessened, by the loss of his friend, his own great pleasure and satisfaction. Procillus said that in his own presence the lots had been thrice consulted to see whether he should be burnt to death at once or saved for another time: to the favour of the lots he owed his safety. Marcus Mettius also was discovered and brought back to Caesar.

[54] When the news of this battle was carried across the Rhine, the Suebi who had come to the banks of the river began to return

homewards; and when the tribes which dwell next to the Rhine perceived their panic, they pursued and slew a great number of them. Two capital campaigns were thus finished in a single summer, and Caesar therefore withdrew his army a little earlier than the season required into winter cantonments among the Sequani, leaving Labienus in command thereof, while he himself set off for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.

BOOK II

[1] While Caesar was wintering in Hither Gaul, as has been shown above, frequent rumours were brought to him, and despatches also from Labienus informed him, that all the Belgae (whom I have already described as a third of Gaul) were conspiring against Rome and giving hostages each to other. The causes of their conspiracy, it was said, were as follow. In the first place, they feared that when all Gaul was pacified they might themselves be brought face to face with a Roman army; in the second, they were being stirred up by certain of the Gauls, who had either been unwilling that the Germans should stay longer in Gaul, and were now no less distressed that a Roman army should winter and establish itself in Gaul, or who for sheer fickleness and inconstancy were set upon a change of rule; in certain cases, too, the agitation was due to the fact that in Gaul the more powerful chiefs, and such as had the means to hire men, commonly endeavoured to make themselves kings, and this they could not so readily effect under our empire.

[2] These reports and despatches prompted Caesar to enrol two new legions in Hither Gaul, and at the beginning of summer he sent Quintus Pedius, lieutenant-general, to lead them into Inner Gaul. He himself, as soon as there began to be a supply of forage, came to the army. He charged the Senones and the rest of the Gauls who were neighbours of the Belgae to find out what the latter were about and to keep him informed thereof. They all with one consent reported that bands were being collected, and an army assembled in one place. Then accordingly he determined that he must no longer hesitate about moving against them. He secured his corn^o-supply, struck his camp, and in about a fortnight reached the borders of the Belgae.

[3] He arrived there unexpectedly, and with more speed than anyone had looked for. The Remi, the Belgic tribe nearest to Gaul, sent as deputies to him Iccius and Andecumborius, the first men of the community, to tell him that they surrendered themselves and all their stuff to the protection and power of Rome; that they had neither taken part with the rest of the Belgae, nor conspired against Rome; and that they were ready to give hostages, to do his commands, to receive him in their towns, and to assist him with corn and everything else. All the rest of the Belgae, they said, were under arms, and the Germans dwelling on the hither side of the Rhine had joined with them; and the infatuation of them all was so great that the Remi had not been able to dissuade even the Suessiones from taking part with them, though these were their own brethren and kinsfolk, observing the same law and ordinances, and sharing one government, one ruler with themselves.

[4] Caesar asked them what states were under arms, what was their size and their war-strength. He discovered that most of the Belgae were of German origin, and had been brought over the Rhine a long while ago, and had settled in their present abode by reason of the fruitfulness of the soil, having driven out the Gauls who inhabited the district. The Belgae, they said, were the only nation who, when all Gaul was harassed in the last generation, had prevented the Teutoni and Cimbri from entering within their borders; and for this cause they relied on the remembrance of those events to assume great authority and great airs in military matters. As concerning their numbers, the Remi affirmed that they had exact information in all particulars, because, as they were closely connected by relationship and intermarriage, they had learnt how large a contingent each chief had promised for the present campaign in the general council of the

Belgae. Among these the Bellovaci had a predominant influence by courage, by authority, by numbers; they could furnish a hundred thousand men-at-arms, and of that number had promised sixty thousand picked men, demanding for themselves the command of the whole campaign. The Suessiones, the Remi said, were their own immediate neighbours; they occupied lands as extensive as they were productive. Among them, even within living memory, Diviciacus had been king, the most powerful man in the whole of Gaul, who had exercised sovereignty alike over a great part of these districts, and even over Britain. Galba was now king; to him, by reason of his justice and sagacity, the supreme charge of the campaign was delivered by general consent; he had twelve towns, and promised fifty thousand men-at-arms. An equal number were promised by the Nervii, accounted the fiercest among the Belgae, and dwelling farthest away; fifteen thousand by the Atrebates, ten by the Ambiani, five-and-twenty by the Morini, seven by the Menapii, ten by the Caleti, as many by the Vellocasses and the Viromandui, nineteen by the Aduatuci. The Condrusi, Eburones, Caeroesi, and Paemani (who are indiscriminately called Germans), had promised, it was thought, some forty thousand men.

[5] Caesar addressed the Remi in a speech of generous encouragement; then he commanded their whole senate to assemble at his headquarters, and the children of their chieftains to be brought thither as hostages. All these commands were punctiliously and punctually performed. He made a powerful and a personal appeal to Diviciacus the Aeduan, showing him how important an advantage it was for the Roman state, and for the welfare of both parties, to keep the contingents of the enemy apart, so as to avoid the necessity of fighting at one time against so large a host. This could be done if the

Aedui led their own forces into the borders of the Bellovaci and began to lay waste their lands. With these instructions he dismissed them. So soon as he perceived that all the forces of the Belgae had been concentrated and were coming against him, and learnt from the scouts he had sent and from the Remi that they were now not far distant, he made haste to lead his army across the river Axona (Aisne), which is upon the outermost borders of the Remi, and there pitched camp. By so doing, he had the banks of the river to protect one side of the camp, rendered his rear safe from the enemy, and made it possible for supplies to be brought up to him from the Remi and the rest of the states without danger. There was a bridge over the river; he set a guard there, and on the other side of the river he left Quintus Titurius Sabinus, lieutenant-general, with six cohorts. He ordered him to entrench a camp, with a rampart twelve feet high and a ditch eighteen feet broad.

[6] From this camp a town of the Remi called Bibrax was eight miles distant. The Belgae turned direct from their march to attack this town with great violence. The defence was with difficulty maintained on that day. The Gauls and the Belgae use one method of attack. A host of men is set all round the ramparts, and when a rain of stones from all sides upon the wall has begun, and the wall is stripped of defenders, the attackers form a "tortoise," move up to the gates, and undercut the wall. This was easily done on the present occasion; for when so vast a host hurled stones and missiles, no man might stand firm on the wall. When night made an end of the assault, Iccius of the Remi, pre-eminent among his tribesmen in rank and favour, who was the officer in charge of the town at this time, and one of those who had come as deputies to Caesar to treat of peace, sent a report to him to the effect that unless a reinforcement were sent


up to him he could no longer hold his position.

[7] Using again as guides the men who had come from Iccius to report, Caesar sent off to Bibrax in the middle of the night Numidian and Cretan archers and Balearic slingers, to reinforce the townsfolk. Their arrival brought the Remi not only hope of defence but heart for counter-attack, and for the same reason dissipated the enemy's hope of gaining the town. Therefore, halting for a short space near the town, they laid waste the lands of the Remi and set fire to all the hamlets and farm-buildings they could come nigh unto, and then with all their forces sped on to the camp of Caesar and pitched their own less than two miles from it. Their camp, as smoke and watch-fires showed, extended for more than eight miles in breadth.

[8] At first Caesar determined, because of the vast numbers of the enemy and their excellent reputation for valour, to avoid an engagement. By cavalry combats, however, he sought daily to prove what the valour of the enemy could do and what our men could dare. Then, perceiving that our men were not inferior, he chose a ground before the camp naturally suitable and appropriate for forming line of battle; for the hill where the camp had been pitched, standing up but a little from the plain, offered to the front as broad a space as a line deployed could occupy; on either flank it fell away, while in front by a gentle slope it came down gradually to the level of the plain. On either flank of that hill he dug at right angles a protecting trench of about four hundred paces, and at the ends of the trenches he constructed forts and there posted his artillery, so that, when he had formed line, the enemy might not be able, because of their great superiority of numbers, to surround the Romans fighting on the flanks. This done, he left in camp the two legions he had last enrolled, that they might be brought up in support wherever needed,

and he put the remaining six in line of battle before the camp. The enemy likewise had led their forces out of camp and drawn them up.

THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE



[9] Between our own and the enemy's army was a marsh of no great size. The enemy waited to see whether our men would cross it; but our men stood to arms, ready to attack them when in difficulties,

should they be the first to attempt the crossing. Meanwhile a cavalry combat was taking place between the two lines. Neither army began to cross the marsh, and the cavalry combat tended to favour our side; so Caesar led his troops back to camp. The enemy hurried immediately from their station to the river Aisne, which, as has been shown, was behind our camp. There they found fords, and endeavoured to throw part of their forces across, intending if they could to storm the fort commanded by the lieutenant-general, Quintus Titurius, and break down the bridge; or, if they found that impossible, to lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great service to us for the conduct of the campaign, and so to cut off our supplies.

[10] This was reported by Titurius, and Caesar led all the cavalry and the light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, across the bridge, and hastened against the enemy. Fierce was the engagement fought there. Our troops attacked the enemy while in difficulties in the river, and slew a great number of them; the remainder, as they endeavoured with the utmost gallantry to cross over the bodies of their comrades, they drove back with a cloud of missiles; the first party, who were already across, the cavalry surrounded and slew. The enemy were now aware that they had been deceived in their hope of storming the town and of crossing the river, and saw that our men did not advance to unfavourable ground for the sake of a battle; moreover, their own corn-supply began to fail. They summoned a council, therefore, and decided that it was best for each man to return home, and to assemble from all quarters to the defence of the tribe into whose territory the Romans should first introduce their army, in order that they might fight in their own rather than in others' territory, and use native for their corn-supply. To this opinion they

were brought, among the other reasons, by this particular consideration, that they had learnt of the approach of Diviciacus and the Aedui to the borders of the Bellovaci. The latter could not be induced to tarry longer, and thereby to fail in bringing assistance to their own tribe.

[11] This, then, being determined, they decamped in the second watch with great uproar and commotion, in no definite order, under no command, each seeking for himself the first place on the road, and hurrying to reach home, so that they made their departure seem like to a flight. Caesar learnt this at once through his scouts; and fearing an ambush, because he had not yet perceived the cause of their departure, he kept the army and the cavalry in camp. At break of day, when the information had been confirmed by reconnaissance, he sent forward all the cavalry to delay the rearguard. He appointed the lieutenant-generals Quintus Pedius and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta to command the cavalry; and ordered the lieutenant-general Titus Labienus to follow in support with three legions. The cavalry attacked the rearguard, and, pursuing for many miles, they struck down a great host of them as they fled; for while the men at the end of the main column, which had been overtaken, stood at bay, bravely sustaining the attack of our troops, the men in front, thinking themselves clear of danger and restrained by no complication or command, broke ranks as soon as they heard the shouting, and all sought safety in flight. Thus without any danger our men slew as great a host of them as daytime allowed, and, ceasing at sunset, retired according to orders into camp.

[12] The next day, or ever the enemy could recover from their panic and rout, Caesar led the army into the borders of the Suessiones, next the Remi, and making a forced march pressed on to

the town of Noviodunum. He endeavoured to assault it direct from the march, hearing that it was undefended; but, by reason of the breadth of its trench and the height of its wall he was not able to take it by storm, though there were few men to defend it. He entrenched his camp, therefore, and began to move up mantlets and to make ready the appliances needed for assault. Meanwhile all the host of the Suessiones returned from the rout and concentrated next night in the town. When the mantlets were speedily moved up to the town, a ramp cast up, and towers constructed, the Gauls were prevailed on by the size of the siege-works, which they had not seen or heard of before, and by the rapidity of the Romans, to send deputies to Caesar to treat of surrender; and upon the Remi interceding for their salvation, they obtained their request.

[13] The leading men of the state and the two sons of King Galba himself were accepted as hostages, and all arms were delivered up from the town; then Caesar admitted the Suessiones to surrender, and led the army into the territory of the Bellovaci. These had collected themselves and all their stuff in the town of Bratuspantium; and when Caesar with his army was about five miles from the place, all the older men came out of the town. They began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and with loud voice to declare that they would come into his protection and power, and were making no armed effort against Rome. Likewise, when he was come up to the town and was pitching camp, the women and children, with hands outstretched from the wall, after their fashion, besought peace from the Romans.

[14] On their behalf Diviciacus (who, after the departure of the Belgae, had disbanded the forces of the Aedui and returned to Caesar) spake as follows: "The Bellovaci have always enjoyed the protection and friendship of the Aeduan state. They have been incited

by their chiefs, who declared that the Aedui have been reduced to slavery by Caesar and are suffering from every form of indignity and insult, both to revolt from the Aedui and to make war on the Roman people. The leaders of the plot, perceiving how great a disaster they have brought on the state, have fled to Britain. Not only the Bellovaci, but the Aedui also on their behalf, beseech you to show your wonted mercy and kindness towards them. By so doing you will enlarge the authority of the Aedui among all the Belgae, for it is by the succours and the resources of Aedui that they have been used to sustain the burden of any wars that may have occurred.”

[15] Caesar replied that for the respect he had towards Diviciacus and the Aedui he would receive them into his protection and save them alive. As their state was possessed of great authority among the Belgae and was largest in population, he demanded six hundred hostages. These were delivered, and all the arms were collected from the town. Then he left the place, and came into the borders of the Ambiani, who surrendered themselves natural their stuff without delay. Their next neighbours were the Nervii, and when Caesar inquired as touching the nature and character of these, he discovered as follows. Traders had no means of access unto them, for they allowed no wine nor any of the other appurtenances of luxury to be imported, because they supposed that their spirit was like to be enfeebled and their courage relaxed thereby. Fierce men they were, of a great courage, denouncing and accusing the rest of the Belgae for that they had surrendered to Rome and cast away the courage of their sires. For themselves they affirmed that they would send no deputies and accept no terms of peace.

[16] After a three days’ march through their borders Caesar found out from prisoners that the river Sabis (Sambre) was not more than

ten miles from his camp, and that across the river all the Nervii were in position, awaiting there the coming of the Romans, along with the Atrebates and the Viromandui, their neighbours (for the Nervii had persuaded both of these tribes to try with them the chance of war); further, that they were awaiting forces of the Aduatuci, already on the march, and that the women and all who by reason of age were deemed useless for battle had been collected together in a district to which there was no approach for an army by reason of the marshes.

[17] Upon this information Caesar sent forward scouts and centurions to choose a fit place for the camp. Now a considerable number of the surrendered Belgae and of the other Gauls were in the train of Caesar and marched with him; and certain of these, as was afterwards learnt from prisoners, having remarked the usual order of our army's march during those days, came by night to the Nervii and showed to them that between legion and legion a great quantity of baggage was interposed, and that it was an easy matter, when the first legion had reached camp and the rest were a great space away, to attack it while it was in heavy marching order; if it were driven back, and the baggage plundered, the rest would not dare to withstand. The plan proposed by those who brought the information was further assisted by an ancient practice of the Nervii. Having no strength in cavalry (for even to this day they care naught for that service, but all their power lies in the strength of their infantry), the easier to hamper the cavalry of their neighbours, whenever these made a raid on them, they cut into young saplings and bent them over, and thus by the thick horizontal growth of boughs, and by intertwining with them brambles and thorns, they contrived that these wall-like hedges should serve them as fortifications which not only could not be penetrated, but not even seen through. As the route of our column

was hampered by these abatis, the Nervii considered that the proposed plan could be tried.

[18] The character of the ground selected by our officers for the camp was as follows. There was a hill, inclining with uniform slope from its top to the river Sambre above mentioned. From the river-side there rose another hill of like slope, over against and confronting the other, open for about two hundred paces at its base, wooded in its upper half, so that it could not easily be seen through from without. Within those woods the enemy kept themselves in hiding. On open ground along the river a few cavalry posts were to be seen. The depth of the river was about three feet.

[19] Caesar had sent on the cavalry, and was following up with all his forces; but the arrangement and order of the column was different from the report given by the Belgae to the Nervii. For, as he was approaching an enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, was moving with six legions in light field order; after them he had placed the baggage of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last enrolled brought up the rear of the whole column and formed the baggage-guard. Our cavalry crossed the river along with the slingers and archers, and engaged the enemy's horsemen. The latter retired repeatedly upon their comrades in the woods, and, issuing hence, again charged our men; nor did our men dare to follow in pursuit farther than the extent of level open ground. Meanwhile the six legions first to arrive measured out the work, and began to entrench camp. The moment that the first baggage-detachments of our army were seen by the enemy, who were lurking hidden in the woods — the moment agreed upon among them for joining battle — they suddenly dashed forth in full force, having already in the woods ordered their line in regular ranks and encouraged one another for the

conflict; and so charged down upon our cavalry. These were easily beaten and thrown into disorder, and with incredible speed the enemy rushed down to the river, so that almost at the same moment they were seen at the edge of the woods, in the river, and then at close quarters. Then with the same speed they hastened up-hill against our camp and the troops engaged in entrenching it.


[20] Caesar had everything to do at one moment — the flag to raise, as signal of a general call to arms; the trumpet-call to sound; the troops to recall from entrenching; the men to bring in who had gone somewhat farther afield in search of stuff for the ramp; the line to form; the troops to harangue; the signal to give. A great part of these duties was prevented by the shortness of the time and the advance of the enemy. The stress of the moment was relieved by two things: the knowledge and experience of the troops — for their training in previous battles enabled them to appoint for themselves what was proper to be done as readily as others could have shown them — and the fact that Caesar had forbidden the several lieutenant-generals to leave the entrenching and their proper legions until the camp was fortified. These generals, seeing the nearness and the speed of the enemy, waited no more for a command from Caesar, but took on their own account what steps seemed to them proper.

[21] Caesar gave the necessary commands, and then ran down in a chance direction to harangue the troops, and came to the Tenth Legion. His harangue to the troops was no more than a charge to bear in mind their ancient valour, to be free from alarm, and bravely to withstand the onslaught of the enemy; then, as the enemy were no farther off than the range of a missile, he gave the signal to engage. He started off among other things in the other direction to give like harangue, and found them fighting. The time was so short, the temper

of the enemy so ready for conflict, that there was no space not only to fit badges in their places, but even to put on helmets and draw covers from shields. In whichever direction each man chanced to come in from the entrenching, whatever standard each first caught sight of, by that he stood, to lose no fighting time in seeking out his proper company.

[22] The army was drawn up rather as the character of the ground, the slope of the hill, and the exigency of the moment required than according to regular tactical formation. The legions were separated, and each was resisting the enemy in a different quarter; while the view to the front was interrupted, as above shown, by a barrier of very thick fences. Supports, therefore, could not be posted with certainty, nor could it be foreseen what would be needed anywhere, nor could all the commands be controlled by one man. Thus, with affairs in so grievous a difficulty, the issues of the day came likewise in varying sequence.

THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE



[23] The troops of the Ninth and the Tenth Legion, who had formed up on the left flank, discharged their pikes, and, as they possessed the higher ground, speedily drove the Atrebates (the section which happened to face them) into the river, breathless as they were with running and weakened with wounds; and, pursuing them with the sword as they endeavoured to cross, they slew a great part of them while in difficulties. They did not hesitate to cross the river themselves, and, advancing with the ground against them, when the enemy turned to resist, renewed the fight and put them to rout. Likewise in another quarter two detached legions, the Eleventh and the Eighth, having broken the Viromandui with whom they had engaged, left the higher ground, and continued the fight on the very banks of the river. But thereby — though on the right wing the Twelfth were stationed, and at no great distance from them the Seventh — almost all the front and the left face of the camp were laid bare; and to this point all the Nervii, led by Boduognatus, their

commander-in- chief, pressed forward in a dense column, part of which began to envelop the legions on their exposed flank, part to attack the highest ground, where was the camp.

[24] At the same moment our cavalry and the light-armed infantry who had accompanied them, having been beaten back, as I related, by the first onslaught of the enemy, were retiring on to the camp, when they met the enemy face to face and again tried to flee in another direction. The sutlers too, who from the rear gate on the crest of the hill had remarked the passage of the river by our victorious troops, and had gone out to plunder, when they looked back and beheld the enemy moving about in our camp, betook themselves headlong to flight. At the same time there arose a confusion of shouting among the detachments coming up with the baggage-train, and they began to rush terror-stricken in all directions. All these events alarmed certain horsemen of the Treveri, whose reputation for valour among the Gauls is unique. Their state had sent them to Caesar as auxiliaries; but when they saw our camp filled with the host of the enemy, our legions hard pressed and almost surrounded in their grip, the sutlers, horsemen, slingers, Numidians, sundered, scattered, and fleeing in all directions, in despair of our fortunes they made haste for home, and reported to their state that the Romans were repulsed and overcome, and that the enemy had taken possession of their camp and baggage-train.

[25] After haranguing the Tenth Legion Caesar started for the right wing. There he beheld his troops hard driven, and the men of the Twelfth Legion, with their standards collected in one place, so closely packed that they hampered each other for fighting. All the centurions of the fourth cohort had been slain, and the standard-bearer likewise, and the standard was lost; almost all the centurions

of the other cohorts were either wounded or killed, among them the chief centurion, Publius Sextius Baculus, bravest of the brave, who was overcome by many grievous wounds, so that he could no longer hold himself upright. The rest of the men were tiring, and some of the rearmost ranks, abandoning the fight, were retiring to avoid the missiles; the enemy were not ceasing to move upwards in front from the lower ground, and were pressing hard on either flank. The condition of affairs, as he saw, was critical indeed, and there was no support that could be sent up. Taking therefore a shield from a soldier of the rearmost ranks, as he himself was come thither without a shield, he went forward into the first line, and, calling on the centurions by name, and cheering on the rank and file, he bade them advance and extend the companies, that they might ply swords more easily. His coming brought hope to the troops and renewed their spirit; each man of his own accord, in sight of the commander-in-chief, desperate as his own case might be, was fain to do his utmost. So the onslaught of the enemy was checked a little.

[26] Perceiving that the Seventh Legion, which had formed up near at hand, was also harassed by the enemy, Caesar instructed the tribunes to close the legions gradually together, and then, wheeling, to advance against the enemy. This was done; and as one soldier supported another, and they did not fear that their rear would be surrounded by the enemy, they began to resist more boldly and to fight more bravely. Meanwhile the soldiers of the two legions which had acted as baggage-guard at the rear of the column heard news of the action. Pressing on with all speed, they became visible to the enemy on the crest of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having taken possession of the enemy's camp, and observed from the higher ground what was going forward in our own camp, sent the Tenth

Legion to support our troops. When these learnt from the flight of cavalry and sutlers the state of affairs, and the grave danger in which the camp, the legions, and the commander-in-chief were placed, they spared not a tittle of their speed.

[27] Their arrival wrought a great change in the situation. Even such of our troops as had fallen under stress of wounds propped themselves against their shields and renewed the fight; then the sutlers, seeing the panic of the enemy, met their armed assault even without arms; finally, the cavalry, to obliterate by valour the disgrace of their flight, fought at every point in the effort to surpass the legionaries. The enemy, however, even when their hope of safety was at an end, displayed a prodigious courage. When their front ranks had fallen, the next stood on the prostrate forms and fought from them; when these were cast down, and the corpses were piled up in heaps, the survivors, standing as it were upon a mound, hurled darts on our troops, or caught and returned our pikes. Not without reason, therefore, was it to be concluded that these were men of a great courage, who had dared to cross a very broad river, to climb very high banks, and to press up over most unfavourable ground. These were tasks of the utmost difficulty, but greatness of courage had made them easy.

[28] This engagement brought the name and nation of the Nervii almost to utter destruction. Upon report of the battle, the older men, who, as above mentioned, had been gathered with the women and children in the creeks and marshes, supposed that there was nothing to hinder the victors, nothing to save the vanquished; and so, with the consent of all the survivors, they sent deputies to Caesar and surrendered to him. In relating the disaster which had come upon their state, they declared that from six hundred senators they had

been reduced to three, and from sixty thousand to barely five hundred that could bear arms. To show himself merciful towards their pitiful supplication, Caesar was most careful for their preservation; he bade them keep their own territory and towns, and commanded their neighbours to restrain themselves and their dependents from outrage and injury.

[29] The Aduatuci, of whom I have written above, were coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, but upon report of this battle they left their march and returned home; and, abandoning all their towns and forts, they gathered all their stuff in one stronghold, which was admirably fortified by Nature. On every side of its circumference it looked down over the steepest rocks, and on one side only was left a gently sloping approach, not more than two hundred feet in breadth. This place they had fortified with a double wall of great height, and at this time they were setting stones of great weight and sharpened beams upon the wall. The tribe was descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who, upon their march into our Province and Italy, set down such of their stock and stuff as they could not drive or carry with them on the near (*i.e.* west) side of the Rhine, and left six thousand men of their company therewith as guard and garrison. This party, after the destruction of the others, were harassed for many years by their neighbours, and fought sometimes on the offensive, sometimes on the defensive; then by general agreement among them peace was made, and they chose this place to be their habitation.

[30] And now, upon the first arrival of our army, they made frequent sallies from the stronghold, and engaged in petty encounters with our troops. Afterwards, when they had round them a fortified rampart of fifteen thousand feet in circumference, with forts at close

interval, they kept within the town. When our mantlets had been pushed up and a ramp constructed, and they saw a tower set up in the distance, they first of all laughed at us from the wall, and loudly railed upon us for erecting so great an engine at so great a distance. By what handiwork, said they, by what strength could men, especially of so puny a stature (for, as a rule, our stature, short by comparison with their own huge physique, is despised of the Gauls), hope to set so heavy a tower on the wall?

[31] But when they saw that it was moving and approaching the walls, they were alarmed at the novel and extraordinary sight, and sent deputies to Caesar to treat of peace, who spake after this fashion: They supposed that the Romans did not wage war without divine aid, inasmuch as they could move forward at so great a speed engines of so great a height; they therefore submitted themselves and all they had to the power of Rome. In one matter only did they seek indulgence: that if haply of his mercy and kindness, whereof they heard from others, Caesar decided to save the Aduatuci alive, he would not despoil them of their arms. Almost all their neighbours were at enmity with them and envied their courage; and from such, if they delivered up their arms, they could not defend themselves. If they were to be brought into such case, it were better for them to suffer any fortune at the hand of Rome than to be tortured and slain by men among whom they were accustomed to hold mastery.

[32] To this Caesar replied that he would save their state alive rather because it was his custom than for any desert on their part, if they surrendered before the battering-ram touched the wall; but there could be no terms of surrender save upon delivery of arms. He would do, he said, what he had done in the case of the Nervii, and command the neighbours to do no outrage to the surrendered subjects of Rome.

They reported this to their tribesmen, and agreed to perform his commands. A great quantity of arms was cast from the wall into the trench which was before the town, so that the heaps of weapons were well-nigh level with the top of the wall and the height of the ramp; and for all this about a third part, as was afterwards seen, was concealed and kept back in the town. So they threw open their gates, and on that day enjoyed the benefit of peace.

[33] At eventide Caesar ordered the gates to be closed and the troops to leave the town, in order that the townsfolk might suffer no outrage at their hands in the night. In the belief that after the surrender our troops would withdraw their posts or would at least look after them less carefully, the townsfolk, it appeared, had previously formed a plan. Part of them had the weapons which they had kept back and concealed, part had shields made of bark or plaited osiers and hastily (as the shortness of time necessitated) spread over with hides. In the third watch they made a sudden sally from the town in full force, on the side where the ascent to our field-works seemed least steep. Speedily, as Caesar had ordered beforehand, the signal was given by flares, and the detachments from the nearest forts doubled in to the point. The enemy fought fiercely, as was to be expected of brave men in desperate case, where all hope of safety lay in valour alone, contending on unfavourable ground against troops who could hurl missiles at them from rampart and towers. Some four thousand men were slain, and the rest were flung back into the town. On the morrow the gates were broken open, for there was no more defence, and our troops were sent in; then Caesar sold as one lot the booty of the town. The purchasers furnished a return to him of three-and-fifty thousand persons.

[34] At the same season Publius Crassus, whom he had despatched

with one legion against the Veneti, Venelli, Osismi, Curiosolitae, Esubii, Aulerici, and Redones, the maritime states which border upon the Ocean, reported that all those states had been brought into subjection to the power of Rome.

[35] These achievements brought peace throughout Gaul, and so mighty a report of this campaign was carried to the natives that deputies were sent to Caesar from the tribes dwelling across the Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and do his commands. As Caesar was for hastening to Italy and Illyricum, he bade these deputations return to him at the beginning of the next summer. As soon as the legions had been withdrawn to winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, the Turones, and such states as were near the scenes of the recent campaign, he himself set out for Italy. And for those achievements, upon receipt of Caesar's despatches, a fifteen days' thanksgiving was decreed, an honour that had previously fallen to no man.

BOOK III

[1] When he was starting for Italy, Caesar sent Servius Galba with the Twelfth Legion and a detachment of cavalry to the district of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, which reaches from the borders of the Allobroges, from the Lake of Geneva, and from the river Rhone to the summits of the Alps. The reason for sending him was that he wished to open up a route through the Alps by which traders had been accustomed to travel, but at great risk and on payment of great tolls; and Caesar gave him permission to station his legion in this locality for the winter, if he thought it necessary. A certain number of successful engagements were fought; several of the enemy's forts were taken by storm; then deputies were sent to Galba from all sides, hostages given, and peace made. So Galba decided to station two cohorts in the district of the Nantuates, and to winter himself with the remaining cohorts of the legion in a hamlet of the Veragri called Octodurus. It is set in a valley, with no great space of level about it, and shut in all round by very lofty mountains. As the hamlet was divided in two by a river, Galba granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which the Gauls evacuated, to his cohorts to winter in. He fortified the place with rampart and trench.

[2] Several days had passed in winter quarters, and Galba had given orders for corn^o to be brought in from the neighbourhood when on a sudden his scouts informed him that in the night every soul had withdrawn from that part of the hamlet which he had granted to the Gauls, and that the heights overhanging were occupied by an enormous host of Seduni and Veragri. Several causes had contributed to make the Gauls suddenly adopt the plan of renewing the war and crushing the legion. In the first place, they despised the small

numbers of a legion, from which, never at full establishment, two cohorts had been withdrawn, and a considerable number of private soldiers sent off to seek supplies. In the second place, they supposed that, because of the disadvantage of position, since they themselves would charge down from the heights into the valley and hurl their missiles, not even their first onset could be withstood. Moreover, they were indignant that their children had been taken away from them under the title of hostages; and they were convinced that the Romans were endeavouring to seize the peaks of the Alps and to add those districts to their neighbouring Province, not only for the sake of the routes, but to secure a permanent occupation.

[3] This was the information received by Galba. Now he knew that the construction and entrenchment of the winter quarters were not fully completed, and that no adequate provision had been made for corn and supplies in general, because he had come to the conclusion that, as surrender had been made and hostages received, no warlike development was to be apprehended. He therefore summoned with speed a council of war, and proceeded to ask for expressions of opinion. The danger that had arisen was as serious as it was sudden and unexpected, and indeed by this time almost all higher ground was seen to be packed with a host of armed men, while, with the communications interrupted, reinforcements could not be attempted nor supplies brought up. In the council, therefore, the chance of safety was almost despaired of, and not a few opinions were expressed in favour of abandoning the baggage, making a sortie, and striving to win safety by the same routes which had brought them thither. None the less, the majority decided to reserve this expedient to the final emergency, and meanwhile to await the issue and defend the camp.

[4] After a short interval — so short that it scarcely allowed time to complete the dispositions and arrangements determined upon — the enemy, upon a signal given, charged down from all sides, and hurled volleys of stones and javelins against the rampart. At first the Roman troops repelled them gallantly with strength unimpaired, and discharged not a missile in vain from their higher station; and if any part of the camp was stripped of defenders and seemed to be hard pressed, they sped thither to render assistance. But they were at a disadvantage, because when any of the enemy, wearied by the long continuance of the battle, retired from the fighting line, others with strength unimpaired would step into their places; but nothing of the kind could be done by the Romans on account of their scantiness of numbers, and not only had a wearied man no chance of retiring from the battle, but not even a wounded man could leave the spot where he had been posted and look after himself.

[5] The fighting actually went on for more than six hours on end, and not only the strength but the missiles of the Romans were failing; the enemy were pressing on more fiercely, and beginning, as our energies slackened, to break down the rampart and fill in the trench. At this juncture Publius Sextius Baculus, the senior centurion (whom we have mentioned as disabled by several wounds in the battle with the Nervii), and with him Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune, a man of great sagacity and courage, hastened to Galba, and informed him that the only hope of safety was to try the last expedient in making a sortie. Galba accordingly summoned the centurions, and speedily instructed the troops to make a short pause in the fighting, and merely to intercept the missiles discharged against them, and to refresh themselves after their effort; then, upon a given signal, to burst from the camp and place all hope of safety in courage.

[6] They did as they were bid; and suddenly from all the gates a sortie was made, leaving the enemy no chance of learning what was afoot, nor of rallying. So there was a complete change of fortune; the Romans surrounded on every side and slew the multitude which had come in hope of capturing the camp, and of more than thirty thousand men (for that was known to be the number of the natives who came against the camp) more than a third were slain, while the rest were driven in headlong flight, and not suffered to stand fast even on the higher ground. Thus all the forces of the enemy were routed, and the Romans, stripping off the arms of the slain, retired to their own entrenched camp. This battle over, Galba declined to try fortune too often: he remembered that there was a great difference between the purpose of his coming into winter quarters and the state of things which he had found, and he was very greatly concerned by the lack of corn and supplies. Accordingly, on the next day he caused all the buildings of that hamlet to be burnt, and made haste to return to the Province; and, as there was no enemy to hinder him or delay his march, he brought the legion safely into the territory of the Nantuates, and then into that of the Allobroges, and there wintered.

[7] After these events Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was at peace again, for the Belgae were defeated, the Germans driven out, and the Seduni in the Alpine region conquered; therefore after the beginning of winter he had set out for Illyricum, desiring to visit the tribes there also and to become acquainted with the country. But at this point war broke out suddenly in Gaul, of which the cause was as follows. Publius Crassus the younger with the Seventh Legion had been wintering by the Ocean in the country of the Andes. As there was a lack of corn in those parts, he despatched several commandants and tribunes into the neighbouring states to seek it. Of

these officers Titus Terrasidius was sent among the Esubii, Marcus Trebius Gallus among the Curiosolites, Quintus Velanius with Titus Silius among the Veneti.

[8] These Veneti exercise by far the most extensive authority over all the sea-coast in those districts, for they have numerous ships, in which it is their custom to sail to Britain, and they excel the rest in the theory and practice of navigation. As the sea is very boisterous, and open, with but a few harbours here and there which they hold themselves, they have as tributaries almost all those whose custom is to sail that sea. It was the Veneti who took the first step, by detaining Silius and Velanius, supposing that through them they should recover their own hostages whom they had given to Crassus. Their authority induced their neighbours — for the Gauls are sudden and spasmodic in their designs — to detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same reason, and, rapidly despatching deputies among their chiefs, they bound themselves by mutual oath to do nothing save by common consent, and to abide together the single issue of their destiny. Moreover, they urged the remaining states to choose rather to abide in the liberty received from their ancestors than to endure Roman slavery. The whole sea-coast was rapidly won to their opinion, and they despatched a deputation in common to Publius Crassus, bidding him restore their hostages if he would receive back his own officers.

[9] Caesar was informed by Crassus concerning these matters, and, as he himself was at some distance, he ordered men-of-war to be built meanwhile on the river Loire, which flows into the Ocean, rowers to be drafted from the Province, seamen and steersmen to be got together. These requirements were rapidly executed, and so soon as the season allowed he himself hastened to join the army. The Veneti and likewise the rest of the states were informed of Caesar's

coming, and at the same time they perceived the magnitude of their offence — they had detained and cast into prison deputies, men whose title had ever been sacred and inviolable among all nations. Therefore, as the danger was great, they began to prepare for war on a corresponding scale, and especially to provide naval equipment, and the more hopefully because they relied much on the nature of the country. They knew that on land the roads were intersected by estuaries, that our navigation was hampered by ignorance of the locality and by the scarcity of harbours, and they trusted that the Roman armies would be unable to remain long in their neighbourhood by reason of the lack of corn. Moreover, they felt that, even though everything should turn out contrary to expectation, they were predominant in sea-power, while the Romans had no supply of ships, no knowledge of the shoals, harbours, or islands in the region where they were about to wage war; and they could see that navigation on a land-locked sea was quite different from navigation on an Ocean very vast and open. Therefore, having adopted this plan, they fortified their towns, gathered corn thither from the fields, and assembled as many ships as possible in Venetia, where it was known that Caesar would begin the campaign. As allies for the war they took to themselves the Osismi, the Lexovii, the Namnetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and they sent to fetch auxiliaries from Britain, which lies opposite those regions.

[10] The difficulties of the campaign were such as we have shown above; but, nevertheless, many considerations moved Caesar to undertake it. Such were the outrageous detention of Roman knights, the renewal of war after surrender, the revolt after hostages given, the conspiracy of so many states — and, above all, the fear that if this

district were not dealt with the other nations might suppose they had the same liberty. He knew well enough that almost all the Gauls were bent on revolution, and could be recklessly and rapidly aroused to war; he knew also that all men are naturally bent on liberty, and hate the state of slavery. And therefore he deemed it proper to divide his army and disperse it at wider intervals before more states could join the conspiracy.

[11] Accordingly he despatched Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general, with the cavalry to the territory of the Treveri, who live next the river Rhine. His instructions were to visit the Remi and the rest of the Belgae, and to keep them loyal, and to hold back the Germans, who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae to their assistance, in case they should endeavour to force the passage of the river by boats. Publius Crassus, with twelve cohorts from the legions and a large detachment of cavalry, was ordered to start for Aquitania, to prevent the despatch of auxiliaries from the tribes there into Gaul, and the junction of the two great nations. Quintus Titurius Sabinus, lieutenant-general, was despatched with three legions to the territory of the Venelli, the Curiosolites, and the Lexovii, to keep that force away from the rest. Decimus Brutus the younger was put in command of the fleet, and of the Gallic ships already ordered to assemble from the territory of the Pictones, the Santoni, and the others now pacified, and was ordered to start as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti, whither Caesar himself hastened with the land force.

[12] The positions of the strongholds were generally of one kind. They were set at the end of tongues and promontories, so as to allow no approach on foot, when the tide had rushed in from the sea — which regularly happens every twelve hours — nor in ships, because

when the tide ebbed again the ships would be damaged in shoal water. Both circumstances, therefore, hindered the assault of the strongholds; and, whenever the natives were in fact overcome by huge siege-works — that is to say, when the sea had been set back by a massive mole built up level to the town-walls — and so began to despair of their fortunes, they would bring close inshore a large number of ships, of which they possessed an unlimited supply, and take off all their stuff and retire to the nearest strongholds, there to defend themselves again with the same advantages of position. They pursued these tactics for a great part of the summer the more easily because our own ships were detained by foul weather, and because the difficulty of navigation on a vast and open sea, with strong tides and few — nay, scarcely any — harbours, was extreme.

[13] Not so the ships of the Gauls, for they were built and equipped in the following fashion. Their keels were considerably more flat than those of our own ships, that they might more easily weather shoals and ebb-tide. Their prows were very lofty, and their sterns were similarly adapted to meet the force of waves and storms. The ships were made entirely of oak, to endure any violence and buffeting. The cross-pieces were beams a foot thick, fastened with iron nails as thick as a thumb. The anchors were attached by iron chains instead of cables. Skins and pieces of leather finely finished were used instead of sails, either because the natives had no supply of flax and no knowledge of its use, or, more probably, because they thought that the mighty ocean-storms and hurricanes could not be ridden out, nor the mighty burden of their ships conveniently controlled, by means of sails. When our own fleet encountered these ships it proved its superiority only in speed and oarsmanship; in all other respects, having regard to the locality and the force of the

tempests, the others were more suitable and adaptable. For our ships could not damage them with the ram (they were so stoutly built), nor, by reason of their height, was it easy to hurl a pike, and for the same reason they were less readily gripped by grapnels. Moreover, when the wind began to rage and they ran before it, they endured the storm more easily, and rested in shoals more safely, with no fear of rocks or crags if left by the tide; whereas our own vessels could not but dread the possibility of all these chances.

[14] Caesar had taken several towns by assault, when he perceived that all his labour availed nothing, since the flight of the enemy could not be checked by the capture of towns, nor damage done to them; accordingly he determined to await the fleet. It assembled in due course, and so soon as it was sighted by the enemy about two hundred and twenty of their ships, fully prepared and provided with every kind of equipment, sailed out of harbour and took station opposite ours. Brutus, who commanded the fleet, and his tribunes and centurions in charge of single ships, were by no means certain what to do or what plan of battle they were to pursue. For our commanders knew the enemy could not be damaged by the ram; while, even when turrets were set up on board, the lofty sterns of the native ships commanded even these, so that from the lower level missiles could not be hurled properly, while those discharged by the Gauls gained a heavier impact. One device our men had prepared to great advantage — sharp-pointed hooks let in and fastened to long poles, in shape not unlike siege-hooks. When by these contrivances the halyards which fastened the yards to the masts were caught and drawn taut, the ship was rowed hard ahead and they were snapped short. With the halyards cut, the yards of necessity fell down; and as all the hope of the Gallic ships lay in their sails and tackle, when

those were torn away all chance of using their ships was taken away also. The rest of the conflict was a question of courage, in which our own troops easily had the advantage — the more so because the engagement took place in sight of Caesar and of the whole army, so that no exploit a little more gallant than the rest could escape notice. The army, in fact, was occupying all the hills and higher ground from which there was a near view down upon the sea.

[15] When the yards had been torn down as described, and each ship was surrounded by two or three, the troops strove with the utmost force to climb on to the enemy's ships. When several of them had been boarded, the natives saw what was toward; and, as they could think of no device to meet it, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And they had headed all their vessels down the wind, when suddenly a calm so complete and absolute came on that they could not stir from the spot. This circumstance was in the highest degree fortunate for the settlement of the business, for our troops pursued and boarded the vessels one by one, with the result that of all the number very few, when night came on, reached the land. The battle, indeed, lasted from about the fourth hour to sunset.

[16] This engagement finished the campaign against the Veneti and the whole sea-coast. For, on the one hand, all the fighting men, nay, all the older men who had any sagacity or distinction, had there assembled; on the other, they had collected in one place every single ship they had anywhere; and after such losses the rest of their men had no point to retire to, no means of defending the towns. Accordingly they surrendered themselves and all they had to Caesar. He decided that their punishment must be the more severe in order that the privilege of deputies might be more carefully preserved by the natives for the future. He therefore put the whole of their senate

to the sword, and sold the rest of the men as slaves.

[17] During these events in the land of the Veneti Quintus Titurius Sabinus, with the force received from Caesar, reached the borders of the Venelli. Their chief, Viridovix, held the supreme command of all the revolted states, from which he had raised an army, and large levies besides. Further, in the last few days the Aulerci, Ebuovices, and the Lexovii, after putting their senate to death because they refused to approve the war, closed their gates and joined Viridovix. Moreover, from every corner of Gaul a great host of desperadoes and brigands had gathered, whom the hope of plunder and the passion for war seduced from the daily toil of agriculture. Sabinus confined himself to camp, in a spot suited for any emergency. Viridovix had encamped against him two miles away, and daily led out his forces to give him a chance of fighting, so that at last Sabinus not only incurred the contempt of the enemy, but was assailed by occasional reproaches even of the Roman troops; indeed, he created so strong an impression of cowardice that at length the enemy ventured to come up to the rampart of the camp. He pursued these tactics because he deemed it improper for a lieutenant-general to fight an engagement with so large a host of the enemy, especially in the absence of his commander-in-chief, unless on favourable ground or on some opportunity offered.

[18] When this impression of timidity had been confirmed, he chose out a fit man and a cunning, one of the Gauls whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He induced him by great rewards and promises to go over to the enemy, and instructed him in what he would have done. When the pretended deserter had reached the enemy, he set before them the timidity of the Romans, explained to them how Caesar himself was in straits and hard pressed by the

Veneti, and told them that no later than next night Sabinus was to lead his army secretly out of his camp and to set out to the assistance of Caesar. Upon hearing this, they all cried with one consent that the chance of successful achievement should not be lost — that they should march upon the camp. Many considerations encouraged the Gauls to this course: the hesitation of Sabinus during the previous days, the confirmation given by the deserter, the lack of victuals (for which they had made too careless a provision), the hope inspired by the Venetian war, and the general readiness of men to believe what they wish. With these thoughts to spur them on, they would not suffer Viridovix and the rest of the leaders to leave the council until they had their permission to take up arms and press on to the camp. Rejoicing at the permission given as though at victory assured, they collected faggots and brushwood to fill up the trenches of the Romans and marched on the camp.

[19] The position of the camp was on high ground, with a gradual slope from the bottom of about a mile. Hither the Gauls hastened at great speed to give the Romans the least possible time to assemble and to arm; and they arrived out of breath. Sabinus exhorted his troops, and gave the signal which they longed for. The enemy were hampered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, and he ordered a sudden sortie to be made from two gates. The order was executed with the advantage of ground; the enemy were inexperienced and fatigued, the Romans courageous and schooled by previous engagements. The result was that without standing even one of our attacks the Gauls immediately turned and ran. Hampered as they were, our troops pursued them with strength unimpaired and slew a great number of them; the rest our cavalry chased and caught, and left but a few, who had got away from the rout. So it chanced

that in the same hour Sabinus learnt of the naval battle, and Caesar of Sabinus' victory; and all the states at once surrendered to Sabinus. For while the temper of the Gauls is eager and ready to undertake a campaign, their purpose is feeble and in no way steadfast to endure disasters.

[20] About this time Publius Crassus had reached Aquitania, a district which, as has been said before, for extent of territory and number of inhabitants is to be reckoned as a third part of Gaul. He understood that he was to conduct a campaign in the localities where a few years before Lucius Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant-general, had been defeated and slain, and from which the proconsul Lucius Mallius had escaped with the loss of his baggage; he understood, therefore, that he must exercise no common care. Accordingly he provided a supply of corn, he collected auxiliaries and cavalry, and he further called up singly many brave men from Toulouse and Narbonne, communities of the Province of Gaul adjacent to the regions concerned; he then marched his army into the borders of the Sotiates. Hearing of his approach, the Sotiates collected a large force, with cavalry, in which lay their chief strength, and attacked our column on the march. First of all they engaged in a cavalry combat; then, when their cavalry were beaten, and ours pursued, they suddenly unmasked their infantry force, which they had posted in ambush in a valley. The infantry attacked our scattered horsemen and renewed the fight.

[21] The battle was long and fierce. The Sotiates, with the confidence of previous victories, felt that upon their own courage depended the safety of all Aquitania: the Romans were eager to have it seen what they could accomplish under a young leader without the commander-in-chief and the rest of the legions. At last, however,

after heavy casualties the enemy fled from the field. A large number of them were slain; and then Crassus turned direct from his march and began to attack the stronghold of the Sotiates. When they offered a brave resistance he brought up mantlets and towers. The enemy at one time attempted a sortie, at another pushed mines as far as the ramp and the mantlets — and in mining the Aquitani are by far the most experienced of men, because in many localities among them there are copper-mines and diggings. When they perceived that by reason of the efficiency of our troops no advantage was to be gained by these expedients, they sent deputies to Crassus and besought him to accept their surrender.

[22] Their request was granted, and they proceeded to deliver up their arms as ordered. Then, while the attention of all our troops was engaged upon that business, Adiatunnus, the commander-in-chief, took action from another quarter of the town with six hundred devotees, whom they call vassals. The rule of these men is that in life they enjoy all benefits with the comrades to whose friendship they have committed themselves, while if any violent fate befalls their fellows, they either endure the same misfortune along with them or take their own lives; and no one yet in the memory of man has been found to refuse death, after the slaughter of the comrade to whose friendship he had devoted himself. With these men Adiatunnus tried to make a sortie; but a shout was raised on that side of the entrenchment, the troops ran to arms, and a sharp engagement was fought there. Adiatunnus was driven back into the town; but, for all that, he begged and obtained from Crassus the same terms of surrender as at first.

[23] After receiving arms and hostages Crassus set his march for the borders of the Vocates and the Tarusates. At this juncture the

natives, alarmed by the information that a town fortified alike by natural position and by the hand of man had been carried within a few days of his arrival, began to send deputies about in every direction, to conspire together, to deliver hostages to each other, and to make ready a force. They even sent deputies to those states of Nearer Spain which border on Aquitania, inviting succours and leaders from thence. Upon their arrival they attempted the campaign with great prestige and a great host of men. And as their leaders for the same they selected men who had served for the whole period with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to be past masters of war. These leaders, in Roman fashion, set to work to take up positions, to entrench a camp, and to cut off our supplies. Crassus remarked that his own force by reason of its slender numbers could not easily be split up, while the enemy could range at will, beset the roads, and yet leave sufficient garrison for their camp; and that for this reason his corn and supplies were less conveniently brought up, while the numbers of the enemy daily increased: he therefore considered that he must not delay to fight a decisive battle. He referred the question to a council of war; and, perceiving that all were agreed, he appointed the following day for the battle.

[24] At dawn he brought out all his force and formed double line, with the auxiliaries massed in the centre; then he waited to see what plan the enemy would adopt. Although they considered that they could fight an action safely by reason of their numbers and their past glory in war and the smallness of the Roman force, they still thought it safer to close the roads and cut off supplies, and so to secure victory without bloodshed. And further, if through lack of corn the Romans began to retire, they had it in mind to attack them when they were encumbered in column by the weight of their packs, so that

their spirit would be weaker. This plan was approved by their leaders; therefore, when the Roman force was brought out, they kept in camp. Crassus perceived this; and, inasmuch as the enemy by their hesitation had created an impression of timidity and increased the eagerness of our soldiers for action, and a general protest was heard against longer delay before an advance on the camp, he harangued his troops, and then amid general enthusiasm he pressed on to the enemy's camp.

[25] Arrived there, some proceeded to fill up the trenches, others by many volleys of missiles to clear the defenders from the rampart and fortifications, while the auxiliaries, in whom Crassus had no great confidence for actual fighting, by handing up stones and missiles and carrying sods to make a ramp, gave the appearance and impression of fighting troops. Meanwhile the enemy, for their part, fought in no irresolute or cowardly fashion, and their missiles discharged from a higher level fell to some purpose. A party of cavalry, however, having moved round the enemy's camp, reported to Crassus that it was not fortified with the same care on the rear side, and might easily be approached there.

[26] Crassus exhorted the cavalry commanders to incite their men by great rewards and promises, and showed what he would have done. In accordance with his orders they led out the cohorts which had been left to guard the camp and were unwearied by exertion; and, having led them a long way round, so as not to be seen from the enemy's camp, they rapidly reached the fortifications above mentioned while the eyes and attention of all were set on the actual fight. They threw down the fortifications, and established themselves in the enemy's camp before they could be clearly seen by them or their action perceived. But when shouting was heard in that quarter

the Romans, with strength renewed, began, as is frequent and usual where there is hope of victory, to assault the more vigorously. The enemy, surrounded on all sides and in utter despair, hastened to lower themselves over the fortifications and to seek safety in flight. The cavalry chased them over plains wholly without shelter; and of fifty thousand, the number known to have assembled from Aquitania and the Cantabrian country, they had left scarce a quarter when they returned to camp late at night.

[27] Upon hearing of this battle the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus, and of its own motion sent hostages, among whom were representatives of the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibuzates, Cocosates. A few of the most distant tribes, trusting in the season, as winter was at hand, omitted to do this.

[28] In the general pacification of Gaul the Morini and Menapii remained under arms, and had never sent deputies to Caesar to treat for peace. About this same time, although the summer was almost over, he led his army against them, believing that the campaign could be speedily completed. These tribes, however, started upon the campaign with tactics quite different from the rest of the Gauls. For, perceiving that the most powerful tribes which had fought an action had been beaten and vanquished, and possessing continuous forests and marshes, they conveyed themselves and all their stuff thither. Caesar reached the outskirts of these forests, and determined to entrench a camp, having in the meanwhile seen nothing of the enemy. When, however, our men were scattered at work, the enemy suddenly dashed out of all parts of the forest and charged our troops. These speedily took up arms, and drove the enemy back into the forests: a considerable number of them were slain, but as the Romans

pursued too far in almost impassable places they lost a few of their own side.

[29] In the days then remaining Caesar set to work to cut down the forests, and, to prevent any flank attack on troops unarmed and unprepared, he placed all the timber felled on the side toward the enemy, and also piled it as a rampart on both flanks. With incredible rapidity a great space was cleared in a few days, until the enemy's cattle and the rearward of their baggage were in our keeping, while they themselves sought the denser forests. But then such storms ensued that the work was of necessity interrupted, and the continual rains made it impossible to keep the troops longer under canvas. Accordingly, after laying waste all the fields of the enemy, and burning villages and farm-buildings, Caesar brought back his army, and placed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the rest of the states which had recently waged war.

BOOK IV

[1] In the following winter — the year in which Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Crassus were consuls — the Usipetes from Germany, and likewise the Tencteri, crossed the Rhine with a large host of men, not far from the sea into which it flows. The reason for their crossing was that for several years they had been much harassed by the Suebi, who pressed on them by force of arms and prevented them from husbandry. The Suebi are by far the largest and the most warlike nation among the Germans. It is said that they have a hundred cantons, from each of which they draw one thousand armed men yearly for the purpose of war outside their borders. The remainder, who have stayed at home, support themselves and the absent warriors; and again, in turn, are under arms the following year, while the others remain at home. By this means neither husbandry nor the theory and practice of war is interrupted. They have no private or separate holding of land, nor are they allowed to abide longer than a year in one place for their habitation. They make not much use of corn^o for food, but chiefly of milk and of cattle, and are much engaged in hunting; and this, owing to the nature of the food, the regular exercise, and the freedom of life — for from boyhood up they are not schooled in a sense of duty or discipline, and do nothing whatever against their wish — nurses their strength and makes men of immense bodily stature. Moreover, they have regularly trained themselves to wear nothing, even in the coldest localities, except skins, the scantiness of which leaves a great part of the body bare, and they bathe in the rivers.

[2] They give access to traders rather to secure purchasers for what they have captured in war than to satisfy any craving for imports.

And, in fact, the Germans do not import for their use draught-horses, in which the Gauls take the keenest delight, procuring them at great expense; but they take their home-bred animals, inferior and ill-favoured, and by regular exercising they render them capable of the utmost exertion. In cavalry combats they often leap from their horses and fight on foot, having trained their horses to remain in the same spot, and retiring rapidly upon them at need; and their tradition regards nothing as more disgraceful or more indolent than the use of saddles. And so, however few in number, they dare approach any party, however large, of saddle-horsemen. They suffer no importation of wine whatever, believing that men are thereby rendered soft and womanish for the endurance of hardship.

[3] As a nation, they count it the highest praise to have the land on their borders untenanted over as wide a tract as may be, for this signifies, they think, that a great number of states cannot withstand their force. Thus it is said that on one side for about six hundred miles from the territory of the Suebi the land is untenanted. On the other side the Ubii come nearest, a state which was once extensive and prosperous, according to German standards. Its inhabitants are somewhat more civilised than the other folk of the same race, because their borders touch the Rhine and traders visit them frequently, and, further, because the Ubii themselves by close neighbourhood have grown accustomed to Gallic fashions. Upon this people the Suebi had made frequent attempts in many wars, but had proved unable to drive them from their territory because the state was populous and powerful; however, they made the Ubii tributary to themselves, and greatly diminished their strength and importance.

[4] The Usipetes and the Tencteri, mentioned above, were in the same case. For several years they withstood the force of the Suebi,

but at last they were driven out of their lands, and after wandering for three years in many districts of Germany they reached the Rhine. The localities thereabout were inhabited by the Menapii, who possessed lands, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river; but, being alarmed by the approach of so great a host, they removed from the buildings which they had possessed beyond the river, and, setting garrisons at intervals on the near side of the Rhine, sought to prevent the Germans from crossing. The Germans tried every expedient, but when they found that they could neither force their way because of their lack of vessels nor cross privily because of the Menapian piquets, they pretended to retire to their own homes and districts. They proceeded for a three days' journey, and then returned; and their cavalry, having completed the whole of this distance in a single night, caught the Menapii uninformed and unawares, for, having learnt through their scouts of the departure of the Germans, they had moved back without fear over the Rhine into their own villages. So they were put to the sword and their vessels seized; then the Germans crossed the river before the section of the Menapii on the near side of the Rhine could learn of it, seized all their buildings, and for the remainder of the winter sustained themselves on the supplies of the Menapii.

[5] Caesar was informed of these events; and fearing the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are capricious in forming designs and intent for the most part on change, he considered that no trust should be reposed in them. It is indeed a regular habit of the Gauls to compel travellers to halt, even against their will, and to ascertain what each of them may have heard or learnt upon every subject; and in the towns the common folk surround traders, compelling them to declare from what districts they come and what they have learnt

there. Such stories and hearsay often induce them to form plans upon vital questions of which they must forthwith repent; for they are the slaves of uncertain rumours, and most men reply to them in fictions made to their taste.

[6] Caesar was aware of this their habit, and, for fear that otherwise he might have to face a more serious campaign, set out for the army earlier than was his wont. When he reached headquarters he learnt that his suspicions had been realised; deputations had been sent by some states to the Germans, inviting them to leave the Rhine, and promising to furnish all things demanded of them. The hope thus inspired encouraged the Germans to range more widely, and they had already reached the borders of the Eburones and the Condrusi, dependents of the Treveri. Thereupon Caesar summoned the chiefs of Gaul from their homes; but, thinking it best to conceal the information in his possession, he comforted and encouraged them, and, having made requisition of cavalry, determined to make war on the Germans.

[7] Having secured his corn-supply and selected his cavalry, he began to march into the localities in which the Germans were reported to be. When he was a few days' march away deputies arrived from them, whose address was to the following effect: The Germans did not take the first step in making war on the Roman people, nor yet, if provoked, did they refuse the conflict of arms, for it was the ancestral custom of the Germans to resist anyone who made war upon them, and not to beg off. They declared, however, that they had come against their will, being driven out of their homes: if the Romans would have their goodwill, they might find their friendship useful. Let the Romans either grant them lands, or suffer them to hold the lands their arms had acquired. They yielded to

the Suebi alone, to whom even the immortal gods could not be equal; on earth at any rate there was no one else whom they could not conquer.

[8] To this Caesar replied as seemed good; but the conclusion of his speech was as follows: He could have no friendship with them, if they remained in Gaul. On the one hand, it was not just that men who had not been able to defend their own territories should seize those of others; on the other hand, there was no land in Gaul which could be granted without injustice, especially to so numerous a host. However, they had permission, if they pleased, to settle in the territories of the Ubii, whose deputies were in his camp, complaining of the outrages of the Suebi and seeking his assistance: he would give orders to the Ubii to this effect.

[9] The envoys said that they would report this to their people and, after deliberation upon the matter, return to Caesar in three days: they asked him not to move his camp nearer in the meanwhile. Caesar replied that he could not even grant that request. He knew, in fact, that they had sent a large detachment of cavalry some days before to the country of the Ambivariti across the Meuse, to get booty and corn: he supposed that they were waiting for this cavalry, and for that reason sought to interpose delay.

[10] The Meuse flows from the range of the Vosges, in the territory of the Lingones, and, receiving from the Rhine a certain tributary called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi; then, no more than eighty miles from the Ocean, it flows into the Rhine. The Rhine rises in the land of the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps; in a long, swift course it runs through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrices, Triboci, and Treveri, and on its approach to the Ocean divides into several streams, forming many large islands (a

great number of which are inhabited by fierce barbaric tribes, believed in some instances to live on fish and birds' eggs); then by many mouths it flows into the Ocean.

[11] When Caesar was no more than twelve miles away from the enemy, the deputies returned to him as agreed: they met him on the march, and besought him earnestly not to advance further. When their request was not granted, they asked him to send forward to the cavalry in advance of his column and to prevent them from engaging, and to grant themselves an opportunity of sending deputies into the land of the Ubii. They put forward the hope that, if the chiefs and the senate of the Ubii pledged their faith on oath, they (the Germans) would accept the terms which Caesar offered; and they asked him to give them an interval of three days to settle these affairs. Caesar supposed that all these pleas had the same object as before, to secure by a three days' interval the return of their absent cavalry; however, he said that on that day he would advance no further than four miles, in order to get water. He instructed them to meet him there next day with as large a number as they could, in order that he might take cognisance of their demands. Meanwhile he sent instructions to the commanders who had gone forward with all the cavalry not to provoke the enemy to an engagement, and, if provoked themselves, to hold their ground until he himself with the army had come up nearer.

[12] The enemy had no more than eight hundred cavalry, for the party which was gone across the Meuse to get corn was not yet returned. Our own men, five thousand strong, had nothing to fear, for the deputies of the Germans had left Caesar but a short while before, having asked for a truce that day. However, directly they saw our cavalry, the enemy charged, and speedily threw our men into

confusion. When our men turned to resist, the enemy, according to their custom, dismounted, and, by stabbing our horses and bringing down many of our troopers to the ground, they put the rest to rout, and indeed drove them in such panic that they did not desist from flight until they were come in sight of our column. In that engagement were slain seventy-four of our cavalry, and among them the gallant Piso of Aquitania, the scion of a most distinguished line, whose grandfather had held the sovereignty in his own state, and had been saluted as Friend by the Roman Senate. Piso went to the assistance of his brother, who had been cut off by the enemy, and rescued him from danger, but was thrown himself, his horse having been wounded. He resisted most gallantly as long as he could; then he was surrounded, and fell after receiving many wounds. His brother, who had escaped from the fight, saw him fall from a distance; then spurred his horse, flung himself upon the enemy, and was slain.

[13] After this engagement was over, Caesar felt that he ought no longer to receive deputies nor to accept conditions from tribes which had sought for peace by guile and treachery, and then had actually begun war. Further, he judged it the height of madness to wait till the enemy's forces should be increased and their cavalry returned. Knowing as he did the fickleness of the Gauls, he apprehended how much influence the enemy had already acquired over them by a single engagement; and he considered that no time to form plans should be given them. Thus determined, he communicated to the lieutenant-generals and the quartermaster-general his purpose not to lose a day in giving battle. Then, most fortunately, a certain thing occurred. The next morning, as treacherous and hypocritical as ever, a large company of Germans, which included all the principal and

senior men, came to his quarters, with a double object — to clear themselves (so they alleged) for engaging in a battle the day before, contrary to the agreement and to their own request therein, and also by deceit to get what they could in respect of the truce. Caesar rejoiced that they were delivered into his hand, and ordered them to be detained; then in person he led all his troops out of camp, commanding the cavalry, which he judged to be shaken by the recent engagement, to follow in the rear.

[14] Triple line of columns was formed, and the eight-mile march was so speedily accomplished that Caesar reached the enemy's camp before the Germans could have any inkling of what was toward. They were struck with sudden panic by everything — by the rapidity of our approach, the absence of their own chiefs; and, as no time was given them to think, or to take up arms, they were too much taken aback to decide which was best — to lead their forces against the enemy, to defend the camp, or to seek safety by flight. When their alarm was betrayed by the uproar and bustle, our troops, stung by the treachery of the day before, burst into the camp. In the camp those who were able speedily to take up arms resisted the Romans for a while, and fought among the carts and baggage-wagons; the remainder, a crowd of women and children (for the Germans had left home and crossed the Rhine with all their belongings), began to flee in all directions, and Caesar despatched the cavalry in pursuit.

[15] Hearing the noise in rear, and seeing their own folk slain, the Germans threw away their arms, abandoned their war-standards, and burst out of the camp. When they reached the junction of the Meuse and the Rhine, they gave up hope of escaping further; a large number were already slain, and the rest hurled themselves into the river, there to perish, overcome by terror, by exhaustion, by the force of the

stream. The Romans, with not a man lost and but few wounded, freed from the fear of a stupendous war — with an enemy whose numbers had been 430,000 souls — returned to camp. Caesar gave to the Germans detained in camp permission to depart; but they, fearing punishments and tortures at the hand of the Gauls whose lands they had harassed, said that they would stay in his company, and he gave them liberty to do so.

[16] The German campaign thus finished, Caesar decided for many reasons that he must cross the Rhine. The most cogent reason was that, as he saw the Germans so easily induced to enter Gaul, he wished to make them fearful in turn for their own fortunes, by showing them that a Roman army could and durst cross the Rhine. Moreover, that section of the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri which, as I have mentioned before, had crossed the Meuse to get booty and corn, and had taken no part in the battle, had now, after the rout of their countrymen, withdrawn across the Rhine into the territory of the Sugambri, and joined them. To them Caesar sent envoys to demand the surrender of the men who had made war upon himself and Gaul. They replied that the Rhine marked the limit of the Roman empire: if he thought it unfair that the Germans should cross into Gaul against his will, why did he claim any imperial power across the Rhine?


The Ubii, on the other hand, the only tribe beyond the Rhine which had sent deputies to Caesar, made friendly terms, and given hostages, earnestly besought him to assist them, as they were grievously hard pressed by the Suebi; or, if the urgent concerns of state prevented that, only to transport his army across the Rhine: that would suffice for their present help and future hope. So great, they said, even among the farthest tribes of Germany was the renown and

reputation of his army, after the defeat of Ariovistus and the success of this last action, that their own safety was secure in the prestige and the friendship of Rome. They promised a large supply of boats for the transport of his army.

[17] For the reasons above mentioned Caesar had decided to cross the Rhine; but he deemed it scarcely safe, and ruled it unworthy of his own and the Romans' dignity, to cross in boats. And so, although he was confronted with the greatest difficulty in making a bridge, by reason of the breadth, the rapidity, and the depth of the river, he still thought that he must make that effort, or else not take his army across. He proceeded to construct a bridge on the following plan. He caused pairs of barks eighteen inches thick, sharpened a little way from the base and measured to suit the depth of the river, to be coupled together at an interval of two feet. These he lowered into the river by means of rafts, and set fast, and drove home by rammers; not, like piles, straight up and down, but leaning forward at a uniform slope, so that they inclined in the direction of the stream. Opposite to these, again, were planted two barks coupled in the same fashion, at a distance of forty feet from base to base of each pair, slanted against the force and onrush of the stream. These pairs of barks had two-foot transoms let into them atop, filling the interval at which they were coupled, and were kept apart by a pair of braces on the outer side at each end. So, as they were held apart and contrariwise clamped together, the stability of the structure was so great and its character such that, the greater the force and thrust of the water, the tighter were the barks held in lock. These trestles were interconnected by timber laid over at right angles, and floored with long poles and wattlework. And further, piles were driven in aslant on the side facing down stream, thrust out below like a buttress and

close joined with the whole structure, so as to take the force of the stream; and others likewise at a little distance above the bridge, so that if trunks of trees, or vessels, were launched by the natives to break down the structure, these fenders might lessen the force of such shocks, and prevent them from damaging the bridge.

THE BRIDGE OVER THE RHINE



[18] The whole work was completed in ten days from that on which the collecting of timber began, and the army was taken across. Leaving a strong post at either end of the bridge, Caesar pressed on into the territory of Sugambri. Meanwhile from several states

deputies came to him, to whose request for peace and friendship he replied in generous fashion, and ordered hostages to be brought to him. But from the moment when the bridge began to be constructed the Sugambri, at the instigation of the Tencteri and Usipetes among them, had been preparing for flight; and now they had evacuated their territory, carried off all their stuff, and hidden themselves in the remote part of the forests.

[19] Caesar tarried for a few days in their territory, until he had burnt all the villages and buildings, and cut down the corn-crops. Then he withdrew into the territory of the Ubii; and, after a promise of his help to them, if they were hard pressed by the Suebi, he received the following information from them. The Suebi, when they had discovered by means of their scouts that a bridge was being built, held a convention according to their custom, and despatched messengers to all quarters, ordering the people to remove from their towns, to lodge their children and all their stuff in the woods, and to assemble in one place all men capable of bearing arms. The place chosen was about the middle of the districts occupied by the Suebi; here they were awaiting the approach of the Romans, having determined to fight the decisive battle on this spot. By the time when Caesar learnt this he had accomplished all the objects for which he had determined to lead his army across the Rhine — to strike terror into the Germans, to take vengeance on the Sugambri, to deliver the Ubii from a state of blockade. So, having spent in all eighteen days across the Rhine, and advanced far enough, as he thought, to satisfy both honour and expediency, he withdrew into Gaul and broke up the bridge.

[20] Only a small part of the summer was left, and in these regions, as all Gaul has a northerly aspect, the winters are early; but for all

this Caesar was intent upon starting for Britain. He understood that in almost all the Gallic campaigns succours had been furnished for our enemy from that quarter; and he supposed that, if the season left no time for actual campaigning, it would still be of great advantage to him merely to have entered the island, observed the character of the natives, and obtained some knowledge of the localities, the harbours, and the landing-places; for almost all these matters were unknown to the Gauls. In fact, nobody except traders journeys thither without good guard; and even traders know nothing except the sea-coast and the districts opposite Gaul. Therefore, although he summoned to his quarters traders from all parts, he could discover neither the size of the island, nor the number or the strength of the tribes inhabiting it, nor their manner of warfare, nor the ordinances they observed, nor the harbours suitable for a number of large ships.

[21] To gain such knowledge before he made the venture, Caesar thought Gaius Volusenus a proper person to send on in advance with a ship of war. His orders were to spy out everything and to return to him at once. He himself with all his forces started for the territory of the Morini, from which was the shortest passage across to Britain. He commanded the general concentration here of ships from the neighbouring districts, and of the fleet which he had built in the previous summer for the Venetian campaign. Meanwhile his purpose had become known and had been reported through traders to the Britons, and deputies came to him from several states in the island with promises to give hostages and to accept the empire of Rome. He heard them, and made them a generous promise, encouraging them to keep their word; then he sent them back home, and along with them he sent Commius, whom he himself, after subduing the Atrebates, had made king over them. Caesar approved his courage and

discretion, and believed him loyal to himself; and his influence was reckoned to be of great account in those parts. Him he commanded to visit what states he could, to exhort them to seek the protection of Rome, and to announce his own speedy advent thither. Volusenus observed all the country so far as was possible for an officer who did not dare to disembark and entrust himself to the rough natives, and on the fifth day returned to Caesar, and reported his observations in Britain.

[22] While Caesar tarried where he was to fit out his ships, deputies came to him from a great part of the Morini to make excuse for their policy of the previous season, when in their barbarism and ignorance of our usage they had made war against Rome, and to promise that they would carry out his commands. Caesar thought this overture exceedingly opportune. He did not wish to leave an enemy in his rear, nor had he a chance of carrying out a campaign because of the lateness of the season; nor did he think the settlement of such trivialities should take precedence of Britain. He therefore ordered them to furnish a large number of hostages; and when they brought these he received them under his protection. When about eighty transports — enough, in his opinion, to carry two legions across — had been collected and concentrated, he distributed all the ships of war he had over between his quartermaster-general, lieutenant-generals, and commandants. To the total stated eighteen transports should be added, which were detained eight miles off by the wind, and prevented from entering the port of concentration; these he allotted to the cavalry. The rest of the army he handed over to Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, lieutenant-generals, to be led against the Menapii and against those cantons of the Morini from which no deputies had come to him. He commanded

Publius Sulpicius Rufus, lieutenant-general, with a garrison he considered sufficient, to hold the port.

[23] These arrangements made, he caught a spell of fair weather for sailing, and weighed anchor about the third watch; he ordered the cavalry to proceed to the further harbour, embark, and follow him. They took somewhat too long to despatch the business; he himself reached Britain about the fourth hour of the day, and there beheld the armed forces of the enemy displayed on all the cliffs. Such was the nature of the ground, so steep the heights which banked the sea, that a missile could be hurled from the higher levels on to the shore. Thinking this place to be by no means suitable for disembarkation, he waited at anchor till the ninth hour for the rest of the flotilla to assemble there. Meanwhile he summoned together the lieutenant-generals and tribunes, to inform them what he had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wished to be done; and he warned them that, to meet the requirements of tactics and particularly of navigation — with its liability to movements as rapid as they were irregular — they must do everything in the nick of time at a hint from him. He then dismissed them; and catching at one and the same moment a favourable wind and tide, he gave the signal, and weighed anchor, and, moving on about seven miles from that spot, he grounded his ships where the shore was even and open.

[24] The natives, however, perceived the design of the Romans. So they sent forward their cavalry and charioteers — an arm which it is their regular custom to employ in fights — and, following up with the rest of their forces, they sought to prevent our troops from disembarking. Disembarkation was a matter of extreme difficulty, for the following reasons. The ships, on account of their size, could not be run ashore, except in deep water; the troops — though they did

not know the ground, had not their hands free, and were loaded with the great and grievous weight of their arms — had nevertheless at one and the same time to leap down from the vessels, to stand firm in the waves, and to fight the enemy. The enemy, on the other hand, had all their limbs free, and knew the ground exceeding well; and either standing on dry land or advancing a little way into the water, they boldly hurled their missiles, or spurred on their horses, which were trained to it. Frightened by all this, and wholly inexperienced in this sort of fighting, our troops did not press on with the same fire and force as they were accustomed to show in land engagements.

[25] When Caesar remarked this, he commanded the ships of war (which were less familiar in appearance to the natives, and could move more freely at need) to remove a little from the transports, to row at speed, and to bring up on the exposed flank of the enemy; and thence to drive and clear them off with slings, arrows, and artillery. This movement proved of great service to our troops; for the natives, frightened by the shape of the ships, the motion of the oars, and the unfamiliar type of the artillery, came to a halt, and retired, but only for a little space. And then, while our troops still hung back, chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, the eagle-bearer of the Tenth Legion, after a prayer to heaven to bless the legion by his act, cried: “Leap down, soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy; it shall be told that I at any rate did my duty to my country and my general.” When he had said this with a loud voice, he cast himself forth from the ship, and began to bear the eagle against the enemy. Then our troops exhorted one another not to allow so dire a disgrace, and leapt down from the ship with one accord. And when the troops on the nearest ships saw them, they likewise followed on, and drew near to the enemy.

[26] The fighting was fierce on both sides. Our troops, however, because they could not keep rank, nor stand firm, nor follow their proper standards — for any man from any ship attached himself to whatever standard he chanced upon — were in considerable disorder. But the enemy knew all the shallows, and as soon as they had observed from the shore a party of soldiers disembarking one by one from a ship, they spurred on their horses and attacked them while they were in difficulties, many surrounding few, while others hurled missiles into a whole party from the exposed flank. Caesar noticed this; and causing the boats of the warships, and likewise the scout-vessels, to be manned with soldiers, he sent them to support any parties whom he had observed to be in distress. The moment our men stood firm on dry land, they charged with all their comrades close behind, and put the enemy to rout; but they could not pursue very far, because the cavalry had not been able to hold on their course and make the island. This one thing was lacking to complete the wonted success of Caesar.

[27] So the enemy were overcome in the fight; and as soon as they had recovered from the rout they at once sent deputies to Caesar to treat for peace, promising that they would give hostages and do what he commanded. Together with these deputies came Commius the Atrebatian, who, as shown above, had been sent forward by Caesar into Britain. When Commius disembarked and delivered Caesar's messages to the Britons, they had seized him and thrown him into chains; but now, after the fight, they sent him back. In their entreaty for peace they cast the blame of the misdeed upon the multitude, and sought pardon in consideration of their ignorance. Caesar complained that, though of their own motion they had sent deputies on to the Continent to seek peace from him, they had now begun war on him

without cause; but he agreed to pardon their ignorance, and required hostages. Part of these they gave at once, part they said they would summon from the more distant parts and give in a few days. Meanwhile they ordered their own folk to get back to their fields; and the chiefs began to assemble from every quarter, and to deliver themselves and their states to Caesar.

[28] Peace was thus established. Four days after the arrival in Britain the eighteen ships above mentioned, which had embarked the cavalry, weighed anchor, in a gentle breeze, from the upper port. When they were nearing Britain, and in view of the camp, so fierce a storm suddenly arose that none of them could hold on its course; some were carried back to the selfsame port whence they had started, others were driven away, with great peril to themselves, to the lower, that is, to the more westerly, part of the island. None the less, they cast anchor; but when they began to fill with the waves they were obliged to stand out to sea in a night of foul weather, and made for the Continent.

[29] That same night, as it chanced, the moon was full, the day of the month which usually makes the highest tides in the Ocean, a fact unknown to our men. Therefore the tide was found to have filled the warships, in which Caesar had caused his army to be conveyed across, and which he had drawn up on dry land; and at the same time the storm was buffeting the transports, which were made fast to anchors. Nor had our troops any chance of handling them or helping. Several ships went to pieces; and the others, by loss of cordage, anchors, and the rest of their tackle, were rendered useless for sailing. This, as was inevitable, caused great dismay throughout the army. For there were no other ships to carry them back; everything needful for the repair of ships was lacking; and, as it was generally

understood that the army was to winter in Gaul, no corn had been provided in these parts against the winter.

[30] When they became aware of this, the British chiefs who had assembled at Caesar's headquarters after the fight took counsel together. As they knew that the Romans lacked cavalry, ships, and corn, and perceived the scantiness of the army from the smallness of the camp (it was straitened even more by the fact that Caesar had brought the legions over without baggage), they thought that the best thing to do was to renew the war, cut off our corn and other supplies, and prolong the business into the winter; for they were confident that when the present force was overcome or cut off from return no one thereafter would cross over into Britain to make war upon them. Therefore they conspired together anew, and, departing a few at a time from the camp, they began secretly to draw in their followers from the fields.

[31] Although Caesar had not yet learnt their designs, yet the misfortune of his ships and the fact that the chiefs had broken off the surrender of hostages led him to suspect that events would turn out as they did; and therefore he prepared means to meet any emergency. He collected corn daily from the fields into the camp, and he utilised the timber and bronze of the ships which had been most severely damaged to repair the rest, and ordered the necessary gear for that purpose to be brought from the Continent. The work was most zealously carried out by the troops; and thus, though twelve ships had been lost, he was able to render the rest tolerably seaworthy.

[32] Meanwhile one legion, called the Seventh, had been sent as usual to collect corn; nor as yet had any suspicion of hostilities intervened, since part of the people remained in the fields, and part were actually frequent visitors to the camp. Then the outposts on

duty before the gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than usual was to be seen in that quarter to which the legion had marched. Caesar suspected the truth — that some fresh design had been started by the natives — and ordered the cohorts which were on outpost to proceed with him to the quarter in question, two of the others to relieve them on outpost, and the rest to arm and follow him immediately. When he had advanced some little way from the camp, he found that his troops were being hard pressed by the enemy and were holding their ground with difficulty: the legion was crowded together, while missiles were being hurled from all sides. The fact was that when the corn had been cut from the rest of the neighbourhood one part remained, and the enemy, supposing that our troops would come hither, had hidden by night in the woods; then, when the men were scattered and, having grounded arms, were engaged in cutting corn, they had suddenly attacked them. They had killed a few, throwing the rest into confusion before they could form up, and at the same time surrounding them with horsemen and chariots.

[33] Their manner of fighting from chariots is as follows. First of all they drive in all directions and hurl missiles, and so by the mere terror that the teams inspire and by the noise of the wheels they generally throw ranks into confusion. When they have worked their way in between the troops of cavalry, they leap down from the chariots and fight on foot. Meanwhile the charioteers retire gradually from the combat, and dispose the chariots in such fashion that, if the warriors are hard pressed by the host of the enemy, they may have a ready means of retirement to their own side. Thus they show in action the mobile of cavalry and the stability of infantry; and by daily use and practice they become so accomplished that they are ready to

gallop their teams down the steepest of slopes without loss of control, to check and turn them in a moment, to run along the pole, stand on the yoke, and then, quick as lightning, to dart back into the chariot.

[34] When our troops were thrown into confusion in this fashion by the novel character of the fighting, Caesar brought assistance in the very nick of time; for his arrival caused the enemy to halt, and enabled our men to recover from their fear. This done, he deemed the moment unsuitable for provoking and engaging in a combat; he therefore stood to his own ground and, after a brief interval, led the legions back to camp. In the course of these events all our troops were busily occupied, and the natives who remained in the fields withdrew. Then for several days on end storms ensued, severe enough to keep our men in camp and to prevent the enemy from fighting. Meanwhile the natives despatched messengers in every direction, to tell of the scanty numbers of our troops and to show how great a chance was given of getting booty and of liberating themselves for ever by driving the Romans out of their camp. By this means they speedily collected a great host of footmen and horsemen, and came on towards the camp.

[35] Caesar saw that the result would be the same as on the previous days — that the enemy, if repulsed, would use their speed to escape from danger; nevertheless, as he had got about thirty horsemen, whom Commius, the Atrebatian before mentioned, had brought over with him, he formed the legions in line before the camp. When battle was joined the enemy, unable to endure for long the attack of our troops, turned and fled. The Romans followed after, as far as their speed and strength enabled, and slew not a few of them; then, after setting on fire all buildings far and wide, they

retired to camp.

[36] On the same day deputies sent by the enemy came to Caesar to treat of peace. For them Caesar doubled the number of hostages previously commanded, and ordered them to be brought to the Continent, because the equinox was close at hand, and with a damaged flotilla he did not think it right to subject his crossing to the hazard of winter storms. He himself, taking advantage of a spell of fair weather, weighed anchor a little after midnight, and all the ships came safe to the Continent; but two of the transports were unable to make the same port as the rest, and were carried a little lower down the coast.

[37] When about three hundred men had been landed from these vessels and were marching rapidly to camp, the Morini, who had been left by Caesar in a state of peace when he set out for Britain, were fired by the hope of booty, and surrounded the troops, at first with no very large number of their own folk, bidding them lay down their arms if they did not wish to be killed. The Romans formed square and defended themselves, and at the noise of shouting some six thousand men speedily came about them. Upon report of this Caesar sent the whole of the cavalry from the camp to assist his men. Meanwhile our troops withstood the enemy's assault, and fought with the greatest gallantry for more than four hours: they received but a few wounds, and slew a good many of the enemy. Howbeit, as soon as our cavalry came in sight, the enemy threw down their arms and fled, and a great number of them were slain.

[38] The next day Caesar sent Titus Labienus, the lieutenant-general, with the legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had renewed hostilities. The enemy had no place of retreat, by reason of the dryness of the marshes, their refuge

in the previous year; almost all of them, therefore, came and surrendered to Labienus. As for Quintus Titurius and Lucius Cotta, the lieutenant-generals who had led legions into the territory of the Menapii, they did not return to Caesar until they had laid waste all the fields of the natives, cut down the corn-crops, and burnt the buildings, because the Menapii had all hidden in their densest forests. Then Caesar established the winter quarters of all the legions in Belgic territory. Thither no more than two of the British states sent hostages; the remainder omitted to do so. And for these achievements, upon receipt of Caesar's despatches, the senate decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.

BOOK V

[1] Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius were still consuls when Caesar, on the eve of his departure from winter quarters to go to Italy, as it was his practice every year to do, ordered the lieutenant-generals in charge of the legions to have as many ships as possible built during the winter, and the old fleet repaired. He set forth the plan and pattern of the new ships. For speed of loading and for purposes of beaching he would build them somewhat lower than those which we are accustomed to use on our own sea — and the more so because he had learnt that by reason of the frequent turns of the tides the waves off Gaul were generally smaller. For the transport of cargo, and of the numerous draught-animals, he would have the ships somewhere broader than those we use on the other seas. All of them he ordered to be fitted for oars as well as sails, to which end their lowness of build helped much. The necessary tackle for the equipment of the ships he commanded to be brought out of Spain. When he had concluded the assizes of Hither Gaul he himself set out for Illyricum, for he learnt that the Pirustae were devastating by raids the portion of the Province nearest them. When he was come thither he made a levy of troops upon the states, and commanded them to assemble at a certain point. Upon report of this the Pirustae sent deputies to him to declare that none of these raids had been the result of any public decision, and they affirmed that they were ready by every means to give satisfaction for the outrages. Accepting their statement, Caesar made requisition of hostages and commanded them to be brought in by a certain day; failing this, he affirmed that he would visit the state with war. The hostages were brought in by the day, as ordered; and Caesar appointed arbitrators as between state

and state to assess the damages and determine the penalty.

[2] When these matters were settled and the assizes concluded he returned to Hither Gaul, and thence set out for the army. When he was come thither he went round all the winter quarters, and learnt that by the exemplary energy of the soldiers, and in spite of the utmost lack of all necessities, about six hundred ships of the type set forth above and twenty-eight men-of-war had been built, and lacked but little to make them ready for launching in a few days. Caesar warmly commended the troops and the officers who had been in charge of the work; he gave his instructions, and commanded all the ships to assemble at the Itian port, from which, as he was informed, was the most convenient passage to Britain, a transit of about thirty miles from the Continent. He left such troops as he thought sufficient for the business; and himself, with four legions marching light and eight hundred horse, set out for the borders of the Treveri, because this tribe came not to the councils nor obeyed his command, and, according to report, was stirring up the Germans beyond the Rhine.

[3] Their state is by far the most powerful in cavalry of all the Gauls, and possesses great forces of infantry; and, as above set forth, it touches the Rhine. Two men in the state were striving together for the chieftaincy, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix. The latter of these, directly he was informed of the coming of Caesar and his legions, came to him, affirming that he and all his followers would abide in loyalty and not forsake their friendship with Rome; moreover, he showed what was afoot among the Treveri. Indutiomarus, on the other hand, began to raise horse and foot, and to prepare for war, as soon as he had hidden away those whose age made them unfit for service, in the Forest of Ardennes, which is of great size, stretching right through the territory of the Treveri, from the river Rhine to the

border of the Remi. But some of the chiefs of the Treveri, actuated by their friendship for Cingetorix, and at the same time alarmed at the coming of our army, came to Caesar and began to make requests of him as touching their own private interests, since it was not in their power, they said, to take measures in the interests of the state. Then Indutiomarus feared that he might be deserted by one and all, and sent deputies to Caesar. He urged that in his reluctance to leave his own folk and to come to Caesar his object was to keep the state the more easily to its allegiance, lest, if the whole of the nobility left them, the common people might go astray through ignorance. As a result, he said, the state was in his power, and, if Caesar allowed, he would come to his headquarters and commit the fortunes of himself and of the state to his protection.

[4] Caesar knew very well the purpose of these remarks, and the circumstance which was discouraging Indutiomarus from his deliberate design; nevertheless, that he might not be obliged to waste the summer among the Treveri, when everything was prepared for the campaign in Britain, he commanded Indutiomarus to come to him with two hundred hostages. When these were brought in, among them his son and all his relatives, whom Caesar had summoned by name, he comforted Indutiomarus and exhorted him to abide in loyalty. Nevertheless he assembled at his headquarters the chiefs of the Treveri, and won them over severally for Cingetorix. He was aware that Cingetorix deserved this of him, but he deemed it also of great importance that the authority of one whose signal goodwill towards himself he had fully proved should be as strong as possible among his own folk. This action Indutiomarus took grievously to heart, for he saw that his own influence among his people was being diminished; and though he had previously felt hostility towards us,

his indignation now burst far more vehemently into flame.

[5] When these matters had been settled Caesar proceeded with the legions to the Itian port. There he was informed that sixty ships, which had been built in the country of the Meldi, had been driven back by the weather so that they could not hold on their course, and had therefore returned to their starting-point. The rest he found ready for sailing and equipped in all respects. A body of cavalry from all Gaul, four thousand strong, assembled at the same spot, together with chiefs from every state. A very few of the latter, whose loyalty towards himself he had proved, he had decided to leave in Gaul, taking the rest with him by way of hostages, because he feared a rising in Gaul during his own absence.

[6] Among the others there was Dumnorix of the Aedui, of whom we have spoken before. Caesar had determined to keep Dumnorix in particular with him, because he knew him to be bent on revolution, bent on sovereignty, a man of great courage and of great weight among the Gauls. Moreover, in the council of the Aedui Dumnorix had said that Caesar meant to offer him the kingship of the state; and while the Aedui took the saying grievously to heart, they did not dare to send envoys to Caesar either to repudiate or deprecate his purpose. Caesar had learnt this fact from his own partisans. Dumnorix at first by every kind of entreaty pressed his petition to be left in Gaul, affirming now that he was unused to a voyage and feared the sea, now that he was hindered on religious grounds. Then, when he saw that leave was inexorably refused, and all hope of it taken away, he began to stir up the Gallic chieftains, drawing them aside severally and exhorting them to stay on the Continent. And he sought to frighten them by expressing apprehension that there was some reason for stripping Gaul of all her nobility: that it was Caesar's design to

transport to Britain and there slaughter all whom he feared to put to death in the sight of Gaul. To the rest he pledged his word, and demanded of them an oath that they would execute by common consent whatever they judged to be for the advantage of Gaul. These plots were reported to Caesar by several persons.

[7] Upon this information Caesar was disposed to think, in view of the great importance he attached to the Aedui, that Dumnorix should be repressed and discouraged by all possible means, and at the same time, as his infatuation was obviously going too far, that precaution should be taken against his being able to do any damage to himself and the Roman state. And therefore, as he was delayed at that spot for some five-and-twenty days, because a north-west wind (prevalent for a great part of every season in these localities) prevented his sailing, he endeavoured to keep Dumnorix to his allegiance, but none the less to learn all his designs. At length fair weather came, and he ordered foot and horse to embark. But when all were thus preoccupied, Dumnorix, along with certain troopers of the Aedui, was minded to leave camp and depart for home. Caesar knew not of this; but upon report thereof he countermanded the sailing and put off everything, and then despatched a large detachment of cavalry to follow him up, with orders to hale him back, and, if he offered force or refused to obey, to put him to death; for he supposed that a man who had disregarded the command before his face would do nothing right-minded behind his back. And indeed when Dumnorix was summoned to return he sought to resist and to defend himself by force, entreating the help of his followers and crying repeatedly that he was a free man and of a free state. The pursuers, as they were ordered, surrounded the man and despatched him; but the troopers of the Aedui all returned to Caesar.

[8] When this was done Labienus was left on the Continent with three legions and two thousand horse, and with instructions to guard the ports, to ensure the corn^o-supply, to keep himself informed of events in Gaul, and to make plans as occasion and circumstance should require. The commander-in-chief, with five legions and a contingent of horse equal to that left on the Continent, weighed anchor about sunset, and proceeded under a gentle south-west wind. But about midnight the wind failed, and he did not make the course: he was carried on too far by the tide, and at sunrise he sighted Britain left afar on the port side. Then once more he followed the turn of the tide, and strove by rowing to make that part of the island where (as he had learnt in the previous summer) was the best place of disembarkation. And herein was the spirit of the troops much to be commended, who, in the heavily built transports, by uninterrupted effort of rowing kept level with the men-of-war. The whole fleet reached the shore of Britain about midday, but no enemy was to be seen there. They had, indeed, as Caesar learnt afterward from prisoners, assembled there in large companies; but, alarmed at the host of ships, of which, counting those of the previous year and the private vessels which individuals had built for their own convenience, over eight hundred had been seen at once, they had withdrawn from the shore and concealed themselves on the high ground.

[9] The army was landed and a place suitable for the camp was chosen. When Caesar had learnt from prisoners where the enemy's forces had taken post, he left ten cohorts and three hundred horse by the seashore to guard the fleet; then, starting in the third watch, he pressed on to meet the enemy, having the less fear for the fleet because he was leaving it at anchor on a sandy, open shore; and he

appointed Quintus Atrius to command the troops guarding the ships. He himself, advancing about twelve miles in the night, came in sight of the enemy's forces. They advanced their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground to a river, and sought to check our troops and to engage. Driven back by our horse, they concealed themselves in the woods: there they had got a position excellently fortified by nature as well as by handiwork, which, as it would seem, had been prepared before for a war among themselves; for all the entries had been barred by a great number of felled trees. The enemy came out of the woods to fight in small groups, and sought to prevent our troops from entering the fortifications. But the men of the Seventh Legion formed a "tortoise," and threw up a ramp against the fortifications, and so took the position, driving the enemy out of the woods at the cost of a few men wounded. Caesar forbade them to pursue the fugitives very far, because he did not know the character of the country, and also because a great part of the day was spent, and he wished to leave time for the entrenchment of the camp.

[10] In the morning of the next day he divided the foot and the horse in three detachments, and sent them as flying columns to pursue the fugitives. When these had advanced a good long march and the rearguards were just in sight, troopers came from Quintus Atrius to Caesar to report that a violent storm had arisen in the previous night, and that nearly all the ships had been damaged and cast up on shore, as the anchors and cables would not hold, and the seamen and steersmen could not face the force of the storm: and so the collision of ships had caused serious damage.

[11] Upon receipt of this intelligence Caesar commanded the legions and the cavalry to be recalled, and to keep off attacks on the line of march, while he himself returned to the fleet. With his own

eyes he saw almost exactly what he had learnt from the messengers and despatches: some forty vessels indeed were lost, but it appeared that the rest could be repaired with great trouble. He therefore picked out artificers from the legions, and ordered others to be fetched from the Continent; and wrote to Labienus to construct as many ships as possible by the help of the legions he had with him. For himself he determined that, although the task involved much labour and effort, it was still the best plan to have all the ships beached and connected with the camp by a single entrenchment. Upon this business he spent about ten days, allowing no interruption even at night-time in the work of the troops. When the ships had been beached and the camp thoroughly well entrenched, he left the same forces as before to guard the ships: he himself then set out for the point whence he had returned. When he was come thither he found that still greater forces of the Britons had assembled there from every direction, and that by common consent they had entrusted the supreme command and conduct of the campaign to Cassivellaunus, whose territories are divided from the maritime states by the river called Thames, about eighty miles from the sea. Hitherto there had been continuous wars between this chief and the other states; but our arrival had moved the Britons to appoint him commander-in-chief for the conduct of the whole campaign.

[12] The inland part of Britain is inhabited by tribes declared in their own tradition to be indigenous to the island, the maritime part by tribes that migrated at an earlier time from Belgium to seek booty by invasion. Nearly all of these latter are called after the names of the states from which they sprang when they went to Britain; and after the invasion they abode there and began to till the fields. The population is innumerable; the farm-buildings are found very close

together, being very like those of the Gauls; and there is great store of cattle. They use either bronze, or gold coins, or instead of coined money tallies of iron, of a certain standard of weight. In the midland districts of Britain tin is produced, in the maritime iron, but of that there is only a small supply; the bronze they use is imported. There is timber of every kind, as in Gaul, save beech and pine. They account it wrong to eat of hare, fowl, and goose; but these they keep for pastime or pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, the cold seasons more moderate.

[13] The natural shape of the island is triangular, and one side lies opposite to Gaul. Of this side one angle, which is in Kent (where almost all the ships from Gaul come in to land), faces the east, the lower angle faces south. This side stretches about five hundred miles. The second side bears towards Spain and the west, in which direction lies Ireland, smaller by one half, as it is thought, than Britain; the sea-passage is of equal length to that from Gaul to Britain. Here in mid-channel is an island called Man; in addition, several smaller islands are supposed to lie close to land, as touching which some have written that in midwinter night there lasts for thirty whole days. We could discover nothing about this by inquiries; but, by exact water measurements, we observed that the nights were shorter than on the Continent. The length of this side, according to the belief of the natives, is seven hundred miles. The third side bears northwards, and has no land confronting it; the angle, however, of that side faces on the way towards Germany. The side is supposed to be eight hundred miles long. Thus the whole island is two thousand miles in circumference.

[14] Of all the Britons the inhabitants of Kent, an entirely maritime district, are by far the most civilised, differing but little from the

Gallic manner of life. Of the inlanders most do not sow corn, but live on milk and flesh and clothe themselves in skins. All the Britons, indeed, dye themselves with woad, which produces a blue colour, and makes their appearance in battle more terrible. They wear long hair, and shave every part of the body save the head and the upper lip. Groups of ten or twelve men have wives together in common, and particularly brothers along with brothers, and fathers with sons; but the children born of the unions are reckoned to belong to the particular house to which the maiden was first conducted.

[15] The horsemen and charioteers of the enemy engaged in fierce conflict with our cavalry on the march, with the result, however, that our troops proved their superiority in all respects, and drove them into the woods and highlands; but, pursuing too eagerly after slaying several of the enemy, they lost some of their own number. After an interval, however, when our troops were off their guard and engaged in entrenching the camp, the enemy suddenly dashed out from the woods, and charging the detachments on outpost duty in advance of the camp, they fought fiercely. And though Caesar sent up two cohorts in support — and those the first cohorts of two legions — and two detachments had taken post with a very slight interval between them, the enemy most gallantly broke through in the middle (as our troops were disconcerted by the novel kind of fighting), and retired safely from the field. On that day a tribune, Quintus Laberius Durus, was killed. The enemy were driven back when more cohorts had been sent up.

[16] The action took place in front of the camp and under the eyes of all; and it was clear that in all such fighting our infantry, by reason of their heavy armament, since they could neither pursue a retiring enemy nor venture far from the standards, were but poorly fitted for

an enemy of this kind. It was clear, again, that our cavalry fought with great risk, because the enemy often retired of deliberate purpose, and, when they had separated our horse a little from the legions, leapt down from their chariots and fought on foot to our disadvantage. Their cavalry tactics, however, threatened us with exactly the same danger in retirement or pursuit. Add to this that the enemy never fought in close array, but in small parties with wide intervals; and had detachments posted at regular stations, so that one party covered another in turn, and fresh, unspent warriors took the place of the battle-weary.

[17] Next day the enemy took post on the hills, at a distance from the camp, and began to show themselves in small parties and to assail our horsemen, though more feebly than on the day before. But at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions and all the cavalry with Gaius Trebonius, the lieutenant-general, to get forage, the enemy swooped suddenly from all directions upon the foraging parties, with such vigour that they did not stop short of the legions drawn up for battle. Our troops charged them fiercely and drove them back, and did not bring the pursuit to an end until the cavalry, relying on the support of the legions they saw behind them, drove the enemy headlong and slew a great number of them, giving them no chance to rally or stand fast, nor to leap down from their chariots. After this rout the succours which had assembled from all quarters took their departure; and never afterwards did the enemy engage us at their full strength.

[18] Having obtained knowledge of their plans, Caesar led his army into the borders of Cassivellaunus as far as the river Thames, which can be crossed at one place only on foot, and that with difficulty. When he was come thither he remarked that on the other bank of the

river a great force of the enemy was drawn up. The bank was fortified with a fringe of sharp projecting stakes, and stakes of the same kind fixed under water were concealed by the stream. When he had learnt these details from prisoners and deserters, Caesar sent the cavalry in advance and ordered the legions to follow up instantly. But the troops moved with such speed and such spirit, although they had only their heads above water, that the enemy could not withstand the assault of legions and cavalry, but abandoned the banks and betook themselves to flight.

[19] When Cassivellaunus, as above set forth, had relinquished all hope of a struggle, and disbanded the greater part of his force, with the remainder — about four thousand charioteers — he kept our marches under observation, and, withdrawing a little from the route, concealed himself in entangled positions among the woods. In whatever districts he had learnt that we intended to march he drove all cattle and human beings from the fields into the woods; then, whenever our cavalry dashed out over the fields to plunder and devastate more freely, he sent out charioteers from the woods by every road and path, engaging our cavalry to their great danger, and preventing them by the fear thus caused from ranging farther afield. The only course left to Caesar was to allow no party to remove very far from the main column of the legions, and to do as much harm to the enemy in laying waste the fields and in conflagrations as the marching powers of the legionaries could accomplish.

[20] In the meantime the Trinobantes, the strongest state, perhaps, in those parts — the state from which young Mandubracius, in quest of the protection of Caesar, had come to him on the mainland of Gaul: his own father had held the kingship in the state, but had been slain by Cassivellaunus, when he himself had escaped death by flight

— sent deputies to Caesar, promising to surrender to him and to do his commands, and beseeching him to protect Mandubracius from outrage at the hands of Cassivellaunus, and to send him to their state as ruler and sovereign lord. Caesar required of them forty hostages, and corn for the army, and sent Mandubracius to them. They speedily did his commands, and sent hostages to the number required, and corn.

[21] When the Trinobantes had been placed under protection and secured from all outrage at the hands of the troops, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi sent deputations and surrendered to Caesar. From them he learnt that the stronghold of Cassivellaunus was not far from thence, fenced by woods and marshes; and that he had assembled there a considerable quantity of men and cattle. Now the Britons call it a stronghold when they have fortified a thick-set woodland with rampart and trench, and thither it is their custom to collect, to avoid a hostile inroad. For this spot Caesar now started with the legions: he found it thoroughly fortified by nature and by handiwork, but none the less he made a vigorous assault from two sides. The enemy tarried for a space, but did not stand the assault of our troops, and broke away from another side of the stronghold. A great quantity of cattle was found there; and many of the enemy were caught in the act of fleeing and put to death.

[22] While these events were proceeding thereabout, Cassivellaunus sent messages to Kent, a country by the sea, as above set forth, over whose four districts Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax ruled as kings, and commanded them to collect all their forces for a sudden attempt and assault upon the naval camp. But when they were come to the camp the Romans made a sortie and slew many of them, capturing also Lugotorix, a

commander of noble station; and then withdrew the detachment without loss. Upon report of this engagement Cassivellaunus was constrained, by the numerous defeats he had suffered, by the devastation of his borders, and chiefly by his alarm at the revolt of the states, to send deputies to Caesar and treat for peace, by the help of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar had determined to winter on the Continent, in view of sudden commotions in Gaul; and as he had little of the summer left, and was aware that it might easily be spun out to no purpose, he made requisition of hostages, and determined what tribute Britain should pay yearly to Rome. He straitly charged Cassivellaunus to do no hurt to Mandubracius or the Trinobantes.

[23] As soon as the hostages were received he led the army back to the sea, and found the ships repaired. When they had been launched he decided, as he had a great number of prisoners, and some ships had perished in the storm, to convey the army back by two journeys. And eventually, of all that number of ships and in all those voyages, not a single ship carrying troops in this or the previous year was missing. But of the ships sent back empty to him from the Continent — both those which had disembarked troops on the first journey, and the second fleet which Labienus had caused to be built, to the number of sixty — very few made the rendezvous; almost all the rest were driven back. Caesar waited some time for these in vain; then, fearing he might be precluded from sailing by the season, as the equinox was nigh at hand, he packed the troops of necessity more closely together; a complete calm ensued, and he weighed anchor at the beginning of the second watch, and at dawn touched land and brought all the ships safely to port.

[24] The ships were beached, and a council of the Gauls was held at Samarobriua (Amiens). Then, as the corn-crop had been scantier

that year in Gaul on account of droughts, Caesar was forced to dispose the army in winter quarters in a different fashion from that of previous years, distributing the legions over a larger number of states. One of the legions he gave to Gaius Fabius, the lieutenant-general, to be led into the country of the Morini, a second to Quintus Cicero for the Nervii, a third to Lucius Roscius for the Esubii; a fourth, with Titus Labienus in command, he ordered to winter among the Remi on the border of the Treveri. There he stationed among the Belgae: in command of them he set Marcus Crassus, the quartermaster-general, and Lucius Munatius Plancus and Gaius Trebonius, lieutenant-generals. One legion, the most recently enrolled north of the Po, with five cohorts, he sent into the country of the Eburones, of which the chief part lies between the Meuse and the Rhine; the tribe was under the rule of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. He ordered Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, lieutenant-generals, to command those detachments. With the legions distributed after this fashion, he supposed that he could easiest remedy any shortage of corn-supply. And yet the winter quarters of all the legions, save that which he had assigned to Lucius Roscius to be led into the most quiet and peaceful district, were within a range of one hundred miles. He himself meanwhile determined to wait in Gaul until he should have information that the legions were at their stations and the cantonments entrenched.

[25] There was among the Carnutes one Tasgetius, a man of the highest lineage, whose ancestors had held the kingship in their state. To him, in consideration for his character and his goodwill towards himself — for in all the campaigns he had profited by his remarkable energy — Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors. He had now reigned for two years and more, when his enemies, with the

open approval of many persons in the state, put him to death. The matter was reported to Caesar, who, apprehending — as a considerable number of persons were concerned — that the state might revolt at the prompting of the regicides, ordered Lucius Plancus to move speedily with his legion from Belgium far into the country of the Carnutes and there to winter, and to seize and send to him the person by whose instrumentality he knew that Tasgetius had been put to death. Meanwhile he received information from all the lieutenant-generals and the quartermaster-general, to whom he had assigned the legions, that winter quarters had been reached and each station duly entrenched for the same.

[26] In about a fortnight after the troops had moved into winter quarters, disorder and revolt suddenly began. It originated with Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, who, after attending Sabinus and Cotta upon the borders of their kingdom, and bringing in corn^o to the cantonments, were induced by messages from Indutiomarus of the Treveri to stir up their own folk. They overwhelmed of a sudden the detachments gathering wood, and with a large force came to assault the camp. Our troops speedily took up arms and mounted the rampart; and a party of Spanish horse sent out on one flank secured us the advantage in a cavalry engagement, upon which the enemy, despairing of success, withdrew their men from the assault. Then, according to their national usage, they called loudly for some one of our number to go forth for a parley, affirming that they had something to say for the interest of both parties, whereby they trusted to be able to reduce the matters in dispute.

[27] Gaius Arpineius, a Roman knight, a friend of Quintus Titurius, and Quintus Junius, a Spaniard, who had previously been accustomed to go to and fro upon Caesar's errands to Ambiorix,

were sent to them for the purpose of a parley. Before them Ambiorix spake as follows. He admitted that he was very greatly indebted to Caesar for his good offices towards himself; for it was by Caesar's instrumentality that he had been set free from the tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to his neighbours the Aduatuci, and by Caesar's action that a son and a nephew, sent to the Aduatuci as hostages, and kept in their country in slavery and bondage, had been sent back to him. He declared that his action in assaulting the camp had been the result, not of judgment or intention on his part, but of compulsion on the part of his state; and that the conditions of his own sovereignty were such that the people had as much authority over him as he himself over the people. The state, moreover, had gone to war because it had not been able to resist the sudden conspiracy of the Gauls. He could easily prove that by the insignificance of his own position; for he was not so ignorant of affairs as to believe that by his own forces the Roman people could be overcome. No, there was common consent among the Gauls: this was the day appointed for assaulting all the cantonments of Caesar, so that one legion might not be able to come to the support of another. It would not have been easy for Gauls to refuse Gauls, especially when they considered that the design they had entered on was for the recovery of their common freedom. And now, having satisfied the Gauls as far as the claim of his country required, he had regard to his duty in response to the good offices of Caesar; and he warned, he prayed Titurius, as in private duty bound, to take measures for his own and his soldiers' safety. A great company of Germans had been hired, and had crossed the Rhine; in two days it would be at hand. It was for the Romans themselves to consider whether they would choose to bring the troops out of cantonments

before neighbours could know of it, and to march them either to Cicero or to Labienus, one of whom was about fifty miles from them, the other a little farther. He promised them, and confirmed it with an oath, that he would grant them safe passage through his borders. In so doing, he said, he was consulting the interests of his state, by relieving it of the burden of cantonments, and was making a return to Caesar according to his merits. After delivering this address Ambiorix departed.

[28] Arpineius and Junius reported what they heard to the lieutenant-generals. The latter were alarmed by the sudden news, and, though the statement was made by an enemy, they nevertheless considered that it must not be disregarded. One thing especially stirred their anxiety — it was scarcely credible that the Eburones, an undistinguished and insignificant state, had dared of their own motion to make war on Rome. They accordingly submitted the question to a council of war, and a great dispute arose among them. Lucius Aurunculeius, with several tribunes and centurions of the first grade, thought that nothing should be done rashly, and no departure from winter quarters made without Caesar's order. They sought to show that even German forces, no matter how numerous, could be withstood by entrenched cantonments; there was proof of it in the fact that they had most gallantly withstood the first charge of the enemy, and had actually dealt them many wounds. They were not hard pressed for corn; meanwhile reinforcements would reach them alike from the nearest cantonments and from Caesar. In fine, what was more senseless or more discreditable than to take the advice of an enemy in deciding supreme issues?

[29] Against this Titurius vociferated that it would be too late to act when larger bodies of the enemy, with Germans in addition, had

come up, or when some disaster had been experienced in the cantonments next their own. There was short time, he said, for deliberation. He believed that Caesar had started for Italy; otherwise the Carnutes would not have conceived the design of murdering Tasgetius, nor, with Caesar present, would the Eburones now have come against the camp with so profound a contempt for us. He had regard, not to the suggestion of the enemy, but to fact. The Rhine was close at hand; the Germans were highly indignant at the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories; Gaul was incensed at all the insults experienced since it was brought in subjection to the authority of Rome, and at the extinction of its earlier renown in war. In fine, who could persuade himself that Ambiorix had engaged in such a design without sure cause? His own view made for safety in either event: if nothing very serious occurred, they would reach the next legion without danger; if the whole of Gaul were at one with the Germans, the sole chance of safety lay in speedy action. And to what was the plan of Cotta, and those who disagreed with himself, to lead? There might be no present danger in it, but there was certainly famine to fear from a prolonged siege.

[30] After this discussion of the alternatives Cotta and the senior centurions vehemently opposed Sabinus, who exclaimed — and with a louder voice than usual, so that a great number of the soldiers might hear— “Have your way, if you please. I am not the man to feel the most serious alarm of any of you at the danger of death. The troops will understand. If anything very serious comes to pass, they will require an account from yourself; for, if you allowed them, they would by the day after to-morrow have joined forces with the nearest cantonments, and would abide the event of war along with the rest, instead of perishing by sword or famine, far removed and isolated

from their comrades.”

[31] The council rose, and the officers laid hold on the two generals and prayed them not utterly to endanger the issue by their own obstinacy in disagreement. There was no difficulty, whether they stayed or marched, if only all shared and approved one plan; in disagreement, on the contrary, they saw no safety. The matter continued in dispute till midnight. At last Cotta was induced to yield, and the view of Sabinus prevailed. It was announced that the troops would march at dawn. The rest of the night was spent without sleep, for each soldier was looking over his effects, to see what he could carry with him, and what part of the winter equipment he must needs leave. They thought of any and every plea to prove that it must be dangerous to remain, and that the danger would be increased by the exhaustion of the troops in long watches. At dawn they marched forth from camp, as men persuaded that counsel had been given them not by an enemy, but by Ambiorix, a devoted friend; the column was very lengthy, and the baggage very heavy.

[32] When the enemy felt sure, by the noise and watchfulness of the night, that the Romans meant to march out, they posted a double ambush in the woods, in a convenient and covert spot about two miles away; and there they awaited the coming of the Romans. When the greater part of the column had descended into a big ravine, they showed themselves suddenly on either flank of the same, and sought to harass the rearguard, to prevent the vanguard from climbing the ascent, and to engage on ground the most unfavourable for our troops.

[33] Then indeed, as he had anticipated nothing, Titurius was alarmed: he ran hither and thither posting cohorts, yet even this he did in timid fashion and with all judgment evidently gone, as

generally happens when men are forced to decide in the moment of action. Cotta, however, as he had thought this might happen on the march, and for that reason had opposed departure, neglected nothing for the safety of the force: in addressing and encouraging the troops he did his duty as a commander, in action his duty as a soldier. When by reason of the length of the column the generals found it too hard to control everything in their own person, and to provide for the action necessary at each point, they ordered to pass the word along the line to abandon the baggage and form square. This plan, though not reprehensible in an emergency, had an unfortunate result; for it diminished the hope of our own troops and made the enemy keener for the fight, since the movement could not but betray the greatest apprehension and despair. Moreover, it was an inevitable consequence that on all sides soldiers were deserting their standards, while each of them hastened to seek and to seize from the baggage-train all that he accounted dearest. So everything was a confusion of shouting and weeping.

[34] But the natives were not lacking in resource. Their leaders ordered the command to be given along the line that no one was to leave his rank, that the booty was theirs, and whatsoever the Romans abandoned was to be reserved for them; wherefore they must think that all depended on victory. The enemy were our equals in valour and in fighting zeal. Our troops, though deserted by their commander and by fortune, still set all hope of safety in valour; and as often as each cohort dashed forward a great number of the enemy would fall in that quarter. Noticing this, Ambiorix ordered the command to be given that his men should discharge their missiles at long range and not approach too near, and give way where the Romans made a charge, for that by reason of the lightness of their armament and their

daily training no harm could be done to them, and when the enemy retired upon their standards they were to pursue in their turn.

[35] This instruction they most carefully observed. When any cohort left the square and made a charge the enemy would run back with great rapidity. Meanwhile that detachment was of necessity uncovered, and a discharge of missiles was received upon its exposed flank. And when they sought to return back to the position from which they had started, they were like to be surrounded both by those who had given way and by those who had the nearest station. If, on the other hand, they were fain to hold their ground, there was no room left for valour, and in close array they could not avoid the missiles discharged by so great a host. Yet, handicapped by all these disadvantages, and with many men wounded, they stood firm; and though a great part of the day was so spent, for the battle lasted from dawn till the eighth hour, they did nothing unworthy of themselves. At this point Titus Balventius, a gallant man of great influence, who in the previous year had commanded the first century, had both thighs pierced by a dart; Quintus Lucanius, of the same rank, was killed fighting most bravely to succour a son who had been surrounded; Lucius Cotta, the lieutenant-general, as he cheered on all the cohorts and centuries, was hit full in the face by a sling-bullet.

[36] Alarmed by these events, Quintus Titurius, who had remarked Ambiorix at a distance encouraging his men, sent his interpreter, Gnaeus Pompeius, to him to ask him to spare himself and his troops. Ambiorix replied to the appeal that, if Titurius wished to parley with him, he was at liberty so to do; he hoped that he could prevail on his host to save the soldiers alive; to Titurius himself certainly no harm would be done, and thereto he pledged his own word. Titurius communicated with the wounded Cotta to see if he agreed to

withdraw with him from the fight and parley with Ambiorix, stating that he hoped he might prevail on him to save themselves and the troops. Cotta refused to go to an armed enemy, and persisted in the refusal.

[37] Sabinus ordered all the tribunes and the senior centurions he had about him at the time to follow him; and when he was come quite near to Ambiorix, and was ordered to cast away his arms, he obeyed the command and commanded his party to do the same. While they two were discussing the terms together, and Ambiorix was purposely making a longer speech than necessary, Titurius was gradually surrounded and slain. Then at once they shouted victory after their own fashion, and, with a loud yell, charged our troops and threw the ranks into confusion. There Lucius Cotta was killed fighting, with the greatest part of the troops. The remainder retired to the camp from which they had marched out. One of them, the standard-bearer Lucius Petrosidius, hard pressed by a great host of the enemy, flung his eagle within the rampart, and was himself cut down, fighting most gallantly, before the camp. The others scarcely kept off the assault till nightfall; in the night, despairing of deliverance, they slew one another to a man. A few who had slipped away from the battle made their way by uncertain paths through the woods to the cantonments of Titus Labienus, the lieutenant-general, and informed him of what had happened.

[38] Elated by this victory, Ambiorix at once set out with his cavalry for the country of the Aduatuci, which lay next to his kingdom; he marched without a break, for a night and a day, ordering his infantry to follow after him. Having reported the battle and aroused the Aduatuci, he came the next day into the territory of the Nervii, and exhorted them not to let slip the chance of winning

freedom for all time and of taking vengeance on the Romans for the outrages they had suffered. He made it clear that two lieutenant-generals had been slain and the great part of an army destroyed; that it was not a difficult business to fall suddenly upon the legion which was wintering with Cicero and cut it to pieces; and he offered his own assistance to that end. With this speech he easily persuaded the Nervii.

[39] Accordingly messengers were at once despatched to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, the Geidumni, all of whom were under the sovereignty of the Nervii; they raised companies as large as they could, and of a sudden swooped upon the winter quarters of Cicero, who had not yet received report of the death of Titurius. In Cicero's case also it happened, as was inevitable, that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods to get timber for entrenching were cut off by the sudden arrival of the enemy's horsemen. They were surrounded; and then in a huge mass the Eburones, the Nervii, the Aduatuci, and the allies and dependents of them all, began the assault upon the legion. Our troops speedily ran to arms and mounted the rampart. Scarcely for that day could they hold out, because the enemy were putting all their hope in despatch, believing that if they won this victory they would be victorious right through.

[40] Despatches were at once sent by Cicero to Caesar, with promise of great rewards if the bearers carried them safe; but all the roads were blocked, and the messengers were cut off. During the night about one hundred and twenty towers were run up with incredible speed out of the timber which had been collected for the purpose of the entrenchment, and all apparent deficiencies in the earthworks were rectified. On the next day the enemy assaulted the

camp with a far larger force which they had assembled, and filled in the trench. Our troops resisted in the same fashion as on the day before. And exactly the same was done on the other days following. For not a moment of the night season was there a break in the work; no chance of rest was given to sick or wounded. All that was needed against the next day's assault was made ready in the night: quantities of stakes fired at the end, a great number of pikes for wall-fighting were got ready; the towers were raised stage by stage, battlements and breastworks of hurdles were attached to them. Cicero himself, though he was in very frail health, left himself not even the night season for rest, until at last he was actually forced to spare himself by the protests of the soldiers, who crowded about him.

[41] Then the leaders and chiefs of the Nervii who had some plea of friendship to give them access to conversation with Cicero said that they desired to parley. When the opportunity was given them they recounted the same arguments which Ambiorix had used with Titurius. All Gaul, they said, was in arms; the Germans had crossed the Rhine; the winter stations of Caesar and the rest were being assaulted. They told further of the death of Sabinus; they pointed to Ambiorix in order to inspire credit. "You are wrong," they said, "to hope for any security from others who are themselves in desperate case; our own feeling, however, towards Cicero and Rome is to refuse nothing except winter quartering, for we are unwilling that this practice should become established. So far as we are concerned, you have liberty to depart safe from your winter quarters, and to march off without fear in what soever direction you please." To this Cicero made one remark only in reply: that it was not the practice of Rome to accept terms from an enemy in arms; if they would lay down their arms, they might use his good offices and send deputies to Caesar; he

hoped that, having regard to the justice of Caesar, they would obtain their petition.

[42] Foiled of this hope, the Nervii encompassed the station with a rampart nine feet high and a trench fifteen feet wide. These expedients they had learnt from us in the intercourse of previous years, and they were further instructed by prisoners from the army whom they kept in secret; but, having no supply of the tools suitable for this purpose, they were striving to cut sods round with swords, and lifting out earth with hands and cloaks. And this circumstance made it possible to ascertain the number of their host; for in less than three hours they completed an entrenchment fifteen miles in circumference, and on the days that followed they set about their preparations, making towers to suit the height of the rampart, grappling-hooks, and shelters, under the instruction of the prisoners aforesaid.

[43] On the seventh day of the siege-operations a very strong wind arose, and they began to sling red-hot bullets of softened clay and to hurl blazing darts on to the huts, which in Gallic fashion had been thatched with straw. These speedily caught fire, which the strength of the wind carried to every corner of the camp. With a huge shout, as though victory were already won and assured, the enemy began to move up their towers and shelters, and to mount the rampart with scaling-ladders. Yet so great was the valour of the troops, and such their presence of mind, that, although they were everywhere scorched by the flame and harassed by the vast multitude of missiles, and understood that all their own baggage and all their possessions were ablaze, not only did no man leave the rampart to withdraw from the fight, but scarcely a man even looked behind him, and all at that time fought with the greatest zeal and gallantry. This day was by far the

most serious for our troops, with the result, however, that a greater number of the enemy were wounded and slain than on any other day, as they had pressed right up to the very rampart, the rear giving no chance of retirement to the van. When the flames had abated somewhat, in one place a tower was moved up to touch the rampart: whereupon the centurions of the third cohort withdrew from their station and moved back all their men, and then began to invite the enemy by signs and shouts, in case they should desire to come in; but not one of them durst advance. Then they were dislodged by volleys of stones from every side, and the tower was set on fire.

[44] In that legion there were two most gallant centurions, now not far from the first class of their rank, Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus. They had continual quarrels together which was to stand first, and every year they struggled in fierce rivalry for the chief posts. One of them, Pullo, when the fight was fiercest by the entrenchments, said: "Why hesitate, Vorenus? Or what chance of proving your pluck do you wait for? This day shall decide our quarrels." So saying, he stepped outside the entrenchments, and dashed upon the section of the enemy which seemed to be in closest array. Neither did Vorenus keep within the rampart, but in fear of what all men would think he followed hard. Then, at short range, Pullo sent his pike at the enemy, and pierced one man as he ran forward from the host. When he was struck senseless the enemy sought to cover him with their shields, and discharged their spears in a volley at the foeman, giving him no chance of retirement. Pullo's shield was penetrated, and a dart was lodged in his belt. This accident threw his scabbard out of place, and delayed his right hand as he tried to draw his sword, and while he was in difficulty the enemy surrounded him. His enemy, Vorenus, ran up to him and helped him in his distress. Upon him at once all the

host turned, and left Pullo, supposing him to be slain by the dart. Vorenius plied his sword at close quarters, and by slaying one man drove off the rest a little; while he pressed on too eagerly he fell down headlong into a dip in the ground. He was surrounded in his turn, but Pullo brought assistance; and both, unhurt, though they had slain several men, retired with the utmost glory within the entrenchments. In the eagerness of their rivalry fortune so handled the two that, for all their mutual hostility, the one helped and saved the other, and it was impossible to decide which should be considered the better man in valour.

[45] The more serious and burdensome the siege-operations each day became — and chiefly because, with a great part of the soldiers overcome by wounds, the burden had fallen on a small number of defenders — the more frequent were the despatches and messengers sent to Caesar. Part of these latter were captured and put to death with torture in sight of our own troops. There was a Nervian in the camp, named Vertico, born to an honourable estate, who at the very beginning of the blockade had fled to Cicero for refuge, and had since proved his loyalty to him. He persuaded a slave by the hope of freedom and by great rewards to deliver a despatch to Caesar. The man carried forth the despatch bound on a javelin, and moving, all unsuspected, as a Gaul among Gauls, he made his way to Caesar. It was he who brought the information about the dangers of Cicero and the legion.

[46] Caesar received the despatch about the eleventh hour of the day, and at once sent a messenger into the country of the Bellovaci to Marcus Crassus, the quartermaster-general, whose winter quarters were twenty-five miles away from him; he bade the legion start at midnight and come speedily to him. Crassus marched out on receipt

of the message. Another envoy was sent to Gaius Fabius, the lieutenant-general, bidding him bring his legion into the borders of the Atrebates, through which Caesar knew he himself would have to march. He wrote instructions to Labienus to come with his legion as far as the borders of the Nervii, if he could so do without damage to the public service. For the rest of the army he did not think he ought to wait, because it was somewhat too far away; he assembled about four hundred horse from the nearest cantonments.

[47] About the third hour the advanced parties informed him of the approach of Crassus, and he moved forward twenty miles that day. He put Crassus in charge of Samarobriva, and assigned him a legion, because he purposed to leave there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, the public documents, and all the corn which he had brought in thither to last through the winter. Fabius and his legion, as ordered, after a brief delay met him on the march. Labienus learnt of the death of Sabinus and the slaughter of the cohorts; but as all the forces of the Treveri were come against him he feared that, if he started to march from his cantonments with the appearance of flight, he would not be able to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, especially as he knew them to be elated by the recent victory. He accordingly sent back a despatch to Caesar explaining the greatness of the danger if he were to bring the legion out of cantonments. He wrote in detail of the operation in the territory of the Eburones, and he informed him that all the horsemen and footmen of the Treveri had stationed themselves three miles from his own camp.

[48] Caesar approved his conclusion, although he was thereby disappointed in his expectation of obtaining three legions, and reduced to two; none the less, he still regarded speed as the only

means to the general safety, and proceeded by forced marches into the borders of the Nervii. There he learnt from prisoners what was taking place at Cicero's station, and how dangerous was his case. Then he persuaded one of the Gallic troopers with great rewards to deliver a letter to Cicero. The letter he sent written in Greek characters, lest by intercepting it the enemy might get to know of our designs. The messenger was instructed, if he could not approach, to hurl a spear, with the letter fastened to the thong, inside the entrenchment of the camp. In the despatch he wrote that he had started with the legions and would speedily be with him, and he exhorted Cicero to maintain his old courage. Fearing danger, the Gaul discharged the spear, as he had been instructed. By chance it stuck fast in the tower, and for two days was not noticed by our troops; on the third day it was sighted by a soldier, taken down, and delivered to Cicero. He read it through, and then recited it at a parade of the troops, bringing the greatest rejoicing to all. Soon the smoke of the fires was to be seen in the distance, and this banished all doubt about the arrival of the legions.

[49] The Gauls were informed of it by their scouts, and, relinquishing the blockade, they pressed on to meet Caesar with all their forces. These amounted to some sixty thousand men under arms. When a chance offered, Cicero again asked Vertico, whom we mentioned above, for a Gaul to deliver a despatch to Caesar. He warned the man to make his way cautiously and carefully. He wrote explicitly in the despatch that the enemy had departed from him and that the whole host had turned round to meet Caesar. The despatch was brought in about midnight; Caesar informed his troops thereof, and encouraged them for the fight. At dawn next day he struck camp, and, having advanced about four miles, he caught sight of the

enemy's host across a valley and a stream. It was a very dangerous thing for so slender a force to fight on unfavourable ground; further, as he knew that Cicero was freed from blockade, he was without anxiety, and thought that he should abate his speed. He halted, therefore, and proceeded to entrench his camp in the most favourable position to be found; and small as was the camp itself, as it was for scarce seven thousand men, and those, too, without baggage, he nevertheless compressed it by narrowing the streets as much as possible, with the object of incurring the utmost contempt on the part of the enemy. Meanwhile, by scouts despatched in all directions, he sought to find the most convenient route by which to cross the valley.

[50] On that day petty encounters of cavalry took place by the water, but both armies kept to their own ground — the Gauls because they were waiting for larger forces which had not yet joined them; Caesar, to see if by pretending fear he could draw the enemy on to his own ground, and fight on this side of the valley, in front of the camp, or, if he might not do so, that, after reconnaissance of the routes, he might cross valley and stream with less danger. At break of day the enemy's horsemen came up to the camp and engaged our own cavalry. Caesar purposely ordered the cavalry to give way and to retire into camp; at the same time he ordered the camp to be fortified with a higher rampart on all sides, the gates to be barricaded, and as much confusion and pretence of fear as possible to be shown in the execution of these arrangements.

[51] All these proceedings tempted the enemy to lead their forces across and to form line on unfavourable ground; and then, as our troops had been withdrawn even from the rampart, they approached nearer and discharged their missiles from all sides into the entrenchment. Next they sent heralds round about, and ordered

proclamation to be made that if anyone, Gaul or Roman, would go over to their side before the third hour, he was at liberty to do so without danger; after that time there would be no chance. And, indeed, they held our troops in such contempt that, thinking they could not break in by the gates, which had been barricaded for show with single rows of sods, some of them set to work to tear down the rampart with their hands, others to fill in the trenches. Then Caesar caused a sally to be made from all the gates, and sending out the cavalry put the enemy speedily to flight, so effectually that never a man stood to fight. He slew a great number of them and stripped all of their arms.

[52] He feared to pursue very far, because there were woods and marshes in the way, and, as he saw, there was no chance now of doing even slight damage to the enemy; therefore, with his whole force unhurt, he joined Cicero the same day. He marvelled at the towers erected, the shelters, the fortifications of the enemy. He paraded the legion and found that not one-tenth of the soldiers were left unwounded. From all these evidences he could judge with what danger and with what courage the operations had been carried out. He warmly praised Cicero according to his desert, and the legion likewise; he addressed severally the centurions and tribunes, whose valour, on the testimony of Cicero, he knew to have been exceptional. As touching the disaster of Sabinus and Cotta, he learnt more particularly from prisoners. The next day he held a parade and set forth all that had occurred, cheering and encouraging the troops, and admonishing them to bear with the greater equanimity the loss incurred through the fault and foolhardiness of a general, inasmuch as by the goodness of the immortal gods and by their own valour the misfortune had been made good, leaving to the enemy no lasting joy,

to themselves no long-enduring grief.

[53] Meanwhile report of Caesar's victory was brought to Labienus with incredible speed through the agency of the Remi. In fact, though Labienus was about sixty miles away from Cicero's cantonments, and Caesar had not reached the latter until after the ninth hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of Labienus' camp, to signify the victory and to express the congratulations of the Remi to Labienus. When the same report was brought to the Treveri, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack Labienus' camp next day, fled away in the night and withdrew all his forces into the country of the Treveri. Caesar sent Fabius with his legion back into cantonments, and determined to winter himself with three legions in three separate stations around Samarobriva; and in view of the great disturbances which had arisen in Gaul, he decided to remain with the army in person throughout the winter. For when news was brought of Sabinus' great disaster almost all the states of Gaul began to think of war, despatching messengers and deputations in all directions to find out what the others purposed and where the war should start, and holding nightly councils in solitary places. And scarcely a moment the whole winter through passed without anxiety for Caesar, without the receipt of some message concerning the projected rising of the Gauls. Among other news he was informed by Lucius Roscius, whom he had put in command of the Thirteenth Legion, that a large force of Gauls, from the states called Armoric, had assembled to attack him and had stationed themselves not farther than eight miles from his cantonments; but that upon receiving report of Caesar's victory they had departed so hastily that their departure seemed like unto flight.

[54] Nevertheless, Caesar summoned to his quarters the chief men

of each state; and by frightening some with the announcement that he knew what was afoot, and by encouraging others, he kept a great part of Gaul in submission. The Senones, however, a state of prominent power and great authority among the Gauls, took counsel together and attempted to slay Cavarinus, whom Caesar had appointed king among them, and whose brother Moritasgus had held the kingship at the time of Caesar's arrival in Gaul, and his ancestors before him. Cavarinus got wind of their design and escaped. They pursued him even to the boundaries and drove him out of kingship and home, and then sent deputies to Caesar to make excuse; but they did not obey his command that all their senate should come to him. Indeed, the fact that they had found men to take the lead in a war of offence had so much weight among the natives, and brought about such a universal change of feeling, that, save the Aedui and the Remi, whom Caesar always held in especial honour — the former for their old-established and unbroken loyalty towards Rome, the latter for their recent services in the Gallic war — scarcely a single state was free from suspicion on our part. And I am inclined to think that this is not so very remarkable, chiefly, among several other reasons, because this nation, which at one time surpassed all others in military courage, was grievously indignant to have lost so much of that estimation as to submit to the sovereignty of the Roman people.

[55] So the Treveri and Indutiomarus, without intermission throughout the course of the winter, sent deputies across the Rhine, inviting the states, promising sums of money, and affirming that, as a great part of our army had been slain, a much smaller part was left. But still none of the German states could be persuaded to cross the Rhine: they had tried it twice, they said, in the war of Ariovistus and the passage of the Tencteri, and they would not tempt fortune further.

Though disappointed in this hope, Indutiomarus none the less set to work to raise forces, to train them, to procure horses from his neighbours, and to attract to his standard by great rewards exiles and condemned persons throughout Gaul. And, indeed, by such means, he had already secured himself so great an authority in Gaul that deputations hastened to him from every direction, seeking favour and friendship for their states or for themselves.

[56] When he perceived that they were coming to him of their own motion, that on the one hand the Senones and Carnutes were spurred on by the sense of guilt, on the other the Nervii and the Aduatuci were preparing for war against the Romans, and that he would not lack forces of volunteers if he began to advance from out his own borders, he proclaimed an armed convention. This in the practice of the Gauls marks the beginning of a war; and by a general law all grown men are accustomed to assemble at it in arms, while the one who comes last to the assembly is put to death with every kind of torture in sight of the host. At the convention Indutiomarus declared Cingetorix an enemy and confiscated his goods. Cingetorix was his son-in-law, the chief man of the other party, who, as set forth above, had sought the protection of Caesar and had not deserted him. This business despatched, Indutiomarus declared in the convention that he had been summoned by the Senones, the Carnutes, and several other Gallic states, and that he proposed to march to them through the borders of the Remi, laying waste their lands, and before so doing to attack the camp of Labienus. He gave instructions as to what he would have done.

[57] Labienus, secure as he was in a camp well fortified by natural position and by handiwork, had no apprehension of danger to himself and his legion; his purpose was to lose no chance of a successful

operation. And so, having learnt from Cingetorix and his kinsfolk the speech which Indutiomarus had made in the convention, he sent messengers to the neighbouring states and called up cavalry from all quarters, appointing them a certain day for assembly. Meanwhile, almost every day, Indutiomarus, with all his horsemen, would range close to his camp, sometimes to reconnoitre the situation thereof, sometimes to parley or to intimidate; and generally all the horsemen would discharge missiles within the rampart. Labienus kept his troops within the entrenchment, and sought by all means in his power to enhance the impression that he was afraid.

[58] Indutiomarus continued to come up to the camp with daily increasing contempt; but in one night Labienus brought inside the cavalry of all the neighbouring states, which he had caused to be summoned, and by means of guards he kept all his troops so carefully inside camp that the fact could by no means be disclosed or reported to the Treveri. Meanwhile, in accordance with his daily custom, Indutiomarus came up to the camp and spent there a great part of the day; his horsemen discharged missiles, and with great insolence of language called our troops out to fight. No reply was given by our men; and towards evening, when it seemed good, the Gauls began to depart, dispersing in disorder. Suddenly from two gates Labienus launched forth all his cavalry; he straitly charged them that when they had once frightened the enemy and sent them flying (foreseeing exactly what would, and did, happen), they should all make for Indutiomarus alone, and no one was to wound any until he saw the chieftain slain, as Labienus did not wish that delay over the rest might give him time to escape. He offered great rewards to those who should kill him, and sent up cohorts to support the horse. The event approved his plan, and as all the force were making for

one man they caught Indutiomarus just in the ford of the river, slew him, and brought his head back to camp; during their return the cavalry chased and killed all they could. On learning of this all the forces of the Eburones and Nervii which had assembled departed, and thereafter Caesar found Gaul somewhat more tranquil.

BOOK VI

[1] For many reasons Caesar anticipated a more serious rising in Gaul; and he decided to raise a levy through the agency of Marcus Silanus, Gaius Antistius Reginus, and Titus Sextius, lieutenant-generals. At the same time he made request of Gnaeus Pompeius, now proconsul, that as he was remaining near Rome for the service of the state while retaining his military authority, he would order the recruits from Cisalpine Gaul sworn in by him as consul to join the colours and start for Caesar's headquarters. He conceived it to be of great importance, for the future as well as for the present, to create an impression in Gaul that the resources of Italy were extensive enough not only to repair in a short time any damage incurred in the war, but even to increase the establishment. Pompey made the concession to public service and private friendship, and as Caesar speedily completed the levy through his staff officers, before the winter was over three legions had been formed and brought to headquarters. Having thereby doubled the number of the cohorts lost with Quintus Titurius, he showed the Gauls, at once by his rapidity and by the strength of his reinforcements, what the system and resources of the Roman people could accomplish.

[2] After Indutiomarus was slain, as we have set forth, the Treveri tendered the chief command to his kindred, who were continuing to tempt the neighbouring Germans and to promise money. As they could not prevail on their immediate neighbours they made trial of the more distant; and, having found some states to their mind, they took an oath to confirm their engagement, and hostages to secure the money; and they associated Ambiorix with themselves by a league and covenant. Caesar had report of this, and saw preparations for war

on every hand: the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, and all the Germans on this side of the Rhine with them, were in arms; the Senones came not at his command, as they were conspiring with the Carnutes and adjacent states; the Germans were being tempted by frequent deputations of the Treveri. He felt, therefore, that he must plan an earlier campaign than usual.

[3] Accordingly, before the winter was ended, he concentrated the four nearest legions; he made a sudden and rapid advance into the borders of the Nervii, and before they could assemble or escape he had captured a great number of cattle and human beings; and giving up such booty to the troops, and laying waste the fields, he compelled the natives to come in and surrender and to give him hostages. That business speedily despatched, he led the legions back into the cantonments. At the beginning of spring a convention of Gaul was proclaimed, according to his practice. The arrival of all except the Senones, Carnutes, and Treveri made him think this exception the beginning of an armed rebellion; and to give the impression that he counted all else of secondary importance, he removed the convention to Lutetia, a town of the Parisii. (These were next neighbours to the Senones, and in the previous generation had formed one state with them; but it was believed that they had held aloof from the present design.) This decision having been proclaimed from the tribunal, on the same day he set off with the legions against the Senones, and reached their territory by forced marches.

[4] Upon report of his coming, Acco, who had been the leader in the plot aforesaid, commanded the population to assemble in their strongholds. They tried to do so; but before it could be brought to pass news came that the Romans were at hand. Of necessity they abandoned the project, and sent deputies to Caesar to entreat his

clemency, approaching him through the Aedui, the protectors of their state from ancient times. Caesar willingly granted pardon and accepted their plea at the instance of the Aedui; for he held that summer was the time for the coming war, not for judicial inquiry. He requisitioned one hundred hostages, and delivered the same to the Aedui for custody. The Carnutes also sent deputies and hostages to his camp, employing the Remi, whose vassals they were, to entreat for them, and received the same replies. Caesar closed the convention, and made requisition of cavalry upon the states.

[5] So this part of Gaul was brought to peace, and he applied himself with all his heart and soul to the war with the Treveri and Ambiorix. He commanded Cavarinus and the horsemen of the Senones to move with him, so as to prevent the occurrence of any commotion in the state as the result of his hot temper or of the enmity which he had earned. Then, having so arranged these matters, since he was convinced that Ambiorix would not fight a decisive action, he began to examine what other courses were left him. There were the Menapii, near the borders of the Eburones, defended by continuous marshes and forests; and they alone in Gaul had never sent deputies to Caesar to treat of peace. He knew that Ambiorix had a formal friendship with them; he had learnt also that through the Treveri they had made friends with the Germans. He considered that these supports should be withdrawn from Ambiorix before he provoked him to hostilities; otherwise, in despair of deliverance, he might hide among the Menapii, or be obliged to make common cause with the tribes beyond the Rhine. Adopting this plan, then, he despatched the baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the territory of the Treveri, and commanded two legions to begin the march to him, while he himself with five legions in light order began

to march against the Menapii. They had raised no force, but, relying only on the protection of the country, fled all into the forests and marshes, and gathered their stuff there also.

[6] Caesar divided his forces with Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, and Marcus Crassus, quartermaster-general; and after causeways had been speedily constructed he approached in three divisions, setting fire to farm-buildings and hamlets, and seizing a large number of cattle and human beings. This action obliged the Menapii to send deputies to him to seek for peace. He accepted their hostages, and assured them that he would regard them as enemies if they received either Ambiorix or his deputies within their borders. When these matters had been securely settled Caesar left Commius, of the Atrebates, with cavalry in the country of the Menapii by way of guard, and he himself set off against the Treveri.

[7] While Caesar was thus engaged, the Treveri collected a large force of infantry and cavalry, and prepared to attack Labienus and the one legion which had wintered within their borders. And by now they were no farther from him than a two days' march, when they learnt that two legions were come, as despatched by Caesar. So they pitched their camp at a distance of fifteen miles, and determined to await their German auxiliaries. Labienus learnt the design of the enemy, and in the hope that their recklessness would afford some chance of engaging them, he left a guard of five cohorts for the baggage, and set off against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large detachment of cavalry. He entrenched a camp at an interval of one mile. Between Labienus and the enemy was a steep-banked river, difficult to cross. He had no intention of crossing this himself, nor did he suppose that the enemy would cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was increasing daily. Labienus declared openly in a

council of war that, as the Germans were said to be approaching, he would not risk his own and his army's fortunes, and that he would strike camp at dawn next day. This information was speedily carried to the enemy, for of a large number of Gallic horsemen natural feeling would compel some, as Gauls, to favour the Gallic cause. At nightfall Labienus summoned the military tribunes and the senior centurions, and propounded his plan; and, the more easily to give the enemy a suspicion that he was afraid, he ordered the camp to be struck with greater noise and disorder than was customary among Romans. By this means he made his departure like a rout. The camps were so close that this, too, was reported to the enemy by scouts before daybreak.

[8] The rear of the column had scarcely moved clear of the entrenchment when the Gauls with mutual exhortations not to let slip from their grasp the booty for which they hoped — it would be tedious, they said, to wait for German assistance when the Romans were terror-stricken; and it was intolerable to their honour not to venture an attack with so large a force upon so puny a company, especially in the moment of its retreat and embarrassment — proceeded to cross the river without hesitation and to engage on unfavourable ground. Labienus had surmised that this would happen, and to entice them all to his side of the river he pretended to march as before, and calmly continued his advance. He sent the baggage a little forward and packed it on some rising ground. Then said he: "Soldiers, you have the catch you have sought; you hold the enemy on ground that hampers and handicaps them: display under our command the same valour that you have often displayed to the commander-in-chief, and think that he is present and beholds this action with his own eyes." At the same moment he commanded the

troops to wheel towards the enemy and deploy into line, and, detaching a few troops of cavalry to act as baggage-guard, he disposed the rest of the cavalry on the flanks. Speedily our troops raised a shout and hurled their pikes at the enemy. When these unexpectedly saw men whom they believed to be in retreat advancing against them in attack formation, they could not even sustain the assault, and at the first charge they were put to rout and sought the nearest woods. Labienus chased them with the cavalry, slew a great number, took a good many prisoners, and a few days later received the allegiance of the state. Nor was this surprising, for the Germans who were coming to its assistance returned home when they heard of the rout of the Treveri; and the kinsfolk of Indutiomarus, who had initiated the revolt, followed them out of the state. The prerogative of chieftaincy was delivered to Cingetorix, who, as we have shown, had remained loyal from the beginning.

[9] After he had passed from the territory of the Menapii to that of the Treveri, Caesar decided for two reasons to cross the Rhine. One reason was that the German tribes had sent auxiliaries to the Treveri against them; the other, to prevent Ambiorix from having a chance of retreating to them. This decision made, he set about to build a bridge a little above the place where he had crossed before with his army. The plan of it was known and definite; and, thanks to the great zeal of the troops, the work was accomplished in a few days. He left a strong guard at the bridge-head in the territory of the Treveri, to prevent the outbreak of any sudden commotion on their part, and led the rest of his forces across with the cavalry. The Ubii had given hostages before and made their surrender, and now, to clear themselves, they sent deputies to him to inform him that no auxiliaries had been despatched from their state to the territory of the

Treveri, and that they had not broken faith. They begged and prayed him to spare them, so that in a general hatred of the Germans the innocent might not be punished for the guilty: if he wished for more hostages, they promised to give them. Caesar heard their case, and ascertained that the auxiliaries had been despatched by the Suebi: he accepted the plea of the Ubii, and began to inquire about lines of advance into the country of the Suebi.

[10] After a few days' interval he was informed by the Ubii that the Suebi were collecting all their forces into one place and proclaiming to the tribes under their dominion that they must send auxiliaries of foot and horse. Upon report of this, he made provision for the corn^o-supply and selected a suitable spot for the camp. He commanded the Ubii to bring in their cattle and to collect all their stuff from the fields into the strongholds, hoping that lack of provisions might act upon untrained natives and oblige them to fight at a disadvantage. He instructed them to send a number of scouting parties into the country of the Suebi and to ascertain their movements. The Ubii carried out his commands, and reported after a few days' interval. The Suebi, they said, after more definite accounts of the Roman army came to them, had all withdrawn, with all the forces of their own folk and of their allies which they had collected, to the uttermost parts of their territory. There was, they added, a forest there of immense size, called Bacenis: it extended a long way into the country and interposed as a natural wall to keep the Cherusci from raids and outrages on the part of the Suebi, and the Suebi likewise from the Cherusci. At the edge of the forest the Suebi had determined to await the coming of the Romans.

[11] Since I have arrived at this point, it would seem to be not inappropriate to set forth the customs of Gaul and of Germany, and

the difference between these nations. In Gaul, not only in every state and every canton and district, but almost in each several household, there are parties; and the leaders of the parties are men who in the judgment of their fellows are deemed to have the highest authority, men to whose decision and judgment the supreme issue of all cases and counsels may be referred. And this seems to have been an ordinance from ancient days, to the end that no man of the people should lack assistance against a more powerful neighbour; for each man refuses to allow his own folk to be oppressed and defrauded, since otherwise he has no authority among them. The same principle holds in regard to Gaul as a whole taken together; for the whole body of states is divided into two parties.

[12] When Caesar arrived in Gaul the leaders of one party were the Aedui, of the other the Sequani. The latter, being by themselves inferior in strength — since the highest authority from ancient times rested with the Aedui, and their dependencies were extensive — had made Ariovistus and the Germans their friends, and with great sacrifices and promises had brought them to their side. Then, by several successful engagements and the slaughter of all the Aeduan nobility, they had so far established their predominance as to transfer a great part of the dependents from the Aedui to themselves, receiving from them as hostages the children of their chief men, compelling them as a state to swear that they would entertain no design against the Sequani, occupying a part of the neighbouring territory which they had seized by force, and securing the chieftaincy of all Gaul. This was the necessity which had compelled Diviciacus to set forth on a journey to the Senate at Rome for the purpose of seeking aid; but he had returned without achieving the object. By the arrival of Caesar a change of affairs was brought about. Their hosts

were restored to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored, and new ones secured through Caesar's efforts (as those who had joined in friendly relations with them found that they enjoyed a better condition and a fairer rule), and their influence and position were increased in all other respects: in result whereof the Sequani had lost the chieftaincy. To their place the Remi had succeeded; and as it was perceived that they had equal influence with Caesar, the tribes which, by reason of ancient animosities, could in no wise join the Aedui were delivering themselves as dependents to the Remi. These tribes the Remi carefully protected, and by this means they sought to maintain their new and suddenly acquired authority. The state of things then at the time in question was that the Aedui were regarded as by far the chief state, while the Remi held the second place in importance.

[13] Throughout Gaul there are two classes of persons of definite account and dignity. As for the common folk, they are treated almost as slaves, venturing naught of themselves, never taken into counsel. The more part of them, oppressed as they are either by debt, or by the heavy weight of tribute, or by the wrongdoing of the more powerful men, commit themselves in slavery to the nobles, who have, in fact, the same rights over them as masters over slaves. Of the two classes above mentioned one consists of Druids, the other of knights. The former are concerned with divine worship, the due performance of sacrifices, public and private, and the interpretation of ritual questions: a great number of young men gather about them for the sake of instruction and hold them in great honour. In fact, it is they who decide in almost all disputes, public and private; and if any crime has been committed, or murder done, or there is any dispute about succession or boundaries, they also decide it, determining

rewards and penalties: if any person or people does not abide by their decision, they ban such from sacrifice, which is their heaviest penalty. Those that are so banned are reckoned as impious and criminal; all men move out of their path and shun their approach and conversation, for fear they may get some harm from their contact, and no justice is done if they seek it, no distinction falls to their share. Of all these Druids one is chief, who has the highest authority among them. At his death, either any other that is preëminent in position succeeds, or, if there be several of equal standing, they strive for the primacy by the vote of the Druids, or sometimes even with armed force. These Druids, at a certain time of the year, meet within the borders of the Carnutes, whose territory is reckoned as the centre of all Gaul, and sit in conclave in a consecrated spot. Thither assemble from every side all that have disputes, and they obey the decisions and judgments of the Druids. It is believed that their rule of life was discovered in Britain and transferred thence to Gaul; and to-day those who would study the subject more accurately journey, as a rule, to Britain to learn it.

[14] The Druids usually hold aloof from war, and do not pay war-taxes with the rest; they are excused from military service and exempt from all liabilities. Tempted by these great rewards, many young men assemble of their own motion to receive their training; many are sent by parents and relatives. Report says that in the schools of the Druids they learn by heart a great number of verses, and therefore some persons remain twenty years under training. And they do not think it proper to commit these utterances to writing, although in almost all other matters, and in their public and private accounts, they make use of Greek letters. I believe that they have adopted the practice for two reasons — that they do not wish the rule

to become common property, nor those who learn the rule to rely on writing and so neglect the cultivation of the memory; and, in fact, it does usually happen that the assistance of writing tends to relax the diligence of the student and the action of the memory. The cardinal doctrine which they seek to teach is that souls do not die, but after death pass from one to another; and this belief, as the fear of death is thereby cast aside, they hold to be the greatest incentive to valour. Besides this, they have many discussions as touching the stars and their movement, the size of the universe and of the earth, the order of nature, the strength and the powers of the immortal gods, and hand down their lore to the young men.

[15] The other class are the knights. These, when there is occasion, upon the incidence of a war — and before Caesar's coming this would happen well-nigh every year, in the sense that they would either be making wanton attacks themselves or repelling such — are all engaged therein; and according to the importance of each of them in birth and resources, so is the number of liegemen and dependents that he has about him. This is the one form of influence and power known to them.

[16] The whole nation of the Gauls is greatly devoted to ritual observances, and for that reason those who are smitten with the more grievous maladies and who are engaged in the perils of battle either sacrifice human victims or vow to do so, employing the Druids as ministers for such sacrifices. They believe, in effect, that, unless for a man's life a man's life be paid, the majesty of the immortal gods may not be appeased; and in public, as in private, life they observe an ordinance of sacrifices of the same kind. Others use figures of immense size, whose limbs, woven out of twigs, they fill with living men and set on fire, and the men perish in a sheet of flame. They

believe that the execution of those who have been caught in the act of theft or robbery or some crime is more pleasing to the immortal gods; but when the supply of such fails they resort to the execution even of the innocent.

[17] Among the gods, they most worship Mercury. There are numerous images of him; they declare him the inventor of all arts, the guide for every road and journey, and they deem him to have the greatest influence for all money-making and traffic. After him they set Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva. Of these deities they have almost the same idea as all other nations: Apollo drives away diseases, Minerva supplies the first principles of arts and crafts, Jupiter holds the empire of heaven, Mars controls wars. To Mars, when they have determined on a decisive battle, they dedicate as a rule whatever spoil they may take. After a victory they sacrifice such living things as they have taken, and all the other effects they gather into one place. In many states heaps of such objects are to be seen piled up in hallowed spots, and it has and often happened that a man, in defiance of religious scruple, has dared to conceal such spoils in his house or to remove them from their place, and the most grievous punishment, with torture, is ordained for such an offence.

[18] The Gauls affirm that they are all descended from a common Father, Dis, and say that this is the tradition of the Druids. For that reason they determine all periods of time by the number, not of days, but of nights, and in their observance of birthdays and the beginnings of months and years day follows night. In the other ordinances of life the main difference between them and the rest of mankind is that they do not allow their own sons to approach them openly until they have grown to an age when they can bear the burden of military service, and they count it a disgrace for a son who is still in his boy

to take his place publicly in the presence of his father.

[19] The men, after making due reckoning, take from their own goods a sum of money equal to the dowry they have received from their wives and place it with the dowry. Of each such sum account is kept between them and the profits saved; whichever of the two survives receives the portion of both together with the profits of past years. Men have the power of life and death over their wives, as over their children; and when the father of a house, who is of distinguished birth, has died, his relatives assemble, and if there be anything suspicious about his death they make inquisition of his wives as they would of slaves, and if discovery is made they put them to death with fire and all manner of excruciating tortures. Their funerals, considering the civilization of Gaul, are magnificent and expensive. They cast into the fire everything, even living creatures, which they believe to have been dear to the departed during life, and but a short time before the present age, only a generation since, slaves and dependents known to have been beloved by their lords used to be burnt with them at the conclusion of the funeral formalities.

[20] Those states which are supposed to conduct their public administration to greater advantage have it prescribed by law that anyone who has learnt anything of public concern from his neighbours by rumour or report must bring the information to a magistrate and not impart it to anyone else; for it is recognised that oftentimes hasty and inexperienced men are terrified by false rumours, and so are driven to crime or to decide supreme issues. Magistrates conceal what they choose, and make known what they think proper for the public. Speech on state questions, except by means of an assembly, is not allowed.

[21] The Germans differ much from this manner of living. They have no Druids to regulate divine worship, no zeal for sacrifices. They reckon among the gods those only whom they see and by whose offices they are openly assisted — to wit, the Sun, the Fire-god, and the Moon; of the rest they have learnt not even by report. Their whole life is composed of hunting expeditions and military pursuits; from early boyhood they are zealous for toil and hardship. Those who remain longest in chastity win greatest praise among their kindred; some think that stature, some that strength and sinew are fortified thereby. Further, they deem it a most disgraceful thing to have had knowledge of a woman before the twentieth year; and there is no secrecy in the matter, for both sexes bathe in the rivers and wear skins or small cloaks of reindeer hide, leaving great part of the body bare.

[22] For agriculture they have no zeal, and the greater part of their food consists of milk, cheese, and flesh. No man has a definite quantity of land or estate of his own: the magistrates and chiefs every year assign to tribes and clans that have assembled together as much land and in such place as seems good to them, and compel the tenants after a year to pass on elsewhere. They adduce many reasons for that practice — the fear that they may be tempted by continuous association to substitute agriculture for their warrior zeal; that they may become zealous for the acquisition of broad territories, and so the more powerful may drive the lower sort from their holdings; that they may build with greater care to avoid the extremes of cold and heat; that some passion for money may arise to be the parent of parties and of quarrels. It is their aim to keep common people in contentment, when each man sees that his own wealth is equal to that of the most powerful.

[23] Their states account it the highest praise by devastating their borders to have areas of wilderness as wide as possible around them. They think it the true sign of valour when the neighbours are driven to retire from their lands and no man dares to settle near, and at the same time they believe they will be safer thereby, having removed all fear of a sudden inroad. When a state makes or resists aggressive war officers are chosen to direct the same, with the power of life and death. In time of peace there is no general officer of state, but the chiefs of districts and cantons do justice among their followers and settle disputes. Acts of brigandage committed outside the borders of their several states involve no disgrace; in fact, they affirm that such are committed in order to practise the young men and to diminish sloth. And when any of the chiefs has said in public assembly that he will be leader, "Let those who will follow declare it," then all who approve the cause and the man rise together to his service and promise their own assistance, and win the general praise of the people. Any of them who have not followed, after promise, are reckoned as deserters and traitors, and in all things afterwards trust is denied to them. They do not think it right to outrage a guest; men who have come to them for any cause they protect from mischief and regard as sacred; to them the houses of all are open, with them is food shared.

[24] Now there was a time in the past when the Gauls were superior in valour to the Germans and made aggressive war upon them, and because of the number of their people and the lack of land they sent colonies across the Rhine. And thus the most fertile places of Germany round the Hercynian forest (which I see was known by report to Eratosthenes and certain Greeks, who call it the Orcynian forest) were seized by the Volcae Tectosages, who settled there, and

the nation maintains itself to this day in these settlements, and enjoys the highest reputation for justice and for success in war. At the present time, since they abide in the same condition of want, poverty, and hardship as the Germans, they adopt the same kind of food and bodily training. Upon the Gauls, however, the neighbourhood of our provinces and acquaintance with oversea commodities lavishes many articles of use or luxury; little by little they have grown accustomed to defeat, and after being conquered in many battles they do not even compare themselves in point of valour with the Germans.

[25] The breadth of this Hercynian forest, above mentioned, is as much as a nine days' journey for an unencumbered person; for in no other fashion can it be determined, nor have they means to measure journeys. It begins in the borders of the Helvetii, the Nemetes, and the Rauraci, and, following the direct line of the river Danube, it extends to the borders of the Daci and the Anartes; thence it turns leftwards, through districts apart from the river, and by reason of its size touches the borders of many nations. There is no man in the Germany we know who can say that he has reached the edge of that forest, though he may have gone forward a sixty days' journey, or who has learnt in what place it begins. It is known that many kinds of wild beasts not seen in any other places breed therein, of which the following are those that differ most from the rest of the animal world and appear worthy of record.

[26] There is an ox shaped like a stag, from the middle of whose forehead between the ears stands forth a single horn, taller and straighter than the horns we know. From its top branches spread out just like open hands. The main features of female and of male are the same, the same the shape and the size of the horns.

[27] There are also elks so-called. Their shape and dappled skin are

like unto goats, but they are somewhat larger in size and have blunted horns. They have legs without nodes or joints, and they do not lie down to sleep, nor, if any shock has caused them to fall, can they raise or uplift themselves. Trees serve them as couches; they bear against them, and thus, leaning but a little, take their rest. When hunters mark by their tracks the spot to which they are wont to betake themselves, they either undermine all the trees in that spot at the roots or cut them so far through as to leave them just standing to outward appearance. When the elk lean against them after their fashion, their weight bears down the weakened trees and they themselves fall along with them.

[28] A third specie consists of the ure-oxen so-called. In size these are somewhat smaller than elephants; in appearance, colour, and shape they are as bulls. Great is their strength and great their speed, and they spare neither man nor beast once sighted. These the Germans slay zealously, by taking them in pits; by such work the young men harden themselves and by this kind of hunting train themselves, and those who have slain most of them bring the horns with them to a public place for a testimony thereof, and win great renown. But even if they are caught very young, the animals cannot be tamed or accustomed to human beings. In bulk, shape, and appearance their horns are very different from the horns of our own oxen. The natives collect them zealously and encase the edges with silver, and then at their grandest banquets use them as drinking-cups.

[29] When Caesar had ascertained through scouts of the Ubii that the Suebi had retired into the forests, he decided to advance no farther, fearing scarcity of corn,^o because, as above mentioned, all the Germans care naught for agriculture. At the same time, in order not to remove altogether from the natives the fear his return and to

delay their reinforcements, after he had withdrawn his army he broke up to the extent of two hundred feet the farthest section of the bridge which touched the banks of the Ubii, and at the end of the bridge he set a tower of four stories, posting a garrison of twelve cohorts to protect the bridge and strengthening the station with considerable fortifications. He set young Gaius Volcatius Tullus in command of the station and garrison, and himself moved on, as soon as the corn-crops began to ripen, through the forest of Ardennes, which is the largest in all Gaul and stretches from the banks of the Rhine and the borders of the Treveri to the country of the Nervii, extending lengthwise for more than five hundred miles, and he sent forward Lucius Minucius Basilus, with all the cavalry, to see if he could gain any advantage by speed of march and chance of opportunity. He instructed him to prevent the making of fires in camp in order to give no intimation from afar of his coming, and said that he himself would follow forthwith.

[30] Basilus did as he was commanded. He accomplished the march speedily, contrary, indeed, to the general expectation, and caught many persons in the fields off their guard. Their information led him to make for Ambiorix himself in the locality where he was reported to be with a few horsemen. In everything, and especially in warfare, great is the power of fortune. For just as it was by great good luck that he fell upon the chief himself actually off his guard and unprepared — in fact, his arrival was seen by everybody before any rumour or message thereof was brought — so likewise it was a great piece of fortune that, when all the military equipment he had about him had been captured, the carriages and horses seized, the chief himself should escape death. But this, too, came to pass because, the building being surrounded by forest, as the dwellings of

the Gauls usually are — for to avoid the heat they generally seek the neighbourhood of woods and rivers — his companions and friends in so confined a place held off the attack of our cavalry for a short time. While they fought, one of his followers set him on a horse, and the woods covered his flight. Thus both in his exposure to danger and in his escape therefrom the influence of fortune was great.

[31] It is doubtful whether it was of set purpose that Ambiorix did not assemble his forces, thinking that he ought not to fight a decisive action, or whether he had no chance of so doing because he was prevented by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, believing that the rest of the army was following close behind. But certain it is that he despatched messengers in different directions through the fields with the order that each man should take thought for himself. Part of them escaped into the forest of Ardennes, part into the long stretches of morass; those who were nearest the Ocean hid themselves in the islands which the tides are accustomed to form; many left their own borders and entrusted themselves and all their stuff to utter strangers. Catuvolcus, king of half the Eburones, who had shared the project of Ambiorix, was old and worn, and, finding that he could not endure the effort of war or flight, cursed Ambiorix by all his gods for suggesting such a project, and hanged himself to a yew-tree, of which there is great plenty in Gaul and Germany.

[32] The Segni and Condrusi, who are of the nation and number of the Germans and have their abode betwixt the Eburones and the Treveri, sent envoys to Caesar to beg him not to count them among his enemies, nor to consider that there was common cause among all the Germans on the Roman side of the Rhine. They pleaded that they had had no idea of war, had sent no auxiliaries for Ambiorix. Caesar investigated the matter by examination of prisoners, and commanded

that if any of the Eburones should have repaired to them in their flight they should be brought back to him; he said that if they did this he would not do violence to their territories. Then, dividing his forces into three parts, he concentrated the baggage of all the legions at Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort situated almost in the middle of the territory of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had stationed themselves to written; and Caesar approved of the position on general grounds, and particularly because the fortifications of the previous year remained intact, in order thereby to lighten the labour of the troops. To guard the baggage he left the Fourteenth Legion, one of the three latest enrolled which he had brought over from Italy. He put Quintus Tullius Cicero in command of the legion and camp, and attached two hundred cavalry to his force.

[33] Having divided the army, he ordered Titus Labienus to proceed with three legions towards the districts which touch the Menapii; Gaius Trebonius with an equal number of legions to devastate the region which adjoins the Aduatuci; and he determined to march himself with the remaining three to the river Scheldt, which flows into the Meuse, and to the uttermost parts of the Ardennes, whither he heard Ambiorix had started with a few horsemen. As he departed he guaranteed that he would return, after an interval of seven days, on the day by which he knew that the corn-ration was due for the legion left in garrison. He urged Labienus and Trebonius, if they could do so without danger to the commonwealth, to return by the same day, in order that they might again take counsel together, examine the tactics of the enemy, and so be able to start the campaign afresh.

[34] As above mentioned, there was nowhere any definite body of troops, any stronghold, any garrison to defend itself in arms; but the

population was scattered in all directions. Each man had settled where a hidden valley or a wooded locality or an entangled morass offered some hope of defence or security. These localities were known to the dwellers round about, and thus the matter required great care, not for the protection of the army as a whole (for no danger could occur to united bodies from individuals scared and scattered), but for the preservation of single soldiers, although this latter consideration affected to some degree the safety of the army. For the passion for plunder was apt to draw many men too far afield, and at the same time the woods forbade the advance of any close-formed body along the hidden and uncertain tracks. If Caesar wished to finish off the business and to make away with a brood of malefactors, he must needs send several bands in different directions and move his troops at wide intervals; if he wished to keep the companies with the standards, as the established rule and custom of the Roman army required, the locality itself gave protection to the natives, and individuals among them lacked not the daring to lay secret ambush and surround scattered detachments. Considering these particular difficulties, all precaution that carefulness could take was taken; and Caesar preferred to forgo some chance of doing harm, although the spirit of every man was burning for vengeance, rather than to do harm with some damage to the troops. He sent messengers round to the neighbouring states and invited them all, in the hope of booty, to join him in pillaging the Eburones, so that he might hazard the lives of the Gauls among the woods rather than the soldiers of the legions, and at the same time, by surrounding it with a large host, destroy the stock and name of the tribe in requital for its horrid crime. A great number assembled speedily from every side.

[35] These operations were being carried out in all parts of the

Eburones' country, and the seventh day drew nigh, by which Caesar had determined to return to the baggage and the legion. Herein it has been possible to note how great is power of fortune in war, and how great the chances she brings in her train. The enemy were scared and scattered, as we have mentioned, and there was no body of troops that could suggest the slightest occasion for alarm. Across the Rhine the report reached the Germans that the Eburones were being pillaged; nay, more — that all were invited to come and plunder. Two thousand horsemen were collected by the Sugambri, who live nearest the Rhine, and, as we set forth above, had received the Tencteri and the Usipetes after their flight. On boats and rafts they crossed the Rhine thirty miles below the spot where the bridge had been built and a garrison left by Caesar; and, coming first to the borders of the Eburones, they caught many persons scattered in flight, and captured a great quantity of cattle, of which barbarians are very covetous. They were tempted by plunder to proceed further. No march, no woods check these children of war and brigandage. From prisoners they inquire in what district Caesar is; they find that he has gone on some distance, they learn that all his army is departed. And then one of their prisoners said: "Why do you pursue this miserable and slender booty, when you now have the chance of the utmost fortune? In three hours you may come to Aduatuca; in that spot the Roman army has concentrated all its stores; the garrison is so small that it cannot even man the wall, and no one dares to step outside the entrenchments." With this hope offered them, the Germans left in a secret place the plunder they had got and made for Aduatuca, using as a guide the very man by whose information they had learnt the news.

[36] For all the previous days Cicero, in obedience to Caesar's

instructions, had most carefully confined his troops to camp, allowing not even a single camp-follower to pass beyond the entrenchment. On the seventh day he did not feel sure that Caesar would keep his word as touching the number of days, as he heard that he had advanced further, and no report about his return was brought in. At the same time he was influenced by the remarks of those who called his patience almost a siege, since no leave to pass out of camp was given; and he did not anticipate any turn of fortune such as, with nine legions and a very large force of cavalry to confront a scattered and almost obliterated enemy, could cause disaster within the distance of three miles. He therefore sent five cohorts to get corn in the nearest fields, between which and the camp but a single hill interposed. Several men of the legions had been left behind sick, and those of them who had recovered during the intervening days, to the number of some three hundred, were sent together under a flag; and, besides, a great host of camp-followers got leave to follow with a great number of pack-animals which had remained in the camp.

[37] Just at this moment, as it chanced, the German horsemen came on the scene, and immediately, at the same speed as had brought them thither, essayed to burst into camp at the main gate. There was a screen of woods on that side, so that they were not seen before they drew near the camp, so much so that the traders encamped close under the rampart had no chance of retreating. Our troops, not expecting them, were thrown into confusion by the surprise, and the cohort on guard scarcely stood the first attack. The enemy poured round the other faces of the camp to see if they could find an entry. Our troops with difficulty defended the gates; all other chances of entrance were prevented by the nature of the place itself and by the

entrenchment. There was confusion throughout the camp, and one sought from another the cause of the uproar; no one had a care to which point the companies were to move or in what quarter each man was to assemble. One declared that the camp was already taken, another insisted that the barbarians were come victorious from the destruction of the army and the commander-in-chief, and the majority pictured to themselves new superstitions because of the place and set before their eyes the disaster of Cotta and Titurius, who (as they remembered) fell in the same fort. Owing to the universal panic caused by such fears, the barbarians were confirmed in the belief that, as they had heard from the prisoner, there was no garrison inside. They strove to break through, exhorting one another not to let so good a chance slip from their hands.

[38] With the garrison there had been left behind, sick, a certain Publius Sextius Baculus, who has been mentioned by us in previous battles. He had now been five days without food, and, doubtful of his own and the general safety, he came forth from his tent unarmed. He saw that the enemy were threateningly close and that the issue was in the greatest danger; he took arms from the nearest men and stationed himself in the gate. He was followed by all the centurions of the cohort on guard, and together for a short space they bore the brunt of the battle. Sextius fainted after receiving severe wounds; with difficulty he was dragged from hand to hand into safety. In the respite thus given the rest took courage so far as to venture to their stations in the entrenchments and to afford a semblance of defence.

[39] Meanwhile, having finished corn-gathering, our troops heard the shouting; the cavalry sped forward, and learnt the great danger of the moment. But here was no entrenchment to receive the scared soldiers; lately enlisted, and unskilled in the practice of war, they

turned their faces with one accord to the tribunes and centurions, waiting to see what these would direct. No one was so brave as not to be confused by so unexpected a situation. The natives, on the other hand, catching sight of the standards at a distance, desisted from the assault; at first they supposed that the legions had returned, which, according to the information given by the prisoners, had gone farther afield; afterwards, despising the small numbers, they made a charge on every side.

[40] The camp-followers dashed forward to the nearest rise. They were speedily hurled down from thence, and ran headlong into the company formations, scaring the soldiers into greater alarm. Some of these proposed to form a wedge and break through speedily, as the camp was so near at hand, feeling confident that if some part were surrounded and slain, yet the remainder could be saved. Others proposed to take post on the ridge and all face the same risk together. This course was not approved by the veterans, who, as we have shown, marched out together under a flag. So they encouraged one another, and, led, by Gaius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been put in command of them, they broke through the midst of the enemy and came into camp all safe to a man. Close behind them in the same onrush came the camp-followers and the cavalry, who were saved by the valour of soldiers. But the party which had taken post on the ridge, still utterly untutored in the practice of war, had proved unable either to abide in the place they had approved and defend themselves on higher ground, or to imitate the vigour and the speed which they had seen to be of assistance to others; indeed, in the attempt to retire into camp they came down to unfavourable ground. Some of their centurions had been transferred, on account of valour, from the lower ranks of the other legion to the higher ranks of this;

and these, that they might not lose the renown for military prowess won in the past, fell, fighting most gallantly. Part of the soldiers, when the enemy had been thrust aside by the valour of the centurions, arrived, though they did not expect it, safe in camp; part were surrounded by the natives and perished.

[41] The Germans despaired of storming the camp, for they could see that our men had now taken post in the entrenchments; they therefore retired across the Rhine with the booty which they had secreted in the woods. And even after their departure so great was the fear of the enemy that the same night, when Gaius Volusenus, who had been sent on with the cavalry, reached the camp, he could not make the troops believe that Caesar was close at hand with his army unhurt. Terror had so completely seized their minds that they were almost crazy, declaring that after the destruction of all the forces the cavalry had escaped the rout, and insisting that if the army had been safe the Germans would not have attacked the camp. This terror was removed by the arrival of Caesar.

[42] When he returned, knowing well the accidents of war, he had but one complaint to make — that cohorts had been sent afield from outpost and garrison duty: he held that no room should have been left for even the slightest mischance, and that fortune had proved her power in the sudden arrival of the enemy — ay, and far more so, in that she had turned away the natives almost from the very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all these events the most remarkable seemed to be that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with the definite intention of devastating the territory of Ambiorix, by their descent on the Roman camp rendered Ambiorix the most acceptable service.

[43] Caesar marched forth again to harass the enemy, and,

collecting a great host from the neighbouring states, he sent them off in every direction. Every hamlet, every homestead that anyone could see was set on fire; captured cattle were driven from every spot; the corn-crops were not only being consumed by the vast host of pack-animals and human beings, but were laid flat in addition because of the rainy season, so that, even if any persons succeeded in hiding themselves for the moment, it seemed that they must perish for want of everything when the army was withdrawn. And with so large a force of cavalry scattered in every direction, it often came to pass that prisoners when taken were gazing about for Ambiorix, whom they had just seen in flight, and even insisting that he had not quite gone out of sight. The hope of catching the fugitive now offered to them inspired immense exertion, and the thought that they would win the highest favour with Caesar made their zeal almost more than human. Yet always it seemed that they had failed by a little to win supreme success, while Ambiorix stole away from covert or glade and, hidden by night, made for other districts or territories, with no more escort of horsemen than four troopers, to whom alone he durst entrust his life.

[44] When the districts had been devastated in such fashion, Caesar brought back the army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum, a city of the Remi; and, having summoned a convention of Gaul at that place, he determined to hold an inquisition touching the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes; and on Acco, the arch-conspirator, who had originated the plot, he pronounced a heavier sentence than usual, and executed punishment in our traditional fashion. Some persons feared trial and fled, and these he outlawed. Then he stationed two legions in cantonments on the borders of the Treveri, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at

Agedincum, in the territory of the Senones; and, having provided a corn-supply for the army, set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes.

BOOK VII

[1] When Gaul was quiet Caesar set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes. There he heard of the murder of Clodius; and having been informed of the Senate's decree that all the younger men of military age in Italy should be sworn in, he decided to hold a levy throughout his province. These events were speedily reported to Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls added to the reports a circumstance of their own invention, which the occasion seemed to require, that Caesar was detained by the commotion at Rome and, in view of discords so serious, could not come to the army. Such an opportunity served as a stimulus to those who even before were chafing at their subjection to the sovereignty of Rome, and they began with greater freedom and audacity to make plans for a campaign. The chiefs of Gaul summoned conventions by mutual arrangement in remote spots and complained of the death of Acco. They pointed out that his fate might fall next upon themselves; they expressed pity for the common lot of Gaul; by all manner of promises and rewards they called for men to start the campaign and at the risk of their own life to champion the liberty of Gaul. First and foremost, they said, they must devise means, before ever their secret designs got abroad, to shut Caesar off from the army. It was an easy task, because the legions would not dare to march out of cantonments in the absence of the commander-in-chief, nor could the latter without a strong escort reach the legions. Finally, it was better, they urged, to be slain in battle than to fail of recovering their old renown in war and the liberty which they had received from their forefathers.

[2] When these subjects had been discussed, the Carnutes declared that there was no hazard they refused for the general welfare, and

promised that they would be the first of all to make war; and, since in the present circumstances they could not give one another security by means of hostages, for fear the matter should get abroad, they asked for the sanction of an oath of honour before the assembled war-standards — the formality which represents their most solemn ritual — to make sure that after beginning the campaign they should not be abandoned by the rest. Thereupon all present praised the Carnutes with one accord and gave their oath, and after appointing a season for the enterprise departed.

[3] When the day came, the Carnutes, under the leadership of two desperate men, Cotuatus and Conconnetodumnus, rushed at a given signal on Cenabum, put to the sword the Roman citizens who had established themselves there for trading purposes — among them Gaius Fufius Cita, a Roman knight of distinction, who by Caesar's order was in charge of the corn^o-supply — and plundered their goods. Speedily the report thereof was carried to all the states of Gaul. As a matter of fact, whenever any event of greater note or importance occurs, the Gauls shout it abroad through fields and districts and then others take it up in turn and pass it on to their next neighbours; as happened on this occasion. For deeds done at Cenabum at sunrise were heard of before the end of the first watch in the borders of the Arverni, a distance of about one hundred and sixty miles.

[4] There in like fashion Vercingetorix, son of Celtillus, an Arvernian youth of supreme influence (whose father had held the chieftainship of all Gaul and consequently, because he aimed at the kingship, had been put to death by his state), summoned his own dependents and easily fired their spirit. Directly his design was known there was a general rush to arms. Gobannitio, his uncle, and

the rest of the chiefs, who did not think this adventure should be hazarded, sought to prevent him; he was cast out of the town of Gergovia, but he did not give up for all that; and in the fields he held a levy of beggars and outcasts. Then, having got together a body of this sort, he brought over to his own way of thinking all the members of his state whom he approached, urging them to take up arms for the sake of general liberty; and having collected large forces, he cast out of the state his opponents by whom he had been expelled a short time before. He was greeted as “King” by his followers. He sent out deputations in every direction, adjuring the tribesmen to remain loyal to him. He speedily added to his side the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turoni, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andi, and all the other maritime tribes; by consent of all, the command was bestowed upon him. In virtue of the power thus conferred he made requisition of hostages on all these states, and ordered a certain number of soldiers to be brought to him speedily; he determined what amount of arms, and by what date, each state should manufacture at home, and he paid especial attention to the cavalry. To the utmost care he added the utmost strictness of command, compelling waverers by severity of punishment. Indeed for the commission of a greater offence he put to death with fire and all manner of tortures; for a lesser case he sent a man home with his ears cut off or one eye gouged out, to point the moral to the rest and terrify others by the severity of the penalty.

[5] By enforcing punishments of this sort he speedily raised an army, and he despatched Lucterius, a Cadurcan of the utmost intrepidity, with a part of the forces into the land of the Ruteni, while he himself started forth against the Bituriges. At his coming the Bituriges sent envoys to the Aedui, in whose allegiance they were, to ask for succour, so as to enable them the easier to withstand the

enemy's forces. Acting on the advice of the deputies left by Caesar with the army, the Aedui sent a force of horse and foot to the support of the Bituriges. When they were come to the river Loire, which parts the Bituriges from the Aedui, they halted there for a few days; and, not venturing to cross the river, they returned home, and reported to the Roman deputies that their return was due to fear of treachery on the part of the Bituriges, who, they learnt, had planned that, if the Aedui crossed the river, they themselves should surround them on the one side, and the Arverni on the other. As we have no clear knowledge whether they acted as they did for the reason which they declared to the deputies, or from motives of treachery, it does not seem proper to state it as a certainty. Upon their departure the Bituriges at once joined the Arverni.

[6] When these matters were reported to Caesar in Italy, he had already received intelligence that affairs in Rome had been brought by the energy of Gnaeus Pompeius into a more satisfactory state, and he therefore set out for Transalpine Gaul. Upon arrival there he was confronted with a great difficulty, as to the means whereby he could reach the army. For if he should summon the legions to the Province, he realised that on the march they might have to fight an action without his presence; if, on the other hand, he himself pressed on to the army, he saw that it was a mistake to entrust his personal safety at that time even to the tribes which appeared to be at peace.

[7] Meanwhile Lucterius the Cadurcan, who had been sent into the country of the Ruteni, united that state with the Arverni. He then advanced into the land of the Nitiobriges and the Gabali, and received hostages from both tribes; and so, having collected a large force, he made an effort to overrun the Province in the direction of Narbo. On report of this Caesar thought that he should proceed to

Narbo in preference to any other plan. When he was come thither he put new strength into timorous hearts by posting garrisons among the Ruteni of the Province, the Volcae Arecomici, the Tolosates, and around Narbo — all localities adjacent to the enemy; and he ordered a part of the forces of the Province, and the supplementary levy which he had brought with him from Italy, to assemble in the territory of the Helvii, which touches the borders of the Arverni.

[8] By these measures of security Lucterius was checked and set back, for he deemed it dangerous to penetrate the line of garrisons; and so Caesar was free to proceed into the district of the Helvii. Now the range of the Cevennes, which parts the Arverni from the Helvii, in this the severest season of the year was likely to hinder the march with great depth of snow; however, he cleared away snow six feet deep and, having thus opened up the roads by a supreme effort of the troops, reached the borders of the Arverni. They were caught off their guard, for they thought themselves fortified by the Cevennes as by a wall, and not even a solitary traveller had ever found the paths open at that season of the year; and Caesar commanded the cavalry to extend on as broad a front and strike as much terror into the enemy as possible. Rumour and reports hereof were speedily brought to Vercingetorix, and all the Arverni gathered about him panic-stricken, beseeching him to have regard to their fortunes and not suffer them to be pillaged by the enemy, especially now that, as he saw, the whole war had been turned against them. He was prevailed upon by their prayers to move his camp from the country of the Bituriges towards that of the Arverni.

[9] Caesar, however, having anticipated that this would be the natural course of things for Vercingetorix, halted for two days in this locality; then he left the army on the pretext of assembling the

supplementary levy and the cavalry. He put young Brutus in command of the force here, instructing him to let his cavalry range the district in every direction on as broad a front as possible, and saying that he would endeavour to be away from the camp no longer than three days. Having set these matters in order, he reached Vienna by forced marches before his own army expected him. There he found the cavalry which he had sent on thither many days beforehand fit for action, and without a break in his march by day or night he pressed on through the country of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, where two legions were wintering — so speedily as to forestall even the possibility of any design of the Aedui on his own safety. Upon arrival at the station he sent word to the rest of the legions and concentrated them all in one place, or ever report of his coming could reach the Arverni. When he was informed of this, Vercingetorix led his army back again to the country of the Bituriges, and starting thence determined to assault Gorgobina, a stronghold of the Boii, whom, after their defeat in the battle against the Helvetii, Caesar had established there as dependents of the Aedui.

[10] This action of Vercingetorix caused Caesar great difficulty in forming his plan of campaign. If he were to keep the legions in one place for the rest of the winter, he was afraid that the reduction of the tributaries of the Aedui would be followed by a revolt of all Gaul, on the ground that Caesar was found to be no safeguard to his friends. If he were to bring the legions out of cantonments too soon, he was afraid that difficulties of transport would cause trouble with the corn^o-supply. However, it seemed preferable to endure any and every difficulty rather than to put up with so dire a disgrace and thus to alienate the sympathies of all his own adherents. Therefore he urged the Aedui to see to the transport of supplies, and sent men forward to

the Boii to apprise them of his own coming and urge them to remain loyal and courageously to withstand the attack of the enemy. Then, leaving two legions at Agedincum with the baggage-train of the whole army, he set off for the Boii.

[11] On the next day he came to Vellaunodunum, a stronghold of the Senones; and in order to leave no enemy in his rear, and so to expedite the corn-supply, he determined to assault the place, and in two days invested it. On the third day deputies were sent out of the town to treat for surrender, and Caesar ordered arms to be collected, pack-animals furnished, and six hundred hostages given. He left Gaius Trebonius, lieutenant-general, to carry out these orders. He himself, in order to end his march as soon as possible, started for Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes. The news of the siege of Vellaunodunum had been brought to them, and thinking that the business would be long drawn out, they were at this moment beginning to raise a garrison to be sent to Cenabum for the protection thereof. Caesar reached it in two days. He pitched his camp before the town, and as the hour of the day forbade further action he deferred the assault until the morrow. He commanded the troops to make ready the appliances required for the operation; and as the bridge over the river Loire was contiguous to the town of Cenabum, he ordered two legions to bivouac under arms, as he feared the inhabitants might escape from the town by night. A little before midnight the men of Cenabum moved out in silence from the town and began to cross the river. This was reported to Caesar by the scouts; and setting the gates on fire, he sent in the legions which he had ordered to be ready for action, and took possession of the town. Exceeding few of the enemy's total strength were lacking to make the capture complete, inasmuch as the narrowness of the bridge and

the roads had prevented the escape of the general population. He plundered and burnt the town, bestowed the booty on the troops, crossed the Loire with the army, and reached the borders of the Bituriges.

[12] As soon as he heard of Caesar's approach Vercingetorix abandoned the siege and started to meet him. Caesar, for his part, had determined to assault Noviodunum, a stronghold of the Bituriges stationed on his route. And as deputies came out to him from the place to entreat pardon for their faults and pity for their lives, he ordered arms to be collected, horses to be furnished, hostages to be given, with intent to complete the remainder of the business as speedily as he had accomplished the greater part thereof. Part of the hostages had already been handed over, and the other demands were in process of fulfilment, as some centurions and a few soldiers had been sent in to collect arms and animals, when the enemy's horsemen were sighted at a distance, the vanguard of the column of Vercingetorix. The moment the townsfolk caught sight of them and conceived a hope of assistance, they raised a shout and began to take up their arms, to shut the gates, and to man the wall. When the centurions in the town perceived by the demonstration on the part of the Gauls that some new design was afoot, they drew their swords, seized the gates, and withdrew all their parties in safety.

[13] Caesar ordered the cavalry to be brought out of camp, and engaged the cavalry of the enemy. When his own troops began to be distressed he sent in support some four hundred German horse, whom he had made a practice of keeping with him from the first. The Gauls could not resist their charge, and were put to flight, retiring to the main body with a loss of many men. At their discomfiture the townsfolk were once more panic-stricken, and seizing the persons by

whose efforts they supposed the populace had been roused, they brought them to Caesar and surrendered themselves to him. When this business had been despatched, Caesar moved off to the town of Avaricum, the largest and best fortified in the territory of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile district. He felt confident that by the recovery of that town he would bring the state of the Bituriges again into his power.

[14] Having experienced three continuous reverses — at Vellaunodunum, Cenabum, and Noviodunum — Vercingetorix summoned his followers to a convention. He pointed out that the campaign must be conducted in far different fashion from hitherto. By every possible means they must endeavour to prevent the Romans from obtaining forage and supplies. The task was easy, because the Gauls had an abundance of horsemen and were assisted by the season of the year. The forage could not be cut; the enemy must of necessity scatter to seek it from the homesteads; and all these detachments could be picked off daily by the horsemen. Moreover, for the sake of the common weal, the interests of private property must be disregarded; hamlets and homesteads must be burnt in every direction for such a distance from the route as the enemy seemed likely to penetrate in quest of forage. The Gauls had a supply of such necessities, because they were assisted by the resources of the tribes in whose territory the campaign was being carried on. The Romans would not endure scarcity, or else would advance farther from their camp at great risk; and it made no difference whether the Gauls killed them or stripped them of their baggage, the loss of which rendered the campaign impossible. Moreover, any towns which were not secure from all danger by fortification or natural position ought to be burnt, in order that they might not afford the Gauls a refuge for

the avoidance of service, nor offer the Romans a chance to carry off plunder and store of supplies. If these measures seemed grievous or cruel, they ought to take into account that it was far more grievous that their children and their wives should be dragged off into slavery, that they themselves should be slaughtered — the inevitable fate of the conquered.

[15] This view was approved by general consent, and in a single day more than twenty cities of the Bituriges were set on fire. The same was done in the other states, and in every direction fires were to be seen. And although it was a bitter pain to all to endure this, yet they set before themselves thus much of comfort, that they were confident of recovering their losses by a well-nigh assured victory. They deliberated in a general convention whether Avaricum should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges flung themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, entreating that they might not be compelled with their own hands to set light to almost the fairest city in all Gaul, the safeguard and the ornament of their state. They declared that they would easily defend themselves by its natural strength, for it was surrounded by river and marsh on almost every side, and had a single and a very narrow approach. Leave was granted to their petition: Vercingetorix at first argued against it, but afterwards yielded to the prayers of the tribesmen and to compassion for the multitude. Suitable defenders for the town were chosen.

[16] Vercingetorix followed after Caesar by shorter stages, and chose for his camp a place fenced by marshes and woods, about sixteen miles from Avaricum. There, by means of scouting parties appointed for each section of the day, he could keep himself informed of the operations about Avaricum, and give such orders as he desired. He kept all our foraging and corn^o-collecting parties

under observation, and when they were scattered, since they had of necessity to advance farther afield, he would attack them and inflict serious loss; at the same time our men took every precaution they could think of to counteract this, by moving at uncertain times and by different routes.

[17] Caesar pitched his camp on that side of the town which was unenclosed by the river and the marshes, and had, as above mentioned, a narrow approach. He began to prepare a ramp, to move up mantlets, to build two towers; for the nature of the locality precluded an investment. He did not cease to importune the Boii and the Aedui in the matter of the corn-supply; but the latter, with no zeal for the task, did not help much, and the former, having no great resources, because their state was small and feeble, speedily consumed what they had. So the army suffered from the utmost difficulty in its corn-supply, because of the indigence of the Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the homesteads — so much so that for several days the troops were without corn, and staved off the extremity of famine by driving in cattle from the more distant hamlets. Yet never a word was heard from their lips unworthy of the dignity of Rome and of their previous victories. Nay more, when Caesar addressed single legions at work, and declared that if the burden of scarcity were too bitter for them to bear he would raise the siege, one and all would beseech him not to do so. They had served, they said, for many years under his command without once incurring disgrace, without anywhere leaving a task unaccomplished; they would regard it in the nature of a disgrace if they relinquished the siege they had begun; it were better to endure any and every bitterness than to fail of avenging the Roman citizens who had perished at Cenabum by the treachery of the Gauls. They entrusted

messages in the same spirit to the centurions and tribunes, to be tendered to Caesar through them.

[18] By the time that the towers had come near to the wall, Caesar learnt from prisoners that Vercingetorix had exhausted his forage and moved his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was gone forward in person, with horsemen and the light troops that were accustomed to do battle among the horse, to set an ambush in the place whither he believed our troops would come next day to get forage. Having learnt this, Caesar marched in silence at midnight, and reached the enemy's camp in the morning. They had speedily learnt through their scouts of Caesar's coming, and having hidden away their wagons and baggage in the denser part of the woods, they drew up all their force on high, open ground. On report of this Caesar ordered packs to be speedily piled and arms got ready.

[19] There was a hill sloping generally from the base, and surrounded on almost every side by a difficult and troublesome marsh, not more than fifty feet across. On this hill, having broken up the causeways, the Gauls were established, with all confidence in the position; distributed according to their several nationalities, they held every ford and thicket by the marsh. They were resolved, if the Romans tried to burst through the marsh, to overwhelm them from the higher ground as they stuck fast. So anyone who remarked how near they were thought them prepared to fight to a finish in almost equal battle; but anyone who observed the inequality of the conditions recognised that they were displaying themselves in empty bravado. The troops were furious that the enemy were able to endure the sight of themselves at so brief an interval, and demanded the signal for action. But Caesar pointed out what great loss, in the death of so many gallant men, a victory must necessarily cost, and said

that, when he saw them resolved to refuse no risk that might win him renown, he deserved to be condemned for the uttermost injustice if he did not count their life dearer than his own welfare. Having thus pacified the troops, he led them back to camp the same day, and began to set in order everything else required for the siege of the town.

[20] When Vercingetorix returned to his followers, he was accused of treachery because he had moved the camp nearer to the Romans, because he had gone off with all the horse and had left so large a force without a commander, and because on his departure the Romans had come with such speed upon their opportunity. All these circumstances, they said, could not have happened by chance or without design; he preferred to possess the kingship of Gaul by the leave of Caesar rather than by favour of themselves. Accused in such sort, he replied to the charges. As for having moved the camp, it had been done, he said, actually at their own instance, through lack of forage; as for having gone nearer the Romans, he had been influenced by the advantage of a person which could protect itself by its own defences; further, the service of the horse should not have been needed on marshy ground, and it had been useful in the place to which they had marched. It was of purpose that he had committed the chief command to no one at his departure, for fear that his deputy might be driven by the zeal of the host to an engagement — an object for which he saw that all were zealous through weakness of spirit, because they could not longer endure hardship. If the appearance of the Romans on the scene had been due to chance, the Gauls had fortune to thank; if they had been summoned thither by some informer, the Gauls had that man to thank for the satisfaction of having been able to learn from their higher station the scantiness of

their numbers, and to despise a courage which had not ventured to fight but had retired disgracefully to camp. He had no need to obtain from Caesar by treachery a title of command which he could enjoy by a victory already assured to himself and all the Gauls. Nay more, he gave the title back to them if they thought that they were bestowing honour on him rather than deriving security from him. "That you may perceive," he continued, "the sincerity of this statement on my part, listen to Roman soldiers." He brought forward slaves whom he had caught foraging a few days before and had tortured with hunger and chains. These had been previously instructed what to state when questioned, and said that they were soldiers of the line; they had been induced by hunger and want to go secretly out of the camp, to see if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; the whole army was suffering from similar want, no man had any strength left, none could endure the strain of work, and therefore the commander-in-chief had decided, if they made no progress in the siege of the town, in three days to withdraw the army. "These," said Vercingetorix, "are the benefits you have from me, whom you accuse of treachery, by whose effort, without shedding of your own blood, you behold this great victorious army wasted with hunger; while it is I who have seen to it that, when it takes shelter in disgraceful flight, no state shall admit within its borders."

[21] The whole host shouted with one accord, and clashed their arms together in their peculiar fashion, as they always do for a man whose speech they approve. They declared that Vercingetorix was a consummate leader, that there could be no doubt of his loyalty, and that the campaign could not be conducted with greater intelligence. They decided that ten thousand men picked from the whole force should be sent into the town, and resolved that the common safety of

all must not be entrusted to the Bituriges alone, for they perceived that in keeping possession of the town rested almost the whole issue of victory.

[22] The matchless courage of our troops was met by all manner of contrivances on the part of the Gauls; for they are a nation possessed of remarkable ingenuity, and extremely apt to copy and carry out anything suggested to them. So now they sought to drag aside the grappling-hooks with nooses, and, when they had caught them, to pull them back inwards with windlasses; and they tried to under-cut the ramp by mines, the more scientifically because they have large iron-workings in their country, and every kind of mine is known and employed. Further, they had furnished the whole wall on every side with a superstructure of wooden turrets, and covered these over with hides. Then in frequent sallies by day and night they tried to set fire to the ramp or to attack the troops engaged in the works; and whatever increase was made in the height of our turrets by daily additions to the ramp, they equalised by joining fresh scaffolding to their own turrets, and tried to check the progress of our own mines where they opened up, and to prevent their approach to the walls by means of timbers hardened in the fire and sharpened, boiling pitch, and stones of a very great weight.

[23] All Gallic walls are, as a rule, of the following pattern. Balks are laid on the ground at equal intervals of two feet throughout the length of the wall and at right angles thereto. These are made fast on the inside and banked up with a quantity of earth, while the intervals above mentioned are stopped up on the front side with big stones. When these balks have been laid and clamped together a second course is added above, in such fashion that the same interval as before is kept, and the balks do not touch each other, but each is

tightly held at a like space apart by the interposition of single stones. So the whole structure is knit together stage by stage until the proper height of wall is completed. This work is not unsightly in appearance and variety, with alternate balks and stones which keep their proper courses in straight lines; and it is eminently suitable for the practical defence of cities, since the stone protects from fire and the timber from battery, for with continuous balks, generally forty feet long, made fast on the inside it can neither be breached nor pulled to pieces.

[24] All these circumstances impeded the siege; but though the troops were delayed throughout by cold and constant showers, still by continuous effort they overcame all these obstacles, and in twenty-five days they built a ramp three hundred and thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. This was almost touching the enemy's wall, and Caesar, according to his custom, bivouacked by the work, urging the troops not to leave off working even for a moment: when shortly before the third watch the ramp was observed to be smoking, for the enemy had set fire to it from a counter-mine. At the same moment a shout was raised all along the wall, and a sortie was made from two gates on either side of the Roman turrets. Others began at long range to hurl torches and dry wood from the wall on to the ramp, and to pour down pitch and everything else that can kindle a fire, so that it was scarcely possible to form an idea in which direction the troops should hasten first or to what point bring assistance. However, as by Caesar's standing order two legions were always in bivouac before the camp, and more, by a succession of reliefs, were engaged on the earthwork, it was speedily arranged that some troops should resist the sorties, while others dragged back the turrets and cut a gap in the ramp, and the whole host from the camp rushed up to extinguish the

fire.

[25] Even when the rest of the night was spent, there was fighting at every point, and ever the enemy's hope of victory was renewed — the more so because they saw that the breastworks of the turrets were burnt up, and observed that without cover it was not easy for the troops to advance in support; and ever, on their side, fresh men replaced the weary, and they believed that the deliverance of Gaul depended on that moment of time. Then there occurred before our eyes a thing which, as it seemed worthy of record, we have not thought it right to omit. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town was hurling into the fire over against a turret lumps of grease and pitch that were handed to him. He was pierced by a dart from a "scorpion" in the right side and fell dead. One of the party next him stepped over his prostrate body and went on with the same work; and when this second man had been killed in the same fashion by a scorpion-shot, a third succeeded, and to the third a fourth; and that spot was not left bare of defenders until the ramp had been extinguished, the enemy cleared away on every side, and a stop put to the fighting.

[26] The Gauls had tried every expedient, and as nothing had succeeded they resolved next day to escape from the town, as Vercingetorix urged and ordered. They hoped that by attempting it in the silence of night they would accomplish it with no great loss of their men, because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far from the town, and the marsh, which filled without break all the space between, must hinder the Romans in pursuit. And it was now night and they were already preparing to do this, when the matrons suddenly rushed out of doors, and, flinging themselves with tears at the feet of their men, with prayers and supplications besought them

not to surrender, to the tender mercies of the enemy, themselves and their common children, whom natural weakness hampered from taking flight. When they saw that the men were firm in their purpose, for as a rule in extreme peril fear admits no sense of pity, they began to cry out in a body and to make signs to the Romans as touching the flight. So the Gauls were terror-struck by the fear that the Roman cavalry might seize the roads before them, and they abandoned their design.

[27] On the morrow, when a turret had been advanced and the works which Caesar had begun to construct were finished, a heavy shower of rain came on. He thought the moment suitable for the execution of his plan, as he observed that the guards on the wall were less carefully posted than usual; so he ordered his men to move more leisurely about the work, and showed them what he wanted to be done. The legions made ready for action secretly under cover of the mantlets; and having urged them to reap at length the fruit of victory in return for their great labours, he offered prizes to those who should first mount the wall, and gave the signal to the troops. They dashed out suddenly from all sides and speedily lined the wall.

[28] The enemy were panic-stricken by the surprise, and when they were hurled down from the wall and the turrets they stood fast in wedge-formations in the market-place and the more open places, with intent, if a movement were made from any side upon them, to deploy into line and fight to a finish. When they saw no one coming down on to the level ground, but that the troops were pouring round everywhere all along the wall, they feared that the hope of escape might be cut off altogether, and, casting away their arms, they made in a continuous rush for the farthest parts of the town; and part, as they crowded one another at the narrow passage of the gates, were

slain there by the troops, part after they had got out of the gates by the cavalry, and no one had any thought for plunder. In such fashion the troops, maddened by the massacre at Cenabum and the toil of the siege-work, spared not aged men, nor women, nor children. Eventually of all the number, which was about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who had flung themselves out of the town when they heard the first shout, reached Vercingetorix in safety. He intercepted the refugees late at night in silence, fearing that a mutiny might arise if they were met and pitied by the common sort: therefore, by stationing his own friends and the chiefs of states at some distance along the roads, he took steps to separate them and conduct them to their friends in the part of the camp allotted to each state from the beginning.

[29] On the next day, summoning a conference, he comforted them, and exhorted them not greatly to lose heart, nor to be disturbed by the disaster. The Romans had not conquered by courage nor in pitched battle, but by stratagem and by knowledge of siege operations, in which the Gauls had had no experience. It was a mistake to expect in war that all events would have a favourable issue. He himself had never agreed with the defence of Avaricum, and of that he had themselves as witnesses; but this experience of disaster had been brought about by the unwisdom of the Bituriges and the undue complaisance of the rest. However, he would speedily remedy it by greater advantages. He would by his own efforts bring to their side the states which disagreed with the rest of Gaul, and establish one policy for the whole of Gaul, whose unanimity not even the world could resist; and already he had almost brought that to pass. Meanwhile it was reasonable that for the sake of the common weal they should do as he asked and set to work to fortify the camp,

in order more easily to resist sudden attacks of the enemy.

[30] This speech was not unpleasing to the Gauls, chiefly because the commander himself had not failed them after the great disaster they had suffered, nor hidden out of their sight and avoided the gaze of the host; and they considered his foresight and forethought the greater because, while the matter was still open, he had first advocated the burning, and afterwards the abandonment, of Avaricum. And thus, whereas the authority of commanders in general is diminished by reverses, so his position, on the contrary, was daily enhanced by the disaster they had suffered. At the same time they were inclined to be hopeful, by reason of his assurance, about bringing in the remaining states; and on this occasion for the first time the Gauls set to work to fortify the camp, and they were so strengthened in spirit that, although unaccustomed to toil, they thought that they must submit to any commands.

[31] As good as his promise, Vercingetorix worked with a will to bring in the remaining states, and tried to attract them by presents and promises. He selected for the purpose suitable persons, each of whom, by guileful speech or by friendly demeanour, should be able most easily to captivate. The men who had escaped at the storming of Avaricum he caused to be armed and clothed; at the same time, to recruit his diminished force, he made requisition of a certain number of soldiers from the states, saying what number he wished for and by what day they should be brought into camp; and he ordered all archers, of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, to be sought out and sent to him. By this means the loss at Avaricum was speedily made up. Meanwhile Teutomatus, the son of Ollovico and king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had been saluted as Friend by the Roman Senate, came to him with a large number of horsemen:

some were his own, and others he had hired from Aquitania.

[32] Caesar halted at Avaricum for several days, and by the immense quantity of corn and all other supplies which he found there recuperated the army after toil and want. The winter was now almost spent; the very season was inviting him to continue the war, and he had decided to march against the enemy to see whether he could entice them out of the marshes and woods or reduce them by blockade, when at this juncture chiefs of the Aedui came on a mission to him to beseech his succour for the state in a crisis of absolute urgency. The administration, they said, was in the utmost peril, because, in spite of their ancient custom of electing single magistrates to hold kingly power for a year, two persons were exercising office, and each of them declared himself legally elected. One of the two was Convictolitavis, a successful and distinguished young man; the other Cotus, the scion of a most ancient house, and himself a man of dominant power and noble connection, whose brother Valetiacus had exercised the same office in the previous year. The whole state was in arms, the senate was divided, and each claimant had his own following. If the quarrel were any longer fomented, one part of the state must inevitably come to blows with the other. The prevention of that depended upon Caesar's energy and authority.

[33] Caesar thought it disastrous to move away from the war and the enemy, but at the same time he knew full well what great troubles generally arose from such dissensions; and therefore, to prevent this large state, so closely connected with Rome — a state which he himself had always cherished and by every means distinguished — from resorting to armed violence, wherein the party which had less confidence in itself would seek succours from Vercingetorix, he

thought the matter should receive his first attention. And, inasmuch as the laws of the Aedui did not suffer those who exercised the highest office to leave the country, he determined, in order that he might not appear in any way to disparage their rights or laws, to proceed in person into the territory of the Aedui, and summoned all their senate, together with the parties to the quarrel, to join him at Decetia. Almost the whole state assembled there, and he was informed that in a small and secret assembly, held in a place and at a time which were irregular, one brother had declared the other elected, although the law not only forbade two of one house, in the lifetime of both, to be elected as officers of state, but even precluded them from membership of the senate. He therefore compelled Cotus to lay down the supreme authority, and ordered Convictolitavis, who had been elected by the priests, according to the tradition of the state when the succession of civil officers had been interrupted, to hold the power.

[34] Having made this decision between them, he urged the Aedui to forget disputes and discord and, leaving all such matters alone, to devote themselves to the present campaign, in anticipation of the rewards they deserved from himself so soon as the conquest of Gaul was complete. He bade them send him speedily all their horsemen and ten thousand infantry, that he might put them in various garrisons to protect the corn^o-supply. He then divided the army into two parts. Four legions he gave to Labienus to be led against the Senones and Parisii, six he led in person along the river Allier towards the town of Gergovia, in the country of the Arverni; he assigned part of the cavalry to Labienus, part he left for himself. As soon as Vercingetorix heard of it he broke up all the bridges over that river and began to march along the other side thereof.

[35] When the two armies had drawn apart, they proceeded to pitch camp in sight of each other and almost opposite, with the enemy's scouts posted about to prevent the Romans from constructing a bridge and effecting a passage. Caesar's position was thus beset by great difficulties; for there was danger that the river would block him for the greater part of the summer, as the Allier is not usually fordable in the autumn. To prevent this, therefore, he pitched camp in a wooded spot opposite one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be cut away, and on the morrow he kept two legions hidden, sending on the rest of the force with all the baggage, according to his custom, and opening out some of the cohorts to make the number of the legions appear the same as usual. This force was ordered to march out as far as possible, and when by the time of day he conjectured that they were safe in camp, he began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles as before, the lower part of which was still intact. The work was speedily completed and the legions put across; and when a suitable camping-ground had been chosen, he recalled the rest of the force. On report of this, Vercingetorix moved ahead by forced marches, in order that he might not be forced to fight against his own wish.

[36] From that position Caesar reached Gergovia in five days' march. On the fifth day a slight cavalry skirmish took place; and having reconnoitred the position of the city, which was set upon a very lofty height, with difficult approaches on every side, he despaired of taking it by storm, and he determined not to attempt a blockade until he had secured his corn-supply. Vercingetorix, for his part, had pitched camp near the town, and posted the contingent of each state separately at short intervals around himself. Every eminence on the ridge from which a bird's-eye view was possible

had been seized, and the appearance was formidable. He would order the chiefs of the states, whom he had chosen to assist him in council, to assemble at dawn daily at his quarters in case there should seem to be anything to communicate or to arrange. And scarcely a day passed that he did not put to the test, by an encounter of horsemen with archers placed among them, the spirit and the courage of each of his followers. Opposite the town there was a hill at the very foot of the mountain, an exceedingly strong position, precipitous on every side. If our troops secured this they thought they could cut off the enemy at once from great part of their water-supply and from freedom of foraging. The post was held, however, by the enemy with a garrison, albeit not a very strong one. None the less, Caesar marched out of camp in the silence of night, dislodged the garrison before it could be reinforced from the town, and made himself master of the position. He posted two legions there, and ran a double ditch, twelve feet broad in each case, from the greater to the lesser camp, so that even single soldiers could pass to and fro safe from a sudden onset of the enemy.

[37] During these operations about Gergovia Convictolitavis the Aeduan, to whom, as above mentioned, the magistracy had been adjudged by Caesar, was tempted by a bribe on the part of the Arverni, and held converse with certain young men, among whom the leaders were Litaviccus and his brethren, young scions of a most distinguished house. The Aeduan shared his bribe with them, and urged them to remember that they were born to freedom and command. The state of the Aedui was the only bar to the absolutely certain victory of Gaul; by its influence the rest were held in check; if it were brought over, the Romans would have no foothold in Gaul. It was true that he himself had received some benefit at Caesar's hands,

but simply in the sense that he had won an entirely just cause before him, and he had a greater duty to the general liberty. Why should the Aedui come to Caesar to decide a question of their own right and law, rather than the Romans to the Aedui? The young men were speedily won over by the speech of the magistrate and by the bribe, and avowed that they would be the very first to support his design. Then they began to seek a means of executing it, because they were not sure that the state could be induced off-hand to undertake a war. It was resolved that Litaviccus should be put in command of the ten thousand soldiers who were to be sent to Caesar for the war, and should be responsible for their leading, while his brethren hastened forward to Caesar. They determined the plan to be adopted for carrying out the rest of the scheme.

[38] Litaviccus took over the army, and when he was about thirty miles from Gergovia he suddenly called together the troops, and with tears addressed them: "Whither, soldiers, are we proceeding? All our horsemen, all our chivalry is perished; Eporedorix and Viridomarus, chief men of our state, have been accused of treachery by the Romans, and put to death with their cause unheard. This you shall learn from men who actually escaped from that same massacre; for all my own brethren and all my kindred have been put to death, and grief prevents me from declaring what was brought to pass." The persons whom he had instructed what they were to say were brought forward, and set forth to the host the same tale which Litaviccus had declared — that many horsemen of the Aedui had been put to death because it was alleged that they had held converse with the Arverni; that they themselves had hidden in the general throng of soldiers, and so had escaped from the midst of the massacre. The Aedui shouted with one accord and entreated Litaviccus to take counsel for their

safety. “As if,” quoth he, “this were a matter of counsel, and it were not necessary for us to make speed to Gergovia and join ourselves to the Arverni! Or can we doubt that after committing an abominable crime the Romans are already hastening hither to slay us? Wherefore, if we have any spirit in us, let us avenge the death of those who have perished most shamefully, and let us slay these brigands.” He pointed to Roman citizens, who were accompanying his force in reliance on his safeguard; he plundered a large quantity of corn and supplies, and put the Romans to death with cruel tortures. He sent messages throughout the state of the Aedui and sought to arouse them by the same falsehood concerning the massacre of horsemen and chiefs, urging them to avenge their own wrongs in the same fashion as he himself had done.

[39] Eporedorix the Aeduan, a young man of the highest rank and of supreme influence in his own country, and with him Viridomarus, his peer in age and popularity, but not in birth — he had been commended by Diviciacus to Caesar, who had advanced him from a humble station to a pre-eminent position — had come along with the horsemen in response to a personal summons from Caesar. These two had a struggle between them for chieftaincy, and in the late dispute between the magistrates the one had fought with might and main for Convictolitavis, the other for Cotus. Of these two, Eporedorix, when he learnt the design of Litavicus, reported the matter about midnight to Caesar. He besought him not to allow the state to fall away from the friendship of Rome through the mischievous designs of the young men; yet this, as he foresaw, would happen if those thousands of troops joined forces with the enemy, for their kindred could not ignore their safety, nor could the state account it of slight importance.

[40] This report caused Caesar great anxiety, because he had always shown especial indulgence to the state of the Aedui; and without a moment's hesitation he marched four legions in light order, and all the cavalry, out of camp. There was no time at such a crisis to reduce the camp-area, as the issue seemed to depend on speed; he left Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, with two legions as camp-garrison. He ordered the brethren of Litaviccus to be arrested, but found that they had fled to the enemy shortly before. He urged the troops not to be disturbed by the fatigue of a march which the emergency rendered necessary, and then, amid the greatest eagerness of all ranks, he advanced for five-and-twenty miles, when he caught sight of the column of the Aedui. By sending on the cavalry he checked and hampered the enemy's march, and he forbade all to put any man to the sword. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whom the other side supposed to be slain, he ordered to move among the horsemen and address their own people. When they were recognized, and the deceit of Litaviccus was discovered, the Aedui began to stretch out their hands in token of surrender and, casting away their arms, to beg for mercy. Litaviccus escaped to Gergovia with his dependents; for, according to the custom of Gaul, it is a crime in dependents to desert their patrons, even in desperate case.

[41] Caesar sent messengers to the state of the Aedui to report that the men, whom by right of war he might have put to death, had by his own favour been saved; and then, having given the army three hours of the night for rest, struck camp for Gergovia. About halfway thither some troopers sent by Fabius related how perilous had been their case. They reported that the camp had been attacked in full force, fresh men frequently taking the place of the fatigued and wearing down our troops by incessant toil, inasmuch as the size of

the camp obliged the same men to continue throughout on the rampart. Many men, they said, had been wounded by the swarms of arrows and of every kind of missile; the artillery, however, had proved of great use in resisting these assaults; and, on the withdrawal of the enemy, Fabius was barricading all the gates except two, setting screens to the rampart, and preparing for a like event on the morrow. On report of this, Caesar reached the camp before sunrise, by a supreme effort of the troops.

[42] During these operations about Gergovia the Aedui received the first messages sent by Litavicus. They left themselves no time to investigate: some were influenced by avarice, others by anger and the recklessness which is specially characteristic of their race, treating frivolous hearsay as assured fact. They plunder the goods of Roman citizens, massacred some, dragged off others into slavery. Convictolitavis encouraged the general tendency, and urged the common folk to fury, that by committing crime they might be ashamed to return to a right mind. By giving him a pledge of safety they then induced Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was travelling to his legion, to quit the town of Cabillonum; those who had settled there for the sake of trade they compelled to do the same. Then they attacked them the moment they started on their journey, stripped them of all their baggage, and, when they defended themselves, blockaded them for a day and a night. After many persons had been slain on both sides, they brought up a still greater multitude of armed men.


[43] In the midst of this a message was brought that all their soldiers were prisoners in the power of Caesar. At once they ran with one consent to Aristius, declaring that the state had had no share in their design or deed. They ordered an inquiry as touching the

plundered goods, they confiscated the goods of Litaviccus and his brethren, and sent deputies to Caesar to clear themselves. This they did to recover their kith and kin; but they were stained with crime, they were tempted by the profit to be made of plundered goods, as the business concerned a large number of persons; so, as they were alarmed by the fear of penalty, they began to entertain secret designs of war and to sound the other states by means of deputations. Caesar was fully aware of this; nevertheless he accosted their deputies as gently as possible, assuring them that the ignorance and inconsequence of the common people did not make him judge more severely of the state, nor diminish aught of his personal goodwill towards the Aedui. He himself was anticipating a greater rising in Gaul; and that he might not be surrounded by all the states, he began to plan how he might withdraw from Gergovia and once more concentrate the whole army without allowing a departure occasioned by fear of the revolt to resemble flight.

[44] While he reflected on these matters, a chance of successful action seemed to offer itself. He had come to the lesser camp to inspect the works, when he noticed that a hill held by the enemy, and on the previous days scarcely visible for the crowd upon it, was undefended. Surprised thereat, he asked deserters, a large number of whom were flocking to him daily, for the reason. All agreed in stating, what Caesar himself had already learnt through scouts, that the crest of the ridge there was almost level, but that this hill was wooded and narrow where it gave access to the other side of the town. For this spot the Gauls, they said, were grievously alarmed, and had now no alternative but to believe that if, after the seizure of one hill by the Romans, they lost the other, they would find themselves to be almost invested, and cut off from all egress and

from foraging. Vercingetorix had accordingly called out every man to fortify this hill.

PLAN OF GERGOVIA



[45] On this information Caesar sent several troops of cavalry thither just after midnight, with orders to range in every direction in rather more noisy fashion than usual. At daybreak he commanded a large quantity of baggage-mules to be brought forth from camp, and the muleteers to take off the packs, and with helmets on their heads to ride round the hills, like cavalry to all seeming. With them he put a few cavalry, to range more widely by way of demonstration, and ordered them all to make for the same general destination by a long circuit. The proceeding was noticed afar from the town, as there was a bird's-eye view from Gergovia into the camp; but at so great a distance the real meaning thereof could not be discovered. He despatched one legion in the same direction, and when it had advanced a little way he halted it on the lower ground and concealed it in the woods. The suspicion of the Gauls was increased, and all their force was brought to the spot to fortify it. When Caesar saw that

the enemy's camp was empty, covering the badges of his men and concealing the war-standards, he moved soldiers from the greater to the lesser camp in small parties so as not to attract attention from the town. He showed the lieutenant-generals whom he had put in command of each legion what he wished to be done: first and foremost he instructed them to keep the troops in hand, lest in the zeal for battle or the hope of booty they might advance too far. He explained the disadvantage caused by the inequality of the ground, and said that this could be remedied by speed alone: it was a question of surprise, not of battle. After these explanations he gave the signal, and started the Aedui at the same moment by another ascent, on the right side.

[46] From the level where the ascent began the wall of the town was twelve hundred paces distant in a straight line, if there were no curve to consider. Any deviation added to ease the slope of necessity increased the distance to be marched. About halfway up the hill, the Gauls had put up a six-foot covering-wall of large stones, running lengthways so as to follow the contour of the height, to check our attack; and leaving all the lower area unoccupied, they had filled all the upper part of the hill, right up to the wall of the town, with their camps, closely crowded together. When the signal was given, the troops speedily reached the fortification, crossed it, and took possession of three camps, and so great was their speed in capturing the camps that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, caught suddenly in his tent in a noontide sleep, barely escaped from the hands of the plundering troops, with the upper part of his body bare, and his horse wounded.

[47] Having thus secured his particular purpose, Caesar ordered the retreat to be sounded, and at once halted the Tenth Legion, which he

had accompanied. But the rank and file of the other legions did not hear the trumpet-call, as a considerable valley lay in between; none the less, efforts were made by the tribunes and lieutenant-generals to hold them back, according to Caesar's instructions. Elated, however, and by the hope of a speedy victory, by the flight of the enemy, and their successful engagements on previous occasions, they thought that nothing was so difficult as to be unattainable by their valour, and they did not make an end of pursuing until they neared the wall and the gates of the town. Then, indeed, shouting arose from all parts of the city, and those who were farther away were terror-struck at the sudden uproar, and, believing that the enemy was within the gates, flung out of the town. Matrons cast clothing and silver from the wall, and with bare breast and outstretched hands implored the Romans to spare them, and then to do as they had done at Avaricum, holding their hand not even from women and children. Some of the women were lowered by hand from the wall, and were fain to deliver themselves to the troops. Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the Eighth Legion, who was known to have said that day among his company that he was spurred on by the rewards at Avaricum, and would allow no one to mount the wall before him, got three men of his company, was lifted up by them, and mounted the wall. Then he in turn took hold of them one by one and pulled them up on to the wall.

[48] Meanwhile the Gauls who had assembled, as above mentioned, at the other side of the town to make a fortification first of all heard the shouting, and then came frequent messages that the town was held by the Romans to arouse them further; so they sent the horsemen in advance and hastened thither in a mighty stream. Each as he arrived took his stand under the wall and swelled the number of their fighting men. When a great host of them had

assembled, the matrons who a moment before were stretching out their hands to the Romans from the wall began to adjure their own men and, in Gallic fashion, to show dishevelled hair and to bring their children forward into view. The Romans had no fair contest in ground or numbers; they were tired out by the speedy march and the duration of the battle, and could not easily resist men that were fresh and unhurt.

[49] Caesar saw that the battle was being fought on unfavourable ground and that the strength of the enemy was increasing. Anxious, therefore, for his troops, he sent a message to Titus Sextius, the lieutenant-general, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, bidding him bring the cohorts speedily out of the camp and post them at the foot of the hill on the right flank of the enemy, so that, if he saw our troops driven down from the position, he might deter the enemy from an indiscriminate pursuit. He himself advanced a little with the legion from the place where he had halted, and awaited the issue of the battle.

[50] The battle was continued most fiercely at close quarters: the enemy trusted to position and numbers, our troops to courage. Suddenly the Aedui, whom Caesar had sent on the right by another line of ascent to divert the enemy's forces, were seen on the exposed flank of our troops. The similarity of their armament to that of the Gauls grievously alarmed the Romans; and although it was noticed that they had their right shoulders uncovered — the distinction agreed upon by custom — still the troops were disposed to think that even this had been done by the enemy to deceive them. At the same moment the centurion Lucius Fabius and those who had mounted the wall along with him were surrounded, slain, and hurled from the wall. Marcus Petronius, a centurion of the same legion, had tried to

cut down a gate, but was overpowered by superior numbers and in desperate case. Already he had received many wounds, and he cried to the men of his company who had followed him: “As I cannot save myself with you, I will at any rate provide for *your* life, whom in the eager desire for glory I have brought into danger. When the chance is given do you look after yourselves.” With this he burst into the midst of the enemy, and by slaying two shifted the rest a little from the gate. When his men tried to assist him he said: “In vain do you try to rescue *my* life, for blood and strength are already failing me. Wherefore depart while you have a chance and get you back to the legion.” So, a moment later, he fell fighting and saved his men.

[51] Our troops were hard pressed on every side, and were dislodged from the position with a loss of six-and-forty centurions. But any immoderate pursuit on the part of the Gauls was checked by the Tenth Legion, which had taken post in support on rather more even ground. This legion was covered in turn by cohorts of the Thirteenth, which had marched out of the lesser camp with Titus Sextius, the lieutenant-general, and had occupied higher ground. As soon as the legions touched the plain they turned the standards against the enemy and halted. Vercingetorix led his men back from the base of the hill within the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred soldiers were missing.

[52] On the morrow Caesar called a parade and reprimanded the troops for their recklessness and headstrong passion: they had decided for themselves whither they should advance or what they should do, they had not halted when the signal for retirement was given, and had not been amenable to the restraint of tribunes and lieutenant-generals. He showed what might be the effect of unfavourable ground, what he himself had borne in mind at

Avaricum, when, though he had caught the enemy without general and without cavalry, he had given up an assured victory in order that even slight loss in action might not be caused by unfavourable ground. Greatly as he admired the high courage of men whom no camp fortifications, no mountain-height, no town-wall had been able to check, he blamed as greatly their indiscipline and presumption in supposing that they had a truer instinct than the commander-in-chief for victory and the final result. He required from his soldiers, he said, discipline and self-restraint no less than valour and high courage.

[53] After delivering this harangue, and at the end thereof encouraging the troops not to be cast down on this account, nor to attribute to the courage of the enemy a result caused by unfavourable ground, though he was still minded, as he had been before, to march off, he led the legions out of camp and formed line-of-battle on suitable ground. When Vercingetorix, notwithstanding, refused to come down to level ground, a cavalry skirmish ensued, favourable to the Romans, after which Caesar led the army back to camp. After a repetition of the same action on the morrow he thought enough had been done to reduce the bravado of the Gauls and to establish the spirit of the troops, and he moved camp accordingly into the territory of the Aedui. Even then the enemy did not pursue; and on the third day he reached the river Allier, rebuilt the bridge, and brought the army across to the other side.

[54] There he was greeted by Viridomarus and Eporedorix, the Aeduans, from whom he learnt that Litaviccus with all his horse was gone to rouse the Aedui, and that they themselves must be before him in order to keep the state loyal. Caesar already had abundant evidence to prove the treachery of the Aedui, and he believed that the departure of these two served but to hasten a revolt of the state;

however, he determined not to detain them, lest he might seem to be inflicting an injury or affording some suspicion of fear. As they departed he set forth briefly his own services to the Aedui: their position, their humiliations at the time when he had received them — crowded into towns, deprived of fields, all their resources plundered, a tribute imposed, hostages wrung from them with the utmost insolence — the success and the distinction to which he had brought them, with the result that they had not only returned to their ancient position, but, to all appearance, had surpassed the dignity and influence of all previous ages. With these monitions he dismissed them from his presence.

[55] Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui situated in an advantageous position by the banks of the Loire. Here Caesar had concentrated all the hostages of Gaul, the corn,^o the state chest, and great part of his own and the army's baggage; hither he had sent a great number of horses purchased for this war in Italy and Spain. When Eporedorix and Viridomarus were come to the town they learnt how it was with the state. Litaviccus had been received by the Aedui at Bibracte, the town of supreme influence among them; the magistrate, Convictolitavis, and a great part of the senate had gone to join him; deputies had been despatched officially to Vercingetorix to secure peace and friendship. So signal an advantage ought not, the two men thought, be forgone. So they put to the sword the troops on guard at Noviodunum and the traders who had gathered there, and divided the money and the horses between them; they caused the hostages of the states to be conducted to the magistrate at Bibracte. As they judged that they could not hold the town they set it on fire, that it might be of no service to the Romans; all the corn that they could handle at once they removed in boats, the rest they spoilt with

fire and river-water. They began themselves to collect forces from the neighbouring districts, to post garrisons and piquets on the banks of the Loire, and to display horsemen everywhere in order to strike terror, in the hope that they might be able to cut the Romans off from their corn-supply, or to reduce them by scarcity and drive them out into the Province. In this hope they were much assisted by the fact that the Loire was so swollen after the snows that it appeared to be altogether unfordable.

[56] On learning this Caesar decided that he must make speed, if the completion of the bridges was to be adventured, in order to fight a decisive battle before larger forces had been collected at the river. As for changing his plan and turning his march into the Province, even apprehension did not seem to necessitate it: there was the shame and disgrace of the thing, as well as the barrier of the Cevennes and the difficulty of the roads, to prevent it, and more especially there was his pressing anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had sent with him on a separate mission. Therefore he executed very long marches by day and night, and came, altogether unexpected, to the Loire; found by means of the cavalry a ford to suit the need of the case, where the troops could just keep arms and shoulders clear of the water, to hold up their weapons; posted the cavalry at intervals to break the force of the stream, and brought the army safe across, as the enemy were put to confusion by the first sight of him. In the country he found corn and store of cattle, and as soon as these requirements of the army had been duly supplied he decided to march into the country of the Senones.

[57] While this was happening with Caesar, Labienus had left the draft of recruits newly arrived from Italy at Agedincum to guard the baggage, and with four legions started for Lutetia (Paris), a town of

the Parisii, situated on an island in the river Seine. When the enemy had news of his coming a large force assembled from the neighbouring states. The chief command was entrusted to Camulogenus the Aulercan, who, though old and well-nigh worn out, was nevertheless singled out for the distinction because of his exceptional knowledge of warfare. He, noticing a continuous marsh which flowed into the Seine and greatly increased the difficulties of the whole locality, halted there and decided to prevent our troops from crossing.

[58] Labienus at first tried to move up mantlets, fill in the marsh with hurdles and earth, and build a roadway. When he found that task too difficult he silently marched out of camp in the third watch, and reached Metiosedum by the same route by which he had come. This is a town of the Senones, situated, as was said just now of Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. Seizing some fifty vessels and fastening them speedily together, he hurried his troops on board, and by the suddenness of the operation struck such terror into the townsfolk, of whom a great proportion had been called out for the war, that he gained possession of the town without a struggle. Repairing the bridge, he led the army across, and began to march down stream towards Lutetia. The enemy were told of it by refugees from Metiosedum. They ordered Lutetia to be set on fire and the bridges belonging to the town to be cut down, and advancing from the marsh to the banks of the Seine, they halted opposite Lutetia over against the camp of Labienus.

[59] By this time it came to be known that Caesar had withdrawn from Gergovia, and rumours began to be brought in touching the revolt of the Aedui and the successful rising in Gaul; and in conversation the Gauls affirmed that Caesar's march and passage of

the Loire had been blocked, and that scarcity of corn had compelled him to make for the Province with speed. The Bellovaci were disloyal in themselves before the revolt of the Aedui, and when they heard thereof they began to collect companies and openly to prepare for war. With the case so completely altered, Labienus perceived that he must adopt a course quite different from his previous design, and he began now to consider the means, not of further acquisition or of provoking the enemy to fight, but of bringing the army safely back to Agedincum. For the Bellovaci, the state which has the greatest reputation for courage in Gaul, were pressing upon him from one side, while the ground on the other was held by Camulogenus with an army regularly equipped and organized; and further, the legions were cut off from their baggage and its guard with a mighty river between. Confronted suddenly with these supreme difficulties, he saw that he must have recourse to personal courage.

[60] Towards evening he called together a council of war. Urging them to carry out his commands with care and energy, he assigned each of the vessels which he had brought down from Metiosedum to a Roman knight, and ordered them at the end of the first watch to proceed silently four miles down stream and there to await him. He left as garrison for the camp the five cohorts which he regarded as least steady for action; he commanded the remaining five of the same legion to start up stream at midnight with all the baggage, with great uproar. He got together small boats also, and despatched these in the same direction with great noise of oars in the rowing. A short time afterwards he himself marched out silently with three legions, and made for the spot where he had ordered the vessels to put in.

[61] Upon his arrival there the enemy's scouts, posted all along the river, were caught unawares by our men and overcome, owing to a

great storm which had suddenly got up. The legions and the cavalry were speedily sent across under the direction of the Roman knights in charge of the business. At almost the same moment, just before daylight, it was reported to the enemy that in the Roman camp there was unusual uproar, that a large column was moving up stream, that the sound of oars was audible in the same quarter, and that a little way down stream troops were being carried across in boats. When they heard this they supposed that the legions were crossing at three places and that all were preparing for flight in the disorder caused by the revolt of the Aedui; so they, too, distributed their force in three divisions. A guard was left opposite the camp; a small company was sent towards Metiosedum, to advance as far as the vessels should have proceeded; the rest of the force they led against Labienus.

[62] By daybreak our own troops had all been carried across, and the enemy's line began to be seen. Labienus urged the troops to remember well their own courage in the past and the brilliant success of their battles, and to think that Caesar himself, under whose leadership they had often overcome the enemy, was present to see them; then he gave the signal for action. At the first encounter on the right wing, where the Seventh Legion was posted, the enemy were driven back and put to rout; on the left, which was held by the Twelfth Legion, although the first ranks of the enemy had fallen pierced by the missiles, the remainder nevertheless resisted most stoutly, and not a man gave an inkling of flight. The leader of the enemy, Camulogenus, was present in person to urge on his men. The ultimate victory, however, was still uncertain; but when the tribunes of the Seventh Legion were told what was afoot on the left wing, they brought out their legion in rear of the enemy and attacked. Not even then did any man yield his ground, but all were surrounded and

slain. Camulogenus met with the same fate. As for the detachment which had been left on guard over against the camp of Labienus, when they heard that the fight had begun they marched to the support of their comrades, and occupied a hill. But they could not withstand the attack of our victorious troops; and thus, as they became intermingled with their fugitive comrades, all who did not win the shelter of woods or heights were slain by the cavalry. Having finished this business, Labienus returned to Agedincum, where the baggage of the whole army had been left. Marching thence with all his force, he reached Caesar on the third day.

[63] When the revolt of the Aedui became known the war increased in extent. Deputations were sent round in all directions: with all the power of influence, authority, money, they strove to stir up the states, and having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar had lodged among them, they sought by the execution of these to terrify waverers. The Aedui requested Vercingetorix to come to them and concert plans for the conduct of the war. When their request was granted, they insisted that the supreme command should be assigned to them. The matter was disputed, and a convention of all Gaul was summoned at Bibracte. Thither assembled many persons from all quarters. The question was put to the vote of the host, and all to a man approved Vercingetorix as commander-in-chief. From this convention the Remi, Lingones, and Treveri were absent: the former two out of consideration for the friendship of Rome, the Treveri because they were too far distant and were hard pressed by the Germans, which was the reason why they took no part throughout the war and sent no succours to either side. The Aedui were greatly distressed at their rejection from the leadership, complaining of the change in their fortune and feeling the loss of Caesar's kindness

towards them; but nevertheless, having undertaken the campaign, they durst not part counsel from the rest. Unwillingly, for they were young and very ambitious, Eporedorix and Viridomarus obeyed Vercingetorix.

[64] He for his part made requisition of hostages from the other states, and appointed a day for the same, ordering all the horsemen, to the number of fifteen thousand, to assemble with speed. He said that he would be content with the footmen that he had beforehand, as he did not purpose to try his fortune or fight a pitched battle; but, as he had abundance of horsemen, it was easy enough to prevent the Romans from getting corn^o and forage. Only, the Gauls must consent to destroy with their own hands their corn-supplies and burn their buildings, seeing that by such loss of property they were acquiring dominion and liberty for all time. When he had made these arrangements he required of the Aedui and the Segusiavi, who are neighbours of the Province, ten thousand foot-soldiers; to this total he added eight hundred horsemen. He set the brother of Eporedorix in command of them, and ordered them to make war on the Allobroges. On the other side he sent the Gabali and the cantons of the Arverni next them against the Helvii, and likewise the Ruteni and Cadurci to devastate the borders of the Volcae Arecomici. At the same time, by secret messages and deputations, he sought to rouse the Allobroges, hoping that their temper had not yet settled down after the late war. To their chiefs he promised sums of money, to their state the dominion over the whole Province.

[65] To meet all these emergencies there had been provided contingents to the number of two-and-twenty cohorts, drafted from the whole Province by Lucius Caesar, lieutenant-general, and now set to oppose the enemy at all points. The Helvii of their own motion

joined battle with their neighbours, and were repulsed; the chief of their state, Gaius Valerius Donnotaurus, son of Caburus, and several others were slain, and they were shut up within the walls of their towns. The Allobroges posted numerous detachments at intervals along the Rhone and protected their borders with great care and efficiency. Caesar was aware that the enemy were superior in mounted troops and that, as all the lines of communication were interrupted, he could in no wise be assisted from the Province and from Italy; accordingly, he sent across the Rhine into Germany to the states which he had reduced to peace in previous years, and fetched horsemen from them and infantry trained to fight along with the horsemen. On their arrival he found that the horses they were using were unsuitable, and therefore he took the horses from the military tribunes and the rest of the Roman knights and the re-enlisted veterans, and distributed them among the Germans.

[66] In the meanwhile the enemy's contingent from the Arverni and the horsemen requisitioned from the whole of Gaul were assembling. While Caesar was marching to the country of the Sequani across the outermost borders of the Lingones, so as to be able to lend support more easily to the Province, Vercingetorix got together a great number of these contingents and established himself in three camps about ten miles from the Romans. He called the cavalry commanders together to a council of war, and stated that the hour of victory was come. The Romans were fleeing to the Province and leaving Gaul. In his opinion that was enough to secure a temporary liberty, but it was too small a gain to give peace and quiet for the future; for they would return when they had collected a large force and would make no end of the war. Therefore, the Gauls must attack them while encumbered with baggage in column of route; then, if the legionaries hung back

to give support to their comrades, they could not pursue the march; if, as he felt sure was more likely to happen, they left the baggage and looked to their own safety, they would be stripped at once of necessities and of reputation. For, as touching the enemy's cavalry, they themselves, at any rate, ought to have no doubt that not a man of them would dare even to advance beyond the column; and further, to make the commanders act with more spirit, he would have all his force paraded in front of the camp and strike terror into the enemy. The horsemen shouted with one accord that they should be bound by a most solemn oath — that no man should be received beneath a roof, nor have access to children, or to parents, or to wife, who had not twice ridden through the enemy's column.

[67] This was approved, and all were sworn, and on the morrow the horsemen were divided into three detachments. Two, in battle array, made a demonstration on the two flanks, and one began to hinder the march at the head of the column. On report of this Caesar divided his own cavalry likewise into three, and ordered it to advance against the enemy. The battle began simultaneously in every quarter. The column halted, and the baggage was drawn back inside the legions. At any point where our troops seemed to be distressed or too hard pressed Caesar would order the standards to advance and line of battle to be formed. This served to check the enemy in pursuit and to encourage our troops by hope of succour. At length the Germans on the right flank gained the top of a ridge and dislodged the enemy, drove them headlong as far as the river, where Vercingetorix had halted with the footmen of his force, and slew not a few. The rest remarked this and, fearing they might be surrounded, betook themselves to flight. Everywhere slaughter ensued. Three Aeduans of distinguished rank were captured and brought to Caesar. They were


Cotus, a commander of horse, who had had the quarrel with Convictolitavis at the last election; Cavarillus, who after the revolt of Litaviccus had commanded the footmen of the force; and Eporedorix, under whose leadership before the coming of Caesar the Aedui had fought a campaign with the Sequani.

[68] When all the horsemen had been put to flight Vercingetorix drew his forces back from their position in front of the camps and at once began the march to Alesia, a town of the Mandubii, ordering the baggage to be brought speedily out of camp and to follow close after him. Caesar withdrew his baggage to the nearest hill and, leaving two legions to guard it, pursued as long as daylight allowed. Some three thousand of the enemy's rearguard were slain, and on the next day he pitched camp near Alesia. He reconnoitred the situation of the city, and as the enemy were terror-struck by the rout of their horsemen, the branch of their army on which they most relied, he urged his soldiers to the task and began the investment.

[69] The actual stronghold of Alesia was set atop of a hill, in a very lofty situation, apparently impregnable save by blockade. The bases of the hill were washed on two separate sides by rivers. Before the town a plain extended for a length of about three miles; on all the other sides there were hills surrounding the town at a short distance, and equal to it in height. Under the wall, on the side which looked eastward, the forces of the Gauls had entirely occupied all this intervening space, and had made in front a ditch and a rough wall six feet high. The perimeter of the siege-works which the Romans were beginning had a length of eleven miles. Camps had been pitched at convenient spots, and three-and-twenty forts had been constructed on the line. In these piquets would be posted by day to prevent any sudden sortie; by night the same stations were held by sentries and

strong garrisons.

PLAN OF ALESIA



70 When the siege-work had been started, a cavalry encounter took place in the plain which we have described above as set between hills and extending to a length of three miles. Both sides strove with the utmost vigour. When our men were distressed Caesar sent up the Germans, and posted the legions in front of the camp to prevent any sudden inrush on the part of the enemy's footmen. With the reinforcement of the legions behind them our men's spirit was increased; the enemy were put to flight, and, hampering one another by sheer numbers, as the gates were left too narrow, were crowded together in a press. The Germans pursued most vigorously right up to the fortifications. A great slaughter ensued; some of the enemy abandoned their horses, and tried to cross the ditch and scale the wall. Caesar ordered the legions posted in front of the rampart to advance a short distance. The Gauls inside the fortifications were in just as great a confusion as the rest; believing that the enemy were

coming on them at once, they shouted the call to arms, and some in panic burst into the town. Vercingetorix ordered the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be deserted. After much slaughter and the capture of many horses the Germans retired.

[71] Vercingetorix now made up his mind to send away all his horsemen by night, before the Romans could complete their entrenchments. His parting instructions were that each of them should proceed to his own state and impress for the campaign all men whose age allowed them to bear arms. He set forth his own claims upon them, and adjured them to have regard for his personal safety, and not to surrender to the torture of the enemy one who had done sterling service for the general liberty. He showed them that if they proved indifferent eighty thousand chosen men were doomed to perish with him. He had calculated that he had corn in short rations for thirty days, but that by economy he could hold out just a little longer. After giving these instructions he sent the horsemen silently away in the second watch, at a point where a gap was left in our works. He ordered all the corn to be brought in to his headquarters; he appointed death as the penalty for any disobedience of the order; the cattle, of which great store had been driven together by the Mandubii, he distributed man by man; he arranged that the corn should be measured out sparingly and gradually; he withdrew into the town all the force which he had posted in front of it. By such measures did he prepare for the conduct of the campaign, in anticipation of the succours from Gaul.

[72] Caesar had report of this from deserters and prisoners, and determined on the following types of entrenchments. He dug a trench twenty feet wide with perpendicular sides, in such fashion that the bottom thereof was just as broad as the distance from edge to edge at

the surface. He set back the rest of the siege-works four hundred paces from the trench; for as he had of necessity included so large an area, and the whole of the works could not easily be manned by a ring-fence of troops, his intention was to provide against any sudden rush of the enemy's host by night upon the entrenchments, or any chance of directing their missiles by day upon our troops engaged on the works. Behind this interval he dug all round two trenches, fifteen feet broad and of equal depth; and the inner one, where the ground was level with the plain or sank below it, he filled with water diverted from the river. Behind the trenches he constructed a ramp and palisade twelve feet high; to this he added a breastwork and battlements, with large fraises projecting at the junctions of screens and ramp, to check the upward advance of the enemy; and all round the works he set turrets at intervals of eighty feet.

[73] As it was necessary that at one and the same time timber and corn should be procured, and lines of such extent constructed, our forces, having to proceed to a considerable distance from camp, were reduced in number; and sometimes the Gauls would try to make an attempt upon our works by a sortie in force from several gates of the town. Caesar, therefore, thought proper to make a further addition to these works, in order that the lines might be defensible by a smaller number of troops. Accordingly, trunks or very stout branches of trees were cut, and the tops thereof barked and sharpened, and continuous trenches five feet deep were dug. Into these the stumps were sunk and fastened at the bottom so that they could not be torn up, while the bough-ends were left projecting. They were in rows of five fastened and entangled together, and anyone who pushed into them must impale himself on the sharpest of stakes. These they called "markers." In front of these, in diagonal rows arranged like a figure

of five, pits three feet deep were dug, sloping inwards slightly to the bottom. In these, tapering stakes as thick as a man's thigh, sharpened at the top and fire-hardened, were sunk so as to project no more than four fingers' breadth from the ground; at the same time, to make all strong and firm, the earth was trodden down hard for one foot from the bottom, and the remainder of the pit was covered over with twigs and brushwood to conceal the trap. Eight rows of this kind were dug, three feet apart. From its resemblance to the flower the device was called a "lily." In front of all these, logs a foot long, with iron hooks firmly attached, were buried altogether in the ground and scattered at brief intervals all over the field, and these they called "spurs."

[74] When all these arrangements had been completed Caesar constructed parallel entrenchments of the same kind facing the other way, against the enemy outside, following the most favourable ground that the locality afforded, with a circuit of fourteen miles. This he did to secure the garrisons of the entrenchments from being surrounded by a host, however large it might chance to be. And in order that he might not be constrained to dangerous excursions from camp, he ordered all his men to have thirty days' corn and forage collected.

[75] While this was proceeding about Alesia, the Gauls summoned a council of chiefs and determined not to call up (according to the proposal of Vercingetorix) all who could bear arms, but to require of each chief a certain quota from his state; for they feared that with so large a host herded together they might not be able to preserve discipline, to distinguish their several contingents, or to secure a supply of corn.^o Of the Aedui and their dependents, Segusiavi, Ambivareti, Aulerci Brannovices, and Blannovii, they required five-and-thirty thousand; an equal number from the Arverni, together with

the Eleuteti, Cadurci, Gabali, and Vellavii, who are regularly under the sovereignty of the Arverni; from the Sequani, Senones, Bituriges, Santoni, Ruteni, and Carnutes, twelve thousand each; from the Bellovaci ten thousand, and as many from the Lemovices; eight thousand each from the Pictones, Turoni, Parisii, and Helvetii; five thousand each from the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges; a like number from the Aulerci Cenomani; four thousand from the Atrebrates; three each from the Vellocasses, Lexovii, and Aulerci Ebuovices; two each from the Rauraci and the Boii; thirty thousand in all from the states touching the Ocean, commonly called by them Armoric, among whom are the Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, and Venelli. Of these the Bellovaci did not make up their quota, because they declared that they would wage war with the Romans on their own account and at their own discretion, and would obey no man's command; however, when Commius made request they sent two thousand men with the rest, out of regard to their private relations with him.

[76] This Commius, as we have before mentioned, had rendered faithful and efficient service to Caesar in previous years in the expedition to Britain. For these good offices Caesar had ordered his state to be exempt from taxation, had restored its rights and laws, and had made the Morini tributary to him. Yet so strong was the unanimity of Gaul as a whole for the maintenance of their liberty and the recovery of their ancient renown in war that no benefits, no memory of friendship could influence them, and all devoted themselves with heart and strength to the campaign before them. When eight thousand horsemen and about two hundred and fifty thousand footmen had been collected, the force was reviewed and a

muster was taken in the country of the Aedui. Officers were appointed, and the chief command was entrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix the Aeduans, and Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, a cousin of Vercingetorix. To them were attached a staff selected from the states, by whose counsel the campaign was to be conducted. Full of spirit and confidence, all started for Alesia; there was not a man of them all who thought the mere sight of so vast a host could be withstood, especially in a two-sided engagement, when there would be fighting with those who made a sortie from within the town, and outside the display of so vast an army of horse and foot.

[77] However, when the day on which they had expected reinforcements of their own folk was past, and they had exhausted all their corn, and knew not what was going on in the land of the Aedui, the Gauls besieged in Alesia called a council of war to consider what would be the issue of their own fortunes. Various opinions were expressed, one party voting for surrender, another for a sortie while their strength sufficed; but the speech of Critognatus should not, I think, be omitted, because of its remarkable and abominable cruelty. He was of high lineage among the Arverni, and considered to have great influence. "Of their opinion," he said, "who call a most disgraceful slavery by the name of surrender I purpose to say nothing; I hold that they should not be treated as citizens nor invited to the council. Let *my* business be with those who approve a sortie; and in their design, by your general agreement, there seems to remain a memory of ancient courage. This is faint-heartedness of yours, not courage, to be unable to endure want for a short space. It is easier to find men to fling themselves recklessly on death than men to endure pain patiently. And yet I might now have approved this view (so

much weight with me has the authority of those who hold it) if I saw therein the loss of nothing but our life; but in making our decision we should have regard to the whole of Gaul, which we have aroused to our assistance. What, think ye, will be the spirit of our friends and kindred, when eighty thousand men have been slain in one spot, if they are forced to fight out the issue almost over their very bodies? Refuse to rob of your support the men who for your deliverance have disregarded their own peril; forbear by folly, recklessness, or weak-mindedness of yours to lay prostrate, and subject to everlasting slavery, the whole of Gaul. Or do you doubt their faithfulness, their resolution, because they are not arrived to the day? What then? Do ye think that the Romans are daily engaged in those outer trenches for mere amusement? If it may not be that your resolve should be strengthened by messages from your friends, since every approach is blocked, yet take the Romans here to your witnesses that their coming draws nigh; and it is in fear thereof that they are busy in their works day and night. What, then, is my counsel? To do what our forefathers did in the war, in no wise equal to this, with the Cimbri and the Teutones. They shut themselves into the towns, and under stress of a like scarcity sustained life on the bodies of those whose age showed them useless for war, and delivered not themselves to the enemy. And if we had not a precedent for this, I should still have judged it a most glorious thing for the sake of liberty to set such a one and to hand it down to posterity. For wherein was that war like this? The Cimbri devastated Gaul, they brought great disaster upon us, yet they departed at length from our borders and sought other countries, leaving us our rights, laws, lands, liberty. But the Romans — what else do they seek or desire than to follow where envy leads, to settle in the lands and states of men whose noble report and

martial strength they have learnt, and to bind upon them a perpetual slavery? 'Tis in no other fashion they have waged wars. And if ye know not what is afoot among distant nations, look now on Gaul close at hand, which has been reduced to a province, with utter change of rights and laws, and crushed beneath the axes in everlasting slavery."

[78] When opinions had been expressed they determined that those who by reason of health or age were useless for war should leave the town, and that every expedient should be tried before they had recourse to the counsel of Critognatus, resolving, however, to adopt that plan, if compelled by circumstances — that is to say, the delay of the reinforcements — rather than to submit to terms of surrender or of peace. The Mandubii, whose town had received them, were compelled to leave it with wives and children. When they reached the Roman lines they begged with tears and abject prayers to be received as slaves and helped with food. But Caesar posted sentries on the rampart and prevented their admission.

[79] Meanwhile Commius and the other leaders entrusted with the supreme command reached the neighbourhood of Alesia with all their force, and, seizing a hill outside, halted not more than a mile from our entrenchments. The day after they brought their horsemen out of camp and filled the whole of that plain which we have described as extending for a length of three miles; their force of footmen they posted a little way back from the spot, on the higher ground. There was a bird's-eye view from the town of Alesia over the plain. At sight of these reinforcements the others hastened together with mutual congratulation, and all minds were stirred to joy. So they brought out their force and halted in front of the town; they covered over the nearest trench with hurdles and filled it in with

earth, and prepared for a sally and for every emergency.

[80] Caesar disposed the whole army on both faces of the entrenchments in such fashion that, if occasion should arise, each man could know and keep his proper station; then he ordered the cavalry to be brought out of camp and to engage. There was a view down from all the camps, which occupied the top of the surrounding ridge, and all the troops were intently awaiting the issue of the fight. The Gauls had placed archers and light-armed skirmishers here and there among the horsemen to give immediate support to their comrades if driven back and to resist the charge of the cavalry. A number of men, wounded unexpectedly by these troops, began to withdraw from the fight. When the Gauls were confident that their own men were getting the better of the battle, and saw ours hard pressed by numbers, with shouts and yells on every side — those who were confined by the entrenchments as well as the others who had come up to their assistance — they sought to inspirit their countrymen. As the action was proceeding in sight of all, and no deed, of honour or dishonour, could escape notice, both sides were stirred to courage by desire of praise and fear of disgrace. The fight lasted, and the victory was doubtful, from noon almost to sunset; then the Germans in one part of the field massed their troops of horse, charged the enemy and routed them, and when they had been put to flight the archers were surrounded and slain. Likewise, from the other parts of the field, our troops pursued the retreating enemy right up to their camp, giving them no chance of rallying. But the Gauls who had come forth from Alesia, almost despairing of victory, sadly withdrew again into the town.

[81] After one day's interval, in the course of which they made a great number of hurdles, ladders, and grappling-hooks, the Gauls left

camp silently at midnight and approached the entrenchments in the plain. Raising a sudden shout, to signify their coming to the besieged inside the town, they began to fling down the hurdles, to dislodge our men from the rampart with slings, arrows and stones, and to carry out everything else proper to an assault. At the same moment, hearing the shout, Vercingetorix gave his troops the signal by trumpet, and led them out of the town. Our troops, as on previous days, moved each to his appointed station in the entrenchments; with slings, one-pounders, stakes set ready inside the works, and bullets, they beat off the Gauls. As the darkness made it impossible to see far, many wounds were received on both sides. A number of missiles were discharged by the artillery. Then Marcus Antonius and Gaius Trebonius, the lieutenant-generals to whom the defence of these sections had been allotted, withdrew troops from forts farther away, and sent them up to bring assistance wherever they remarked that our men were hard pressed.

[82] While the Gauls were some distance from the entrenchment they had more advantage from the quantity of their missiles; then, when they came up closer, they were soon caught unawares on the “spurs,” or they sank into the pits and were impaled, or they were shot by artillery pikes from the rampart and the turrets, and so perished on every side. Many a man was wounded, but the entrenchment was nowhere penetrated; and when daybreak drew nigh, fearing that they might be surrounded on their exposed flank by a sortie from the camps above them, they retired to their comrades. Meanwhile the inner force brought out the appliances which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for a sortie, and filled in the nearer trenches; but they lingered too long in the execution of the business, and, or ever they could get near the entrenchments, they learnt that

their countrymen had withdrawn. So without success they returned to the town.

[83] Twice beaten back with great loss, the Gauls took counsel what to do. They called in men who knew the locality well, and from them they learnt the positions and the defences of the upper camps. On the north side there was a hill, which by reason of its huge circumference our troops had been unable to include within the works; they had been obliged to lay out the camp on ground generally sloping, which put them almost at a disadvantage. This camp was held by Gaius Antistius Reginus and Gaius Caninius Rebilus, lieutenant-generals, with two legions. Having reconnoitred the locality by means of scouts, the commanders of the enemy chose out of the whole host sixty thousand men belonging to the states which had the greatest reputation for courage: they determined secretly together what should be done and in what fashion, and decided that the advance should take place at the moment when it was seen to be midday. In charge of this force they put Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, one of the four commanders, a kinsman of Vercingetorix. He left camp in the first watch, and having almost completed his march just before dawn, he concealed himself behind the height and ordered his soldiers to rest after their night's work. When at last it was seen to be near midday he moved with speed on the camp above mentioned and at the same moment the horsemen began to advance towards the entrenchments in the plain, and the rest of the force to make a demonstration before the camp.

[84] When from the citadel of Alesia Vercingetorix observed his countrymen, he moved out of the town, taking with him the hurdles, poles, mantlets, grappling-hooks, and all the other appliances prepared for the sally. The fight went on simultaneously in all places,

and all expedients were attempted, with a rapid concentration on that section which was seen to be least strong. With lines so extensive the Roman army was strung out, and at several points defence proved difficult. The shouting which arose in rear of the fighting line did much to scare our troops, as they saw that the risk to themselves depended on the success of others; for, as a rule, what is out of sight disturbs men's minds more seriously than what they see.

[85] Caesar found a suitable spot from which he could see what was proceeding in each quarter. To parties distressed he sent up supports. Both sides felt that this was the hour of all others in which it was proper to make their greatest effort. The Gauls utterly despaired of safety unless they could break through the lines; the Romans anticipated an end of all toils if they could hold their own. The hardest struggle occurred by the entrenchments on the hill, whither, as we have mentioned, Vercassivellaunus had been sent. The unfavourable downward slope of the ground had great effect. Some of the enemy discharged missiles, others moved up in close formation under their shields; fresh men quickly replaced the exhausted. Earth cast by the whole body together over the entrenchments gave the Gauls a means of ascent and at the same time covered over the appliances which the Romans had concealed in the ground; and our troops had now neither arms nor strength enough.

[86] When Caesar learnt this, he sent Labienus with six cohorts to support them in their distress. He commanded him, if he could not hold his ground, to draw in the cohorts and fight his way out, but not to do so unless of necessity. He himself went up to the rest of the troops, and urged them not to give in to the strain, telling them that the fruit of all previous engagements depended upon that day and hour. The enemy on the inner side, despairing of success on the level

ground, because of the size of the entrenchments, made an attempt to scale the precipitous parts, conveying thither the appliances they had prepared. They dislodged the defenders of the turrets by a swarm of missiles, filled in the trenches with earth and hurdles, tore down rampart and breastwork with grappling-hooks.

[87] Caesar first sent young Brutus with some cohorts, and then Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, with others; last of all, as the fight raged more fiercely, he himself brought up fresh troops to reinforce. The battle restored, and the enemy repulsed, he hastened to the quarter whither he had sent Labienus. He withdrew four cohorts from the nearest fort, and ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, part to go round the outer entrenchments and attack the enemy in rear. Labienus, finding that neither ramps nor trenches could resist the rush of the enemy, collected together forty cohorts, which had been withdrawn from the nearest post and by chance presented themselves, and sent messengers to inform Caesar what he thought it proper to do. Caesar hurried on to take part in the action.

[88] His coming was known by the colour of his cloak, which it was his habit to wear in action as a distinguishing mark; and the troops of cavalry and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him were noticed, because from the upper levels these downward slopes and depressions were visible. Thereupon the enemy joined battle: a shout was raised on both sides, and taken up by an answering shout from the rampart and the whole of the entrenchments. Our troops discarded their pikes and got to work with their swords. Suddenly the cavalry was noticed in the rear; other cohorts drew near. The enemy turned to flee; the cavalry met them in flight, and a great slaughter ensued. Sedulius, commander and chief of the Lemovices, was killed; Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian was captured alive in the

route; seventy-four war-standards were brought in to Caesar; of the vast host few returned safe to camp. The others beheld from the town the slaughter and rout of their countrymen, and, in despair of safety, recalled their force from the entrenchments. Directly they heard what had happened the Gauls fled from their camp. And if the troops had not been worn out by frequent reinforcing and the whole day's effort, the entire force of the enemy could have been destroyed. The cavalry were sent off just after midnight and caught up with the rearguard; a great number were taken and slain, the rest fled away into the different states.

[89] On the morrow Vercingetorix summoned a council, at which he stated that he had undertaken that campaign, not for his own occasions, but for the general liberty; and as they must yield to fortune he offered himself to them for whichever course they pleased — to give satisfaction to the Romans by his death, or to deliver him alive. Deputies were despatched to Caesar to treat of this matter. He ordered the arms to be delivered up, the chiefs to be brought out. He himself took his seat in the entrenchments in front of the camp: the leaders were brought out to him there. Vercingetorix was surrendered, arms were thrown down. Keeping back the Aedui and the Arverni, to see if through them he could recover their states, he distributed the rest of the prisoners, one apiece to each man throughout the army, by way of plunder.

[90] When these affairs were settled he started for the country of the Aedui and recovered the state. The Arverni sent deputies to him there who promised to carry out his commands: he required of them a great number of hostages. He sent the legions into cantonments. He restored some twenty thousand prisoners to the Aedui and the Arverni. He ordered Titus Labienus with two legions and cavalry to

march off into the country of the Sequani, attaching Marcus Sempronius Rutilus to him. Gaius Fabius, the lieutenant-general, and Lucius Minucius Basilus he stationed with two legions in the country of the Remi, in order that they might suffer no damage from the neighbouring Bellovaci. Gaius Antistius Reginus he sent into the territory of the Ambivareti, Titus Sextius to the Bituriges, Gaius Caninius Rebilus to the Ruteni, with a legion apiece. Quintus Tullius Cicero and Publius Sulpicius he stationed at Cabillonum and Matisco, Aeduan towns near the Arar, to secure the corn-supply. He himself decided to winter at Bibracte. When the despatches of the campaign were published at Rome a public thanksgiving of twenty days was granted.

BOOK VIII

By your continual reproaches, Balbus, which seemed to regard my daily refusal not as a plea caused by difficulty, but as an evasion due to indolence, I have been constrained to undertake a most difficult task. I have tacked a supplement to the Commentaries of our great Caesar on the operations in Gaul, as his previous and his subsequent writings did not otherwise fit together; and his last work, which was left unfinished from the operations at Alexandria onwards, I have completed as far as the conclusion, not indeed of civil discord, of which we see no end, but of Caesar's life. And I trust that those who will read it may understand how unwillingly I have undertaken the task of writing this Commentary; for so shall I the easier free myself from the charge of folly and presumption for having intruded myself in the middle of Caesar's writings. For it is universally agreed that nothing was ever so elaborately finished by others that is not surpassed by the refinement of these Commentaries. They have been published that historians may not lack knowledge of those great achievements; and so strong is the unanimous verdict of approval as to make it appear that historians have been robbed of an opportunity rather than enriched with one. Yet herein is our own admiration greater than all other men's; the world knows how excellently, how faultlessly, but we know also how easily, how speedily he completed his Commentaries. Caesar possessed not only the greatest facility and refinement of style, but also the surest skill in explaining his own plans. For myself, I had not the fortune ever to take part in the Alexandrian and the African campaign. It is true that those campaigns are partially known to me from the conversation of Caesar; but we listen in different fashion to events which fascinate us

by their wonderful novelty, and to events which we are to state in evidence. Yet I doubt not that, in collecting every plea to excuse myself from comparison with Caesar, I incur a charge of presumption for imagining that there is anyone in whose judgment I can be set beside Caesar. Farewell.

[1] The whole of Gaul was now subdued, and Caesar, having been continuously engaged in war since the previous summer, desired to refresh his troops with a rest in cantonments after their great exertions. Reports came, however, that several states at once were considering fresh plans of campaign and forming conspiracies. The reason suggested for this movement was probable. All the Gauls, it was said, were aware that, on the one hand, it was impossible to make a stand against the Romans by the concentration of any number of men in one place, and that, on the other, if a number of states attacked them in separate places at the same time, the army of Rome was not likely to have strength or time or troops enough to deal with everything. Wherefore it was not proper for a particular state to refuse any trouble that might befall, if by such a respite the remainder could reclaim their liberty.

[2] Caesar did not wish to encourage the Gauls in this opinion: he therefore put Marcus Antonius, his quartermaster-general, in command of his own cantonments, and on the last day of December marched off himself, with an escort of cavalry, from the town of Bibracte to the quarters of the Thirteenth Legion, stationed in the country of the Bituriges not far from that of the Aedui, and he brigaded with it the Eleventh Legion, its next neighbour. Leaving two cohorts of each to guard the baggage, he led the rest of the army into the most fertile districts of the Bituriges, since, being the possessors of broad territories and numerous strongholds, they had

proved more than a single legion in cantonments could restrain from warlike preparations and conspiracies.

[3] The sudden coming of Caesar brought the inevitable consequence on a folk dispersed and unprepared. They were tilling their farms without the least fear, and they were caught by the cavalry before they could flee for refuge into the strongholds. For even the ordinary sign of a hostile inroad (which is usually perceived by the wholesale burning of farm-buildings) had been omitted by Caesar's command, in order that his supply of forage and corn^o might not run short if he should wish to advance further, nor the enemy be frightened by the conflagrations. The capture of many thousand persons struck terror into the Bituriges; and those who had been able in the first instance to escape from the coming of the Romans had fled for refuge into neighbouring states, trusting either to private relations or to political sympathy. In vain; for by means of forced marches Caesar appeared in every corner, giving no state a chance of thought for another's safety rather than for its own; and by this rapidity of action he contrived at once to keep friends loyal and to bring doubters by intimidation to terms of peace. The Bituriges saw that the clemency of Caesar opened the way for a return to his friendship, and that neighbouring states, without punishment of any kind, had given hostages and had been readmitted to protection; and the chance of such terms induced them to do likewise.

[4] In spite of winter days, the most difficult of marches, and cold weather beyond endurance, the troops had stuck most zealously to their work, and in reward for their effort and hardship Caesar promised them two hundred sesterces apiece, and as many thousand to each centurion, as a free gift in lieu of booty. Then he sent the legions back to cantonments, and himself returned on the fortieth day

to Bibracte. While he was administering justice there the Bituriges sent deputies to him to seek help against the Carnutes who, as they complained, had made war upon them. On report of this, after a halt of no more than eighteen days in cantonments, he marched the Fourteenth and Sixth Legions from their cantonments on the Saône (these legions, as mentioned in the previous book of the Commentaries, he had stationed there to keep the corn-supply clear); then, with the two legions, he started to punish the Carnutes.

[5] When report of the army reached the enemy, the influence of the disaster which had befallen the rest made itself felt. The Carnutes forsook the villages and the strongholds — in which they were living for protection against the winter, in mean buildings erected hastily to meet their need, for after their recent defeat they had abandoned many of their strongholds — and fled in all directions. Caesar was unwilling that his troops should be subjected to the storms which break out in especial vehemence just at that time; so he pitched camp at Cenabum, the town of the Carnutes, and crowded the men partly into the dwellings of the Gauls, partly into huts built on to them with the thatch hastily collected for roofing the tents in winter. The cavalry, however, and auxiliary infantry were sent in all directions which the enemy were said to have taken, and not in vain, for as a rule our men returned with great store of booty. The Carnutes were overcome by the distress of winter and the fear of danger; they were driven out of their homes and durst make no long stay in any place; nor when the storms were most severe could they get shelter in the protection of the woods. So they scattered abroad and dispersed among the neighbouring states, with the loss of a great part of their own folk.

[6] It was now the most troublesome season of the year, and

Caesar, deeming it sufficient to scatter bands that were assembling so as to prevent any new outbreak of war, and feeling sure, so far as could reasonably be reckoned, that no war of first-rate importance could be stirred up until the summer season, stationed Gaius Trebonius, with the two legions of his own command, in cantonments at Cenabum. By frequent deputations from the Remi he was receiving information that the Bellovaci (who surpassed all the Gauls and Belgae in renown of war) and the neighbouring states were preparing armies under the leadership of Correus of the Bellovaci and Commius of the Atrebates, and concentrating the same. Their object was to make an incursion with all their host into the country of the Suessiones, who were tributaries of the Remi; and as Caesar deemed it important not only to his honour, but even to his security, that no disaster should come upon allies who had deserved exceeding well of the Republic, he again called out the Eleventh Legion from cantonments. Further, he sent a despatch to Gaius Fabius bidding him bring his two legions into the country of the Suessiones, and summoned one of the two legions with Titus Labienus. Thus, so far as the situation of the cantonments allowed, and the tactics of the campaign required, he contrived, by continuous work on his own part, to lay the burden of expeditions on the legions in turn.

[7] When this force was collected, he marched for the country of the Bellovaci, and having pitched camp therein, he despatched troops of cavalry in all directions to catch any prisoners they could from whom they might learn the enemy's plans. The cavalry performed their duty, and reported that in the buildings a few persons had been found; and even these had not stayed behind to till the fields (for the emigration had been thorough everywhere), but had been sent back

to act as spies. By inquiring of these as to where the main body of the Bellovaci was and what was their intention, he found out that all the Bellovaci able to bear arms had assembled in one place, and likewise the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caleti, Vellocasses, and Atrebatas; that they had chosen for their camp high ground in a wood surrounded by a marsh, and had collected all the baggage in the more distant woods; that several chiefs were responsible for the war, but the rank and file were mostly under the orders of Correus, because they had perceived that he was the one to whom the name of the Roman people was most hateful. He further learnt that a few days before Commius the Atrebatian had left their camp to bring up succours from the Germans, whose proximity was as imminent as their numbers were infinite. The Bellovaci, however, had determined, with the consent of all the chiefs and the utmost enthusiasm of the common folk, if Caesar, as was said, came with three legions, to offer battle, lest they might be compelled afterwards to fight it out with his whole army under conditions more miserable and severe. If Caesar brought up a larger force, they had determined to stand fast in the position they had chosen, while they tried, from ambushades, to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which by reason of the time of year was both scanty and scattered), corn, and all other supplies.

[8] Upon this information, in regard to which most of the prisoners were in agreement, Caesar considered that the plans proposed were full of a prudence far removed from the recklessness of barbarians, and decided accordingly to make all possible efforts to induce the enemy, by contempt for the scanty number of the Romans, to come forth the more speedily to battle. For the truth was that he had the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions, real veterans of incomparable courage, and the Eleventh, a most promising corps of picked younger

men: it was now on its eighth campaign, but in comparison with the rest had not yet won the same reputation for length of service and for courage. Accordingly, he summoned a council of war and set forth everything that had been reported to him; then he spoke encouragingly to the rank and file. To see if he could entice the enemy to a decisive battle by the appearance of only three legions, he arranged the order of the column as follows. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth were to march in front of all the baggage, and the Eleventh was to bring up the rear of the whole baggage-train (which, however, was but moderate, according to the custom on expeditions), to prevent the enemy from catching a sight of greater numbers than they themselves had challenged. By this arrangement he formed the army almost in battle column, and brought it within sight of the enemy before they expected it.

[9] When the Gauls (whose plans in all their self-confidence had been reported to Caesar) suddenly saw the legions in their formation advancing upon them in regular step as in line of battle, they drew up their force in front of their camp, but — either because they felt the risk of a struggle, or because of the suddenness of our arrival, or because they waited to see our plan — did not move from the higher ground. Anxious as he had been to fight, Caesar was surprised at the greater number of the enemy, and set his camp over against that of the enemy, with a valley in between, deep rather than extensive. He commanded the camp to be fortified with a twelve-foot rampart, a breastwork to be built on in proportion to the height of the same, a double trench fifteen feet wide in each case to be dug with perpendicular sides, turrets three stories high to be set up at frequent intervals and connected by covered cross-bridges, having their front faces protected by a breastwork of wattles. His object was to hold the

camp against the enemy by the double ditch and a double rank of defenders: one rank, posted on the bridges, from the greater safety afforded by height, could hurl its missiles with greater range and confidence; the other, posted on the actual rampart nearer the enemy, would be covered by the bridge from the showers of missiles. At the gateways he set doors and higher turrets.

[10] The object of this fortification was twofold. He hoped that the size of the works and the evidence of fear on his part would bring confidence into the minds of the natives, and he saw that whenever it was necessary to march farther afield for forage and corn the fortification of itself would make it possible to defend the camp with a small force. Meanwhile there were frequent encounters across the marsh that lay between the two camps, for a few men would dash forward from either side; but sometimes our own Gallic or German auxiliaries would cross the marsh to pursue the enemy the more fiercely, or in turn the enemy would push across it and force our troops to give ground. Moreover, in the daily expeditions for forage it happened — as was inevitable, when forage had to be collected from homesteads few and far apart — that scattered foraging parties were surrounded in troublesome places; and this occurrence, though causing our troops an insignificant loss in draught-animals and slaves, served nevertheless to arouse foolish fancies in the mind of the natives, the more so as Commius, who, as I have shown, had departed to fetch German auxiliaries, was now come with some horsemen. It is true they were no more in number than five hundred; nevertheless, the arrival of these Germans gave the natives something to rely on.

[11] Caesar remarked that for several days the enemy kept within their camp, which was fortified by the marsh and by its natural

position, and that it could not be assaulted without an expensive action, nor the position enclosed by siege-works without a larger army than he had. Wherefore he sent a despatch to Trebonius to summon with all speed the Thirteenth Legion (which was wintering in the country of the Bituriges with Titus Sextius, lieutenant-general), and so with three legions to come to him by forced marches. He himself had called out a large number of horsemen belonging to the Remi, the Lingones, and other states; and he now sent these by turns to act as escort for the foraging parties and to resist sudden raids of the enemy.

[12] This happened daily, and at length the sameness of the duty began to diminish carefulness — the usual result of long continuance in one thing. Then the Bellovaci chose out a detachment of footmen, and, as they knew the daily stations of our cavalry piquets, set ambuscades about in wooded spots, and on the morrow sent thither horsemen also, first to lure on our men, and then, when they were surrounded, to attack them. As it chanced, the blow fell upon the Remi, to whom the performance of duty for that day had been allotted. When they suddenly remarked the enemy's horsemen, and in their superiority of numbers despised the scanty force, they pursued too eagerly and were surrounded by footmen on every side. They were more speedily thrown into confusion by this occurrence than is usually the case in a cavalry combat, and retired with the loss of Vertiscus, a chief of their state and commander of the horse. Though he could scarcely sit a horse by reason of age, yet, according to the custom of the Gauls, he had made no excuse of age in undertaking the command, and he had desired that no battle should take place without him. The spirit of the enemy was fired and excited by the success of the combat and the slaughter of a chief and

commander of the Remi, and our own troops were taught by the disaster to search localities more carefully before they posted their piquets and to pursue a retiring enemy with more restraint.

[13] There was no interruption meanwhile of the daily combats in sight of both camps, which usually took place at the fords and passages over the marsh. In this sort of contest the Germans (whom Caesar had brought over the Rhine on purpose that they might fight intermingled with cavalry) on one occasion crossed the marsh in a body with much resolution, cut down such few men as stood their ground, and stubbornly pursued the rest of the host. The result was a panic, not only of those whom they caught at close quarters or wounded at long range, but even of those who formed the regular reserve at a distance. It was a disgraceful rout, which did not end until, after several times losing the advantage of position, the enemy reached once more their own camp, or in some cases were shamed into yet further flight. Their danger threw the whole force into such confusion that it was scarce possible to judge which was the greater — their arrogance after a trifling success, or their terror after a slight reverse.^a

[14] After several days spent in the same camp, the chiefs of the Bellovacī learnt that the legions with Gaius Trebonius, lieutenant-general, were come nearer; and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, they thought to send away at night all persons failing in years or strength, or unarmed, and the rest of the baggage along with them. While they were marshalling the crowded and disorderly column (for a great quantity of carts usually accompanies the Gauls, even when they are moving light), daybreak came upon them, and they drew up their force of armed men in front of their own camp, for fear that the Romans might essay to pursue them before their baggage-train had

advanced to any distance. Caesar, however, considered that if they stood their ground they should not be attacked, owing to the steepness of the ascent, and yet that the legions should certainly be moved up close enough to make it impossible for the natives to withdraw from the spot without risk of an attack. Seeing, therefore, that camp was divided from camp by a troublesome marsh so difficult to cross that it could check the speed of a pursuit, and remarking that beyond the marsh the ridge, stretching almost to the enemy's camp, was cut off from the same by but a slight valley, he had gangways laid over the marsh, led the legions across, and speedily reached the highest plateau on the ridge, which was protected on its two sides by a downward slope. There he reformed the legions, and then reached the end of the ridge, where he posted his line of battle in a spot from which the missiles of the artillery could be discharged into the masses of the enemy.

[15] The natives relied on the natural strength of the position; and while they did not intend to decline battle, if perchance the Romans should try to mount the hill, they could not send their forces away gradually in detachments, for fear that, if so dispersed, they would be put to confusion. So they stood fast in line. Caesar noted their stubbornness, and forming up twenty cohorts, he measured out a camp on the spot and ordered it to be entrenched. The works finished, he set the legions in battle array before the rampart, and placed the cavalry, with chargers bridled, on outpost. The Bellovaci saw that the Romans were ready for pursuit, and feeling that they could not spend the night where they were, nor, indeed, remain longer without danger, they determined on the following plan of retirement. They had a very large quantity of straw bales and faggots in their camp; and passing these from hand to hand between them

where they sat (for, as stated in former books of Caesar's Commentaries, it is the custom of the Gauls to sit in line of battle), they piled them in front of their line, and at the end of the day they fired them simultaneously at a given signal. So a continuous flame suddenly covered the whole force from the sight of the Romans. When this occurred, the natives fled away at a most furious speed.

[16] Caesar could not observe the withdrawal of the enemy through the screen of fires, but, nevertheless, suspecting that the stratagem had been adopted with flight in view, he advanced the legions and despatched troops of cavalry in pursuit. He himself moved forward more slowly, fearing an ambushade — in other words, that the enemy might perhaps try to hold their ground and to entice our troops onto unfavourable ground. The cavalry feared to enter the smoke and the thick belt of flame, and even if any more eager spirits entered therein, they scarce could make out the front part of their own horses; wherefore, in fear of an ambushade, they gave the Bellovaci a free chance of retirement. So they fled, with as much of cunning as of fear, and with no loss; and proceeding no more than ten miles, they pitched camp in a strongly fenced place. Thence, often setting horsemen and foot in ambushades, they wrought great havoc upon the Roman foraging parties.

[17] This happened somewhat frequently, and from a prisoner Caesar discovered that Correus, the chief of the Bellovaci, had chosen six thousand footmen and a thousand horse from the total number, to put them in ambushade at a spot to which he suspected the Romans would be sending because of the store and corn and forage there. Upon information of this design Caesar brought out more legions than usual, and pushed forward cavalry, according to his practice of sending such as an escort for foraging parties, and

among them he put light-armed auxiliaries. He himself approached as near as possible with the legions.

[18] The enemy were set about in ambuscades. They had chosen for the despatch of the business a plain extending not more than a mile in every direction, fenced every way by woods or by a most troublesome river: this plain they surrounded with a network of ambuscades. The enemy's design was found out, and our men, with hearts and hands all ready for fight — for with the legions supporting they had no idea of declining battle — reached the spot troop by troop. Their arrival led Correus to suppose that a chance of despatching the business was offered him; and showing himself first with a few men, he charged the nearest troops of cavalry. Our men stoutly withstood the onrush of the ambuscaders without crowding together — and when such crowding occurs, as it generally does in cavalry combats, through a sense of fear, the mere numbers of the men engaged cause loss.

[19] Our troops of cavalry were thus posted in different places, and when scattered parties began one after another to engage, to prevent their comrades being outflanked, the rest of the enemy, while Correus was fighting, burst out of the woods. In different parts of the field a fierce struggle began; and as it tended to drag on indecisively, little by little there issued from the woods a formed body of footmen, which forced our cavalry to give way. But they were speedily supported by the light-armed infantry, which, as I have mentioned, had been sent on in front of the legions, and these, taking post between the troops of our cavalry, fought stoutly. For some time the battle was evenly contested; then, as was inevitable from the nature of the engagement, the troops which had withstood the first attack from the ambuscades began to get the better of it just because they

had not suffered any damage from the ambuscaders through want of judgment. Meanwhile the legions were drawing nearer, and frequent reports were being brought alike to our own side and to the enemy to the effect that the commander-in-chief was come with troops in order of battle. When they learnt this our men, relying on the support of the cohorts, fought most fiercely, for they feared that if they were too slow of execution they would be thought to have shared the glory of victory with the legions. The enemy's spirits fell, and by different roads they sought to flee. In vain; for they themselves were held fast by those difficulties of the locality, by which they had hoped to cut off the Romans. Still, beaten and broken as they were, and panic-stricken by the loss of more than half their number, they fled on, part by way of the woods, part by the river-side; yet even these fugitives were slain by the eager pursuit of our men. Meanwhile Correus, in no wise conquered by disaster, could not be induced to withdraw from the engagement and seek the woods, nor to surrender at our summons; nay, fighting most gallantly and wounding many men, he compelled the victors, in a frenzy of rage, to hurl their missiles against him.

[20] The business had been despatched after this fashion, and the traces of the combat were still fresh, when Caesar came on the scene. He supposed that the enemy were crushed by so dire a disaster, and that upon report thereof they would abandon their camping-ground, said to be not farther than eight miles, more or less, from the field of slaughter. He saw that his passage was impeded by the river, but, none the less, he led the army across and advanced. But when the Bellovacii and the rest of the states received suddenly among them the few fugitives, and those wounded, who by the help of the woods had escaped destruction, they recognized their disaster, seeing that all

was against them, that Correus was slain, that their horsemen and the most gallant of their footmen were lost. And as they thought the Romans were coming upon them they suddenly summoned a conference by trumpet-call, and clamoured that deputies and hostages should be sent to Caesar.

[21] When this counsel was approved by all, Commius the Atrebatian escaped to the Germans from whom he had borrowed succours for that campaign. The rest at once sent deputies to Caesar, and besought him to be satisfied with a punishment of his enemy which, had he been able to inflict it without a battle while their strength was unimpaired, in his mercy and kindness he would assuredly never have inflicted. The power of the Bellovaci was crushed, they said, by the cavalry combat; many thousand chosen footmen had perished, scarcely had men escaped to tell of the slaughter. Nevertheless, for all the greatness of the disaster, the Bellovaci had gained one advantage by the combat, in the slaughter of Correus, who had originated the campaign and stirred up the people. For never during his lifetime had the council possessed so much power in the state as the untutored populace.

[22] To this petition of the deputies Caesar remarked that in the previous year the Bellovaci and the rest of the Gallic states had simultaneously engaged in war: the Bellovaci had stuck to their intention the most obstinately of all, and had not been brought to a right mind by the surrender of the rest. He was very well aware that it was easy enough to shift the blame of the offence on to the dead. But no one was so powerful that, if chiefs were reluctant, the council in opposition, and all good citizens adverse, he could excite and conduct a war by means of a feeble band of common folk. Nevertheless, he would be satisfied with the punishment which they

had brought upon themselves.

[23] In the ensuing night the deputies reported his replies to the people, and the tale of hostages was made up. Deputies met hastily together from the rest of the states, which were watching to see how the Bellovaci fared. They gave hostages and did as commanded, with the exception of Commius, whom fear prevented from entrusting his personal safety to the honour of any man. The truth was that in the previous year, while Caesar was in Nearer Gaul administering justice, Titus Labienus, having discovered Commius to be tampering with the states and forming a conspiracy against Caesar, determined that his faithlessness might be suppressed without any breach of faith. And as he did not suppose that Commius would come to the camp on a summons, he did not wish to make him more cautious by any such attempt; he therefore sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to compass his execution on pretence of parley. He gave him a party of centurions, chosen as fit for the purpose. When they were come to the parley, and, as agreed, Volusenus seized the hand of Commius, a centurion — unsteadied, it may be, by the strangeness of the task, or speedily prevented by the friends of Commius — could not despatch the man; however, with the first stroke he dealt him a severe blow on the head. Swords were drawn on both sides, but both thought not so much of fight as of flight, our own men because they believed that Commius had got a mortal wound, the Gauls because they knew it was an ambush, and feared more trouble than they saw. After this deed Commius, it was said, had resolved never to come within sight of any Roman.

[24] So the most warlike nations were subdued; and as he saw that there was no longer any state able to compass a war of resistance to himself — that not a few persons were moving out of the towns and

fleeing away from the fields to avoid the dominion at their gates — Caesar determined to divide the army into several parts. Marcus Antonius, the quartermaster-general, with the Twelfth Legion he attached to his own force. Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, with five-and-twenty cohorts he sent to an entirely different part of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were in arms, and believed that the two legions with Gaius Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant-general in those parts, were not strong enough. Titus Labienus he summoned to join him, sending the Fifteenth Legion, however, which had been with Labienus in cantonments, to Italian Gaul to protect the colonies of Roman citizens and to prevent the occurrence of a disaster, through a raid of barbarians, similar to that which had occurred the summer before to the men of Tergeste, who had been overwhelmed by a sudden assault of Illyrian brigands. He himself moved off to devastate and plunder the country of Ambiorix; and, in despair of being able to bring the frightened fugitive into his power, he deemed it the best thing, out of regard for his own prestige, so completely to strip his territory of citizens, buildings, and cattle as to make Ambiorix hated by any of his subjects who might chance to survive, and to leave him no return to the state by reason of disasters so grievous.

[25] He despatched legions or auxiliaries into every part of the country of Ambiorix, wrought general devastation by slaughter, fire, and pillage, killed or captured a large number of persons. He then sent Labienus with two legions against the Treveri. This state, by reason of its proximity to Germany and its training in daily wars, differed little from the Germans in its habits of barbarity, and never submitted to commands except under compulsion of an army.

[26] Meanwhile Gaius Caninius, lieutenant-general, had learnt by

despatches and messages from Duratius that a great host of the enemy had assembled in the country of the Pictones. Duratius had remained throughout in amity with the Romans, though a certain part of his state had revolted. Caninius therefore pushed forward towards the town of Lemonum (Poitiers), and as he came near it he received more definite information from prisoners that Duratius was shut up in Lemonum and attacked by Dumnacus, chief of the Andes, with many thousand men. Not venturing to pit weak legions against the enemy, the Roman commander pitched camp in a fenced position. When Dumnacus learnt the approach of Caninius, he turned the whole of his force against the legions and prepared to assault the Roman camp. After spending several days on the assault, and failing, though with great loss of his men, to break down any part of the entrenchments, he returned again to the siege of Lemonum.

[27] Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, was readmitting several states to protection, with hostages to confirm the same, just at the moment when by a despatch from Gaius Caninius Rebilus he learnt what was happening in the country of the Pictones. Upon the information he started to render assistance to Duratius. But when Dumnacus learnt of the arrival of Fabius he despaired of safety, if he were to be compelled at one and the same time to withstand a Roman enemy outside and to keep an anxious watch upon the townsfolk; so he suddenly retired with his force from the place, thinking that he would not be really safe unless he marched his force across the river Loire, which by reason of its size had to be crossed by a bridge. Fabius was not yet come within sight of the enemy and had not joined forces with Caninius; nevertheless, on information derived from those who knew the character of the country, he believed that the enemy in panic would make for the spot for which they were

actually making. So he pressed on with his force to the same bridge, and commanded the cavalry to advance to such a distance in front of the column as should make it possible, after such advance, to retire without fatiguing the horses to the same camp as himself. The Roman cavalry went in chase, according to their instructions, and attacked the column of Dumnacus, and as their assault was delivered upon panic-stricken fugitives in heavy marching order they slew many and got great spoil. So, their business well done, they retired to camp.

[28] The following night Fabius sent on the cavalry with instructions to fight and to delay the whole column till he himself should come up. And in order to carry out the operation in accordance with these instructions Quintus Atius Varus, commander of the cavalry, a soldier of uncommon spirit and sagacity, after haranguing his men, caught up the enemy's column and, placing part of his troops of cavalry in suitable positions, with part engaged in combat. The enemy's cavalry fought with the greater boldness because their footmen were coming up in support, and the latter, halting their whole column, rendered assistance to their cavalry against ours. A fiercely contested combat ensued. Our cavalry despised an enemy they had beaten the day before, and, remembering that the legions were following up, were ashamed to yield and eager to finish the combat by themselves, so that they fought most gallantly against the footmen; while the enemy, believing, according to their information of the day before, that there were no more troops to come up, thought they had got a chance of exterminating our cavalry.

[29] As the fight went on for some time with the utmost keenness, Dumnacus was drawing up his line to furnish in due turn a support for his horsemen, when suddenly the legions in close order came into

view of the enemy. At sight of them the troops of native horse were paralyzed, the enemy's line was terror-struck; and throwing their baggage-column into confusion, with a great shout they scattered in every direction and betook themselves to flight. Then our own cavalry, who a moment before had been struggling most gallantly with a resisting foe, set up a great shout on every hand in the joyful excitement of victory and surrounded them as they retreated, and in that encounter they slew as long as their horses had strength to pursue and their hands to strike. So more than twelve thousand, armed men or men who had flung away their arms in the panic I have described, were slain, and the whole train of the baggage was captured.

[30] After the rout it became known that Drappes, a Senonian — who at the first outbreak of the revolt in Gaul had collected desperadoes from anywhere and everywhere, calling slaves to liberty, summoning exiles from every state, and harbouring brigands, and with these forces had cut off the baggage-trains and supplies of the Romans — with no more than two thousand men, collected from the rout, was making for the Province; and that Lucterius the Cadurcan, who (as we know from the preceding book of the Commentaries) had desired to make an attack on the Province at the beginning of the Gallic revolt, had made common cause with him. Wherefore Caninius, the lieutenant-general, pressed on with two legions in pursuit of them to prevent the dire disgrace that must result, by loss of panic in the Province, from the acts of these desperate brigands.

[31] Gaius Fabius, with the rest of the army, marched off against the Carnutes and the other states whose forces, as he knew, had been worsted in the battle which he had fought with Dumnacus. He had,

indeed, no doubt that they would prove more submissive in view of the recent disaster, but felt that, if time and space were granted, they might be stirred up again on the provocation of Dumnacus. And on this occasion Fabius was attended by the most signal and speedy success in his recovery of the states. The Carnutes, who, though often harassed, had never made mention of peace, gave hostages and surrendered; and the other states aid in the most distant borders of Gaul, next the Ocean, the Armoric states so-called, were constrained by the example of the Carnutes to submit at once to orders when Fabius and the legions arrived. Dumnacus was driven out of his own country and compelled, in secret, solitary wanderings, to seek the uttermost parts of Gaul.

[32] But Drappes and his partner Lucterius, when they learnt that Caninius and the legions were at hand, conceived that with an army at their heels they could not enter the confines of the Province without certain destruction; and as they had no chance of ranging freely and committing acts of brigandage, they halted in the country of the Cadurci. Lucterius had wielded great power there among his own countrymen in earlier days when their fortunes were unimpaired, and a champion of revolution always exercised great influence among the natives. With his own and Drappes' forces he occupied Uxellodunum, formerly a dependency of his, a town exceedingly well protected by its natural position, and he added the townsfolk to his force.

[33] Thither with all speed came Gaius Caninius. He noticed that every part of the town was protected by the most precipitous rocks, which, even if undefended, it was difficult for armed men to climb; but at the same time he saw that the townsfolk had great quantities of baggage, and that, if they tried to remove it in secret flight, they

would be unable to escape not only the cavalry but even the legions. Accordingly he divided his cohorts into three detachments, and formed three camps on very high ground, from which he proceeded by degrees, according to the capacity of his troops, to run a rampart all round the town.

[34] When the townsfolk remarked this they were filled with anxiety, remembering the utter distress at Alesia, and fearing that a blockade might have similar result; and Lucterius most of all, having experienced that fate, admonished them to have a care for the corn-supply. By general consent, therefore, the two leaders determined to leave a part of their force there, and to set forth with a body of light-armed troops to get corn into the town. This plan being approved, Drappes and Lucterius the following night left behind two thousand armed men and led the rest out of the town. In the space of a few days this party collected a great quantity of corn from the country of the Cadurci, some of whom were eager to assist them with a supply, while others were unable to prevent them from taking it; and several times they moved by night to attack our forts. Therefore Gaius Caninius delayed to make a ring of entrenchments all round the town, for fear he might not be able to defend the works when finished or might have to post weak detachments in a number of separate positions.

[35] Having collected great store of corn, Drappes and Lucterius established themselves not more than ten miles from the town, intending from this point to convey the corn into the town by degrees. The commanders divided the duties between them: Drappes stood fast with part of the force to guard the camp, Lucterius escorted the train of animals to the town. Having posted several detachments thereabout, he began about the tenth hour of the night to carry the

corn into the town by narrow paths through the woods. The camp sentries noticed the noise thereof, and scouts, being sent out, reported what was afoot; so Caninius moved speedily with cohorts (which had stood to arms) from the nearest forts and attacked the corn-carriers just before dawn. They were panic-struck by the sudden blow, and fled helter-skelter to their own detachments. When our men saw it they dashed the more fiercely against the armed men, and suffered not one of the number to be taken alive. Lucterius fled away from the spot with a few followers, and did not return to the camp.

[36] After his success Caninius discovered from the prisoners that a part of the force was with Drappes in camp not much more than twelve miles away. He ascertained this from several persons, and perceiving that if they were panic-stricken by the rout of one chief, the rest could easily be overwhelmed, he thought it a great piece of fortune that no one had escaped from the slaughter to the camp to bring news to Drappes of the disaster they had suffered. But, though he saw no danger in the attempt, he sent forward to the enemy's camp all the cavalry and the German infantry, the swiftest of troops, and, distributing one legion between the three camps, himself led off the other in light order. When he was come nearer the enemy, he learnt from the scouts he had sent forward that, according to the general rule of the natives, the higher ground had been abandoned and the camp brought down to the banks of the river; also that the Germans and cavalry had caught them altogether unawares when they swooped suddenly upon them, and had engaged. On this report he brought up the legion, armed and formed for action, and then suddenly, at a given signal, the upper ground was surrounded and captured. When this happened, the Germans and the cavalry, at sight of the standards of the line, fought with the utmost fury. The cohorts

charged at once from all sides, and as every man was killed or captured much booty fell into their hands. Drappes himself was captured in that engagement.

[37] After this brilliant success, with scarce a soldier wounded, Caninius returned to the blockade of the townsfolk; and now that he had exterminated the enemy outside, in fear of whom he had hitherto been prevented from breaking up his force into detachments and surrounding the townsfolk with an entrenchment, he commanded siege-works to be carried out on every side. Next day Gaius Fabius joined him there with his own force and took a part of the town to blockade.

[38] Meanwhile Caesar left Marcus Antonius, quartermaster-general, with fifteen cohorts in the country of the Bellovaci, in order to give the Belgae no further chance of framing rebellious designs. He himself visited the rest of the states, making requisition of more hostages and quieting the general apprehension by words of encouragement. When he was come to the Carnutes, the state in which (as Caesar explained in the preceding book of his Commentaries) the war had originated, he remarked that they were especially alarmed owing to their consciousness of guilt; and the more speedily to free the state from apprehension he demanded for punishment Gutruatus, the ringleader in that crime and the instigator of the rebellion. And although the man would not trust himself even to his fellow-countrymen, all bestirred themselves speedily to seek him out and bring him to the camp. In opposition to his own natural inclination, Caesar was compelled to execute him by the troops who gathered in a mighty crowd, for they attributed to him all the dangers and losses of the war. He was therefore scourged to death and then decapitated.

[39] At this point Caesar learned by frequent despatches from Caninius what had been done with Drappes and Lucterius and what was the steadfast purpose of the townsfolk. And though he disregarded their small numbers, he judged nevertheless that their obstinacy must be visited with a severe punishment, for he feared that the Gauls as a whole might suppose that what had been lacking in them for resisting the Romans was not strength, but resolution; and that the rest of the state might follow this example and rely on any advantage offered by strong positions to reassert their liberty. All the Gauls were aware, as he knew, that there was one more summer season in his term of office, and that, if they could hold out for that, they had no further danger to fear. And so, leaving Quintus Calenus, lieutenant-general, with the legions to follow after him by regular marches, he himself with the whole of the cavalry pressed on with all speed to join Caninius.

[40] He reached Uxellodunum altogether unexpected. He perceived that the town was surrounded by siege-works and that the enemy had no chance of retreat from an assault, and he had learnt from deserters that the townsfolk were well supplied with a large quantity of corn; he began, therefore, to try to cut off their water. A river ran through the bottom of the valley which almost entirely surrounded the hill, and on the hill was built the town of Uxellodunum, with a precipice on every side. The lie of the ground prevented a diversion of the river, for its course at the very base of the hill was such that it could nowhere be drawn off by sinking trenches. But the townsfolk had a difficult and precipitous descent to the river, so that our troops, without danger to life or limb, could prevent them from either approaching the river or retiring up the steep ascent. Caesar remarked this difficulty of theirs, and by posting archers and slingers

thereabout, and, further, by placing artillery at certain points opposite the easiest lines of descent, he sought to cut off the townsfolk from the river-water.

[41] Subsequently the whole host of water-carriers assembled at one spot, immediately under the town wall. A great spring of water gushed out there, on the side where for an interval of about three hundred feet there was a break in the circuit of the river. All the Romans wished that the townsfolk could be cut off from this spring, but Caesar alone saw how it could be done. He began, just opposite the place, to push up mantlets against the hill and to build a ramp with great effort and continual fighting; for the townsfolk ran down from the higher ground and engaged without risk at long range, wounding many men as they doggedly worked upwards. However, our troops were not to be deterred from thrusting the mantlets forward and from defeating the local difficulties by sheer labour of engineering. At the same time they were pushing forward covered mines from the mantlets to the head of the spring; and this kind of work involved no risk, and could be done without suspicion on the part of the enemy. The ramp was built up to a height of sixty feet, and upon it was set a turret of ten stories, not, indeed, to reach the level of the walls, for no siege-works could effect that, but to overtop the level of the spring. When the artillery from the turret began to discharge missiles upon the line of approach to the spring, and the townsfolk could not get water without danger, not only cattle and beasts of burden, but even the great host of the enemy, were like to die of thirst.

[42] Terror-struck by this trouble, the townsfolk filled tubs with grease, pitch, and shingles, and rolled them burning on to the works, at the same time engaging with the utmost ferocity in order that the

danger of the fight might prevent the Romans from extinguishing the fire. A mighty flame suddenly shot forth in the midst of the works; for everything that was discharged over the escarpment was held up by the mantlets and the ramp, and set fire to the particular object which checked its course. On the other hand, our soldiers, though handicapped by the dangerous position, none the less endured every difficulty in the most gallant spirit. For the action went on at a considerable height and in sight of our army, and great shouting arose on both sides. So each man, in as conspicuous a fashion as he could — the better to make his valour known and approved — faced alike the missiles of the enemy and the flames.

[43] Seeing not a few of his men wounded, Caesar ordered cohorts to climb the height from every side of the town and under pretence of attacking the walls to raise a shout all round. This action terrified the townsfolk, and in their uncertainty as to what was going on in the other quarters they replaced their men-at-arms from the attempt on the works and set them along the walls. So our men, when the fighting ceased, speedily extinguished or cut away the parts of the works which had caught fire. Although the townsfolk continued to resist stoutly, and stuck to their resolve, even when they had lost a great part of their number through thirst, at last by means of the mines the feeders of the spring were cut off and diverted. This caused the perpetual spring suddenly to dry up, and wrought such despair of deliverance in the townsfolk that they thought it due, not to the device of man, but to the act of God. And so necessity forced them to surrender.

[44] Caesar's clemency, as he knew, was familiar to all, and he did not fear that severer action on his part might seem due to natural cruelty; at the same time he could not see any successful issue to his

plans if more of the enemy in different districts engaged in designs of this sort. He therefore considered that the rest must be deterred by an exemplary punishment; and so, while granting them their lives, he cut off the hands of all who had borne arms, to terrify the more openly the penalty of evildoers. Drappes, taken prisoner by Caninius, as I have related, was so mortified at the indignity of bondage, or so fearful of yet more grievous punishment, that he abstained from food for a few days and so met his death. At the same time Lucterius, who escaped from the fight, as I described, came into the hands of Epasnactus, an Arvernian; for he had to change his quarters frequently and to entrust himself to the honour of many persons, as he felt that he could make no long stay anywhere without danger, conscious as he was how bitter an enemy he must have in Caesar. And now Epasnactus the Arvernian, a devoted friend of the Roman people, put him in bonds without hesitation and brought him in to Caesar.

[45] Meanwhile, in the country of the Treveri, Labienus fought a cavalry combat with success, killing not a few of the Treveri and of the Germans, who never refused succours to any state against the Romans. Their chiefs he got into his power alive, among them Surus the Aeduan, a man of the highest distinction in courage as well as lineage, and the only Aeduan who had remained in arms up to that time.

[46] On report of this, Caesar saw that matters were going well in every part of Gaul, and he judged that in the campaigns of the previous summers Gaul had been conquered and subdued. But as he himself had never visited Aquitaine, though he had partially conquered it by the campaign of Publius Crassus, he started with two legions for that part of Gaul, to spend there the campaign season of

his last summer. And he carried out this work, like all others, with speed and success, for all the states of Aquitaine sent deputies to him and gave hostages. These affairs settled, he started for Narbonne with an escort of cavalry, despatching the army to winter quarters under command of the lieutenant-generals. Four legions he stationed in Belgium, with the generals Marcus Antonius, Gaius Trebonius, and Publius Vatinius; two he despatched into the country of the Aedui, whose influence he knew to be supreme in the whole of Gaul; two he stationed among the Turoni, on the borders of the Carnutes, to hold all that district next to the Ocean; the remaining two in the country of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, in order that no part of Gaul might be without an army. He himself stayed for a few days in the Province, and speedily passed through all the assize towns, investigated matters of public dispute, and assigned rewards to the meritorious; for he had the best possible chance of learning what had been the temper of each person in that revolt of all Gaul which he had withstood by the loyalty and the succours of that Province. This business despatched, he retired to the legions in Belgium and wintered at Nemetocenna.

[47] There he learnt that Commius the Atrebatian had had an encounter with the Roman cavalry. The truth was that Antonius had gone into cantonments, and the state of the Atrebates was loyal; but Commius, after the wound which I have related above, had kept himself always in readiness for any rising in the interest of his fellow-countrymen, that when they sought a plan of campaign they might not lack a man to inspire and to lead their arms. And now, when the state was in obedience to the Romans, with his own horsemen he supported himself and his followers by acts of brigandage, and by infesting the roads he cut off several trains of

supplies which were being conveyed to the cantonments of the Romans.

[48] Gaius Volusenus Quadratus had been attached as cavalry commander to Antonius, to winter with him, and Antonius despatched him to pursue the enemy's horse. With the unique courage which he possessed Volusenus combined great hatred of Commius, so that he was the more willing to carry out his order. So he set ambuscades about, attacked the other's horsemen frequently, and won his actions. At last, in a fiercer struggle than unusual, wherein Volusenus, in his desire to cut off Commius in person, had pursued him too persistently with a few followers, while Commius in furious flight had led Volusenus on too far, in his hatred of the Roman he suddenly called on the loyal assistance of his men not to leave unpunished the wounds inflicted on himself under pledge of faith, then turned his horse, and leaving the rest, recklessly galloped at the Roman commander. All his horsemen did likewise, turning and pursuing our small party. Commius spurred on his horse and brought it abreast of the horse of Quadratus, pointed his lance, and with a mighty thrust pierced him in the middle of the thigh. When their commander was wounded our men at once stood fast, then turned their horses about and drove back the enemy. Upon this a number of the enemy were crushed and wounded by the strength of our onset, and some were ridden down in flight, some cut off. Their leader escaped this fate by the speed of his horse; but the Roman commander, so grievously wounded that he seemed likely to come within peril of his life, was carried back to camp. Commius, however, either because his wrath was appraised or because he had lost a great part of his following, sent deputies to Antonius and gave hostages to guarantee that he would report himself where Antonius

should prescribe and submit to his commands. One concession he prayed might be granted to his fears — that he would not come into the sight of any Roman. Judging that this demand proceeded from a legitimate fear, Antonius indulged his petition and accepted his hostages. I am aware that Caesar has compiled a separate Commentary for each year; but I have deemed it unnecessary for me to do this, because the ensuing year, when Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus were consuls, contains no operations on a large scale in Gaul. However, to leave no one in ignorance as to the positions of Caesar and his army at that time, I have decided to write a few remarks and add them to this Commentary.

[49] During his winter in Belgium Caesar had one definite purpose in view — to keep the states friendly, and to give hope or occasion of armed action to none. There was nothing, in fact, which he desired less than to have the definite necessity of a campaign imposed upon him on the eve of his quitting his province, for fear that, when he was about to lead his army south, he might leave behind a war which all Gaul could readily take up without immediate danger. Accordingly, by addressing the states in terms of honour, by bestowing ample presents upon the chief, by imposing no new burdens, he easily kept Gaul at peace after the exhaustion of so many defeats, under improved conditions of obedience.

[50] The winter season over, he varied his usual practice, travelling to Italy with all possible speed in order to address the boroughs and colonies to which he had already commended the candidature of his quartermaster-general, Marcus Antonius, for the priesthood. He was glad to use his personal influence in the contest for an intimate friend of his own, whom he had sent on a little before to pursue his candidature; he was no less eager to do so in opposition to the

powerful partisanship of the few who desired, by the defeat of Marcus Antonius, to upset the influence of Caesar when he should retire from his province. And although he had heard on the way that, before he could reach Italy, Antonius had been elected augur, he felt that he had no less legitimate reason for visiting the boroughs and colonies to thank them for affording Antonius their support in so large numbers, and at the same time to commend himself as a candidate for the office he sought for the following year. For his opponents were insolently boasting that Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus had been elected consuls to despoil Caesar of every office and distinction, and that the consulship had been wrested from Servius Galba, though he had been far stronger in influence and votes alike, because he was intimately connected with Caesar by personal friendship and by service as his lieutenant-general.

[51] The arrival of Caesar was welcomed by all the boroughs and colonies with honour and affection beyond belief; for it was his first coming since the glorious campaign against a united Gaul. Nothing was omitted that wit could devise for the decoration of gates, roads, and every place where Caesar was to pass. The whole population, with the children, went forth to meet him, victims were sacrificed everywhere, festal couches, duly spread, occupied market-places and temples, so as to anticipate, if possible, the joy of the triumph so long, so very long expected. Such was the magnificence shown by the richer folk, such the eagerness of the humbler sort.

[52] Having passed rapidly through all the districts of Italian Gaul, Caesar returned with all speed to the army at Nemetocenna; he summoned the legions out of all the cantonments to the country of the Treveri, proceeded thither himself, and there reviewed the army. He put Titus Labienus in charge of Italian Gaul, that it might be won

over to give stronger support to his candidature for the consulship. He himself marched as far as he deemed sufficient for change of stations, to keep the troops in health. In the course of his marches he frequently heard that Labienus was being tampered with by his enemies, and he was informed that it was the aim of a few plotters to interpose a resolution of the Senate and deprive him of some part of the army; nevertheless he believed nothing in regard to Labienus, nor could he be induced to take any action against the resolution of the Senate. For he judged that his cause was like to be easily gained if the votes of the conscript fathers were unrestrained. Indeed, Gaius Curio, tribune of the people, had undertaken to defend the cause and the position of Caesar; and he had often promised the Senate that, if any person suffered from apprehension of Caesar's arms, and as the armed tyranny of Pompeius was creating considerable alarm in the Forum, he would move that both leaders should give up arms and disband their armies. He held that by this means the state would be free and independent. And this was no mere promise, but he even tried to secure a decree by a division; however, the consuls and the friends of Pompeius interposed to prevent it, and thus frustrated the attempt by delaying action.

[53] The testimony of the Senate as a whole was important, and consistent with their previous action. The year before, in the course of an attack on the position of Caesar, Marcellus had brought before the Senate prematurely, and in violation of a law of Pompeius and Crassus, a motion touching the provinces of Caesar. Opinions were expressed, and when Marcellus, who coveted for himself any position to be secured from the feeling against Caesar, tried to divide the House, a crowded Senate passed over in support of the general negative. These set-backs did not break the spirit of Caesar's

enemies, but they prompted them to find more forcible arguments whereby the Senate would be compelled to approve what they themselves had resolved.

[54] Then a decree of the Senate was made that for the Parthian campaign one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompeius, a second by Gaius Caesar, and it was clear enough that the two legions were to be withdrawn from one man. For the First Legion, which he had sent to Caesar, as it had been raised from a levy in Caesar's province, Pompeius gave as one of his own. Caesar, though there was not the least doubt about the intention of his opponents, nevertheless sent the legion back to Pompeius, and on his own account ordered the Fifteenth, which he had kept in Nearer Gaul, to be handed over in accordance with the Senate's decree. In its stead he sent the Thirteenth Legion to Italy, to maintain the garrisons from which the Fifteenth was to be withdrawn. He himself arranged the cantonments for the army: he stationed Gaius Trebonius with three legions in Belgium, Gaius Fabius with the same number he moved into the country of the Aedui; for he thought that the safety of Gaul would best be assured if the Belgae, whose valour was greatest, and the Aedui, whose influence was strongest, were held in check by armies. He himself proceeded to Italy.

[55] When he was come thither he learnt that through the action of the consul Gaius Marcellus the two legions sent back by himself, which in accordance with the Senate's decree ought to have been marched off for the Parthian campaign, had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompeius and kept in Italy. This action left no doubt in any man's mind what was afoot against Caesar; still, Caesar determined to submit to anything so long as some hope was left to him of a constitutional settlement rather than an appeal to arms. He pressed . .

THE CIVIL WAR




Translated by W. A. MacDevitt

De Bello Civili concerns Caesar's war against Gnaeus Pompeius, Pompey the Great, and the Senate of Rome. The work is much shorter than the previous commentary on the Gallic Wars, being formed of only three books and is believed to be unfinished, covering the events of 49-48 BC, from shortly before Caesar's invasion of Italy to Pompey's defeat at the Battle of Pharsalus and his subsequent flight to Egypt. The work closes with Pompey being assassinated, Caesar attempting to mediate rival claims to the Egyptian throne and the beginning of the Alexandrian War.

As the governor of Gaul, Caesar presents himself as the victim of a conspiracy occurring in Rome led by his political enemies, including Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Cicero. Throughout the commentaries, Caesar presents his cause as a noble one to restore order and return peace to the Roman people, while explaining how his actions were justified. Interestingly, Caesar omits many details of the military campaigns, focusing in large part on the larger strategic situation and the reasoning behind the actions occurring.

Formed as a third-person narrative, the work commences with the expiration of Caesar's term as governor of Gaul and the party dominating the Roman Senate ordering him to return to the city to face charges of misconduct and possible execution. Caesar explains how he was wronged by Pompeius and the senators, who refused to permit him the triumph that was traditionally permitted to victorious

generals. He proceeds with his army to invade Italy from Gaul. Pompeius attempts to raise an army in southern Italy, but is forced to retreat with the army to Greece. Caesar continually points to his efforts to reach an accommodation with Pompeius, and attempts to portray Pompeius as a jealous man only interested in perpetuating a rule in which he and his inner circle control the Republic. The commentary culminates with the Battle of Pharsalus in June 48, resulting in the decisive victory by Caesar's army and the flight of Pompeius.



Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, Pompey the Great, (106 – 48 BC), Caesar's great rival, was a military and political leader of the late Roman Republic, as well as a legendary general.

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
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APPENDIX. MAPS



The site of the Battle of Pharsalus today



Proposed plan of the Battle of Pharsalus — the decisive battle of the Civil War

BOOK I

I. — When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to suffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail, that any question should be put to the senate on the subject of the letter. The consuls put the question on the regulation of the state. Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not fail the senate and republic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly and resolutely, but if they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his favour, as they did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and not submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means of regaining Caesar's favour and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same purport, "that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if the senate would support him; but if they should hesitate and act without energy, they would in vain implore his aid, if they should require it hereafter."

II. — This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city, and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips of Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, as Marcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that the question ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levies were made throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protection the senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thought proper": as Marcus Calpurnius afterwards, who was of opinion, "that Pompey should set out for his province, that there might be no cause for arms: that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced from him, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near the city to do him

injury”: as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost word for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, who peremptorily refused to propose Calidius’s motion. Marcellus, overawed by his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate, intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a present army, and the threats of Pompey’s friends, unwillingly and reluctantly adopted Scipio’s opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a certain day, and should he not do so, he should be considered as acting against the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the people, interposed. The question was immediately put on their interposition. Violent opinions were expressed: whoever spoke with the greatest acrimony and cruelty, was most highly commended by Caesar’s enemies.

III. — The senate having broken up in the evening, all who belonged to that order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, and secured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved and excited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served in Pompey’s armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewards and promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions, which had been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the Comitium were crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consuls’ friends, all Pompey’s connections, all those who bore any ancient enmity to Caesar, were forced into the senate house. By their concourse and declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and the greater part deprived of the power of speaking their sentiments with freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as did likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs, and require only six days’ time to finish the business. Opinions were

expressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to Caesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure.

IV. — All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all, in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge against Caesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government of an army and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from such princes as should receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and boasted amongst his friends, that he would be a second Sylla, to whom the supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a province and armies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of his connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover, [he was influenced by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an ostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at that time had great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature. Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwilling that any person should bear an equal degree of dignity, had wholly alienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured a reconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom he had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At the same time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by converting the two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to [augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring matters to a war.

V. — For these reasons everything was done in a hasty and disorderly manner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform him [of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people to deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, which Sylla had left them, the interposing their authority;

but on the seventh day they were obliged to think of their own safety, which the most turbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, nor to fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighth month. Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate (which was never resorted to even by daring proposers except when the city was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public safety was despaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and proconsuls in the city should take care that the state received no injury." These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides of January; therefore, in the first five days, on which the senate could meet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two days of election excepted, the severest and most virulent decrees were passed against Caesar's government, and against those most illustrious characters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately made their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then at Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matters could be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the part of the enemies.

VI. — During the succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city. Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through Scipio. He applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, acquainted them with his force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he was moreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected, and that he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him. Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that levies should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as proprætor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey from the public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba should be [honoured with the

title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said that he would not allow this motion for the present. Philip, one of the tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respecting the other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular, the remainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria, Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private motive, and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provinces praetors were sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer to the people on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath, and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the military habit, after offering their vows; a circumstance which had never before happened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictors in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times. Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from the municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. All distinctions between things human and divine are confounded.

VII. — These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued his soldiers; he reminded them “of the wrongs done to him at all times by his enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him and led astray by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory, though he had always favoured and promoted Pompey’s honour and dignity. He complained that an innovation had been introduced into the republic, that the intercession of the tribunes, which had been restored a few years before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed by force of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every other power, had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; that Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had taken

away the privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate decreed, “that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained no injury” (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to repair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when the tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and possessed themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (and these instances of former times, he showed them were expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing of this kind was attempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was promulgated, no intrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he exhorted them to defend from the malice of his enemies, the reputation and honour of that general, under whose command they had for nine years most successfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, and subdued all Gaul and Germany.” The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which was present (for in the beginning of the disturbances he had called it out, his other legions not having yet arrived), all cry out that they are ready to defend their general, and the tribunes of the commons, from all injuries.

VIII. — Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of his soldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met the tribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his other legions from winter quarters, and ordered them to follow him. Thither came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant general under Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech, and stating for what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a private nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himself to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for the republic, to a design of affronting

him; that he had ever preferred the interest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar, too, for his own honour, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to the public good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies, lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. He spoke a few words to the same purport from himself, in addition to Pompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in the same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey had empowered him to do so.

IX. — Though these things seemed to have no tendency towards redressing his injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could communicate his wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that as they had conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a great dispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears.

“That the honour of the republic had ever been his first object, and dearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favour of the Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of his enemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and dragged back to the city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid to his suit for the consulate at the next election, though he was not present; that, however, he had patiently submitted to this loss of honour for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters to the senate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of their armies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were made throughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him, under the pretence of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that the state was in arms. To what did all these

things tend, unless to his ruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and to endure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own province; let them both disband their armies; let all persons in Italy lay down their arms; let all fears be removed from the city; let free elections, and the whole republic be resigned to the direction of the senate and Roman people. That these things might be the more easily performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either let Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be that all their disputes would be settled by an interview."

X. — Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went to Capua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to them Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sent written proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was, that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband his army: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In the meantime, until security was given that Caesar would perform his promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies.

XI. — It was not an equitable proposal, to require that Caesar should quit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] should himself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another, and desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, whilst he himself was making new levies: and that he should merely promise to go to his province, without naming the day on which he would set out; so that if he should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired, yet he would not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting a falsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising to set out to meet him, made the

expectation of peace appear very hopeless. Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum to Arretium; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, with the intention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and Ancona, with a cohort each.

XII. — In the meantime, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined towards himself; he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it, and made his escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the thirteenth legion from the garrisons, and set out for Auximum, a town into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country of Picenum, to raise new levies.

XIII. — Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them to determine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen would suffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the republic, after performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their town and walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion of posterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A few of Caesar's front rank

having pursued him, obliged him to halt, and when the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of them disperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along with them, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. But Caesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful for their conduct.

XIV. — Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great a panic spread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open the treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediately on opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falsely rumoured that Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were already at the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most of the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and was on his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and had disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped within the city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua they first began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raise levies in the colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law: and Lentulus brought into the public market-place the gladiators which Caesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people, and confirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered them to attend him; but afterwards, being warned by his friends that this action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them among the slaves of the districts of Campania, to keep guard there.

XV. — Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum. All the governors in these countries

most cheerfully received him, and aided his army with every necessary. Ambassadors came to him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and built at his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with his orders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the meantime, the twelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched to Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that town with ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fled from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, was deserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the road with a small number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey into Picenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius, being informed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers from him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighbouring countries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Amongst them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with six cohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which he made up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys to Corfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar was advancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighbouring states.

XVI. — Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered the soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a muster to be made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, he marched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius from the town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, at three miles' distance from it. An engagement taking place there with Caesar's advanced-guard,

Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from the bridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marched his legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by the walls.

XVII. — Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well acquainted with the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded, with despatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to his assistance. That Caesar could be easily enclosed by the two armies, through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtaining supplies: unless he did so, that he and upwards of thirty cohorts, and a great number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger. In the meantime he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls, and assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In a speech to the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; to every private soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to the centurions and veterans.

XVIII. — In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people of Sulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts of the eighth legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards, threw open their gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers, went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped off the walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged that he might be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had set out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his own army, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesar

employed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in corn from the neighbouring free towns, and waiting for the rest of his forces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second camp on another part of the town, and gave the command of it to Curio. He determined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during the remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of the work was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.

XIX. — Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; and encouraged them not to despond, but to provide everything necessary for the defence of the town. He held private conferences with a few of his most intimate friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. As Domitius's countenance did not agree with his words, and he did everything with more confusion and fear than he had shown on the preceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his friends, contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as he avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in answer, "That he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius had retreated into the town of Corfinium, without either his advice or consent. Therefore, if any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius] should come to him with the whole force." But the blockade and works round the town prevented his escape.

XX. — Domitius's design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Confinium [***error in original: should be CORFINIUM*] early in the

evening began to mutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes and centurions, and the most respectable amongst themselves: "that they were besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almost finished; that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectations they had confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his own escape; that they ought to provide for their own safety." At first the Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of the town which they thought the strongest. And so violent a dispute arose between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms. However, in a little time, by messengers sent from one side to the other, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight, of which they were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent brought Domitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and sent deputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready to throw open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and to deliver up Domitius alive into his hands.

XXI. — Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it of great consequence to become master of the town as soon as possible, and to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should be wrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or fictitious messages, because in war great events are often brought about by trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town should be plundered by the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent them back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He disposed his soldiers on the works, which he had begun, not at certain intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of sentinels and stations,

so that they touched each other, and formed a circle round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and general officers to ride round; and exhorted them not only to be on their guard against sallies from the town, but also to watch that no single person should get out privately. Nor was any man so negligent or drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was their expectation raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to different objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of another.

XXII. — About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels and guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview with Caesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he was escorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him till they brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for his life, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of their former friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favours to him were very great; in that through his interest he had been admitted into the college of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointed to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his suit for the consulship. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told him, "that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], but to protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their dignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by a few factious men." Encouraged by this address, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that the security which he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement to the rest to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they were

induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave being granted him, he departed.

XXIII. — When day appeared Caesar ordered all the senators and their children, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights, to be brought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal towns. When they were brought before him he protected them from the insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that they had not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his very extraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty sestertia, which Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the public treasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he gave them back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate with respect to the life of men than in money matters, though he knew that it was public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that day decamped and performed the regular march. He stayed only seven days before Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of the Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Larinates.

XXIV. — Pompey, being informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marches from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundisium. He orders all the forces raised everywhere by the new levies to repair to him. He gives arms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for them. Of these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, the praetor, fled from Alba, with six

cohorts: Rutilus Lupus, the praetor, from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at a distance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the praetor, carried their colours to Curius and went over to him. In like manner during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with the main body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, from Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and brought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As hitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march to him at Brundisium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and general safety that he should have an interview with Pompey; and that the same advantage could not be gained at a great distance when the proposals were conveyed to them by others, as if terms were argued by them both in person."

XXV. — Having delivered this message he marched to Brundisium with six legions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had raised in the late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all Domitius's cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army, and that Pompey remained at Brundisium with twenty cohorts; but could not find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey stayed behind to keep possession of Brundisium, that he might the more easily command the whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy and the coast of Greece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of it, or whether he remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, he determined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by the harbour of Brundisium. The plan of his work was as follows:

— Where the mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on either side, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so far that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixed double floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These he fastened with four anchors at the four corners, that they might not be carried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them, he then joined to them other floats of equal size. These he covered over with earth and mould, that he might not be prevented from access to them to defend them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with a parapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, two stories high, to secure them the better from being attacked by the shipping and set on fire.

XXVI. — To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, which he found in the harbour of Brundisium: on them he erected turrets three stories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and all sorts of weapons, drove them amongst Caesar's works, to break through the floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes every day at a distance with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesar conducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yet to be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; and though his attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous prosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means to persevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius Rebilus to have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend and relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but, above all things, requires that he should be admitted to an interview with Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowed him, that the

consequence would be that both parties would lay down their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory and reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice and agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the conference with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns with answer that, as the consuls were absent, no treaty of compositions could be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore thought it time at length to give over the attempt which he had often made in vain, and act with energy in the war.

XXVII. — When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and after nine days were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first division of the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned to Brundisium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determined from the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure on the arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar's attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town at the moment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across the streets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground by means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastened in the ground and sharpened at the ends two passages and roads without the walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, he ordered his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here and there, on the wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers and slingers. These he designed to call off by a certain signal, when all the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for them in a secure place.

XXVIII. — The people of Brundisium, irritated by the insolence

of Pompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were in favour of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware of Pompey's departure, whilst his men were running up and down, and busied about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar, being apprized of the design by them, ordered scaling ladders to be got ready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any opportunity of coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldiers who had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by the signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to the ships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: but being cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and covered trenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants by a long circuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats and small craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struck against Caesar's moles.

XXIX.-Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossing the sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to a conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary to effect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived him of the means of pursuing him at present. The only resource left to Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of Gaul, Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the season of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwilling that, in the meantime, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one of which was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be confirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should be provided and Gaul and Italy reduced in his

absence.

XXX. — Therefore, for the present, he relinquished all intention of pursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded the magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have them conveyed to Brundisium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with one legion to Sardinia; Curio, the proprietor, to Sicily with three legions; and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately transport his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of Sardinia: Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had the government of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as they heard that Valerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their own accord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he understood that the whole province was combined [against him], fled from Sardinia to Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, and demanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed with great zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani and Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horse and foot from the states of Sicily. When these things were nearly completed, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint that he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken an unnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when questioned by him and other members in the senate, had assured them that every thing was ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaints in a public assembly, he fled from his province.

XXXI. — Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their governors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of

the province, who, having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightway fled to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of his own accord, and making levies, had raised two legions. From his acquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge of that province, he found the means of effecting this; because a few years before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained that province. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his entering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though labouring under sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor and quit the place.

XXXIL. — When these affairs were despatched, Caesar, that there might be an intermission from labour for the rest of the season, drew off his soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome. Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of his enemies; and told them, “That he aimed at no extraordinary honour, but had waited for the time appointed by law, for standing candidate for the consulate, being contented with what was allowed to every citizen. That a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people (notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a very violent opposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by a tedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though absent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapproved of the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, why should he debar him [Caesar] from the people’s favour? He made mention of his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all armies should be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both of dignity and honour. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refused to comply with what they required from others, and had rather that all things should be thrown

into confusion, than that they should lose their power and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking away his legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges of the tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an interview, which had been refused him: For which reasons, he begged and desired that they would undertake the management of the republic, and unite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear they declined it, he would not be a burden to them, but take the management of it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted in the senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in those persons to whom ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that sent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for his part, as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so he was desirous of excelling them in justice and equity.”

XXXIII. — The senate approved of sending deputies, but none could be found fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his own private fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, had declared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree of estimation, those who stayed in Rome and those in Caesar’s camp. Thus three days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, Lucius Metellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar’s enemies, to prevent this, and to embarrass everything else which Caesar should propose. Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending several days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he had intended.

XXXIV. — On his arrival there, he was informed that, Vibullius Rufus, whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at

liberty, was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seize Massilia with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some private persons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noblemen of Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome had exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from their minds the memory of his former favours. On receiving this message, the Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to them the Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and who inhabited the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise conveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and from all the forts into the city; had opened armouries in the city: and were repairing the walls, the fleet, and the gates.

XXXV. — Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia to attend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates [in the following language]; “that they ought to follow the precedent set by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man.” He made use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them to reason. The deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by the authority of the state bring him back this answer: “That they understood that the Roman people was divided into two factions: that they had neither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause; but that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar, the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to their state the lands of the Volcae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter had assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented their revenue. Wherefore, having received equal favours from both, they ought to

show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other, nor admit either into their city or harbours.”

XXXVI. — Whilst this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived at Massilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and made governor of it. The chief management of the war was entrusted to him. At his command they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbour; they apply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished to rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, all the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of their lading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event take place. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vineæ to assault the town, and to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed and rigged in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down), and being brought to Massilia, he put under the command of Decimus Brutus; and left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city.

XXXVII. — Whilst he was preparing and getting these things in readiness, he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three legions, which he had disposed in winter quarters in Narbo, and the neighbouring country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes of the Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by detachments from Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey’s lieutenants. He desired the other legions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to follow close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition, dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up with the army of Afranius.

XXXVIII. — On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have

already mentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with three legions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to the river Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana to the country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number of legions), divided amongst themselves their respective departments. Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and join Afranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain with what legions he had. These matters being settled, reinforcements of horse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from the Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on the ocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched through the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent to carry on the war in the vicinity of Ilerda, on account of the advantages of its situation.

XXXIX. — Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two. There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and Further Spain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province had shields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horse raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, with about six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which had served under him in all his former wars, and the same number from Gaul, which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the most noble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from the Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. He had been informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with his legions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowed money from the tribunes and centurions, which he

distributed amongst his soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured the interest of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by his liberality he purchased the affections of his army.

XL. — Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighbouring states by letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre, at the distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging parties over these bridges, because he had already consumed all the forage that was on his side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almost the same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse had frequent skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as was their constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to the foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horse were following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and the mass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from the main army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber and hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediately crossed his own bridge, which communicated between his camp and the town, with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched against Fabius's two legions. When his approach was announced, Lucius Plancus, who had the command of those legions, compelled by the emergency, took post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts, that it might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the horse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a distance by both sides the colours of two legions, which Caius Fabius had sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting, as the event verified, that the enemy's generals would take advantage of the opportunity which fortune had put in their way, to attack our

men. Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general led back his legions to their respective camps.

XXI. — In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse, which he had retained for a bodyguard. The bridge which had been broken down by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finished in the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he left behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all his baggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda, with all his forces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp of Afranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offered him battle on equal terms. When this offer was made, Afranius drew out his forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. When Caesar perceived that Afranius declined coming to an engagement, he resolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance from the very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers whilst engaged in their works, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, or disturbed in their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall, which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the front opposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first and second lines continued under arms as was from the first appointed. Behind them the third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that the whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was being fortified.

XLII. — In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this trench, and rested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept his whole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from a considerable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in his work; and to each legion, one after the other, he

assigned one side of the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to be cut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage to oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the work, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, and challenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work, relying on the protection of the three legions, and the strength of the fosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great distance from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp. The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered the other cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to be removed to it.

XLIII.—Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afranius and Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred paces broad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above the level: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortify it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge, and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation of this he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army in an advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion to hasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the cohorts which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent a nearer way to occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and as Afranius's men had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed, and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn their backs and retreat to the standards of legions.

XLIV. — The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard

pressed they thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed to this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced by the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time. This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such a description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not to quit their colours, nor, without good reason, to give up the post which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but retreated to the next hill.

XLV. — Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because it had occurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged his men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked the insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in their turn, to show their backs and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous to repair the dishonour which had been sustained, having rashly pursued the fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to the foot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when they wished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising ground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and was so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle, would fill it; but no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horse could be of no service to them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed, the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for near four hundred paces. Our men

had to retreat this way, as they had, through their eagerness, advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this place, which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of its narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, so that no weapon was thrown at them without effect: yet they exerted their valour and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were increasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the camp through the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar was obliged to do the same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to that post.

XLVI. — After the battle had in this manner continued incessantly for five hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers, having spent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemy up the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. The cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by their fears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. Our cavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or low ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, riding between the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such were the various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter about seventy of our men fell: amongst them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion of the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary valour, had been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About six hundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party there were killed Titus Caecilius, principal centurion, and four other centurions, and above two hundred men.

XLVII. — But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this day, that each party thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's

soldiers, because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yet they had stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, had kept the post and the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute; and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours, because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and the disparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, had advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly from the higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the hill, about which the contest had been, with strong works, and posted a garrison on it.

XLVIII. — In two days after this transaction, there happened an unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed that there were never seen higher floods in those countries; it swept down the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the banks of the river, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius had built, — a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army. For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers, the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for the space of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within these narrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar's cause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could the convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp. Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year, when there was no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states were exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, before Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had been already consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a secondary resource

against want, had been removed by the states to a great distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to get forage or corn, were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, and the targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well acquainted with the country, and could readily swim across the river, because it is the custom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders.

XLIX. — But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a great stock of corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity was coming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. The bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these without any danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had no access, were as yet untouched.

L. — Those floods continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to repair the bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him: and the cohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed; and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the river and the height of the water, but especially because their darts were thrown from the whole course of the bank on one confined spot; and it was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a work in a very rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.

LI. — Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great convoys, which were on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage, according to the Gallic custom of travelling, had arrived there; there were besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slaves and freed men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as every one followed his own humour, and all travelled without apprehension, taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several young noblemen, sons of senators, and

of equestrian rank; there were ambassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. The river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out in the beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horse soon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few, they withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought on equal terms: but when the legions began to approach, having lost a few men, they retreated to the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this battle was of great importance to the security of our men; for having gained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were missing that day about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable number of servants and baggage.

LII. — However, by all these things, the price of provisions was raised, which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of present scarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had now reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished the strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasing every day: and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and fortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle with the want of every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of all things, and were considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded from those states which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, as they had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers to the more distant states, and endeavoured to remedy the present scarcity by every resource in his power.

LIII. — Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their acquaintances. Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to

be almost at an end. When these letters and despatches were received at Rome, a great concourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, and congratulations ran high: several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey; some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others, that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, and to have come last of all.

LIV. — When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavourable position, and all the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and the bridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships of the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taught him. First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the rest of the hulk of the ships was wrought with wicker-work, and covered over with hides. When these were finished, he drew them down to the river in waggons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and transported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden took possession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately fortified, before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterwards transported a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it in two days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp the convoys, and those who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for the provisions.

LV. — The same day he made a great part of his horse pass the river, who, falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed without any suspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people; and when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy, our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one to protect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beat them back, and they cut off from the rest

and surrounded one cohort, which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and after putting it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to the camp over the same bridge.

LVI. — Whilst these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians, adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, of which eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels, that our fleet might be terrified by numbers: they man them with a great number of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been already made, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required certain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists and shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thus furnished with every necessary, he advanced with great confidence against our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at an island opposite to Massilia.

LVII. — Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but Caesar had appointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions, antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in that service. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thus prepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out from the harbour, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with great courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on the highlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valour: and being lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their minds their recent promises: and the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope of liberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the presence of their masters.

LVIII. — The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness of their ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded

the shock, and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening their line they endeavoured to surround us, or to attack single ships with several of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars, if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they had recourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valour of the mountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skilful pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, were moreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which having been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easily manœuvred. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one of theirs. And throwing in the grappling irons, and holding both ships fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's; and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some of their ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest into the harbour. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those that were taken.

LIX. — When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the bridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn. The enemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as freely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a small distance from the camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged within narrower bounds: at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, or descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of their expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolved to leave off foraging for several days, and,

contrary to the practice of all nations, to go out at night.

LX. — In the meantime the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under the government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors to Caesar, and offer to submit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani, and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell near the river Ebro. He requires of them all to assist him with corn, to which they agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country, they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of the Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar, from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colours with them. A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridge being finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a way opened for the receiving of corn, and the rumours of the assistance of legions which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head, through Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant states revolt from Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar.

LXI. — Whilst the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things, Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a long circuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began to sink several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a part of the river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almost finished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest they should be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar was very strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts, and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstance that confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties, that which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered by Pompey, still trembled at his name and

sway, though absent: the other which had remained firm in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favours which they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to the barbarians. From these they expected considerable aid, both of horse and foot, and hoped to protract the war till winter, in a friendly country. Having come to this resolution, they gave orders to collect all the ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a town situated on the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At this part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened together, and transported two legions over the river Segre, and fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.

LXII. — Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar continued his work day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to drain the river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were both able and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to pass the river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of their breast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not only by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current. However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridge being nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre.

LXIII. — Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought to hasten their march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed one camp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before. Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since with his cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; so that they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse, which he had detached, crossed the ford,

and when Afranius and Petreius had broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared on their rear, and spreading round them in great numbers, began to retard and impede their march.

LXIV. — At break of day, it was perceived from the rising grounds which joined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by our horse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at other times, that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by a general charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them when they wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered in parties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily protracted. They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreated them to inform Caesar that he need not spare their labour or consider their danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture to ford the river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal and importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river so exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make a trial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or strength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from each century, and left them, with one legion besides, to guard the camp: the rest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, having disposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below the ford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away by the force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, and not a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew out his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions: and so great was the ardour of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the addition

of a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording the river, before the ninth hour of the day they came up with those who had set out at the third watch.

LXV. — When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a distance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on a rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on the plain that he might not expose them to battle whilst fatigued; and when the enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them. They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had intended, for there were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow roads awaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these mountains that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in the narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forces across the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was their interest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued by the skirmishes all day, and by the labour of their march, they deferred it till the following day: Caesar likewise encamped on the next hill.

LXVI. — About midnight a few of their men who had gone some distance from the camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is informed by them that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of the camp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal to be given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage. When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in the night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they should be confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop to their march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreius went out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. A

similar movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa was detached with a small party to explore the nature of the country. Each returned with the same account to his camp, that there was a level road for the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough and mountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of the defiles would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress.

LXVII. — There was a debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius, and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of opinion that they should begin their march at night, "for they might reach the defiles before they should be discovered." Others, because a shout had been raised the night before in Caesar's camp, used this as an argument that they could not leave the camp unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalry were patrolling the whole night, and that all the ways and roads were beset; that battles at night ought to be avoided, because in civil dissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears than his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of shame in the eyes of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions had the same effect: by these things the soldiers would be restrained and awed to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force their way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet the post which they desired might be secured with safety to the main body of the army." This opinion prevailed in the council, and the next day, at the dawn, they resolved to set forward.

LXVIII. — Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the moment the sky began to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at the head of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for the road which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was

occupied by the enemy's camp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to cross extensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places, interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of their march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would be a period to all their toils if they could cut off the enemy from the Ebro and intercept their convoys.

LXIX. — At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp to look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that we were forced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to Ilerda." For our route was different from what we proposed, and we appeared to be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded their own prudence in keeping within their camp, and it was a strong confirmation of their opinion, that they saw we marched without waggons or baggage, which made them confident that we could not long endure want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, and observed our van was already passing the line of their camp, there was nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary to march from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was raised, and all the army, except a few which were left to guard the camp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro.

LXX. — The contest depended entirely on despatch, which should first get possession of the defile and the mountain. The difficulty of the roads delayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces, retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced to this point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gained the mountains, which they desired, they

would themselves avoid all danger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, being intercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given. Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a plain behind large rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing the enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, and seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it. Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest mountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with all expedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going to the same place with all his forces, then altering his route, and crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making towards it in an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them, nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of the two armies.

LXXI. — There was now an opportunity for managing affairs successfully, nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a loss before their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surrounded by our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and open ground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants, centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged "that he would not hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all the soldiers were very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by several circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assisted their party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did not sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one place, did not observe either rank or order. But if

he had any apprehensions from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity would be given him of coming to battle in some other place: for that Afranius must certainly come down, and would not be able to remain there for want of water.”

LXXII. — Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair without an engagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off the enemy’s supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, even in a successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded; who had deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune? especially when it was as much a general’s duty to conquer by tactics, as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for those citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his object without any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was not generally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other, that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not come to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He persevered however in his resolution, and retired a little from that place to abate the enemy’s fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity, retired to their camp. Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains, and cut off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close to the enemy as he could.

LXXIII. — The day following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed that they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro, consulted as to what other course they should take. There were two roads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if they should march to it. Whilst they were deliberating on these matters, intelligence was brought them that their watering parties were attacked by our horse: upon which

information, they dispose several parties of horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and intermix some legionary cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp to the water, that they might be able to procure water within their lines, both without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided this task between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.

LXXIV. — The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free opportunity of conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquired each for whatever acquaintance or fellow citizen he had in our camp, and invited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparing them the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledged that they were alive through their kindness; then they inquired about the honour of our general, and whether they could with safety entrust themselves to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not done so in the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against their relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the general's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might not appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When they were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that they would immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of the first rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In the meantime some of them invite their acquaintances, and bring them to their camp, others are brought away by their friends, so that the two camps seemed to be united into one, and several of the tribunes and centurions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The same was done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their assistance, and kept in their camp as

hostages. They inquired after their acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means of being recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man, endeavoured by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for his own and his father's life. Every place was filled with mirth and congratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had escaped so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his conduct was applauded by all.

LXXV. — When these circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left the work which he had begun, and returned to his camp determined, as it appeared, whatever should be the event to bear it with an even and steady mind. Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics; with them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreign horse, his dependants, whom he commonly kept near him to guard his person, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the conferences of the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as many as he caught. The rest formed into a body, and, being alarmed by the unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew their swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their camp, defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made good their retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the cohorts, which were on guard.

LXXVI. — Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every maniple, calling the soldiers by their names and entreating with tears, that they would not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to the vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in

crowds to the general's pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that they would not desert nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form any design distinct from the general interest. He himself swore first to the tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same oath. The tribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers were brought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, that whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon as they were produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium, but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let them out at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals, the cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed all hopes of surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and reduced matters to the former state of war.

LXXVII. — Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his camp to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest diligence, and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several voluntarily remained with him, and he afterwards treated them with great respect. The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Roman knights the honour of tribunes.

LXXVIII. — Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and procured water with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn, because they had been ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they had but few opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were not accustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of them came over to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these difficulties; but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because they had left

some corn there; and there they hoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at a greater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit of many changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set out from their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and retard their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a moment passed in which their rear was not engaged with our horse.

LXXIX. — Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts closed their rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If they had a mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily secured them from any danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds, protected the rest in their ascent. When they approached a valley or declivity, and the advanced men could not impart assistance to the tardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds with advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the only plan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they should give orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse our horse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with the utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passed it, should face about again on the next hill. For so far were they from deriving any assistance from their horse (of which they had a large number), that they were obliged to receive them into the centre of their army, and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by former battles. And on their march no one could quit the line without being taken by Caesar's horse.

LXXX. — Whilst skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced but slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as then happened. For having advanced four miles, and

being very much harassed by our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenched themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, they suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopes that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and charged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and several privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them.

LXXXI. — Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose a convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground naturally unfavourable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the whole night in extending their works, and turn their camp to ours. The next day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that manner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extended their camp, they were farther distant from the water; and one evil was remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. The next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more desirous that they

should be humbled by these means, and forced to come to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured to surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to check their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.

LXXXII. — In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent. By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's works was finished. To interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth hour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before their camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and ordering the horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshalled his army: for to appear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers and the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage. But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing to engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute much to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would afford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For this reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him, but not to be the first to provoke the battle.

LXXXIII. — Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, the auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as

reserves: and three others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed in the centre of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works which he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a ford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light-armed Germans and a party of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along the banks to guard them.

LXXXIV. — At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been four days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers. When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general, Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but confessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was any room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer the most severe penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most

submissive and humble language.

LXXXV. — Caesar replied, “That either to complain or sue for mercy became no man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty: himself, in having declined to engage on favourable terms, in an advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and even Afranius’s soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a peace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all. Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the laws either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore, they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and most earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or his present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for so many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful fleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent to command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him; that none of these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the use of the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need of no such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him: that against him a new sort of government was established, that the

same person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the magistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should not be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, but persons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse of age was not admitted: but persons of tried experience in former wars were called up to take the command of the armies, that with respect to him only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to all generals, that, after a successful war, they should return home and disband their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least without disgrace: that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would still submit to them: nor did he now desire to take their army from them and keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult matter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him: and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, and disband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure no person; that these were the last and only conditions of peace.”

LXXXVI. — It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius’s soldiers, as might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expected some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the place and time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should be discharged immediately: for although every security might be given that they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was brought to this issue: that those

who had any settlement or possession in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var. Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that no person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military oath under him.

LXXXVII. — Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the present time, till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation being made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterwards amongst themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that Caesar should take cognizance of it: and both parties were content with his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in two days, Caesar ordered two of his legions to go before, the rest to follow the vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a small distance from each other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions, they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army was disbanded.

BOOK II

I. — Whilst these things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius, Caesar's lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault of Massilia, began to raise a mound, vineae, and turrets against the town, on two sides: one of which was next the harbour and docks, the other on that part where there is a passage from Gaul and Spain to that sea which forces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almost on three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the only side which has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches to the fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a very deep valley, required a long and difficult siege. To accomplish these works, Caius Trebonius sends for a great quantity of carriages and men from the whole Province, and orders hurdles and materials to be furnished. These things being provided, he raised a mound eighty feet in height.

II. — But so great a store of everything necessary for a war had been a long time before laid up in the town, and so great a number of engines, that no vineae made of hurdles could withstand their force. For poles twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, and these too shot from very large engines, sank into the ground through four rows of hurdles. Therefore the arches of the vineae were covered over with beams a foot thick, fastened together, and under this the materials of the agger were handed from one to another. Before this was carried a testudo sixty feet long, for levelling the ground, made also of very strong timber, and covered over with every thing that was capable of protecting it against the fire and stones thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the works, the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of engines retarded the progress of our works. Besides,

frequent sallies were made from the town by the Albici, and fire was thrown on our mound and turrets. These our men easily repulsed, and, doing considerable damage to those who sallied, beat them back into the town.

III. — In the meantime, Lucius Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey with a fleet of sixteen sail, a few of which had beaks of brass, to the assistance of Lucius Domitius and the Massilians, passed the straits of Sicily without the knowledge or expectation of Curio, and, putting with his fleet into Messana, and making the nobles and senate take flight with the sudden terror, carried off one of their ships out of dock. Having joined this to his other ships, he made good his voyage to Massilia, and, having sent in a galley privately, acquaints Domitius and the Massilians of his arrival, and earnestly encourages them to hazard another battle with Brutus's fleet with the addition of his aid.

IV. — The Massilians, since their former loss, had brought the same number of old ships from the docks, and had repaired and fitted them out with great industry: they had a large supply of seamen and pilots. They had got several fishing-smacks, and covered them over, that the seamen might be secure against darts: these they filled with archers and engines. With a fleet thus appointed, encouraged by the entreaties and tears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succour the state in this hour of distress, they went on board with no less spirit and confidence than they had fought before. For it happens, from a common infirmity of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence, or more vehemently alarmed at things unseen, concealed, and unknown, as was the case then. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the state with the most sanguine hopes and wishes. Having got a fair wind, they sailed out of port and

went to Nasidius to Taurois, which is a fort belonging to the Massilians, and there ranged their fleet and again encouraged each other to engage, and communicated their plan of operation. The command of the right division was given to the Massilians, that of the left to Nasidius.

V. — Brutus sailed to the same place with an augmented fleet: for to those made by Caesar at Arelas were added six ships taken from the Massilians, which he had refitted since the last battle and had furnished with every necessary. Accordingly, having encouraged his men to despise a vanquished people whom they had conquered when yet unbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence and spirit. From Trebonius's camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the town — how all the youth which remained in it, and all persons of more advanced years, with their wives and children, and the public guards, were either extending their hands from the wall to the heavens, or were repairing to the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostrating themselves before their images, were entreating them to grant them victory. Nor was there a single person who did not imagine that his future fortune depended on the issue of that day; for the choice of their youth and the most respectable of every age, being expressly invited and solicited, had gone on board the fleet, that if any adverse fate should befall them they might see that nothing was left for them to attempt, and, if they proved victorious, they might have hopes of preserving the city, either by their internal resources or by foreign assistance.

VI.-When the battle was begun, no effort of valour was wanting to the Massilians, but, mindful of the instructions which they had a little before received from their friends, they fought with such spirit as if they supposed that they would never have another opportunity

to attempt a defence, and as if they believed that those whose lives should be endangered in the battle would not long precede the fate of the rest of the citizens, who, if the city was taken, must undergo the same fortune of war. Our ships being at some distance from each other, room was allowed both for the skill of their pilots and the manoeuvring of their ships; and if at any time ours, gaining an advantage by casting the iron hooks on board their ships, grappled with them, from all parts they assisted those who were distressed. Nor, after being joined by the Albici, did they decline coming to close engagement, nor were they much inferior to our men in valour. At the same time, showers of darts, thrown from a distance from the lesser ships, suddenly inflicted several wounds on our men when off their guard and otherwise engaged; and two of their three-decked galleys, having descried the ship of Decimus Brutus, which could be easily distinguished by its flag, rowed up against him with great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus, seeing into their designs, by the swiftness of his ship extricated himself with such address as to get clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity of their motion they struck against each other with such violence that they were both excessively injured by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one of them being broken off, the whole ship was ready to founder, which circumstance being observed, the ships of Brutus's fleet, which were nearest that station, attack them when in this disorder and sink them both.

VII. — But Nasidius's ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; for the sight of their country, or the entreaties of their relations, did not urge them to run a desperate risk of their lives. Therefore, of the number of the ships not one was lost: of the fleet of the Massilians five were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with Nasidius:

all that escaped made the best of their way to Hither Spain, but one of the rest was sent forward to Massilia for the purpose of bearing this intelligence, and when it came near the city, the whole people crowded out to hear the tidings, and on being informed of the event, were so oppressed with grief, that one would have imagined that the city had been taken by an enemy at the same moment. The Massilians, however, began to make the necessary preparations for the defence of their city with unwearied energy.

VIII. — The legionary soldiers who had the management of the works on the right side observed, from the frequent sallies of the enemy, that it might prove a great protection to them to build a turret of brick under the wall for a fort and place of refuge, which they at first built low and small, [to guard them] against sudden attacks. To it they retreated, and from it they made defence if any superior force attacked them; and from it they sallied out either to repel or pursue the enemy. It extended thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the walls was five feet. But afterwards, as experience is the best master in everything on which the wit of man is employed, it was found that it might be of considerable service if it was raised to the usual height of turrets, which was effected in the following manner.

IX.-When the turret was raised to the height for flooring, they laid it on the walls in such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered by the outer face of the wall, that nothing should project to which the enemy's fire might adhere. They, moreover, built over the joists with small bricks as high as the protection of the *plutei* and *vineae* permitted them; and on that place they laid two beams across, angle-ways, at a small distance from the outer walls, to support the rafters which were to cover the turret, and on the beams they laid joists across in a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks.

These joists they made somewhat longer, to project beyond the outside of the wall, that they might serve to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel all blows whilst they were building the walls between that and the next floor, and the floor of this story they faced with bricks and mortar, that the enemy's fire might do them no damage; and on this they spread mattresses, lest the weapons thrown from engines should break through the flooring, or stones from catapults should batter the brickwork. They, moreover, made three mats of cable ropes, each of them the length of the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging them round the turret on the three sides which faced the enemy, fastened them to the projecting joists. For this was the only sort of defence which, they had learned by experience in other places, could not be pierced by darts or engines. But when that part of the turret which was completed was protected and secured against every attempt of the enemy, they removed the plutei to other works. They began to suspend gradually, and raise by screws from the first-floor, the entire roof of the turret, and then they elevated it as high as the length of the mats allowed. Hid and secured within these coverings, they built up the walls with bricks, and again, by another turn of the screw, cleared a place for themselves to proceed with the building; and, when they thought it time to lay another floor, they laid the ends of the beams, covered in by the outer bricks in like manner as in the first story, and from that story they again raised the uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this manner, securely and without a blow or danger, they raised it six stories high, and in laying the materials left loop-holes in such places as they thought proper for working their engines.

X. — When they were confident that they could protect the works which lay around from this turret, they resolved to build a musculus,

sixty feet long, of timber, two feet square, and to extend it from the brick tower to the enemy's tower and wall. This was the form of it: two beams of equal length were laid on the ground, at the distance of four feet from each other; and in them were fastened small pillars, five feet high, which were joined together by braces, with a gentle slope, on which the timber which they must place to support the roof of the musculus should be laid: upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with iron plates and nails. To the upper covering of the musculus and the upper beams, they fastened laths, four fingers square, to support the tiles which were to cover the musculus. The roof being thus sloped and laid over in rows in the same manner as the joists were laid on the braces, the musculus was covered with tiles and mortar, to secure it against fire, which might be thrown from the wall. Over the tiles hides are spread, to prevent the water let in on them by spouts from dissolving the cement of the bricks. Again, the hides were covered over with mattresses, that they might not be destroyed by fire or stones. The soldiers under the protection of the vineae, finish this whole work to the very tower, and suddenly, before the enemy were aware of it, moved it forward by naval machinery, by putting rollers under it, close up to the enemy's turret, so that it even touched the building.

XI. — The townsmen, affrighted at this unexpected stroke, bring forward with levers the largest stones they can procure; and pitching them from the wall, roll them down on the musculus. The strength of the timber withstood the shock; and whatever fell on it slid off, on account of the sloping roof. When they perceived this, they altered their plan and set fire to barrels, filled with resin and tar, and rolled them down from the wall on the musculus. As soon as they fell on it, they slid off again, and were removed from its side by long poles and

forks. In the meantime, the soldiers, under cover of the musculus, were looting out with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's turret, with which the foundation was laid. The musculus was defended by darts, thrown from engines by our men from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten off from the wall and turrets; nor was a fair opportunity of defending the walls given them. At length several stones being picked away from the foundation of that turret next the musculus, part of it fell down suddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned forward.

XII. — Hereupon, the enemy, distressed at the sudden fall of the turret, surprised at the unforeseen calamity, awed by the wrath of the gods, and dreading the pillage of their city, rush all together out of the gate unarmed, with their temples bound with fillets, and suppliantly stretch out their hands to the officers and the army. At this uncommon occurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped, and the soldiers, turning away from the battle, ran eagerly to hear and listen to them. When the enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they all fell down at their feet, and besought them “to wait till Caesar's arrival; they saw that their city was taken, our works completed, and their tower undermined, therefore they desisted from a defence; that no obstacle could arise, to prevent their being instantly plundered at a beck, as soon as he arrived, if they refused to submit to his orders.” They inform them that, “if the turret had entirely fallen down, the soldiers could not be withheld from forcing into the town and sacking it, in hopes of getting spoil.” These and several other arguments to the same effect were delivered, as they were a people of great learning, with great pathos and lamentations.

XIII. — The lieutenants, moved with compassion, draw off the

soldiers from the work, desist from the assault, and leave sentinels on the works. A sort of a truce having been made through compassion for the besieged, the arrival of Caesar is anxiously awaited; not a dart was thrown from the walls or by our men, but all remit their care and diligence, as if the business was at an end. For Caesar had given Trebonius strict charge not to suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest the soldiers, too much irritated both by abhorrence of their revolt, by the contempt shown to them, and by their long labour, should put to the sword all the grown-up inhabitants, as they threatened to do. And it was with difficulty that they were then restrained from breaking into the town, and they were much displeased, because they imagined that they were prevented by Trebonius from taking possession of it.

XIV. — But the enemy, destitute of all honour, only waited a time and opportunity for fraud and treachery. And after an interval of some days, when our men were careless and negligent, on a sudden, at noon, when some were dispersed, and others indulging themselves in rest on the very works, after the fatigue of the day, and their arms were all laid by and covered up, they sallied out from the gates, and, the wind being high and favourable to them, they set fire to our works; and the wind spread it in such a manner that, in the same instant, the agger, plutei, testudo, tower, and engines all caught the flames and were consumed before we could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed at such an unexpected turn of fortune, lay hold on such arms as they could find. Some rush from the camp; an attack is made on the enemy: but they were prevented, by arrows and engines from the walls, from pursuing them when they fled. They retired to their walls, and there, without fear, set the musculus and brick tower on fire. Thus, by the perfidy of the enemy and the

violence of the storm, the labour of many months was destroyed in a moment. The Massilians made the same attempt the next day, having got such another storm. They sallied out against the other tower and agger, and fought with more confidence. But as our men had on the former occasion given up all thoughts of a contest, so, warned by the event of the preceding day, they had made every preparation for a defence. Accordingly, they slew several, and forced the rest to retreat into the town without effecting their design.

XV. — Trebonius began to provide and repair what had been destroyed, with much greater zeal on the part of the soldiers; for when they saw that their extraordinary pains and preparations had an unfortunate issue, they were fired with indignation that, in consequence of the impious violation of the truce, their valour should be held in derision. There was no place left them from which the materials for their mound could be fetched, in consequence of all the timber, far and wide, in the territories of the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away; they began therefore to make an agger of a new construction, never heard of before, of two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floors over them of almost the same breadth with the agger, made of timber. But wherever the space between the walls, or the weakness of the timber, seemed to require it, pillars were placed underneath and traversed beams laid on to strengthen the work, and the space which was floored was covered over with hurdles, and the hurdles plastered over with mortar. The soldiers, covered overhead by the floor, on the right and left by the wall, and in the front by the mantlets, carried whatever materials were necessary for the building without danger: the business was soon finished — the loss of their laborious work was soon repaired by the dexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates for making sallies were

left in the wall in such places as they thought proper.

XVI. — But when the enemy perceived that those works, which they had hoped could not be replaced without a great length of time, were put into so thorough repair by a few days' labour and diligence, that there was no room for perfidy or sallies, and that no means were left them by which they could either hurt the men by resistance or the works by fire, and when they found by former examples that their town could be surrounded with a wall and turrets on every part by which it was accessible by land, in such a manner that they could not have room to stand on their own fortifications, because our works were built almost on the top of their walls by our army, and darts could be thrown from our hands, and when they perceived that all advantage arising from their engines, on which they had built great hopes, was totally lost, and that though they had an opportunity of fighting with us on equal terms from walls and turrets, they could perceive that they were not equal to our men in bravery, they had recourse to the same proposals of surrender as before.

XVII. — In Further Spain, Marcus Varro, in the beginning of the disturbances, when he heard of the circumstances which took place in Italy, being diffident of Pompey's success, used to speak in a very friendly manner of Caesar. That though, being pre-engaged to Cneius Pompey in quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honour to him, that, nevertheless, there existed a very intimate tie between him and Caesar; that he was not ignorant of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who bore an office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the disposition of the whole province to Caesar. These sentiments he constantly expressed in his ordinary conversation, and did not attach himself to either party. But afterwards, when he found that Caesar was detained before Massilia, that the forces of Petreius had effected

a junction with the army of Afranius, that considerable reinforcements had come to their assistance, that there were great hopes and expectations, and heard that the whole Hither province had entered into a confederacy, and of the difficulties to which Caesar was reduced afterwards at Ilerda for want of provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller and more exaggerated account of these matters, he began to regulate his movements by those of fortune.

XVIII. — He made levies throughout the province; and, having completed his two legions, he added to them about thirty auxiliary cohorts: he collected a large quantity of corn to send partly to the Massilians, partly to Afranius and Petreius. He commanded the inhabitants of Gades to build ten ships of war; besides, he took care that several others should be built in Spain. He removed all the money and ornaments from the temple of Hercules to the town of Gades, and sent six cohorts thither from the province to guard them, and gave the command of the town of Gades to Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend of Domitius, who had come thither sent by Domitius to recover an estate for him; and he deposited all the arms, both public and private, in Gallonius's house. He himself [Varro] made severe harangues against Caesar. He often pronounced from his tribunal that Caesar had fought several unsuccessful battles, and that a great number of his men had deserted to Afranius. That he had these accounts from undoubted messengers, and authority on which he could rely. By these means he terrified the Roman citizens of that province, and obliged them to promise him for the service of the state one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight of silver, and a hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat. He laid heavier burdens on those states which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar, and billeted troops on them; he

passed judgment against some private persons, and condemned to confiscation the properties of those who had spoken or made orations against the republic, and forced the whole province to take an oath of allegiance to him and Pompey. Being informed of all that happened in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. This was his plan of operations. He was to retire with his two legions to Gades, and to lay up all the shipping and provisions there. For he had been informed that the whole province was inclined to favour Caesar's party. He thought that the war might be easily protracted in an island, if he was provided with corn and shipping. Caesar, although called back to Italy by many and important matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of war behind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had many dependants and clients in the Hither province.

XIX. — Having therefore sent two legions into Further Spain under the command of Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people; he himself advances with six hundred horse by forced marches, and issues a proclamation, appointing a day on which the magistrates and nobility of all the states should attend him at Corduba. This proclamation being published through the whole province, there was not a state that did not send a part of their senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and not a Roman citizen of any note but appeared that day. At the same time the senate at Corduba shut the gates of their own accord against Varro, and posted guards and sentinels on the wall and in the turrets, and detained two cohorts (called *Colonicae*, which had come there accidentally), for the defence of the town. About the same time the people of Carmona, which is by far the strongest state in the whole province, of themselves drove out of the town the cohorts, and shut the gates against them, although three cohorts had been detached by Varro to garrison the citadel.

XX. — But Varro was in greater haste on this account to reach Gades with his legion as soon as possible, lest he should be stopped either on his march or on crossing over to the island. The affection of the province to Caesar proved so great and so favourable, that he received a letter from Gades, before he was far advanced on his march: that as soon as the nobility of Gades heard of Caesar's proclamation, they had combined with the tribune of the cohorts, which were in garrison there, to drive Gallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and island for Caesar. That having agreed on the design they had sent notice to Gallonius, to quit Gades of his own accord whilst he could do it with safety; if he did not, they would take measures for themselves; that for fear of this Gallonius had been induced to quit the town. When this was known, one of Varro's two legions, which was called Vernacula, carried off the colours from Varro's camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired to Hispalis, and took post in the market and public places without doing any injury, and the Roman citizens residing there approved so highly of this act, that every one most earnestly offered to entertain them in their houses. When Varro, terrified at these things, having altered his route, proposed going to Italica, he was informed by his friends that the gates were shut against him. Then indeed, when intercepted from every road, he sends word to Caesar that he was ready to deliver up the legion which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus Caesar, and orders him to deliver it up to him. Varro, having delivered up the legion, went to Caesar to Corduba, and having laid before him the public accounts, handed over to him most faithfully whatever money he had, and told him what quantity of corn and shipping he had, and where.

XXI. — Caesar made a public oration at Corduba, in which he

returned thanks to all severally: to the Roman citizens, because they had been zealous to keep the town in their own power; to the Spaniards, for having driven out the garrison; to the Gaditani, for having defeated the attempts of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the Tribunes and Centurions who had gone there as a guard, for having by their valour confirmed them in their purpose. He remitted the tax which the Roman citizens had promised to Varro for the public use: he restored their goods to those who he was informed had incurred that penalty by speaking too freely, having given public and private rewards to some: he filled the rest with flattering hopes of his future intentions; and having stayed two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades: he ordered the money and ornaments which had been carried away from the temple of Hercules, and lodged in the houses of private persons, to be replaced in the temple. He made Quintus Cassius governor of the province, and assigned him four legions. He himself, with those ships which Marcus Varro had built, and others which the Gaditani had built by Varro's orders, arrived in a few days at Tarraco, where ambassadors from the greatest part of the nearer province waited his arrival. Having in the same manner conferred marks of honour both publicly and privately on some states, he left Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence to Massilia. There he was informed that a law was passed for creating a dictator, and that he had been nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus the praetor.

XXII. — The Massilians, wearied out by misfortunes of every sort, reduced to the lowest ebb for want of corn, conquered in two engagements at sea, defeated in their frequent sallies, and struggling moreover with a fatal pestilence, from their long confinement and change of victuals (for they all subsisted on old millet and damaged

barley, which they had formerly provided and laid up in the public stores against an emergency of this kind), their turret being demolished, a great part of their wall having given way, and despairing of any aid, either from the provinces or their armies, for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar's power, resolved to surrender now without dissimulation. But a few days before, Lucius Domitius, having discovered the intention of the Massilians, and having procured three ships, two of which he gave up to his friends, went on board the third himself, having got a brisk wind, put out to sea. Some ships, which by Brutus's orders were constantly cruising near the port, having espied him, weighed anchor, and pursued him. But of these, the ship on board of which he was, persevered itself, and continuing its flight, and by the aid of the wind got out of sight: the other two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys, put back again into the harbour. The Massilians conveyed their arms and engines out of the town, as they were ordered: brought their ships out of the port and docks, and delivered up the money in their treasury. When these affairs were despatched, Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to their renown and antiquity than to any claim they could lay to his favour, left two legions in garrison there, sent the rest to Italy, and set out himself for Rome.

XXIII. — About the same time Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily to Africa, and from the first despising the forces of Publius Attius Varus, transported only two of the four legions which he had received from Caesar, and five hundred horse, and having spent two days and three nights on the voyage, arrived at a place called Aquilaria, which is about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and in the summer season has a convenient harbour, and is enclosed by two projecting promontories. Lucius Caesar, the son, who was

waiting his arrival near Clupea with ten ships which had been taken near Utica in a war with the pirates, and which Publius Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at the number of our ships, fled the sea, and running his three-decked covered galley on the nearest shore, left her there and made his escape by land to Adrumetum. Caius Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion, guarded this town. The rest of Caesar's fleet, after his flight, retired to Adrumetum. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, pursued him with twelve ships, which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy to the merchantmen, and seeing a ship left on the shore, he brought her off by a towing rope, and returned with his fleet to Curio.

XXIV. — Curio detached Marcus before with the fleet to Utica, and marched thither with his army. Having advanced two days, he came to the river Bagrađa, and there left Caius Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant, with the legions; and went forward himself with the horse to view the Cornelian camp, because that was reckoned a very eligible position for encamping. It is a straight ridge, projecting into the sea, steep and rough on both sides, but the ascent is more gentle on that part which lies opposite Utica. It is not more than a mile distant from Utica in a direct line. But on this road there is a spring, to which the sea comes up, and overflows; an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person would avoid it, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town.

XXV. — Having examined this place, Curio got a view of Varus's camp, joining the wall and town, at the gate called Bellica, well fortified by its natural situation, on one side by the town itself, on the other by a theatre which is before the town, the approaches to the town being rendered difficult and narrow by the very extensive out-buildings of that structure. At the same time he observed the

roads very full of carriages and cattle which they were conveying from the country into the town on the sudden alarm. He sent his cavalry after them to plunder them and get the spoil. And at the same time Varus had detached as a guard for them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred foot, which king Juba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries a few days before. There was a friendship subsisting between his [Juba's] father and Pompey, and a feud between him and Curio, because he, when a tribune of the people, had proposed a law, in which he endeavoured to make public property of the kingdom of Juba. The horse engaged; but the Numidians were not able to stand our first charge; but a hundred and twenty being killed, the rest retreated into their camp near the town. In the meantime, on the arrival of his men-of-war, Curio ordered proclamation to be made to the merchant ships, which lay at anchor before Utica, in number about two hundred, that he would treat as enemies all that did not set sail immediately for the Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation was made, in an instant they all weighed anchor and left Utica, and repaired to the place commanded them. This circumstance furnished the army with plenty of everything.

XXVI. — After these transactions, Curio returned to his camp at Bagrada; and by a general shout of the whole army was saluted imperator. The next day he led his army to Utica, and encamped near the town. Before the works of the camp were finished, the horse upon guard brought him word that a large supply of horse and foot sent by king Juba were on their march to Utica, and at the same time a cloud of dust was observed, and in a moment the front of the line was in sight. Curio, surprised at the suddenness of the affair, sent on the horse to receive their first charge, and detain them. He immediately called off his legions from the work, and put them in battle array. The

horse began the battle: and before the legions could be completely marshalled and take their ground, the king's entire forces being thrown into disorder and confusion, because they had marched without any order, and were under no apprehensions, betake themselves to flight: almost all the enemy's horse being safe, because they made a speedy retreat into the town along the shore, Caesar's soldiers slay a great number of their infantry.

XXVII. — The next night two Marsian centurions, with twenty-two men belonging to the companies, deserted from Curio's camp to Attius Varus. They, whether they uttered the sentiments which they really entertained, or wished to gratify Varus (for what we wish we readily give credit to, and what we think ourselves, we hope is the opinion of other men), assured him, that the minds of the whole army were disaffected to Curio, that it was very expedient that the armies should be brought in view of each other, and an opportunity of a conference be given. Induced by their opinion, Varus the next day led his troops out of the camp: Curio did so in like manner, and with only one small valley between them, each drew up his forces.

XXVIII. — In Varus's army there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus who, as we have mentioned before, was at Corfinium. When Caesar gave him his liberty, he went over to Africa; now, Curio had transported to Africa those legions which Caesar had received under his command a short time before at Corfinium: so that the officers and companies were still the same, excepting the change of a few centurions. Quintilius, making this a pretext for addressing them, began to go round Curio's lines, and to entreat the soldiers "not to lose all recollection of the oath which they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear arms against those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the same hardships in a siege, nor fight for

those by whom they had been opprobriously called deserters.” To this he added a few words by way of encouragement, what they might expect from his own liberality, if they should follow him and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, no intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio’s army, and thus both generals led back their troops to their camp.

XXIX. — However, a great and general fear spread through Curio’s camp, for it is soon increased by the various discourses of men. For every one formed an opinion of his own; and to what he had heard from others, added his own apprehensions. When this had spread from a single author to several persons, and was handed from one another, there appeared to be many authors for such sentiments as these: [“That it was a civil war; that they were men; and therefore that it was lawful for them to act freely, and follow which party they pleased.” These were the legions which a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the custom of offering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had changed Caesar’s kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in general did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those which passed in the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiers heard them with displeasure. Some additions were also made to them by those who wished to be thought more zealous in their duty.]

XXX. — For these reasons, having called a council, Curio began to deliberate on the general welfare. There were some opinions, which advised by all means an attempt to be made, and an attack on Varus’s camp; for when such sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, they thought idleness was improper. In short, they said, “that it was better bravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to be deserted and surrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit

to the greatest cruelties.” There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought to withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longer interval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way of thinking; and also, that if any misfortune should befall them, they might have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the great number of their ships.

XXXI. — Curio, censuring both measures, said, “that the one was as deficient in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the latter advised a shameful flight, and the former recommended us to engage at a great disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we rely that we can storm a camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed, what advantage do we gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered considerable loss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of his army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp imply but a shameful flight, and universal despair, and the alienation of the army? For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they are distrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear them; because our fears augment the licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal of the former. But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of the reports of the disaffection of the army (which I indeed am confident are either altogether groundless, or at least less than they are supposed to be), how much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it, than by our conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an army to be as carefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increase the enemy’s hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight, in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have a fairer opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either by shame or fear, to the display of which the night is most adverse. Wherefore, I am neither

so rash as to give my opinion that we ought to attack their camp without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fear as to despond: and I imagine that every expedient ought first to be tried; and I am in a great degree confident that I shall form the same opinion as yourselves on this matter.”

XXXII. — Having broken up the council he called the soldiers together, and reminded them “what advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal at Corfinium; how by their good offices and influence he had brought over a great part of Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipal towns afterwards imitated you and your conduct; nor was it without reason that Caesar judged so favourably, and the enemy so harshly of you. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged to shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established by your conduct. Caesar committed me, whom he considered his dearest friend, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was not able to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some here present who encourage you to revolt from us; for what can they wish for more, than at once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? or what baser opinions could they in their resentment entertain of you, than that you would betray those who acknowledged themselves indebted to you for everything, and put yourselves in the power of those who think they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard of Caesar’s exploits in Spain? that he routed two armies, conquered two generals, recovered two provinces, and effected all this within forty days after he came in sight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand against him whilst they were uninjured resist him when they are ruined? Will you, who took part with Caesar whilst victory was uncertain, take part with the conquered enemy when the fortune of

the war is decided, and when you ought to reap the reward of your services? For they say that they have been deserted and betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. But did you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Did he not, when you were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties, cast you off? Did he not, without your privacy, endeavour to effect his own escape? When you were betrayed by him, were you not preserved by Caesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your oath to him, when, after having thrown up the ensigns of power, and abdicated his government, he became a private person, and a captive in another's power? A new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard the oath, by which you are at present bound; and have respect only to that which was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and his diminution of rank. But I suppose, although you are pleased with Caesar, you are offended with me; however I shall not boast of my services to you, which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations. But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards of labour at the conclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely to be, not even you can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own diligence and good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived? Are you sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the loss of a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routed the enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse? That I carried out of the very harbour and bay, two hundred of the enemy's victuallers, and reduced them to that situation that they can receive no supplies either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves from this fortune and these generals; and prefer the disgrace of Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of both Spains, and the prestige of the African

war? I, for my part, wished to be called a soldier of Caesar's; you honoured me with the title of Imperator. If you repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former name that you may not appear to have conferred the honour on me as a reproach."

XXXIII. — The soldiers, being affected by this oration, frequently attempted to interrupt him whilst he was speaking, so that they appeared to bear with excessive anguish the suspicion of treachery, and when he was leaving the assembly they unanimously besought him to be of good spirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their fidelity and courage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all were changed by this act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, whenever opportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out his forces and ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where they had been posted the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw out his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either to tamper with our men or to engage on equal terms, he might not miss the opportunity.

XXXIV.—There lay between the two armies a valley, as already mentioned, not very deep, but of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting till the enemy's forces should attempt to pass it, that they might engage with the advantage of the ground. At the same time, on the left wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and several light-armed infantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending into the valley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of the Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand, but, setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: the light-infantry being deserted by those who had come out along with them, were surrounded and cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facing that way, saw their men flee

and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily knowing that he had great experience in military matters, cried out, "You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do you hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely "expressed this, that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions which they had made to him the day before," then ordered them to follow him, and ran far before them all. The valley was so difficult of ascent that the foremost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind. But the minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and the flight and slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; and they all imagined that they were already surrounded by our horse, and, therefore, before a dart could be thrown or our men come near them, Varus's whole army turned their backs and retreated to their camp.

XXXV.-In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian and common soldier in Curio's army, pursuing the enemy's rear, with a loud voice shouted to Varus by his name, and often called him, so that he seemed to be one of his soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give him advice. When Varus, after being repeatedly called, stopped and looked at him, and inquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword at his naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the danger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surrounded by the soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude and crowds of those that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the passage stopped, and a greater number perished in that place without a stroke than in the battle and flight. Nor were we far from driving them from this camp; and some of them ran straightway to the town without halting. But both the nature of the ground and the strength of the fortifications

prevented our access to the camp; for Curio's soldiers, marching out to battle, were without those things which were requisite for storming a camp. Curio, therefore, led his army back to the camp, with all his troops safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundred were killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after Curio's return, and several more under pretext of their wounds, but in fact through fear, withdrew from the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving and knowing the terror of his army, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and a few tents for show, at the third watch led back his army quietly into the town.

XXXVI. — The next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw lines about it. In the town there was a multitude of people, ignorant of war, owing to the length of the peace; some of them Uticans, very well inclined to Caesar, for his favours to them; the Roman population was composed of persons differing widely in their sentiments. The terror occasioned by former battles was very great; and therefore they openly talked of surrendering, and argued with Attius that he should not suffer the fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy. Whilst these things were in agitation, couriers, who had been sent forward, arrived from king Juba, with the intelligence that he was on his march, with considerable forces, and encouraged them to protect and defend their city, a circumstance which greatly comforted their desponding hearts.

XXXVII. — The same intelligence was brought to Curio; but for some time he could not give credit to it, because he had so great confidence in his own good fortune. And at this time Caesar's success in Spain was announced in Africa by messages and letters. Being elated by all these things, he imagined that the king would not dare to attempt anything against him. But when he found out, from

undoubted authority, that his forces were less than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning his works, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here he began to lay in corn and wood, and to fortify his camp, and immediately despatched orders to Sicily, that his two legions and the remainder of his cavalry should be sent to him. His camp was well adapted for protracting a war, from the nature and strength of the situation, from its proximity to the sea, and the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had been stored up from the neighbouring salt-pits. Timber could not fail him from the number of trees, nor corn, with which the lands abounded. Wherefore, with the general consent, Curio determined to wait for the rest of his forces, and protract the war.

XXXVIII. — This plan being settled, and his conduct approved of, he is informed by some deserters from the town that Juba had stayed behind in his own kingdom, being called home by a neighbouring war, and a dispute with the people of Leptis; and that Sabura, his commander-in-chief, who had been sent with a small force, was drawing near to Utica. Curio rashly believing this information, altered his design, and resolved to hazard a battle. His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune and confidence of success, contributed much to confirm this resolution. Induced by these motives, early in the night he sent all his cavalry to the enemy's camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom we have already spoken, was the commander. But the king was coming after them with all his forces, and was posted at a distance of six miles behind Sabura. The horse that were sent perform their march that night, and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly; for the Numidians, after the usual barbarous custom, encamped here and there without any regularity. The cavalry having attacked them, when

sunk in sleep and dispersed, killed a great number of them; many were frightened and ran away. After which the horse returned to Curio, and brought some prisoners with them.

XXXIX. — Curio had set out at the fourth watch with all his forces, except five cohorts which he left to guard the camp. Having advanced six miles, he met the horse, heard what had happened, and inquired from the captives who commanded the camp at Bagrada. They replied Sabura. Through eagerness to perform his journey, he neglected to make further inquiries, but looking back to the company next him, “Don’t you see, soldiers,” says he, “that the answer of the prisoners corresponds with the account of the deserters, that the king is not with him, and that he sent only a small force which was not able to withstand a few horse? Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin to think of rewarding you, and returning you thanks.” The achievements of the horse were great in themselves, especially if their small number be compared with the vast host of Numidians. However, the account was enlarged by themselves, as men are naturally inclined to boast of their own merit. Besides, many spoils were produced; the men and horses that were taken were brought into their sight, that they might imagine that every moment of time which intervened was a delay to their conquest. By this means the hopes of Curio were seconded by the ardour of the soldiers. He ordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his march, that he might attack them as soon as possible, while in consternation after their flight. But the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the preceding night, were not able to keep up with him, but fell behind in different places. Even this did not abate Curio’s hopes.

XL. — Juba, being informed by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent to his relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, which he

was accustomed to keep near him to guard his person, and that part of his infantry on which he had the greatest dependence, and he himself followed slowly after with the rest of his forces and forty elephants, suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before, he himself would follow them. Sabura drew up his army, both horse and foot, and commanded them to give way gradually and retreat through the pretence of fear; that when it was necessary he would give them the signal for battle, and such orders as he found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea of their present behaviour was calculated to confirm his former hopes, imagined that the enemy were running away, and led his army from the rising grounds down to the plain.

XLI. — And when he had advanced from this place about sixteen miles, his army being exhausted with the fatigue, he halted. Sabura gave his men the signal, marshalled his army, and began to go around his ranks and encourage them. But he made use of the foot only for show; and sent the horse to the charge: Curio was not deficient in skill, and encouraged his men to rest all their hopes in their valour. Neither were the soldiers, though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted with fatigue, deficient in ardour to engage, and courage: but the latter were in number but two hundred: the rest had dropped behind on the march. Wherever they charged they forced the enemy to give ground, but they were not able to pursue them far when they fled, or to press their horses too severely. Besides, the enemy's cavalry began to surround us on both wings and to trample down our rear. When any cohorts ran forward out of the line, the Numidians, being fresh, by their speed avoided our charge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to return to their post, and cut them off from the main body. So that it did not appear safe either to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue

from the line, and run the risk. The enemy's troops were frequently reinforced by assistance sent from Juba; strength began to fail our men through fatigue; and those who had been wounded could neither quit the field nor retire to a place of safety, because the whole field was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry. Therefore, despairing of their own safety, as men usually do in the last moment of their lives, they either lamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended their parents to the survivors, if fortune should save any from the impending danger. All were full of fear and grief.

XLII. — When Curio perceived that in the general consternation neither his exhortations nor entreaties were attended to, imagining that the only hope of escaping in their deplorable situation was to gain the nearest hills, he ordered the colours to be borne that way. But a party of horse, that had been sent by Sabura, had already got possession of them. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme despair: and some of them were killed by the cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell to the ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander of the cavalry, standing round Curio with a small party of horse, urged Curio to endeavour to escape by flight, and to hasten to his camp; and assured him that he would not forsake him. But Curio declared that he would never more appear in Caesar's sight, after losing the army which had been committed by Caesar to his charge, and accordingly fought till he was killed. Very few of the horse escaped from that battle, but those who had stayed behind to refresh their horses having perceived at a distance the defeat of the whole army, retired in safety to their camp.

XLIII. — The soldiers were all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, who was left behind in the camp by Curio, having got intelligence of these things, encouraged his men not to be

disheartened. They beg and entreat to be transported to Sicily. He consented, and ordered the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought close to the shore early in the evening. But so great was the terror in general that some said that Juba's forces were marching up, others that Varus was hastening with his legions, and that they already saw the dust raised by their coming; of which not one circumstance had happened: others suspected that the enemy's fleet would immediately be upon them. Therefore, in the general consternation, every man consulted his own safety. Those who were on board of the fleet, were in a hurry to set sail, and their flight hastened the masters of the ships of burden. A few small fishing boats attended their duty and his orders. But as the shores were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine who of such a vast number should first get on board, that some of the vessels sank with the weight of the multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed them from coming to the shore.

XLIV. — From which circumstances it happened that a few foot and aged men, that could prevail either through interest or pity, or who were able to swim to the ships, were taken on board, and landed safe in Sicily. The rest of the troops sent their centurions as deputies to Varus at night, and surrendered themselves to him. But Juba, the next day having spied their cohorts before the town, claimed them as his booty, and ordered a great part of them to be put to the sword; a few he selected and sent home to his own realm. Although Varus complained that his honour was insulted by Juba, yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rode on horseback into the town, attended by several senators, amongst whom were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, and in a few days arranged and ordered what he would have done in Utica, and in a few days more returned to his own

kingdom, with all his forces.

BOOK III

I. — Julius Caesar, holding the election as dictator, was himself appointed consul with Publius Servilius; for this was the year in which it was permitted by the laws that he should be chosen consul. This business being ended, as credit was beginning to fail in Italy, and the debts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators should be appointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions and properties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war, and that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This he thought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of an abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and dissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewise restored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes first submitting the question to the people) some persons condemned for bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time when Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another pronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service to him in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them; setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because they had put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they ought to be restored, rather by the judgment of the people, than appear admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful in repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of their prerogative of exercising this bounty.

II. — In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival, and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and

having resigned the dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, where he had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But he scarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteen thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcity of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting a speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very short of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, and the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of the whole army.

III. — Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during which he was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected a numerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had given directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government, to count down to him a large sum.

IV. — He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy, which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, which being composed of two, he called the Gemella; one from Crete and Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals, and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been levied by the activity of Lentulus. Besides he had distributed among his legions a considerable number, by way of

recruits, from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the soldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two legions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria, and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts of slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; six hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, five hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number from Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia there were two hundred, of extraordinary valour, commanded by Rascipolis; five hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinus's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus Gabinus had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the son, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among his own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus had given three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the other sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. To these were added Dardanians, and Bessians, some of them mercenaries; others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians, and troops from other nations and states, which completed the number which we mentioned before.

V. — He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other sea-ports, to hinder Caesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed his fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey, the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: the Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by

Caius Marcellus, in conjunction with Caius Coponius; and the Liburnian, and Achaian, by Scribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed commander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated every matter. The chief direction rested upon him.

VI. — When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers: “That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of their toils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slaves and baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greater number of men might be put on board: that they might expect everything from victory and his liberality.” They cried out with one voice, “he might give what orders he pleased, that they would cheerfully fulfil them.” He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with seven legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land, between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with a safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at a place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.

VII. — Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the orders of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten ships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of the harbour; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, only four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered and his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at the continent before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached those regions.

VIII. — Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the

same night to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry. The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus, with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the ships having put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the night breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus, at Corcyra, being informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of our ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken about thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them all on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to deter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the harbours and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depth of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting for reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach.

IX. — But after the departure of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius sailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona; and having spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issa off from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail with the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved to storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation, and a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it; but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the last resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear arms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their engines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded the town with five encampments, and

began to press them at once with a siege and storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and their greatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies to Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences they bore by their own resources, as well as they could: and after a long interval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops more remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemy were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, to keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselves into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, they made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that, attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the fourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and having killed a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for refuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was now approaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, after sustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.

X. — We have mentioned that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, had fallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterwards in Spain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favours conferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he had an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals: "That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, and forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficient loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson and instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities, by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Spains, and

one hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio, and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his soldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and the republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient experience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the only time to treat of peace; when each had confidence in his own strength, and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if fortune showed ever so little favour to either, he who thought himself superior, would not submit to terms of accommodation; nor would he be content with an equal division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That, as they could not agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate and people in Rome. That in the meantime, it ought to content the republic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a public assembly, that they would disband their forces within the three following days. That having divested themselves of the arms and auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they must both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. To give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all his forces on land, even his garrisons.

XI. — Vibullius, having received this commission from Caesar, thought it no less necessary to give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach, that he might adopt such plans as the circumstance required, than to inform him of Caesar's message; and therefore continuing his journey by night as well as by day, and taking fresh horses for despatch, he posted away to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was marching towards him with all his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia, and was on his march from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium; but surprised at the

unexpected news, he determined to go to Apollonia by speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all the maritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set off the same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, who was governor of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison of Parthinians in it, endeavoured to shut the gates and defend the town, and ordered the Greeks to man the walls, and to take arms. But as they refused to fight against the power of the Roman people, and as the citizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit Caesar, despairing of any assistance, he threw open the gates, and surrendered himself and the town to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him.

XII. — Having taken Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay to Apollonia. Staberius the governor, hearing of his approach, began to bring water into the citadel, and to fortify it, and to demand hostages of the town's people. But they refuse to give any, or to shut their gates against the consul, or to take upon them to judge contrary to what all Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he knew their inclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of Apollonia sent ambassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town. Their example was followed by the inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, and the other neighbouring states, and all Epirus: and they sent ambassadors to Caesar, and promised to obey his commands.

XIII. — But Pompey having received information of the transactions at Oricum and Apollonia, began to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, and endeavoured to reach it, marching day and night. As soon as it was said that Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell upon Pompey's army, because in his haste he had made no

distinction between night and day, and had marched without intermission, that they almost every man deserted their colours in Epirus and the neighbouring countries; several threw down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight. But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders for measuring out the ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing in their fright, Labienus first stepped forward and swore that he would never desert him, and would share whatever fate fortune should assign to him. The other lieutenants took the same oath, and the tribunes and centurions followed their example: and the whole army swore in like manner. Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in the possession of Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river Apsus, in the territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved his support might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts; and there he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions from Italy, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching his camp on the other side of the river Apsus, collected there all his troops and auxiliaries.

XIV. — Kalenus, having put the legions and cavalry on board at Brundisium, as Caesar had directed him, as far as the number of his ships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a little distance from port, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was informed, that all the ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's fleet: on receiving this information he returned into the harbour, and recalled all the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did not obey Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was private property, bore away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who spared neither slaves nor free men, nor even children; but put all to the sword. Thus the safety of the whole army depended

on a very short space of time and a great casualty.

XV. — Bibulus, as has been observed before, lay with his fleet near Oricum, and as he debarred Caesar of the liberty of the sea and harbours, so he was deprived of all intercourse with the country by land; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed in different places by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or water, or even anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, and distressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that he was obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions, but even wood and water; and it once happened that, meeting with violent storms, they were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on the hides that covered their decks; yet all these difficulties they bore patiently and without repining, and thought they ought not to leave the shores and harbours free from blockade. But when they were suffering under the distress which I have mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus, they both called from on ship-board to Marcus Acilius and Statius Marcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the town, the other the guards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on affairs of importance, if permission should be granted them. They add something further to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat about an accommodation. In the meantime they requested a truce, and obtained it from them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and it was well known that Caesar desired it above all things, and it was imagined that some advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals.

XVI. — Caesar having set out with one legion to gain possession of the more remote states, and to provide corn, of which he had but a small quantity, was at this time at Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. There receiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing him of

Libo's and Bibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and returned himself to Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference. Libo came and made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong passion, and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was aedile and praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lest affairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by the warmth of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's most earnest wish, that they should be reconciled, and lay down their arms; but they were not authorized to treat on that subject, because they resigned the whole management of the war, and all other matters, to Pompey, by order of the council. But when they were acquainted with Caesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey, who would conclude all of himself by their persuasions. In the meantime, let the truce be continued till the messengers could return from him; and let no injury be done on either side." To this he added a few words of the cause for which they fought, and of his own forces and resources.

XVII. — To this, Caesar did not then think proper to make any reply, nor do we now think it worth recording. But Caesar required "that he should be allowed to send commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer no personal injury; and that either they should grant it, or should take his commissioners in charge, and convey them to Pompey. That as to the truce, the war in its present state was so divided, that they by their fleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries; while he prevented them from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they wished that this restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish their blockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like manner would retain the other; that

nevertheless, the treaty of accommodation might still be carried on, though these points were not conceded, and that they need not be an impediment to it." They would neither receive Caesar's commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred the whole to Pompey. They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one point respecting a truce. But when Caesar perceived that they had proposed the conference merely to avoid present danger and distress, but that they offered no hopes or terms of peace, he applied his thoughts to the prosecution of the war.

XVIII. — Bibulus, being prevented from landing for several days, and being seized with a violent distemper from the cold and fatigue, as he could neither be cured on board, nor was willing to desert the charge which he had taken upon him, was unable to bear up against the violence of the disease. On his death, the sole command devolved on no single individual, but each admiral managed his own division separately, and at his own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which Caesar's unexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver Caesar's message in the presence of Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theophanes, to whom Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He had scarcely entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbade him to proceed. "What need," says he, "have I of life or Rome, if the world shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar; an opinion which can never be removed whilst it shall be thought that I have been brought back by him to Italy, from which I set out." After the conclusion of the war, Caesar was informed of these expressions by some persons who were present at the conversation. He attempted, however, by other means to bring about a negotiation of peace.

XIX. — Between Pompey's and Caesar's camp there was only the

river Apsus, and the soldiers frequently conversed with each other; and by a private arrangement among themselves, no weapons were thrown during their conferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to the bank of the river, to make such proposals as should appear most conducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice [asking], “Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treat of peace? a concession which had been made even to fugitives on the Pyrenean mountains, and to robbers, especially when by so doing they would prevent citizens from fighting against citizens.” Having spoken much in humble language, as became a man pleading for his own and the general safety, and being listened to with silence by the soldiers of both armies, he received an answer from the enemy’s party that Aulus Varro proposed coming the next day to a conference, and that deputies from both sides might come without danger, and explain their wishes, and accordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When the deputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled, and the expectations of every person concerning this subject were raised very high, and their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace. Titus Labienus walked forward from the crowd, and in submissive terms began to speak of peace, and to argue with Vatinius. But their conversation was suddenly interrupted by darts thrown from all sides, from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the arms of the soldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and some privates; hereupon Labienus exclaimed, “Forbear, then, to speak any more about an accommodation, for we can have no peace unless we carry Caesar’s head back with us.”

XX. — At the same time in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of

the praetors, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on entering into his office, fixed his tribunal near the bench of Caius Trebonius, the city praetor, and promised if any person appealed to him in regard to the valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as appointed by Caesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened, from the justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought that in such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderation and compassion), that not one could be found who would offer himself the first to lodge an appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his own private calamities, or the general distresses of the times, or to assert the difficulty of setting the goods to sale, is the behaviour of a man even of a moderate temper; but to retain their possessions entire, and at the same time acknowledge themselves in debt, what sort of spirit, and what impudence would it not have argued! Therefore nobody was found so unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius proved more severe to those very persons for whose advantage it had been designed; and starting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear to have engaged in so dishonourable an affair without effecting something, he promulgated a law, that all debts should be discharged in six equal payments, of six months each, without interest.

XXI. — When Servilius, the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him, and he himself effected less than he expected, in order to raise the passions of the people, he dropped it, and promulgated two others; one, by which he remitted the annual rents of the houses to the tenants, the other, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made an assault on Caius Trebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him from his tribunal. The consul Servilius informed

the senate of his proceedings, who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the management of the republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate; and when he was attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of the rostrum. Stung with the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended in public that he would go to Caesar, but privately sent messengers to Milo, who had murdered Clodius, and had been condemned for it; and having invited him into Italy, because he had engaged the remains of the gladiators to his interest, by making them supple presents, he joined him, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds. When he himself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his military standards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples, and the design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed, and Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because the Roman citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he ought to be treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design, and changed his route.

XXII. — Milo in the meantime despatched letters to the free towns, purporting that he acted as he did by the orders and commands of Pompey, conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he endeavoured to engage in his interest all persons whom he imagined were under difficulties by reason of their debts. But not being able to prevail with them, he set at liberty some slaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa in the district of Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown from the wall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one legion, he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar, went to Thurii, where he was put to death as he was tampering with some of the freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallic

and Spanish horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison. And thus these mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and kept the magistrates employed, found a speedy and happy issue.

XXIII. — Libo having sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships, which he commanded, came to Brundisium, and seized an island, which lies opposite to the harbour; judging it better to guard that place, which was our only pass to sea, than to keep all the shores and ports blocked up by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with some of our transports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with corn; he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed a party of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from their station, and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that he despatched letters to Pompey, that if he pleased he might order the rest of the ships to be hauled upon shore and repaired; for that with his own fleet he could prevent Caesar from receiving his auxiliaries.

XXIV. — Antonius was at this time at Brundisium, and relying on the valour of his troops, covered about sixty of the long-boats belonging to the men-of-war with penthouses and bulwarks of hurdles, and put on board them select soldiers; and disposed them separately along the shore: and under the pretext of keeping the seamen in exercise, he ordered two three-banked galleys, which he had built at Brundisium, to row to the mouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing boldly towards him, he sent five four-banked galleys against them, in hopes of intercepting them. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers retreated within the harbour. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture them, pursued them unguardedly; for instantly the boats of Antonius, on a

certain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against the enemy; and at the first charge took one of the four-banked galleys, with the seamen and marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. In addition to this loss, they were prevented from getting water by the horse which Antonius had disposed along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed at the distress and disgrace, departed from Brundisium, and abandoned the blockade.

XXV. — Several months had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, and Caesar's legions and shipping were not coming to him from Brundisium, and he imagined that some opportunities had been neglected, for the winds had at least been often favourable, and he thought that he must trust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the more eager were those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and were more confident of preventing our getting assistance: they receive frequent reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not prevented Caesar's arrival at the first, they should at least stop the remainder of his army: and they were expecting that the season for transporting troops would become more unfavourable every day, as the winds grew calmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble on this account, wrote in severe terms to his officers at Brundisium, [and gave them orders] that as soon as they found the wind to answer, they should not let the opportunity of setting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course to the shore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground. That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet, because they dare not venture too far from the harbour.

XXVI. — They [his officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by the instructions of Marcus Antonius, and Fufius Kalenus, and animated by the soldiers strongly encouraging them, and

declining no danger for Caesar's safety, having got a southerly wind, weighed anchor, and the next day were carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and being seen from the continent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian fleet at Dyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had almost come up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south wind sprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from his attempt, but hoped by the labour and perseverance of his seamen to be able to bear up against the violence of the storm; and although we were carried beyond Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he nevertheless continued to chase us. Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness, for they were still afraid of being attacked by the enemy's fleet, if the wind abated, having come near a port, called Nymphaeum, about three miles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port is protected from a south-west wind, but is not secure against a south wind); and thought less danger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the enemy. But as soon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had blown for two days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west.

XXVII. — Here one might observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, a moment before, were alarmed for ourselves, were safely lodged in a very secure harbour: and they who had threatened ruin to our fleet, were forced to be uneasy on their own account: and thus, by a change of circumstances, the storm protected our ships, and damaged the Rhodian fleet to such a degree, that all their decked ships, sixteen in number, foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the prodigious number of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashed against the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent them all safe home.

XXVIII. — Two of our ships, that had not kept up with the rest, being overtaken by the night, and not knowing what port the rest had made to, came to an anchor opposite Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded Pompey's fleet, detached after them several barges and small craft, and attempted to take them. At the same time, he treated with them about capitulating, and promised them their lives if they would surrender. One of them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other was manned with somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen what security men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightened at the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea; and with sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first received his oath, that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they were brought before him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they were inhumanly put to death in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteran legion, who had also struggled, not only with the inclemency of the weather, but by labouring at the pump, thought it their duty to remit nothing of their former valour: and having protracted the beginning of the night in settling the terms, under pretence of surrendering, they obliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a convenient place on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and at daybreak, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, who guarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, besides some armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made a brave defence, and having killed some of them, retreated in safety to our army.

XXIX. — After this action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, a town which Caesar had before assigned them, and had carefully fortified, received Antony into their town, and gave him

every assistance. Otacilius, apprehensive for his own safety, escaped out of the town, and went to Pompey. All his forces, whose number amounted to three veteran legions, and one of recruits, and about eight hundred horse, being landed, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to transport the remainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a sort of Gallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey, imagining Italy defenceless, should transport his army thither (and this notion was spread among the common people), Caesar might have some means of pursuing him; and he sent messengers to him with great despatch, to inform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and what number of troops he had brought over with him.

XXX. — Caesar and Pompey received this intelligence almost at the same time; for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium. They directed their march after them by land; but at first they were ignorant to what part they had been carried; but when they were informed of it, they each adopted a different plan; Caesar, to form a junction with Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey, to oppose Antonius's forces on their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon them unexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out their armies from their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey, privately by night; Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march a longer circuit up the river to find a ford. Pompey's route being easy, because he was not obliged to cross the river, he advanced rapidly and by forced marches against Antonius, and being informed of his approach, chose a convenient situation, where he posted his forces; and kept his men close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled, that his arrival might be the more secret. An account of this was immediately carried to Antonius by the

Greeks. He despatched messengers to Caesar, and confined himself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar came up with him. On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in between two armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces to Asparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in a convenient situation.

XXXI. — During these times, Scipio, though he had sustained some losses near mount Amanus, had assumed to himself the title of imperator, after which he demanded large sums of money from the states and princes. He had also exacted from the tax-gatherers two years' rents that they owed; and enjoined them to lend him the amount of the next year, and demanded a supply of horse from the whole province. When they were collected, leaving behind him his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians (who shortly before had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and had kept Marcus Bibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of Syria; and when he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and fear of the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers, "That they would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but would never bear arms against a countryman and consul"; he drew off his legions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, and made them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to his interest, permitted them to plunder the cities.

XXXII. — In the meantime, the money which had been demanded from the province at large, was most rigorously exacted. Besides, many new imposts of different kinds were devised to gratify his avarice. A tax of so much a head was laid on every slave and child. Columns, doors, corn, soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages, were made subject to a duty. Wherever a name could be

found for anything, it was deemed a sufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed to collect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village and fort: and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigour and inhumanity, was esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The province was overrun with bailiffs and officers, and crowded with overseers and tax-gatherers; who, besides the duties imposed, exacted a gratuity for themselves; for they asserted, that being expelled from their own homes and countries, they stood in need of every necessary; endeavouring by a plausible pretence to colour the most infamous conduct. To this was added the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in times of war; the whole sums being called in, on which occasion they alleged that the delay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years, the debt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes were exacted, not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporation and every state. And they said that these were loans, exacted by the senate's decree. The taxes of the ensuing year were demanded beforehand as a loan from the collectors, as on their first appointment.

XXXIII. — Moreover, Scipio ordered the money formerly lodged in the temple of Diana at Ephesus, to be taken out with the statues of that goddess which remained there. When Scipio came to the temple, letters were delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence of several senators, whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him] that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to him with his army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received the letter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for his journey to Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstance saved the money at Ephesus.

XXXIV. — Caesar, having effected a junction with Antonius's army, and having drawn his legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guard the coast, thought he ought to sound the inclination of the provinces, and march farther into the country; and when ambassadors came to him from Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in those countries would obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them, he despatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legion composed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: and Caius Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse, into Aetolia. He recommended them to be especially careful to provide corn, because those regions were nearest to him. He ordered Cneius Domitius Calvinus to march into Macedonia with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, and five hundred horse; from which province, Menedemus, the principal man of those regions, on that side which is called the Free, having come as ambassador, assured him of the most devoted affection of all his subjects.

XXXV. — Of these Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being very kindly received, dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon and Naupactus, and made himself master of the whole country. Cassius went to Thessaly with his legion. As there were two factions there, he found the citizens divided in their inclinations. Hegasaretus, a man of established power, favoured Pompey's interest. Petreius, a young man of a most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and his friends' influence.

XXXVI. — At the same time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and when numerous embassies had begun to wait on him from many of the states, news was brought that Scipio was approaching with his legions, which occasioned various opinions and reports; for in

strange events, rumour generally goes before. Without making any delay in any part of Macedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when he was come within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden towards Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, that news of his march and arrival came together; for to render his march expeditious, he left the baggage of his legions behind him at the river Haliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care of Marcus Favonius, with a guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to build a strong fort there. At the same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used to infest the neighbourhood of Macedonia, flew to attack Cassius's camp, at which Cassius being alarmed, and having received information of Scipio's approach, and seen the horse, which he imagined to be Scipio's, he betook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly, and thence began to make his route towards Ambracia. But when Scipio was hastening to pursue him, despatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius was marching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintain the garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance. On receipt of these despatches, Scipio changed his designs and his route, desisted from his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieve Favonius. Accordingly, continuing his march day and night, he came to him so opportunely, that the dust raised by Domitius's army, and Scipio's advanced guard, were observed at the same instant. Thus, the vigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the expedition of Scipio, Favonius.

XXXVII — Scipio, having stayed for two days in his camp, along the river Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's camp, on the third day, at dawn, led his army across a ford, and having

made a regular encampment the day following, drew up his forces in front of his camp. Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but should draw out his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six miles in breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio's camp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his entrenchment. However, Domitius with difficulty restrained his men, and prevented their beginning a battle; the more so as a rivulet with steep banks, joining Scipio's camp, retarded the progress of our men. When Scipio perceived the eagerness and alacrity of our troops to engage, suspecting that he should be obliged the next day, either to fight, against his inclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within his camp, though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly, made a shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving the signal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from which he came, and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation. After a few days, he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night, where our men had usually gone to forage for several days before. And when Quintus Varus, commander of Domitius's horse, came there as usual, they suddenly rushed from their ambush. But our men bravely supported their charge, and returned quickly every man to his own rank, and in their turn, made a general charge on the enemy: and having killed about eighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their camp with the loss of only two men.

XXXVIII. — After these transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio to a battle, pretended to be obliged to change his position through want of corn, and having given the signal for decamping, advanced about three miles, and posted his army and cavalry in a convenient place, concealed from the enemy's view. Scipio being in

readiness to pursue him, detached his cavalry and a considerable number of light infantry to explore Domitius's route. When they had marched a short way, and their foremost troops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions being raised by the neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest who followed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt. Our men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, and thinking it in vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in their power, intercepted them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of the horse, but he made his escape: they either killed or took prisoners all the rest of these two troops, and brought them to Domitius.

XXXIX. — Caesar, having drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, as before mentioned, left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, and committed to them the charge of his ships of war, which he had transported from Italy. Acilius, as lieutenant-general, had the charge of this duty and the command of the town; he drew the ships into the inner part of the harbour, behind the town, and fastened them to the shore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbour to block it up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret, and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers, and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack.

XL. — Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got intelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship, that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with several ropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watch the port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets, so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh men constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting the town on all sides by land, with

ladders and his fleet, in order to divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and the immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men who were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in small boats; and at the same time he seized a natural mole on the opposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. He carried over land, into the inner part of the harbour, four galleys, by putting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Then attacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore, and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest on fire. After despatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and went himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left within the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm Lissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defence of the Roman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers which Caesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in the assault, he returned without effecting his object.

XLI. — As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out for that place with his army, and having taken the capital of the Parthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, he reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped beside him; and the day following, having drawn out all his forces before his camp, he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within his trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his forces by a long circuit, through a

difficult and narrow road to Dyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow him to Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off, because he had deposited there all his provisions and mat[’e]riel of war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design, because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction from that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him to shift his quarters; but having afterwards got true intelligence from his scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking a shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his troops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very small part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium, when the van of Pompey’s army was visible at a distance, and there he encamped.

XLII. — Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect his purpose, took a new resolution, and entrenched himself strongly on a rising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size can come in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his men-of-war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought from Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar, imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, and despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were guarded with great diligence by Pompey’s adherents; and because his own fleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn; and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in certain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for the neighbouring states. He likewise gave directions that search should be made for whatever

corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, and all the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from the nature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and the people commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey had foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off all the corn, which he collected by means of his horse.

XLIII. — Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursued measures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey's camps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of all occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing a fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each position allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey; with these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was strong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other necessaries from all sides with less danger: secondly, to prevent Pompey from foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in the operations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on which he saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report should have spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, and dare not hazard a battle.

XLIV. — Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium, because he had lodged his mat[^h]riel there, his weapons, arms, and engines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships: nor was he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle, which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but to adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills as he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his troops, and divide Caesar's forces as

much as possible; and so it happened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of fifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuit there were several fields lately sown, in which the cattle might feed in the meantime. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawing lines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid that Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear; so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit within ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them on the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to enclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had resolved not to oppose him with his whole force or to come to a general engagement; yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers, with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, and filled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers made coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or raw hides to defend them against the weapons.

XLV. — In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, to confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and several skirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, when Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun to fortify it; Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite the same place, and endeavoured to annoy the men while at work; and as the approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with archers and slingers, and afterwards by detaching a strong party of light infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works: and it was no easy matter for our men at once to

defend themselves, and to proceed with their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops were wounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post; his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on with more spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imagined that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey said that day in triumph to his friends about him, “That he would consent to be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar’s legions effected a retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they had rashly advanced.”

XLVI. — Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered hurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placed opposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth to be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles: and the ground to be made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers in convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things being completed, he ordered his legions to file off. Pompey’s men insultingly and boldly pursued and chased us, levelling the hurdles that were thrown up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained, when his men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them by Antonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be sounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth legion suddenly closing their files threw their javelins, and advancing impetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey’s men precipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; but their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that

lay in a long line before them, and the pallisadoes which were in their way, and the trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat without injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat on this side of that place, completed their fortifications.

XLVII. — This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on account of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works, and the manner of attack and defence, as on account of other circumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, have attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat; or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have had a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of a siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, with an inferior force, was enclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number of ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from any point that would not be favourable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar, having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress, but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they remembered that they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by labour and patience had concluded a dangerous war. They recollected too that they had suffered an alarming scarcity at Alesia, and a much greater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over mighty nations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, and they held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantities from Epirus.

XLVIII. — There was a sort of root, called chara, discovered by

the troops which served under Valerius. This they mixed up with milk, and it greatly contributed to relieve their want. They made it into a sort of bread. They had great plenty of it: loaves made of this, when Pompey's men upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among them to damp their hopes.

XLIX. — The corn was now beginning to ripen, and their hope supported their want, as they were confident of having abundance in a short time. And there were frequently heard declarations of the soldiers on guard, in discourse with each other, that they would rather live on the bark of the trees, than let Pompey escape from their hands. For they were often told by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain their horses, and that their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were not in good health from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from the noisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue to them, being men unaccustomed to work, and labouring under a great want of water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers and streams which ran to the sea, or had dammed them up with strong works. And as the country was mountainous, and the valleys narrow at the bottom, he enclosed them with piles sunk in the ground, and heaped up mould against them to keep in the water. They were therefore obliged to search for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells, and they had this labour in addition to their daily works. And even these springs were at a considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon dried up with the heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance of water, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and they had a prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laid before them by the ripening of the grain.

L. — In this new kind of war, new methods of managing it were

invented by both generals. Pompey's men, perceiving by our fires at night, at what part of the works our cohorts were on guard, coming silently upon them discharged their arrows at random among the whole multitude, and instantly retired to their camp: as a remedy against which our men were taught by experience to light their fires in one place, and keep guard in another.

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LI. — In the meantime, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure had left governor of his camp, came up with two legions to assist the cohort; upon whose arrival Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor did they stand the sight and charge of our men, and the foremost falling, the rest turned their backs and quitted the field. But Sylla called our men in from the pursuit, lest their ardour should carry them too far, but most people imagine, that if he had consented to a vigorous pursuit, the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however does not appear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general and of a commander-in-chief are very different; the one is bound to act entirely according to his instructions, the other to regulate his conduct without control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed by Caesar to take care of the camp, and having rescued his men, was satisfied with that, and did not desire to hazard a battle (although this circumstance might probably have had a successful issue), that he might not be thought to have assumed the part of the general. One circumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making good a retreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and were posted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep, they dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and there was but a short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing the business, they

had protracted the battle almost till night. Taking therefore measures suited to their exigency, and to the shortness of the time, Pompey possessed himself of an eminence, at such a distance from our fort, that no weapon discharged from an engine could reach him. Here he took up a position, and fortified it, and kept all his forces there.

LII. — At the same time, there were engagements in two other places; for Pompey had attacked several forts at once, in order to divide our forces; that no relief might be sent from the neighbouring posts. In one place, Volcatius Tullus sustained the charge of a legion with three cohorts, and beat them off the field. In another, the Germans, having sallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy, and retreated safe to our camp.

LIII. — Thus six engagements having happened in one day, three at Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications, when a computation was made of the number of slain, we found that about two thousand fell on Pompey's side, several of them volunteer veterans and centurions. Among them was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus, who as praetor had formerly had the government of Asia, and six military standards were taken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the action. But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and in one cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous to produce testimony of the fatigue they underwent, and the danger they sustained, they counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been thrown into the fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva, which was brought to him, were found two hundred and thirty holes. In reward for this man's services both to himself and the republic, Caesar presented to him two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, and declared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion. For it appeared that

the fort had been in a great measure saved by his exertions; and he afterwards very amply rewarded the cohorts with double pay, corn, clothing, and other military honours.

LIV. — Pompey, having made great additions to his works in the night, the following days built turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feet high, faced that part of his camp with mantlets; and after an interval of five days, taking advantage of a second cloudy night, he barricaded all the gates of his camp to hinder a pursuit, and about midnight quietly marched off his army, and retreated to his old fortifications.

LV. — Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilocheis, being reduced, as we have related, by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought he ought to attempt the conquest of Achaia, and to advance farther into the country. Accordingly, he detached Fufius thither, and ordered Quintus Sabinus and Cassius to join him with their cohorts. Upon notice of their approach, Rutilius Lupus, who commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, began to fortify the Isthmus, to prevent Fufius from coming into Achaia. Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, by a voluntary submission of those states. Some he subdued by force, the rest he endeavoured to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending deputies round to them. In these things, principally, Fufius was employed.

LVI. — Every day afterwards, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground, and offered Pompey battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey's camp; and his front line was at no greater distance from the rampart than that no weapons from their engines could reach it. But Pompey, to save his credit and reputation with the world, drew out his legions, but so close to his camp that his rear lines might touch the rampart, and that his whole army, when drawn up, might

be protected by the darts discharged from it.

LVII. — Whilst these things were going forward in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, and when it was certainly known that Scipio was arrived in Macedonia, Caesar, never losing sight of his first intention, sends Clodius to him, an intimate friend to both, whom Caesar, on the introduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted into the number of his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and instructions to Pompey, the substance of which was as follows: “That he had made every effort towards peace, and imputed the ill success of those efforts to the fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those negotiations: because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an improper time. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freely explain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degree enforce his advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error; that he commanded an army independent of Pompey, so that besides his authority, he had strength to compel; and if he did so, all men would be indebted to him for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, and the preservation of the empire.” These proposals Clodius made to him, and for some days at the first appeared to have met with a favourable reception, but afterwards was not admitted to an audience; for Scipio being reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterwards when the war was ended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned to Caesar.

LVIII. — Caesar, that he might the more easily keep Pompey’s horse enclosed within Dyrrachium, and prevent them from foraging, fortified the two narrow passes already mentioned with strong works, and erected forts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived no advantage from his cavalry, after a few days had them conveyed

back to his camp by sea. Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his horses upon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reeds pounded. For the corn which had been sown within the lines was already consumed, and they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodder from Corcyra and Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as the quantity of that fell short, to increase it by mixing barley with it, and by these methods support their cavalry. But when not only the barley and fodder in these parts were consumed, and the herbs cut away, when the leaves too were not to be found on the trees, the horses being almost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt by a sally.

LIX. — In the number of Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers, named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Abducillus, who for several years possessed the chief power in his own state; men of singular valour, whose gallant services Caesar had found very useful in all his wars in Gaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed the offices of greatest honour in their own country, and took care to have them chosen into the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands taken from the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy had made them affluent. Their valour had not only procured them Caesar's esteem, but they were beloved by the whole army. But presuming on Caesar's friendship, and elated with the arrogance natural to a foolish and barbarous people, they despised their countrymen, defrauded their cavalry of their pay, and applied all the plunder to their own use. Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a body to Caesar, and openly complained of their ill usage; and to their other charges added, that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged pay applied to their own use.

LX. — Caesar, not thinking it a proper time to call them to account, and willing to pardon many faults, on account of their valour, deferred the whole matter, and gave them a private rebuke, for having made a traffic of their troops, and advised them to expect everything from his friendship, and by his past favours to measure their future hopes. This, however, gave them great offence, and made them contemptible in the eyes of the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from the reproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and a consciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imagining that they were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day, they resolved to break off from us, to put their fortune to a new hazard, and to make trial of new connections. And having conferred with a few of their clients, to whom they could venture to entrust so base an action, they first attempted to assassinate Caius Volusenus, general of the horse (as was discovered at the end of the war), that they might appear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important service on him. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and no opportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money they could, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for what they had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, they deserted to Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot.

LXI. — As they were persons nobly descended and of liberal education, and had come with a great retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned men of courage, and had been in great esteem with Caesar, and as it was a new and uncommon event, Pompey carried them round all his works, and made an ostentatious show of them, for till that day, not a soldier, either horse or foot, had deserted from

Caesar to Pompey, though there were desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar: but more commonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in those countries which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, having been acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in our works, or what appeared to the best judges of military matters to be deficient, the particular times, the distance of places, and the various attention of the guards, according to the different temper and character of the officer who commanded the different posts, gave an exact account of all to Pompey.

LXII. — Upon receiving this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formed the design of attempting a sally, as before mentioned, ordered the soldiers to make ozier coverings for their helmets, and to provide fascines. These things being prepared, he embarked on board small boats and row galleys by night, a considerable number of light infantry and archers, with all their fascines, and immediately after midnight, he marched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the outposts, to that part of our works which extended towards the sea, and were at the farthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sent the ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armed troops; and all the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each he gave particular instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar had posted Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and as he was not in a good state of health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent to assist him in the command.

LXIII. — At this place, fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart ten feet high, and the top of the rampart was ten feet in breadth. At an interval of six hundred feet from that there was another rampart turned the contrary way, with

the works lower. For some days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might be surrounded by sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be attacked on both sides, he might have the means in defending himself. But the extent of the lines, and the incessant labour for so many days, because he had enclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did not allow time to finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which should make a communication between the other two, was not yet completed. This circumstance was known to Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogian deserters, and proved of great disadvantage to us. For when our cohorts of the ninth legion were on guard by the sea-side, Pompey's army arrived suddenly by break of day, and their approach was a surprise to our men, and at the same time, the soldiers that came by sea cast their darts on the front rampart; and the ditches were filled with fascines: and the legionary soldiers terrified those that defended the inner rampart, by applying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of all sorts, and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every side. Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over their helmets, were a great security to them against the blows of stones which were the only weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our men were oppressed in every manner, and were scarcely able to make resistance, the defect in our works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers, landing between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished, attacked our men in the rear, and having beat them from both sides of the fortification, obliged them to flee.

LXIV. — Marcellinus, being informed of this disorder, detached some cohorts to the relief of our men, who seeing them flee from the camp, were neither able to persuade them to rally at their approach,

nor themselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in like manner, whatever additional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears of the defeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was prevented by the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer was dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of our horse, he said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatest care for many years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my last moments restore it to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjure you, suffer a dishonour to be sustained in the field, which never before happened to Caesar's army, but deliver it safe into his hands." By this accident the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions of the first cohorts were killed, except the principal.

LXV. — And now the Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, were approaching Marcellinus's camp, and had struck no small terror into the rest of the cohorts, when Marcus Antonius, who commanded the nearest fort, being informed of what had happened, was observed descending from the rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked the Pompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extreme affright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke from all the forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted off some cohorts from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. And having there learnt the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that Pompey had forced our works, and had encamped along the coast, so that he was at liberty to forage, and had a communication with his shipping, he altered his plan for conducting the war, as his design had not succeeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near Pompey.

LXVI. — When this work was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that some cohorts, which to them appeared like a legion, were retired

behind the wood, and were on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two camps was as follows: a few days before, when Caesar's ninth legion had opposed a party of Pompey's troops, and were endeavouring to enclose them, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place. This camp joined a certain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea. Afterwards, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar removed his camp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days, Pompey took possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the inner rampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By this means, the lesser camp included within the greater, answered the purpose of a fort and citadel. He had also carried an entrenchment from the left angle of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that his soldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water. But he too, changing his design for reasons not necessary to be mentioned, abandoned the place. In this condition the camp remained for several days, the works being all entire.

LXVII. — Caesar's scouts brought him word that the standard of a legion was carried to this place. That the same thing was seen he was assured by those in the higher forts. This place was half a mile distant from Pompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise this legion, and anxious to repair the loss sustained that day, left two cohorts employed in the works to make an appearance of entrenching himself, and by a different route, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts amounting to thirty-three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so many centurions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, he marched in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nor did this first opinion deceive him. For he reached the place before Pompey could have

notice of it; and though the works were strong, yet having made the attack with the left wing, which he commanded in person, he obliged the Pompeians to quit the rampart in disorder. A barricade had been raised before the gates, at which a short contest was maintained, our men endeavouring to force their way in, and the enemy to defend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that Caius Antonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. But the valour of our men prevailed, and having cut down the barricade, they first forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which was enclosed within it: and as the legion on its repulse had retired to this, they slew several defending themselves there.

LXVIII. — But Fortune, who exerts a powerful influence as well in other matters, as especially in war, effects great changes from trifling causes, as happened at this time. For the cohorts on Caesar's right wing, through ignorance of the place, followed the direction of that rampart, which ran along from the camp to the river, whilst they were in search of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But when they found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, they immediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all our cavalry.

LXIX. — In the meantime Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned, being informed of what had happened, marched with the fifth legion, which he called away from their work to support his party; and at the same time his cavalry were advancing up to ours, and an army in order of battle was seen at a distance by our men who had taken possession of the camp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a stand at the Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry, who had mounted

the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive of their retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing, which had been separated from the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to prevent their being overpowered within the lines, were endeavouring to retreat by the same way as they burst in; and most of them, lest they should be engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet high into the trenches; and the first being trodden to death, the rest procured their safety and escaped over their bodies. The soldiers of the left wing, perceiving from the rampart that Pompey was advancing, and their own friends fleeing, being afraid that they should be enclosed between the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both within and without, strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All was disorder, consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold of the colours of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, some left their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner; others through fear even threw away their colours, nor did a single man face about.

LXX. — In this calamity, the following favourable circumstance occurred to prevent the ruin of our whole army, viz., that Pompey suspecting an ambuscade (because, as I suppose, the success had far exceeded his hopes, as he had seen his men a moment before fleeing from the camp), durst not for some time approach the fortification; and that his horse were retarded from pursuing, because the passes and gates were in possession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling circumstance proved of great importance to each party; for the rampart drawn from the camp to the river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's victory, after he had forced Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding the rapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army.

LXXI. — In the two actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty rank and file, several Roman knights of distinction, Felginas Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius Felginas from Placentia; Aulus Gravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from Capua; and thirty-two military tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part of all these perished without a wound, being trodden to death in the trenches, on the ramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight of their own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; this title he retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterwards. But neither in his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he use the laurel as a mark of honour. But Labienus, having obtained his consent that the prisoners should be delivered up to him, had them all brought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompey might place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and calling them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting manner whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put to death in the sight of the whole army.

LXXII.—Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at this success, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war, but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not consider that the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place and the confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having first possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from within and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into two parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the cause of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the contest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and that our men

had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of room, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not reflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, either from groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, have oftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army has been unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or the oversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by their valour, and as if no change could ever take place, they published the success of the day throughout the world by reports and letters.

LXXIII. — Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to change the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once called in all out-posts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into one place, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them “not to be troubled at what had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their many successful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, a trifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whose favour they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; through whose favour they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a most warlike people under the command of the most skilful and experienced generals: through whose favour they had reduced to submission the neighbouring states that abounded with corn: in fine, that they ought to remember with what success they had been all transported safe through blockading fleets of the enemy, which possessed not only the ports, but even the coasts: that if all their attempts were not crowned with success, the defects of Fortune must be supplied by industry; and whatever loss had been sustained, ought to be attributed rather to her caprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen a safe ground for the engagement,

that he had possessed himself of the enemy's camp; that he had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered resistance; but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune herself had interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all now to use their utmost efforts to repair by their valour the loss which had been incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to their advantage, as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face the enemy would be the first to offer themselves to battle.

LXXIV. — Having concluded his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers, and reduced them to the ranks; for the whole army was seized with such grief at their loss, and with such an ardent desire of repairing their disgrace, that not a man required the command of his tribune or centurion, but they imposed each on himself severer labours than usual as a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with eagerness to meet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly affected at their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue in their present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle. But, on the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence in men so lately thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allow them time to recover their dejected spirits; and having abandoned his works, he was apprehensive of being distressed for want of corn.

LXXV. — Accordingly, suffering no time to intervene but what was necessary for a proper attention to be paid to the sick and wounded, he sent on all his baggage privately in the beginning of the night from his camp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt till they had performed their journey; and he detached one legion with them as a convoy. This affair being concluded, having retained only

two legions in his camp; he marched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning by several gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a short space after, that the military practice might be preserved, and his march known as late as possible, he ordered the signal for decamping to be given; and setting out immediately, and following the rear of his own army, he was soon out of sight of the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon as he had notice of his design, make any delay to pursue him; but with a view to surprise them whilst encumbered with baggage on their march, and not yet recovered from their fright, he led his army out of his camp, and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not able to come up with them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched without baggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep, their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them to action. To oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with them about four hundred of his advanced light troops, who attacked their horse with such success, that having routed them all, and killed several, they returned without any loss to the main body.

LXXVI. — Having performed the exact march which he had proposed that day, and having led his army over the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself in his old camp opposite Asparagium; and kept his soldiers close within the entrenchments; and ordered the horse, who had been sent out under pretence of foraging, to retire immediately into the camp, through the Decuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the same day's march, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, as they had no work (the fortifications being entire), made long excursions, some to collect wood and forage; others, invited by the nearness of the former

camp, laid up their arms in their tents, and quitted the entrenchments in order to bring what they had left behind them, because the design of marching being adopted in a hurry, they had left a considerable part of their waggons and luggage behind. Being thus incapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about noon he gave the signal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's march, he advanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him, because his troops were dispersed.

LXXVII. — The next day Caesar sent his baggage forward early in the night, and marched off himself immediately after the fourth watch: that if he should be under the necessity of risking an engagement, he might meet a sudden attack with an army free from incumbrance. He did so for several days successively, by which means he was enabled to effect his march over the deepest rivers, and through the most intricate roads without any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and the fatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exerted himself by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had got the start of him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, and determined to follow other measures.

LXXVIII. — Caesar was obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded, pay his army, confirm his friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. But for these matters, he allowed no more time than was necessary for a person in haste. And being apprehensive for Domitius, lest he should be surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all speed and earnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the whole campaign on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, he would be drawn off from the sea, and from those forces which he had provided in Dyrrachium, and

separated from his corn and magazines, and be obliged to carry on the war on equal terms; but if he crossed over into Italy, Caesar, having effected a junction with Domitius, would march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; but if he endeavoured to storm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the whole coast, he hoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to come to his assistance. Accordingly, Caesar despatching couriers, writes to Domitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and having stationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he set forward on his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also, guessing at Caesar's design, determined to hasten to Scipio, that if Caesar should march in that direction, he might be ready to relieve him; but that if Caesar should be unwilling to quit the sea-coast and Corcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself might fall on Domitius with all his forces.

LXXIX. — For these reasons, each of them studied despatch, that he might succour his friends, and not miss an opportunity of surprising his enemies. But Caesar's engagements at Apolloma had carried him aside from the direct road. Pompey had taken the short road to Macedonia, through Candavia. To this was added another unexpected disadvantage, that Domitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite Scipio, had quitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched to Heraclea Sentica, a city subject to Candavia; so that fortune herself seemed to throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up to this time. Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all the provinces and states, with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, very much enlarged and exaggerated beyond the real facts, a rumour had been circulated, that

Caesar had been defeated and forced to flee, and had lost almost all his forces. These reports had made the roads dangerous, and drawn off some states from his alliance: whence it happened, that the messengers despatched by Caesar, by several different roads to Domitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any means to accomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue of Aegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on the road a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, because they had served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave them an account of all that had happened, and informed them of Caesar's departure, and Pompey's arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours' march distant, having got intelligence from these, by the courtesy of the enemy, avoided the danger, and met Caesar coming to join him at Aeginium, a town on the confines of and opposite to Thessaly.

LXXX. — The two armies being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which is the first town of Thessaly on the road from Epirus. Now, the Thessalians, a few months before, had of themselves sent ambassadors to Caesar, offering him the free use of everything in their power, and requesting a garrison for their protection. But the report, already spoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in many particulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which, Androstenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be the companion of Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in his misfortunes, collected all the people, both slaves and freemen, from the country into the town and shut the gates, and despatched messengers to Scipio and Pompey "to come to his relief, that he could depend on the strength of the town, if succour was speedily sent; but that it could not withstand a long siege."

Scipio, as soon as he received advice of the departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had marched with his legions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Caesar having fortified his camp, ordered scaling ladders and pent-houses to be made for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as they were ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage it would be to assist them with all sorts of necessaries if they made themselves masters of a rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time, to strike terror into other states by the example of this, and to effect this with speed, before auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, taking advantage of the unusual ardour of the soldiers, he began his assault on the town at a little after three o'clock on the very day on which he arrived, and took it, though defended with very high walls, before sunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and immediately decamped from before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such rapidity as to outstrip any messenger or rumour of the taking of Gomphi.

LXXXI. — The inhabitants of Metropolis, at first influenced by the same rumours, followed the same measures, shut the gates and manned their walls. But when they were made acquainted with the fate of the city of Gomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar had ordered to be brought up to the walls, they threw open their gates. As he preserved them with the greatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly (except Larissa, which was awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing the fate of the inhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gave admission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a position convenient for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground, he determined there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the centre

of all his warlike operations.

LXXXII. — Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days after, and having harangued the combined army, returned thanks to his own men, and exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was now secured, they should endeavour to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And receiving all the legions into one camp, he shared his honours with Scipio, ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to be erected for him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two such powerful armies united, their former expectations were confirmed, and their hopes of victory so much increased, that whatever time intervened was considered as so much delay to their return into Italy: and whenever Pompey acted with slowness and caution, they used to exclaim, that it was the business only of a single day, but that he had a passion for power, and was delighted in having persons of consular and praetorian rank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openly about rewards and priesthoods, and disposed of the consulate for several years to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and properties of all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warm debate, whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey against the Parthians, should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in his absence at the next election; his friends imploring Pompey's honour to fulfil the engagements which he had made to him at his departure, that he might not seem deceived through his authority: whilst others, embarked in equal labour and danger, pleaded that no individual ought to have a preference before all the rest.

LXXXIII. — Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinthur, in their daily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, openly abused each

other in the most scurrilous language. Lentulus urging the respect due to his age, Domitius boasting his interest in the city and his dignity, and Scipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus charged Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action that happened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that it was his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should be given to all the senators who had taken part with them in the war, and that they should pass sentence on every single person who had stayed behind at Rome, or who had been within Pompey's garrisons and had not contributed their assistance in the military operations; that by the first billet they should have power to acquit, by the second to pass sentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary fine. In short, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honours or sums of money which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies; and never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in what manner they should use their victory.

LXXXIV. — Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a sufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when Caesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of his troops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intention or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out of the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their own ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterwards for several days in succession he advanced from his own camp, and led them up to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct inspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to his former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees inferior in number, he

selected the youngest and most active of the advanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, and they by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. By these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse would dare, even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's, if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number. For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, and killed one of the two Allobrogians who had deserted to Pompey, as we before observed, and several others.

LXXXV. — Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at the very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, that Caesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar, seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judged it the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from that post, and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting his camp and removing from place to place, he might be more conveniently supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get some opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters being settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents struck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily practice, Pompey's army had advanced farther than usual from his entrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action on equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when they were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer," says he, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which has been our constant wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. We shall not hereafter easily find such an

opportunity.” He immediately marched out at the head of his troops.

LXXXVI. — Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimous solicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle. For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before the battalions came to battle, Caesar’s army would be put to the rout. When most people expressed their surprise at it, “I know,” says he, “that I promise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed, that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon as the two armies have met, to attack Caesar’s right wing on the flank, and enclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this means we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions, and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far outnumber them in cavalry.” At the same time he gave them notice to be ready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity which they had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint the opinion generally entertained of their experience and valour.

LXXXVII. — After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of Caesar’s forces, as to extol Pompey’s scheme with the highest encomiums. “Think not, Pompey,” says he, “that this is the army which conquered Gaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles and do not speak at random on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of that army now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarily happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilence in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on the continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are composed of invalids? The forces

which you now behold, have been recruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part from the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forces perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium.” Having so said, he took an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and he encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it. After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and joy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that in a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made by a general of such experience.

LXXXVIII. — When Caesar had approached near Pompey’s camp, he observed that his army was drawn up in the following manner: — On the left wing were the two legions delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of the disputes in compliance with the senate’s decree, one of which was called the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio with the Syrian legions commanded the centre. The Cilician legion in conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over by Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the centre and the wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted to forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers, who having received favours from him in former wars, flocked to his standard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The seven remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and the neighbouring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steep banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and slingers, on his left wing.

LXXXIX. — Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the

tenth legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the centre to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so.

XC. — When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the military custom, and spoke to them of the favours that they had constantly received from him, he took especial care to remind them “that he could call his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had sought peace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference [with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in what manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo to send ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood of his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or other of her armies.” After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet the signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were very impatient for the onset.

XCI. — There was in Caesar's army a volunteer of the name of Crastinus, who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man of pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me, my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general as you have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall be won, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty." At the same time he looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such a manner to-day, that you will feel grateful to me living or dead." After uttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about one hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed.

XCII. — There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficed for the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers to await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, or suffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have done this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and that Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while in disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force if the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after running over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted by the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient reason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a desire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavour not to repress, but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised; by which they imagined that

the enemy were struck with terror, and their own army inspired with courage.

XCIII. — But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with their javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men did not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom, and being practised in former battles, they of their own accord repressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might not come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins, and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood our charge, and maintained their ranks: and having launched their javelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse, according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, and his whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did not withstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey's horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, and flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to his fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantly rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a man of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless, were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled about upon Pompey's left wing, whilst his infantry still continued to make battle, and attacked them in the rear.

XCIV. — At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which till then had not been engaged, but had kept their

post. Thus, new and fresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and others having made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able to maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in his opinion that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to his soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts which he had placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by them the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be the first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part of his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown into confusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreated straightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions, whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, that the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp," says he, "defend it with diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the other gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having thus said, he retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue.

XCIV. — Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into their entrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respite to recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of fortune's kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued by the intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, being prepared to undergo any labour, they cheerfully obeyed his command. The camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guard it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries. For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle, affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and military standards, had

their thoughts more engaged on their further escape than on the defence of the camp. Nor could the troops who were posted on the battlements long withstand the immense number of our darts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under the conduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the high mountains which joined the camp.

XCVI. — In Pompey's camp you might see arbours in which tables were laid, a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered with fresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and many other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and a confidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that they had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulged themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in want of common necessities. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the trenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit, went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same despatch collecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nor night, he arrived at the sea-side, attended by only thirty horse, and went on board a victualling barque, often complaining, as we have been told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had expected victory, as they began the flight.

XCVII. — Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his soldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity of completing their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began to draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians

distrusting the position, as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began to retreat towards Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops, and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back a part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a shorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew up his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain whose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops, though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labour the whole day, and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off the communication between the river and the mountain, that the enemy might not get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sent ambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who had espoused that party, made their escape by night.

XCVIII. — At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on the mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, and pile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears, implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and having spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers that no injury should be done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this diligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, and those which were, with him to take their turn of rest, and go back to the camp; and the same day went to Larissa.

XCIX. — In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing, but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus, also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most

courageously, lost his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false which he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highest opinion of his behaviour in that battle, and thought him highly deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for even the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to Sylla. Several others took shelter in the neighbouring states. One hundred and eighty standards of colours, and nine eagles, were brought to Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, his strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse.

C. — About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at Brundisium and in the same manner as Libo had done before, possessed himself of an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. In like manner, Valimus, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barques, endeavoured to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-benched galley and two smaller vessels that had ventured farther than the rest into a narrow part of the harbour: and likewise disposing the horse along the shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. But Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till he had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced either by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want of necessaries, to quit the port and islands.

CI. — Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided into two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding

one division at Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messana, Cassius got into Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, and having found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the wind being high and favourable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch, and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius's fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty of which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror, that though there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town with difficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory been brought at that instant by the horse stationed along the coast, it was generally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town was maintained till the news arrived very opportunely; and Cassius set sail from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships being moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same manner as before. The wind being favourable, he sent into the port about forty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both sides, five ships were burnt to ashes. And when the fire began to spread wider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions, who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids, could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the ships and weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two five-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he made his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were taken besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action in Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with his fleet from that coast.

CII. — Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursue Pompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able to provide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on every day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legion to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompey at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians and Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued it with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as possible his design of fleeing farther, or to endeavour to keep possession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is impossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling together his friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for his necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from that place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained two days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of all the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the castle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers had been despatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge in the neighbouring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that if they did that, it would be attended with imminent danger to their lives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been consul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and to several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight, and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; and having received a message to leave that neighbourhood, set sail much against their will; for the rumour of Caesar's approach had now reached those states.

CIII. — Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside his design of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from the farmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, and having put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for military purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from the slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, and such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, he sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was there with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he had expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from his. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria, and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in consideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted between his father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed their commission, began to converse with less restraint with the king's troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not to think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several of Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in Syria, and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.

CIV. — The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the minority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, as they afterwards declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army, and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as in adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave a favourable answer to his deputies, and desired him to

come to the king; but secretly laid a plot against him, and despatched Achillas, captain of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius a military tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and deluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the pirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in a small boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas and Septimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's order, and put to death in prison.

CV. — When Caesar arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius had attempted to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; and for this purpose had convened all the senators in the province that he might have them to attest the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar's arrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two occasions, Caesar saved the money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in the temple of Minerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the very day on which Caesar had gained his battle, the image of Victory which was placed before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about towards the portal and entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch in Syria, such a shout of an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard, that the citizens ran in arms to the walls. The same thing happened at Ptolemais; a sound of drums too was heard at Pergamus, in the private and retired parts of the temple, into which none but the priests are allowed admission, and which the Greeks call *Adyta* (the inaccessible), and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which there stood a statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown that had sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, and shot up above the roof.

CVI. — After a few days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompey had been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he had directed his course into Egypt, on account of his connection with that kingdom, set out for Alexandria with two legions (one of which he ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other he called in from Achaia, from Fufius, the lieutenant-general) and with eight hundred horse, ten ships of war from Rhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to three thousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received in various battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could not follow him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits; did not hesitate to set forward with a feeble force, and thought that he would be secure in any place. At Alexandria he was informed of the death of Pompey: and at his landing there, heard a cry among the soldiers whom the king had left to garrison the town, and saw a crowd gathering towards him, because the fasces were carried before him; for this the whole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity. Though this tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for several days successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of his soldiers were killed in all parts of the city.

CVIL — Having observed this, he ordered other legions to be brought to him from Asia, which he had made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he was himself detained against his will, by the etesian winds, which are totally unfavourable to persons on a voyage from Alexandria. In the meantime, considering that the disputes of the princes belonged to the jurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and that it was a duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league had been made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law, and a decree of the senate, he signified

that it was his pleasure, that king Ptolemy, and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, and decide their disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by the sword.

CVIII. — A eunuch named Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of the kingdom on account of his youthfulness. He at first began to complain amongst his friends, and to express his indignation, that the king should be summoned to plead his cause: but afterwards, having prevailed on some of those whom he had made acquainted with his views to join him, he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to Alexandria, and appointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of the forces. Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and the king's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how he should act. By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons and the more advanced in years of his two daughters were declared his heirs, and for the more effectual performance of his intention, in the same will he conjured the Roman people by all the gods, and by the league which he had entered into at Rome, to see his will executed. One of the copies of his will was conveyed to Rome by his ambassadors to be deposited in the treasury, but the public troubles preventing it, it was lodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up, and kept at Alexandria.

CIX. — Whilst these things were debated before Caesar, and he was very anxious to settle the royal disputes as a common friend and arbitrator; news was brought on a sudden that the king's army and all his cavalry were on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means so strong that he could trust to them, if he had occasion to hazard a battle without the town. His only resource was to keep within the town in the most convenient places, and get information of Achillas's designs. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their

arms; and advised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatest influence, as deputies to Achillas and to signify his royal pleasure. Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both been ambassadors at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy the father, went to Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence, without hearing them, or learning the occasion of their coming, he ordered them to be seized and put to death. One of them, after receiving a wound, was taken up and carried off by his attendants as dead: the other was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar took care to secure the king's person, both supposing that the king's name would have great influence with his subjects, and to give the war the appearance of the scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by the king's consent.

CX. — The forces under Achillas did not seem despicable, either for number, spirit, or military experience; for he had twenty thousand men under arms. They consisted partly of Gabinus's soldiers, who were now become habituated to the licentious mode of living at Alexandria, and had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had married wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had children. To these was added a collection of highwaymen and free-booters, from Syria, and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides several convicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all our runaway slaves were sure of finding protection for their persons on the condition that they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers: and if any of them was apprehended by his master, he was rescued by a crowd of his fellow soldiers, who being involved in the same guilt, repelled, at the hazard of their lives, every violence offered to any of their body. These by a

prescriptive privilege of the Alexandrian army, used to demand the king's favourites to be put to death, pillage the properties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the king's palace, banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile. Besides these, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill of veterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restored Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; and had been engaged in war with the Egyptians; such was their experience in military affairs.


CXI. — Full of confidence in his troops, and despising the small number of Caesar's soldiers, Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part of the town which Caesar occupied with his troops. At first he attempted to force the palace; but Caesar had disposed his cohorts through the streets, and repelled his attack. At the same time there was an action at the port: where the contest was maintained with the greatest obstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained in several streets at once, and the enemy endeavoured to seize with a strong party the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey's assistance, but after the battle in Thessaly had returned home. They were all of either three or five banks of oars, well equipped and appointed with every necessary for a voyage. Besides these, there were twenty-two vessels with decks, which were usually kept at Alexandria, to guard the port. If they made themselves masters of these, Caesar being deprived of his fleet, they would have the command of the port and whole sea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and auxiliaries. Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed when the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the other their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all those ships, and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guard so

many places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed some troops to the Pharos by his ships.

CXIL — The Pharos is a tower on an island, of prodigious height, built with amazing works, and takes its name from the island. This island lying over against Alexandria forms a harbour; but on the upper side it is connected with the town by a narrow way eight hundred paces in length, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge. In this island some of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a town; and whatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel, or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast, they constantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who are masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbour, on account of its narrowness. Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, whilst the enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he gained this point, that he could be supplied without danger with corn and auxiliaries: for he sent to all the neighbouring countries, to demand supplies. In other parts of the town, they fought so obstinately, that they quitted the field with equal advantage, and neither were beaten (in consequence of the narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed on both sides, Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in the night. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, in which Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theatre adjoining the house which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to the port and other docks. These fortifications he increased during the succeeding days, that he might have them before him as a rampart, and not be obliged to fight against his will. In the meantime Ptolemy's younger daughter, hoping the throne would become


vacant, made her escape from the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in prosecuting the war. But they soon quarrelled about the command, which circumstance enlarged the presents to the soldiers, for each endeavoured by great sacrifices to secure their affection. Whilst the enemy was thus employed, Pothinus, tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in Caesar's part of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not to desist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but his messengers being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death by Caesar. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war.

APPENDIX. MAPS



PHARSALUS


Caesar B.C. iii 84-98



Stanford's Geog. Estab., London.

CURIOS CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA

Caesar B.C. ii 23-44




Stanford's Geog! Estab^t, London.

BRUNDISIUM

Caesar B.C. i 25-28

Yards


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ILERDA

Caesar B. C. i 38-64



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ON THE ALEXANDRINE WAR



Translated by W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn

De Bello Alexandrino resumes Caesar's commentaries, detailing his campaigns in Alexandria and Asia. Although traditionally ascribed to Caesar, the work's authorship has been debated since antiquity, with Suetonius suggesting both Oppius and Hirtius as possible authors.

The commentary follows on from the conclusion of *De Bello Civili*, narrating how Caesar became involved with an Egyptian civil war between the child Pharaoh and his sister, wife and co-regent queen, Cleopatra. Perhaps as a result of the Pharaoh's role in Pompey's murder, Caesar sided with Cleopatra. He withstood the Siege of Alexandria and later he defeated the Pharaoh's forces at the Battle of the Nile in 47 BC and installed Cleopatra as ruler. Caesar and Cleopatra celebrated their victory with a triumphal procession on the Nile in the spring of 47 BC. The royal barge was accompanied by 400 additional ships, and Caesar was introduced to the luxurious lifestyle of the Egyptian pharaohs.



Cleopatra VII Philopator (69 BC-30 BC) was the last Pharaoh of Ancient Egypt.

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The Alexandrian War

1

When the war broke out at Alexandria, Caesar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for all his fleet; and summoned archers from Crete, and cavalry from Malchus, king of the Nabatheans. He likewise ordered military engines to be provided, corn to be brought, and forces dispatched to him. Meanwhile he daily strengthened his fortifications by new works; and such parts of the town as appeared less tenable were strengthened with testudos and mantelets. Openings were made in the walls, through which the battering-rams might play; and the fortifications were extended over whatever space was covered with ruins, or taken by force. For Alexandria is in a manner secure from fire, because the houses are all built without joists or wood, and are all vaulted, and roofed with tile or pavement. Caesar's principal aim was, to inclose with works the smallest part of the town, separated from the rest by a morass toward the south: with these views, first, that as the city was divided into two parts, the army should be commanded by one general and one council; in the second place, that he might be able to succor his troops when hard pressed, and carry aid from the other part of the city. Above all, he by this means made sure of water and forage, as he was but ill provided with the one, and wholly destitute of the other. The morass, on the contrary, served abundantly to supply him with both.

2

Nor were the Alexandrians remiss on their side, or less active in the conduct of their affairs. For they had sent deputies and commissioners into all parts, where the powers and territories of Egypt extend, to levy troops. They had carried vast quantities of darts and engines into the town, and drawn together an innumerable

multitude of soldiers. Nevertheless workshops were established in every part of the city, for the making of arms. They enlisted all the slaves that were of age; and the richer citizens supplied them with food and pay. By a judicious disposition of this multitude, they guarded the fortifications in the remoter parts of the town; while they quartered the veteran cohorts, which were exempted from all other service, in the squares and open places; that on whatever side an attack should be made, they might be at hand to give relief, and march fresh to the charge. They shut up all the avenues and passes by a triple wall built of square stones, and carried to the height of forty feet. They defended the lower parts of the town by very high towers of ten stories: besides which, they had likewise contrived a kind of moving towers, which consisted of the same number of stories, and which being fitted with ropes and wheels, could, by means of horses, as the streets of Alexandria were quite even and level, be conveyed wherever their service was necessary.

3

The city abounding in every thing, and being very rich, furnished ample materials for these several works: and as the people were extremely ingenious, and quick of apprehension, they so well copied what they saw done by us that our men seemed rather to imitate their works. They even invented many things themselves, and attacked our works, at the same time that they defended their own. Their chiefs every where represented: “That the people of Rome were endeavoring by degrees to assume the possession of Egypt; that a few years before Gabinius had come thither with an army; that Pompey had retreated to the same place in his flight; that Caesar was now among them with a considerable body of troops, nor had they

gained any thing by Pompey's death; that Caesar should not prolong his stay; that if they did not find means to expel him, the kingdom would be reduced to a Roman province: and that they ought to do it at once, for he, blockaded by the storms on account of the season of the year, could receive no supplies from beyond the sea."

4

Meanwhile, a division arising between Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, and Arsinoe, the youngest daughter of king Ptolemy, as has been mentioned above, while they mutually endeavored to supplant one another, each striving to engross the supreme authority, Arsinoe, by the assistance of the eunuch Ganymed, her governor, at length prevailed, and slew Achillas. After his death, she possessed the whole power without a rival, and raised Ganymed to the command of the army; who, on his entrance upon that high office, augmented the largesses of the troops, and with equal diligence discharged all other parts of his duty.

5

Alexandria is almost quite hollow underneath, occasioned by the many aqueducts to the Nile, that furnish the private houses with water; where being received in cisterns, it settles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. The master and his family are accustomed to use this: for the water of the Nile being extremely thick and muddy, is apt to breed many distempers. The common people, however, are forced to be contented with the latter, because there is not a single spring in the whole city. The river was in that part of the town which was in the possession of the Alexandrians. By which circumstance Ganymed was reminded that our men might be deprived of water; because being distributed into several streets, for

the more easy defense of the works, they made use of that which was preserved in the aqueducts and the cisterns of private houses.

6

With this view he began a great and difficult work; for having stopped up all the canals by which his own cisterns were supplied, he drew vast quantities of water out of the sea, by the help of wheels and other engines, pouring it continually into the canals of Caesar's quarter. The cisterns in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter than ordinary, and occasioned great wonder among the men, who could not think from what cause it proceeded. They were even ready to disbelieve their senses when those who were quartered a little lower in the town assured them that they found the water the same as before. This put them upon comparing the cisterns one with another, and by trial they easily perceived the difference. But in a little time the water in the nearest houses became quite unfit for use, and that lower down grew daily more tainted and brackish.

7

All doubt being removed by this circumstance, such a terror ensued among the troops that they fancied themselves reduced to the last extremity. Some complained of Caesar's delay, that he did not order them immediately to repair to their ships. Others dreaded a yet greater misfortune, as it would be impossible to conceal their design of retreating from the Alexandrians, who were so near them; and no less so to embark in the face of a vigorous and pursuing enemy. There were besides a great number of the townsmen in Caesar's quarter, whom he had not thought proper to force from their houses, because they openly pretended to be in his interest, and to have quitted the party of their follow-citizens. But to offer here a defense

either of the sincerity or conduct of these Alexandrians, would be only labor in vain, since all who know the genius and temper of the people must be satisfied that they are the fittest instruments in the world for treason.

8

Caesar labored to remove his soldiers' fears by encouraging and reasoning with them. For he affirmed "that they might easily find fresh water by digging wells, as all sea coasts naturally abounded with fresh springs: that if Egypt was singular in this respect, and differed from every other soil, yet still, as the sea was open, and the enemy without a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their fetching it at pleasure in their ships, either from Paraetionium on the left, or from the island on the right; and as their two voyages were in different directions, they could not be prevented by adverse winds at the same time; that a retreat was on no account to be thought of, not only by those that had a concern for their honor, but even by such as regarded nothing but life; that it was with the utmost difficulty they could defend themselves behind their works; but if they once quitted that advantage, neither in number or situation would they be a match for the enemy: that to embark would require much time, and be attended with great danger, especially where it must be managed by little boats: that the Alexandrians, on the contrary, were nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted with the streets and buildings; that, moreover, when flushed with victory, they would not fail to run before, seize all the advantageous posts, possess themselves of the tops of the houses, and by annoying them in their retreat, effectually prevent their getting on board; that they must therefore think no more of retreating, but place all their hopes of safety in victory."

9

Having by this speech re-assured his men, he ordered the centurions to lay aside all other works, and apply themselves day and night to the digging of wells. The work once begun, and the minds of all aroused to exertion, they exerted themselves so vigorously that in the very first night abundance of fresh water was found. Thus, with no great labor on our side, the mighty projects and painful attempts of the Alexandrians were entirely frustrated. Within these two days the thirty-seventh legion, composed of Pompey's veterans that had surrendered to Caesar, embarking by order of Domitius Calvinus, with arms, darts, provisions, and military engines, arrived upon the coast of Africa, a little above Alexandria. These ships were hindered from gaining the port by an easterly wind, which continued to blow for several days; but all along that coast it is very safe to ride at anchor. Being detained, however, longer than they expected, and distressed by want of water, they gave notice of it to Caesar, by a dispatch sloop.

10

Caesar, that he might himself be able to determine what was best to be done, went on board one of the ships in the harbor, and ordered the whole fleet to follow. He took none of the land forces with him, because he was unwilling to leave the works unguarded during his absence. Being arrived at that part of the coast known by the name of Chersonesus, he sent some mariners on shore to fetch water. Some of these venturing too far into the country for the sake of plunder, were intercepted by the enemy's horse. From them the Egyptians learned that Caesar himself was on board, without any soldiers. Upon this information, they thought fortune had thrown in their way a good

opportunity of attempting something with success. They therefore manned all the ships that they had ready for sea, and met Caesar on his return. He declined fighting that day, for two reasons, first, because he had no soldiers on board, and secondly, because it was past four in the afternoon. The night, he was sensible, must be highly advantageous to his enemies, who depended on their knowledge of the coast, while he would be deprived of the benefit of encouraging his men, which could not be done with any effect in the dark, where courage and cowardice must remain equally unknown. Caesar, therefore, drew all his ships toward the shore, where he imagined the enemy would not follow him.

11

There was one Rhodian galley in Caesar's right wing, considerably distant from the rest. The enemy observing this, could not restrain themselves, but came forward with four-decked ships, and several open barks, to attack her. Caesar was obliged to advance to her relief, that he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one of his galleys sunk before his eyes though, had he left her to perish, he judged that she deserved it for her rashness. The attack was sustained with great courage by the Rhodians, who, though at all times distinguished by their valor and experience in engagements at sea yet exerted themselves in a particular manner on this occasion, that they might not draw upon themselves the charge of having occasioned a misfortune to the fleet. Accordingly they obtained a complete victory, took one four-banked galley, sunk another, disabled a third, and slew all that were on board, besides a great number of the combatants belonging to the other ships. Nay, had not night interposed, Caesar would have made himself master of their whole

fleet. During the consternation that followed upon this defeat, Caesar, finding the contrary winds to abate, took the transports in tow, and advanced with the victorious fleet to Alexandria.

12

The Alexandrians, disheartened at this loss, since they found themselves now worsted, not by the superior valor of the soldiers, but by the skill and ability of the mariners, retired to the tops of their houses, and blocked up the entrances of their streets, as if they feared our fleet might attack them even by land. But soon after, Ganymed assuring them in council, that he would not only restore the vessels they had lost, but even increase their number, they began to repair their old ships with great expectation and confidence, and resolved to apply more than ever to the putting their fleet in a good condition. And although they had lost above a hundred and ten ships in the port and arsenal, yet they did not relinquish the idea of repairing their fleet; because, by making themselves masters of the sea, they saw they would have it in their power to hinder Caesar's receiving any reinforcements or supplies. Besides, being mariners, born upon the sea-coast, and exercised from their infancy in naval affairs, they were desirous to return to that wherein their true and proper strength lay, remembering the advantages they had formerly gained, even with their little ships. They therefore applied themselves with all diligence to the equipping a fleet.

13

Vessels were stationed at all the mouths of the Nile; for receiving and gathering in the customs. Several old ships were likewise lodged in the king's private arsenals which had not put to sea for many years. These last they refitted, and recalled the former to Alexandria.

Oars were wanting; they uncovered the porticos, academies, and public buildings, and made use of the planks they furnished for oars. Their natural ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to be met with in the city, supplied every want. In fine, they had no long navigation to provide for, and were only solicitous about present exigences, foreseeing they would have no occasion to fight but in the port. In a few days, therefore, contrary to all expectation, they had fitted out twenty-two quadriremes, and five quinqueremes. To these they added a great number of small open barks; and after testing the efficiency of each in the harbor, put a sufficient number of soldiers on board, and prepared every thing necessary for an engagement. Caesar had nine Rhodian galleys (for of the ten which were sent, one was shipwrecked on the coast of Egypt), eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from Asia. Of these, ten were quadriremes, and five quinqueremes; the rest were smaller, and for the most part without decks. Yet, trusting to the valor of his soldiers, and being acquainted with the strength of the enemy, he prepared for an engagement.

14

When both sides were come to have sufficient confidence in their own strength, Caesar sailed round Pharos, and formed in line of battle opposite to the enemy. He placed the Rhodian galleys on his right wing, and those of Pontus on his left. Between these he left a space of four hundred paces, to allow for extending and working the vessels. This disposition being made, he drew up the rest of the fleet as a reserve, giving them the necessary orders, and distributing them in such a manner that every ship followed that to which she was appointed to give succor. The Alexandrians brought out their fleet

with great confidence, and drew it up, placing their twenty-two quadriremes in front, and disposing the rest behind them in a second line, by way of reserve. They had besides a great number of boats and smaller vessels, which carried fire and combustibles, with the intention of intimidating us by their number, cries, and flaming darts. Between the two fleets were certain flats, separated by very narrow channels, and which are said to be on the African coast, as being in that division of Alexandria which belongs to Africa. Both sides waited which should first pass these shallows, because whoever entered the narrow channels between them, in case of any misfortune, would be impeded both in retreating and working their ships to advantage.

15

Euphranor commanded the Rhodian fleet, who for valor and greatness of mind deserved to be ranked among our own men rather than the Grecians. The Rhodians had raised him to the post of admiral, on account of his known courage and experience. He, perceiving Caesar's design, addressed him to this effect: "You seem afraid of passing the shallow first, lest you should be thereby forced to come to an engagement, before you can bring up the rest of the fleet. Leave the matter to us; we will sustain the fight (and we will not disappoint your expectations), until the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It is both dishonorable and afflicting that they should so long continue in our sight with an air of triumph." Caesar, encouraging him in his design, and bestowing many praises upon him, gave the signal for engaging. Four Rhodian ships having passed the shallows, the Alexandrians gathered round and attacked them. They maintained the fight with great courage, disengaging

themselves by their art and address, and working their ships with so much skill, that notwithstanding the inequality of number, none of the enemy were suffered to run alongside, or break their oars. Meantime the rest of the fleet came up; when, on account of the narrowness of the place, art became useless, and the contest depended entirely upon valor. Nor was there at Alexandria a single Roman or citizen who remained engaged in the attack or defense, but mounted the tops of the houses and all the eminences that would give a view of the fight, addressing the gods by vows and prayers for victory.

16

The event of the battle was by no means equal; a defeat would have deprived us of all resources either by land or sea; and even if we were victorious, the future would be uncertain. The Alexandrians, on the contrary, by a victory gained every thing; and if defeated, might yet again have recourse to fortune. It was likewise a matter of the highest concern to see the safety of all depend upon a few, of whom, if any were deficient in resolution and energy, they would expose their whole party to destruction. This Caesar had often represented to his troops during the preceding days, that they might be thereby induced to fight with the more resolution, when they knew the common safety to depend upon their bravery. Every man said the same to his comrade, companion, and friend, beseeching him not to disappoint the expectation of those who had chosen him in preference to others for the defense of the common interest. Accordingly, they fought with so much resolution, that neither the art nor address of the Egyptians, a maritime and seafaring people, could avail them, nor the multitude of their ships be of service to them; nor

the valor of those selected for this engagement be compared to the determined courage of the Romans. In this action a quinquereme was taken, and a bireme, with all the soldiers and mariners on board, besides three sunk, without any loss on our side. The rest fled toward the town, and protecting their ships under the mole and forts, prevented us from approaching.

17

To deprive the enemy of this resource for the future, Caesar thought it by all means necessary to render himself master of the mole and island; for having already in a great measure completed his works within the town, he was in hopes of being able to defend himself both in the island and city. This resolution being taken, he put into boats and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic cavalry as he thought fittest for his purpose, and sent them against the island; while, at the same time, to create a diversion, he attacked it on the other with his fleet, promising great rewards to those who should first render themselves masters of it. At first, the enemy firmly withstood the impetuosity of our men; for they both annoyed them from the tops of the houses, and gallantly maintained their ground along the shore; to which being steep and craggy, our men could find no way of approach; the more accessible avenues being skillfully defended by small boats, and five galleys, prudently stationed for that purpose. But when after examining the approaches, and sounding the shallows, a few of our men got a footing upon the shore, and were followed by others, who pushed the islanders, without intermission; the Pharians at last betook themselves to flight. On their defeat, the rest abandoning the defense of the port, quitted their ships, and retired into the town, to

provide for the security of their houses.

18

But they could not long maintain their ground there: though, to compare small things with great, their buildings were not unlike those of Alexandria, and their towers were high, and joined together so as to form a kind of wall; and our men had not come prepared with ladders, fascines, or any weapons for assault. But fear often deprives men of intellect and counsel, and weakens their strength, as happened upon this occasion. Those who had ventured to oppose us on even ground, terrified by the loss of a few men, and the general rout, durst not face us from a height of thirty feet; but throwing themselves from the mole into the sea, endeavored to gain the town, though above eight hundred paces distant. Many however were slain, and about six hundred taken.

19

Caesar, giving up the plunder to the soldiers, ordered the houses to be demolished, but fortified the castle at the end of the bridge next the island, and placed a garrison in it. This the Pharians had abandoned; but the other, toward the town, which was considerably stronger, was still held by the Alexandrians. Caesar attacked it next day; because by getting possession of these two forts, he would be entirely master of the port, and prevent sudden excursions and piracies. Already he had, by means of his arrows and engines, forced the garrison to abandon the place, and retire toward the town. He had also landed three cohorts which was all the place would contain; the rest of his troops were stationed in their ships. This being done, he orders them to fortify the bridge against the enemy, and to fill with stones and block up the arch on which the bridge was built, through

which there was egress for the ships. When one of these works was accomplished so effectually, that no boat could pass out at all, and when the other was commenced, the Alexandrians sallied, in crowds from the town, and drew up in an open place, over against the intrenchment we had cast up at the head of the bridge. At the same time they stationed at the mole the vessels which they had been wont to make pass under the bridge, to set fire to our ships of burden. Our men fought from the bridge and the mole; the enemy from the space, opposite to the bridge, and from their ships, by the side of the mole.

20

While Caesar was engaged in these things, and in exhorting his troops, a number of rowers and mariners, quitting their ships, threw themselves upon the mole, partly out of curiosity, partly to have a share in the action. At first, with stones and slings, they forced the enemy's ships from the mole; and seemed to do still greater execution with their darts. But when, some time after, a few Alexandrians found means to land, and attack them in flank, as they had left their ships without order or discipline, so they soon began to flee, with precipitation. The Alexandrians, encouraged by this success, landed in great numbers, and vigorously pressed upon our men, who were, by this time, in great confusion. Those that remained in the galleys perceiving this, drew up the ladders and put off from the shore, to prevent the enemy's boarding them. Our soldiers who belonged to the three cohorts, which were at the head of the mole to guard the bridge, astonished at this disorder, the cries they heard behind them, and the general rout of their party, unable besides to bear up against the great number of darts which came pouring upon them, and fearing to be surrounded, and have their retreat cut off, by

the departure of their ships, abandoned the fortifications which they had commenced at the bridge, and ran, with all the speed they could, toward the galleys: some getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded and sank them: part, resisting the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians. Others, more fortunate, got to the ships that rode at anchor; and a few, supported by their bucklers, making a determined struggle, swam to the nearest vessels.

21

Caesar, endeavoring to re-animate his men, and lead them back to the defense of the works, was exposed to the same danger as the rest; when, finding them universally to give ground, he retreated to his own galley, whither such a multitude followed and crowded after him, that it was impossible either to work or put her off. Foreseeing what must happen, he flung himself into the sea, and swam to the ships that lay at some distance. Hence dispatching boats to succor his men, he, by that means, preserved a small number. His own ship, being sunk by the multitude that crowded into her, went down with all that were on board. About four hundred legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that number of sailors and rowers, were lost in this action. The Alexandrians secured the fort by strong works, and a great number of engines; and having cleared away the stones with which Caesar had blocked up the port, enjoyed henceforward a free and open navigation.

22

Our men were so far from being disheartened at this loss, that they seemed rather roused and animated by it. They made continual sallies upon the enemy, to destroy or check the progress of their works; fell

upon them as often as they had an opportunity; and never failed to intercept them, when they ventured to advance beyond their fortifications. In short, the legions were so bent upon fighting, that they even exceeded the orders and exhortations of Caesar. They were inconsolable for their late disgrace, and impatient to come to blows with the enemy; insomuch, that he found it necessary rather to restrain and check their ardor, than incite them to action.

23

The Alexandrians, perceiving that success confirmed the Romans, and that adverse fortune only animated them the more, as they knew of no medium between these on which to ground any further hopes, resolved, as far as we can conjecture, either by the advice of the friends of their king who were in Caesar's quarter, or of their own previous design, intimated to the king by secret emissaries, to send ambassadors to Caesar to request him, "To dismiss their king and suffer him to rejoin his subjects; that the people, weary of subjection to a woman, of living under a precarious government, and submitting to the cruel laws of the tyrant Ganymed, were ready to execute the orders of the king: and if by his sanction they should embrace the alliance and protection of Caesar, the multitude would not be deterred from surrendering by the fear of danger."

24

Though Caesar knew the nation to be false and perfidious, seldom speaking as they really thought, yet he judged it best to comply with their desire. He even flattered himself, that his condescension in sending back their king at their request, would prevail on them to be faithful; or, as was more agreeable to their character, if they only wanted the king to head their army, at least it would be more for his

honor and credit to have to do with a monarch than with a band of slaves and fugitives. Accordingly, he exhorted the king, "To take the government into his own hands, and consult the welfare of so fair and illustrious a kingdom, defaced by hideous ruins and conflagrations. To make his subjects sensible of their duty, preserve them from the destruction that threatened them, and act with fidelity toward himself and the Romans, who put so much confidence in him, as to send him among armed enemies." Then taking him by the hand, he dismissed the young prince who was fast approaching manhood. But his mind being thoroughly versed in the art of dissimulation, and no way degenerating from the character of his nation, he entreated Caesar with tears not to send him back; for that his company was to him preferable to a kingdom. Caesar, moved at his concern, dried up his tears; and telling him, if these were his real sentiments, they would soon meet again, dismissed him. The king, like a wild beast escaped out of confinement, carried on the war with such acrimony against Caesar, that the tears he shed at parting seemed to have been tears of joy. Caesar's lieutenants, friends, centurions, and soldiers, were delighted that this had happened; because his easiness of temper had been imposed upon by a child: as if in truth Caesar's behavior on this occasion had been the effect of easiness of temper, and not of the most consummate prudence.

25

When the Alexandrians found that on the recovery of their king, neither had they become stronger, nor the Romans weaker; that the troops despised the youth and weakness of their king; and that their affairs were in no way bettered by his presence: they were greatly discouraged; and a report ran that a large body of troops was

marching by land from Syria and Cilicia to Caesar's assistance (of which he had not as yet himself received information); still they determined to intercept the convoys that came to him by sea. To this end, having equipped some ships, they ordered them to cruise before the Canopic branch of the Nile, by which they thought it most likely our supplies would arrive. Caesar, who was informed of it, ordered his fleet to get ready, and gave the command of it to Tiberius Nero. The Rhodian galleys made part of this squadron, headed by Euphranor their admiral, without whom there never was a successful engagement fought. But fortune, which often reserves the heaviest disasters for those who have been loaded with her highest favors, encountered Euphranor upon this occasion, with an aspect very different from what she had hitherto worn. For when our ships were arrived at Canopus, and the fleets drawn up on each side had begun the engagement, Euphranor, according to custom, having made the first attack, and pierced and sunk one of the enemy's ships; as he pursued the next a considerable way, without being sufficiently supported by those that followed him, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. None of the fleet advanced to his relief, either out of fear for their own safety, or because they imagined he would easily be able to extricate himself by his courage and good fortune. Accordingly he alone behaved well in this action, and perished with his victorious galley.

26

About the same time Mithridates of Pergamus, a man of illustrious descent, distinguished for his bravery and knowledge of the art of war, and who held a very high place in the friendship and confidence of Caesar, having been sent in the beginning of the Alexandrian war,

to raise succors in Syria and Cilicia, arrived by land at the head of a great body of troops, which his diligence, and the affection of these two provinces, had enabled him to draw together in a very short time. He conducted them first to Pelusium, where Egypt joins Syria. Achillas, who was perfectly well acquainted with its importance, had seized and put a strong garrison into it. For Egypt is considered as defended on all sides by strong barriers; on the side of the sea by the Pharos, and on the side of Syria by Pelusium, which are accounted the two keys of that kingdom. He attacked it so briskly with a large body of troops, fresh men continually succeeding in the place of those that were fatigued, and urged the assault with so much firmness and perseverance, that he carried it the same day on which he attacked it, and placed a garrison in it. Thence he pursued his march to Alexandria, reducing all the provinces through which he passed, and conciliating them to Caesar, by that authority which always accompanies the conqueror.

27

Not far from Alexandria lies Delta, the most celebrated province of Egypt, which derives its name from the Greek letter so called. For the Nile, dividing into two channels, which gradually diverge as they approach the sea, into which they at last discharge themselves, at a considerable distance from one another, leaves an intermediate space in form of a triangle. The king understanding that Mithridates was approaching this place, and knowing he must pass the river, sent a large body of troops against him, sufficient, as he thought, if not to overwhelm and crush him, at least to stop his march, for though he earnestly desired to see him defeated, yet he thought it a great point gained, to hinder his junction with Caesar. The troops that first

passed the river, and came up with Mithridates, attacked him immediately, hastening to snatch the honor of victory from the troops that were marching to their aid. Mithridates at first confined himself to the defense of his camp, which he had with great prudence fortified according to the custom of the Romans: but observing that they advanced insolently and without caution, he sallied upon them from all parts, and put a great number of them to the sword; insomuch that, but for their knowledge of the ground, and the neighborhood of the vessels in which they had passed the river, they must have been all destroyed. But recovering by degrees from their terror, and joining the troops that followed them, they again prepared to attack Mithridates.

28

A messenger was sent by Mithridates to Caesar, to inform him of what had happened. The king learns from his followers that the action had taken place. Thus, much about the same time, Ptolemy set out to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king made use of the more expeditious conveyance of the Nile, where he had a large fleet in readiness. Caesar declined the navigation of the river, that he might not be obliged to engage the enemy's fleet; and coasting along the African shore, found means to join the victorious troops of Mithridates, before Ptolemy could attack him. The king had encamped in a place fortified by nature, being an eminence surrounded on all sides by a plain. Three of its sides were secured by various defenses. One was washed by the river Nile, the other was steep and inaccessible, and the third was defended by a morass.

29

Between Ptolemy's camp and Caesar's route lay a narrow river with

very steep banks, which discharged itself into the Nile. This river was about seven miles from the king's camp; who, understanding that Caesar was directing his march that way, sent all his cavalry, with a choice body of light-armed foot, to prevent Caesar from crossing, and maintain an unequal fight from the banks, where courage had no opportunity to exert itself, and cowardice ran no hazard. Our men, both horse and foot, were extremely mortified, that the Alexandrians should so long maintain their ground against them. Wherefore, some of the German cavalry, dispersing in quest of a ford, found means to swim the river where the banks were lowest; and the legionaries at the same time cutting down several large trees, that reached from one bank to another, and constructing suddenly a mound, by their help got to the other side. The enemy were so much in dread of their attack, that they betook themselves to flight; but in vain: for very few returned to the king, almost all being cut to pieces in the pursuit.

30

Caesar, upon this success, judging that his sudden approach must strike great terror into the Alexandrians, advanced toward their camp with his victorious army. But finding it well intrenched, strongly fortified by nature, and the ramparts covered with armed soldiers, he did not think proper that his troops, who were very much fatigued both by their march and the late battle, should attack it; and therefore encamped at a small distance from the enemy. Next day he attacked a fort, in a village not far off, which the king had fortified and joined to his camp by a line of communication, with a view to keep possession of the village. He attacked it with his whole army, and took it by storm; not because it would have been difficult to carry it with a few

forces; but with the design of falling immediately upon the enemy's camp, during the alarm which the loss of this fort must give them. Accordingly, the Romans, in continuing the pursuit of those that fled from the fort, arrived at last before the Alexandrian camp, and commenced a most furious action at a distance. There were two approaches by which it might be attacked; one by the plain, of which we have spoken before, the other by a narrow pass, between their camp and the Nile. The first, which was much the easiest, was defended by a numerous body of their best troops; and the access on the side of the Nile gave the enemy great advantage in distressing and wounding our men; for they were exposed to a double shower of darts: in front from the rampart, behind from the river; where the enemy had stationed a great number of ships, furnished with archers and slingers, that kept up a continual discharge.

31

Caesar, observing that his troops fought with the utmost ardor, and yet made no great progress, on account of the disadvantage of the ground; and perceiving they had left the highest part of their camp unguarded, because, it being sufficiently fortified by nature, they had all crowded to the other attacks, partly to have a share in the action, partly to be spectators of the issue; he ordered some cohorts to wheel round the camp, and gain that ascent: appointing Carfulenus to command them, a man distinguished for bravery and acquaintance with the service. When they had reached the place, as there were but very few to defend it, our men attacked them so briskly that the Alexandrians, terrified by the cries they heard behind them, and seeing themselves attacked both in front and rear, fled in the utmost consternation on all sides. Our men, animated by the confusion of the

enemy, entered the camp in several places at the same time, and running down from the higher ground, put a great number of them to the sword. The Alexandrians, endeavoring to escape, threw themselves in crowds over the rampart in the quarter next the river. The foremost tumbling into the ditch, where they were crushed to death, furnished an easy passage for those that followed. It is ascertained that the king escaped from the camp, and was received on board a ship; but by the crowd that followed him, the ship in which he fled was overloaded and sunk.

32

After this speedy and successful action, Caesar, in consequence of so great a victory, marched the nearest way by land to Alexandria with his cavalry, and entered triumphant into that part of the town which was possessed by the enemy's guards. He was not mistaken in thinking that the Alexandrians, upon hearing of the issue of the battle, would give over all thoughts of war. Accordingly, as soon as he arrived, he reaped the just fruit of his valor and magnanimity. For all the multitude of the inhabitants, throwing down their arms, abandoning their works, and assuming the habit of suppliants, preceded by all those sacred symbols of religion with which they were wont to mollify their offended kings, met Caesar on his arrival and surrendered. Caesar, accepting their submission, and encouraging them, advanced through the enemy's works into his own quarter of the town, where he was received with the universal congratulations of his party, who were no less overjoyed at his arrival and presence, than at the happy issue of the war.

33

Caesar, having thus made himself master of Alexandria and Egypt,

lodged the government in the hands of those to whom Ptolemy had bequeathed it by will, conjuring the Roman people not to permit any change. For the eldest of Ptolemy's two sons being dead, Caesar settled the kingdom upon the youngest, in conjunction with Cleopatra, the elder of the two sisters, who had always continued under his protection and guardianship. The younger, Arsinoe, in whose name Ganymed, as we have seen, tyrannically reigned for some time he thought proper to banish the kingdom, that she might not raise any new disturbance, through the agency of seditious men, before the king's authority should be firmly established. Taking the sixth veteran legion with him into Syria, he left the rest in Egypt to support the authority of the king and queen, neither of whom stood well in the affections of their subjects, on account of their attachment to Caesar, nor could be supposed to have given any fixed foundation to their power, in an administration of only a few days' continuance. It was also for the honor and interest of the republic that if they continued faithful our forces should protect them; but if ungrateful that they should be restrained by the same power. Having thus settled the kingdom, he marched by land into Syria.

34

While these things passed in Egypt, king Deiotarus applied to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had intrusted the government of Asia and the neighboring provinces, beseeching him "not to suffer the Lesser Armenia which was his kingdom, or Cappadocia, which belonged to Ariobarzanes, to be seized and laid waste by Pharnaces, because, unless they were delivered from these insults, it would be impossible for them to execute Caesar's orders, or raise the money they stood engaged to pay." Domitius, who was not only sensible of

the necessity of money to defray the expenses of the war, but likewise thought it dishonorable to the people of Rome and the victorious Caesar, as well as infamous to himself, to suffer the dominions of allies and friends to be usurped by a foreign prince, sent ambassadors to Pharnaces, to acquaint him, "That he must withdraw immediately from Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer insult the majesty and right of the Roman people, while engaged in a civil war." But believing that his deputation would have greater weight, if he was ready to second it himself at the head of an army; he repaired to the legions which were then in Asia, ordering two of them into Egypt, at Caesar's desire, and carrying the thirty-sixth: along with him. To the thirty-sixth legion Deiotarus added two more, which he had trained up for several years, according to our discipline; and a hundred horse. The like number of horse were furnished by Ariobarzanes. At the same time, he sent P. Sextius to C. Plaetorius the questor, for the legion which had been lately levied in Pontus; and Quinctius Partisius into Cilicia, to draw thence a body of auxiliary troops. All these forces speedily assembled at Comana, by orders of Domitius.

35

Meanwhile his ambassadors bring back the following answer from Pharnaces: "That he had quitted Cappadocia; but kept possession of the Lesser Armenia, as his own, by right of inheritance: that he was willing, however, to submit every thing to the decision of Caesar, to whose commands he would pay immediate obedience." C. Domitius, sensible that he had quitted Cappadocia, not voluntarily, but out of necessity; because he could more easily defend Armenia, which lay contiguous to his own kingdom, than Cappadocia, which was more

remote: and because believing, at first, that Domitius had brought all the three legions along with him, upon hearing that two were gone to Caesar, he seemed more determined to keep possession; and insisted “upon his quitting Armenia likewise, as the same right existed in both cases; nor was it just to demand that the matter should be postponed till Caesar’s return, unless things were put in the condition in which they were at first.” Having returned this answer, he advanced toward Armenia, with the forces above-mentioned, directing his march along the hills; for from Pontus, by way of Comana, runs a woody ridge of hills, that extends as far as Lesser Armenia, dividing it from Cappadocia. The advantages he had in view, by such a march, were, that he would thereby effectually prevent all surprises, and be plentifully supplied with provisions from Cappadocia.

36

Meantime Pharnaces sends several embassies to Domitius to treat of peace, bearing royal gifts. All these he firmly rejected, telling the deputies: “That nothing was more sacred with him, than the majesty of the Roman people, and recovering the rights of their allies.” After long and continued marches, he reached Nicopolis (which is a city of Lesser Armenia, situated in a plain, having mountains, however, on its two sides, at a considerable distance), and encamped about seven miles from the town. Between his camp and Nicopolis, lay a difficult and narrow pass, where Pharnaces placed a chosen body of foot, and all his horse, in ambuscade. He ordered a great number of cattle to be dispersed in the pass, and the townsmen and peasants to show themselves, that if Domitius entered the defile as a friend, he might have no suspicion of an ambuscade, when he saw the men and flocks

dispersed, without apprehension, in the fields; or if he should come as an enemy, that the soldiers, quitting their ranks to pillage, might be cut to pieces when dispersed.

37

While this design was going forward, he never ceased sending ambassadors to Domitius, with proposals of peace and amity, fancying, by this means, the more easy to ensnare him. The expectation of peace kept Domitius in his camp; so that Pharnaces, having missed the opportunity, and fearing the ambuscade might be discovered, drew off his troops. Next day Domitius approached Nicopolis, and encamped near the town. While our men were working at the trenches, Pharnaces drew up his army in order of battle, forming his front into one line, according to the custom of the country, and securing his wings with a triple body of reserves. In the same manner, the center was formed in single files, and two intervals were left on the right and left. Domitius, ordering part of the troops to continue under arms before the rampart, completed the fortifications of his camp.

38

Next night, Pharnaces, having intercepted the couriers who brought Domitius an account of the posture of affairs at Alexandria, understood that Caesar was in great danger, and requested Domitius to send him succors speedily, and come himself to Alexandria by the way of Syria. Pharnaces, upon this intelligence, imagined that protracting the time would be equivalent to a victory, because Domitius, he supposed, must very soon depart. He therefore dug two ditches, four feet deep, at a moderate distance from each other, on that side where lay the easiest access to the town and our forces

might, most advantageously, attack him; resolving not to advance beyond them. Between these, he constantly drew up his army, placing all his cavalry upon the wings without them, which greatly exceeded ours in number, and would otherwise have been useless.

39

Domitius, more concerned at Caesar's danger than his own, and believing he could not retire with safety, should he now desire the conditions he had rejected, or march away without any apparent cause, drew his forces out of the camp, and ranged them in order of battle. He placed the thirty-sixth legion on the right, that of Pontus on the left, and those of Deiotarus in the main body; drawing them up with a very narrow front, and posting the rest of the cohorts to sustain the wings. The armies being thus drawn up on each side, they advanced to the battle.

40

The signal being given at the same time by both parties, they engage. The conflict was sharp and various, for the thirty-sixth legion falling upon the king's cavalry, that was drawn up without the ditch, charged them so successfully, that they drove them to the very walls of the town, passed the ditch, and attacked their infantry in the rear. But on the other side, the legion of Pontus having given way, the second line, which advanced to sustain them, making a circuit round the ditch, in order to attack the enemy in flank, was overwhelmed and borne down by a shower of darts, in endeavoring to pass it. The legions of Deiotarus made scarcely any resistance; thus the victorious forces of the king turned their right wing and main body against the thirty-sixth legion, which yet made a brave stand; and though surrounded by the forces of the enemy, formed themselves into a

circle, with wonderful presence of mind, and retired to the foot of a mountain, whither Pharnaces did not think fit to pursue them, on account of the disadvantage of the place. Thus the legion of Pontus being almost wholly cut off, with great part of those of Deiotarus, the thirty-sixth legion retreated to an eminence, with the loss of about two hundred and fifty men. Several Roman knights, of illustrious rank, fell in this battle. Domitius, after this defeat, rallied the remains of his broken army, and retreated, by safe ways, through Cappadocia, into Asia.

41

Pharnaces, elated with this success, as he expected that Caesar's difficulties would terminate as he [Pharnaces] wished, entered Pontus with all his forces. There, acting as conqueror and a most cruel king, and promising himself a happier destiny than his father, he stormed many towns, and seized the effects of the Roman and Pontic citizens, inflicted punishments, worse than death, upon such as were distinguished by their age or beauty, and having made himself master of all Pontus, as there was no one to oppose his progress, boasted that he had recovered his father's kingdom.

42

About the same time, we received a considerable check in Illyricum; which province, had been defended the preceding months, not only without insult, but even with honor. For Caesar's quaestor, Q. Cornificius, had been sent there as proprætor, the summer before, with two legions; and though it was of itself little able to support an army, and at that time in particular was almost totally ruined by the war in the vicinity, and the civil dissensions; yet, by his prudence, and vigilance, being very careful not to undertake any rash

expedition, he defended and kept possession of it. For he made himself master of several forts, built on eminences, whose advantageous situation tempted the inhabitants to make descents and inroads upon the country; and gave the plunder of them to his soldiers (and although this was but inconsiderable, yet as they were no strangers to the distress and ill condition of the province, they did not cease to be grateful; the rather as it was the fruit of their own valor). And when, after the battle of Pharsalia, Octavius had retreated to that coast with a large fleet; Cornificius, with some vessels of the inhabitants of Jadia, who had always continued faithful to the commonwealth, made himself master of the greatest part of his ships, which, joined to those of his allies, rendered him capable of sustaining even a naval engagement. And while Caesar, victorious, was pursuing Pompey to the remotest parts of the earth; when he [Cornificius] heard that the enemy had, for the most part, retired into Illyricum, on account of its neighborhood to Macedonia, and were there collecting such as survived the defeat [at Pharsalia], he wrote to Gabinius, "To repair directly thither, with the new raised legions, and join Cornificius, that if any danger should assail the province, he might ward it off, but if less forces sufficed, to march into Macedonia, which he foresaw would never be free from commotions, so long as Pompey lived."

43

Gabinius, whether he imagined the province better provided than it really was, or depended much upon the auspicious fortune of Caesar, or confided in his own valor and abilities, he having often terminated with success difficult and dangerous wars, marched into Illyricum, in the middle of winter, and the most difficult season of the year; where,

not finding sufficient subsistence in the province, which was partly exhausted, partly disaffected, and having no supplies by sea, because the season of the year had put a stop to navigation, he found himself compelled to carry on the war, not according to his own inclination, but as necessity allowed. As he was therefore obliged to lay siege to forts and castles, in a very rude season, he received many checks, and fell under such contempt with the barbarians, that while retiring to Salona, a maritime city, inhabited by a set of brave and faithful Romans, he was compelled to come to an engagement on his march; and after the loss of two thousand soldiers, thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes, got to Salona with the rest; where his wants continually increasing, he died a few days after. His misfortunes and sudden death gave Octavius great hopes of reducing the province. But fortune, whose influence is so great in matters of war, joined to the diligence of Cornificius, and the valor of Vatinius, soon put an end to his triumphs.

44

Vatinius, who was then at Brundisium, having intelligence of what passed in Illyricum, by letters from Cornificius, who pressed him to come to the assistance of the province, and informed him, that Octavius had leagued with the barbarians, and in several places attacked our garrisons, partly by sea with his fleet, partly by land with the troops of the barbarians; Vatinius, I say, upon notice of these things, though extremely weakened by sickness, insomuch that his strength of body no way answered his resolution and greatness of mind; yet, by his valor, surmounted all opposition, the force of his distemper, the rigor of the winter and the difficulties of a sudden preparation. For having himself but a very few galleys, he wrote to

Q. Kalenus, in Achaia, to furnish him with a squadron of ships. But these not coming with that dispatch which the danger our army was in required, because Octavius pressed hard upon them, he fastened beaks to all the barks and vessels that lay in the port, whose number was considerable enough, though they were not sufficiently large for an engagement. Joining these to what galleys he had, and putting on board the veteran soldiers, of whom he had a great number, belonging to all the legions, who had been left sick at Brundisium, when the army went over to Greece, he sailed for Illyricum; where, having subjected several maritime states that had declared for Octavius, and neglecting such as continued obstinate in their revolt, because he would suffer nothing to retard his design of meeting the enemy, he came up with Octavius before Epidaurus; and obliging him to raise the siege, which he was carrying on with vigor, by sea and land, joined the garrison to his own forces.

45

Octavius, understanding that Vatinius's fleet consisted mostly of small barks, and confiding in the strength of his own, stopped at the Isle of Tauris. Vatinius followed him thither, not imagining he would halt at that place, but being determined to pursue him wherever he went. Vatinius, who had no suspicion of an enemy, and whose ships were moreover dispersed by a tempest, perceived, as he approached the isle, a vessel filled with soldiers that advanced toward him, in full sail. Upon this he gave orders for furling the sails, lowering the sail-yards, and arming the soldiers; and hoisting a flag, as a signal for battle, intimated to the ships that followed to do the same. Vatinius's men prepared themselves in the best manner their sudden surprise would allow, while Octavius advanced in good order, from the port.

The two fleets drew up; Octavius had the advantage in arrangement, and Vatinius in the bravery of his troops.

46

Vatinius, finding himself inferior to the enemy, both in the number and largeness of his ships, resolved to commit the affair to fortune, and therefore in his own quinquereme, attacked Octavius in his four-banked galley. This he did with such violence, and the shock was so great, that the beak of Octavius's galley was broken. The battle raged with great fury likewise in other places, but chiefly around the two admirals; for as the ships on each side advanced to sustain those that fought, a close and furious conflict ensued in a very narrow sea, where the nearer the vessels approached the more had Vatinius's soldiers the advantage. For, with admirable courage, they leaped into the enemy's ships, and forcing them by this means to an equal combat, soon mastered them by their superior valor. Octavius's galley was sunk, and many others were taken or suffered the same fate; the soldiers were partly slain in the ships, partly thrown overboard into the sea. Octavius got into a boat, which sinking under the multitude that crowded after him, he himself, though wounded, swam to his brigantine; where, being taken up, and night having put an end to the battle, as the wind blew very strong, he spread all his sails and fled. A few of his ships, that had the good fortune to escape, followed him.

47

But Vatinius, after his success, sounded a retreat, and entered victorious the port whence Octavius had sailed to fight him, without the loss of a single vessel. He took, in this battle, one quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-banked galleys, and a great number of

rowers. The next day was employed in repairing his own fleet, and the ships he had taken from the enemy: after which, he sailed for the island of Issa, imagining Octavius had retired thither after his defeat. In this island was a flourishing city, well affected to Octavius, which however, surrendered to Vatinius, upon the first summons. Here he understood that Octavius, attended by a few small barks, had sailed, with a fair wind, for Greece, whence he intended to pass on to Sicily, and afterward to Africa. Vatinius, having in so short a space successfully terminated the affair, restored the province, in a peaceable condition, to Cornificius, and driven the enemy's fleet out of those seas, returned victorious to Brundusium, with his army and fleet in good condition.

48

But during the time that Caesar besieged Pompey at Dyrrachium, triumphed at Old Pharsalia, and carried on the war, with so much danger, at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had been left in Spain as *propraetor* of the further province, either through his natural disposition, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the province, on account of a wound he had treacherously received there when *quaestor*, drew upon himself the general dislike of the people. He discerned this temper among them, partly from a consciousness that he deserved it, partly from the manifest indications they gave of their discontent. To secure himself against their disaffection, he endeavored to gain the love of the soldiers; and having, for this purpose, assembled them together, promised them a hundred *sesterces* each. Soon after, having made himself master of Medobriga, a town in Lusitania, and of Mount Herminius, whither the Medobrigians had retired, and being upon that occasion saluted

imperator by the army, he gave them another hundred sesterces each. These, accompanied by other considerable largesses, in great number, seemed, for the present, to increase the good-will of the army, but tended gradually and imperceptibly to the relaxation of military discipline.

49

Cassius, having sent his army into winter quarters, fixed his residence at Corduba, for the administration of justice. Being greatly in debt, he resolved to pay it by laying heavy burdens upon the province: and, according to the custom of prodigals, made his liberalities a pretense to justify the most exorbitant demands. He taxed the rich at discretion, and compelled them to pay, without the least regard to their remonstrances; frequently making light and trifling offenses the handle for all manner of extortions. All methods of gain were pursued, whether great and reputable, or mean and sordid. None that had any thing to lose could escape accusation; insomuch, that the plunder of their private fortunes was aggravated by the dangers they were exposed to from pretended crimes.

50

For which reasons it happened that when Longinus as proconsul did those same things which he had done as quaestor, the provincials formed similar conspiracies against his life. Even his own dependents concurred in the general hatred; who, though the ministers of his rapine, yet hated the man by whose authority they committed those crimes. The odium still increased upon his raising a fifth legion, which added to the expense and burdens of the province. The cavalry was augmented to three thousand, with costly ornaments and equipage: nor was any respite given to the province.

51

Meanwhile he received orders from Caesar, to transport his army into Africa and march through Mauritania, toward Numidia, because king Juba had sent considerable succors to Pompey, and was thought likely to send more. These letters filled him with an insolent joy, by the opportunity they offered him of pillaging new provinces, and a wealthy kingdom. He therefore hastened into Lusitania, to assemble his legions, and draw together a body of auxiliaries; appointing certain persons to provide corn, ships, and money, that nothing might retard him at his return; which was much sooner than expected: for when interest called, Cassius wanted neither industry nor vigilance.

52

Having got his army together, and encamped near Corduba, he made a speech to the soldiers, wherein he acquainted them with the orders he had received from Caesar and promised them a hundred sesterces each, when they should arrive in Mauritania: the fifth legion, he told them, was to remain in Spain. Having ended his speech, he returned to Corduba. The same day, about noon, as he went to the hall of justice, one Minutius Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented him with a paper, in a soldier's habit, as if he had some request to make. Then retiring behind Racilius (who walked beside Cassius), as if waiting for an answer, he gradually drew near, and a favorable opportunity offering, seized Cassius with his left hand, and wounded him twice with a dagger in his right. A shout was then raised and an attack made on him by the rest of the conspirators, who all rushed upon him in a body. Munatius Plancus killed the lictor, that was next Longinus; and wounded Q. Cassius his lieutenant. T. Vasius and L. Mergilio seconded their countryman Plancus; for they were all natives of

Italica. L. Licinius Squillus flew upon Longinus himself, and gave him several slight wounds as he lay upon the ground.

53

By this time, his guards came up to his assistance (for he always had several beronians and veterans, armed with darts, to attend him), and surrounded the rest of the conspirators, who were advancing to complete the assassination. Of this number were Calphurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tuscus. Cassius was carried home; and Minutius Silo, stumbling upon a stone, as he endeavored to make his escape, was taken, and brought to him. Racilius retired to the neighboring house of a friend, till he should have certain information of the fate of Cassius. L. Laterensis, not doubting but he was dispatched, ran in a transport of joy to the camp, to congratulate the second and the new-raised legions upon it, who, he knew, bore a particular hatred to Cassius; and who, immediately upon this intelligence, placed him on the tribunal, and proclaimed him praetor. For there was not a native of the province, nor a soldier of the newly-raised legion, nor a person who by long residence was naturalized in the province, of which class the second legion consisted, who did not join in the general hatred of Cassius.

54

Meantime Laterensis was informed that Cassius was still alive; at which, being rather grieved than disconcerted, he immediately so far recovered himself, as to go and wait upon him. By this time, the thirtieth legion having notice of what had passed, had marched to Corduba, to the assistance of their general. The twenty-first and fifth followed their example. As only two legions remained in the camp, the second, fearing they should be left alone, and their sentiments

should be consequently manifested, did the same. But the new-raised legion continued firm, nor could be induced by any motives of fear to stir from its place.

55

Cassius ordered all the accomplices of the conspiracy to be seized, and sent back the fifth legion to the camp, retaining the other three. By the confession of Minutius, he learned, that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and Annius Scapula, man of great authority and credit in the province, and equally in his confidence with Laterensis and Racilius, were concerned in the plot: nor did he long defer his revenge, but ordered them to be put to death. He delivered Minutius to be racked by his freed-men; likewise Calphurnius Salvianus; who, turning evidence, increased the number of the conspirators; justly, as some think; but others pretend that he was forced. L. Mergilio was likewise put to the torture. Squillus impeached many others, who were all condemned to die, except such as redeemed their lives by a fine; for he pardoned Calphurnius for ten, and Q. Sextius for fifty thousand sesterces, who, though deeply guilty, yet having, in this manner, escaped death, showed Cassius to be no less covetous than cruel.

56

Some days after, he received letters from Caesar, by which he learned that Pompey was defeated, and had fled with the loss of all his troops, which news equally affected him with joy and sorrow. Caesar's success gave him pleasure; but the conclusion of the war would put an end to his rapines: insomuch, that he was uncertain which to wish for, victory or an unbounded licentiousness. When he was cured of his wounds, he sent to all who were indebted to him, in

any sums, and insisted upon immediate payment. Such as were taxed too low, had orders to furnish larger sums. He likewise instituted a levy of Roman citizens, and as they were enrolled from all the corporations and colonies, and were terrified by service beyond the sea, he called upon them to redeem themselves from the military oath. This brought in vast revenue, but greatly increased the general hatred. He afterward reviewed the army, sent the legions and auxiliaries, designed for Africa, toward the straits of Gibraltar, and went himself to Seville, to examine the condition of the fleet. He staid there some time, in consequence of an edict he had published, ordering all who had not paid the sums in which they were amerced, to repair to him thither; which created a universal murmuring and discontent.

57

In the mean time, L. Titius, a military tribune of the native legion, sent him notice of a report that the thirteenth legion, which Q. Cassius his lieutenant was taking with him, when it was encamped at Ilurgis, had mutinied and killed some of the centurions that opposed them, and were gone over to the second legion, who marched another way toward the Straits. Upon this intelligence he set out by night with five cohorts of the twenty-first legion, and came up with them in the morning. He staid there that day to consult what was proper to be done, and then went to Carmona, where he found the thirtieth and twenty-first legions, with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the cavalry assembled. Here he learned that the new-raised legion had surprised four cohorts, near Obucula, and forced them along with them to the second legion, where all joining, they had chosen T. Thorius, a native of Italica, for their general. Having instantly called a council,

he sent Marcellus to Corduba to secure that town, and Q. Cassius, his lieutenant, to Seville. A few days after, news was brought that the Roman citizens at Corduba had revolted, and that Marcellus, either voluntarily or through force (for the reports were various), had joined them; as likewise the two cohorts of the fifth legion that were in garrison there. Cassius, provoked at these mutinies, decamped, and the next day came to Segovia, upon the river Xenil. There, summoning an assembly, to sound the disposition of the troops, he found that it was not out of any regard to him, but to Caesar, though absent, that they continued faithful, and were ready to undergo any danger for the, recovery of the province.

58

Meantime Thorius marched the veteran legions to Corduba; and, that the revolt might not appear to spring from a seditious inclination in him or the soldiers, as likewise to oppose an equal authority to that of Q. Cassius, who was drawing together a great force in Caesar's name; he publicly gave out that his design was to recover the province for Pompey; and perhaps he did this through hatred of Caesar, and love of Pompey, whose name was very powerful among those legions which M. Varro had commanded. Be this as it will, Thorius at least made it his pretense; and the soldiers were so infatuated with the thought, that they had Pompey's name inscribed upon their bucklers. The citizens of Corduba, men, women, and children, came out to meet the legions, begging "they would not enter Corduba as enemies, seeing they joined with them in their aversion to Cassius, and only desired they might not be obliged to act against Caesar."

59

The soldiers, moved by the prayers and tears of so great a multitude, and seeing they stood in no need of Pompey's name and memory to spirit up a revolt against Cassius, and that he was as much hated by Caesar's followers as Pompey's; neither being able to prevail with Marcellus or the people of Corduba to declare against Caesar, they erased Pompey's name from their bucklers, chose Marcellus their commander, called him praetor, joined the citizens of Corduba, and encamped near the town. Two days after, Cassius encamped on an eminence, on this side the Guadalquivir, about four miles from Corduba, and within view of the town; whence he sent letters to Bogud, in Mauritania, and M. Lepidus, proconsul of Hither Spain, to come to his assistance as soon as possible, for Caesar's sake. Meanwhile he ravaged the country, and set fire to the buildings around Corduba.

60

The legions under Marcellus, provoked at this indignity, ran to him, and begged to be led against the enemy, that they might have an opportunity of engaging with them before they could have time to destroy with fire and sword the rich and noble possessions of the inhabitants of Corduba. Marcellus, though averse to a battle, which, whoever was victorious, must turn to Caesar's detriment, yet unable to restrain the legions, led them across the Guadalquivir, and drew them up. Cassius did the same upon a rising ground, but as he would not quit his advantageous post, Marcellus persuaded his men to return to their camp. He had already begun to retire when Cassius, knowing himself to be stronger in cavalry, fell upon the legionaries with his horse, and made a considerable slaughter in their rear upon the banks of the river. When it was evident from this loss, that

crossing the river was an error and attended with great loss, Marcellus removed his camp to the other side of the Guadalquivir, where both armies frequently drew up, but did not engage, on account of the inequality of the ground.

61

Marcellus was stronger in foot, for he commanded veteran soldiers of great experience in war. Cassius depended more on the fidelity than the courage of his troops. The two camps being very near each other, Marcellus seized a spot of ground, where he built a fort, very convenient for depriving the enemy of water. Longinus, apprehending he should be besieged in a country where all were against him, quitted his camp silently in the night, and, by a quick march, reached Ulia, a town on which he thought he could rely. There he encamped so near the walls, that both by the situation of the place (for Ulia stands on an eminence), and the defenses of the town, he was on all sides secure from an attack. Marcellus followed him and encamped as near the town as possible. Having taken a view of the place he found himself reduced, by necessity, to do what was most agreeable to his own inclination; namely, neither to engage Cassius, which the ardor of his soldiers would have forced him to, had it been possible, nor to suffer him, by his excursions, to infest the territories of other states, as he had done those of Corduba. He therefore raised redoubts in proper places, and continued his works quite round the town, inclosing both Ulia and Cassius within his lines. But before they were finished, Cassius sent out all his cavalry, who he imagined might do him great service by cutting off Marcellus's provisions and forage, and could only be a useless encumbrance to him, by consuming his provisions if he was shut up

in his camp.

62

A few days after, king Bogud, having received Cassius's letters, came and joined him with all his forces, consisting of one legion, and several auxiliary cohorts. For as commonly happens in civil dissensions, some of the states of Spain at that time favored Cassius, but a yet greater number, Marcellus. Bogud came up to the advanced works of Marcellus, where many sharp skirmishes happened with various success: however, Marcellus still kept possession of his works.

63

Meanwhile Lepidus came to Ulia, from the hither province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, and a great body of horse and auxiliaries, with the intention of adjusting the differences between Cassius and Marcellus. Marcellus submitted without hesitation: but Cassius kept within his works, either because he thought his cause the justest, or from an apprehension that his adversary's submission had prepossessed Lepidus in his favor. Lepidus encamped at Ulia, and forming a complete junction with Marcellus, prevented a battle, invited Cassius into his camp, and pledged his honor to act without prejudice. Cassius hesitated long, but at last desired that the circumvallation should be leveled, and free egress given him. The truce was not only concluded, but the works demolished, and the guards drawn off; when king Bogud attacked one of Marcellus's forts, that lay nearest to his camp, unknown to any (except perhaps Longinus, who was not exempt from suspicion on this occasion), and slew a great number of his men. And had not Lepidus interposed, much mischief would have been done.

64

A free passage being made for Cassius, Marcellus joined camps with Lepidus; and both together marched for Corduba, while Cassius retired with his followers to Carmona. At the same time, Trebonius, the proconsul, came to take possession of the province. Cassius having notice of his arrival, sent his legions and cavalry into winter quarters, and hastened, with all his effects, to Melaca, where he embarked immediately, though it was the winter season, that he might not, as he pretended, intrust his safety to Marcellus, Lepidus, and Trebonius; as his friends gave out, to avoid passing through a province, great part of which had revolted from him; but as was more generally believed, to secure the money he had amassed by his numberless extortions. The wind favoring him as far as could be expected at that season of the year, he put into the Ebro, to avoid sailing in the night: and thence continuing his voyage, which he thought he might do with safety, though the wind blew considerably fresher, he was encountered by such a storm, at the mouth of the river, that being neither able to return on account of the stream, nor stem the fury of the waves, the ship sank, and he perished.

65

When Caesar arrived in Syria, from Egypt, and understood from those who attended him there from Rome, and the letters he received at the same time, that the government at Rome was badly and injudiciously conducted, and all the affairs of the commonwealth managed indiscreetly; that the contests of the tribunes were producing perpetual seditions, and that, by the ambition and indulgence of the military tribunes, many things were done contrary to military usage, which tend to destroy all order and discipline, all

which required his speedy presence to redress them; thought it was yet first incumbent upon him to settle the state of the provinces through which he passed; that, freeing them from domestic contentions, and the fear of a foreign enemy, they might become amenable to law and order. This he hoped soon to effect in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia, because these provinces were not involved in war. In Bithynia and Pontus indeed he expected more trouble, because he understood Pharnaces still continued in the latter, and was not likely to quit it easily, being flushed with the victory he had obtained over Domitius Calvinus. He made a short stay in most states of note, distributing rewards both publicly and privately to such as deserved them, settling old controversies, and receiving into his protection the kings, princes, and potentates, as well of the provinces as of the neighboring countries. And having settled the necessary regulations for the defense and protection of the country, he dismissed them, with most friendly feelings to himself and the republic.

66

After a stay of some days in these parts, he named Sextus Caesar, his friend and relation, to the command of Syria and the legions appointed to guard it; and sailed himself for Cilicia, with the fleet he had brought from Egypt. He summoned the states to assemble at Tarsus, the strongest and finest city of the province; where, having settled everything that regarded either that province or the neighboring countries, through his eagerness to march to carry on the war he delayed no longer, but advancing through Cappadocia with the utmost expedition, where he stopped two days at Mazaca, he arrived at Comana, renowned for the ancient and sacred temple of Bellona, where she is worshiped with so much veneration, that her

priest is accounted next in power and dignity to the king. He conferred this dignity on Lycomedes of Bithynia, who was descended from the ancient kings of Cappadocia, and who demanded it in right of inheritance; his ancestors having lost it upon occasion of the scepter being transferred to another line. As for Ariobarzanes, and his brother Ariarates, who had both deserved well of the commonwealth, he confirmed the first in his kingdom, and put the other under his protection; after which, he pursued his march with the same dispatch.

67

Upon his approaching Pontus, and the frontiers of Gallograecia, Deiotarus, tetrarch of that province (whose title, however, was disputed by the neighboring tetrarchs) and king of Lesser Armenia, laying aside the regal ornaments, and assuming the habit not only of a private person, but even of a criminal, came in a suppliant manner to Caesar, to beg forgiveness for assisting Pompey with his army, and obeying his commands, at a time when Caesar could afford him no protection: urging, that it was his business to obey the governors who were present, without pretending to judge of the disputes of the people of Rome.

68

Caesar, after reminding him “of the many services he had done him, and the decrees he had procured in his favor when consul; that his defection could claim no excuse for want of information, because one of his industry and prudence could not but know who was master of Italy and Rome, where the senate, the people, and the majesty of the republic resided; who, in fine, was consul after Marcellus and Lentulus; told him, that he would notwithstanding forgive his present

fault in consideration of his past services, the former friendship that had subsisted between them, the respect due to his age, and the solicitation of those connected with him by hospitality, and his friends who interceded in his behalf: adding, that he would defer the controversy relating to the tetrarchate to another time.” He restored him the royal habit, and commanded him to join him with all his cavalry, and the legion he had trained up after the Roman manner.

69

When he was arrived in Pontus, and had drawn all his forces together, which were not very considerable either for their number or discipline (for except the sixth legion, composed of veteran soldiers, which he had brought with him from Alexandria, and which, by its many labors and dangers, the length of its marches and voyages, and the frequent wars in which it had been engaged, was reduced to less than a thousand men, he had only the legion of Deiotarus, and two more that had been in the late battle between Domitius and Pharnaces) ambassadors arrived from Pharnaces, “to entreat that Caesar would not come as an enemy, for he would submit to all his commands.” They represented particularly that “Pharnaces had granted no aid to Pompey, as Deiotarus had done, whom he had nevertheless pardoned.”

70

Caesar replied, “That Pharnaces should meet with the utmost justice, if he performed his promises: but at the same time he admonished the ambassadors, in gentle terms, to forbear mentioning Deiotarus, and not to overrate the having refused aid to Pompey. He told them that he never did any thing with greater pleasure than pardon a suppliant, but that he would never look upon private services to himself as an

atonement for public injuries done the province; that the refusal of Pharnaces to aid Pompey had turned chiefly to his own advantage, as he had thereby avoided all share in the disaster of Pharsalia; that he was however willing to forgive the injuries done to the Roman citizens in Pontus, because it was now too late to think of redressing them; as he could neither restore life to the dead, nor manhood to those he had deprived of it, by a punishment more intolerable to the Romans than death itself. But that he must quit Pontus immediately, send back the farmers of the revenues, and restore to the Romans and their allies what he unjustly detained from them. If he should do this, he might then send the presents which successful generals were wont to receive from their friends” (for Pharnaces had sent him a golden crown). With this answer he dismissed the ambassadors.

71

Pharnaces promised every thing: but hoping that Caesar, who was in haste to be gone, would readily give credit to whatever he said, that he might the sooner set out upon more urgent affairs (for every body knew that his presence was much wanted at Rome), he performed but slowly, wanted to protract the day of his departure, demanded other conditions, and in fine endeavored to elude his engagements. Caesar, perceiving his drift, did now, out of necessity, what he was usually wont to do through inclination, and resolved to decide the affair as soon as possible by a battle.

72

Zela is a town of Pontus, well fortified, though situated in a plain; for a natural eminence, as if raised by art, sustains the walls on all sides. All around is a great number of large mountains, intersected by valleys. The highest of these, which is celebrated for the victory of

Mithridates, the defeat of Triarius, and the destruction of our army, is not above three miles from Zela, and has a ridge that almost extends to the town. Here Pharnaces encamped, with all his forces, repairing the fortifications of a position which had proved so fortunate to his father.

73

Caesar having encamped about five miles from the enemy, and observing that the valleys which defended the king's camp would likewise defend his own, at the same distance, if the enemy, who were much nearer, did not seize them before him; ordered a great quantity of fascines to be brought within the intrenchments. This being quickly performed, next night, at the fourth watch, leaving the baggage in the camp, he set out with the legions; and arriving at daybreak unsuspected by the enemy, possessed himself of the same post where Mithridates had defeated Triarius. Hither he commended all the fascines to be brought, employing the servants of the army for that purpose, that the soldiers might not be called off from the works; because the valley, which divided the eminence, where he was intrenching himself from the enemy, was not above a mile wide.

74

Pharnaces perceiving this, next morning ranged all his troops in order of battle before his camp. Caesar, on account of the disadvantage of the ground, believed that he was reviewing them according to military discipline; or with a view to retard his works, by keeping a great number of his men under arms; or through the confidence of the king, that he might not seem to defend his position by his fortifications rather than by force. Therefore, keeping only his

first line in order of battle, he commanded the rest of the army to go on with their works. But Pharnaces, either prompted by the place itself, which had been so fortunate to his father; or induced by favorable omens, as we were afterward told; or discovering the small number of our men that were in arms (for he took all that were employed in carrying materials to the works to be soldiers); or confiding in his veteran army, who valued themselves upon having defeated the twenty-second legion; and at the same time, despising our troops, whom he knew he had worsted, under Domitius; was determined upon a battle, and to that end began to cross the valley. Caesar, at first, laughed at his ostentation, in crowding his army into so narrow a place, where no enemy, in his right senses, would have ventured: while, in the mean time, Pharnaces continued his march, and began to ascend the steep hill on which Caesar was posted.

75

Caesar, astonished at his incredible rashness and confidence, and finding himself suddenly and unexpectedly attacked, called off his soldiers from the works, ordered them to arms, opposed the legions to the enemy, and ranged his troops in order of battle. The suddenness of the thing occasioned some terror at first; and our ranks not being yet formed, the scythed chariots disordered and confused the soldiers: however, the multitude of darts discharged against them, soon put a stop to their career. The enemy's army followed them close, and began the battle with a shout. Our advantageous situation, but especially the assistance of the gods, who preside over all the events of war, and more particularly those where human conduct can be of no service, favored us greatly on this occasion.

76

After a sharp and obstinate conflict, victory began to declare for us on the right wing, where the sixth legion was posted. The enemy there were totally overthrown, but, in the center and left, the battle was long and doubtful; however, with the assistance of the gods, we at last prevailed there also, and drove them with the utmost precipitation down the hill which they had so easily ascended before. Great numbers being slain, and many crushed by the flight of their own troops, such as had the good fortune to escape were nevertheless obliged to throw away their arms; so that having crossed, and got upon the opposite ascent, they could not, being unarmed, derive any benefit from the advantage of the ground. Our men flushed with victory, did not hesitate to advance up the disadvantageous ground, and attack their fortifications, which they soon forced, notwithstanding the resistance made by the cohorts left by Pharnaces to guard it. Almost the whole army was cut to pieces or made prisoners. Pharnaces himself escaped, with a few horse; and had not the attack on the camp given him an opportunity of fleeing without pursuit, he must certainly have fallen alive into Caesar's hands.

77

Though Caesar was accustomed to victory, yet he felt incredible joy at the present success; because he had so speedily put an end to a very great war. The remembrance, too, of the danger to which he had been exposed, enhanced the pleasure, as he had obtained an easy victory in a very difficult conjuncture. Having thus recovered Pontus, and abandoned the plunder of the enemy's camp to the soldiers, he set out next day with some light horse. He ordered the sixth legion to return to Italy to receive the honors and rewards they had merited; and sent home the auxiliary troops of Deiotarus, and left two legions

with Caelius Vincianus to protect the kingdom of Pontus.

78

Through Gallograecia and Bithynia he marched into Asia, and examined and decided all the controversies of the provinces as he passed, and established the limits and jurisdictions of the several kings, states, and tetrarchs. Mithridates of Pergamus, who had so actively and successfully served him in Egypt, as we have related above, a man of royal descent and education (for Mithridates, king of all Asia, out of regard to his birth, had carried him along with him when very young, and kept him in his camp several years), was appointed king of Bosphorus, which had been under the command of Pharnaces. And thus he guarded the provinces of the Roman people against the attempts of barbarous and hostile kings, by the interposition of a prince firmly attached to the interests of the republic. He bestowed on him likewise the tetrarchy of Gallograecia, which was his by the law of nations and family claims, though it had been possessed for some years by Deiotarus. Thus Caesar, staying nowhere longer than the necessity of the seditions in the city required, and having settled all things relating to the provinces with the utmost success and dispatch, returned to Italy much sooner than was generally expected.

ON THE AFRICAN WAR



Translated by W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn

Detailing Caesar's campaigns against his Republican enemies in the province of Africa, *De Bello Africo* is also generally considered to have been written by one of Caesar's officers. It relates how the general gained a significant victory in 46 BC over Cato the Younger, who then committed suicide.



Cato the Younger (95 BC-46 BC) was a politician and statesman in the late Roman Republic. A noted Stoic and orator, Cato is remembered for his stubbornness, his immunity to bribes, his moral integrity and his famous distaste for the ubiquitous corruption of the period. His suicide is commonly regarded as signalling the end of the Roman Republic.

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The African War

1

Caesar, advancing by moderate journeys, and continuing his march without intermission, arrived at Lilybaeum, on the 14th day before the calends of January. Designing to embark immediately, though he had only one legion of new levies, and not quite six hundred horse, he ordered his tent to be pitched so near the sea-side that the waves lashed the very foot of it. This he did with a view that none should think he had time to delay, and that his men might be kept in readiness at a day or an hour's warning. Though the wind at that time was contrary, he nevertheless detained the soldiers and mariners on board, that he might lose no opportunity of sailing; the rather, because the forces of the enemy were announced by the inhabitants of the province, to consist of innumerable cavalry not to be numbered; four legions headed by Juba, together with a great body of light-armed troops; ten legions under the command of Scipio; a hundred and twenty elephants, and fleets in abundance. Yet he was not alarmed, nor lost his confident hopes and spirits. Meantime the number of galleys and transports increased daily; the new-levied legions flocked in to him from all parts; among the rest the fifth, a veteran legion, and about two thousand horse.

2

Having got together six legions and about two thousand horse, he embarked the legions as fast as they arrived, in the galleys, and the cavalry in the transports. Then sending the greatest part of the fleet before, with orders to sail for the island of Aponiana, not far from Lilybaeum; he himself continued a little longer in Sicily, and exposed to public sale some confiscated estates. Leaving all other affairs to the care of Allienus the praetor, who then commanded in

the island; and strictly charging him to use the utmost expedition in embarking the remainder of the troops; he set sail the sixth day before the calends of January, and soon came up with the rest of the fleet. As the wind was favorable, and afforded a quick passage, he arrived the fourth day within sight of Africa, attended by a few galleys: for the transports, being mostly dispersed and scattered by the winds, with the exception of a few were driven different ways. Passing Clupea and Neapolis with the fleet, he continued for some time to coast along the shore, leaving many towns and castles behind him.

3

After he came before Adrumetum, where the enemy had a garrison, commanded by C. Considius, and where Cn. Piso appeared upon the shore toward Clupea, with the cavalry of Adrumetum, and about three thousand Moors, he stopped awhile, facing the port, till the rest of the fleet should come up, and then landed his men, though their number at that time did not exceed three thousand foot and a hundred and fifty horse. There, encamping before the town, he continued quiet, without offering any act of hostility, and restrained all from plunder. Meantime the inhabitants manned the walls, and assembled in great numbers before the gate, to defend themselves, their garrison within amounting to two legions. Caesar, having ridden round the town, and thoroughly examined its situation, returned to his camp. Some blamed his conduct on this occasion, and charged him with a considerable oversight, in not appointing a place of meeting to the pilots and captains of the fleet, or delivering them sealed instructions, according to his usual custom; which being opened at a certain time, might have directed them to assemble at a specified place. But in this

Caesar acted not without design; for as he knew of no port in Africa that was clear of the enemy's forces, and where the fleet might rendezvous in security, he chose to rely entirely upon fortune, and land where occasion offered.

4

In the mean time, L. Plancus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, desired leave to treat with Considius, and try, if possible, to bring him to reason. Leave being granted accordingly, he wrote him a letter, and sent it into the town by a captive. When the captive arrived, and presented the letter, Considius, before he received it, demanded whence it came, and being told from Caesar, the Roman general, answered, "That he knew no general of the Roman forces but Scipio." Then, commending the messenger to be immediately slain in his presence, he delivered the letter, unread and unopened, to a trusty partisan, with orders to carry it directly to Scipio.

5

Caesar had now continued a day and a night before the town, without receiving any answer from Considius; the rest of the forces were not yet arrived; his cavalry was not considerable; he had not sufficient troops with him to invest the place, and these were new levies: neither did he think it advisable, upon his first landing, to expose the army to wounds and fatigue; more especially, as the town was strongly fortified, and extremely difficult of access, and a great body of horse was said to be upon the point of arrival to succor the inhabitants; he therefore thought it advisable not to remain and besiege the town, lest while he pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry should come behind and surround him.

6

But as he was drawing off his men, the garrison made a sudden sally; and the cavalry which had been sent by Juba to receive their pay, happening just then to come up, they took possession of the camp Caesar had left, and began to harass his rear. This being perceived, the legionaries immediately halted; and the cavalry, though few in number, boldly charged the vast multitude of the enemy. An incredible event occurred, that less than thirty Gallic horse repulsed two thousand Moors, and drove them into the town. Having thus repulsed the enemy and compelled them to retire behind their walls, Caesar resumed his intended march: but observing that they often repeated their sallies, renewing the pursuit from time to time, and again fleeing when attacked by the horse, he posted a few of the veteran cohorts which he had with him, with part of the cavalry, in the rear, and so proceeded slowly on his march. The further he advanced from the town, the less eager were the Numidians to pursue. Meantime, deputies arrived from the several towns and castles on the road, offering to furnish him with corn, and to perform whatever he might command. Toward the evening of that day, which was the calends of January, he fixed his camp at Ruspina.

7

Thence he removed and came before Leptis, a free city and governed by its own laws. Here he was met by deputies from the town, who, in the name of the inhabitants, offered their free submission. Whereupon, placing centurions and a guard before the gates, to prevent the soldiers from entering, or offering violence to any of the inhabitants, he himself encamped toward the shore, not far distant from the town. Hither by accident arrived some of the galleys and

transports; by whom he was informed that the rest of the fleet, uncertain what course to pursue, had been steering for Utica. In the mean time Caesar could not depart from the sea, nor seek the inland provinces, on account of the error committed by the fleet. He likewise sent the cavalry back to their ships, probably to hinder the country from being plundered, and ordered fresh water to be carried to them on board. Meanwhile the Moorish horse rose suddenly, Caesar's party not expecting it, on the rowers who had been employed in carrying water, as they came out of the ships, and wounded many with their darts and killed some. For the manner of these barbarians is, to lie in ambush with their horses among the valleys, and suddenly launch upon an enemy; they seldom choosing to engage hand to hand in a plain.

8

In the mean time, Caesar dispatched letters and messengers into Sardinia and the neighboring provinces, with orders, as soon as they read the letters, to send supplies of men, corn, and warlike stores; and having unloaded part of the fleet, detached it, with Rabirius Posthumus, into Sicily, to bring over the second embarkation. At the same time he ordered out ten galleys, to get intelligence of the transports that had missed their way, and to maintain the freedom of the sea. He also ordered C. Sallustius Prispus, the praetor, at the head of a squadron, to sail to Percina, then in the hands of the enemy, because he heard there was great quantity of corn in that island: he gave these orders and instructions in such a manner as to leave no room for excuse or delay. Meanwhile, having informed himself, from the deserters and natives, of the condition of Scipio and his followers; and understanding that they were at the whole charge of

maintaining Juba's cavalry; he could not but pity the infatuation of men, who thus chose to be tributaries to the king of Numidia, rather than securely enjoy their fortunes at home with their fellow-citizens.

9

Caesar moved his camp on the third day before the nones of January; and leaving six cohorts at Leptis, under the command of Saserna, returned with the rest of the forces to Ruspina, whence he had come the day before. Here he deposited the baggage of the army; and marching out with a light body of troops to forage, ordered the inhabitants to follow with their horses and carriages. Having by this means got together a great quantity of corn, he came back to Ruspina. I think that he acted with this intention, that by keeping possession of the maritime cities, and providing them with garrisons, he might secure a retreat for his fleet.

10

Leaving therefore P. Saserna, the brother of him who commanded at Leptis, to take charge of the town, with one legion, he orders all the wood that could be found to be carried into the place; and set out in person from Ruspina, with seven cohorts, part of the veteran legions who had behaved so well in the fleet under Sulpicius and Vatinius; and marching directly for the port, which lies at about two miles' distance, embarked with them in the evening, without imparting his intentions to the army, who were extremely inquisitive concerning the general's design. His departure occasioned the utmost sadness and consternation among the troops; for being few in number, mostly new levies, and those not all suffered to land, they saw themselves exposed, upon a foreign coast, to the mighty forces of a crafty nation, supported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor had they any resource in

their present circumstances, or expectation of safety in their own conduct; but derived all their hope from the alacrity, vigor, and wonderful cheerfulness that appeared in their general's countenance; for he was of an intrepid spirit, and behaved with undaunted resolution and confidence. On his conduct, therefore, they entirely relied, and hoped to a man, that by his skill and talents, all difficulties would vanish before them.

11

Caesar, having continued the whole night on board, prepared to set sail about day-break; when, all on a sudden, the part of the fleet that had caused so much anxiety, appeared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore, ordering his men to quit their ships immediately, and receive the rest of the troops in arms upon the shore, he made the new fleet enter the port with the utmost diligence; and landing all the forces, horse and foot, returned again to Ruspina. Here he established his camp; and taking with him thirty cohorts, without baggage, advanced into the country to forage. Thus was Caesar's purpose at length discovered: that he meant, unknown to the enemy, to have sailed to the assistance of the transports that had missed their way, lest they should unexpectedly fall in with the African fleet. And he did not wish his own soldiers who were left behind in garrison to know this, lest they should be intimidated by the smallness of their numbers, and the multitude of the enemy.

12

Caesar had not marched above three miles from his camp, when he was informed by his scouts, and some advanced parties of horse, that the enemy's forces were in view. As soon as this announcement was made, a great cloud of dust began to appear. Upon this intelligence,

Caesar ordered all his horse, of which he had at that time but a very small number, to advance, as likewise his archers, only a few of whom had followed him from the camp; and the legions to march quietly after him in order of battle; while he went forward at the head of a small party. Soon after, having discovered the enemy at some distance, he commanded the soldiers to repair to their arms, and prepare for battle. Their number in all did not exceed thirty cohorts, with four hundred horse, and one hundred and fifty archers.

13

Meanwhile the enemy, under the command of Labienus, and the two Pacidii, drew up, with a very large front, consisting not so much of foot as of horse, whom they intermixed with light-armed Numidians and archers; forming themselves in such close order, that Caesar's army, at a distance, mistook them all for infantry; and strengthening their right and left with many squadrons of horse. Caesar drew up his army in a single line, being obliged to do so by the smallness of his numbers; covering his front with his archers, and placing his cavalry on the right and left wings, with particular instructions not to suffer themselves to be surrounded by the enemy's numerous horse; for he imagined that he would have to fight only with infantry.

14

As both sides stood in expectation of the signal, and Caesar would not stir from his post, as he saw that with such few troops against so great a force he must depend more on stratagem than strength, on a sudden the enemy's horse began to extend themselves, and move in a lateral direction, so as to encompass the hills and weaken Caesar's horse, and at the same time to surround them. The latter could scarcely keep their ground against their numbers. Meanwhile, both

the main bodies advancing to engage, the enemy's cavalry, intermixed with some light-armed Numidians, suddenly sprang forward, from their crowded troops, and attacked the legions with a shower of darts. Our men, preparing to return the charge, their horse retreated a little, while the foot continued to maintain their ground, till the others, having rallied, came on again, with fresh vigor, to sustain them.

15

Caesar perceived that his ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, for our foot, in pursuing the enemy's horse, having advanced a considerable way beyond their colors, were wounded in the flank by the nearest Numidian darts, while the enemy's horse easily escaped our infantry's javelins by flight; he therefore gave express orders that no soldier should advance above four feet beyond the ensigns. Meanwhile, Labienus's cavalry, confiding in their numbers endeavored to surround those of Caesar: who being few in number, and overpowered by the multitude of the enemy, were forced to give ground a little, their horses being much wounded. The enemy pressed on more and more; so that in an instant, the legions, being surrounded on all sides by the enemy's cavalry, were obliged to form themselves into a circle, and fight, as if inclosed with barriers.

16

Labienus, with his head uncovered, advanced on horseback to the front of the battle, sometimes encouraging his own men, sometimes addressing Caesar's legions thus: "So ho! you raw soldiers there!" says he, "why so fierce? Has he infatuated you too with his words? Truly he has brought you into a fine condition! I pity you sincerely."

Upon this, one of the soldiers said: "I am none of your raw warriors, Labienus, but a veteran of the tenth legion." "Where's your standard?" replied Labienus. "I'll soon make you sensible who I am," answered the soldier. Then pulling off his helmet, to discover himself, he threw a javelin, with all his strength at Labienus, which wounding his horse severely in the breast—"Know, Labienus," says he, "that this dart was thrown by a soldier of the tenth legion." However, the whole army was not a little daunted, especially the new levies; and began to cast their eyes upon Caesar, minding nothing, for the present, but to defend themselves from the enemy's darts.

17

Caesar meanwhile, perceiving the enemy's design, endeavored to extend his line of battle, as much as possible, directing the cohorts to face about alternately to the right and left. By this means, he broke the enemy's circle with his right and left wings; and attacking one part of them, thus separated from the other, with his horse and foot, at last put them to flight. He pursued them but a little way, fearing an ambuscade, and returned again to his own men. The same was done by the other division of Caesar's horse and foot, so that the enemy being driven back, and severely wounded on all sides, he retreated toward his camp, in order of battle.

18

Meantime M. Petreius, and Cn. Piso, with eleven hundred select Numidian horse, and a considerable body of foot, arrived to the assistance of the enemy; who, recovering from their terror, upon this reinforcement, and again resuming courage, fell upon the rear of the legions, as they retreated, and endeavored to hinder them from reaching their camp. Caesar, perceiving this, ordered his men to

wheel about, and renew the battle in the middle of the plain. As the enemy still pursued their former plan, and avoided a closing engagement, and the horses of Caesar's cavalry had not yet recovered the fatigue of their late voyage, and were besides weakened with thirst, weariness, wounds, and of course unfit for a vigorous and long pursuit, which even the time of the day would not allow, he ordered both horse and foot to fall at once briskly upon the enemy, and not slacken the pursuit till they had driven them quite beyond the furthest hills, and taken possession of them themselves. Accordingly, upon a signal being given, when the enemy were throwing their javelins in a faint and careless manner, he suddenly charged them with his horse and foot; who in a moment driving them from the field, and over the adjoining hill, kept possession of that post for some time, and then retired slowly, in order of battle, to their camp. The enemy, who, in this last attack, had been very roughly handled, then at length retreated to their fortifications.

19

Meanwhile the action being over, a great number of deserters, of all kinds, flocked to Caesar's camp, besides multitudes of horse and foot that were made prisoners. From them we learned that it was the design of the enemy to have astonished our raw troops, with their new and uncommon manner of fighting; and after surrounding them with their cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as they had done Curio; and that they had marched against us expressly with that intention. Labienus had even said, in the council of war, that he would lead such a numerous body of auxiliaries against his adversaries, as should fatigue us with the very slaughter, and defeat us even in the bosom of victory; for he relied more on the number

than the valor of his troops. He had heard of the mutiny of the veteran legions at Rome, and their refusal to go into Africa; and was likewise well assured of the fidelity of his troops, who had served three years under him in Africa. He had a great number of Numidian cavalry and light-armed troops, besides the Gallic and German horse, whom he had drawn together out of the remains of Pompey's army, and carried over with him from Brundisium: he had likewise the freed men raised in the country, and trained to use bridled horses; and also the immense number of Juba's forces, his hundred and twenty elephants, his innumerable cavalry and legionaries, amounting to above twelve thousand. Emboldened by the hope such mighty forces raised in him, on the day before the nones of January, three days after Caesar's arrival, he came against him, with sixteen hundred Gallic and German horse, nine hundred under Petreius, eight thousand Numidians, four times that number of light-armed foot, with a multitude of archers and slingers. The battle lasted from the fifth hour till sunset, during which time Petreius, receiving a dangerous wound, was obliged to quit the field.

20

Meantime Caesar fortified his camp with much greater care, reinforced the guards, and threw up two intrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his camp to the sea likewise, to secure the communication, and receive supplies without danger. He landed a great number darts and military engines, armed part of the mariners, Gauls, Rhodians, and others, that after the example of the enemy he might have a number of light-armed troops to intermix with his cavalry. He likewise strengthened his army with a great number of Syrian and Iturean archers whom he drew from the fleet

into his camp: for he understood that within three days Scipio was expected to unite his forces to Labienus and Petreius, and his army was said to consist of eight legions and three thousand horse. At the same time he established workshops, made a great number of darts and arrows, provided himself with leaden bullets and palisades, wrote to Sicily for hurdles and wood to make rams, because he had none in Africa, and likewise gave orders for sending corn; for the harvest in that country was like to be inconsiderable, the enemy having taken all the laborers into their service the year before, and stored up the grain in a few fortified towns, after demolishing the rest, forcing the inhabitants into the garrisoned places, and exhausting the whole country.

21

In this necessity, by paying court to private individuals, he obtained a small supply, and husbanded it with care. In the mean time he went round the works in person daily, and kept about four cohorts constantly on duty, on account of the multitude of the enemy. Labienus sent his sick and wounded, of which the number was very considerable, in wagons to Adrumetum. Meanwhile Caesar's transports, unacquainted with the coast, or where their general had landed wandered up and down in great uncertainty; and being, attacked, one after another, by the enemy's coasters, were, for the most part, either taken or burned. Caesar, being informed of this, stationed his fleet along the coast and islands for the security of his convoys.

22

Meanwhile M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, never ceased urging and exhorting young Pompey, in words to this effect: "Your father,

when he was at your age, and observed the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and daring men, and the party of order either slain or driven into banishment from their country and relations, incited by the greatness of his mind and the love of glory, though then very young, and only a private man, had yet the courage to rally the remains of his father's army, and assert the freedom of Italy and Rome, which was almost crushed forever. He also recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia, Mauritania, with amazing dispatch, and by that means gained an illustrious and extensive reputation among all nations, and triumphed while very young and only a Roman knight. Nor did he enter upon the administration of public affairs, distinguished by the shining exploits of his father, or the fame and reputation of his ancestors, or the honors and dignities of the state. Will you, on the contrary, possessed of these honors, and the reputation acquired by your father, sufficiently distinguished by your own industry and greatness of mind, not bestir yourself, join your father's friends, and give the earnestly required assistance to yourself, the republic, and every man of worth?"

23

The youth, roused by the remonstrances of that grave and worthy senator, got together about thirty sail, of all sorts, of which some few were ships of war, and sailing from Utica to Mauritania, invaded the kingdom of Bogud. And leaving his baggage behind him, with an army of two thousand men, partly freedmen, partly slaves, some armed, some not, approached the town of Ascurum, in which the king had a garrison. On the arrival of Pompey, the inhabitants suffered him to advance to the very walls and gates; when, suddenly sallying out, they drove back his troops in confusion and dismay to

the sea and their ships. This ill-success determined him to leave that coast, nor did he afterward land in any place, but steered directly for the Balearean Isles.

24

Meantime Scipio, leaving a strong garrison at Utica, began his march, with the forces we have described above, and encamped first at Adrumetum; and then, after a stay of a few days, setting out in the night, he joined Petreius and Labienus, lodging all the forces in one camp, about three miles distant from Caesar's. Their cavalry made continual excursions to our very works, and intercepted those who ventured too far in quest of wood or water, and obliged us to keep within our intrenchments. This soon occasioned a great scarcity of provision among Caesar's men, because no supplies had yet arrived from Sicily and Sardinia. The season, too, was dangerous for navigation, and he did not possess above six miles in each direction, in Africa, and was moreover greatly distressed for want of forage. The veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had been engaged in many wars both by sea and land, and often struggled with wants and misfortunes of this kind, gathering sea-weed, and washing it in fresh water, by that means subsisted their horses and cattle.

25

While things were in this situation, king Juba, being informed of Caesar's difficulties, and the few troops he had with him, resolved not to allow him time to remedy his wants or increase his forces. Accordingly he left his kingdom, at the head of a large body of horse and foot, and marched to join his allies. Meantime P. Sittius, and king Bogud, having intelligence of Juba's march, joined their forces, entered Numidia, and laying siege to Cirta, the most opulent city in

the county, carried it in a few days, with two others belonging to the Getulians. They had offered the inhabitants leave to depart in safety, if they would peaceably deliver up the town; but these conditions being rejected, they were taken by storm, and the citizens all put to the sword. They continued to advance, and incessantly harassed the cities and country; of which Juba having intelligence, though he was upon the point of joining Scipio and the other chiefs, determined that it was better to march to the relief of his own kingdom, than run the hazard of being driven from it while he was assisting others, and, perhaps, after all, miscarry too in his designs against Caesar. He therefore retired, with his troops, leaving only thirty elephants behind him, and marched to the relief of his own cities and territories.

26

Meanwhile Caesar, as there was a doubt in the province concerning his arrival, and no one believed that he had come in person, but that some of his lieutenants had come over with the forces lately sent, dispatched letters to all the several states, to inform them of his presence. Upon this, many persons of rank fled to his camp, complaining of the barbarity and cruelty of the enemy. Caesar deeply touched by their tears and complaints, although before he had remained inactive, resolved to take the field as soon as the weather would permit, and he could draw his troops together. He immediately dispatched letters into Sicily, to Allienus and Rabirius Posthumus the praetors [to tell them] that without delay or excuse, either of the winter or the winds, they must send over the rest of the troops, to save Africa from utter ruin; because, without some speedy remedy, not a single house would be left standing, nor any thing escape the fury and ravages of the enemy. And he himself was so anxious and

impatient, that from the day the letters were sent, he complained without ceasing of the delay of the fleet, and had his eyes night and day turned toward the sea. Nor was it wonderful; for he saw the villages burned, the country laid waste, the cattle destroyed, the towns plundered, the principal citizens either slain or put in chains, and their children dragged into servitude under the name of hostages; nor could he, amid all this scene of misery, afford any relief to those who implored his protection, on account of the small number of his forces. In the mean time he kept the soldiers incessantly at work upon the intrenchments, built forts and redoubts, and carried on his lines quite to the sea.

27

Meanwhile Scipio made use of the following contrivance for training and disciplining his elephants. He drew up two parties in order of battle; one of slingers, who were to act as enemies, and discharge small stones against the elephants: and fronting them, the elephants themselves, in one line, and his whole army behind him in battle-array; that when the enemy, by their discharge of stones, had frightened the elephants, and forced them to turn upon their own men, they might again be made to face the enemy, by the volleys of stones from the army behind them. The work however, went on but slowly, because these animals, after many years' training, are dangerous to both parties when brought into the field.

28

While the two generals were thus employed near Ruspina, C. Virgilius, a man of praetorian rank, who commanded in Thapsus, a maritime city, observing some of Caesar's transports that had missed their way, uncertain where Caesar had landed or held his camp; and

thinking that a fair opportunity offered of destroying them, manned a galley that was in the port with soldiers and archers, and joining with it a few armed barks, began to pursue Caesar's ships. Though he was repulsed on several occasions he still pursued his design, and at last fell in with one, on board of which were two young Spaniards, of the name of Titius, who were tribunes of the fifth legion, and whose father had been made a senator by Caesar. There was with them a centurion of the same legion, T. Salienus by name, who had invested the house of M. Messala, Caesar's lieutenant, at Messana, and made use of very seditious language; nay, had even seized the money and ornaments destined for Caesar's triumph, and for that reason dreaded his resentment. He, conscious of his demerits, persuaded the young men to surrender themselves to Virgilius, by whom they were sent under a strong guard to Scipio, and three days after put to death. It is said, that the elder Titius begged of the centurions who were charged with the execution, that he might be first put to death; which being easily granted, they both suffered according to their sentence.

29

The cavalry that mounted guard in the two camps were continually skirmishing with one another. Sometimes too the German and Gallic cavalry of Labienus entered into discourse with those of Caesar, after promising not to injure one another. Meantime Labienus, with a party of horse, endeavored to surprise the town of Leptis, which Saserna guarded with three cohorts; but was easily repulsed, because the town was strongly fortified, and well provided with warlike engines; he however renewed the attempt several times. One day, as a strong squadron of the enemy had posted themselves before the gate, their officer being slain by an arrow discharged from a cross-

bow, and pinned to his own shield, the rest were terrified and took to flight; by which means the town was delivered from any further attempts.

30

At the same time Scipio daily drew up his troops in order of battle, about three hundred paces from his camp; and after continuing in arms the greatest part of the day, retreated again to his camp in the evening. This he did several times, no one mean while offering to stir out of Caesar's camp, or approach his forces; which forbearance and tranquillity gave him such a contempt of Caesar and his army, that drawing out all his forces, and his thirty elephants, with towers on their backs, and extending his horse and foot as wide as possible, he approached quite up to Caesar's intrenchments.

31

Upon perceiving this, Caesar, quietly, and without noise or confusion, recalled to his camp all that were gone out either in quest of forage, wood, or to work upon the fortifications: he likewise ordered the cavalry that were upon guard not to quit their post until the enemy were within reach of dart; and if they then persisted in advancing, to retire in good order within the intrenchments. He ordered the rest of the cavalry to be ready and armed, each in his own place. These orders were not given by himself in person, or after viewing the disposition of the enemy from the rampart; but such was his consummate knowledge of the art of war, that he gave all the necessary directions by his officers, he himself sitting in his tent, and informing himself of the motions of the enemy by his scouts. He very well knew, that, whatever confidence the enemy might have in their numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the camp of a

general who had so often repulsed, terrified, and put them to flight; who had frequently pardoned and granted them their lives; and whose very name had weight and authority enough to intimidate their army. He was besides well intrenched with a high rampart and deep ditch, the approaches to which were rendered so difficult by the sharp spikes which he had disposed in a very skillful manner, that they were even sufficient of themselves to keep off the enemy. He had also a large supply of cross-bows, engines, and all sorts of weapons necessary for a vigorous defense, which he had prepared on account of the fewness of his troops, and the inexperience of his new levies. It was not owing to being influenced by the fear of the enemy or their numerical strength, that he allowed himself to appear daunted in their estimation. And it was not owing to his having any doubts of gaining the victory that he did not lead his troops to action, although they were raw and few, but he thought that it was a matter of great importance, what sort the victory should be: for he thought that it would disgrace him, if after so many noble exploits, and defeating such powerful armies, and after gaining so many glorious victories, he should appear to have gained a bloody victory over the remnants who had rallied after their flight. He determined, in consequence of this, to endure the pride and exultation of his enemies, until some portion of his veteran legion should arrive in the second embarkation.

32

Scipio, after a short stay before the intrenchments, as if in contempt of Caesar, withdrew slowly to his camp: and having called the soldiers together, enlarged upon the terror and despair of the enemy, when encouraging his men, he assured them of a complete victory in

a short time. Caesar made his soldiers again return to the works, and under pretense of fortifying his camp, inured the new levies to labor and fatigue. Meantime the Numidians and Getulians deserted daily from Scipio's camp. Part returned home; part came over to Caesar, because they understood he was related to C. Marius, from whom their ancestors had received considerable favors. Of these he selected some of distinguished rank, and sent them home, with letters to their countrymen, exhorting them to levy troops for their own defense, and not to listen to the suggestions of his enemies.

33

While these things were passing near Ruspina, deputies from Acilla, a free town, and all the neighboring towns, arrived in Caesar's camp, and promised "to be ready to execute Caesar's commands, and to do so withal, and that they only begged and requested of him to give them garrisons, that they might do so in safety and without danger to themselves, that they would furnish them with corn and whatever supplies they had, to secure the common safety. Caesar readily complied with their demands, and having assigned a garrison, sent C. Messius, who had been aedile, to command in Acilla. Upon intelligence of this, Considius Longus, who was at Adrumetum with two legions and seven hundred horse, leaving a garrison in that city, hastened to Acilla at the head of eight cohorts: but Messius, having accomplished his march with great expedition, arrived there before him. When Considius, therefore, approached, and found Caesar's garrison in possession of the town, not daring to make any attempt, he returned again to Adrumetum. But some days after, Labienus having sent him a reinforcement of horse, he began to besiege the town.

34

Much about the same time, C. Sallustius Crispus, who, as we have seen, had been sent a few days before to Cercina with a fleet, arrived in that island. Upon his arrival, C. Decimus the quaestor, who, with a strong party of his own domestics, had charge of the magazines erected there, went on board a small vessel and fled. Sallustius meanwhile was well received by the Cercinates, and finding great store of corn in the island, loaded all the ships then in the port, whose number was very considerable, and dispatched them to Caesar's camp. At the same time Allienus, the proconsul, put on board of the transports at Lilybaeum the thirteenth and fourteenth legions, with eight hundred Gallic horse and a thousand archers and slingers, and sent the second embarkation to Africa, to Caesar. This fleet meeting with a favorable wind, arrived in four days at Ruspina, where Caesar had his camp. Thus he experienced a double pleasure on this occasion, receiving at one and the same time, both a supply of provisions and a reinforcement of troops, which animated the soldiers, and delivered them from the apprehensions of want. Having landed the legions and cavalry, he allowed them some time to recover from the fatigue and sickness of their voyage, and then distributed them into the forts, and along the works.

35

Scipio and the other generals were greatly surprised at this conduct, and could not conceive why Caesar, who had always been forward and active in war, should all of a sudden change his measures; which they therefore suspected must proceed from some very powerful reasons. Uneasy and disturbed to see him so patient, they made choice of two Getulians, on whose fidelity they thought they could

rely; and promising them great rewards, sent them, under the name of deserters, to get intelligence of Caesar's designs. When they were brought before him, they begged they might have leave to speak without personal danger, which being granted, "It is now a long time, great general," said they, "since many of us Getulians, clients of C. Marius, and almost all Roman citizens of the fourth and sixth legions, have wished for an opportunity to come over to you; but have hitherto been prevented by the guards of Numidian horse, from doing it without great risk. Now we gladly embrace the occasion, being sent by Scipio under the name of deserters, to discover what ditches and traps you have prepared for his elephants, how you intended to oppose these animals, and what dispositions you are making for battle." They were praised by Caesar, and liberally rewarded, and sent to the other deserters. We had soon a proof of the truth of what they had advanced; for the next day a great many soldiers of these legions, mentioned by the Getulians, deserted to Caesar's camp.

36

While affairs were in this posture at Ruspina, M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, was daily enlisting freed-men, Africans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear arms, and sending them without intermission to Scipio's camp. Meanwhile deputies from the town of Tisdra came to Caesar to inform him, that some Italian merchants had brought three hundred thousand bushels of corn into that city, and to demand a garrison as well for their own defense as to secure the corn. Caesar thanked the deputies, promised to send the garrison they desired, and having encouraged them, sent them back to their fellow-citizens. Meantime P. Silius entered Numidia with his troops,

and took by storm a castle situated on a mountain, where Juba had laid up a great quantity of provisions, and other things necessary for carrying on the war.

37

Caesar, having increased his forces with two veteran legions, and all the cavalry and light-armed troops that had arrived in the second embarkation, detached six transports to Lilybaeum, to bring over the rest of the army. He himself on the sixth day before the calends of February, ordering the scouts and lictors to attend him at six in the evening, drew out all the legions at midnight, and directed his march toward Ruspina, where he had a garrison, and which had first declared in his favor, no one knowing or having the least suspicion of his design. Thence he continued his route, by the left of the camp, along the sea, and passed a little declivity, which opened into a fine plain, extending fifteen miles, and bordering upon a chain of mountains of moderate height, that formed a kind of theater. In this ridge were some hills that rose higher than the rest, on which forts and watchtowers had formerly been erected, and at the furthest of which, Scipio's guards and out-posts were stationed.

38

After Caesar gained the ridge, which I have just mentioned, and began to raise redoubts upon the several eminences (which he executed in less than half an hour), and when he was not very far from the last, which bordered on the enemy's camp, and where, as we have said, Scipio had his out-guard of Numidians, he stopped a moment; and having taken a view of the ground, and posted his cavalry in the most commodious situation, he ordered the legions to throw up an intrenchment along the middle of the ridge, from the

place at which he was arrived to that whence he set out. When Scipio and Labienus observed this, they drew all their cavalry out of the camp, formed them in order of battle, and advancing about a mile, posted their infantry by way of a second line, somewhat less than half a mile from their camp.

39

Caesar was unmoved by the appearance of the enemy's forces, and encouraged his men to go on with the work. But when he perceived that they were within fifteen hundred paces of the intrenchment, and saw that the enemy were coming nearer to interrupt and disturb the soldiers and oblige him to draw off the legions from the work, he ordered a squadron of Spanish cavalry, supported by some light-armed infantry, to attack the Numidian guard upon the nearest eminence, and drive them from that post. They accordingly, advancing rapidly, attacked the Numidian cavalry: they took some of them alive, severely wounded several in their flight, and made themselves masters of the place. This being observed by Labienus, he wheeled off almost the whole right wing of the horse, that he might the more effectually succor the fugitives. Caesar waited till he was at a considerable distance from his own men, and then detached his left wing to intercept the enemy.

40

In the plain where this happened was a large villa, with four turrets, which prevented Labienus from seeing that he was intercepted by Caesar's cavalry. He had therefore no apprehension of the approach of Caesar's horse till he found himself charged in the rear; which struck such a sudden terror into the Numidian cavalry that they immediately betook themselves to flight. The Gauls and Germans

who stood their ground, being surrounded on all sides, were entirely cut off. This being perceived by Scipio's legions, who were drawn up in order of battle before the camp, they fled in the utmost terror and confusion. Scipio and his forces being driven from the plain and the hills, Caesar sounded a retreat, and ordered all the cavalry to retire behind the works. When the field was cleared, he could not forbear admiring the huge bodies of the Gauls and Germans, who had been partly induced by the authority of Labienus to follow him out of Gaul, and partly drawn over by promises and rewards. Some being made prisoners in the battle with Curio, and having their lives granted them, continued faithful out of gratitude. Their bodies, of surprising symmetry and size, lay scattered all over the plain.

41

Next day, Caesar drew all his forces together, and formed them in order of battle upon the plain. Scipio, discouraged by so unexpected a check, and the number of his wounded and slain, kept within his lines. Caesar, with his army in battle array, marched along the roots of the hills, and gradually approached his trenches. Caesar's legions were, by this time, not more than a mile from Uzita, a town possessed by Scipio, when the latter, fearing lest he should lose the town, whence he procured water and other conveniences for his army, resolved therefore to preserve it, at all hazards, and brought forth his whole army, and drew them up in four lines, forming the first of cavalry, supported by elephants with castles on their backs. Caesar believing that Scipio approached with the intention of giving battle, continued where he was posted, not far from the town. Scipio meanwhile, having the town in the center of his front, extended his two wings, where were his elephants, in full view of our army.

42

When Caesar had waited till sunset, without finding that Scipio stirred from his post, who seemed rather disposed to defend himself by his advantageous situation, than hazard a battle in the open field, he did not think proper to advance further that day, because the enemy had a strong garrison of Numidians in the town, which besides covered the center of their front: and he foresaw great difficulty in forming, at the same time, an attack upon the town, and opposing their right and left, with the advantage of the ground; especially as the soldiers had continued under arms and fasted since morning. Having therefore led back his troops to their camp, he resolved next day to extend his lines nearer the town.

43

Meantime Considius, who was besieging eight mercenary cohorts of Numidians and Getulians in Acilla, where P. Messius commanded, after continuing long before the place, and seeing all his works burned and destroyed by the enemy, upon the report of the late battle of the cavalry, set fire to his corn, destroyed his wine, oil, and other stores, which were necessary for the maintenance of his army; and abandoning the siege of Acilla, divided his forces with Scipio, and retired through the kingdom of Juba, to Adrumetum.

44

Meanwhile one of the transports, belonging to the second embarkation, which Allienus had sent from Sicily, in which were Q. Cominius, and L. Ticide, a Roman knight, being separated from the rest of the fleet, in a storm, and driven to Thapsus, was taken by Virgilius, and all the persons on board sent to Scipio. A three-banked galley likewise, belonging to the same fleet, being forced by the

winds to Aegimurum, was intercepted by the squadron under Varus and M. Octavius. In this vessel were some veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few new levies, whom Varus treated without insult, and sent under a guard to Scipio. When they came into his presence, and appeared before his tribunal: "I am satisfied," said he, "it is not by your own inclination, but at the instigation of your wicked general, that you impiously wage war on your fellow-citizens, and every man of worth. If, therefore, now that fortune has put you in our power, you will take this opportunity to unite with the good citizens, in the defense of the commonwealth, I am determined to give you life and money: therefore speak openly your sentiments."

45

Scipio having ended his speech, and expecting a thankful return to so gracious an offer, permitted them to reply; one of their number, a centurion of the fourteenth legion, thus addressed him: "Scipio," says he ("for I can not give you the appellation of general), I return you my hearty thanks for the good treatment you are willing to show to prisoners of war; and perhaps I might accept of your kindness were it not to be purchased at the expense of a horrible crime. What! shall I carry arms, and fight against Caesar, my general, under whom I have served as centurion; and against his victorious army, to whose renown I have for more than thirty-six years endeavored to contribute by my valor? It is what I will never do, and even advise you not to push the war any further. You know not what troops you have to deal with, nor the difference betwixt them and yours: of which, if you please, I will give you an indisputable instance. Do you pick out the best cohort you have in your army, and give me only ten of my comrades, who are now your prisoners, to engage them: you

shall see by the success, what you are to expect from your soldiers.”

46

When the centurion had courageously made this reply, Scipio, incensed at his boldness, and resenting the affront, made a sign to some of his officers to kill him on the spot, which was immediately put in execution. At the same time, ordering the other veteran soldiers to be separated from the new levies, “Carry away,” said he, “these men, contaminated by the pollution of crime, and pampered with the blood of their fellow-citizens.” Accordingly they were conducted without the rampart, and cruelly massacred. The new-raised soldiers were distributed among his legions, and Cominius and Ticida forbade to appear in his presence. Caesar, concerned for his misfortune, broke, with ignominy, the officers whose instructions were to secure the coast, and advance to a certain distance into the main sea, to protect and facilitate the approach of the transports, but who had neglected their duty on that important station.

47

About this time a most incredible accident befell Caesar’s army; for the Pleiades being set, about the second watch of the night, a terrible storm arose, attended by hail of an uncommon size. But what contributed to render this misfortune the greater was, that Caesar had not, like other generals, put his troops into winter quarters, but was every three or four days changing his camp, to gain ground on the enemy; which keeping the soldiers continually employed they were utterly unprovided with any conveniences to protect them from the inclemency of the weather. Besides, he had brought over his army from Sicily with such strictness, that neither officer nor soldier had been permitted to take their equipages or utensils with them, nor so

much as a vessel or a single slave; and so far had they been from acquiring or providing themselves with any thing in Africa, that, on account of the great scarcity of provisions, they had even consumed their former stores. Impoverished by these accidents, very few of them had tents; the rest had made themselves a kind of covering, either by spreading their clothes, or with mats and rushes. But these being soon penetrated by the storm and hail, the soldiers had no resource left, but wandered up and down the camp, covering their heads with their bucklers to shelter them from the violence of the weather. In a short time the whole camp was under water, the fires extinguished, and all their provisions washed away or spoiled. The same night the shafts of the javelins belonging to the fifth legion, of their own accord, took fire.

48

In the mean time, king Juba, having been informed of the cavalry actions with Scipio, and being earnestly solicited, by letters from that general, to come to his assistance, left Sabura at home with part of the army, to carry on the war against Sitius, and that he might add the weight of his authority to free Scipio's troops from the dread they had of Caesar, began his march, with three legions, eight hundred regular horse, a body of Numidian cavalry, great numbers of light-armed infantry, and thirty elephants. When he arrived he lodged himself, with those forces which I have described, in a separate camp, at no great distance from that of Scipio. (Great alarm had prevailed for some time previously in Caesar's camp, and the report of his approach had increased and produced a general suspense and expectation among the troops. But his arrival, and the appearance of his camp, soon dispelled all these apprehensions; and they despised

the king of Mauritania, now that he was present, as much as they had feared him when at a distance.) After this junction, any one might easily perceive that Scipio's courage and confidence were increased by the arrival of the king. For next day, drawing out all his own and the royal forces, with sixty elephants, he ranged them, in order of battle, with great ostentation advancing a little beyond his intrenchments, and, after a short stay, retreated to his camp.

49

Caesar, knowing that Scipio had received all the supplies he expected, and judging he would no longer decline coming to an engagement, began to advance along the ridge with his forces, extend his lines, secure them with redoubts, and possess himself of the eminences between him and Scipio. The enemy, confiding in their numbers, seized a neighboring hill, and thereby prevented the progress of our works. Labienus had formed the design of securing this post, and as it lay nearest his quarters, soon got thither.

50

There was a broad and deep valley, of rugged descent, broken with caves, which Caesar had to pass before he could come to the hill which he wished to occupy, and beyond which was a thick grove of old olives. Labienus, perceiving that Caesar must march this way, and having a perfect knowledge of the country, placed himself in ambush, with the light-armed foot and part of the cavalry. At the same time he disposed some horse behind the hills, that when he should fall unexpectedly upon Caesar's foot, they might suddenly advance from behind the mountain. And thus Caesar and his army being attacked in front and rear, surrounded with danger on all sides, and unable either to retreat or advance, would, he imagined, fall an

easy prey to his victorious troops. Caesar, who had no suspicion of the ambuscade, sent his cavalry before; and arriving at the place, Labienus's men, either forgetting or neglecting the orders of their general, or fearing to be trampled to death in the ditch by our cavalry, began to issue in small parties from the rock, and ascend the hill. Caesar's horse pursuing them, slew some, and took others prisoners; then making toward the hill drove thence Labienus's detachment and immediately took possession. Labienus, with a small party of horse, escaped with great difficulty by flight.

51

The cavalry having thus cleared the mountain, Caesar resolved to intrench himself there, and distributed the work to the legions. He then ordered two lines of communication to be drawn from the greater camp, across the plain on the side of Uzita, which stood between him and the enemy, and was garrisoned by a detachment of Scipio's army, and place them in such a manner as to meet at the right and left angles of the town. His design in this work was, that when he approached the town with his troops, and began to attack it, these lines might secure his flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from surrounding him, and compelling him to abandon the siege. It likewise gave his men more frequent opportunities of conversing with the enemy, and facilitated the means of desertion to such as favored his cause; many of whom had already come over, though not without great danger to themselves. He wanted also, by drawing nearer the enemy, to see if they really intended to come to an action, and in addition to all these reasons, that the place itself being very low, he might there sink some wells; whereas before he had a long and troublesome way to send for water. While the legions were

employed in these works, part of the army stood ready drawn up before the trenches, and had frequent skirmishes with the Numidian horse and light-armed foot

52

A little before evening, when Caesar was drawing off his legions from the works, Juba, Scipio, and Labienus, at the head of all their horse and light-armed foot, fell furiously upon his cavalry; who, being overwhelmed by the sudden and general attack of so great a multitude, were forced to give ground a little. But the event was very different from what the enemy expected; for Caesar, leading back his legions to the assistance of his cavalry, they immediately rallied, turned upon the Numidians, and charging them vigorously while they were dispersed and disordered with the pursuit, drove them with great loss to the king's camp, and slew several of them. And had not night intervened, and the dust raised by the wind obstructed the prospect, Juba and Labienus would both have fallen into Caesar's hands, and their whole cavalry and light-armed infantry have been cut off. Meanwhile Scipio's men, of the fourth and sixth legions, left him in crowds, some deserting to Caesar's camp, others fleeing to such places as were most convenient for them. Curio's horse likewise, distrusting Scipio and his troops, followed the same counsel.

53

While these things were being carried on by Caesar and his opponents around Uzita, two legions, the ninth and tenth, sailing in transports from Sicily, when they came before Ruspina, observing Caesar's ships that lay at anchor about Thapsus, and fearing it might be the enemy's fleet stationed there to intercept them, imprudently

stood out to sea; and after being long tossed by the winds, and harassed by thirst and famine, at last arrived at Caesar's camp.

54

Soon after these legions were landed, Caesar, calling to mind their former licentious behaviour in Italy, and the rapines of some of their officers, seized the slight pretext furnished by C. Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, who, when he set out for Sicily, filled a ship entirely with his own slaves and horses, without taking on board one single soldier. Wherefore, summoning all the military tribunes and centurions to appear before his tribunal next day, he addressed them in these terms, "I could have wished that those, whose insolence and former licentious character have given me cause of complaint, had been capable of amendment, and of making a good use of my mildness, patience, and moderation. But since they know not how to confine themselves within due bounds, I intend to make an example of them, according to the law of arms, in order that others may be taught a better conduct. Because you, C. Avienus, when you were in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the Roman people to revolt from the republic and have been guilty of rapines and plunders in the municipal towns; and because you have never been of any real service, either to the commonwealth or to your general, and in lieu of soldiers, have crowded the transports with your slaves and equipage; so that, through your fault, the republic is in want of soldiers, who at this time are not only useful, but necessary; for all these causes, I break you with ignominy, and order you to leave Africa this very day. In like manner I break you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved yourself as a seditious officer, and as a bad citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusinus, have attained the

rank of centurions through my indulgence, and not through your own merit; and since you have been invested with that rank, have neither shown bravery in war, nor good conduct in peace, and have been more zealous in raising seditions, and exciting the soldiers against your general than in observing forbearance and moderation. I therefore think you unworthy of continuing centurions in my army: I break you, and order you to quit Africa as soon as possible.” Having concluded this speech, he delivered them over to some centurions, with orders to confine them separately on board a ship, allowing each of them a single slave to wait on him.

55

Meantime the Getulian deserters, whom Caesar had sent home with letters and instructions, as we related above, arrived among their countrymen: who, partly swayed by their authority, partly by the name and reputation of Caesar, revolted from Juba; and speedily and unanimously taking up arms, scrupled not to act in opposition to their king. Juba, having thus three wars to sustain, was compelled to detach six cohorts from the army destined to act against Caesar, and send them to defend the frontiers of his kingdom against the Getulians.

56

Caesar, having finished his lines of communication, and pushed them so near the town, as to be just out of reach of dart, intrenched himself there. He caused warlike engines in great numbers to be placed in the front of his works, wherewith he played perpetually against the town; and to increase the enemy’s apprehensions, drew five legions out of his other camp. When this opportunity was presented, several persons of eminence and distinction earnestly requested an interview

with their friends, and held frequent conferences, which Caesar foresaw would turn to his advantage. For the chief officers of the Getulian horse, with other illustrious men of that nation (whose fathers had served under C. Marius, and from his bounty obtained considerable estates in their country, but after Sylla's victory had been made tributaries to king Hiempsal), taking advantage of the night, when the fires were lighted, came over to Caesar's camp near Uzita, with their horses and servants, to the number of about a thousand.

57

When Scipio and his party learned this, and were much annoyed at the disaster, they perceived, much about the same time, M. Aquinius in discourse with C. Saserna. Scipio sent him word that he did not do well to correspond with the enemy. Aquinius, however, paid no attention to this reprimand, but pursued his discourse. Soon after, one of Juba's guards came to him and told him, in the hearing of Saserna, "The king forbids you to continue this conversation." He, being terrified by this order, immediately retired, and obeyed the command of the king. One can not wonder enough at this step in a Roman citizen, who had already attained to considerable honors in the commonwealth; that though neither banished his country, nor stripped of his possessions, he should pay a more ready obedience to the orders of a foreign prince than those of Scipio; and choose rather to behold the destruction of his party than return into the bosom of his country. And still greater insolence was shown by Juba, not to M. Aquinius, a man of no family, and an inconsiderable senator, but even to Scipio himself, a man of illustrious birth, distinguished honors, and high dignity in the state. For as Scipio, before the king's

arrival, always wore a purple coat of mail, Juba is reported to have told him, that he ought not to wear the same habit as he did. Accordingly, Scipio changed his purple robe for a white one, submitting to Juba, a most haughty and insolent monarch.

58

Next day they drew out all their forces from both camps; and forming them on an eminence not far from Caesar's camp, continued thus in order of battle. Caesar likewise drew out his men, and disposed them in battle array before his lines; not doubting but the enemy, who exceeded him in number of troops, and had been so considerably reinforced by the arrival of king Juba, would advance to attack him. Wherefore, having ridden through the ranks, encouraged his men, and gave them the signal of battle, he stayed, expecting the enemy's charge. For he did not think it advisable to remove far from his lines: because the enemy having a strong garrison in Uzita, which was opposite to his right wing, he could not advance beyond that place without exposing his flank to a sally from the town. He was also deterred by the following reason, because the ground before Scipio's army was very rough, and he thought it likely to disorder his men in the charge.

59

And I think that I ought not to omit to describe the order of battle of both armies. Scipio drew up his troops in the following manner: he posted his own legions and those of Juba in the front; behind them the Numidians, as a body of reserve: but in so very thin ranks, and so far extended in length, that to see them at a distance you would have taken the main body for a simple line of legionaries, which was doubled only upon the wings. He placed elephants at equal distances

on the right and left, and supported them by the light-armed troops and auxiliary Numidians. All the regular cavalry were on the right; for the left was covered by the town of Uzita, nor had the cavalry room to extend themselves on that side. Accordingly, he stationed the Numidian horse, with an incredible multitude of light-armed foot, about a thousand paces from his right, toward the foot of a mountain, considerably removed from his own and the enemy's troops. He did so with this intention, that, when the two armies should engage, his cavalry at the commencement of the action should take a longer sweep, inclose Caesar's army and throw them into confusion by their darts. Such was Scipio's disposition.

60

Caesar's order of battle, to describe it from left to right, was arranged in the following manner: the ninth and eighth legions formed the left wing; the thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and twenty-sixth, the main body; and the thirtieth and twenty-eighth the right. His second line on the right consisted partly of the cohorts of those legions we have already mentioned, partly of the new levies. His third line was posted to the left, extending as far as the middle legion of the main body, and so disposed, that the left wing formed a triple order of battle. The reason of this disposition was, because his right wing being defended by the works, it behooved him to make his left stronger, that they might be a match for the numerous cavalry of the enemy; for which reason he had placed all his horse there, intermixed with light-armed foot; and as he could not rely much upon them, had detached the fifth legion to sustain them. He placed archers up and down the field, but principally in the two wings.

61

The two armies thus facing one another in order of battle, with a space of no more than three hundred paces between, continued so posted from morning till night without fighting, of which perhaps there was never an instance before. But when Caesar began to retreat within his lines, suddenly all the Numidian and Getulian horse without bridles, who were posted behind the enemy's army, made a motion to the right, and began to approach Caesar's camp on the mountain; while the regular cavalry under Labienus continued in their post to keep our legions in check. Upon this, part of Caesar's cavalry, with the light-armed foot, advancing hastily, and without orders, against the Getulians, and venturing to pass the morass, found themselves unable to deal with the superior multitude of the enemy; and being abandoned by the light-armed troops, were forced to retreat in great disorder, after the loss of one trooper, twenty-six light-armed foot, and many of their horses wounded. Scipio, overjoyed at this success, returned toward night to his camp. But fortune determined not to give such unalloyed joy to those engaged in war, for the day after, a party of horse, sent by Caesar to Leptis in quest of provisions, falling in unexpectedly with some Numidian and Getulian stragglers, killed or made prisoners about a hundred of them. Caesar, meanwhile, omitted not every day to draw out his men and labor at the works; carrying a ditch and rampart quite across the plain, to prevent the incursions of the enemy. Scipio likewise drew lines opposite to Caesar's, and used great exertions lest Caesar should cut off his communication with the mountain. Thus both generals were busied about their intrenchments, yet a day seldom passed, without some skirmish between the cavalry.

In the mean time, Varus, upon notice that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed from Sicily, speedily equipped the fleet he had brought to winter at Utica; and manning it with Getulian rowers and mariners, went out a cruising and came before Adrumetum with fifty-five ships. Caesar, ignorant of his arrival, sent L. Cispus, with a squadron of twenty-seven sail toward Thapsus, to anchor there for the security of his convoys; and likewise dispatched Q. Aquila to Adrumetum, with thirteen galleys, upon the same errand. Cispus soon reached the station appointed to him: but Aquila being attacked by a storm could not double the cape, which obliged him to put into a creek at some distance, that afforded convenient shelter. The rest of the fleet which remained at sea before Leptis, where the mariners having landed and wandered here and there upon the shore, some having gone into the town for the purpose of purchasing provisions, was left quite defenseless. Varus, having notice of this from a deserter, and resolving to take advantage of the enemy's negligence, left Adrumetum in Cothon at the commencement of the second watch, and arriving early next morning with his whole fleet before Leptis, burned all the transports that were out at sea, and took without opposition two five-benched galleys, in which were none to defend them.

63

Caesar had an account brought him of this unlucky accident, as he was inspecting the works of his camp. Whereupon he immediately took horse, and leaving every thing else, went full speed to Leptis, which was but two leagues distant, and going on board a brigantine, ordered all the ships to follow him. He soon came up with Aquila, whom he found dismayed and terrified at the number of ships he had

to oppose; and continuing his course, began to pursue the enemy's fleet. Meantime Varus, astonished at Caesar's boldness and dispatch, tacked about with his whole fleet, and made the best of his way for Adrumetum. But Caesar, after four miles' sail, recovered one of his galleys, with the crew and a hundred and thirty of the enemy's men left to guard her; and took a three benched galley belonging to the enemy which had fallen astern during the engagement, with all the soldiers and mariners on board. The rest of the fleet doubled the cape, and made the port of Adrumetum in Cothon. Caesar could not double the cape with the same wind, but keeping the sea at anchor all night, appeared early next morning before Adrumetum. He set fire to all the transports without Cothon, and took what galleys he found there, or forced them into the harbor; and having waited some time to offer the enemy battle, returned again to his camp.

64

On board the ship he had taken was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius, who had served in Spain under Afranius, the same who had prosecuted the war against him in Spain, and who, instead of acknowledging the conqueror's generosity, in granting him his liberty, had joined Pompey in Greece; and after the battle of Pharsalia, had gone into Africa, to Varus, there to continue in the service of the same cause. Caesar, to punish his perfidy and breach of oath, gave immediate orders for his execution. But he pardoned P. Vestrius, because his brother had paid his ransom at Rome, and because he himself proved, that being taken in Nasidius's fleet, and condemned to die, he had been saved by the kindness of Varus, since which no opportunity had offered of making his escape.

65

It is the custom of the people of Africa to deposit their corn privately in vaults, under ground, to secure it in time of war, and guard it from the sudden incursions of an enemy. Caesar, having intelligence of this from a spy, drew out two legions, with a party of cavalry, at midnight, and sent them about ten miles off; whence they returned, loaded with corn to the camp. Labienus, being informed of it, marched about seven miles, through the mountains Caesar had passed the day before, and there encamped with two legions; where expecting that Caesar would often come the same way in quest of corn, he daily lay in ambush with a great body of horse and light-armed foot.

66

Caesar, being informed of the ambuscade of Labienus by deserters, delayed there a few days, till the enemy, by repeating the practice often, had abated a little of their circumspection. Then suddenly, one morning ordering eight veteran legions with part of the cavalry to follow him by the Decuman gate, he sent forward the rest of the cavalry; who, coming suddenly upon the enemy's light-armed foot, that lay in ambush among the valleys, slew about five hundred, and put the rest to flight. Meantime Labienus advanced, with all his cavalry, to support the fugitives, and was on the point of overpowering our small party with his numbers, when suddenly Caesar appeared with the legions, in order of battle. This sight checked the ardor of Labienus, who thought proper to sound a retreat. The day after, Juba ordered all the Numidians who had deserted their post and fled to their camp to be crucified.

67

Meanwhile Caesar, being distressed by want of corn, recalled all his

forces to the camp; and having left garrisons at Leptis, Ruspina, and Acilla, ordered Cispus and Aquila to blockade with their fleets, the one Adrumetum, the other Thapsus, and setting fire to his camp at Uzita, he set out, in order of battle, at the fourth watch, disposed his baggage on the left, and came to Agar, which had been often vigorously attacked by the Getulians, and as valiantly defended by the inhabitants. There encamping in the plain before the town, he went with part of his army round the country in quest of provisions; and having found a large store of barley, oil, wine, and figs, with a small quantity of wheat, after allowing the troops some time to refresh themselves, he returned to his camp. Scipio meanwhile hearing of Caesar's departure, followed him along the hills, with all his forces, and posted himself about six miles off; in three different camps.

68

The town of Zeta, lying on Scipio's side of the country, was not above ten miles from his camp, but might be about eighteen from that of Caesar. Scipio had sent two legions thither to forage; which Caesar having intelligence of from a deserter, removed his camp from the plain to a hill, for the greater security; and leaving a garrison there, marched at three in the morning with the rest of his forces, passed the enemy's camp, and possessed himself of the town. He found that Scipio's legions were gone further into the country to forage: against whom, setting out immediately, he found that the whole army had come up to their assistance, which obliged him to give over the pursuit. He took, on this occasion, C. Mutius Reginus, a Roman knight, Scipio's intimate friend, and governor of the town; also P. Atrius, a Roman knight, of the province of Utica, with

twenty-two camels, belonging to king Juba. Then leaving a garrison in the place, under the command of Oppius, his lieutenant, he returned to his own camp.

69

As he drew near Scipio's camp, by which he was obliged to pass, Labienus and Afranius, who lay in ambuscade among the nearest hills, with all their cavalry and light-armed infantry, started up and attacked his rear. When Caesar perceived this, he detached his cavalry to receive their charge, ordered the legions to throw all their baggage into a heap, and face about upon the enemy. No sooner was this order executed than, upon the first charge of the legions, the enemy's horse and light-armed foot began to give way, and were with incredible ease driven from the higher ground. But when Caesar, supposing them sufficiently deterred from any further attempts, began to pursue his march, they again issued from the hills; and the Numidians, with the light armed infantry, who are wonderfully nimble, and accustom themselves to fight intermixed with the horse, with whom they keep an equal pace, either in advancing or retiring, fell a second time upon our foot. As they repeated this often, pressing upon our troops when we marched, and retiring when we endeavored to engage, always keeping at a certain distance, and with singular care avoiding a close fight, and considering it enough to wound us with their darts, Caesar plainly saw that their whole aim was to oblige him to encamp in that place, where no water was to be had; that his soldiers, who had tasted nothing from three in the morning till four in the afternoon, might perish with hunger, and the cattle with thirst.

70

When sunset now approached, and Caesar found he had not gained a hundred paces in four hours, and that by keeping his cavalry in the rear he lost many horse, he ordered the legions to fall behind, and close the march. Proceeding thus with a slow and gentle pace, he found the legions fitter to sustain the enemy's charge. Meantime the Numidian horse, wheeling round the hills, to the right and left, threatened to inclose Caesar's forces with their numbers, while part continued to harass his rear: and if but three or four veteran soldiers faced about, and darted their javelins at the enemy, no less than two thousand of them would tale to flight: but suddenly rallying, returned to the fight, and charged the legionaries with their darts. Thus Caesar, at one time marching forward, at another halting, and going on but slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven that evening, having only ten men wounded. Labienus too retreated to his camp, after having thoroughly fatigued his troops with the pursuit: in which, besides a great number wounded, his loss amounted to about three hundred men. And Scipio withdrew his legions and elephants, whom, for the greater terror, he had ranged before his camp within view of Caesar's army.

71

Caesar, to meet enemies of this sort, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, not like a general of a veteran army which had been victorious in so many battles, but like a fencing master training up his gladiators, with what foot they must advance or retire; when they were to oppose and make good their ground; when to counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner to launch their javelins. For the enemy's light-armed troops gave wonderful trouble and annoyance to our army; because they not only deterred the cavalry

from the encounter, by killing their horses with their javelins, but likewise wearied out the legionary soldiers by their swiftness: for as often as these heavy-armed troops advanced to attack them, they evaded the danger by a quick retreat.

72

Caesar was rendered very anxious by these occurrences; because as often as he engaged with his cavalry, without being supported by the infantry, he found himself by no means a match for the enemy's horse, supported by their light-armed foot: and as he had no experience of the strength of their legions, he foresaw still greater difficulties when these should be united, as the shock must then be overwhelming. In addition to this, the number and size of the elephants greatly increased the terror of the soldiers; for which, however, he found a remedy, in causing some of those animals to be brought over from Italy, that his men might be accustomed to the sight of them, know their strength and courage, and in what part of the body they were most vulnerable. For as the elephants are covered with trappings and ornaments, it was necessary to inform them what parts of the body remained naked, that they might direct their darts thither. It was likewise needful to familiarize his horses to the cry, smell, and figure of these animals; in all of which he succeeded to a wonder; for the soldiers quickly came to touch them with their hands, and to be sensible of their tardiness; and the cavalry attacked them with blunted darts, and, by degrees, brought their horses to endure their presence.

73

For these reasons already mentioned, Caesar was very anxious, and proceeded with more slowness and circumspection than usual,

abating considerably in his wonted expedition and celerity. Nor ought we to wonder; for in Gaul he had under him troops accustomed to fight in a champaign country, against an open undesigning enemy, who despised artifice, and valued themselves only on their bravery. But now he was to habituate his soldiers to the arts and contrivances of a crafty enemy, and teach them what to pursue, and what to avoid. The sooner therefore to instruct them in these matters, he took care not to confine his legions to one place, but under pretense of foraging, engaged them in frequent marches, and counter-marches; because he thought that the enemy's troops would not lose his track. Three days after, he drew up his forces with great skill, and marching past Scipio's camp, waited for him in an open plain; but seeing that he still declined a battle, he retreated to his camp a little before evening.

74

Meantime ambassadors arrived from the town of Vacca, bordering upon Zeta, of which we have observed Caesar had possessed himself. They requested and entreated that he would send them a garrison, promising to furnish many of the necessaries of war. At the same time, by the will of the gods, and their kindness to Caesar, a deserter informed him, that Juba had, by a quick march, before Caesar's troops could arrive, reached the town and surrounded it, and after taking possession of it, massacred the inhabitants, and abandoned the place itself to the plunder of his soldiers.

75

Caesar, having reviewed his army the twelfth day before the calends of April, advanced next day, with all his forces, five miles beyond his camp, and remained a considerable time in order of battle, two miles

from Scipio's. When he saw distinctly that the enemy, though frequently and for a long time challenged to a battle, declined it, he led back his troops. Next day he decamped, and directed his march toward Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians, and a magazine of corn. Labienus being informed of this motion, began to harass his rear with the cavalry and light-armed troops: and having made himself master of part of the baggage, was encouraged to attack the legions themselves, believing they would fall an easy prey, under the load and encumbrance of a march. However, this circumstance had not escaped Caesar's attention, for he had ordered three hundred men out of each legion to hold themselves in readiness for action. These being sent against Labienus, he was so terrified at their approach, that he shamefully took to flight, great numbers of his men being killed or wounded. The legionaries returned to their standards, and pursued their march. Labienus continued to follow us at a distance along the summit of the mountains on our right.

76

Caesar, arriving before Sarsura, took it in presence of the enemy, who durst not advance to its relief; and put to the sword the garrison which had been left there by Scipio, under the command of P. Cornelius, one of Scipio's veterans, who, after a vigorous defense, was surrounded slain. Having given all the corn in the place to the army, he marched next day to Tisdra, where Considius was, with a strong garrison and his cohort of gladiators. Caesar, having taken a view of the town, and being deterred from besieging it by want of corn, set out immediately, and after a march of four miles, encamped near a river. He marched from it on the fourth day, and then returned to his former camp at Agar. Scipio did the same, and retreated to his

old quarters.

77

Meantime the inhabitants of Thabena, a nation situated on the extreme confines of Juba's kingdom, along the seacoast, and who had been accustomed to live in subjection to that monarch, having massacred the garrison left there by the king, sent deputies to Caesar to inform him of what they had done, and to beg he would take under his protection a city which deserved so well of the Roman people. Caesar, approving their conduct, sent M. Crispus the tribune, with a cohort, a party of archers, and a great number of engines of war, to charge himself with the defense of Thabena. At the same time the legionary soldiers, who, either on account of sickness or for other reasons, had not been able to come over into Africa with the rest, to the number of four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers, reached Caesar by one embarkation. With these and his former troops, he advanced into a plain eight miles distant from his own camp, and four from that of Scipio, where he awaited the enemy in order of battle.

78

There was a town below Scipio's camp, of the name of Tegea, where he had a garrison of four hundred horse. These he drew up on the right and left of the town; and bringing forth his legions, formed them in order of battle upon a hill somewhat lower than his camp, and which was about a thousand paces distant from it. After he had continued a considerable time in one place, without offering to make any attempt, Caesar sent some squadrons of horse, supported by his light-armed infantry, archers, and slingers, to charge the enemy's cavalry, who were on duty before the town. After Caesar's troops

advanced and came to the charge with their horses at a gallop, Placidius began to extend his front, that he might at once surround us and give us a warm reception. Upon this Caesar detached three hundred legionaries to our assistance, while at the same time Labienus was continually sending fresh reinforcements, to replace those that were wounded or fatigued. Our cavalry, who were only four hundred in number, not being able to sustain the charge of four thousand, and being besides greatly harassed by the light-armed Numidians, began at last to give ground: which Caesar observing, detached the other wing to their assistance: who, joining those that were like to be overpowered, fell in a body upon the enemy, put them to flight, slew or wounded great numbers, pursued them three miles quite to the mountains, and then returned to their own men. Caesar continued in order of battle till four in the afternoon, and then retreated to his camp without the loss of a man. In this action Placidius received a dangerous wound in the head, and had many of his best officers either killed or wounded.

79

After he found that he could not by any means induce the enemy to come down to the plain and make trial of the legions, and that he could not encamp nearer them for want of water, in consideration of which alone, and not from any confidence in their numbers, the Africans had dared to despise him; he decamped the day before the nones of April at midnight, marched sixteen miles beyond Agar to Thapsus, where Virgilius commanded with a strong garrison, and there fixed his camp, and began to surround the town the very day on which he arrived, and raised redoubts in proper places, as well for his own security, as to prevent any succors from entering the town. In

the mean time, Scipio, on learning Caesar's designs, was reduced to the necessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of abandoning Virgilius and the Thapsitani, who had all along remained firm to his party; and therefore, following Caesar without delay, he posted himself in two camps eight miles from Thapsus.

80

Now there were some salt-pits, between which and the sea was a narrow pass of about fifteen hundred paces, by which Scipio endeavored to penetrate and carry succors to the inhabitants of Thapsus. But Caesar anticipating that this might happen, had the day before raised a very strong fort at the entrance of it, in which he left a triple garrison; and encamping with the rest of his troops in the form of a half moon, carried his works round the town. Scipio, disappointed in his design, passed the day and night following a little above the morass; but early next morning advanced within a small distance of the last mentioned camp and fort, where he began to intrench himself about fifteen hundred paces from the sea. Caesar being informed of this, drew off his men from the works; and leaving Asprenas the proconsul, with two legions, at the camp, marched all the rest of his forces with the utmost expedition to that place. He left part of the fleet before Thapsus, and ordered the rest to make as near the shore as possible toward the enemy's rear, observing the signal he should give them, upon which they were to raise a sudden shout, that the enemy, alarmed and disturbed by the noise behind them, might be forced to face about.

81

When Caesar came to the place, he found Scipio's army in order of battle before the intrenchments, the elephants posted on the right and

left wings, and part of the soldiers busily employed in fortifying the camp. Upon sight of this disposition, he drew up his army in three lines, placed the tenth and second legions on the right wing, the eighth and ninth on the left, five legions in the center, covered his flanks with five cohorts, posted opposite the elephants, disposed the archers and slingers in the two wings, and intermingled the light-armed troops with his cavalry. He himself on foot went from rank to rank, to rouse the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their former victories, and animating them by his kind expressions. He exhorted the new levies who had never yet been in battle to emulate the bravery of the veterans, and endeavor by a victory to attain the same degree of fame, glory, and renown.

82

As he ran from rank to rank, he observed the enemy about the camp very uneasy, hurrying from place to place, at one time retiring behind the rampart, another coming out again in great tumult and confusion. As many others in the army began to observe this, his lieutenants and volunteers begged him to give the signal for battle, as the immortal gods promised him a decisive victory. While he hesitated and strove to repress their eagerness and desires, exclaiming that it was not his wish to commence the battle by a sudden sally, at the same time keeping back his army, on a sudden a trumpeter in the right wing, without Caesar's leave, but compelled by the soldiers, sounded a charge. Upon this all the cohorts began to rush toward the enemy, in spite of the endeavors of the centurions, who strove to restrain them by force, lest they should charge withal the general's order, but to no purpose.

83

Caesar perceiving that the ardor of his soldiers would admit of no restraint, giving “good fortune” for the word, spurred on his horse, and charged the enemy’s front. On the right wing the archers and slingers poured their eager javelins without intermission upon the elephants, and by the noise of their slings and stones, so terrified these animals, that turning upon their own men, they trod them down in heaps, and rushed through the half-finished gates of the camp. At the same time the Mauritanian horse, who were in the same wing with the elephants, seeing themselves deprived of their assistance, betook themselves to flight. Whereupon the legions wheeling round the elephants, soon possessed themselves of the enemy’s intrenchments, and some few that made great resistance being slain, the rest fled with all expedition to the camp they had quitted the day before.

84

And here we must not omit to notice the bravery of a veteran soldier of the fifth legion. For when an elephant which had been wounded in the left wing, and, roused to fury by the pain, ran against an unarmed sutler, threw him under his feet, and kneeling on him with his whole weight, and brandishing his uplifted trunk, with hideous cries, crushed him to death, the soldier could not refrain from attacking the animal. The elephant, seeing him advance with his javelin in his hand, quitted the dead body of the sutler, and seizing him with his trunk, wheeled him round in the air. But he, amid all the danger, preserving his presence of mind, ceased not with his sword to strike at the elephant’s trunk, which enclasped him, and the animal, at last overcome with the pain, quitted the soldier, and fled to the rest with hideous cries,

Meanwhile the garrison of Thapsus, either designing to assist their friends, or abandoning the town to seek safety by flight, sallied out by the gate next the sea, and wading navel deep in the water; endeavored to reach the land. But the servants and attendants of the camp, attacking them with darts and stones, obliged them to return to the town. Scipio's forces meanwhile being beaten, and his men fleeing on all sides, the legions instantly began the pursuit, that they might have no time to rally. When they arrived at the camp to which they fled, and where, having repaired it, they hoped to defend themselves they began to think of choosing a commander, to whose authority and orders they might submit; but finding none on whom they could rely, they threw down their arms, and fled to the king's quarter. Finding this, on their arrival, occupied by Caesar's forces, they retired to a hill, where, despairing of safety, they cast down their arms, and saluted them in a military manner. But this stood them in little stead, for the veterans, transported with rage and anger, not only could not be induced to spare the enemy, but even killed or wounded several citizens of distinction in their own army, whom they upbraided as authors of the war. Of this number was Tullius Rufus the quaestor, whom a soldier designedly ran through with a javelin; and Pompeius Rufus, who was wounded with a sword in the arm, and would doubtless have been slain, had he not speedily fled to Caesar for protection. This made several Roman knights and senators retire from the battle, lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory assumed an unbounded license, should be induced by the hopes of impunity to wreck their fury on them likewise. In short all Scipio's soldiers, though they implored the protection of Caesar, were in the very sight of that general, and in spite of his entreaties to his men to

spare them, without exception put to the sword.

86

Caesar, having made himself master of the enemy's three camps, killed ten thousand, and putting the rest to flight, retreated to his own quarters with the loss of not more than fifty men and a few wounded. In his way he appeared before the town of Thapsus, and ranged all the elephants he had taken in the battle, amounting to sixty-four, with their ornaments, trappings, and castles, in full view of the place. This he did in hopes that possibly Virgilius and those that were besieged with him might give over the idea of resistance on learning the defeat of their friends. He even called and invited him to submit, reminding him of his clemency and mildness; but no answer being given, he retired from before the town. Next day, after returning thanks to the gods, he assembled his army before Thapsus, praised his soldiers in presence of the inhabitants, rewarded the victorious, and from his tribunal extended his bounty to every one, according to their merit and services. Setting out thence immediately he left the proconsul C. Rebellius, with three legions, to continue the siege, and sent Cn. Domitius with two to invest Tisdra, where Considius commanded. Then ordering M. Messala to go before with the cavalry, he began his march to Utica.

87

Scipio's cavalry, who had escaped out of the battle, taking the road to Utica, arrived at Parada; but being refused admittance by the inhabitants, who heard of Caesar's victory, they forced the gates, lighted a great fire in the middle of the forum, and threw all the inhabitants into it, without distinction of age or sex, with their effects; avenging in this manner, by an unheard of cruelty, the affront

they had received. Thence they marched directly to Utica. M. Cato, some time before, distrusting the inhabitants of that city, on account of the privileges granted them by the Julian law, had disarmed and expelled the populace, obliging them to dwell without the Warlike gate, in a small camp surrounded by a slight intrenchment, around which he had planted guards, while at the same time he put the senators under arrest. The cavalry attacked their camp, knowing them to be favorers of Caesar, and intending to wipe out by their destruction, the disgrace of their own defeat. But the people, animated by Caesar's victory, repulsed them with stones and clubs. They therefore threw themselves into the town, killed many of the inhabitants, and pillaged their houses. Cato, unable to prevail with them to abstain from rapine and slaughter, and undertake the defense of the town, as he was not ignorant of what they aimed at, gave each a hundred sesterces to make them quiet. Sylla Faustus did the same out of his own money; and marching with them from Utica, advanced into the kingdom.

88

A great many others that had escaped out of the battle, fled to Utica. These Cato assembled, with three hundred more who had furnished Scipio with money for carrying on the war, and exhorted them to set their slaves free, and in conjunction with them defend the town. But finding that though part assembled, the rest were terrified and determined to flee, he gave over the attempt, and furnished them with ships to facilitate their escape. He himself, having settled all his affairs with the utmost care, and commended his children to L. Caesar his quaestor, without the least indication which might give cause of suspicion, or any change in his countenance and behavior,

privately carried a sword into his chamber when he retired to rest, and stabbed himself with it. When the wound not proving mortal, he fell heavily to the ground, his physician and friends suspecting what was going on, burst into the room and began to stanch and bind up his wound, he himself most resolutely tore it open, and met death with the greatest determination. The Uticans, though they hated his party, yet in consideration of his singular integrity, his behavior so different from that of the other chiefs, and because he had strengthened their town with wonderful fortifications, and increased the towers, interred him honorably. L. Caesar, that he might procure some advantage by his death, assembled the people, and after haranguing them, exhorted them to open their gates, and throw themselves upon Caesar's clemency, from which they had the greatest reason to hope the best. This advice being followed, he came forth to meet Caesar. Messala having reached Utica, according to his orders, placed guards at the gates.

89

Meanwhile Caesar, leaving Thapsus came to Usceta, where Scipio had laid up a great store of corn, arms, darts, and other warlike provisions, under a small guard. He soon made himself master of the place, and marched directly to Adrumetum, which he entered without opposition. He took an account of the arms, provisions, and money in the town; pardoned Q. Ligarius, and C. Considius; and leaving Livineius Regulus there with one legion, set out the same day for Utica. L. Caesar, meeting him by the way, threw himself at his feet, and only begged for his life. Caesar, according to his wonted clemency, easily pardoned him, as he did likewise Caecina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. Cella, father and son, M. Eppius, M. Aquinius,

Cato's son, and the children of Damasippus. He arrived at Utica in the evening by torch-light, and continued all that night without the town.

90

Early on the morning of the following day he entered the place, summoned an assembly of the people, and thanked them for the affection they had shown to his cause. At the same time he censured severely, and enlarged upon the crime of the Roman citizens and merchants, and the rest of the three hundred, who had furnished Scipio and Varus with money; but concluded with telling them, that they might show themselves without fear, as he was resolved to grant them their lives, and content himself with exposing their effects to sale; but that he would give them notice when their goods were to be sold, and the liberty of redeeming them upon payment of a certain fine. The merchants, half dead with fear, and conscious that they merited death, hearing upon what terms life was offered them, greedily accepted the condition, and entreated Caesar that he would impose a certain sum in gross upon all the three hundred. Accordingly, he amerced them in two hundred thousand sesterces, to be paid to the republic, at six equal payments, within the space of three years. They all accepted the condition, and considering that day as a second nativity, joyfully returned thanks to Caesar.

91

Meanwhile, king Juba, who had escaped from the battle with Petreius, hiding himself all day in the villages, and traveling only by night, arrived at last in Numidia. When he came to Zama, his ordinary place of residence, where were his wives and children, with all his treasures, and whatever he held most valuable, and which he

had strongly fortified at the beginning of the war; the inhabitants, having heard of Caesar's victory, refused him admission, because, upon declaring war against the Romans, he had raised a mighty pile of wood in the middle of the forum, designing, if unsuccessful, to massacre all the citizens, fling their bodies and effects upon the pile, then setting fire to the mass, and throwing himself upon it, destroy all without exception, wives, children, citizens, and treasures, in one general conflagration. After continuing a considerable time before the gates, finding that neither threats nor entreaties would avail, he at last desired them to deliver up his wives and children, that he might carry them along with him. But receiving no answer, and seeing them determined to grant him nothing, he quitted the place, and retired to one of his country-seats with Petreius and a few horse.

92

Meantime the Zamians sent ambassadors to Caesar at Utica, to inform him of what they had done, and to request "that he should send them aid before the king could collect an army and besiege them; that they were determined to defend the town for him as long as life remained." Caesar commended the ambassadors, and sent them back to acquaint their fellow-citizens that he was coming himself to their relief. Accordingly, setting out the next day from Utica with his cavalry, he directed his march toward the kingdom. Many of the king's generals met him on the way, and sued for pardon; to all of whom a favorable hearing was given, and they attended him to Zama. The report of his clemency and mildness spreading into all parts, the whole Numidian cavalry flocked to him at Zama, and were there relieved from their fears.

93

During these transactions, Considius, who commanded at Tisdra, with his own retinue, a garrison of Getulians, and a company of gladiators, hearing of the defeat of his party, and terrified at the arrival of Domitius and his legions, abandoned the town; and privately withdrawing, with a few of the barbarians, and all his money, fled hastily toward the kingdom. The Getulians, to render themselves masters of his treasure, murdered him by the way, and fled every man where he could, Meantime, C. Virgilius, seeing himself shut up by sea and land, without the power of making a defense; his followers all slain or put to flight; M. Cato dead by his own hands at Utica; Juba despised and deserted by his own subjects; Sabura and his forces defeated by Sitius; Caesar received without opposition at Utica; and that of so vast an army, nothing remained capable of screening him or his children; thought it his most prudent course, to surrender himself and the city to the proconsul Caninius, by whom he was besieged.

94

At the same time king Juba, seeing himself excluded from all the cities of his kingdom, and that there remained no hopes of safety; having supped with Petreius, proposed an engagement, sword in hand, that they might die honorably. Juba, as being the stronger, easily got the better of his adversary, and laid him dead at his feet: but endeavoring afterward to run himself through the body, and wanting strength to accomplish it, he was obliged to have recourse to one of his slaves, and, by entreaties, prevailed upon him to put him to death.

95

In the mean time, P. Sitius, having defeated the army of Sabura,

Juba's lieutenant, and slain the general, and marching with a few troops through Mauritania, to join Caesar, chanced to fall in with Faustus and Afranius, who were at the head of the party that had plundered Utica, amounting in all to about fifteen hundred men, and designing to make the best of their way to Spain. Having expeditiously placed himself in ambuscade during the night, and attacking them by day-break, he either killed or made them all prisoners, except a few that escaped from the van. Afranius and Faustus were taken among the rest, with their wives and children: but some few days after, a mutiny arising among the soldiers, Faustus and Afranius were slain. Caesar pardoned Pompeia, the wife of Faustus, with her children, and permitted her the free enjoyment of all her effects.

96

Meanwhile Scipio, with Damasippus and Torquatus, and Plaetorius Rustianus, having embarked on board some galleys, with the intention of making for the coast of Spain; and being long and severely tossed by contrary winds, were at last obliged to put into the port of Hippo, where the fleet commanded by P. Silius chanced at that time to be. Scipio's vessels, which were but small, and few in number, were easily surrounded and sunk, by the larger and more numerous ships of Silius; on which occasion Scipio, and all those whom we have mentioned above, as having embarked with him, perished.

97

Meanwhile Caesar, having exposed the king's effects to public sale at Zama, and confiscated the estates of those who, though Roman citizens, had borne arms against the republic; after conferring

rewards upon such of the Zamians as had adopted the design of excluding the king, he abolished all the royal tribunes, converted the kingdom into a province; and appointing Crispus Sallustius to take charge of it, with the title of proconsul, returned to Utica. There he sold the estates of the officers who had served under Juba and Petreius, fined the people of Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, and the company of Roman merchants there thirty thousand; he likewise fined the inhabitants of Adrumetum in thirty thousand, and their company fifty thousand; but preserved the cities and their territories from insult and plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had pillaged some time before, and who, upon complaint made to the senate by their deputies, had obtained arbitrators and restitution, were enjoined to pay yearly three hundred thousand pounds of oil; because from the beginning of the war, in consequence of a dissension among their chiefs, they had made an alliance with the king of Numidia, and supplied him with arms, soldiers, and money. The people of Tisdra, on account of their extreme poverty, were only condemned to pay annually a certain quantity of corn.

98

These things being settled, he embarked at Utica on the ides of June, and three days after arrived at Carales in Sardinia. Here he condemned the Sulcitani in a fine of one hundred thousand sesterces, for receiving and aiding Nasidius's fleet; and instead of a tenth which was their former assessment, ordered them now to pay an eighth to the public treasury. He likewise confiscated the estates of some who had been more active than the rest, and weighing from Carales on the third day before the calends of July, coasted along the shore, and after a voyage of twenty-eight days, during which he was several

times obliged by contrary winds to put into port, arrived safe at Rome.

ON THE HISPANIC WAR



Translated by W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn

Traditionally ascribed to Caesar's hand, though now believed to have been written by another author, *De Bello Hispaniensi*, concerns Caesar's campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula. The work relates how Pompey's sons escaped to Spain, with Caesar giving chase and defeating the last remnants of opposition in the Battle of Munda in March 45 BC. This was the last battle of Caesar's civil war against the republican armies of the Optimate leaders. After this victory, and the deaths of Titus Labienus and Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey's oldest son), Caesar was free to return to Rome and govern as dictator.



Bust of Caesar, c.50BC

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The Spanish War

1

On the defeat of Pharnaces and reduction of Africa, those who escaped from those battles fled to young Cn. Pompey, who had taken possession of Further Spain, while Caesar was detained in Italy in exhibiting games. Pompey began to throw himself on the protection of every state, in order the more readily to establish the means of defense against him. Accordingly, with a considerable force which had been collected, partly by entreaty, partly by force, he began to lay waste the province. Under these circumstances some states voluntarily sent him supplies, others shut the gates of their towns against him. If any of these chanced to fall into his hands by assault, although some citizen in it had deserved well of Cn. Pompey (his father), yet some cause was alleged against him on account of the greatness of his wealth, so that, he being dispatched, his fortune might become the reward of the soldiers. Thus the enemy, being encouraged by a few advantages, their forces increased much, wherefore those states which were opposed to Pompey, by continual messages dispatched to Italy, sought protection for themselves.

2

When Caesar, now a third time dictator, and elected a fourth time, having already proceeded many marches into Spain with prompt dispatch, was coming to finish the war, he was met on the way by ambassadors from Corduba, who had deserted Cn. Pompey; these informed him that it would be an easy matter to make himself master of the town by night, because the enemy as yet knew nothing of his arrival in the province, as the scouts sent out by Cn. Pompey to inform him of Caesar's approach had been all made prisoners. They alleged besides many other very plausible reasons. He, therefore,

immediately sent intelligence of his arrival to Q. Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus his lieutenants, to whom he had left the command of the troops in the province, ordering them to send him all the cavalry they had been able to raise. He came up with them much sooner than they expected, and had not the protection of the cavalry, according to his desire.

3

Sextus Pompey, the brother of Cneius, commanded at this time at Corduba, which was accounted the capital of the province. Young Cneius Pompey himself was employed in the siege of Ulia, which had now lasted some months. Notice of Caesar's arrival having been received, messengers having passed Pompey's guards came to him from that town and besought him to send them relief as soon as possible. Caesar, knowing that this people had deserved very well of the Romans, detached, about nine o'clock, at night eleven cohorts, with a like number of horse, under the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a man known in that province, and also well acquainted with it. When he arrived at Pompey's quarter, a dreadful tempest arising, attended with a violent wind, so great a darkness ensued that you could scarcely have distinguished even the person next you. This accident proved of great advantage to Paciecus: for being arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the cavalry to advance two by two, and march directly through the enemy's quarters to the town; one of their guards calling to know who passed, one of our troopers bade him be silent, for they were just then endeavoring by stealth to approach the wall, in order to get possession of the town; and partly by this answer, partly by favor of the tempest, the sentinels were prevented from examining things diligently. When they reached the gates, upon

a signal being given, they were admitted; and both horse and foot raising a loud shout, after leaving some troops to guard the town, sallied in a body upon the enemy's camp. This came upon them so unexpectedly that the greater number of the men in the camps thought that they were captured.

4

Ulia being relieved, Caesar, to draw Pompey from the siege, marched toward Corduba; sending the cavalry before, with a select body of heavy-armed foot; who, as soon as they came within sight of the place, got up behind the troopers. By this stratagem they could not possibly be perceived by those of Corduba. Upon their approach to the walls, the enemy sallied in great numbers to attack our cavalry; when the infantry, whom we have mentioned above, leaping down, fell upon them with such fury that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, very few returned to the town. This so alarmed Sextus Pompey that he immediately sent letters to his brother, requesting him to come speedily to his relief, lest Caesar should make himself master of Corduba before his arrival. Thus Cn. Pompey, moved by his brother's letters, quitted the siege of Ulia, which was upon the point of surrendering, and set out toward Corduba.

5

Caesar, arriving at the river Guadalquivir, which he found too deep to be forded, sank several baskets of stones in it. Thus having formed a bridge, he transported his troops in three bodies to the camps. As I have just mentioned, the beams of the bridge stretched over against the tower in two rows. Pompey, arriving soon after with his troops, encamped directly over against him. Caesar, to cut off his provisions and communication with the town, ran a line from his camp to the

bridge. Pompey did the same; so that a struggle arose between the two generals, which should first get possession of the bridge; and this daily brought on skirmishes, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other party had the better. When these merged into a serious engagement, both sides fought hand to hand; in the heat of the struggle for this position, owing to the narrowness of the bridge, they were pressed together, and in their efforts to extend themselves toward the river-side, many fell headlong. Thus the loss was pretty equal; for on either side lay heaps of slain, and Caesar for many days used all possible endeavors to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible.

6

But finding that they carefully avoided a battle, with a view to which chiefly he had quitted the route of Ulia; he caused great fires to be lighted in the night, repassed the river with all his forces, and marched toward Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. Pompey, being informed of this by the deserters, on the same day brought back many carriages and machines by narrow paths, and betook himself to Corduba. Caesar began his attack upon Ategua, and carried lines quite round the town. Pompey, having intelligence of this, set out upon his march the same day. In order to guard against his arrival, Caesar possessed himself of many forts; partly to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of infantry for the defense of his camp. Pompey's arrival happened at a time when the mist was very thick, so that he found means, with some cohorts and troops of cavalry, to hem in a party of Caesar's horse, and fell upon them in such manner that very few escaped slaughter.

7

The following night Pompey set fire to his camp, passed the river Rio Salado, and, marching through the valleys, encamped on a rising ground, between the two towns of Ategua and Ucubis. Caesar cast up a mound and brought forward his machines, with other preparations which were necessary for storming the town. The country all around is mountainous, and seems formed for war, being separated from the plain by the river Rio Salado, ascending on the side toward Ategua, about two miles from the river. Pompey's camp was upon these mountains, within view of both towns; he could, however, send no relief to his friends. He had the emblems and standards of thirteen legions, but of those on whom he trusted for support two were natives which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed out of the Roman colonies in those parts; and a fourth, belonging to Afranius, he had brought with him from Africa; the rest were for the most part made up of fugitives and deserters; in light-armed foot and cavalry we far exceeded him in both courage and numbers.

8

Another reason why Pompey was enabled to protract the war was that the country was full of mountains and extremely well adapted to encampments. For almost the whole province of Further Spain, though of an extremely fertile soil, and abounding in springs, is nevertheless very difficult of access. Here too, on account of the frequent incursions of the natives, all the places remote from great towns, are fortified with towers and castles, covered as in Africa, not with tiles but with earth, on these they place sentinels, and their high situation commands an extensive view of the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest part of the towns of this province are built on

mountains, and places exceedingly strong by nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus sieges are rare and hazardous in Spain, since it is not easy to reduce their towns by force; as happened in the present war. For Pompey having established his camp between Ategua and Ucubis, as related above, and within view of both towns, Caesar possessed himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about four miles from his own camp, on which he built a fortress.

9

Pompey, who, from the nature of the ground, was covered by the same eminence, which was besides at a sufficient distance from Caesar's quarters, became sensible of the importance of this post; and as Caesar was separated from it by the river Rio Salado, he imagined that the difficulty of sending relief would prevent his attempting any thing of that kind in its defense. Influenced by this belief, he set out about midnight and attacked the fort, that he might bring assistance to the besieged. Our troops, upon their approach, setting up a shout, discharged their javelins in great numbers, and wounded multitudes of men. After this, when those in the camp began to resist, and when tidings of it was conveyed to the great camps to Caesar, he set out with three legions, and when he approached them, many were killed, owing to their trepidation and flight, and a great number made prisoners. Among these two * * *; and many others, having thrown down their arms escaped, so that fourscore shields were found.

10

The next day Arguetius arrived from Italy with the cavalry, and five standards taken from the Saguntines; but was forced to quit his post

by Asprenas, who likewise brought a reinforcement from Italy to Caesar. The same night Pompey set fire to his camp, and drew toward Corduba. A king, named Indus, who was bringing some troops to Caesar with a party of cavalry, following the pursuit of the enemy too briskly, was made prisoner, and slain by the Spanish legionaries.

11

On the next day, our cavalry pursued those who were employed in carrying provisions from the town to Pompey's camp, almost to the very walls of Corduba, and took fifty prisoners besides horses. On the same day, Q. Marcius, a military tribune in Pompey's army, deserted to us. At midnight, a keen encounter took place in the town, and they hurled fire and every means was resorted to by which fire could be cast. When the attack was ended, C. Fundanius, a Roman knight, quitted the enemy, and came over to us.

12

On the next day, two Spanish legionaries, who pretended to be slaves, were made prisoners by a party of our horse; but being brought to the camp, they were known by the soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius and Pedeijs, and deserted from Trebonius. No pardon was extended to them, and they were slaughtered by our troops. At the same time, some couriers, sent from Corduba to Pompey, entering our camp by mistake, were seized, had their hands cut off, and then were dismissed. About nine at night, the besieged, according to custom, spent a considerable time in casting fire and darts upon our soldiers, and wounded a great number of men. At day-break they sallied upon the sixth legion, while we were busy at the works, and began a sharp contest, in

which, however, our men got the better, though the besieged had the advantage of the higher ground. Those who had begun the attack, being vigorously opposed on our side, notwithstanding all the inconveniences we fought under, were at length obliged to retire into the town, with many wounds.

13

On the next day Pompey began a line from the camp to the river Rio Salado; and a small party of our horse, being attacked by a much larger body of the enemy, were driven from their post, and three of their number slain. On the same day, A. Valgius, the son of a senator, whose brother was in Pompey's camp, mounted his horse and went over to the enemy, leaving all his baggage behind him. A spy, belonging to Pompey's second legion, was taken and slain. At the same time, a bullet was shot into the town, with this inscription: "That he should set up a shield on whatever day they advanced to storm the town." This encouraging some to hope that they might scale the walls, and possess themselves of the town without danger, they fell the next day to sapping them, and threw down a considerable part of the outward wall. * * In this action, being captured and protected by the townsmen, as if they had been of their own party, they requested Caesar to dismiss in armor even those who were appointed over the city by Pompey to guard it. To this Caesar answered, "That it was his custom to give, not accept of conditions:" which being reported to the garrison, they set up a shout, and began to pour their darts upon our men from the whole circuit of the wall; which gave reason to believe that the garrison intended that day to make a vigorous sally. Wherefore, surrounding the town with our troops, the conflict was for some time maintained with great

violence, and one of our engines threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, in which were five of their men, and a boy, whose office it was to observe the engine.

14

After this Pompey erected a fort on the other side of the Rio Salado, in which he met with no interruption from our men, and exulted not a little in the idea of having possessed himself of a post so near us. Also the following day, extending himself in like manner still further, he came up with our out-post of cavalry; and charging them briskly, obliged several squadrons and the light-armed foot to give ground: many of whom, owing to the smallness of their numbers and their light armor, were trodden down by the enemy's horse. This passed within view of both camps, and not a little animated the Pompeians, to see our men pushed so far: but the latter, being afterward reinforced by a party from our camp, faced about with the intention of renewing the fight.

15

It invariably happens in encounters of cavalry that when the troopers dismount to charge the infantry, the match proves unequal, as happened on the present occasion. For a select body of the enemy's light-armed foot, coming unexpectedly upon our horse, they alighted to sustain the charge. Thus in a very little time, from a cavalry it became an infantry engagement, and again from an infantry changed to a cavalry engagement, in which our men were driven back to their very lines; but being there reinforced, about a hundred and twenty-three of the enemy were slain, several forced to throw down their arms, many wounded, and the rest pursued quite to their camp. On our side, three were slain, besides twelve foot-soldiers and five

troopers wounded. Toward the evening of the same day, the fight, as usual, was renewed before the walls: and the enemy having thrown many darts, and a great quantity of fire from the battlements, proceeded afterward to an action of unexampled cruelty and barbarity: for in the very sight of our troops they fell to murdering the citizens, and tumbling them headlong from the walls, as is usual among barbarians: no parallel to this is to be found in the memory of man.

16

When night came on, Pompey sent a messenger unknown to us, to exhort the garrison to set fire to our towers and mound, and make a sally at midnight. Accordingly, having poured upon us a great quantity of darts and fire, and destroyed a considerable part of the rampart, they opened the gate which lay over against and within view of Pompey's camp, and sallied out with all their forces, carrying with them fascines to fill up the ditch; hooks and fire to destroy and reduce to ashes the barracks, which the soldiers had built mostly of reeds to defend them from the winter; and some silver and rich apparel to scatter among the tents, that while our men should be employed in securing the plunder, they might fight their way through and escape to Pompey; who, in expectation that they would be able to effect their design, had crossed the Rio Salado with his army, where he continued all night in order of battle, to favor their retreat. But though our men had no apprehension of this design, their valor enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and repulse the enemy with many wounds. They even made themselves masters of the spoil, their arms, and some prisoners, who were put to death next day. At the same time, a deserter from the town informed us that Junius, who

was employed in the mine when the citizens were massacred, exclaimed that it was a cruel and barbarous action-”that they had never deserved such treatment at their hands-for that they had received them in their temples and their homes-that it was in violation of all hospitality.” He added many things besides, which made such an impression upon the garrison that they desisted from the massacre.

17

The next day, Tullius, a lieutenant-general, accompanied by C. Antonius of Lusitania, came to Caesar, and addressed him to this effect: “Would to Heaven I had been one of your soldiers rather than a follower of C. Pompey, and given those proofs of valor and constancy in obtaining victories for you, rather than in suffering for him. The only advantage we reap from following his banners are wretched applauses; being reduced to the condition of indigent citizens, and by the melancholy fate of our country ranked among its enemies; we, who having never shared with Pompey his good fortune, yet find ourselves involved in his disgrace; and after sustaining the attack of so many armed legions, employing ourselves day and night in the works of defense, exposed to the darts and swords of our fellow-citizens; vanquished, deserted by Pompey, and compelled to give way to the superior valor of your troops, find ourselves at last obliged to have recourse to your clemency, and implore that you will not show yourselves less placable to fellow-citizens, than you have so often been to foreign nations.” “I shall,” said Caesar, “prove myself the same to fellow-citizens, as I have been to conquered nations.”

18

The ambassadors being dismissed, when Tiberius Tullius arrived at the gate of the town, and C. Antony did not follow him, he returned to the gate and laid hold of him, upon which drawing a poniard from his breast, he wounded him in the hand, and in this condition they both fled to Caesar. At the same time the standard-bearer of the first legion came over to our camp, and reported that the day when the skirmish happened between the horse, no less than thirty-five of his company fell; but it was not allowed to mention it in Pompey's camp, or so much as own the loss of one man. A slave, whose master was in Caesar's camp, and who had left his wife and son in the city, cut his master's throat, and deceiving the guards, escaped privately to Pompey's camp; whence by means of a bullet, on which he inscribed his intelligence, Caesar was informed of the preparations made for the defense of the place. When we had read the inscription, those who were employed to throw the bullet returning to the city, two Lusitanian brothers deserted, and informed us that Pompey in a speech made to his soldiers, had said: "That as he found it impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved to withdraw in the night from the sight of the enemy, and retire toward the sea;" to which one answered "that it was better to hazard a battle than take refuge in flight," but he who said so was instantly put to death. At the same time some of his couriers were intercepted, who were endeavoring to get into the town. Caesar sent the letters to the inhabitants, and ordered one of the messengers begging his life, to set fire to the townsmen's wooden turret, promising that if he did this he would grant him all. The enterprise was not without difficulty: he undertook it, however, but was slain in the attempt. The same night a deserter informed us that Pompey and Labienus were greatly offended at the massacre of the citizens.

19

About nine at night, one of our wooden towers, which had been severely battered by the enemy's engines, gave way as far as the third story. A sharp encounter ensued under the walls, and the besieged, assisted by a favorable wind, burned the remaining part of that tower and another. Next morning a matron threw herself from the wall, and came over to the camp, reporting, "that the rest of her family had intended the same, but were apprehended and put to death;" likewise, a letter was thrown over, in which was written" L. Minatius to Caesar; Pompey has abandoned me; if you will grant me my life, I promise to serve you with the same fidelity and attachment I have hitherto manifested toward him." At the same time deputies who had been sent before to Caesar by the garrison, now waited on him a second time, offering to deliver up the town next day, upon a bare grant of their lives: to which he replied, "That he was Caesar, and would perform his word." Thus, having made himself master of the place, on the nineteenth of February he was saluted imperator.

20

Pompey, being informed by some deserters that the town had surrendered, removed his camp toward Ucubis, where he began to build redoubts, and secure himself with lines. Caesar also decamped and drew near him. At the same time a Spanish legionary soldier deserting to our camp, informed us that Pompey had assembled the people of Ucubis, and given them instructions to inquire diligently who favored his party, who that of the enemy. Some time after in the town which was taken, the slave, who, as we have related above, had murdered his master, was apprehended in a mine and burned alive. About the same time eight Spanish centurions came over to Caesar,

and in a skirmish between our cavalry and that of the enemy, we were repulsed, and some of our light-armed foot wounded. The same night we took of the enemy's spies, three slaves and one Spanish soldier. The slaves were crucified, and the soldier was beheaded.

21

The day following, some of the enemy's cavalry and light-armed infantry deserted to us; and about eleven of their horse falling upon a party of our men that were sent to fetch water, killed some and took others prisoners; among which last were eight troopers. On the next day Pompey beheaded seventy-four persons supposed to be favorers of Caesar's cause, ordering the rest who lay under the same suspicion to be carried back to the town, of whom a hundred and twenty escaped to Caesar.

22

Some time after, the deputies from Bursavola (whom Caesar had taken prisoners at Ategua, and sent along with his own ambassadors to their city, to inform them of the massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had to apprehend from Pompey, who suffered his soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all manner of crimes with impunity), arriving in the town, none of our deputies, except such as were natives of the place, durst enter the city, though they were all Roman knights and senators. But after many messages backward and forward, when the deputies were upon their return, the garrison pursued and put them all to the sword, except two who escaped to Caesar, and informed him of what had happened. Some time after, the inhabitants of Bursavola, sending spies to Ategua to know the truth of what had happened, and finding the report of our deputies confirmed, were for stoning to death him who had been the cause of

the murder of the deputies, and were with difficulty restrained from laying violent hands upon him, which in the end proved the occasion of their own destruction. For having obtained leave of the inhabitants to go in person to Caesar and justify himself, he privately drew together some troops, and when he thought himself strong enough, returned in the night, and was treacherously admitted into the town, where he made a dreadful massacre of the inhabitants, slew all the leaders of the opposite party, and reduced the place to subjection. Soon after, some slaves who had deserted informed us that he had sold all the goods of the citizens, and that Pompey suffered none of his soldiers to quit the camp but unarmed, because, since the taking of Ategua, many despairing of success fled into Baeturia, having given over all expectation of victory; and that if any deserted from our camp, they were put among the light-armed infantry, whose pay was only sixteen asses a day.

23

The day following Caesar removed his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to draw a line to the river Salado. While our men were employed in the work, some of the enemy fell upon us from the higher ground, and as we were in no condition to make resistance, wounded great numbers. Here, as Ennius says, "our men retreated a little." This occurrence, so contrary to our usual custom, being perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion passed the river, and restored the battle; when, pressing upon the enemy with astonishing bravery, one of them fell overwhelmed by the multitude of darts discharged from above. The other continued the combat for some time, but seeing himself in danger of being surrounded, endeavored to make good his retreat, but stumbled and fell. His death being

known, the enemy crowded together in still greater numbers, upon which our cavalry passed the river, and drove them back to their intrenchments; so that, while they too eagerly desired to slay them within their lines, they were surrounded by the cavalry and light-armed troops. Many of these would have been captured alive, had not their valor been pre-eminent, for they were so confined by the space included in the fortress, that the cavalry could not well defend itself. Many of our men were wounded in these two encounters, and among the rest Clodius Aquitius, but as the fight was carried on mostly from a distance, none of our men fell, except the two centurions who sacrificed themselves in the cause of glory.

24

Next day both parties withdrawing from Soricaria, we continued our works. But Pompey, observing that our fort had cut off his communication with Aspavia, which is about five miles distant from Ucubis, judged it necessary to come to a battle. Yet he did not offer it upon equal terms, but chose to draw up his men upon a hill, that he might have the advantage of the higher ground. In this respect, when both parties were seeking the superior position, our men anticipating them, drove them into the plain, which gave us the advantage. The enemy yielded on all hands, and we made immense havoc among them. The mountain and not their valor protected them; of which advantage, and of all relief, our men, though few in number, would have deprived them had not night intervened. Three hundred and twenty-four light-armed foot, and about a hundred and thirty-eight legionary soldiers of their number fell, besides those whose armor and spoils we carried off. Thus the death of the two centurions, which happened the day before, was fully revenged.

The day after, Pompey's cavalry advanced, according to their usual custom, to our lines; for they only dared venture to draw up on equal ground. They therefore began to skirmish with our men who were at work, the legionaries calling out to us at the same time to choose our field of battle, with a view to make us believe that they desired nothing so much as to come to blows; upon this our men quitted the eminence where they were encamped, and advanced a great way into the plain. But none of the enemy had the boldness to present themselves, excepting Antistius Turpio; who, presuming on his strength, and fancying no one on our side a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon this, as is recorded of Memnon and Achilles, Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, advanced from our ranks to the encounter. The fierce air of Antistius having engaged the attention of all, the two armies drew up to be spectators of the issue of this challenge, and expressed as much impatience as if the whole fortune of the war had depended upon it. The wishes on both sides for success were equal to the anxiety and concern each felt for his own combatant. They advanced into the plain with great courage, having each a resplendent buckler of curious workmanship. And doubtless the combat would have been soon decided, had not some light-armed foot drawn up near the lines, to serve as a guard to the camp because of the approach of the enemy's horse, which we have before alluded to. * * * Our horse, in retreating to their camp, being warmly pursued by the enemy, suddenly faced about with great cries; which so terrified the Pompeians, that they immediately betook themselves to flight, and retreated to their camp with the loss of many of their men.

26

Caesar, to reward the valor of the Cassian troop, presented them with thirteen thousand sesterces, distributed ten thousand more among the light-armed foot, and gave to the commander of the cavalry five golden collars. The same day, A. Bebius, C. Flavius, and A. Trebellius, Roman knights of Asta, with their horses richly caparisoned and adorned with silver, came over to Caesar, and informed him, that all the rest of the Roman knights in Pompey's camp, had like them conspired to come and join him, that, on the information of a slave they had all been seized and cast into custody; that out of this number they only had escaped. The same day letters were intercepted, sent by Pompey to Ursao, with the usual greeting, and stating, "That hitherto he had all the success against the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner than was expected, could he have brought them to engage him upon equal terms; that he did not think it advisable to venture new-levied troops on a plain; that the enemy, depending on our supplies, as yet protract the war for they storm city after city, thence supplying themselves with provisions: that he would therefore endeavor to protect the towns of his party, and bring the war to as speedy an issue as possible: that he would send them a reinforcement of some cohorts, and that having deprived them of provisions he would necessitate the enemy to come to an engagement.

27

Some time after, as our men were carelessly dispersed about the works, a few horse were killed, who had gone to a grove of olives to fetch wood. Several slave deserted at this time, and informed us that ever since the action at Soritia on the 7th of March, the enemy had

been under continual alarms, and appointed Attius Varus to guard the lines. The same day Pompey decamped, and posted himself in an olive-wood over against Hispalis. Caesar, before he removed, waited till midnight, when the moon began to appear. At his departure he ordered them to set fire to the fort of Ucubis, which Pompey had abandoned, and to assemble in the greater camp. He afterward laid siege to Ventisponde, which surrendered; and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the city, because the garrison refused to open the gates to him. A soldier who had murdered his brother in the camp, being intercepted by our men, was scourged to death. Caesar, still pursuing his march, arrived in the plains of Munda, and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey.

28

Next day as Caesar was preparing to set out with the army, notice was sent him by his spies, that Pompey had been in order of battle ever since midnight. Upon this intelligence he ordered the standard to be raised. Pompey had taken this resolution in consequence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao, who were his firm adherents, in which he told them that Caesar refused to come down into the plain, because his army consisted mostly of new-levied troops. This had greatly confirmed the city in its allegiance. Thus relying on this opinion, he thought that he could effect the whole, for he was defended by the nature of his situation, and by the position for defense of the town, where he had his camp: for, as we observed before, this country is full of hills which run in a continued chain, without any plains intervening.

29

But we must by no means omit to mention an accident which

happened about this time. The two camps were divided from one another by a plain about five miles in extent, so that Pompey, in consequence of the town's elevated position, and the nature of the country, enjoyed a double defense. Across this valley ran a rivulet, which rendered the approach to the mountain extremely difficult, because it formed a deep morass on the right. Caesar had no doubt that the enemy would descend into the plain and come to a battle, when he saw them in array. This appeared evident to all; the rather because the plain would give their cavalry full room to act, and the day was so serene and clear that the gods seemed to have sent it on purpose to favor the engagement. Our men rejoiced at the favorable opportunity: some however were not altogether exempt from fear when they considered that their all was at stake, with the uncertainty of what might be their fate an hour after. He advanced however to the field of battle, fully persuaded that the enemy would do the same; but they durst not venture above a mile from the town, being determined to shelter themselves under its walls. Our men still continued before them in order of battle; but although the equality of the ground sometimes tempted them to come and dispute the victory, they nevertheless still kept their post on the mountain, in the neighborhood of the town. We doubled our speed to reach the rivulet, without their stirring from the place where they stood.

30

Their army consisted of thirteen legions; the cavalry was drawn up upon the wings, with six thousand light-armed infantry and about the same number of auxiliaries. We had only eighty heavy-armed cohorts, and eight thousand horse. When we reached the extremity of the plain, the real seat of disadvantage, the enemy were awaiting us

above, so that it would have been exceedingly dangerous to proceed. When Caesar perceived this, he pointed out the locality, lest any disagreeable occurrence should result from the temerity of his troops. The army murmured greatly, as if they had been kept back from a certain victory, when this was told them. The delay, however, served to enliven the enemy, thinking that Caesar's troops shrank from an encounter through fear: they therefore had the boldness to advance a little way, yet without quitting the advantage of their post, the approach to which was extremely dangerous. The tenth legion, as usual, was on the right, the third and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary troops and cavalry. The battle began with a shout.

31

But though our men were superior to the enemy in courage, the latter nevertheless defended themselves so well by the advantage of the higher ground, and the shouts were so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides so great, that we almost began to despair of victory. For the first onset and shout, by which an enemy is most apt to be dismayed, were pretty equal in the present encounter. All fought with equal valor; the place was covered with arrows and darts, and great numbers of the enemy fell. We have already observed that the tenth legion was on the right, which, though not considerable for the number of men, was nevertheless formidable for its courage; and so pressed the enemy on that side that they were obliged to draw a legion from the right wing to reinforce the left, lest we should come upon their flank; but they fought so bravely that the reinforcement could not find an opportunity of entering the ranks. Upon this motion, our cavalry on the left fell upon Pompey's right wing. Meanwhile the clashing of armor mingled with the shouts of

combatants, and the groans of the dying and the wounded, terrified the new-raised soldiers. On this occasion, as Ennius says, “they fought hand to hand, foot to foot, and shield to shield;” but though the enemy fought with the utmost vigor, they were obliged to give ground, and retire toward the town. The battle was fought on the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were entirely routed and put to flight; insomuch that not a man could have escaped, had they not sheltered themselves in the place whence they advanced to the charge. The enemy lost on this occasion upward of thirty thousand men, and among the rest Labienus and Attius Varus, whose funeral obsequies were performed upon the field of battle. They had likewise three thousand Roman knights killed, partly Italian, partly provincial. About a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, partly horse; and five hundred wounded. We gained thirteen eagles, and several standards, and emblems of authority, and made seventeen officers prisoners. Such was the issue of this action.

32

The remains of Pompey’s army retreating to Munda, with the intention of defending themselves in that town, it became necessary to invest it. The dead bodies of the enemy, heaped together, served as a rampart, and their javelins and darts were fixed up by way of palisades. Upon these we hung their bucklers to supply the place of a breastwork, and fixing the heads of the deceased upon swords and lances, planted them all around the works, to strike the greater terror into the besieged, and keep awake in them a sense of our prowess. Amid these mournful objects did they find themselves shut in, when our men began the attack, which was conducted chiefly by the Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped to Corduba with some horse,

informed Sextus Pompey of what had happened; who, upon receipt of the mournful news, distributing what money he had about him to the troopers, left the town about nine at night, under pretense of going to find out Caesar, to treat of an accommodation. On the other side, Cn. Pompey, attended by a few horse and foot, took the road to Carteia, where his fleet lay, and which was about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Corduba. When he was arrived within eight miles of the place, he sent P. Calvitus his camp-marshal before, to procure a litter to carry him to the town, as he found himself unwell. The litter came, and when he entered the town, those of his party waited on him privately, to receive his orders about the management of the war. As they assembled round the place in great crowds, Pompey quitting his litter put himself under their protection.

33

After the encounter, Caesar seeing the circumvallation of Munda completed, marched to Corduba. Those of the enemy who had escaped the slaughter, possessing themselves of a bridge, upon the approach of our men, called out to them with an air of derision—"What! we who are no more than a handful of men escaped from the battle, shall we be allowed no place of retreat?" They immediately prepared to defend the bridge. Caesar passed the river and encamped. Scapula, who had stirred up the freedmen to a revolt, escaping after the battle to Corduba, when he found himself besieged, assembled all his followers, ordered a funeral pile to be erected and a magnificent supper served up; when, putting on his richest dress, he distributed his plate and money among his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed himself several times, and, last of all, ordered one of his freedmen to dispatch him, and another to set fire to the pile.

34

Caesar had no sooner encamped before the place than a division arose among the inhabitants, between the parties of Caesar and Pompey, till the dispute almost reached to our camps. During the contest, some legions, composed partly of deserters, partly of slaves made free by Pompey, came and surrendered themselves to Caesar. But the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the town, and with that view possessed themselves of the walls and some towers, in spite of all opposition, which obliged the other party to send deputies to Caesar for aid. Upon this those who had escaped out of the battle set fire to the place, and our men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them, besides those who were slain without the walls; thus Caesar obtained the town. While he was employed in this siege, those who, as we have said, were blockaded at Munda made a sally, but were driven back into the town with considerable loss.

35

Thence Caesar marched to Hispalis, which sent deputies to sue for pardon. Though the citizens assured him that they were able to defend the town, he sent Caninius his lieutenant thither with some troops, and encamped before the place. There was in the town a strong party of Pompeians, who, displeased to see Caesar's troops received within the walls, secretly deputed one Philo, a zealous partisan of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to beg assistance of Cecilius Niger, one of the barbarians, who lay encamped near Lenius, with a strong army of Lusitanians. He is received into the town of Hispalis by night, surprises the sentinels and garrison, shuts the gates, and begins to defend the place.

36

During these transactions deputies arrived from Carteia, with accounts of their having secured Pompey; hoping by this service to atone for their former fault of shutting their gates against Caesar. Meantime, the Lusitanians in Hispalis plundered the town, which, though known to Caesar, did not yet determine him to press it too hard, lest they should in despair set fire to it, and destroy the walls. It was resolved in council to suffer the Lusitanians to escape in the night by a sally, yet so that the thing might not appear designed. In this sally, they set fire to the ships that were in the river Guadalquivir, and while our men were employed in extinguishing the flames, endeavored to get off; but being overtaken by the cavalry, were mostly cut to pieces. Thence Caesar marched to Asta, which submitted. Munda having been now a long while besieged, many of those who had escaped out of the battle, despairing of safety, surrendered to us; and being formed into a legion, conspired among themselves, that upon a signal being given, the garrison should sally out in the night, while they at the same time should begin a massacre in the camp. But the plot being discovered, they were next night, at the changing of the third watch, all put to death outside the rampart.

37

The Carteians, while Caesar was employed in reducing the other towns upon his route, began to disagree about young Pompey. One party had sent the deputies to Caesar, and another was in the Pompeian interest. These last prevailing, seized the gates, and made a dreadful slaughter of their adversaries. Pompey himself was wounded in the fray, but escaping to his ships, fled with about twenty galleys. Didius, who was at Gades with Caesar's fleet, hearing of

what had happened, immediately sailed in pursuit of them; stationing at the same time some cavalry and infantry along the coast, to prevent his escaping by land. Pompey had left Carteia with so much precipitation, that he took no time to furnish himself with water, and this circumstance obliging him to stop by the way, Didius came up with him after four days' sailing, took some of his ships, and burned the rest.

38

With a few friends, Pompey escaped to a place strongly fortified by nature; of which the troops sent in pursuit of him having certain intelligence by their scouts, followed day and night. He was wounded in the shoulder and left leg, and had besides sprained his ankle, all which greatly retarded his flight, and obliged him to make use of a litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the place of his retreat, he was quickly surrounded by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing himself betrayed, he took refuge in a post fortified by nature, and which could easily be defended by a few men, the approach to it being extremely difficult. We attempted to storm it, but were repulsed, and pursued by the enemy; and meeting with no better success after several trials, we at length resolved to lay siege to the place, it seeming too hazardous to force it. Accordingly, a terrace was raised, and lines drawn round the place; which the enemy perceiving, thought it best to betake themselves to flight.

39

Pompey as we have observed above being lame and wounded, was in no condition to make a speedy retreat; and the rather, because the place was such that he could use neither horse nor litter. Slaughter was dealt on all hands by our troops, his fortress having been

stormed, and his resources cut off. In this extremity he fled to a cave, where he could not easily be discovered, unless by the information of the captives. Here he was slain, his head was brought to Hispalis on the day before the ides of April, and exhibited before the people when Caesar was at Gades.

40

After the death of young Pompey, Didius, proud of his success, retired to the nearest fortress and hauled some of his vessels on shore to be refitted. The Lusitanians, who had escaped from the battle, rallying in great bodies, advanced to Didius. Though the preservation of the fleet principally engaged his attention, he was obliged to leave his fort in order to restrain the frequent sallies of the enemy. These daily skirmishes gave them an opportunity of projecting an ambuscade; for which purpose they divided their troops into three bodies. Some were prepared to set fire to the fleet, and in the mean time others were to come to their relief. These were so arranged that they could advance to the battle without any one seeing them. Didius sallied out according to custom; when upon a signal being given, one of the parties advanced to set fire to the fleet; and another, counterfeiting a retreat, drew him insensibly into the ambuscade, where he was surrounded and slain with most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some escaped in boats which they found upon the coast; others endeavored to reach the galleys by swimming; and, weighing anchor, stood out to sea. A great many saved themselves in this manner, but the Lusitanians got all the baggage. Caesar meanwhile returned from Gades to Hispalis.

41

Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to continue the siege of Munda,

conducted it with great zeal; so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut up on all sides, sallied out, but were repulsed with great loss. Our men seized this opportunity to get possession of the town, and took the rest prisoners, in number about fourteen thousand. Thence they retreated toward Ursao, a town exceedingly strong both by nature and art, and capable of resisting an enemy. Besides, there is not, within eight miles of the place any spring but that which supplies the town, which was a decided advantage to the besieged. In addition to all this, the wood necessary for building towers and other machines had to be fetched from a distance of six miles. And Pompey, to render the siege more difficult, had cut down all the timber round the place, and collected it within the walls, which obliged our men to bring all the materials for carrying on the siege from Munda, the nearest town which they had subdued.

42

During these transactions at Munda and Ursao, Caesar, who had returned from Gades to Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and made the following speech: “That when he was advanced to the quaestorship, he had chosen their province in preference to all others, and during his continuance in that office, had done them every service in his power; that during his praetorship he had obtained for them from the senate the abolition of the taxes imposed by Metellus, declared himself their patron, procured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and made himself many enemies by undertaking the defense both of their private and public rights. In fine, that when he was consul, he had, though absent, rendered the province all the services in his power; that instead of making a suitable return for so many favors, they had always discovered the utmost ingratitude both

toward him and the people of Rome; as well in this last war as the preceding. “You,” says he, “though no strangers to the law of nations and the rights of Roman citizens, have yet like barbarians often violated the sacred persons of Roman magistrates. You attempted in open day, in the public square, to assassinate Cassius. You have been always such enemies to peace that the senate could never suffer the province to be without legions. You take favors for offenses, and insults for benefits, are insolent and restless in peace, and cowardly and effeminate in war. Young Pompey, though only a private citizen, nay a fugitive, was yet received among you, and suffered to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After putting many citizens to death, you still furnished him with forces, and even urged him to lay waste the country and province. Against whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be ignorant that even if I should be destroyed, the people of Rome have still ten legions, capable not only of opposing you, but even of pulling down heaven? With whose praises and virtues ...

The Latin Texts



The Forum of Caesar, Rome — built by Caesar near the Forum Romanum in 46 BC. As he became involved in the project, the Forum became a place for public business that was related to the Senate. Before his assassination, Caesar would have the Senate meet him before his temple, one of his many acts deemed unpopular by the Senate.

LIST OF LATIN TEXTS



In this section of the eBook, readers can view the original Latin texts of Caesar's works. You may wish to Bookmark this page for future reference.

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LIBER I

1 Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt. Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen, a Belgis Matrona et Sequana dividit. Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important, proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt. Eorum una, pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano, continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum, attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum, vergit ad septentriones. Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur, pertinent ad inferiorem partem fluminis Rheni, spectant in septentrionem et orientem solem. Aquitania a Garumna flumine ad Pyrenaeos montes et eam partem Oceani quae est ad Hispaniam pertinet; spectat inter occasum solis et septentriones.

2 Apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus fuit et ditissimus Orgetorix. Is M. Messala, et P. M. Pisone consulibus regni cupiditate inductus coniurationem nobilitatis fecit et civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent: perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri. Id hoc facilius iis persuasit, quod undique loci natura Helvetii continentur: una ex parte flumine Rheno latissimo atque altissimo, qui agrum Helvetium a Germanis

dividit; altera ex parte monte Iura altissimo, qui est inter Sequanos et Helvetios; tertia lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit. His rebus fiebat ut et minus late vagarentur et minus facile finitimis bellum inferre possent; qua ex parte homines bellandi cupidi magno dolore adficiebantur. Pro multitudine autem hominum et pro gloria belli atque fortitudinis angustos se fines habere arbitrabantur, qui in longitudinem milia passuum CCXL, in latitudinem CLXXX patebant.

3 His rebus adducti et auctoritate Orgetorigis permoti constituerunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinerent comparare, iumentorum et carrorum quam maximum numerum coemere, sementes quam maximas facere, ut in itinere copia frumenti suppeteret, cum proximis civitatibus pacem et amicitiam confirmare. Ad eas res conficiendas biennium sibi satis esse duxerunt; in tertium annum profectionem lege confirmant. Ad eas res conficiendas Orgetorix deligitur. Is sibi legationem ad civitates suscipit. In eo itinere persuadet Castico, Catamantaloedis filio, Sequano, cuius pater regnum in Sequanis multos annos obtinuerat et a senatu populi Romani amicus appellatus erat, ut regnum in civitate sua occuparet, quod pater ante habuerit; itemque Dumnorigi Haeduo, fratri Diviciaci, qui eo tempore principatum in civitate obtinebat ac maxime plebi acceptus erat, ut idem conaretur persuadet eique filiam suam in matrimonium dat. Perfacile factu esse illis probat conata perficere, propterea quod ipse suae civitatis imperium obtenturus esset: non esse dubium quin totius Galliae plurimum Helvetii possent; se suis copiis suoque exercitu illis regna conciliaturum confirmat. Hac oratione adducti inter se fidem et ius iurandum dant et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant.

4 Ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata. Moribus suis Orgetoricem ex vinculis causam dicere coegerunt; damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni cremaretur. Die constituta causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit; per eos ne causam diceret se eripuit. Cum civitas ob eam rem incitata armis ius suum exequi conaretur multitudinemque hominum ex agris magistratus cogerent, Orgetorix mortuus est; neque abest suspicio, ut Helvetii arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem consciverit.

5 Post eius mortem nihilo minus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur, ut e finibus suis exeant. Ubi iam se ad eam rem paratos esse arbitrati sunt, oppida sua omnia, numero ad duodecim, vicos ad quadringentos, reliqua privata aedificia incendunt; frumentum omne, praeter quod secum portaturi erant, comburunt, ut domum reditionis spe sublata paratiores ad omnia pericula subeunda essent; trium mensum molita cibaria sibi quemque domo efferre iubent. Persuadent Rauracis et Tulingis et Latobrigis finitimis, uti eodem usu consilio oppidis suis vicisque exustis una cum iis proficiscantur, Boiosque, qui trans Rhenum incoluerant et in agrum Noricum transierant Noreiamque oppugnabant, receptos ad se socios sibi adsciscunt.

6 Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent: unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, inter montem Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur, mons autem altissimus impendebat, ut facile perpauci prohibere possent; alterum per provinciam nostram, multo facilius atque expeditius, propterea quod inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum, qui nuper pacati erant, Rhodanus fluit isque non nullis locis vado transitur. Extremum

oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque Helvetiorum finibus Genava. Ex eo oppido pons ad Helvetios pertinet. Allobrogibus sese vel persuasuros, quod nondum bono animo in populum Romanum viderentur, existimabant vel vi coacturos ut per suos fines eos ire paterentur. Omnibus rebus ad profectionem comparatis diem dicunt, qua die ad ripam Rhodani omnes conveniant. Is dies erat a. d. V. Kal. Apr. L. Pisone, A. Gabinio consulibus.

7 Caesari cum id nuntiatum esset, eos per provinciam nostram iter facere conari, maturat ab urbe proficisci et quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem contendit et ad Genavam pervenit. Provinciae toti quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat (erat omnino in Gallia ulteriore legio una), pontem, qui erat ad Genavam, iubet rescindi. Ubi de eius adventu Helvetii certiores facti sunt, legatos ad eum mittunt nobilissimos civitatis, cuius legationis Nammeius et Verucloetius principem locum obtinebant, qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per provinciam facere, propterea quod aliud iter haberent nullum: rogare ut eius voluntate id sibi facere liceat. Caesar, quod memoria tenebat L. Cassium consulem occisum exercitumque eius ab Helvetiis pulsum et sub iugum missum, concedendum non putabat; neque homines inimico animo, data facultate per provinciam itineris faciundi, temperaturos ab iniuria et maleficio existimabat. Tamen, ut spatium intercedere posset dum milites quos imperaverat convenirent, legatis respondit diem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: si quid vellent, ad Id. April. reverterentur.

8 Interea ea legione quam secum habebat militibusque, qui ex provincia convenerant, a lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, milia passuum XVIII murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim

fossamque perducit. Eo opere perfecto praesidia disponit, castella communit, quo facilius, si se invito transire conentur, prohibere possit. Ubi ea dies quam constituerat cum legatis venit et legati ad eum reverterunt, negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et, si vim facere conentur, prohibitorium ostendit. Helvetii ea spe deiecti navibus iunctis ratibusque compluribus factis, alii vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, non numquam interdiu, saepius noctu si perrumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum concursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu destiterunt.

9 Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invitis propter angustias ire non poterant. His cum sua sponte persuadere non possent, legatos ad Dumnorigem Haeduum mittunt, ut eo deprecatore a Sequanis impetrarent. Dumnorix gratia et largitione apud Sequanos plurimum poterat et Helvetiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in matrimonium duxerat, et cupiditate regni adductus novis rebus studebat et quam plurimas civitates suo beneficio habere obstrictas volebat. Itaque rem suscipit et a Sequanis impetrat ut per fines suos Helvetios ire patiantur, obsidesque uti inter sese dent perficit: Sequani, ne itinere Helvetios prohibeant, Helvetii, ut sine maleficio et iniuria transeant.

10 Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. Id si fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet. Ob eas causas ei munitioni quam fecerat T. Labienum legatum praeficit; ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit duasque ibi legiones conscribit et

tres, quae circum Aquileiam hiemabant, ex hibernis educit et, qua proximum iter in ulteriorem Galliam per Alpes erat, cum his quinque legionibus ire contendit. Ibi Ceutrones et Graioceli et Caturiges locis superioribus occupatis itinere exercitum prohibere conantur. Compluribus his proeliis pulsus ab Ocelo, quod est oppidum citerioris provinciae extremum, in fines Vocontiorum ulterioris provinciae die septimo pervenit; inde in Allobrogum fines, ab Allobrogibus in Segusiavos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.

¹¹ Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias traduxerant et in Haeduorum fines pervenerant eorumque agros populabantur. Haedui, cum se suaque ab iis defendere non possent, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium: ita se omni tempore de populo Romano meritos esse ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi eorum in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint. Eodem tempore quo Haedui Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Haeduorum, Caesarem certiores faciunt sese depopulatis agris non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere. Item Allobroges, qui trans Rhodanum vicos possessionesque habebant, fuga se ad Caesarem recipiunt et demonstrant sibi praeter agri solum nihil esse reliqui. Quibus rebus adductus Caesar non expectandum sibi statuit dum, omnibus, fortunis sociorum consumptis, in Santonos Helvetii pervenirent.

¹² Flumen est Arar, quod per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit, incredibili lenitate, ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iudicari non possit. Id Helvetii ratibus ac lintribus iunctis transibant. Ubi per exploratores Caesar certior factus est tres iam partes copiarum Helvetios id flumen traduxisse, quartam vero partem citra flumen Ararim reliquam esse, de tertia vigilia cum legionibus

tribus e castris profectus ad eam partem pervenit quae nondum flumen transierat. Eos impeditos et inopinantes adgressus magnam partem eorum concidit; reliqui sese fugae mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdiderunt. Is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus; nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est. Hic pagus unus, cum domo exisset, patrum nostrorum memoria L. Cassium consulem interfecerat et eius exercitum sub iugum miserat. Ita sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenam persolvit. Qua in re Caesar non solum publicas, sed etiam privatas iniurias ultus est, quod eius soceri L. Pisonis avum, L. Pisonem legatum, Tigurini eodem proelio quo Cassium interfecerant.

13 Hoc proelio facto, reliquas copias Helvetiorum ut consequi posset, pontem in Arari faciendum curat atque ita exercitum traducit. Helvetii repentino eius adventu commoti cum id quod ipsi diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellexerent, legatos ad eum mittunt; cuius legationis Divico princeps fuit, qui bello Cassiano dux Helvetiorum fuerat. Is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque esse voluisset; sin bello persequi perseveraret, reminisceretur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. Quod improvise unum pagum adortus esset, cum ii qui flumen transissent suis auxilium ferre non possent, ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere virtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret. Se ita a patribus maioribusque suis didicisse, ut magis virtute contenderent quam dolo aut insidiis niterentur. Quare ne committeret ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi Romani et internecone exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet.

14 His Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii commemorassent memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent; qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellexeret quare timeret neque sine causa timendum putaret. Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, memoriam deponere posse? Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere. Consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundoiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. Cum ea ita sint, tamen, si obsides ab iis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur facturos intellegat, et si Haeduis de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allobrogibus satis faciunt, sese cum iis pacem esse facturum. Divico respondit: ita Helvetios a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare, consuerint; eius rei populum Romanum esse testem. Hoc responso dato discessit.

15 Postero die castra ex eo loco movent. Idem facit Caesar equitatumque omnem, ad numerum quattuor milium, quem ex omni provincia et Haeduis atque eorum sociis coactum habebat, praemittit, qui videant quas in partes hostes iter faciant. Qui cupidius novissimum agmen insecuti alieno loco cum equitatu Helvetiorum proelium committunt; et pauci de nostris cadunt. Quo proelio sublatis Helvetii, quod quingentis equitibus tantam multitudinem equitum propulerant, audacius subsistere non numquam et novissimo agmine proelio nostros lacessere coeperunt. Caesar suos a proelio continebat,

ac satis habebat in praesentia hostem rapinis, pabulationibus populationibusque prohibere. Ita dies circiter XV iter fecerunt uti inter novissimum hostium agmen et nostrum primum non amplius quinis aut senis milibus passuum interesset.

16 Interim cotidie Caesar Haeduos frumentum, quod essent publice polliciti, flagitare. Nam propter frigora quod Gallia sub septentrionibus, ut ante dictum est, posita est, non modo frumenta in agris matura non erant, sed ne pabuli quidem satis magna copia suppetebat; eo autem frumento quod flumine Arari navibus subvexerat propterea uti minus poterat quod iter ab Arari Helvetii averterant, a quibus discedere nolebat. Diem ex die ducere Haedui: conferri, comportari, adesse dicere. Ubi se diutius duci intellexit et diem instare quo die frumentum militibus metiri oporteret, convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Diviciaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerat, quem *vergobretum* appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae necisque in suos habet potestatem, graviter eos accusat, quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit, tam necessario tempore, tam propinquis hostibus ab iis non sublevetur, praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum suscepit; multo etiam gravius quod sit destitutus queritur.

17 Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: esse non nullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus possint quam ipsi magistratus. Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem detertere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant: praestare, si iam principatum Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre, neque dubitare debeant quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una cum reliqua Gallia Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi. Ab

isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse. Quin etiam, quod necessariam rem coactus Caesari enuntiarit, intellegere sese quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam causam quam diu potuerit tacuisse.

18 Caesar hac oratione Lisci Dumnorigem, Diviciaci fratrem, designari sentiebat, sed, quod pluribus praesentibus eas res iactari nolebat, celeriter concilium dimittit, Liscum retinet. Quaerit ex solo ea quae in conventu dixerat. Dicit liberius atque audacius. Eadem secreto ab aliis quaerit; reperit esse vera: ipsum esse Dumnorigem, summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum. Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Haeduum vectigalia parvo pretio redempta habere, propterea quod illo licente contra liceri audeat nemo. His rebus et suam rem familiarem auxisse et facultates ad largiendum magnas comparasse; magnum numerum equitatus suo sumptu semper alere et circum se habere, neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates largiter posse, atque huius potentiae causa matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo conlocasse; ipsum ex Helvetiis uxorem habere, sororum ex matre et propinquas suas nuptum in alias civitates conlocasse. Favere et cupere Helvetiis propter eam adfinitatem, odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos, quod eorum adventu potentia eius deminuta et Diviciacus frater in antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris sit restitutus. Si quid accidat Romanis, summam in spem per Helvetios regni obtinendi venire; imperio populi Romani non modo de regno, sed etiam de ea quam habeat gratia desperare. Reperiebat etiam in quaerendo Caesar, quod proelium equestre adversum paucis ante diebus esset factum, initium eius fugae factum a Dumnorige atque eius equitibus (nam equitatu, quem auxilio Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix

praeerat): eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum.

19 Quibus rebus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciones certissimae res accederent, quod per fines Sequanorum Helvetios traduxisset, quod obsides inter eos dando curasset, quod ea omnia non modo iniussu suo et civitatis sed etiam inscientibus ipsis fecisset, quod a magistratu Haeduum accusaretur, satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitatem animadvertere iuberet. His omnibus rebus unum repugnabat, quod Diviciaci fratris summum in populum Romanum studium, summum in se voluntatem, egregiam fidem, iustitiam, temperantiam cognoverat; nam ne eius supplicio Diviciaci animum offenderet verebatur. Itaque prius quam quicquam conaretur, Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet et, cotidianis interpretibus remotis, per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo conloquitur; simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio Gallorum de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit. Petit atque hortatur ut sine eius offensione animi vel ipse de eo causa cognita statuatur vel civitatem statuere iubeat.

20 Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset; quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri. Quod si quid ei a Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, neminem existimaturum non sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se

avertentur. Haec cum pluribus verbis flens a Caesare peteret, Caesar eius dextram premit; consolatus rogat finem orandi faciat; tanti eius apud se gratiam esse ostendit uti et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius voluntati ac precibus condonet. Dumnorigem ad se vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse intellegat, quae civitas queratur proponit; monet ut in reliquum tempus omnes suspiciones vitet; praeterita se Diviciaco fratri condonare dicit. Dumnorigi custodes ponit, ut quae agat, quibuscum loquatur scire possit.

21 Eodem die ab exploratoribus certior factus hostes sub monte consedisse milia passuum ab ipsius castris octo, qualis esset natura montis et qualis in circuitu ascensus qui cognoscerent misit. Renuntiatum est facilem esse. De tertia vigilia T. Labienum, legatum pro praetore, cum duabus legionibus et iis ducibus qui iter cognoverant summum iugum montis ascendere iubet; quid sui consilii sit ostendit. Ipse de quarta vigilia eodem itinere quo hostes ierant ad eos contendit equitatumque omnem ante se mittit. P. Considius, qui rei militaris peritissimus habebatur et in exercitu L. Sullae et postea in M. Crassi fuerat, cum exploratoribus praemittitur.

22 Prima luce, cum summus mons a Lucio Labieno teneretur, ipse ab hostium castris non longius mille et quingentis passibus abesset neque, ut postea ex captivis comperit, aut ipsius adventus aut Labieni cognitus esset, Considius equo admissus ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse. Caesar suas copias in proximum collem subducit, aciem instruit. Labienus, ut erat ei praeceptum a Caesare ne proelium committeret, nisi ipsius copiae prope hostium castra visae essent, ut undique uno tempore in hostes impetus fieret, monte occupato nostros expectabat proelioque

abstinebat. Multo denique die per exploratores Caesar cognovit et montem a suis teneri et Helvetios castra movisse et Considium timore perterritum quod non vidisset pro viso sibi renuntiavisse. Eo die quo consuerat intervallo hostes sequitur et milia passuum tria ab eorum castris castra ponit.

23 Postridie eius diei, quod omnino biduum supererat, cum exercitui frumentum metiri oporteret, et quod a Bibracte, oppido Haeduum longe maximo et copiosissimo, non amplius milibus passuum XVIII aberat, rei frumentariae prospiciendum existimavit; itaque iter ab Helvetiis avertit ac Bibracte ire contendit. Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemilii, decurionis equitum Gallorum, hostibus nuntiatur. Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacescere coeperunt.

24 Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subduxit equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium impetum, misit. Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas legiones quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat et omnia auxilia conlocavit, ita ut supra se totum montem hominibus compleret; impedimenta sarcinasque in unum locum conferri et eum ab iis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit. Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie, reiecto nostro equitatu, phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt.

25 Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus

suos proelium commisit. Milites loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Ea disiecta gladiis destrictis in eos impetum fecerunt. Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et conligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant, multi ut diu iactato brachio praeoptarent scutum manu emittere et nudo corpore pugnare. Tandem vulneribus defessi et pedem referre et, quod mons suberit circiter mille passuum spatio, eo se recipere coeperunt. Capto monte et succedentibus nostris, Boi et Tulingi, qui hominum milibus circiter XV agmen hostium claudebant et novissimis praesidio erant, ex itinere nostros ab latere aperto adgressi circumvenire, et id conspicati Helvetii, qui in montem sese receperant, rursus instare et proelium redintegrare coeperunt. Romani conversa signa bipertito intulerunt: prima et secunda acies, ut victis ac submotis resisteret, tertia, ut venientes sustineret.

26 Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt. Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit. Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pugnatum est, propterea quod pro vallo carros obiecerunt et e loco superiore in nostros venientes tela coniciebant et non nulli inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque vulnerabant. Diu cum esset pugnatum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti sunt. Ibi Orgetorigis filia atque unus e filiis captus est. Ex eo proelio circiter hominum milia CXXX superfuerunt eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso; in fines Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt, cum et

propter vulnera militum et propter sepulturam occisorum nostri triduum morati eos sequi non potuissent. Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re iuvarent: qui si iuvisent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum. Ipse triduo intermisso cum omnibus copiis eos sequi coepit.

27 Helvetii omnium rerum inopia adducti legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt. Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, paruerunt. Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent, poposcit. Dum ea conquiruntur et conferuntur, nocte intermissa circiter hominum milia VI eius pagi qui Verbigenus appellatur, sive timore perterriti, ne armis traditis supplicio adficerentur, sive spe salutis inducti, quod in tanta multitudine deditionum suam fugam aut occultari aut omnino ignorari posse existimarent, prima nocte e castris Helvetiorum egressi ad Rhenum finesque Germanorum contenderunt.

28 Quod ubi Caesar resciit, quorum per fines ierant his uti conquirent et reducerent, si sibi purgati esse vellent, imperavit; reductos in hostium numero habuit; reliquos omnes obsidibus, armis, perfugis traditis in deditionem accepit. Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, et, quod omnibus frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, restituere iussit. Id ea maxime ratione fecit, quod noluit eum locum unde Helvetii discesserant vacare, ne propter bonitatem agrorum Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, ex suis finibus in Helvetiorum fines transirent et finitimi Galliae provinciae Allobrogibusque essent. Boios petentibus Haeduis, quod

egregia virtute erant cogniti, ut in finibus suis conlocarent, concessit; quibus illi agros dederunt quosque postea in parem iuris libertatisque condicionem atque ipsi erant receperunt.

29 In castris Helvetiorum tabulae repertae sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim, quot pueri, senes mulieresque. Quarum omnium rerum summa erat capitum Helvetiorum milium CCLXIII, Tulingorum milium XXXVI, Latobrigorum XIII, Rauracorum XXIII, Boiorum XXXII; ex his qui arma ferre possent ad milia nonaginta duo. Summa omnium fuerunt ad milia CCCLXVIII. Eorum qui domum redierunt censu habito, ut Caesar imperaverat, repertus est numerus milium C et X.

30 Bello Helvetiorum confecto totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt: intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu terrae Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse, propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent. Petierunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent. Ea re permissa diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt.

31 Eo concilio dimisso, idem princeps civitatum qui ante fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de

sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret. Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: non minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent. Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduus: Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab Arvernibus Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur. Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad C et XX milium numerum. Cum his Haeduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum armis contendisse; magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse. Quibus proeliis calamitatibusque fractos, qui et sua virtute et populi Romani hospitio atque amicitia plurimum ante in Gallia potuissent, coactos esse Sequanis obsides dare nobilissimos civitatis et iure iurando civitatem obstringere sese neque obsides repetituros neque auxilium a populo Romano imploratorios neque recusatorios quo minus perpetuo sub illorum dicione atque imperio essent. Unum se esse ex omni civitate Haeduorum qui adduci non potuerit ut iuraret aut liberos suos obsides daret. Ob eam rem se ex civitate profugisse et Romam ad senatum venisse auxilium postulatam, quod solus neque iure iurando neque obsidibus teneretur. Sed peius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis accidisse, propterea quod Ariovistus, rex Germanorum, in eorum finibus consedisset tertiamque partem agri Sequani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupavisset et nunc de altera parte tertia Sequanos decedere iuberet, propterea quod

paucis mensibus ante Harudum milia hominum XXIII ad eum venissent, quibus locus ac sedes pararentur. Futurum esse paucis annis uti omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent; neque enim conferendum esse Gallicum cum Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem victus cum illa comparandam. Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque liberos poscere et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad voluntatem eius facta sit. Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium: non posse eius imperia diutius sustineri. Nisi quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit auxilii, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a Germanis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accadat, experiantur. Haec si enuntiata Ariovisto sint, non dubitare quin de omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint gravissimum supplicium sumat. Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Romani deterrere posse ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere.

32 Hac oratione ab Diviciaco habita omnes qui aderant magno fletu auxilium a Caesare petere coeperunt. Animadvertit Caesar unos ex omnibus Sequanos nihil earum rerum facere quas ceteri facerent sed tristes capite demisso terram intueri. Eius rei quae causa esset miratus ex ipsis quaesiit. Nihil Sequani respondere, sed in eadem tristitia taciti permanere. Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque ullam omnino vocem exprimere posset, idem Diviacus Haeduus respondit: hoc esse miseriorem et graviolem fortunam Sequanorum quam reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium

implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem, velut si coram adesset, horrerent, propterea quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas daretur, Sequanis vero, qui intra fines suos Ariovistum recepissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestate eius essent, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi.

³³ His rebus cognitis Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum. Hac oratione habita, concilium dimisit. Et secundum ea multae res eum hortabantur quare sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, in primis quod Haeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepe numero a senatu appellatos, in servitute atque in dicione videbat Germanorum teneri eorumque obsides esse apud Ariovistum ac Sequanos intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur. Paulatim autem Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire et in Galliam magnam eorum multitudinem venire populo Romano periculosum videbat, neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros temperaturos existimabat quin, cum omnem Galliam occupavissent, ut ante Cimbri Teutonique fecissent, in provinciam exirent atque inde in Italiam contenderent, praesertim cum Sequanos a provincia nostra Rhodanus divideret; quibus rebus quam maturime occurrendum putabat. Ipse autem Ariovistus tantos sibi spiritus, tantam arrogantiam sumpserat, ut ferendus non videretur.

³⁴ Quam ob rem placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis utriusque rebus cum eo agere. Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se

venire oportere. Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno comaeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse. Sibi autem mirum videri quid in sua Gallia, quam bello vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Romano negotii esset.

35 His responsis ad Caesarem relatis, iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit: quoniam tanto suo populiue Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eo postularet: primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis redderet Sequanisque permetteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret. Si id ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum.

36 Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. Si ipse populo Romano non praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in suo iure impediri. Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortunam temptassent et armis congressi ac superati essent, stipendiarios esse factos. Magnam

Caesarem iniuriam facere, qui suo adventu vectigalia sibi deteriora faceret. Haeduis se obsides redditurum non esse neque his neque eorum sociis iniuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo manerent quod convenisset stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id non fecissent, longe iis fratrum nomen populi Romani afuturum. Quod sibi Caesar denuntiaret se Haeduum iniurias non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse. Cum vellet, congredere: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos XIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent.

37 Haec eodem tempore Caesari mandata referebantur et legati ab Haeduis et a Treveris veniebant: Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse; Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedis, qui Rhenum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres. Quibus rebus Caesar vehementer commotus maturandum sibi existimavit, ne, si nova manus Sueborum cum veteribus copiis Ariovisti sese coniunxisset, minus facile resisti posset. Itaque re frumentaria quam celerrime potuit comparata magnis itineribus ad Ariovistum contendit.

38 Cum tridui viam processisset, nuntiatum est ei Ariovistum cum suis omnibus copiis ad occupandum Vesontionem, quod est oppidum maximum Sequanorum, contendere triduique viam a suis finibus processisse. Id ne accideret, magnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimabat. Namque omnium rerum quae ad bellum usui erant summa erat in eo oppido facultas, idque natura loci sic muniebatur ut magnam ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propterea quod flumen alduas Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit, reliquum spatium, quod est non amplius pedum MDC, qua

flumen intermittit, mons continet magna altitudine, ita ut radices eius montis ex utraque parte ripae fluminis contingant, hunc murus circumdatus arcem efficit et cum oppido coniungit. Huc Caesar magnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus contendit occupatoque oppido ibi praesidium conlocat.

39 Dum paucos dies ad Vesontionem rei frumentariae commeatusque causa moratur, ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse praedicabant (saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse), tantus subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit ut non mediocriter omnium mentes animosque perturbaret. Hic primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis, reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant: quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret; non nulli pudore adducti, ut timoris suspicionem vitarent, remanebant. Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant: abditi in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis commune periculum miserabantur. Vulgo totis castris testamenta obsignabantur. Horum vocibus ac timore paulatim etiam ii qui magnum in castris usum habebant, milites centurionesque quique equitatu praecerant, perturbabantur. Qui se ex his minus timidos existimari volebant, non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam, ut satis commode supportari posset, timere dicebant. Non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientes milites

neque propter timorem signa laturos.

40 Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent. Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret? Sibi quidem persuaderi cognitis suis postulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi Romani gratiam repudiaturum. Quod si furore atque amentia impulsus bellum intulisset, quid tandem vererentur? Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent? Factum eius hostis periculum patrum nostrorum memoria Cimbris et Teutonis a C. Mario pulsus cum non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritis videbatur; factum etiam nuper in Italia servili tumultu, quos tamen aliquid usus ac disciplina, quam a nobis acceperant, sublevarint. Ex quo iudicari posse quantum haberet in se boni constantia, propterea quod quos aliquam diu inermes sine causa timuissent hos postea armatos ac victores superassent. Denique hos esse eosdem Germanos quibuscum saepe numero Helvetii congressi non solum in suis sed etiam in illorum finibus plerumque superarint, qui tamen pares esse nostro exercitui non potuerint. Si quos adversum proelium et fuga Gallorum commoveret, hos, si quaerent, reperire posse diuturnitate belli defatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset neque sui potestatem fecisset, desperantes iam de pugna et dispersos subito adortum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros atque imperitos locus fuisset, hac ne ipsum quidem sperare nostros exercitus capi posse. Qui suum timorem in rei frumentariae simulationem

angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum aut de officio imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur. Haec sibi esse curae; frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura; de itinere ipsos brevi tempore iudicatuos. Quod non fore dicto audientes neque signa latu-
dicantur, nihil se ea re commoveri: scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. Itaque se quod in longiorem diem conlaturus fuisset repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta vigilia castra moturum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an timor plus valeret. Quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua non dubitet, sibi-
que eam praetoriam cohortem futuram. Huic legioni Caesar et indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime.

41 Hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi innata est, princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit. Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satis facerent: se neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed imperatoris esse existimavisse. Eorum satisfactione accepta et itinere exquisito per Diviciacum, quod ex Gallis ei maximam fidem habebat, ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret, de quarta vigilia, ut dixerat, profectus est. Septimo die, cum iter non intermitteret, ab exploratoribus certior factus est Ariovisti copias a

nostris milia passuum IIII et XX abesse.

42 Cognito Caesaris adventu Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse existimaret. Non respuit condicionem Caesar iamque eum ad sanitatem reverti arbitrabatur, cum id quod antea petenti denegasset ultro polliceretur, magnamque in spem veniebat pro suis tantis populique Romani in eum beneficiis cognitis suis postulatis fore uti pertinacia desisteret. Dies conloquio dictus est ex eo die quintus. Interim saepe cum legati ultro citroque inter eos mitterentur, Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar adduceret: vereri se ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu veniret: alia ratione sese non esse venturum. Caesar, quod neque conloquium interposita causa tolli volebat neque salutem suam Gallorum equitatu committere audebat, commodissimum esse statuit omnibus equis Gallis equitibus detractis eo legionarios milites legionis X., cui quam maxime confidebat, imponere, ut praesidium quam amicissimum, si quid opus facto esset, haberet. Quod cum fieret, non inridicule quidam ex militibus X. legionis dixit: plus quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum se in cohortis praetoriae loco X. legionem habiturum ad equum rescribere.

43 Planities erat magna et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis. Hic locus aequum fere spatium a castris Ariovisti et Caesaris aberat. Eo, ut erat dictum, ad conloquium venerunt. Legionem Caesar, quam equis devexerat, passibus CC ab eo tumulo constituit. Item equites Ariovisti pari intervallo constiterunt. Ariovistus ex equis ut conloquerentur et praeter se denos ad conloquium adducerent postulavit. Ubi eo ventum est, Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex appellatus esset a senatu,

quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat; illum, cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iustam haberet, beneficio ac liberalitate sua ac senatus ea praemia consecutum. Docebat etiam quam veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercederent, quae senatus consulta quotiens quamque honorifica in eos facta essent, ut omni tempore totius Galliae principatum Haedui tenuissent, prius etiam quam nostram amicitiam adpetissent. Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse; quod vero ad amicitiam populi Romani attulissent, id iis eripi quis pati posset? Postulavit deinde eadem quae legatis in mandatis dederat: ne aut Haeduis aut eorum sociis bellum inferret, obsides redderet, si nullam partem Germanorum domum remittere posset, at ne quos amplius Rhenum transire pateretur.

44 Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit: transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed rogatum et arcessitum a Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint. Non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas esse. Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerit. Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, atque se hac spe petisse. Si per populum

Romanum stipendium remittatur et dediticii subtrahantur, non minus libenter sese recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam quam adpetierit. Quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam traducat, id se sui muniendi, non Galliae oppugnandae causa facere; eius rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogatus non venerit et quod bellum non intulerit sed defenderit. Se prius in Galliam venisse quam populum Romanum. Numquam ante hoc tempus exercitum populi Romani Galliae provinciae finibus egressum. Quid sibi vellet? Cur in suas possessiones veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut illam nostram. Ut ipsi concedi non oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos, quod in suo iure se interpellaremus. Quod fratres a senatu Haeduos appellatos diceret, non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos in iis contentionibus quas Haedui secum et cum Sequanis habuissent auxilio populi Romani usos esse. Debere se suspicari simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi causa habere. Qui nisi decedat atque exercitum deducat ex his regionibus, sese illum non pro amico sed pro hoste habiturum. Quod si eum interfecerit, multis sese nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum (id se ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere), quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset. Quod si decessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi tradidisset, magno se illum praemio remuneraturum et quaecumque bella geri vellet sine ullo eius labore et periculo confecturum.

45 Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios desereret, neque se

iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium posuisset. Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset.

46 Dum haec in conloquio geruntur, Caesari nuntiatum est equites Ariovisti propius tumultum accedere et ad nostros adequitare, lapides telaque in nostros coicere. Caesar loquendi finem fecit seque ad suos recepit suisque imperavit ne quod omnino telum in hostes reicerent. Nam etsi sine ullo periculo legionis delectae cum equitatu proelium fore videbat, tamen committendum non putabat ut, pulsus hostibus, dici posset eos ab se per fidem in conloquio circumventos. Postea quam in vulgus militum elatum est qua arrogantia in conloquio Ariovistus usus omni Gallia Romanis interdixisset, impetumque in nostros eius equites fecissent, eaque res conloquium ut diremisset, multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum est.

47 Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter eos egi coepit neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret. Conloquendi Caesari causa visa non est, et eo magis quod pridie eius diei Germani retineri non potuerant quin tela in nostros coicerent. Legatum ex suis sese magno cum periculo ad eum missurum et hominibus feris obiecturum existimabat. Commodissimum visum est C. Valerium Procillum, C. Valerii Caburi filium, summa virtute et humanitate adolescentem, cuius pater a C. Valerio Flacco civitate donatus erat, et propter fidem

et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam, qua multa iam Ariovistus longinqua consuetudine utebatur, et quod in eo peccandi Germanis causa non esset, ad eum mittere, et una M. Metium, qui hospitio Ariovisti utebatur. His mandavit quae diceret Ariovistus cognoscerent et ad se referrent. Quos cum apud se in castris Ariovistus conspexisset, exercitu suo praesente conclamavit: quid ad se venirent? an speculandi causa? Conantes dicere prohibuit et in catenas coniecit.

48 Eodem die castra promovit et milibus passuum VI a Caesaris castris sub monte consedit. Postridie eius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copias traduxit et milibus passuum duobus ultra eum castra fecit eo consilio uti frumento commeatuque qui ex Sequanis et Haeduis supportaretur Caesarem intercluderet. Ex eo die dies continuos V Caesar pro castris suas copias produxit et aciem instructam habuit, ut, si vellet Ariovistus proelio contendere, ei potestas non deesset. Ariovistus his omnibus diebus exercitum castris continuit, equestri proelio cotidie contendit. Genus hoc erat pugnae, quo se Germani exercuerant: equitum milia erant VI, totidem numero pedites velocissimi ac fortissimi, quos ex omni copia singuli singulos suae salutis causa delegerant: cum his in proeliis versabantur, ad eos se equites recipiebant; hi, si quid erat durius, concurrebant, si qui graviore vulnere accepto equo deciderat, circumsistebant; si quo erat longius prodeundum aut celerius recipiendum, tanta erat horum exercitatione celeritas ut iubis sublevati equorum cursum adaequarent.

49 Ubi eum castris se tenere Caesar intellexit, ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur, ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant, circiter passus DC ab his, castris idoneum locum delegit acieque triplici instructa ad eum locum venit. Primam et secundam aciem in

armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit. Hic locus ab hoste circiter passus DC, uti dictum est, aberat. Eo circiter hominum XVI milia expedita cum omni equitatu Ariovistus misit, quae copiae nostros terrerent et munitione prohiberent. Nihilo setius Caesar, ut ante constituerat, duas acies hostem propulsare, tertiam opus perficere iussit. Munitis castris duas ibi legiones reliquit et partem auxiliorum, quattuor reliquas legiones in castra maiora reduxit.

50 Proximo die instituto suo Caesar ex castris utrisque copias suas eduxit paulumque a maioribus castris progressus aciem instruxit hostibusque pugnandi potestatem fecit. Ubi ne tum quidem eos prodire intellexit, circiter meridiem exercitum in castra reduxit. Tum demum Ariovistus partem suarum copiarum, quae castra minora oppugnaret, misit. Acriter utrimque usque ad vesperum pugnatum est. Solis occasu suas copias Ariovistus multis et inlatis et acceptis vulneribus in castra reduxit. Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, hanc reperiēbat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset ut matres familiae eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent utrum proelium committi ex usu esset necne; eas ita dicere: non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam lunam proelio contendissent.

51 Postridie eius diei Caesar praesidio utrisque castris quod satis esse visum est reliquit, alarios omnes in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quod minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur; ipse triplici instructa acie usque ad castra hostium accessit. Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Tribocos, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes

in fuga relinqueretur. Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes milites passis manibus flentes implorabant ne se in servitutem Romanis traderent.

52 Caesar singulis legionibus singulos legatos et quaestorem praefecit, uti eos testes suae quisque virtutis haberet; ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit. Ita nostri acriter in hostes signo dato impetum fecerunt itaque hostes repente celeriterque procurrerunt, ut spatium pila in hostes coiciendi non daretur. Relictis pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est. At Germani celeriter ex consuetudine sua phalange facta impetus gladiatorum exceperunt. Reperti sunt complures nostri qui in phalanga insilirent et scuta manibus revellerent et desuper vulnerarent. Cum hostium acies a sinistro cornu pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, a dextro cornu vehementer multitudine suorum nostram aciem premebant. Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus adolescens, qui equitatu praerat, quod expeditior erat quam ii qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem laborantibus nostris subsidio misit.

53 Ita proelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga verterunt nec prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter L pervenerunt. Ibi perpauci aut viribus confisi tranare contenderunt aut lintribus inventis sibi salutem reppererunt. In his fuit Ariovistus, qui naviculam deligatam ad ripam nactus ea profugit; reliquos omnes consecuti equites nostri interfecerunt. Duae fuerunt Ariovisti uxores, una Sueba natione, quam domo secum eduxerat, altera Norica, regis Voccionis soror, quam in Gallia duxerat a fratre missam: utraque in ea fuga periit; duae filiae: harum altera occisa, altera capta est. C. Valerius Procillus, cum a custodibus in fuga trinis catenis vinctus traheretur, in ipsum Caesarem hostes

equitatu insequentem incidit. Quae quidem res Caesari non minorem quam ipsa victoria voluptatem attulit, quod hominem honestissimum provinciae Galliae, suum familiarem et hospitem, ereptum ex manibus hostium sibi restitutum videbat neque eius calamitate de tanta voluptate et gratulatione quicquam fortuna deminuerat. Is se praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur an in aliud tempus reservaretur: sortium beneficio se esse incolumem. Item M. Metius repertus et ad eum reductus est.

54 Hoc proelio trans Rhenum nuntiato, Suebi, qui ad ripas Rheni venerant, domum reverti coeperunt; quos ubi qui proximi Rhenum incolunt perterritos senserunt, insecuti magnum ex iis numerum occiderunt. Caesar una aestate duobus maximis bellis confectis maturius paulo quam tempus anni postulabat in hiberna in Sequanos exercitum deduxit; hibernis Labienum praeposuit; ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

LIBER II

1 Cum esset Caesar in citeriore Gallia in hibernis, ita uti supra demonstravimus, crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat omnes Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra populum Romanum coniurare obsidesque inter se dare. Coniurandi has esse causas: primum quod vererentur ne, omni pacata Gallia, ad eos exercitus noster adduceretur; deinde quod ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui, ut Germanos diutius in Gallia versari noluerant, ita populi Romani exercitum hiemare atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant, partim qui mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant; ab non nullis etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro consequi poterant.

2 His nuntiis litterisque commotus Caesar duas legiones in citeriore Gallia novas conscripsit et inita aestate in ulteriorem Galliam qui deduceret Q. Pedium legatum misit. Ipse, cum primum pabuli copia esse inciperet, ad exercitum venit. Dat negotium Senonibus reliquisque Gallis qui finitimi Belgis erant uti ea quae apud eos gerantur cognoscant seque de his rebus certiore faciant. Hi constanter omnes nuntiaverunt manus cogi, exercitum in unum locum conduci. Tum vero dubitandum non existimavit quin ad eos proficisceretur. Re frumentaria provisa castra movet diebusque circiter XV ad fines Belgarum pervenit.

3 Eo cum de improvviso celeriusque omnium opinione venisset, Remi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum legatos Iccium et Andebrogium, primos civitatis, miserunt, qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se

cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra populum Romanum coniurasse, paratosque esse et obsides dare et imperata facere et oppidis recipere et frumento ceterisque rebus iuvare; reliquos omnes Belgas in armis esse, Germanosque qui cis Rhenum incolant sese cum his coniunxisse, tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem ut ne Suessiones quidem, fratres consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, deterrire potuerint quin cum iis consentirent.

4 Cum ab iis quaereret quae civitates quantaeque in armis essent et quid in bello possent, sic reperiebat: plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter loci fertilitatem ibi consedis Gallosque qui ea loca incolerent expulisse, solosque esse qui, patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata, Teutonos Cimbrosque intra suos fines ingredi prohibuerint; qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent. De numero eorum omnia se habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus adfinitatibus quo coniuncti quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint. Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia centum, pollicitos ex eo numero electa milia LX totiusque belli imperium sibi postulare. Suessiones suos esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere. Apud eos fuisse regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae potentissimum, qui cum magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse regem Galbam: ad hunc propter iustitiam prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium voluntate deferri; oppida habere numero XII, polliceri milia armata L; totidem Nervios, qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur

longissimeque absint; XV milia Atrebates, Ambianos X milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios VII milia, Caletos X milia, Veliocasses et Viromandos totidem, Atuaticos XVIII milia; Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur, arbitrari ad XL milia.

5 Caesar Remos cohortatus liberaliterque oratione prosecutus omnem senatum ad se convenire principumque liberos obsides ad se adduci iussit. Quae omnia ab his diligenter ad diem facta sunt. Ipse Diviciacum Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet quanto opere rei publicae communisque salutis intersit manus hostium distineri, ne cum tanta multitudine uno tempore confligendum sit. Id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum agros populari coeperint. His datis mandatis eum a se dimittit. Postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se venire vidit neque iam longe abesse ab iis quos miserat exploratoribus et ab Remis cognovit, flumen Axonam, quod est in extremis Remorum finibus, exercitum traducere maturavit atque ibi castra posuit. Quae res et latus unum castrorum ripis fluminis muniebat et post eum quae erant tuta ab hostibus reddebat et commeatus ab Remis reliquisque civitatibus ut sine periculo ad eum portari possent efficiebat. In eo flumine pons erat. Ibi praesidium ponit et in altera parte fluminis Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum sex cohortibus relinquit; castra in altitudinem pedum XII vallo fossaque duodeviginti pedum muniri iubet.

6 Ab his castris oppidum Remorum nomine Bibrax aberat milia passuum VIII. Id ex itinere magno impetu Belgae oppugnare coeperunt. Aegre eo die sustentatum est. Gallorum eadem atque Belgarum oppugnatio est haec: ubi circumiecta multitudine hominum totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt murusque

defensoribus nudatus est, testudine facta portas succedunt murumque subruunt. Quod tum facile fiebat. Nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela coicerent, in muro consistendi potestas erat nulli. Cum finem oppugnandi nox fecisset, Iccius Remus, summa nobilitate et gratia inter suos, qui tum oppido praeerat, unus ex iis qui legati de pace ad Caesarem venerant, nuntium ad eum mittit, nisi subsidium sibi submittatur, sese diutius sustinere non posse.

7 Eo de media nocte Caesar isdem ducibus usus qui nuntii ab Iccio venerant, Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Baleares subsidio oppidanis mittit; quorum adventu et Remis cum spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit et hostibus eadem de causa spes potiundi oppidi discessit. Itaque paulisper apud oppidum morati agrosque Remorum depopulati, omnibus vicis aedificiisque quo adire potuerant incensis, ad castra Caesaris omnibus copiis contenderunt et a milibus passuum minus duobus castra posuerunt; quae castra, ut fumo atque ignibus significabatur, amplius milibus passuum VIII latitudinem patebant.

8 Caesar primo et propter multitudinem hostium et propter eximiam opinionem virtutis proelio supersedere statuit; cotidie tamen equestribus proeliis quid hostis virtute posset et quid nostri auderent periclitabatur. Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura oportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis ubi castra posita erant paululum ex planitie editus tantum adversus in latitudinem patebat quantum loci acies instructa occupare poterat, atque ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat et in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit circiter passuum CCCC et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta conlocavit, ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes, quod tantum multitudine poterant, ab

lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent. Hoc facto, duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis ut, si quo opus esset, subsidio duci possent, reliquas VI legiones pro castris in acie constituit. Hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerunt.

9 Palus erat non magna inter nostrum atque hostium exercitum. Hanc si nostri transirent hostes expectabant; nostri autem, si ab illis initium transeundi fieret, ut impeditos adgrederentur, parati in armis erant. Interim proelio equestri inter duas acies contendebatur. Ubi neutri transeundi initium faciunt, secundiore equitum proelio nostris Caesar suos in castra reduxit. Hostes protinus ex eo loco ad flumen Axonam contenderunt, quod esse post nostra castra demonstratum est. Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt eo consilio ut, si possent, castellum, cui praeerat Q. Titurius legatus, expugnarent pontemque interscinderent; si minus potuissent, agros Remorum popularentur, qui magno nobis usui ad bellum gerendum erant, commeatuque nostros prohiberent.

10 Caesar certior factus ab Titurio omnem equitatum et levis armaturae Numidas, funditores sagittariosque pontem traducit atque ad eos contendit. Acriter in eo loco pugnatum est. Hostes impeditos nostri in flumine adgressi magnum eorum numerum occiderunt; per eorum corpora reliquos audacissime transire conantes multitudine telorum reppulerunt primosque, qui transierant, equitatu circumventos interfecerunt. Hostes, ubi et de expugnando oppido et de flumine transeundo spem se fefellisse intellexerunt neque nostros in locum iniquiorem progredi pugnandi causa viderunt atque ipsos res frumentaria deficere coepit, concilio convocato constituerunt optimum esse domum suam quemque reverti, et quorum in fines primum Romani exercitum introduxissent, ad eos defendendos

undique convenirent, ut potius in suis quam in alienis finibus decertarent et domesticis copiis rei frumentariae uterentur. Ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod Diviciacum atque Haeduos finibus Bellovacorum adpropinquare cognoverant. His persuaderi ut diutius morarentur neque suis auxilium ferrent non poterat.

11 Ea re constituta, secunda vigilia magno cum, strepitu ac tumultu castris egressi nullo certo ordine neque imperio, cum sibi quisque primum itineris locum peteret et domum pervenire properaret, fecerunt ut consimilis fugae profectio videretur. Hac re statim Caesar per speculatores cognita insidias veritus, quod qua de causa discederent nondum perspexerat, exercitum equitatumque castris continuit. Prima luce, confirmata re ab exploratoribus, omnem equitatum, qui novissimum agmen moraretur, praemisit. His Q. Pedium et L. Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praefecit; T. Labienum legatum cum legionibus tribus subsequi iussit. Hi novissimos adorti et multa milia passuum prosecuti magnam multitudinem eorum fugientium conciderunt, cum ab extremo agmine, ad quos ventum erat, consisterent fortiterque impetum nostrorum militum sustinerent, priores, quod abesse a periculo viderentur neque ulla necessitate neque imperio continerentur, exaudito clamore perturbatis ordinibus omnes in fuga sibi praesidium ponerent. Ita sine ullo periculo tantam eorum multitudinem nostri interfecerunt quantum fuit diei spatium; sub occasum solis sequi destiterunt seque in castra, ut erat imperatum, receperunt.

12 Postridie eius diei Caesar, prius quam se hostes ex terrore ac fuga reciperent, in fines Suessionum, qui proximi Remis erant, exercitum duxit et magno itinere confecto ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit. Id ex itinere oppugnare conatus, quod vacuum ab

defensoribus esse audiebat, propter latitudinem fossae murique altitudinem paucis defendentibus expugnare non potuit. Castris munitis vineas agere quaeque ad oppugnandum usui erant comparare coepit. Interim omnis ex fuga Suessionum multitudo in oppidum proxima nocte convenit. Celeriter vineis ad oppidum actis, aggere iacto turribusque constitutis, magnitudine operum, quae neque viderant ante Galli neque audierant, et celeritate Romanorum permoti legatos ad Caesarem de deditione mittunt et petentibus Remis ut conservarentur impetrant.

13 Caesar, obsidibus acceptis primis civitatis atque ipsius Galbae regis duobus filiis armisque omnibus ex oppido traditis, in deditionem Suessiones accipit exercitumque in Bellovacos ducit. Qui cum se suaque omnia in oppidum Bratuspantium contulissent atque ab eo oppido Caesar cum exercitu circiter milia passuum V abesset, omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum Romanum armis contendere. Item, cum ad oppidum accessisset castraque ibi poneret, pueri mulieresque ex muro passis manibus suo more pacem ab Romanis petierunt.

14 Pro his Diviciacus (nam post discessum Belgarum dimissis Haeduum copiis ad eum reverterat) facit verba: Bellovacos omni tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse; impulsos ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitutem redactos. Omnes indignitates contumeliasque perferre, et ab Haeduis defecisse et populo Romano bellum intulisse. Qui eius consilii principes fuissent, quod intellegerent quantam calamitatem civitati intulissent, in Britanniam profugisse. Petere non solum Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Haeduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur. Quod si fecerit, Haeduum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas

amplificaturum, quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare consuerint.

15 Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduorum causa sese eos in fidem recepturum et conservaturum dixit, et quod erat civitas magna inter Belgas auctoritate atque hominum multitudine praestabat, DC obsides poposcit. His traditis omnibusque armis ex oppido conlatis, ab eo loco in fines Ambianorum pervenit; qui se suaque omnia sine mora dederunt. Eorum fines Nervii attingebant. Quorum de natura moribusque Caesar cum quaereret, sic reperiebat: nullum esse aditum ad eos mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarumque rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium inferri, quod his rebus relanguescere animos eorum et remitti virtutem existimarent; esse homines feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent; confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem pacis accepturos.

16 Cum per eorum fines triduum iter fecisset, inveniebat ex captivis Sabim flumen a castris suis non amplius milibus passuum X abesse; trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedissee adventumque ibi Romanorum expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis (nam his utrisque persuaserant uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur); expectari etiam ab iis Atuatuorum copias atque esse in itinere; mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam inutiles viderentur in eum locum coniecisse quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non esset.

17 His rebus cognitis, exploratores centurionesque praemittit qui locum castris idoneum deligant. Cum ex dediticiis Belgis reliquisque Gallis complures Caesarem secuti una iter facerent, quidam ex his, ut postea ex captivis cognitum est, eorum dierum consuetudine itineris nostri exercitus perspecta, nocte ad Nervios pervenerunt atque his

demonstrarunt inter singulas legiones impedimentorum magnum numerum intercedere, neque esse quicquam negotii, cum prima legio in castra venisset reliquaeque legiones magnum spatium abessent, hanc sub sarcinis adoriri; qua pulsa impedimentisque direptis, futurum ut reliquae contra consistere non auderent. Adiuvabat etiam eorum consilium qui rem deferebant quod Nervii antiquitus, cum equitatu nihil possent (neque enim ad hoc tempus ei rei student, sed quicquid possunt, pedestribus valent copiis), quo facilius finitimorum equitatum, si praedandi causa ad eos venissent, impedirent, teneris arboribus incisis atque inflexis crebrisque in latitudinem ramis enatis et rubis sentibusque interiectis effecerant ut instar muri hae saepes munimentum praeberent, quo non modo non intrari sed ne perspicere quidem posset. His rebus cum iter agminis nostri impediretur, non omittendum sibi consilium Nervii existimaverunt.

18 Loci natura erat haec, quem locum nostri castris delegerant. Collis ab summo aequaliter declivis ad flumen Sabim, quod supra nominavimus, vergebat. Ab eo flumine pari acclivitate collis nascebatur adversus huic et contrarius, passus circiter CC infimus apertus, ab superiore parte silvestris, ut non facile introrsus perspicere posset. Intra eas silvas hostes in occulto sese continebant; in aperto loco secundum flumen paucae stationes equitum videbantur. Fluminis erat altitudo pedum circiter trium.

19 Caesar equitatu praemisso subsequebatur omnibus copiis; sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant. Nam quod hostibus adpropinquabat, consuetudine sua Caesar VI legiones expeditas ducebat; post eas totius exercitus impedimenta conlocarat; inde duae legiones quae proxime conscriptae erant totum agmen claudebant praesidioque impedimentis erant. Equites nostri cum funditoribus sagittariisque

flumen transgressi cum hostium equitatu proelium commiserunt. Cum se illi identidem in silvis ad suos reciperent ac rursus ex silva in nostros impetum facerent, neque nostri longius quam quem ad finem porrecta ac loca aperta pertinebant cedentes insequi auderent, interim legiones VI quae primae venerant, opere dimenso, castra munire coeperunt. Ubi prima impedimenta nostri exercitus ab iis qui in silvis abditi latebant visa sunt, quod tempus inter eos committendi proelii convenerat, ut intra silvas aciem ordinesque constituerant atque ipsi sese confirmaverant, subito omnibus copiis provolaverunt impetumque in nostros equites fecerunt. His facile pulsus ac proturbatis, incredibili celeritate ad flumen decucurrerunt, ut paene uno tempore et ad silvas et in flumine et iam in manibus nostris hostes viderentur. Eadem autem celeritate adverso colle ad nostra castra atque eos qui in opere occupati erant contenderunt.

20 Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda: vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne, cum ad arma concurri oporteret; signum tuba dandum; ab opere revocandi milites; qui paulo longius aggeris petendi causa processerant arcessendi; acies instruenda; milites cohortandi; signum dandum. Quarum rerum magnam partem temporis brevitatis et incursus hostium impendebat. His difficultatibus duae res erant subsidio, scientia atque usus militum, quod superioribus proeliis exercitati quid fieri oporteret non minus commode ipsi sibi praescribere quam ab aliis doceri poterant, et quod ab opere singulisque legionibus singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat. Hi propter propinquitatem et celeritatem hostium nihil iam Caesaris imperium expectabant, sed per se quae videbantur administrabant.

21 Caesar, necessariis rebus imperatis, ad cohortandos milites, quam in partem fors obtulit, decucurrit et ad legionem decimam

devenit. Milites non longiore oratione cohortatus quam uti suae pristinae virtutis memoriam retinerent neu perturbarentur animo hostiumque impetum fortiter sustinerent, quod non longius hostes aberant quam quo telum adigi posset, proelii committendi signum dedit. Atque in alteram item cohortandi causa profectus pugnantibus occurrit. Temporis tanta fuit exiguitas hostiumque tam paratus ad dimicandum animus ut non modo ad insignia accommodanda sed etiam ad galeas induendas scutisque tegimenta detrahenda tempus defuerit. Quam quisque ab opere in partem casu devenit quaeque prima signa conspexit, ad haec constitit, ne in quaerendis suis pugnandi tempus dimitteret.

22 Instructo exercitu magis ut loci natura deiectusque collis et necessitas temporis quam ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat, cum diversae legiones aliae alia in parte hostibus resisterent saepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, interiectis prospectus impediretur, neque certa subsidia conlocari neque quid in quaque parte opus esset provideri neque ab uno omnia imperia administrari poterant. Itaque in tanta rerum iniquitate fortunae quoque eventus varii sequebantur.

23 Legionis VIII. et X. milites, ut in sinistra parte aciei constiterant, pilis emissis cursu ac lassitudine exanimatos vulneribusque confectos Atrebates (nam his ea pars obvenerat) celeriter ex loco superiore in flumen compulerunt et transire conantes insecuti gladiis magnam partem eorum impeditam interfecerunt. Ipsi transire flumen non dubitaverunt et in locum iniquum progressi rursus resistentes hostes redintegrato proelio in fugam coniecerunt. Item alia in parte diversae duae legiones, XI. et VIII., profligatis Viromanduis, quibuscum erant congressae, ex loco superiore in ipsis fluminis ripis proeliabantur. At totis fere castris a fronte et a sinistra

parte nudatis, cum in dextro cornu legio XII. et non magno ab ea intervallo VII. constitisset, omnes Nervii confertissimo agmine duce Boduognato, qui summam imperii tenebat, ad eum locum contenderunt; quorum pars ab aperto latere legiones circumvenire, pars summum castrorum locum petere coepit.

24 Eodem tempore equites nostri levisque armaturae pedites, qui cum iis una fuerant, quos primo hostium impetu pulsos dixeram, cum se in castra reciperent, adversis hostibus occurrebant ac rursus aliam in partem fugam petebant; et calones, qui ab decumana porta ac summo iugo collis nostros victores flumen transire conspexerant, praedandi causa egressi, cum respexissent et hostes in nostris castris versari vidissent, praecipites fugae sese mandabant. Simul eorum qui cum impedimentis veniebant clamor fremitusque oriebatur, aliique aliam in partem perterriti ferebantur. Quibus omnibus rebus permoti equites Treveri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis, qui auxilii causa a civitate missi ad Caesarem venerant, cum multitudine hostium castra nostra compleri, legiones premi et paene circumventas teneri, calones, equites, funditores, Numidas diversos dissipatosque in omnes partes fugere vidissent, desperatis nostris rebus domum contenderunt: Romanos pulsos superatosque, castris impedimentisque eorum hostes potitos civitati renuntiaverunt.

25 Caesar ab X. legionis cohortatione ad dextrum cornu profectus, ubi suos urgeri signisque in unum locum conlatis XII. legionis confertos milites sibi ipsos ad pugnam esse impedimento vidit, quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus occisis signiferoque interfecto, signo amisso, reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis, in his primipilo P. Sextio Baculo, fortissimo viro, multis gravibusque vulneribus confecto, ut iam se sustinere non posset, reliquos esse tardiores et non nullos ab

novissimis deserto loco proelio excedere ac tela vitare, hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere instare et rem esse in angusto vidit, neque ullum esse subsidium quod submitti posset, scuto ab novissimis uni militi detracto, quod ipse eo sine scuto venerat, in primam aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus milites signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti possent. Cuius adventu spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu imperatoris etiam in extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet, paulum hostium impetus tardatus est.

26 Caesar, cum VII. legionem, quae iuxta constiterat, item urgeri ab hoste vidisset, tribunos militum monuit ut paulatim sese legiones coniungerent et conversa signa in hostes inferrent. Quo facto cum aliis alii subsidium ferrent neque timerent ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare coeperunt. Interim milites legionum duarum quae in novissimo agmine praesidio impedimentis fuerant, proelio nuntiato, cursu incitato in summo colle ab hostibus conspiciebantur, et T. Labienus castris hostium potitus et ex loco superiore quae res in nostris castris gererentur conspicatus X. legionem subsidio nostris misit. Qui cum ex equitum et calorum fuga quo in loco res esset quantoque in periculo et castra et legiones et imperator versaretur cognovissent, nihil ad celeritatem sibi reliqui fecerunt.

27 Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui vulneribus confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent, equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnae se legionariis militibus praeferrent. At hostes, etiam in extrema spe salutis, tantam virtutem praestiterunt

ut, cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent, his deiectis et coacervatis cadaveribus qui superessent ut ex tumultu tela in nostros conicerent et pila intercepta remitterent: ut non nequiquam tantae virtutis homines iudicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas ripas, subire iniquissimum locum; quae facilia ex difficillimis animi magnitudo redegerat.

28 Hoc proelio facto et prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto, maiores natu, quos una cum pueris mulieribusque in aestuaria ac paludes coniectos dixeramus, hac pugna nuntiata, cum victoribus nihil impeditum, victis nihil tutum arbitrarentur, omnium qui supererant consensu legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dediderunt; et in commemoranda civitatis calamitate ex DC ad tres senatores, ex hominum milibus LX vix ad D, qui arma ferre possent, sese redactos esse dixerunt. Quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus atque oppidis uti iussit et finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque prohiberent.

29 Atuatuco, de quibus supra diximus, cum omnibus copiis auxilio Nervii venirent, hac pugna nuntiata ex itinere domum reverterunt; cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis sua omnia in unum oppidum egregie natura munitum contulerunt. Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes deiectusque haberet, una ex parte leniter acclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius pedum CC relinquebatur; quem locum duplici altissimo muro munierant; tum magni ponderis saxa et praeacutas trabes in muro conlocabant. Ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui, cum iter in provinciam nostram atque Italiam facerent, iis impedimentis quae secum agere ac portare non poterant citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodiam ex

suis ac praesidium VI milia hominum una reliquerant. Hi post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, cum alias bellum inferrent, alias inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum delegerant.

30 Ac primo adventu exercitus nostri crebras ex oppido excursiones faciebant parvulisque proeliis cum nostris contendebant; postea vallo pedum XII in circuitu quindecim milium crebrisque castellis circummuniti oppido sese continebant. Ubi vineis actis aggere extructo turrim procul constitui viderunt, primum inridere ex muro atque increpitare vocibus, quod tanta machinatio a tanto spatio institueretur: quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae (nam plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum quorum brevitudo nostra contemptui est) tanti oneris turrim in muro sese posse conlocare confiderent?

31 Ubi vero moveri et adpropinquare muris viderunt, nova atque inusitata specie commoti legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt, qui ad hunc modum locuti; non se existimare Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere possent; se suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt. Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuaticos esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret. Sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos ac suae virtuti invidere; a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent. Sibi praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati quam ab his per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consueverant.

32 Ad haec Caesar respondit: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent; sed deditionis nullam esse condicionem nisi

armis traditis. Se id quod in Nervii fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam inferrent. Re renuntiata ad suos illi se quae imperarentur facere dixerunt. Armorum magna multitudine de muro in fossam, quae erat ante oppidum, iacta, sic ut prope summam muri aggerisque altitudinem acervi armorum adaequarent, et tamen circiter parte tertia, ut postea perspectum est, celata atque in oppido retenta, portis patefactis eo die pace sunt usi.

33 Sub vesperum Caesar portas claudi militesque ex oppido exire iussit, ne quam noctu oppidani a militibus iniuriam acciperent. Illi ante inito, ut intellectum est, consilio, quod deditione facta nostros praesidia deducturos aut denique indiligentius servaturos crediderant, partim cum iis quae retinuerant et celaverant armis, partim scutis ex cortice factis aut viminibus intextis, quae subito, ut temporis exiguitas postulabat, pellibus induxerant, tertia vigilia, qua minime arduus ad nostras munitiones ascensus videbatur, omnibus copiis repente ex oppido eruptionem fecerunt. Celeriter, ut ante Caesar imperaverat, ignibus significatione facta, ex proximis castellis eo concursus est, pugnatumque ab hostibus ita acriter est ut a viris fortibus in extrema spe salutis iniquo loco contra eos qui ex vallo turribusque tela iacerent pugnari debuit, cum in una virtute omnis spes consisteret. Occisis ad hominum milibus IIII reliqui in oppidum reiecti sunt. Postridie eius diei refractis portis, cum iam defenderet nemo, atque intromissis militibus nostris, sectionem eius oppidi universam Caesar vendidit. Ab iis qui emerant capitum numerus ad eum relatus est milium LIII.

34 Eodem tempore a P. Crasso, quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Venellos, Osismos, Coriosolitas, Esvios, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt,

certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani esse redactas.

35 His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata, tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est uti ab iis nationibus quae trans Rhenum incolerent legationes ad Caesarem mitterentur, quae se obsides daturas, imperata facturas pollicerentur. Quas legationes Caesar, quod in Italiam Illyricumque properabat, inita proxima aestate ad se reverti iussit. Ipse in Carnutes, Andes, Turonos quaeque civitates propinquae iis locis erant ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hiberna deductis, in Italiam profectus est. Ob easque res ex litteris Caesaris dierum XV supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli.

LIBER III

1 Cum in Italiam proficisceretur Caesar, Ser. Galbam cum legione XII et parte equitatus in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque misit, qui a finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano ad summas Alpes pertinent. Causa mittendi fuit quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis mercatores ire consuerant, patefieri volebat. Huic permisit, si opus esse arbitraretur, uti in his locis legionem hiemandi causa conlocaret. Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta, constituit cohortes duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis eius legionis cohortibus in vico Veragrorum, qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare; qui vicus positus in valle non magna adiecta planitie altissimis montibus undique continetur. Cum hic in duas partes flumine divideretur, alteram partem eius vici Gallis ad hiemandum concessit, alteram vacuum ab his relictam cohortibus attribuit. Eum locum vallo fossaque munivit.

2 Cum dies hibernorum complures transissent frumentumque eo comportari iussisset, subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri. Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent: primum, quod legionem neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant; tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri

existimabant. Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.

3 His nuntiis acceptis Galba, cum neque opus hibernorum munitionesque plene essent perfectae neque de frumento reliquoque commeatu satis esset provisum quod deditione facta obsidibusque acceptis nihil de bello timendum existimaverat, consilio celeriter convocato sententias exquirere coepit. Quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent, prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad salutem contenderent. Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere.

4 Brevi spatio interiecto, vix ut iis rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque administrandis tempus daretur, hostes ex omnibus partibus signo dato decurrere, lapides gaesaeque in vallum coicere. Nostri primo integris viribus fortiter propugnare neque ullum frustra telum ex loco superiore mittere, et quaecumque pars castrorum nudata defensoribus premi videbatur, eo occurrere et auxilium ferre, sed hoc superari quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi proelio excedebant, alii integris viribus succedebant; quarum rerum a nostris propter paucitatem fieri nihil poterat, ac non modo defesso ex pugna excedendi, sed ne saucio quidem eius loci ubi constiterat relinquendi ac sui recipiendi facultas dabatur.

5 Cum iam amplius horis sex continenter pugnaretur, ac non

solum vires sed etiam tela nostros deficerent, atque hostes acrius instarent languidioribusque nostris vallum scindere et fossas complere coepissent, resque esset iam ad extremum perducta casum, P. Sextius Baculus, primi pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus, et item C. Volusenus, tribunus militum, vir et consilii magni et virtutis, ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur. Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.

6 Quod iussi sunt faciunt, ac subito omnibus portis eruptione facta neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt. Ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum venerant undique circumventos intercipiunt, et ex hominum milibus amplius XXX, quem numerum barbarorum ad castra venisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coiciunt ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur. Sic omnibus hostium copiis fuis armisque exutis se intra munitiones suas recipiunt. Quo proelio facto, quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba nolebat atque alio se in hiberna consilio venisse meminerat, aliis occurrisset rebus videbat, maxime frumenti commeatusque inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici aedificiis incensis in provinciam reverti contendit, ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter demorante incolumem legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique hiemavit.

7 His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus

Sedunis, atque ita inita hieme in Illyricum profectus esset, quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere volebat, subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est. Eius belli haec fuit causa. P. Crassus adulescens cum legione VII. proximus mare Oceanum in Andibus hiemabat. Is, quod in his locis inopia frumenti erat, praefectos tribunosque militum complures in finitimas civitates frumenti causa dimisit; quo in numero est T. Terrasidius missus in Esuvios, M. Trebius Gallus in Coriosolites, Q. Velanius cum T. Silio in Venetos.

8 Huius est civitatis longe amplissima auctoritas omnis orae maritimae regionum earum, quod et naves habent Veneti plurimas, quibus in Britanniam navigare consuerunt, et scientia atque usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt et in magno impetu maris atque aperto paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent vectigales. Ab his fit initium retinendi Silii atque Velanii, quod per eos suos se obsides, quos Crasso dedissent, recuperaturos existimabant. Horum auctoritate finitimi adducti, ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia, eadem de causa Trebium Terrasidiumque retinent et celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos, reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint. Omni ora maritima celeriter ad suam sententiam perducta communem legationem ad P. Crassum mittunt, si velit suos recuperare, obsides sibi remittat.

9 Quibus de rebus Caesar a Crasso certior factus, quod ipse aberat longius, naves interim longas aedificari in flumine Ligeri, quod influit in Oceanum, remiges ex provincia institui, nautas gubernatoresque comparari iubet. His rebus celeriter administratis ipse, cum primum per anni tempus potuit, ad exercitum contendit.

Veneti reliquaeque item civitates cognito Caesaris adventu certiores facti, simul quod quantum in se facinus admisissent intellegebant, legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos, pro magnitudine periculi bellum parare et maxime ea quae ad usum navium pertinent providere instituunt, hoc maiore spe quod multum natura loci confidebant. Pedestria esse itinera concisa aestuariis, navigationem impeditam propter inscientiam locorum paucitatemque portuum sciebant, neque nostros exercitus propter inopiam frumenti diutius apud se morari posse confidebant; ac iam ut omnia contra opinionem acciderent, tamen se plurimum navibus posse, quam Romanos neque ullam facultatem habere navium, neque eorum locorum ubi bellum gesturi essent vada, portus, insulas novisse; ac longe aliam esse navigationem in concluso mari atque in vastissimo atque apertissimo Oceano perspiciebant. His initis consiliis oppida muniunt, frumenta ex agris in oppida comportant, naves in Venetiam, ubi Caesarem primum bellum gesturum constabat, quam plurimas possunt cogunt. Socios sibi ad id bellum Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt.

10 Erant hae difficultates belli gerendi quas supra ostendimus, sed tamen multa Caesarem ad id bellum incitabant: iniuria retentorum equitum Romanorum, rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio, in primis ne hac parte neglecta reliquae nationes sibi idem licere arbitrarentur. Itaque cum intellexeret omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari, omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse, prius quam plures civitates conspirarent, partiendum sibi ac latius distribuendum exercitum

putavit.

11 Itaque T. Labienum legatum in Treveros, qui proximi flumini Rheno sunt, cum equitatu mittit. Huic mandat, Remos reliquosque Belgas adeat atque in officio contineat Germanosque, qui auxilio a Belgis arcessiti dicebantur, si per vim navibus flumen transire conentur, prohibeat. P. Crassum cum cohortibus legionariis XII et magno numero equitatus in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet, ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur. Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum legionibus tribus in Venellos, Coriosolites Lexoviosque mittit, qui eam manum distinendam curet. D. Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat, praeficit et, cum primum possit, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit.

12 Erant eius modi fere situs oppidorum ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent, cum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod bis accidit semper horarum XII spatio, neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis adfluctarentur. Ita utraque re oppidorum oppugnatio impediabatur. Ac si quando magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis, suis fortune desperare coeperant, magno numero navium adpulso, cuius rei summam facultatem habebant, omnia sua deportabant seque in proxima oppida recipiebant: ibi se rursus isdem opportunitatibus loci defendebant. Haec eo facilius magnam partem aestatis faciebant quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, raris ac prope nullis portibus difficultas navigandi.

13 Namque ipsorum naves ad hunc modum factae armataeque

erant: carinae aliquanto planiores quam nostrarum navium, quo facilius vada ac decessum aestus excipere possent; prorae admodum erectae atque item puppes, ad magnitudinem fluctuum tempestatumque accommodatae; naves totae factae ex robore ad quamvis vim et contumeliam perferendam; transtra ex pedalibus in altitudinem trabibus, confixa clavis ferreis digiti pollicis crassitudine; ancorae pro funibus ferreis catenis revinctae; pelles pro velis alutaeque tenuiter confectae, hae sive propter inopiam lini atque eius usus inscientiam, sive eo, quod est magis veri simile, quod tantas tempestates Oceani tantosque impetus ventorum sustineri ac tanta onera navium regi velis non satis commode posse arbitrabantur. Cum his navibus nostrae classi eius modi congressus erat ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret, reliqua pro loci natura, pro vi tempestatum illis essent aptiora et accommodatiora. Neque enim iis nostrae rostro nocere poterant (tanta in iis erat firmitudo), neque propter altitudinem facile telum adigebatur, et eadem de causa minus commode copulis continebantur. Accedebat ut, cum saevire ventus coepisset et se vento dedissent, et tempestatem ferrent facilius et in vadis consisterent tutius et ab aestu relictas nihil saxa et cautes timerent; quarum rerum omnium nostris navibus casus erat extimescendus.

14 Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar, ubi intellexit frustra tantum laborem sumi neque hostium fugam captis oppidis reprimi neque iis noceri posse, statuit expectandam classem. Quae ubi convenit ac primum ab hostibus visa est, circiter CCXX naves eorum paratissimae atque omni genere armorum ornatissimae profectae ex portu nostris adversae constiterunt; neque satis Bruto, qui classi praeerat, vel tribunis militum centurionibusque, quibus singulae naves erant attributae, constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem

pugnae insisterent. Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant; turribus autem excitatis tamen has altitudo puppium ex barbaris navibus superabat, ut neque ex inferiore loco satis commode tela adigi possent et missa a Gallis gravius acciderent. Una erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium. His cum funes qui antemnas ad malos destinabant comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato praerumpebantur. Quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant, ut, cum omnis Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis omnis usus navium uno tempore eriperetur. Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur, ut nullum paulo fortius factum latere posset; omnes enim colles ac loca superiora, unde erat propinquus despectus in mare, ab exercitu tenebantur.

15 Deiectis, ut diximus, antemnis, cum singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant, milites summa vi transcendere in hostium naves contendebant. Quod postquam barbari fieri animadverterunt, expugnatis compluribus navibus, cum ei rei nullum reperiretur auxilium, fuga salutem petere contenderunt. Ac iam conversis in eam partem navibus quo ventus ferebat, tanta subito malacia ac tranquillitas exstitit ut se ex loco movere non possent. Quae quidem res ad negotium conficiendum maximae fuit opportunitati: nam singulas nostri consecrati expugnaverunt, ut perpaucae ex omni numero noctis interventu ad terram pervenirent, cum ab hora fere IIII usque ad solis occasum pugnaretur.

16 Quo proelio bellum Venetorum totiusque orae maritimae confectum est. Nam cum omnis iuventus, omnes etiam gravioris aetatis in quibus aliquid consilii aut dignitatis fuit eo convenerant,

tum navium quod ubique fuerat in unum locum coegerant; quibus amissis reliqui neque quo se reciperent neque quem ad modum oppida defenderent habebant. Itaque se suaque omnia Caesari dediderunt. In quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.

17 Dum haec in Venetis geruntur, Q. Titurius Sabinus cum iis copiis quas a Caesare acceperat in fines Venellorum pervenit. His praeerat Viridovix ac summam imperii tenebat earum omnium civitatum quae defecerant, ex quibus exercitum magnasque copias coegerat; atque his paucis diebus Aulerci Eburovices Lexoviique, senatu suo interfecto quod auctores belli esse nolebant, portas clauserunt seque cum Viridovice coniunxerunt; magnaue praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat, quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat. Sabinus idoneo omnibus rebus loco castris sese tenebat, cum Viridovix contra eum duorum milium spatio consedisset cotidieque productis copiis pugnandi potestatem faceret, ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus non nihil carperetur; tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent. Id ea de causa faciebat quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data legato dimicandum non existimabat.

18 Hac confirmata opinione timoris idoneum quendam hominem et callidum deligit, Gallum, ex iis quos auxilii causa secum habebat. Huic magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque persuadet uti ad hostes

transeat, et quid fieri velit edocet. Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet, neque longius abesse quin proxima nocte Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa proficiscatur. Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene gerendi amittendam non esse: ad castra iri oportere. Multae res ad hoc consilium Gallos hortabantur: superiorum dierum Sabini cunctatio, perfugae confirmatio, inopia cibariorum, cui rei parum diligenter ab iis erat provisum, spes Venetici belli, et quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. His rebus adducti non prius Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt quam ab iis sit concessum arma uti capiant et ad castra contendant. Qua re concessa laeti, ut explorata victoria, sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant, ad castra pergunt.

19 Locus erat castrorum editus et paulatim ab imo acclivis circiter passus mille. Huc magno cursu contenderunt, ut quam minimum spatii ad se colligendos armandosque Romanis daretur, exanimatique pervenerunt. Sabinus suos hortatus cupientibus signum dat. Impeditis hostibus propter ea quae ferebant onera subito duabus portis eruptionem fieri iubet. Factum est oportunitate loci, hostium inscientia ac defatigatione, virtute militum et superiorum pugnarum exercitatione, ut ne unum quidem nostrorum impetum ferrent ac statim terga verterent. Quos impeditos integris viribus milites nostri consecuti magnum numerum eorum occiderunt; reliquos equites consecrati paucos, qui ex fuga evaserant, reliquerunt. Sic uno tempore et de navali pugna Sabinus et de Sabini victoria Caesar est certior factus, civitatesque omnes se statim Titurio dediderunt. Nam ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic

mollis ac minime resistens ad calamitates ferendas mens eorum est.

20 Eodem fere tempore P. Crassus, cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset, quae pars, ut ante dictum est, et regionum latitudine et multitudine hominum tertia pars Galliae est aestimanda, cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum ubi paucis ante annis L. Valerius Praeconinus legatus exercitu pulso interfectus esset atque unde L. Manlius proconsul impedimentis amissis profugisset, non mediocrem sibi diligentiam adhibendam intellegebat. Itaque re frumentaria provisa, auxiliis equitatuque comparato, multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae, ex his regionibus nominatim evocatis, in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit. Cuius adventu cognito Sotiates magnis copiis coactis, equitatuque, quo plurimum valebant, in itinere agmen nostrum adorti primum equestre proelium commiserunt, deinde equitatu suo pulso atque insequentibus nostris subito pedestres copias, quas in convalle in insidiis conlocaverant, ostenderunt. Hi nostros disiectos adorti proelium renovarunt.

21 Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem quid sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent perspicere cuperent; tandem confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt. Quorum magno numero interfecto Crassus ex itinere oppidum Sotiatium oppugnare coepit. Quibus fortiter resistantibus vineas turresque egit. Illi alias eruptione temptata, alias cuniculis ad aggerem vineasque actis (cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt), ubi diligentia nostrorum nihil his rebus profici posse intellexerunt, legatos ad Crassum mittunt seque in deditionem ut recipiat petunt.

22 Qua re impetrata arma tradere iussi faciunt. Atque in eam rem omnium nostrorum intentis animis alia ex parte oppidi Adiatunnus, qui summam imperii tenebat, cum DC devotis, quos illi soldurios appellant, quorum haec est condicio, ut omnibus in vita commodis una cum iis fruantur quorum se amicitiae dediderint, si quid his per vim accidat, aut eundem casum una ferant aut sibi mortem consciscant; neque adhuc hominum memoria repertus est quisquam qui, eo interfecto cuius se amicitiae devovisset, mortem recusaret — cum his Adiatunnus eruptionem facere conatus clamore ab ea parte munitionis sublato cum ad arma milites concurrissent vehementerque ibi pugnatum esset, repulsus in oppidum tamen uti eadem deditiois condicione uteretur a Crasso impetravit.

23 Armis obsidibusque acceptis, Crassus in fines Vocationum et Tarusatum profectus est. Tum vero barbari commoti, quod oppidum et natura loci et manu munitum paucis diebus quibus eo ventum erat expugnatum cognoverant, legatos quoque versum dimittere, coniurare, obsides inter se dare, copias parare coeperunt. Mittuntur etiam ad eas civitates legati quae sunt citerioris Hispaniae finitimae Aquitaniae: inde auxilia ducesque arcessuntur. Quorum adventu magna cum auctoritate et magna cum hominum multitudine bellum gerere conantur. Duces vero ii deliguntur qui una cum Q. Sertorio omnes annos fuerant summamque scientiam rei militaris habere existimabantur. Hi consuetudine populi Romani loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instituunt. Quod ubi Crassus animadvertit, suas copias propter exiguitatem non facile diduci, hostem et vagari et vias obsidere et castris satis praesidii relinquere, ob eam causam minus commode frumentum commeatumque sibi supportari, in dies hostium numerum augeri, non cunctandum existimavit quin pugna decertaret. Hac re ad consilium

delata, ubi omnes idem sentire intellexit, posterum diem pugnae constituit.

24 Prima luce productis omnibus copiis duplici acie instituta, auxiliis in mediam aciem coniectis, quid hostes consilii caperent expectabat. Illi, etsi propter multitudinem et veterem belli gloriam paucitatemque nostrorum se tuto dimicaturos existimabant, tamen tutius esse arbitrabantur obsessis viis commeatu intercluso sine vulnere victoria potiri, et si propter inopiam rei frumentariae Romani se recipere coepissent, impeditos in agmine et sub sarcinis infirmiore animo adoriri cogitabant. Hoc consilio probato ab ducibus, productis Romanorum copiis, sese castris tenebant. Hac re perspecta Crassus, cum sua cunctatione atque opinione timoris hostes nostros milites alacriores ad pugnandum effecissent atque omnium voces audirentur expectari diutius non oportere quin ad castra iretur, cohortatus suos omnibus cupientibus ad hostium castra contendit.

25 Ibi cum alii fossas complerent, alii multis telis coniectis defensores vallo munitionibusque depellerent, auxiliaresque, quibus ad pugnam non multum Crassus confidebat, lapidibus telisque subministrandis et ad aggerem caespitibus comportandis speciem atque opinionem pignantium praeberent, cum item ab hostibus constanter ac non timide pugnaretur telaque ex loco superiore missa non frustra acciderent, equites circumitis hostium castris Crasso renuntiaverunt non eadem esse diligentia ab decumana porta castra munita facilemque aditum habere.

26 Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus, ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri vellet ostendit. Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus quae praesidio castris relictas intritae ab labore erant, et longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad

pugnam intentis celeriter ad eas quas diximus munitiones pervenerunt atque his prorutis prius in hostium castris constiterunt quam plane ab his videri aut quid rei gereretur cognosci posset. Tum vero clamore ab ea parte audito nostri redintegratis viribus, quod plerumque in spe victoriae accidere consuevit, acrius impugnare coeperunt. Hostes undique circumventi desperatis omnibus rebus se per munitiones deicere et fuga salutem petere contenderunt. Quos equitatus apertissimis campis consecratus ex milium L numero, quae ex Aquitania Cantabrisque convenisse constabat, vix quarta parte relicta, multa nocte se in castra recepit.

27 Hac audita pugna maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso dedit obsidesque ultro misit; quo in numero fuerunt Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, Cocosates: paucae ultimae nationes anni tempore confisae, quod hiems suberat, id facere neglexerunt.

28 Eodem fere tempore Caesar, etsi prope exacta iam aestas erat, tamen, quod omni Gallia pacata Morini Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent, arbitratus id bellum celeriter confici posse eo exercitum duxit; qui longe alia ratione ac reliqui Galli bellum gerere coeperunt. Nam quod intellegebant maximas nationes, quae proelio contendissent, pulsas superatasque esse, continentesque silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaeque omnia contulerunt. Ad quarum initium silvarum cum Caesar pervenisset castraque munire instituisset neque hostis interim visus esset, dispersis in opere nostris subito ex omnibus partibus silvae evolaverunt et in nostros impetum fecerunt. Nostri celeriter arma ceperunt eosque in silvas repulerunt et compluribus interfectis longius impeditioribus locis secuti paucos ex suis deperdiderunt.

29 Reliquis deinceps diebus Caesar silvas caedere instituit, et ne

quis inermibus imprudentibusque militibus ab latere impetus fieri posset, omnem eam materiam quae erat caesa conversam ad hostem conlocabat et pro vallo ad utrumque latus extruebat. Incredibili celeritate magno spatio paucis diebus confecto, cum iam pecus atque extrema impedimenta a nostris tenerentur, ipsi densiores silvas peterent, eius modi sunt tempestates consecutae uti opus necessario intermitteretur et continuatione imbrium diutius sub pellibus milites contineri non possent. Itaque vastatis omnibus eorum agris, vicis aedificiisque incensis, Caesar exercitum reduxit et in Aulercis Lexoviisque, reliquis item civitatibus quae proxime bellum fecerant, in hibernis conlocavit.

LIBER IV

1 Ea quae secuta est hieme, qui fuit annus Cn. Pompeio, M. Crasso consulibus, Usipetes Germani et item Tencteri magna cum multitudine hominum flumen Rhenum transierunt, non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit. Causa transeundi fuit quod ab Suebis complures annos exagitati bello premebantur et agri cultura prohibebantur. Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium. Hi centum pagos habere dicuntur, ex quibus quotannis singula milia armatorum bellandi causa ex finibus educunt. Reliqui, qui domi manserunt, se atque illos alunt; hi rursus in vicem anno post in armis sunt, illi domi remanent. Sic neque agri cultura nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur. Sed privati ac separati agri apud eos nihil est, neque longius anno remanere uno in loco colendi causa licet. Neque multum frumento, sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt multum sunt in venationibus; quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitatione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina adsuefacti nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciunt, et vires alit et immani corporum magnitudine homines efficit. Atque in eam se consuetudinem adduxerunt ut locis frigidissimis neque vestitus praeter pelles habeant quicquam, quarum propter exiguitatem magna est corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

2 Mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus vendant habeant, quam quo ullam rem ad se importari desiderent. Quin etiam iumentis, quibus maxime Galli delectantur quaeque impenso parant pretio, Germani importatis non utuntur, sed quae sunt apud eos nata, parva atque deformia, haec cotidiana exercitatione summi ut sint laboris efficiunt. Equestribus proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equos eodem remanere vestigio

adsuefecerunt, ad quos se celeriter, cum usus est, recipiunt: neque eorum moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti. Itaque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire audent. Vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur.

3 Publice maximam putant esse laudem quam latissime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari magnum numerum civitatum suam vim sustinere non posse. Itaque una ex parte a Suebis circiter milia passuum C agri vacare dicuntur. Ad alteram partem succedunt Ubii, quorum fuit civitas ampla atque florens, ut est captus Germanorum; ii paulo, quamquam sunt eiusdem generis, sunt ceteris humaniores, propterea quod Rhenum attingunt multum ad eos mercatores ventitant et ipsi propter propinquitatem quod Gallicis sunt moribus adsuefacti. Hos cum Suebi multis saepe bellis experti propter amplitudinem gravitatem civitatis finibus expellere non potuissent, tamen vectigales sibi fecerunt ac multo humiliores infirmiores redegerunt.

4 In eadem causa fuerunt Usipetes et Tencteri, quos supra diximus; qui complures annos Sueborum vim sustinuerunt, ad extremum tamen agris expulsi et multis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt, quas regiones Menapii incolebant. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant; sed tantae multitudinis adventu perterriti ex iis aedificiis quae trans flumen habuerant demigraverant, et cis Rhenum dispositis praesidiis Germanos transire prohibebant. Illi omnia experti, cum neque vi contendere propter inopiam navium neque clam transire propter custodias Menapiorum possent, reverti se in suas sedes regionesque simulaverunt et tridui viam progressi rursus reverterunt atque omni

hoc itinere una nocte equitatu confecto inscios inopinantes Menapios oppresserunt, qui de Germanorum discessu per exploratores certiores facti sine metu trans Rhenum in suos vicos remigraverant. His interfectis navibus eorum occupatis, prius quam ea pars Menapiorum quae citra Rhenum erat certior fieret, flumen transierunt atque omnibus eorum aedificiis occupatis reliquam partem hiemis se eorum copiis aluerunt.

5 His de rebus Caesar certior factus et infirmitatem Gallorum veritus, quod sunt in consiliis capiendis mobiles et novis plerumque rebus student, nihil his committendum existimavit. Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et viatores etiam invitos consistere cogant et quid quisque eorum de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit quaerant et mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibus ex regionibus veniant quas ibi res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat. His rebus atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio paenitere necesse est, cum incertis rumoribus serviant et pleri ad voluntatem eorum ficta respondeant.

6 Qua consuetudine cognita Caesar, ne graviori bello, occurreret, maturius quam consuerat ad exercitum proficiscitur. Eo cum venisset, ea quae fore suspicatus erat facta cognovit: missas legationes ab non nullis civitatibus ad Germanos invitatosque eos uti ab Rheno discederent: omnia quae postulassent ab se fore parata. Qua spe adducti Germani latius iam vagabantur et in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant. Principibus Gallice evocatis Caesar ea quae cognoverat dissimulanda sibi existimavit, eorumque animis permulsis et confirmatis equitatu imperato bellum cum Germanis gerere constituit.

7 Re frumentaria comparata equitibusque delectis iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat. A quibus cum

paucorum dierum iter abesset, legati ab iis venerunt, quorum haec fuit oratio: Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre neque tamen recusare, si lacescantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum consuetudo haec sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invitos, eiectos domo; si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur eos tenere quos armis possederint: sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales pares esse possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint.

8 Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent; neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint; sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considerare, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturus.

9 Legati haec se ad suos relatores dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt. Ne id quidem Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit. Cognoverat enim magnam partem equitatus ab iis aliquot diebus ante praedandi frumentandi causa ad Ambivaritos trans Mosam missam: hos expectari equites atque eius rei causa moram interponi arbitrabatur.

10 Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulam efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit. Rhenus autem oritur ex

Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur et, ubi Oceano adpropinquavit, in plures diffluit partes multis ingentibus insulis effectis, quarum pars magna a feris barbaris nationibus incolitur, ex quibus sunt qui piscibus atque ovis avium vivere existimantur, multis capitibus in Oceanum influit.

11 Caesar cum ab hoste non amplius passuum XII milibus abesset, ut erat constitutum, ad eum legati revertuntur; qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progredieretur orabant. Cum id non impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos equites qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos pugna prohiberet, sibi ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi; quorum si principes ac senatus sibi iure iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret. Haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur ut tridui mora interposita equites eorum qui abessent reverterentur; tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit: huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret. Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacesserent, et si ipsi lacesserentur, sustinerent quoad ipse cum exercitu propius accessisset.

12 At hostes, ubi primum nostros equites conspexerunt, quorum erat V milium numerus, cum ipsi non amplius DCCC equites haberent, quod ii qui frumentandi causa erant trans Mosam profecti nondum redierant, nihil timentibus nostris, quod legati eorum paulo ante a Caesare discesserant atque is dies indutiis erat ab his petitus, impetu facto celeriter nostros perturbaverunt; rursus his resistentibus consuetudine sua ad pedes desiluerunt subfossis equis compluribus

nostris deiectis reliquos in fugam coniecerunt atque ita perterritos egerunt ut non prius fuga desisterent quam in conspectum agminis nostri venissent. In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur IIII et LXX, in his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat amicus a senatu nostro appellatus. Hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus, quoad potuit, fortissime restitit; cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis cecidisset atque id frater, qui iam proelio excesserat, procul animadvertisset, incitato equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfectus est.

13 Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent; expectare vero dum hostium copiae augerentur equitatus reverteretur summae dementiae esse iudicabat, et cognita Gallorum infirmitate quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat. His constitutis rebus et consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato, ne quem diem pugnae praetermitteret, oportunissima res accidit, quod postridie eius diei mane eadem et perfidia et simulatione usi Germani frequentes, omnibus principibus maioribusque natu adhibitis, ad eum in castra venerunt, simul, ut dicebatur, sui purgandi causa, quod contra atque esset dictum et ipsi petissent, proelium pridie commisissent, simul ut, si quid possent, de indutiis fallendo impetrarent. Quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus illos retineri iussit; ipse omnes copias castris D eduxit equitatumque, quod recenti proelio perterritum esse existimabat, agmen subsequi iussit.

14 Acie triplici instituta et celeriter VIII milium itinere confecto,

prius ad hostium castra pervenit quam quid ageretur Germani sentire possent. Qui omnibus rebus subito perterriti et celeritate adventus nostri et discessu suorum, neque consilii habendi neque arma capiendi spatio dato perturbantur, copiasne adversus hostem ducere an castra defendere an fuga salutem petere praestaret. Quorum timor cum fremitu et concursu significaretur, milites nostri pristini diei perfidia incitati in castra inruperunt. Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter carros impedimentaue proelium commiserunt; at reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenum transierant) passim fugere coepit, ad quos consecrandos Caesar equitatum misit.

15 Germani post tergum clamore audito, cum suos interfici viderent, armis abiectis signis militaribus relictis se ex castris eiecerunt, et cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, reliqua fuga desperata, magno numero interfecto, reliqui se in flumen praecipitaverunt atque ibi timore, lassitudine, vi fluminis oppressi perierunt. Nostri ad unum omnes incolumes, perpaucis vulneratis, ex tanti belli timore, cum hostium numerus capitum CCCCXXX milium fuisset, se in castra receperunt. Caesar iis quos in castris retinuerat discedendi potestatem fecit. Illi supplicia cruciatusque Gallorum veriti, quorum agros vexaverant, remanere se apud eum velle dixerunt. His Caesar libertatem concessit.

16 Germanico bello confecto multis de causis Caesar statuit sibi Rhenum esse transeundum; quarum illa fuit iustissima quod, cum videret Germanos tam facile impelli ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire. Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam supra commemoravi

praedandi frumentandi causa Mosam transisse neque proelio interfuisse, post fugam suorum se trans Rhenum in fines Sugambrorum receperat seque cum his coniunxerat. Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliaeque bellum intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt: populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet? Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur; vel, si id facere occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id sibi ad auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum. Tantum esse nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint. Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur.

17 Caesar his de causis quas commemoravi Rhenum transire decrevat; sed navibus transire neque satis tutum esse arbitrabatur neque suae neque populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat. Itaque, etsi summa difficultas faciendi pontis proponebatur propter latitudinem, rapiditatem altitudinemque fluminis, tamen id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat. Rationem pontis hanc instituit. Tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat. Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo directe ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent, iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta

intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetu fluminis conversa statuebat. Haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur; quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut, quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur. Haec directa materia iniecta contexebantur ac longuriis cratibusque consternebantur; ac nihilo setius sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent, et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut, si arborum trunci sive naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent.

18 Diebus X, quibus materia coepta erat comportari, omni opere effecto exercitus traducitur. Caesar ad utramque partem pontis firmo praesidio relicto in fines Sugambrorum contendit. Interim a compluribus civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt; quibus pacem atque amicitiam petentibus liberaliter respondet obsidesque ad se adduci iubet. At Sugambri, ex eo tempore quo pons institui coeptus est fuga comparata, hortantibus iis quos ex Tencteris atque Usipetibus apud se habebant, finibus suis excesserant suaque omnia exportaverant seque in solitudinem ac silvas abdiderant.

19 Caesar paucos dies in eorum finibus moratus, omnibus vicis aedificiisque incensis frumentisque succisis, se in fines Ubiorum recepit atque his auxilium suum pollicitus, si a Suebis premerentur, haec ab iis cognovit: Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes qui arma ferre possent unum in

locum convenirent. Hunc esse delectum medium fere regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi decertare constituisse. Quod ubi Caesar comperit, omnibus iis rebus confectis, quarum rerum causa exercitum traducere constituerat, ut Germanis metum iniceret, ut Sugambros ulcisceretur, ut Ubios obsidione liberaret, diebus omnino XVIII trans Rhenum consumptis, satis et ad laudem et ad utilitatem profectum arbitratus se in Galliam recepit pontemque rescidit.

20 Exigua parte aestatis reliqua Caesar, etsi in his locis, quod omnis Gallia ad septentriones vergit, maturae sunt hiemes, tamen in Britanniam proficisci contendit, quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat, et si tempus anni ad bellum gerendum deficeret, tamen magno sibi usui fore arbitrabatur, si modo insulam adiisset, genus hominum perspexisset, loca, portus, aditus cognovisset; quae omnia fere Gallis erant incognita. Neque enim temere praeter mercatores illo adit quisquam, neque his ipsis quicquam praeter oram maritimam atque eas regiones quae sunt contra Galliam notum est. Itaque vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus, neque quanta esset insulae magnitudo neque quae aut quantae nationes incolerent, neque quem usum belli haberent aut quibus institutis uterentur, neque qui essent ad maiorem navium multitudinem idonei portus reperire poterat.

21 Ad haec cognoscenda, prius quam periculum faceret, idoneum esse arbitratus C. Volusenum cum navi longa praemittit. Huic mandat ut exploratis omnibus rebus ad se quam primum revertatur. Ipse cum omnibus copiis in Morinos proficiscitur, quod inde erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus. Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire. Interim, consilio eius cognito et per

mercatores perlato ad Britannos, a compluribus insulae civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt, qui polliceantur obsides dare atque imperio populi Romani obtemperare. Quibus auditis, liberaliter pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent, eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat, cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit. Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet. Volusenus perspectis regionibus omnibus quantum ei facultatis dari potuit, qui navi egredi ac se barbaris committere non auderet, V. die ad Caesarem revertitur quaeque ibi perspexisset renuntiat.

22 Dum in his locis Caesar navium parandarum causa moratur, ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur. Hoc sibi Caesar satis oportune accidisse arbitratus, quod neque post tergum hostem relinquere volebat neque belli gerendi propter anni tempus facultatem habebat neque has tantularum rerum occupationes Britanniae anteponendas iudicabat, magnum iis numerum obsidum imperat. Quibus adductis eos in fidem recipit. Navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis contractisque, quot satis esse ad duas transportandas legiones existimabat, quod praeterea navium longarum habebat quaestori, legatis praefectisque distribuit. Huc accedebant XVIII onerariae naves, quae ex eo loco a milibus passuum VIII vento tenebantur quo minus in eundem portum venire possent: has equitibus tribuit. Reliquum exercitum Q. Titurio Sabino

et L. Aurunculeio Cottae legatis in Menapios atque in eos pagos Morinorum a quibus ad eum legati non venerant ducendum dedit. P. Sulpicium Rufum legatum cum eo praesidio quod satis esse arbitrabatur portum tenere iussit.

23 His constitutis rebus, nactus idoneam ad navigandum tempestatem III. fere vigilia solvit equitesque in ulteriorem portum progredi et naves conscendere et se sequi iussit. A quibus cum paulo tardius esset administratum, ipse hora diei circiter IIII. cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit atque ibi in omnibus collibus expositas hostium copias armatas conspexit. Cuius loci haec erat natura atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in litus telum adigi posset. Hunc ad egrediendum nequaquam idoneum locum arbitratus, dum reliquae naves eo convenirent ad horam nonam in ancoris expectavit. Interim legatis tribunisque militum convocatis et quae ex Voluseno cognovisset et quae fieri vellet ostendit monuitque, ut rei militaris ratio, maximeque ut maritimae res postularent, ut, cum celerem atque instabilem motum haberent, ad nutum et ad tempus omnes res ab iis administrarentur. His dimissis et ventum et aestum uno tempore nactus secundum dato signo et sublatis ancoris circiter milia passuum septem ab eo loco progressus, aperto ac plano litore naves constituit.

24 At barbari, consilio Romanorum cognito praemisso equitatu et essedariis, quo plerumque genere in proeliis uti consuerunt, reliquis copiis subsecuti nostros navibus egredi prohibebant. Erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem nisi in alto constitui non poterant, militibus autem, ignotis locis, impeditis manibus, magno et gravi onere armorum oppressis simul et de navibus desiliendum et in fluctibus consistendum et cum hostibus erat pugnandum, cum illi aut ex arido aut paulum in aquam progressi

omnibus membris expeditis, notissimis locis, audacter tela coicerent et equos insuefactos incitarent. Quibus rebus nostri perterriti atque huius omnino generis pugnae imperiti, non eadem alacritate ac studio quo in pedestribus uti proeliis consueverant utebantur.

25 Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris inusitatio et motus ad usum expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et remis incitari et ad latus apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, tormentis hostes propelli ac submoveri iussit; quae res magno usui nostris fuit. Nam et navium figura et remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt ac paulum modo pedem rettulerunt. Atque nostris militibus cunctantibus, maxime propter altitudinem maris, qui X legionis aquilam gerebat, obtestatus deos, ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, ‘desilite’, inquit, ‘milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.’ Hoc cum voce magna dixisset, se ex navi proiecit atque in hostes aquilam ferre coepit. Tum nostri cohortati inter se, ne tantum dedecus admitteretur, universi ex navi desiluerunt. Hos item ex proximis primi navibus cum conspexissent, subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.

26 Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. Nostri tamen, quod neque ordines servare neque firmiter insistere neque signa subsequi poterant atque alius alia ex navi quibuscumque signis occurrerat se adgregabat, magnopere perturbabantur; hostes vero, notis omnibus vadii, ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur, plures paucos circumsistebant, alii ab latere aperto in universos tela coiciebant. Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, scaphas longarum navium, item speculatoria navigia militibus compleri iussit, et quos laborantes

conspexerat, his subsidia submittebat. Nostri, simul in arido constiterunt, suis omnibus consecutis, in hostes impetum fecerunt atque eos in fugam dederunt; neque longius prosequi potuerunt, quod equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non potuerant. Hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit.

27 Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt; obsides sese daturos quaeque imperasset facturos polliciti sunt. Una cum his legatis Commius Atrebas venit, quem supra demonstraveram a Caesare in Britanniam praemisum. Hunc illi e navi egressum, cum ad eos oratoris modo Caesaris mandata deferret, comprehenderant atque in vincula coniecerant; tum proelio facto remiserunt et in petenda pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt. Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit; quorum illi partem statim dederunt, partem ex longinquioribus locis arcessitam paucis diebus sese daturos dixerunt. Interea suos in agros remigrare iusserunt, principesque undique convenire et se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt.

28 His rebus pace confirmata, post diem quartum quam est in Britanniam ventum naves XVIII, de quibus supra demonstratum est, quae equites sustulerant, ex superiore portu leni vento solverunt. Quae cum adpropinquarent Britanniae et ex castris viderentur, tanta tempestas subito coorta est ut nulla earum cursum tenere posset, sed aliae eodem unde erant profectae referrentur, aliae ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum, magno suo cum periculo deicerentur; quae tamen ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur, necessario adversa nocte in altum provectae

continentem petierunt.

29 Eadem nocte accidit ut esset luna plena, qui dies a maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit, nostrisque id erat incognitum. Ita uno tempore et longas naves, quibus Caesar exercitum transportandum curaverat, quas Caesar in aridum subduxerat, aestus complebat, et onerarias, quae ad ancoras erant deligatae, tempestas adfflictabat, neque ulla nostris facultas aut administrandi aut auxiliandi dabatur. Compluribus navibus fractis, reliquae cum essent funibus, ancoris reliquisque armamentis amissis ad navigandum inutiles, magna, id quod necesse erat accidere, totius exercitus perturbatio facta est. Neque enim naves erant aliae quibus reportari possent, et omnia deerant quae ad reficiendas naves erant usui, et, quod omnibus constabat hiemari in Gallia oportere, frumentum in his locis in hiemem provisum non erat.

30 Quibus rebus cognitis, principes Britanniae, qui post proelium ad Caesarem convenerant, inter se conlocuti, cum et equites et naves et frumentum Romanis deesse intellegerent et paucitatem militum ex castrorum exiguitate cognoscerent, quae hoc erant etiam angustior quod sine impedimentis Caesar legiones transportaverat, optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellionem facta frumento commeatuque nostros prohibere et rem in hiemem producere, quod his superatis aut reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum confidebant. Itaque rursus coniuratione facta paulatim ex castris discedere et suos clam ex agris deducere coeperunt.

31 At Caesar, etsi nondum eorum consilia cognoverat, tamen et ex eventu navium suarum et ex eo quod obsides dare intermiserant fore id quod accidit suspicabatur. Itaque ad omnes casus subsidia comparabat. Nam et frumentum ex agris cotidie in castra conferebat et, quae gravissime adfflictae erant naves, earum materia atque aere

ad reliquas reficiendas utebatur et quae ad eas res erant usui ex continenti comportari iubebat. Itaque, cum summo studio a militibus administraretur, XII navibus amissis, reliquis ut navigari satis commode posset effecit.

32 Dum ea geruntur, legione ex consuetudine una frumentatum missa, quae appellabatur VII, neque ulla ad id tempus belli suspicione interposita, cum pars hominum in agris remaneret, pars etiam in castra ventitaret, ii qui pro portis castrorum in statione erant Caesari nuntiaverunt pulverem maiorem quam consuetudo ferret in ea parte videri quam in partem legio iter fecisset. Caesar id quod erat suspicatus aliquid novi a barbaris initum consilii, cohortes quae in statione erant secum in eam partem proficisci, ex reliquis duas in stationem succedere, reliquas armari et confestim sese subsequi iussit. Cum paulo longius a castris processisset, suos ab hostibus premi atque aegre sustinere et conferta legione ex omnibus partibus tela coici animadvertit. Nam quod omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento pars una erat reliqua, suspicati hostes huc nostros esse venturos noctu in silvis delituerant; tum dispersos depositis armis in metendo occupatos subito adorti paucis interfectis reliquos incertis ordinibus perturbaverant, simul equitatu atque essedis circumdederant.

33 Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae. Primo per omnes partes perequitant et tela coiciunt atque ipso terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque perturbant, et cum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverunt, ex essedis desiliunt et pedibus proeliantur. Aurigae interim paulatim ex proelio excedunt atque ita currus conlocant ut, si illi a multitudine hostium premantur, expeditum ad quos receptum habeant. Ita mobilitatem equitum, stabilitatem peditum in proeliis praestant, ac tantum usu cotidiano et exercitatione

efficiunt uti in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos sustinere et brevi moderari ac flectere et per temonem percurrere et in iugo insistere et se inde in currus citissime recipere consuerint.

³⁴ Quibus rebus perturbatis nostris novitate pugnae tempore oportunissimo Caesar auxilium tulit: namque eius adventu hostes constiterunt, nostri se ex timore receperunt. Quo facto, ad lacessendum hostem et committendum proelium alienum esse tempus arbitratus suo se loco continuit et brevi tempore intermisso in castra legiones reduxit. Dum haec geruntur, nostris omnibus occupatis qui erant in agris reliqui discesserunt. Secutae sunt continuos complures dies tempestates, quae et nostros in castris continerent et hostem a pugna prohiberent. Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt. His rebus celeriter magna multitudo peditatus equitatusque coacta ad castra venerunt.

³⁵ Caesar, etsi idem quod superioribus diebus acciderat fore videbat, ut, si essent hostes pulsi, celeritate periculum effugerent, tamen nactus equites circiter XXX, quos Commius Atrebas, de quo ante dictum est, secum transportaverat, legiones in acie pro castris constituit. Commisso proelio diutius nostrorum militum impetum hostes ferre non potuerunt ac terga verterunt. Quos tanto spatio secuti quantum cursu et viribus efficere potuerunt, complures ex iis occiderunt, deinde omnibus longe lateque aedificiis incensis se in castra receperunt.

³⁶ Eodem die legati ab hostibus missi ad Caesarem de pace venerunt. His Caesar numerum obsidum quem ante imperaverat duplicavit eosque in continentem adduci iussit, quod propinqua die

aequinoctii infirmis navibus hiemi navigationem subiciendam non existimabat. Ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus paulo post mediam noctem naves solvit, quae omnes incolumes ad continentem pervenerunt; sed ex iis onerariae duae eosdem portus quos reliquae capere non potuerunt et paulo infra delatae sunt.

³⁷ Quibus ex navibus cum essent expositi milites circiter CCC atque in castra contenderent, Morini, quos Caesar in Britanniam proficiscens pacatos reliquerat, spe praedae adducti primo non ita magno suorum numero circumsteterunt ac, si sese interfici nollent, arma ponere iusserunt. Cum illi orbe facto sese defenderent, celeriter ad clamorem hominum circiter milia VI convenerunt; qua re nuntiata, Caesar omnem ex castris equitatum suis auxilio misit. Interim nostri milites impetum hostium sustinuerunt atque amplius horis IIII fortissime pugnaverunt et paucis vulneribus acceptis complures ex iis occiderunt. Postea vero quam equitatus noster in conspectum venit, hostes abiectis armis terga verterunt magnusque eorum numerus est occisus.

³⁸ Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum iis legionibus quas ex Britannia reducerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit. Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se reciperent non haberent, quo perfugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni venerunt. At Q. Titurius et L. Cotta legati, qui in Menapiorum fines legiones duxerant, omnibus eorum agris vastatis, frumentis succisis, aedificiis incensis, quod Menapii se omnes in densissimas silvas abdiderant, se ad Caesarem receperunt. Caesar in Belgis omnium legionum hiberna constituit. Eo duae omnino civitates ex Britannia obsides miserunt, reliquae neglexerunt. His rebus gestis ex litteris Caesaris dierum XX supplicatio a senatu decreta est.

LIBER V

1 L. Domitio Ap. Claudio consulibus, discedens ab hibernis Caesar in Italiam, ut quotannis facere consuerat, legatis imperat quos legionibus praefecerat uti quam plurimas possent hieme naves aedificandas veteresque reficiendas curarent. Earum modum formamque demonstrat. Ad celeritatem onerandi subductionesque paulo facit humiliores quam quibus in nostro mari uti consuevimus, atque id eo magis, quod propter crebras commutationes aestuum minus magnos ibi fluctus fieri cognoverat; ad onera, ad multitudinem iumentorum transportandam paulo latiores quam quibus in reliquis utimur maribus. Has omnes actuarias imperat fieri, quam ad rem multum humilitas adiuvat. Ea quae sunt usui ad armandas naves ex Hispania apportari iubet. Ipse conventibus Galliae citerioris peractis in Illyricum proficiscitur, quod a Pirustis finitimam partem provinciae incursionibus vastari audiebat. Eo cum venisset, civitatibus milites imperat certumque in locum convenire iubet. Quare nuntiata Pirustae legatos ad eum mittunt qui doceant nihil earum rerum publico factum consilio, seseque paratos esse demonstrant omnibus rationibus de iniuriis satisfacere. Accepta oratione eorum Caesar obsides imperat eosque ad certam diem adduci iubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat. Eis ad diem adductis, ut imperaverat, arbitros inter civitates dat qui litem aestiment poenamque constituent.

2 His confectis rebus conventibusque peractis, in citeriorem Galliam revertitur atque inde ad exercitum proficiscitur. Eo cum venisset, circuitis omnibus hibernis, singulari militum studio in summa omnium rerum inopia circiter sescentas eius generis cuius supra demonstravimus naves et longas XXVIII invenit instructas

neque multum abesse ab eo quin paucis diebus deduci possint. Collaudatis militibus atque eis qui negotio praefuerant, quid fieri velit ostendit atque omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet, quo ex portu commodissimum in Britanniam traiectum esse cognoverat, circiter milium passuum XXX transmissum a continenti: huic rei quod satis esse visum est militum reliquit. Ipse cum legionibus expeditis IIII et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur, quod hi neque ad concilia veniebant neque imperio parebant Germanosque Transrhenanos sollicitare dicebantur.

3 Haec civitas longe plurimum totius Galliae equitatu valet magnasque habet copias peditum Rhenumque, ut supra demonstravimus, tangit. In ea civitate duo de principatu inter se contendebant, Indutiomarus et Cingetorix; e quibus alter, simul atque de Caesaris legionumque adventu cognitum est, ad eum venit, se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit. At Indutiomarus equitatum peditatumque cogere, eisque qui per aetatem in armis esse non poterant in silvam Arduennam abditis, quae ingenti magnitudine per medios fines Treverorum a flumine Rheno ad initium Remorum pertinet, bellum parare instituit. Sed posteaquam nonnulli principes ex ea civitate et familiaritate Cingetorigis adducti et adventu nostri exercitus perterriti ad Caesarem venerunt et de suis privatim rebus ab eo petere coeperunt, quoniam civitati consulere non possent, veritus ne ab omnibus desereretur Indutiomarus legatos ad Caesarem mittit: sese idcirco ab suis discedere atque ad eum venire noluisse, quo facilius civitatem in officio contineret, ne omnis nobilitatis discessu plebs propter imprudentiam laberetur: itaque esse civitatem in sua potestate, seseque, si Caesar permetteret, ad eum in castra venturum, suas civitatisque fortunas eius fidei permissurum.

4 Caesar, etsi intellegebat qua de causa ea dicerentur quaeque eum res ab instituto consilio deterreret, tamen, ne aestatem in Treveris consumere cogeretur omnibus ad Britannicum bellum rebus comparatis, Indutiomarum ad se cum CC obsidibus venire iussit. His adductis, in eis filio propinquisque eius omnibus, quos nominatim evocaverat, consolatus Indutiomarum hortatusque est uti in officio maneret; nihilo tamen setius principibus Treverorum ad se convocatis hos singillatim Cingetorigi conciliavit, quod cum merito eius a se fieri intellegebat, tum magni interesse arbitrabatur eius auctoritatem inter suos quam plurimum valere, cuius tam egregiam in se voluntatem perspexisset. Id tulit factum graviter Indutiomarus, suam gratiam inter suos minui, et, qui iam ante inimico in nos animo fuisset, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.

5 His rebus constitutis Caesar ad portum Itium cum legionibus pervenit. Ibi cognoscit LX naves, quae in Meldis factae erant, tempestate reiectas cursum tenere non potuisse atque eodem unde erant profectae revertisse; reliquas paratas ad navigandum atque omnibus rebus instructas invenit. Eodem equitatus totius Galliae convenit, numero milium quattuor, principesque ex omnibus civitatibus; ex quibus perpaucos, quorum in se fidem perspexerat, relinquere in Gallia, reliquos obsidum loco secum ducere decreverat, quod, cum ipse abesset, motum Galliae verebatur.

6 Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix Aeduus, de quo ante ab nobis dictum est. Hunc secum habere in primis constituerat, quod eum cupidum rerum novarum, cupidum imperi, magni animi, magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis cognoverat. Accedebat huc quod in concilio Aeduum Dumnorix dixerat sibi a Caesare regnum civitatis deferri; quod dictum Aedui graviter ferebant, neque recusandi aut deprecandi causa legatos ad Caesarem mittere audebant. Id factum ex suis

hospitibus Caesar cognoverat. Ille omnibus primo precibus petere contendit ut in Gallia relinqueretur, partim quod insuetus navigandi mare timeret, partim quod religionibus impediri sese diceret. Posteaquam id obstinate sibi negari vidit, omni spe impetrandi adempta principes Galliae sollicitare, sevocare singulos hortarique coepit uti in continenti remanerent: metu territare: non sine causa fieri, ut Gallia omni nobilitate spoliaretur; id esse consilium Caesaris, ut quos in conspectu Galliae interficere vereretur, hos omnes in Britanniam traductos necaret; fidem reliquis interponere, iusiurandum poscere, ut quod esse ex usu Galliae intellexissent communi consilio administrarent. Haec a compluribus ad Caesarem deferebantur.

7 Qua re cognita Caesar, quod tantum civitati Aeduae dignitatis tribuebat, coercendum atque deterrendum quibuscumque rebus posset Dumnorigem statuebat; quod longius eius amentiam progredi videbat, prospiciendum, ne quid sibi ac rei publicae nocere posset. Itaque dies circiter XXV in eo loco commoratus, quod Corus ventus navigationem impediabat, qui magnam partem omnis temporis in his locis flare consuevit, dabat operam ut in officio Dumnorigem contineret, nihilo tamen setius omnia eius consilia cognosceret: tandem idoneam nactus tempestatem milites equitesque conscendere in naves iubet. At omnium impeditis animis Dumnorix cum equitibus Aeduorum a castris insciente Caesare domum discedere coepit. Qua re nuntiata Caesar intermissa profectione atque omnibus rebus postpositis magnam partem equitatus ad eum insequendum mittit retrahique imperat; si vim faciat neque pareat, interfici iubet, nihil hunc se absente pro sano facturum arbitratus, qui praesentis imperium neglexisset. Ille enim revocatus resistere ac se manu defendere suorumque fidem implorare coepit, saepe clamitans

liberum se liberaeque esse civitatis. Illi, ut erat imperatum, circumsistunt hominem atque interficiunt: at equites Aedui ad Caesarem omnes revertuntur.

8 His rebus gestis, Labieno in continente cum tribus legionibus et equitum milibus duobus relicto ut portus tueretur et rem frumentariam provideret quaeque in Gallia gererentur cognosceret consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet, ipse cum quinque legionibus et pari numero equitum, quem in continenti reliquerat, ad solis occasum naves solvit et leni Africo proventus media circiter nocte vento intermisso cursum non tenuit, et longius delatus aestu orta luce sub sinistra Britanniam relictam conspexit. Tum rursus aestus commutationem secutus remis contendit ut eam partem insulae caperet, qua optimum esse egressum superiore aestate cognoverat. Qua in re admodum fuit militum virtus laudanda, qui vectoriis gravibusque navigiis non intermisso remigandi labore longarum navium cursum adaequarunt. Accessum est ad Britanniam omnibus navibus meridiano fere tempore, neque in eo loco hostis est visus; sed, ut postea Caesar ex captivis cognovit, cum magnae manus eo convenissent, multitudine navium perterritae, quae cum annotinis privatisque quas sui quisque commodi fecerat amplius octingentae uno erant visae tempore, a litore discesserant ac se in superiora loca abdiderant.

9 Caesar exposito exercitu et loco castris idoneo capto, ubi ex captivis cognovit quo in loco hostium copiae consedisent, cohortibus decem ad mare relictis et equitibus trecentis, qui praesidio navibus essent, de tertia vigilia ad hostes contendit, eo minus veritus navibus, quod in litore molli atque aperto deligatas ad ancoram relinquebat, et praesidio navibus Q. Atrium praefecit. Ipse noctu progressus milia passuum circiter XII hostium copias conspicatus

est. Illi equitatu atque essedis ad flumen progressi ex loco superiore nostros prohibere et proelium committere coeperunt. Repulsi ab equitatu se in silvas abdiderunt, locum nacti egregie et natura et opere munitum, quem domestici belli, ut videbantur, causa iam ante praeparaverant: nam crebris arboribus succisis omnes introitus erant praeclusi. Ipsi ex silvis rari propugnabant nostrosque intra munitiones ingredi prohibebant. At milites legionis septimae, testudine facta et aggere ad munitiones adiecto, locum ceperunt eosque ex silvis expulerunt paucis vulneribus acceptis. Sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat.

10 Postridie eius diei mane tripertito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit, ut eos qui fugerant persequerentur. His aliquantum itineris progressis, cum iam extremi essent in prospectu, equites a Quinto Atrio ad Caesarem venerunt, qui nuntiarent superiore nocte maxima coorta tempestate prope omnes naves adflictas atque in litore eiectas esse, quod neque ancorae funesque subsisterent, neque nautae gubernatoresque vim tempestatis pati possent; itaque ex eo concursu navium magnum esse incommodum acceptum.

11 His rebus cognitis Caesar legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet, ipse ad naves revertitur; eadem fere quae ex nuntiis litterisque cognoverat coram perspicit, sic ut amissis circiter XL navibus reliquae tamen refici posse magno negotio viderentur. Itaque ex legionibus fabros deligit et ex continenti alios arcessi iubet; Labieno scribit, ut quam plurimas posset eis legionibus, quae sunt apud eum, naves instituat. Ipse, etsi res erat multae operae ac laboris, tamen commodissimum esse statuit omnes naves subduci et cum

castris una munitione coniungi. In his rebus circiter dies X consumit ne nocturnis quidem temporibus ad laborem militum intermissis. Subductis navibus castrisque egregie munitis easdem copias, quas ante, praesidio navibus reliquit: ipse eodem unde redierat proficiscitur. Eo cum venisset, maiores iam undique in eum locum copiae Britannorum convenerant summa imperi bellicae administrandi communi consilio permissa Cassivellauno, cuius fines a maritimis civitatibus flumen dividit, quod appellatur Tamesis, a mari circiter milia passuum LXXX. Huic superiore tempore cum reliquis civitatibus continentia bella intercesserant; sed nostro adventu permoti Britanni hunc toti bello imperioque praefecerant.

12 Britanniae pars interior ab eis incolitur quos natos in insula ipsi memoria proditum dicunt, maritima ab eis, qui praedae ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierunt (qui omnes fere eis nominibus civitatum appellantur, quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerunt) et bello illato ibi permanserunt atque agros colere coeperunt. Hominum est infinita multitudo creberrimaeque aedificia fere Gallicis consimilia, pecorum magnus numerus. Utuntur aut aere aut nummo aureo aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo. Nascitur ibi plumbum album in mediterraneis regionibus, in maritimis ferrum, sed eius exigua est copia; aere utuntur importato. Materia cuiusque generis ut in Gallia est, praeter fagum atque abietem. Leporem et gallinam et anserem gustare fas non putant; haec tamen alunt animi voluptatisque causa. Loca sunt temperatiora quam in Gallia, remissioribus frigoribus.

13 Insula natura triquetra, cuius unum latus est contra Galliam. Huius lateris alter angulus, qui est ad Cantium, quo fere omnes ex Gallia naves appellantur, ad orientem solem, inferior ad meridiem spectat. Hoc pertinet circiter milia passuum quingenta. Alterum vergit

ad Hispaniam atque occidentem solem; qua ex parte est Hibernia, dimidio minor, ut aestimatur, quam Britannia, sed pari spatio transmissus atque ex Gallia est in Britanniam. In hoc medio cursu est insula, quae appellatur Mona: complures praeterea minores subiectae insulae existimantur, de quibus insulis nonnulli scripserunt dies continuos triginta sub bruma esse noctem. Nos nihil de eo percontationibus reperiebamus, nisi certis ex aqua mensuris breviores esse quam in continenti noctes videbamus. Huius est longitudo lateris, ut fert illorum opinio, septingentorum milium. Tertium est contra septentriones; cui parti nulla est obiecta terra, sed eius angulus lateris maxime ad Germaniam spectat. Hoc milia passuum octingenta in longitudinem esse existimatur. Ita omnis insula est in circuitu vicies centum milium passuum.

14 Ex his omnibus longe sunt humanissimi qui Cantium incolunt, quae regio est maritima omnis, neque multum a Gallica differunt consuetudine. Interiores plerique frumenta non serunt, sed lacte et carne vivunt pellibusque sunt vestiti. Omnes vero se Britanni vitro inficiunt, quod caeruleum efficit colorem, atque hoc horridiores sunt in pugna aspectu; capilloque sunt promisso atque omni parte corporis rasa praeter caput et labrum superius. Uxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes et maxime fratres cum fratribus parentesque cum liberis; sed qui sunt ex his nati, eorum habentur liberi, quo primum virgo quaeque deducta est.

15 Equites hostium essedariiique acriter proelio cum equitatu nostro in itinere conflixerunt, tamen ut nostri omnibus partibus superiores fuerint atque eos in silvas collesque compulerint; sed compluribus interfectis cupidius insecuti nonnullos ex suis amiserunt. At illi intermisso spatio imprudentibus nostris atque occupatis in munitione castrorum subito se ex statione pro castris

collocati, acriter pugnaverunt, duabusque missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare atque eis primis legionum duarum, cum hae perexiguo intermisso loci spatio inter se constitissent, novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris per medios audacissime perruperunt seque inde incolumes receperunt. Eo die Quintus Laberius Durus, tribunus militum, interficitur. Illi pluribus submissis cohortibus repelluntur.

16 Toto hoc in genere pugnae, cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem, equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent. Equestris autem proeli ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat. Accedebat huc ut numquam conferti sed rari magnisque intervallis proeliarentur stationesque dispositas haberent, atque alios alii deinceps exciperent, integrique et recentes defetigatis succederent.

17 Postero die procul a castris hostes in collibus constiterunt rarique se ostendere et lenius quam pridie nostros equites proelio lacessere coeperunt. Sed meridie, cum Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum Gaio Trebonio legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab signis legionibusque non absisterent. Nostri acriter in eos impetu facto reppulerunt neque finem sequendi fecerunt, quoad subsidio confisi equites, cum post se legiones viderent, praecipites hostes egerunt magnoque eorum numero interfecto neque sui colligendi neque consistendi aut ex essedis desiliendi facultatem dederunt. Ex hac fuga protinus, quae undique convenerant, auxilia discesserunt,

neque post id tempus umquam summis nobiscum copiis hostes contenderunt.

18 Caesar cognito consilio eorum ad flumen Tamesim in fines Cassivellauni exercitum duxit; quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest. Eo cum venisset, animum advertit ad alteram fluminis ripam magnas esse copias hostium instructas. Ripa autem erat acutis sudibus praefixis munita, eiusdemque generis sub aqua defixae sudes flumine tegebantur. His rebus cognitis a captivis perfugisque Caesar praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit. Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua exstarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent.

19 Cassivellaunus, ut supra demonstravimus, omni deposita spe contentionis dimissis amplioribus copiis milibus circiter quattuor essedariorum relictis itinera nostra servabat paulumque ex via excedebat locisque impeditis ac silvestribus sese occultabat, atque eis regionibus quibus nos iter facturos cognoverat pecora atque homines ex agris in silvas compellebat et, cum equitatus noster liberius praedandi vastandique causa se in agros eiecerat, omnibus viis semitisque essedarios ex silvis emittebat et magno cum periculo nostrorum equitum cum eis confligebat atque hoc metu latius vagari prohibebat. Relinquebatur ut neque longius ab agmine legionum discedi Caesar pateretur, et tantum in agris vastandis incendiisque faciendis hostibus noceretur, quantum labore atque itinere legionarii milites efficere poterant.

20 Interim Trinobantes, prope firmissima earum regionum civitas, ex qua Mandubracius adulescens Caesaris fidem secutus ad eum in continentem Galliam venerat, cuius pater in ea civitate regnum

obtinuerat interfectusque erat a Cassivellauno, ipse fuga mortem vitaverat, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata facturos; petunt, ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in civitatem mittat, qui praesit imperiumque obtineat. His Caesar imperat obsides quadraginta frumentumque exercitui Mandubraciumque ad eos mittit. Illi imperata celeriter fecerunt, obsides ad numerum frumentumque miserunt.

21 Trinobantibus defensis atque ab omni militum iniuria prohibitis Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, Cassi legationibus missis sese Caesari dedunt. Ab his cognoscit non longe ex eo loco oppidum Cassivellauni abesse silvis paludibusque munitum, quo satis magnus hominum pecorisque numerus invenerit. Oppidum autem Britanni vocant, cum silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, quo incursionis hostium vitandae causa convenire consuerunt. Eo proficiscitur cum legionibus: locum reperit egregie natura atque opere munitum; tamen hunc duabus ex partibus oppugnare contendit. Hostes paulisper morati militum nostrorum impetum non tulerunt seseque alia ex parte oppidi eiecerunt. Magnus ibi numerus pecoris repertus, multique in fuga sunt comprehensi atque interfecti.

22 Dum haec in his locis geruntur, Cassivellaunus ad Cantium, quod esse ad mare supra demonstravimus, quibus regionibus quattuor reges praeerant, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, Segovax, nuntios mittit atque eis imperat uti coactis omnibus copiis castra navalia de improvviso adorianantur atque oppugnent. Ei cum ad castra venissent, nostri eruptione facta multis eorum interfectis, capto etiam nobili duce Lugotorige suos incolumes reduxerunt. Cassivellaunus hoc proelio nuntiato tot detrimentis acceptis, vastatis finibus, maxime etiam permotus defectione civitatum legatos per

Atrebatem Commium de deditione ad Caesarem mittit. Caesar, cum constituisset hiemare in continenti propter repentinos Galliae motus, neque multum aestatis superesset, atque id facile extrahi posse intellexeret, obsides imperat et quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet constituit; interdicat atque imperat Cassivellauno, ne Mandubracio neu Trinobantibus noceat.

23 Obsidibus acceptis exercitum reducit ad mare, naves invenit refectas. His deductis, quod et captivorum magnum numerum habebat, et nonnullae tempestate deperierant naves, duobus commeatibus exercitum reportare instituit. Ac sic accidit, uti ex tanto navium numero tot navigationibus neque hoc neque superiore anno ulla omnino navis, quae milites portaret, desideraretur; at ex eis, quae inanes ex continenti ad eum remitterentur et prioris commeatus expositis militibus et quas postea Labienus faciendas curaverat numero LX, perpaucae locum caperent, reliquae fere omnes reicerentur. Quas cum aliquamdiu Caesar frustra exspectasset, ne anni tempore a navigatione excluderetur, quod aequinotium suberat, necessario angustius milites collocavit ac summa tranquillitate consecuta, secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia, prima luce terram attigit omnesque incolumes naves perduxit.

24 Subductis navibus concilioque Gallorum Samarobrivae peracto, quod eo anno frumentum in Gallia propter siccitates angustius provenerat, coactus est aliter ac superioribus annis exercitum in hibernis collocare legionesque in plures civitates distribuere. Ex quibus unam in Morinos ducendam Gaio Fabio legato dedit, alteram in Nervios Quinto Ciceroni, tertiam in Esubios Lucio Roscio; quartam in Remis cum Tito Labieno in confinio Treverorum hiemare iussit. Tres in Belgis collocavit: eis Marcum Crassum quaestorem et Lucium Munatium Plancum et Gaium Trebonium legatos praefecit.

Unam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat, et cohortes V in Eburones, quorum pars maxima est inter Mosam ac Rhenum, qui sub imperio Ambiorigis et Catuvolci erant, misit. Eis militibus Quintum Titurium Sabinum et Lucium Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praeesse iussit. Ad hunc modum distributis legionibus facillime inopiae frumentariae sese mederi posse existimavit. Atque harum tamen omnium legionum hiberna praeter eam, quam Lucio Roscio in pacatissimam et quietissimam partem ducendam dederat, milibus passuum centum continebantur. Ipse interea, quoad legiones collocatas munitaque hiberna cognovisset, in Gallia morari constituit.

25 Erat in Carnutibus summo loco natus Tasgetius, cuius maiores in sua civitate regnum obtinuerant. Huic Caesar pro eius virtute atque in se benevolentia, quod in omnibus bellis singulari eius opera fuerat usus, maiorum locum restituerat. Tertium iam hunc annum regnantem inimici, multis palam ex civitate eius auctoribus, eum interfecerunt. Defertur ea res ad Caesarem. Ille veritus, quod ad plures pertinebat, ne civitas eorum impulsu deficeret, Lucium Plancum cum legione ex Belgio celeriter in Carnutes proficisci iubet ibique hiemare quorumque opera cognoverat Tasgetium interfectum, hos comprehensos ad se mittere. Interim ab omnibus legatis quaestoreque, quibus legiones tradiderat, certior factus est in hiberna perventum locumque hibernis esse munitum.

26 Diebus circiter XV, quibus in hiberna ventum est, initium repentini tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco; qui, cum ad fines regni sui Sabino Cottaeque praesto fuissent frumentumque in hiberna comportavissent, Indutiomari Treveri nuntiis impulsu suos concitaverunt subitoque oppressis lignatoribus magna manu ad castra oppugnatum venerunt. Cum

celeriter nostri arma cepissent vallumque adscendissent atque una ex parte Hispanis equitibus emissis equestri proelio superiores fuissent, desperata re hostes suos ab oppugnatione reduxerunt. Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui posse sperarent.

27 Mittitur ad eos colloquendi causa Gaius Arpineius, eques Romanus, familiaris Quinti Tituri, et Quintus Iunius ex Hispania quidam, qui iam ante missu Caesaris ad Ambiorigem ventitare consuerat; apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est: Sese pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuisset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius ab Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud in servitute et catenis tenuissent; neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaeque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem. Civitati porro hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat. Sed esse Galliae commune consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset. Non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur. Quibus quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem officii pro beneficiis Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore

biduo. Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab eis absit. Illud se polliceri et iureiurando confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum. Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre. Hac oratione habita discedit Ambiorix.

28 Arpineius et Iunius, quae audierunt, ad legatos deferunt. Illi repentina re perturbati, etsi ab hoste ea dicebantur, tamen non neglegenda existimabant maximeque hac re permovebantur, quod civitatem ignobilem atque humilem Eburonum sua sponte populo Romano bellum facere ausam vix erat credendum. Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magnaue inter eos exsistit controversia. Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: quantasvis magnas copias etiam Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?

29 Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium adiunctis Germanis convenissent aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam; neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. Non hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum;

magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias; ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris extincta. Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa re Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse? Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem. Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda.

30 Hac in utramque partem disputatione habita, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus acriter resisteretur, “Vincite,” inquit, “si ita vultis,” Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret; “neque is sum,” inquit, “qui gravissime ex vobis mortis periculo terrear: hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, qui, si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe ab ceteris aut ferro aut fame intereant.”

31 Consurgitur ex consilio; comprehendunt utrumque et orant, ne sua dissensione et pertinacia rem in summum periculum deducat: facilem esse rem, seu maneant, seu proficiscantur, si modo unum omnes sentiant ac probent; contra in dissensione nullam se salutem perspicere. Res disputatione ad mediam noctem perducitur. Tandem dat Cotta permotus manus: superat sententia Sabini. Pronuntiatur prima luce ituros. Consumitur vigiliis reliqua pars noctis, cum sua quisque miles circumspiceret, quid secum portare posset, quid ex instrumento hibernorum relinquere cogeretur. Omnia excogitantur, quare nec sine periculo maneatur, et languore militum et vigiliis

periculum augeatur. Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed ab homine amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum, longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis.

32 At hostes, posteaquam ex nocturno fremitu vigiliisque de profectione eorum senserunt, collocatis insidiis bipertito in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus Romanorum adventum expectabant, et cum se maior pars agminis in magnam convallem demisisset, ex utraque parte eius vallis subito se ostenderunt novissimosque premere et primos prohibere ascensu atque iniquissimo nostris loco proelium committere coeperunt.

33 Tum demum Titurius, qui nihil ante providisset, trepidare et concursare cohortesque disponere, haec tamen ipsa timide atque ut eum omnia deficere viderentur; quod plerumque eis accidere consuevit, qui in ipso negotio consilium capere coguntur. At Cotta, qui cogitasset haec posse in itinere accidere atque ob eam causam profectionis auctor non fuisset, nulla in re communi saluti deerat et in appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat. Cum propter longitudinem agminis minus facile omnia per se obire et, quid quoque loco faciendum esset, providere possent, iusserunt pronuntiare, ut impedimenta relinquerent atque in orbem consisterent. Quod consilium etsi in eiusmodi casu reprehendendum non est, tamen incommode accidit: nam et nostris militibus spem minuit et hostes ad pugnam alacriores effecit, quod non sine summo timore et desperatione id factum videbatur. Praeterea accidit, quod fieri necesse erat, ut vulgo milites ab signis discederent, quae quisque eorum carissima haberet, ab impedimentis petere atque arripere properaret, clamore et fletu omnia complerentur.

34 At barbaris consilium non defuit. Nam duces eorum tota acie pronuntiare iusserunt, ne quis ab loco discederet: illorum esse praedam atque illis reservari quaecumque Romani reliquissent: proinde omnia in victoria posita existimarent. Erant et virtute et studio pugnandi pares; nostri, tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant, et quotiens quaeque cohors procurrebat, ab ea parte magnus numerus hostium cadebat. Qua re animadversa Ambiorix pronuntiare iubet, ut procul tela coniciant neu propius accedant et, quam in partem Romani impetum fecerint, cedant (levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil eis noceri posse), rursus se ad signa recipientes insequantur.

35 Quo praecepto ab eis diligentissime observato, cum quaequam cohors ex orbe excesserat atque impetum fecerat, hostes velocissime refugiebant. Interim eam partem nudari necesse erat et ab latere aperto tela recipi. Rursus cum in eum locum unde erant egressi reverti coeperant, et ab eis qui cesserant et ab eis qui proximi steterant circumveniebantur; sin autem locum tenere vellent, nec virtuti locus relinquebatur, neque ab tanta multitudine coniecta tela conferti vitare poterant. Tamen tot incommodis conflictati, multis vulneribus acceptis resistebant et magna parte diei consumpta, cum a prima luce ad horam octavam pugnaretur, nihil quod ipsis esset indignum committebant. Tum Tito Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat, viro forti et magnae auctoritatis, utrumque femur tragula traicitur; Quintus Lucanius, eiusdem ordinis, fortissime pugnans, dum circumvento filio subvenit, interficitur; Lucius Cotta legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque adhortans in adversum os funda vulneratur.

36 His rebus permotus Quintus Titurius, cum procul Ambiorigem

suos cohortantem conspexisset, interpretem suum Gnaeum Pompeium ad eum mittit rogatum ut sibi militibusque parcat. Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; sperare a multitudine impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri, inque eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta saucio communicat, si videatur, pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una colloquantur: sperare ab eo de sua ac militum salute impetrari posse. Cotta se ad armatum hostem iturum negat atque in eo perseverat.

³⁷ Sabinus quos in praesentia tribunos militum circum se habebat et primorum ordinum centuriones se sequi iubet et, cum propius Ambiorigem accessisset, iussus arma abicere imperatum facit suisque ut idem faciant imperat. Interim, dum de condicionibus inter se agunt longiorque consulto ab Ambiorige instituitur sermo, paulatim circumventus interficitur. Tum vero suo more victoriam conclamant atque ululatum tollunt impetuque in nostros facto ordines perturbant. Ibi Lucius Cotta pugnans interficitur cum maxima parte militum. Reliqui se in castra recipiunt unde erant egressi. Ex quibus Lucius Petrosidius aquilifer, cum magna multitudine hostium premeretur, aquilam intra vallum proiecit; ipse pro castris fortissime pugnans occiditur. Illi aegre ad noctem oppugnationem sustinent; noctu ad unum omnes desperata salute se ipsi interficiunt. Pauci ex proelio lapsi incertis itineribus per silvas ad Titum Labienum legatum in hiberna perveniunt atque eum de rebus gestis certiores faciunt.

³⁸ Hac victoria sublatus Ambiorix statim cum equitatu in Aduatucos, qui erant eius regno finitimi, proficiscitur; neque noctem neque diem intermittit peditatumque subsequi iubet. Re demonstrata Aduatucisque concitatis postero die in Nervios pervenit hortaturque,

ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque ulciscendi Romanos pro eis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant: interfectos esse legatos duos magnamque partem exercitus interisse demonstrat; nihil esse negoti subito oppressam legionem quae cum Cicerone hiemet interfici; se ad eam rem profitetur adiutorem. Facile hac oratione Nervii persuadet.

39 Itaque confestim dimissis nuntiis ad Ceutrones, Grudios, Levacos, Pleumoxios, Geidumnos, qui omnes sub eorum imperio sunt, quam maximas manus possunt cogunt et de improvviso ad Ciceronis hiberna advolant nondum ad eum fama de Tituri morte perlata. Huic quoque accidit, quod fuit necesse, ut nonnulli milites, qui lignationis munitionisque causa in silvas discessissent, repentino equitum adventu interciperentur. His circumventis magna manu Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci atque horum omnium socii et clientes legionem oppugnare incipiunt. Nostri celeriter ad arma concurrunt, vallum conscendunt. Aegre is dies sustentatur, quod omnem spem hostes in celeritate ponebant atque hanc adepti victoriam in perpetuum se fore victores confidebant.

40 Mittuntur ad Caesarem confestim ab Cicerone litterae magnis propositis praemiis, si pertulissent: obsessis omnibus viis missi intercipiuntur. Noctu ex materia, quam munitionis causa comportaverant, turres admodum CXX excitantur incredibili celeritate; quae deesse operi videbantur, perficiuntur. Hostes postero die multo maioribus coactis copiis castra oppugnant, fossam complent. Eadem ratione, qua pridie, ab nostris resistitur. Hoc idem reliquis deinceps fit diebus. Nulla pars nocturni temporis ad laborem intermittitur; non aegris, non vulneratis facultas quietis datur. Quaecumque ad proximi diei oppugnationem opus sunt noctu comparantur; multae praeustae sudes, magnus muralium pilorum

numerus instituitur; turres contabulantur, pinnae loricaeque ex cratibus attexuntur. Ipse Cicero, cum tenuissima valetudine esset, ne nocturnum quidem sibi tempus ad quietem relinquebat, ut ultro militum concursu ac vocibus sibi parcere cogeretur.

41 Tunc duces principesque Nerviorum qui aliquem sermonis aditum causamque amicitiae cum Cicerone habebant colloqui sese velle dicunt. Facta potestate eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant: omnem esse in armis Galliam; Germanos Rhenum transisse; Caesaris reliquorumque hiberna oppugnari. Addunt etiam de Sabini morte: Ambiorigem ostentant fidei faciendae causa. Errare eos dicunt, si quidquam ab his praesidi sperent, qui suis rebus diffidant; sese tamen hoc esse in Ciceronem populumque Romanum animo, ut nihil nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere consuetudinem nolint: licere illis incolumibus per se ex hibernis discedere et quascumque in partes velint sine metu proficisci. Cicero ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem: si ab armis discedere velint, se adiutore utantur legatosque ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae petierint, impetraturos.

42 Ab hac spe repulsi Nervii vallo pedum IX et fossa pedum XV hiberna cingunt. Haec et superiorum annorum consuetudine ab nobis cognoverant et, quos clam de exercitu habebant captivos, ab eis docebantur; sed nulla ferramentorum copia quae esset ad hunc usum idonea, gladiis caespites circumcidere, manibus sagulisque terram exhaurire nitebantur. Qua quidem ex re hominum multitudo cognosci potuit: nam minus horis tribus milium pedum XV in circuitu munitionem perfecerunt reliquisque diebus turres ad altitudinem valli, falces testudinesque, quas idem captivi docuerant, parare ac

facere coeperunt.

43 Septimo oppugnationis die maximo coorto vento ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes fundis et fervefacta iacula in casas, quae more Gallico stramentis erant tectae, iacere coeperunt. Hae celeriter ignem comprehenderunt et venti magnitudine in omnem locum castrorum distulerunt. Hostes maximo clamore sicuti parta iam atque explorata victoria turres testudinesque agere et scalis vallum ascendere coeperunt. At tanta militum virtus atque ea praesentia animi fuit, ut, cum undique flamma torrerentur maximaque telorum multitudine premerentur suaque omnia impedimenta atque omnes fortunas conflagrare intellegerent, non modo demigrandi causa de vallo decederet nemo, sed paene ne respiceret quidem quisquam, ac tum omnes acerrime fortissimeque pugnarent. Hic dies nostris longe gravissimus fuit; sed tamen hunc habuit eventum, ut eo die maximus numerus hostium vulneraretur atque interficeretur, ut se sub ipso vallo constipaverant recessumque primis ultimi non dabant. Paulum quidem intermissa flamma et quodam loco turri adacta et contingente vallum tertiae cohortis centuriones ex eo, quo stabant, loco recesserunt suosque omnes removerunt, nutu vocibusque hostes, si introire vellent, vocare coeperunt; quorum progredi ausus est nemo. Tum ex omni parte lapidibus coniectis deturbati, turrisque succensa est.

44 Erant in ea legione fortissimi viri, centuriones, qui primis ordinibus appropinquarent, Titus Pullo et Lucius Vorens. Hi perpetuas inter se controversias habebant, quinam anteferretur, omnibusque annis de locis summis simultatibus contendebant. Ex his Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, “Quid dubitas,” inquit, “Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas? hic dies de nostris controversiis iudicabit.” Haec cum dixisset,

procedit extra munitiones quaque pars hostium confertissima est visa irrumpit. Ne Voreus quidem tum sese vallo continet, sed omnium veritus existimationem subsequitur. Mediocri spatio relicto Pullo pilum in hostes immittit atque unum ex multitudine procurrentem traicit; quo percusso et exanimato hunc scutis protegent, in hostem tela universi coniciunt neque dant regrediendi facultatem. Transfigitur scutum Pulloni et verutum in balteo defigitur. Avertit hic casus vaginam et gladium educere conanti dextram moratur manum, impeditumque hostes circumsistunt. Succurrit inimicus illi Voreus et laboranti subvenit. Ad hunc se confestim a Pullone omnis multitudo convertit: illum veruto arbitrantur occisum. Gladio cominus rem gerit Voreus atque uno interfecto reliquos paulum propellit; dum cupidius instat, in locum deiectus inferiorem concidit. Huic rursus circumvento fert subsidium Pullo, atque ambo incolumes compluribus interfectis summa cum laude sese intra munitiones recipiunt. Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur.

45 Quanto erat in dies gravior atque asperior oppugnatio, et maxime quod magna parte militum confecta vulneribus res ad paucitatem defensorum pervenerat, tanto crebriores litterae nuntiique ad Caesarem mittebantur; quorum pars deprehensa in conspectu nostrorum militum cum cruciatu necabatur. Erat unus intus Nervius nomine Vertico, loco natus honesto, qui a prima obsidione ad Ciceronem perfugerat suamque ei fidem praestiterat. Hic servo spe libertatis magnisque persuadet praemiis, ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat. Has ille in iaculo illigatas effert et Gallus inter Gallos sine ulla suspicione versatus ad Caesarem pervenit. Ab eo de periculis Ciceronis legionisque cognoscitur.

46 Caesar acceptis litteris hora circiter XI diei statim nuntium in Bellovacos ad M. Crassum quaestorem mittit, cuius hiberna aberant ab eo milia passuum XXV; iubet media nocte legionem proficisci celeriterque ad se venire. Exit cum nuntio Crassus. Alterum ad Gaium Fabium legatum mittit, ut in Atrebatium fines legionem adducat, qua sibi iter faciendum sciebat. Scribit Labieno, si rei publicae commodo facere posset, cum legione ad fines Nerviorum veniat. Reliquam partem exercitus, quod paulo aberat longius, non putat exspectandam; equites circiter quadringentos ex proximis hibernis colligit.

47 Hora circiter tertia ab antecursoribus de Crassi adventu certior factus eo die milia passuum XX procedit. Crassum Samarobrivae praeficit legionemque attribuit, quod ibi impedimenta exercitus, obsides civitatum, litteras publicas frumentumque omne quod eo tolerandae hiemis causa devexerat relinquebat. Fabius, ut imperatum erat, non ita multum moratus in itinere cum legione occurrit. Labienus interitu Sabini et caede cohortium cognita, cum omnes ad eum Treverorum copiae venissent, veritus, si ex hibernis fugae similem profectionem fecisset, ut hostium impetum sustinere posset, praesertim quos recenti victoria efferri sciret, litteras Caesari remittit, quanto cum periculo legionem ex hibernis educturus esset; rem gestam in Eburonibus perscribit; docet omnes equitatus peditatusque copias Treverorum tria milia passuum longe ab suis castris consedissee.

48 Caesar consilio eius probato, etsi opinione trium legionum deiectus ad duas redierat, tamen unum communis salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat. Venit magnis itineribus in Nerviorum fines. Ibi ex captivis cognoscit, quae apud Ciceronem gerantur, quantoque in periculo res sit. Tum cuidam ex equitibus Gallis magnis praemiis

persuadet uti ad Ciceronem epistolam deferat. Hanc Graecis conscriptam litteris mittit, ne intercepta epistola nostra ab hostibus consilia cognoscantur. Si adire non possit, monet ut tragulam cum epistola ad amentum deligata intra munitionem castrorum abiciat. In litteris scribit se cum legionibus profectum celeriter adfore; hortatur ut pristinam virtutem retineat. Gallus periculum veritus, ut erat praeceptum, tragulam mittit. Haec casu ad turrim adhaesit neque ab nostris biduo animadversa tertio die a quodam milite conspicitur, dempta ad Ciceronem defertur. Ille perlectam in conventu militum recitat maximaque omnes laetitia adficit. Tum fumi incendiorum procul videbantur; quae res omnem dubitationem adventus legionum expulit.

49 Galli re cognita per exploratores obsidionem relinquunt, ad Caesarem omnibus copiis contendunt. Hae erant armata circiter milia LX. Cicero data facultate Gallum ab eodem Verticone, quem supra demonstravimus, repetit, qui litteras ad Caesarem deferat; hunc admonet, iter caute diligenterque faciat: perscribit in litteris hostes ab se discessisse omnemque ad eum multitudinem convertisse. Quibus litteris circiter media nocte Caesar adlatis suos facit certiores eosque ad dimicandum animo confirmat. Postero die luce prima movet castra et circiter milia passuum quattuor progressus trans vallem et rivum multitudinem hostium conspicatur. Erat magni periculi res tantulis copiis iniquo loco dimicare; tum, quoniam obsidione liberatum Ciceronem sciebat, aequo animo remittendum de celeritate existimabat: consedit et quam aequissimo loco potest castra communit atque haec, etsi erant exigua per se vix hominum milium septem praesertim nullis cum impedimentis, tamen angustiis viarum quam maxime potest contrahit, eo consilio, ut in summam contemtionem hostibus veniat. Interim speculatoribus in omnes

partes dimissis explorat quo commodissime itinere vallem transire possit.

50 Eo die parvulis equestribus proeliis ad aquam factis utrique sese suo loco continent: Galli, quod ampliores copias, quae nondum convenerant, exspectabant; Caesar, si forte timoris simulatione hostes in suum locum elicere posset, ut citra vallem pro castris proelio contenderet, si id efficere non posset, ut exploratis itineribus minore cum periculo vallem rivumque transiret. Prima luce hostium equitatus ad castra accedit proeliumque cum nostris equitibus committit. Caesar consulto equites cedere seque in castra recipere iubet, simul ex omnibus partibus castra altiore vallo muniri portasque obstrui atque in his administrandis rebus quam maxime concursari et cum simulatione agi timoris iubet.

51 Quibus omnibus rebus hostes invitati copias traducunt aciemque iniquo loco constituunt, nostris vero etiam de vallo deductis propius accedunt et tela intra munitionem ex omnibus partibus coniciunt praeconibusque circummissis pronuntiari iubent, seu quis Gallus seu Romanus velit ante horam tertiam ad se transire, sine periculo licere; post id tempus non fore potestatem: ac sic nostros contempserunt, ut obstructis in speciem portis singulis ordinibus caespitum, quod ea non posse introrumpere videbantur, alii vallum manu scindere, alii fossas complere inciperent. Tum Caesar omnibus portis eruptione facta equitatuque emissio celeriter hostes in fugam dat, sic uti omnino pugnandi causa resisteret nemo, magnumque ex eis numerum occidit atque omnes armis exuit.

52 Longius prosequi veritus, quod silvae paludesque intercedebant neque etiam parvulo detrimento illorum locum relinqui videbat, omnibus suis incolumibus copiis eodem die ad Ciceronem pervenit. Institutas turres, testudines munitionesque hostium admiratur;

legione producta cognoscit non decimum quemque esse reliquum militem sine vulnere: ex his omnibus iudicat rebus, quanto cum periculo et quanta cum virtute res sint administratae. Ciceronem pro eius merito legionemque collaudat; centuriones singillatim tribunosque militum appellat, quorum egregiam fuisse virtutem testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat. De casu Sabini et Cottae certius ex captivis cognoscit. Postero die contione habita rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat: quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetatio neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur.

53 Interim ad Labienum per Remos incredibili celeritate de victoria Caesaris fama perfertur, ut, cum ab hibernis Ciceronis milia passuum abesset circiter LX, eoque post horam nonam diei Caesar pervenisset, ante mediam noctem ad portas castrorum clamor oreretur, quo clamore significatio victoriae gratulatioque ab Remis Labieno fieret. Hac fama ad Treveros perlata Indutiomarus, qui postero die castra Labieni oppugnare decreverat, noctu profugit copiasque omnes in Treveros reducit. Caesar Fabium cum sua legione remittit in hiberna, ipse cum tribus legionibus circum Samarobrivam trinis hibernis hiemare constituit et, quod tanti motus Galliae exstiterant, totam hiemem ipse ad exercitum manere decrevit. Nam illo incommodo de Sabini morte perlato omnes fere Galliae civitates de bello consultabant, nuntios legationesque in omnes partes dimittebant et quid reliqui consili caperent atque unde initium belli fieret explorabant nocturnaue in locis desertis concilia habebant. Neque ullum fere totius hiemis tempus sine sollicitudine Caesaris intercessit, quin aliquem de consiliis ac motu Gallorum nuntium acciperet. In his ab Lucio Roscio, quem legioni tertiae decimae

praefecerat, certior factus est magnas Gallorum copias earum civitatum, quae Armoricae appellantur, oppugnandi sui causa convenisse neque longius milia passuum octo ab hibernis suis afuisse, sed nuntio allato de victoria Caesaris discessisse, adeo ut fugae similis discessus videretur.

54 At Caesar principibus cuiusque civitatis ad se evocatis alias territando, cum se scire quae fierent denuntiaret, alias cohortando magnam partem Galliae in officio tenuit. Tamen Senones, quae est civitas in primis firma et magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis, Cavarinum, quem Caesar apud eos regem constituerat, cuius frater Moritasgus adventu in Galliam Caesaris cuiusque maiores regnum obtinuerant, interficere publico consilio conati, cum ille praesensisset ac profugisset, usque ad fines insecuti regno domoque expulerunt et, missis ad Caesarem satisfaciendi causa legatis, cum is omnem ad se senatum venire iussisset, dicto audientes non fuerunt. Tantum apud homines barbaros valuit esse aliquos repertos principes inferendi belli tantamque omnibus voluntatum commutationem attulit, ut praeter Aeduos et Remos, quos praecipuo semper honore Caesar habuit, alteros pro vetere ac perpetua erga populum Romanum fide, alteros pro recentibus Gallici belli officiis, nulla fere civitas fuerit non suspecta nobis. Idque adeo haud scio mirandumne sit, cum compluribus aliis de causis, tum maxime quod ei, qui virtute belli omnibus gentibus praeferebantur, tantum se eius opinionis deperdidisse ut a populo Romano imperia perferrent gravissime dolebant.

55 Treveri vero atque Indutiomarus totius hiemis nullum tempus intermiserunt, quin trans Rhenum legatos mitterent, civitates sollicitarent, pecunias pollicerentur, magna parte exercitus nostri interfecta multo minorem superesse dicerent partem. Neque tamen

ulli civitati Germanorum persuaderi potuit, ut Rhenum transiret, cum se bis expertos dicerent, Ariovisti bello et Tencterorum transitu: non esse amplius fortunam temptaturos. Hac spe lapsus Indutiomarus nihilo minus copias cogere, exercere, a finitimis equos parare, exules damnatosque tota Gallia magnis praemiis ad se allicere coepit. Ac tantam sibi iam his rebus in Gallia auctoritatem comparaverat ut undique ad eum legationes concurrerent, gratiam atque amicitiam publice privatimque peterent.

56 Ubi intellexit ultro ad se veniri, altera ex parte Senones Carnutesque conscientia facinoris instigari, altera Nervios Aduatucosque bellum Romanis parare, neque sibi voluntariorum copias defore, si ex finibus suis progredi coepisset, armatum concilium indicit. Hoc more Gallorum est initium belli, quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consuerunt; qui ex eis novissimus convenit, in conspectu multitudinis omnibus cruciatibus affectus necatur. In eo concilio Cingetorigem, alterius principem factionis, generum suum, quem supra demonstravimus Caesaris secutum fidem ab eo non discessisse, hostem iudicat bonaque eius publicat. His rebus confectis, in concilio pronuntiat arcessitum se a Senonibus et Carnutibus aliisque compluribus Galliae civitatibus; huc iturum per fines Remorum eorumque agros populaturum ac, priusquam id faciat, castra Labieni oppugnaturum. Quae fieri velit praecipit.

57 Labienus, cum et loci natura et manu munitissimis castris sese teneret, de suo ac legionis periculo nihil timebat; ne quam occasionem rei bene gerendae dimitteret, cogitabat. Itaque a Cingetorige atque eius propinquis oratione Indutiomari cognita, quam in concilio habuerat, nuntios mittit ad finitimas civitates equitesque undique evocat: his certum diem conveniendi dicit.

Interim prope cotidie cum omni equitatu Indutiomarus sub castris eius vagabatur, alias ut situm castrorum cognosceret, alias colloquendi aut territandi causa: equites plerumque omnes tela intra vallum coniciebant. Labienus suos intra munitionem continebat timorisque opinionem, quibuscumque poterat rebus, augebat.

58 Cum maiore in dies contemptione Indutiomarus ad castra accederet, nocte una intromissis equitibus omnium finitimarum civitatum quos arcessendos curaverat, tanta diligentia omnes suos custodiis intra castra continuit, ut nulla ratione ea res enuntiari aut ad Treveros perferri posset. Interim ex consuetudine cotidiana Indutiomarus ad castra accedit atque ibi magnam partem diei consumit; equites tela coniciunt et magna cum contumelia verborum nostros ad pugnam evocant. Nullo ab nostris dato responso, ubi visum est, sub vesperum dispersi ac dissipati discedunt. Subito Labienus duabus portis omnem equitatum emittit; praecipit atque interdicat, proterritis hostibus atque in fugam coniectis (quod fore, sicut accidit, videbat) unum omnes peterent Indutiomarum, neu quis quem prius vulneret, quam illum interfectum viderit, quod mora reliquorum spatium nactum illum effugere nolebat; magna proponit eis qui occiderint praemia; mittit cohortes equitibus subsidio. Comprobat hominis consilium fortuna, et cum unum omnes peterent, in ipso fluminis vado deprehensus Indutiomarus interficitur, caputque eius refertur in castra: redeuntes equites quos possunt consecantur atque occidunt. Hac re cognita omnes Eburonum et Nerviorum quae convenerant copiae discedunt, pauloque habuit post id factum Caesar quietiorem Galliam.

LIBER VI

1 Multis de causis Caesar maiorem Galliae motum exspectans per Marcum Silanum, Gaium Antistium Reginum, Titum Sextium legatos dilectum habere instituit; simul ab Gnaeo Pompeio proconsule petit, quoniam ipse ad urbem cum imperio rei publicae causa remaneret, quos ex Cisalpina Gallia consulis sacramento rogavisset, ad signa convenire et ad se proficisci iuberet, magni interesse etiam in reliquum tempus ad opinionem Galliae existimans tantas videri Italiae facultates ut, si quid esset in bello detrimenti acceptum, non modo id brevi tempore sarciri, sed etiam maioribus augeri copiis posset. Quod cum Pompeius et rei publicae et amicitiae tribuisset, celeriter confecto per suos dilectu tribus ante exactam hiemem et constitutis et adductis legionibus duplicatoque earum cohortium numero, quas cum Quinto Titurio amiserat, et celeritate et copiis docuit, quid populi Romani disciplina atque opes possent.

2 Interfecto Indutiomaro, ut docuimus, ad eius propinquos a Treveris imperium defertur. Illi finitimos Germanos sollicitare et pecuniam polliceri non desistunt. Cum ab proximis impetrare non possent, ultiores temptant. Inventis nonnullis civitatibus iureiurando inter se confirmant obsidibusque de pecunia cavent: Amborigem sibi societate et foedere adiungunt. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, cum undique bellum parari videret, Nervios, Aduatucos ac Menapios adiunctis Cisrhenanis omnibus Germanis esse in armis, Senones ad imperatum non venire et cum Carnutibus finitimisque civitatibus consilia communicare, a Treveris Germanos crebris legationibus sollicitari, maturius sibi de bello cogitandum putavit.

3 Itaque nondum hieme confecta proximis quattuor coactis

legionibus de improvise in fines Nerviorum contendit et, priusquam illi aut convenire aut profugere possent, magno pecoris atque hominum numero capto atque ea praeda militibus concessa vastatisque agris in deditionem venire atque obsides sibi dare coegit. Eo celeriter confecto negotio rursus in hiberna legiones reduxit. Concilio Galliae primo vere, ut instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent, initium belli ac defectionis hoc esse arbitratus, ut omnia postponere videretur, concilium Lutetiam Parisiorum transfert. Confines erant hi Senonibus civitatemque patrum memoria coniunxerant, sed ab hoc consilio afuisse existimabantur. Hac re pro suggestu pronuntiata eodem die cum legionibus in Senones proficiscitur magnisque itineribus eo pervenit.

4 Cognito eius adventu Acco, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, iubet in oppida multitudinem convenire. Conantibus, priusquam id effici posset, adesse Romanos nuntiatur. Necessario sententia desistunt legatosque deprecandi causa ad Caesarem mittunt: adeunt per Aeduos, quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas. Libenter Caesar petentibus Aeduis dat veniam excusationemque accipit, quod aestivum tempus instantis belli, non quaestionis esse arbitrabatur. Obsidibus imperatis centum hos Aeduis custodiendos tradit. Eodem Carnutes legatos obsidesque mittunt usi deprecatoribus Renis, quorum erant in clientela: eadem ferunt responsa. Peragit concilium Caesar equitesque imperat civitatibus.

5 Hac parte Galliae pacata totus et mente et animo in bellum Treverorum et Ambiorigis insistit. Cavarinum cum equitatu Senonum secum proficisci iubet, ne quis aut ex huius iracundia aut ex eo, quod meruerat, odio civitatis motus existat. His rebus constitutis, quod pro explorato habebat Ambiorigem proelio non esse

concertaturum, reliqua eius consilia animo circumspiciebat. Erant Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti, qui uni ex Gallia de pace ad Caesarem legatos numquam miserant. Cum his esse hospitium Ambiorigi sciebat; item per Treveros venisse Germanis in amicitiam cognoverat. Haec prius illi detrahenda auxilia existimabat quam ipsum bello laceraret, ne desperata salute aut se in Menapios abderet aut cum Transrhenanis congredi cogeretur. Hoc inito consilio totius exercitus impedimenta ad Labienum in Treveros mittit duasque legiones ad eum proficisci iubet; ipse cum legionibus expeditis quinque in Menapios proficiscitur. Illi nulla coacta manu loci praesidio freti in silvas paludesque confugiunt suaeque eodem conferunt.

6 Caesar partitis copiis cum Gaio Fabio legato et Marco Crasso quaestore celeriterque effectis pontibus adit tripertito, aedificia vicosque incendit, magno pecoris atque hominum numero potitur. Quibus rebus coacti Menapii legatos ad eum pacis petendae causa mittunt. Ille obsidibus acceptis hostium se habiturum numero confirmat, si aut Ambiorigem aut eius legatos finibus suis receperint. His confirmatis rebus Commius Atrebatem cum equitatu custodis loco in Menapiis relinquit; ipse in Treveros proficiscitur.

7 Dum haec a Caesare geruntur, Treveri magnis coactis peditatus equitatusque copiis Labienum cum una legione, quae in eorum finibus hiemaverat, adoriri parabant, iamque ab eo non longius bidui via aberant, cum duas venisse legiones missu Caesaris cognoscunt. Positis castris a milibus passuum XV auxilia Germanorum exspectare constituunt. Labienus hostium cognito consilio sperans temeritate eorum fore aliquam dimicandi facultatem praesidio quinque cohortium impedimentis relicto cum viginti quinque

cohortibus magnoque equitatu contra hostem proficiscitur et mille passuum intermisso spatio castra communit. Erat inter Labienum atque hostem difficili transitu flumen ripisque praeuptis. Hoc neque ipse transire habebat in animo neque hostes transituros existimabat. Augebatur auxiliorum cotidie spes. Loquitur in concilio palam, quoniam Germani appropinquare dicantur, sese suas exercitusque fortunas in dubium non devocaturum et postero die prima luce castra moturum. Celeriter haec ad hostes deferuntur, ut ex magno Gallorum equitum numero nonnullos Gallicis rebus favere natura cogeat. Labienus noctu tribunis militum primisque ordinibus convocatis, quid sui sit consili proponit et, quo facilius hostibus timoris det suspicionem, maiore strepitu et tumultu, quam populi Romani fert consuetudo castra moveri iubet. His rebus fugae similem profectionem effecit. Haec quoque per exploratores ante lucem in tanta propinquitate castrorum ad hostes deferuntur.

8 Vix agmen novissimum extra munitiones processerat, cum Galli cohortati inter se, ne speratam praedam ex manibus dimitterent — longum esse per territis Romanis Germanorum auxilium exspectare, neque suam pati dignitatem ut tantis copiis tam exiguam manum praesertim fugientem atque impeditam adoriri non audeant — flumen transire et iniquo loco committere proelium non dubitant. Quae fore suspicatus Labienus, ut omnes citra flumen eliceret, eadem usus simulatione itineris placide progrediebatur. Tum praemissis paulum impedimentis atque in tumultu quodam collocatis “Habetis,” inquit, “milites, quam petistis facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis: praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate.” Simul signa ad hostem converti aciemque dirigi iubet, et paucis turmis praesidio ad impedimenta dimissis reliquos

equites ad latera disponit. Celeriter nostri clamore sublato pila in hostes immittunt. Illi, ubi praeter spem quos fugere credebant infestis signis ad se ire viderunt, impetum modo ferre non potuerunt ac primo concursu in fugam coniecti proximas silvas petierunt. Quos Labienus equitatu consecratus, magno numero interfecto, compluribus captis, paucis post diebus civitatem recepit. Nam Germani qui auxilio veniebant percepta Treverorum fuga sese domum receperunt. Cum his propinqui Indutiomari, qui defectionis auctores fuerant, comitati eos ex civitate excesserunt. Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum.

9 Caesar, postquam ex Menapiis in Treveros venit, duabus de causis Rhenum transire constituit; quarum una erat, quod auxilia contra se Treveris miserant, altera, ne ad eos Ambiorix receptum haberet. His constitutis rebus paulum supra eum locum quo ante exercitum traduxerat facere pontem instituit. Nota atque instituta ratione magno militum studio paucis diebus opus efficitur. Firmo in Treveris ad pontem praesidio relicto, ne quis ab his subito motus oreretur, reliquas copias equitatumque traducit. Ubi, qui ante obsides dederant atque in deditionem venerant, purgandi sui causa ad eum legatos mittunt, qui doceant neque auxilia ex sua civitate in Treveros missa neque ab se fidem laesam: petunt atque orant ut sibi parcat, ne communi odio Germanorum innocentes pro nocentibus poenas pendant; si amplius obsidum vellet, dare pollicentur. Cognita Caesar causa reperit ab Suebis auxilia missa esse; Ubiorum satisfactionem accipit, aditus viasque in Suebos perquirat.

10 Interim paucis post diebus fit ab Ubiis certior Suebos omnes in unum locum copias cogere atque eis nationibus quae sub eorum sint imperio denuntiare, ut auxilia peditatus equitatusque mittant. His cognitis rebus rem frumentariam providet, castris idoneum locum

deligit; Ubiis imperat ut pecora deducant suaque omnia ex agris in oppida conferant, sperans barbaros atque imperitos homines inopia cibariorum adductos ad iniquam pugnandi condicionem posse deduci; mandat, ut crebros exploratores in Suebos mittant quaeque apud eos gerantur cognoscant. Illi imperata faciunt et paucis diebus intermissis referunt: Suebos omnes, posteaquam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint, cum omnibus suis sociorumque copiis, quas coegissent, penitus ad extremos fines se recepisse: silvam esse ibi infinita magnitudine, quae appellatur Bacenis; hanc longe introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro obiectam Cheruscos ab Suebis Suebosque ab Cheruscis iniuriis incursionibusque prohibere: ad eius initium silvae Suebos adventum Romanorum exspectare constituisse.

11 Quoniam ad hunc locum perventum est, non alienum esse videtur de Galliae Germaniaeque moribus et quo differant hae nationes inter sese proponere. In Gallia non solum in omnibus civitatibus atque in omnibus pagis partibusque, sed paene etiam in singulis domibus factiones sunt, earumque factionum principes sunt qui summam auctoritatem eorum iudicio habere existimantur, quorum ad arbitrium iudiciumque summa omnium rerum consiliorumque redeat. Itaque eius rei causa antiquitus institutum videtur, ne quis ex plebe contra potentiores auxili egeret: suos enim quisque opprimi et circumveniri non patitur, neque, aliter si faciat, ullam inter suos habet auctoritatem. Haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae: namque omnes civitates in partes divisae sunt duas.

12 Cum Caesar in Galliam venit, alterius factionis principes erant Aedui, alterius Sequani. Hi cum per se minus valerent, quod summa auctoritas antiquitus erat in Aeduis magnaeque eorum erant clientelae, Germanos atque Ariovistum sibi adiunxerant eosque ad se

magnis iacturis pollicitationibusque perduxerant. Proeliis vero compluribus factis secundis atque omni nobilitate Aeduorum interfecta tantum potentia antecesserant, ut magnam partem clientium ab Aeduis ad se traducerent obsidesque ab eis principum filios acciperent et publice iurare cogerent nihil se contra Sequanos consili inituros et partem finitimi agri per vim occupatam possiderent Galliaque totius principatum obtinerent. Qua necessitate adductus Diviciacus auxili petendi causa Romam ad senatum profectus infecta re redierat. Adventu Caesaris facta commutatione rerum, obsidibus Aeduis redditis, veteribus clientelis restitutis, novis per Caesarem comparatis, quod hi, qui se ad eorum amicitiam adgregaverant, meliore condicione atque aequiore imperio se uti videbant, reliquis rebus eorum gratia dignitateque amplificata Sequani principatum dimiserant. In eorum locum Remi successerant: quos quod adaequare apud Caesarem gratia intellegebatur, ei, qui propter veteres inimicitias nullo modo cum Aeduis coniungi poterant, se Remis in clientelam dicabant. Hos illi diligenter tuebantur: ita et novam et repente collectam auctoritatem tenebant. Eo tum statu res erat, ut longe principes haberentur Aedui, secundum locum dignitatis Remi obtinerent.

13 In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo. Nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco, quae nihil audet per se, nullo adhibetur consilio. Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus: in hos eadem omnia sunt iura, quae dominis in servos. Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum. Illi rebus divinis intersunt, sacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur: ad hos magnus adulescentium numerus disciplinae causa concurrat,

magnoque hi sunt apud eos honore. Nam fere de omnibus controversiis publicis privatisque constituunt, et, si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes facta, si de hereditate, de finibus controversia est, idem decernunt, praemia poenasque constituunt; si qui aut privatus aut populus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt. Haec poena apud eos est gravissima. Quibus ita est interdictum, hi numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur, his omnes decedunt, aditum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant, neque his petentibus ius redditur neque honos ullus communicatur. His autem omnibus druidibus praeest unus, qui summam inter eos habet auctoritatem. Hoc mortuo aut si qui ex reliquis excellit dignitate succedit, aut, si sunt plures pares, suffragio druidum, nonnumquam etiam armis de principatu contendunt. Hi certo anni tempore in finibus Carnutum, quae regio totius Galliae media habetur, considunt in loco consecrato. Huc omnes undique, qui controversias habent, conveniunt eorumque decretis iudiciisque parent. Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur, et nunc, qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur.

14 Druides a bello abesse consuerunt neque tributa una cum reliquis pendunt; militiae vacationem omniumque rerum habent immunitatem. Tantis excitati praemiis et sua sponte multi in disciplinam conveniunt et a parentibus propinquisque mittuntur. Magnum ibi numerum versuum ediscere dicuntur. Itaque annos nonnulli vicanos in disciplina permanent. Neque fas esse existimant ea litteris mandare, cum in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus Graecis litteris utantur. Id mihi duabus de causis instituisse videntur, quod neque in vulgum disciplinam efferri velint neque eos, qui discunt, litteris confisos minus memoriae studere: quod fere

plerisque accidit, ut praesidio litterarum diligentiam in perdiscendo ac memoriam remittant. In primis hoc volunt persuadere, non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios, atque hoc maxime ad virtutem excitari putant metu mortis neglecto. Multa praeterea de sideribus atque eorum motu, de mundi ac terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de deorum immortalium vi ac potestate disputant et iuventuti tradunt.

15 Alterum genus est equitum. Hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum incidit (quod fere ante Caesaris adventum quotannis accidere solebat, uti aut ipsi iniurias inferrent aut illatas propulsarent), omnes in bello versantur, atque eorum ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque noverunt.

16 Natio est omnis Gallorum admodum dedita religionibus, atque ob eam causam, qui sunt adfecti gravioribus morbis quique in proeliis periculisque versantur, aut pro victimis homines immolant aut se immolatuos vovent administrisque ad ea sacrificia druidibus utuntur, quod, pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur, non posse deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur, publiceque eiusdem generis habent instituta sacrificia. Alii immani magnitudine simulacra habent, quorum contexta viminibus membra vivis hominibus complent; quibus succensis circumventi flamma exanimantur homines. Supplicia eorum qui in furto aut in latrocinio aut aliqua noxia sint comprehensi gratiora dis immortalibus esse arbitrantur; sed, cum eius generis copia defecit, etiam ad innocentium supplicia descendunt.

17 Deum maxime Mercurium colunt. Huius sunt plurima simulacra: hunc omnium inventorem artium ferunt, hunc viarum atque itinerum ducem, hunc ad quaestus pecuniae mercaturasque

habere vim maximam arbitrantur. Post hunc Apollinem et Martem et Iovem et Minervam. De his eandem fere, quam reliquae gentes, habent opinionem: Apollinem morbos depellere, Minervam operum atque artificiorum initia tradere, Iovem imperium caelestium tenere, Martem bella regere. Huic, cum proelio dimicare constituerunt, ea quae bello ceperint plerumque devovent: cum superaverunt, animalia capta immolant reliquasque res in unum locum conferunt. Multis in civitatibus harum rerum exstructos tumulos locis consecratis conspicari licet; neque saepe accidit, ut neglecta quispiam religione aut capta apud se occultare aut posita tollere auderet, gravissimumque ei rei supplicium cum cruciatu constitutum est.

18 Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos praedicant idque ab druidibus proditum dicunt. Ob eam causam spatia omnis temporis non numero dierum sed noctium finiunt; dies natales et mensum et annorum initia sic observant ut noctem dies subsequatur. In reliquis vitae institutis hoc fere ab reliquis differunt, quod suos liberos, nisi cum adoleverunt, ut munus militiae sustinere possint, palam ad se adire non patiuntur filiumque puerili aetate in publico in conspectu patris adsistere turpe ducunt.

19 Viri, quantas pecunias ab uxoribus dotis nomine acceperunt, tantas ex suis bonis aestimatione facta cum dotibus communicant. Huius omnis pecuniae coniunctim ratio habetur fructusque servantur: uter eorum vita superarit, ad eum pars utriusque cum fructibus superiorum temporum pervenit. Viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos, vitae necisque habent potestatem; et cum paterfamiliae illustriore loco natus decessit, eius propinqui conveniunt et, de morte si res in suspicionem venit, de uxoribus in servilem modum quaestionem habent et, si compertum est, igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas interficiunt. Funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica et

sumptuosa; omniaque quae vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia, ac paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab eis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.

20 Quae civitates commodius suam rem publicam administrare existimantur, habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de re publica a finitimis rumore aut fama acceperit, uti ad magistratum deferat neve cum quo alio communicet, quod saepe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terreri et ad facinus impelli et de summis rebus consilium capere cognitum est. Magistratus quae visa sunt occultant quaeque esse ex usu iudicaverunt multitudini produnt. De re publica nisi per concilium loqui non conceditur.

21 Germani multum ab hac consuetudine differunt. Nam neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis praesint, neque sacrificiis student. Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus iuvantur, Solem et Vulcanum et Lunam, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt. Vita omnis in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris consistit: ab parvulis labori ac duritiae student. Qui diutissime impuberes permanserunt, maximam inter suos ferunt laudem: hoc ali staturam, ali vires nervosque confirmari putant. Intra annum vero vicesimum feminae notitiam habuisse in turpissimis habent rebus; cuius rei nulla est occultatio, quod et promiscue in fluminibus perluuntur et pellibus aut parvis renonum tegimentis utuntur magna corporis parte nuda.

22 Agriculturae non student, maiorque pars eorum victus in lacte, caseo, carne consistit. Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios; sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire

cogunt. Eius rei multas adferunt causas: ne adsidua consuetudine capti studium belli gerendi agricultura commutent; ne latos fines parare studeant, potentioresque humiliores possessionibus expellant; ne accuratius ad frigora atque aestus vitandos aedificent; ne qua oriatur pecuniae cupiditas, qua ex re factiones dissensionesque nascuntur; ut animi aequitate plebem contineant, cum suas quisque opes cum potentissimis aequari videat.

23 Civitatibus maxima laus est quam latissime circum se vastatis finibus solitudines habere. Hoc proprium virtutis existimant, expulsos agris finitimos cedere, neque quemquam prope audere consistere; simul hoc se fore tutiores arbitrantur repentinae incursionis timore sublato. Cum bellum civitas aut illa tum defendit aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello praesint, ut vitae necisque habeant potestatem, deliguntur. In pace nullus est communis magistratus, sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt. Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidia minuendae causa fieri praedicant. Atque ubi quis ex principibus in concilio dixit se ducem fore, qui sequi velint, profiteantur, consurgunt ei qui et causam et hominem probant suumque auxilium pollicentur atque ab multitudine collaudantur: qui ex his secuti non sunt, in desertorum ac proditorum numero ducuntur, omniumque his rerum postea fides derogatur. Hospitem violare fas non putant; qui quacumque de causa ad eos venerunt, ab iniuria prohibent, sanctos habent, hisque omnium domus patent victusque communicatur.

24 Ac fuit antea tempus, cum Germanos Galli virtute superarent, ultro bella inferrent, propter hominum multitudinem agrique inopiam trans Rhenum colonias mitterent. Itaque ea quae fertilissima

Germaniae sunt loca circum Hercyniam silvam, quam Eratostheni et quibusdam Graecis fama notam esse video, quam illi Orcyniam appellant, Volcae Tectosages occupaverunt atque ibi consederunt; quae gens ad hoc tempus his sedibus sese continet summamque habet iustitiae et bellicae laudis opinionem. Nunc quod in eadem inopia, egestate, patientia qua Germani permanent, eodem victu et cultu corporis utuntur; Gallis autem provinciarum propinquitas et transmarinarum rerum notitia multa ad copiam atque usus largitur, paulatim adsuefacti superari multisque victi proeliis ne se quidem ipsi cum illis virtute comparant.

25 Huius Hercyniae silvae, quae supra demonstrata est, latitudo novem dierum iter expedito patet: non enim aliter finiri potest, neque mensuras itinerum noverunt. Oritur ab Helvetiorum et Nemetum et Rauracorum finibus rectaque fluminis Danubi regione pertinet ad fines Dacorum et Anartium; hinc se flectit sinistrorsus diversis ab flumine regionibus multarumque gentium fines propter magnitudinem adtingit; neque quisquam est huius Germaniae, qui se aut adisse ad initium eius silvae dicat, cum dierum iter LX processerit, aut, quo ex loco oriatur, acceperit: multaque in ea genera ferarum nasci constat, quae reliquis in locis visa non sint; ex quibus quae maxime differant ab ceteris et memoriae prodenda videantur haec sunt.

26 Est bos cervi figura, cuius a media fronte inter aures unum cornu exsistit excelsius magisque directum his, quae nobis nota sunt, cornibus: ab eius summo sicut palmae ramique late diffunduntur. Eadem est feminae marisque natura, eadem forma magnitudoque cornuum.

27 Sunt item, quae appellantur alces. Harum est consimilis capris figura et varietas pellium, sed magnitudine paulo antecedunt

mutilaeque sunt cornibus et crura sine nodis articulisque habent neque quietis causa procumbunt neque, si quo adflictae casu conciderunt, erigere sese aut sublevare possunt. His sunt arbores pro cubilibus: ad eas se applicant atque ita paulum modo reclinatae quietem capiunt. Quarum ex vestigiis cum est animadversum a venatoribus, quo se recipere consuerint, omnes eo loco aut ab radicibus subruunt aut accidunt arbores, tantum ut summa species earum stantium relinquatur. Huc cum se consuetudine reclinaverunt, infirmas arbores pondere adfligunt atque una ipsae concidunt.

28 Tertium est genus eorum, qui uri appellantur. Hi sunt magnitudine paulo infra elephantos, specie et colore et figura tauri. Magna vis eorum est et magna velocitas, neque homini neque ferae quam conspexerunt parcut. Hos studiose foveis captos interficiunt. Hoc se labore durant adulescentes atque hoc genere venationis exercent, et qui plurimos ex his interfecerunt, relatis in publicum cornibus, quae sint testimonio, magnam ferunt laudem. Sed adsuescere ad homines et mansuefieri ne parvuli quidem excepti possunt. Amplitudo cornuum et figura et species multum a nostrorum boum cornibus differt. Haec studiose conquisita ab labris argento circumcludunt atque in amplissimis epulis pro poculis utuntur.

29 Caesar, postquam per Ubios exploratores comperit Suebos sese in silvas recepisse, inopiam frumenti veritus, quod, ut supra demonstravimus, minime omnes Germani agriculturae student, constituit non progredi longius; sed, ne omnino metum reditus sui barbaris tolleret atque ut eorum auxilia tardaret, reducto exercitu partem ultimam pontis, quae ripas Ubiorum contingebat, in longitudinem pedum ducentorum rescindit atque in extremo ponte turrim tabulatorum quattuor constituit praesidiumque cohortium duodecim pontis tuendi causa ponit magnisque eum locum

munitionibus firmat. Ei loco praesidioque Gaium Volcatium Tullum adulescentem praefecit. Ipse, cum maturescere frumenta inciperent, ad bellum Ambiorigis profectus per Arduennam silvam, quae est totius Galliae maxima atque ab ripis Rheni finibusque Treverorum ad Nervios pertinet milibusque amplius quingentis in longitudinem patet, Lucium Minucium Basilum cum omni equitatu praemittit, si quid celeritate itineris atque opportunitate temporis proficere possit; monet, ut ignes in castris fieri prohibeat, ne qua eius adventus procul significatio fiat: sese confestim subsequi dicit.

³⁰ Basilus, ut imperatum est, facit. Celeriter contraque omnium opinionem confecto itinere multos in agris inopinantes deprehendit: eorum indicio ad ipsum Ambiorigem contendit, quo in loco cum paucis equitibus esse dicebatur. Multum cum in omnibus rebus tum in re militari potest fortuna. Nam <sicut> magno accidit casu ut in ipsum incautum etiam atque imparatum incideret, priusque eius adventus ab omnibus videretur, quam fama ac nuntius adferretur: sic magnae fuit fortunae omni militari instrumento, quod circum se habebat, erepto, raedis equisque comprehensis ipsum effugere mortem. Sed hoc quoque factum est, quod aedificio circumdato silva, ut sunt fere domicilia Gallorum, qui vitandi aestus causa plerumque silvarum atque fluminum petunt propinquitates, comites familiaresque eius angusto in loco paulisper equitum nostrorum vim sustinuerunt. His pugnantibus illum in equum quidam ex suis intulit: fugientem silvae texerunt. Sic et ad subeundum periculum et ad vitandum multum fortuna valuit.

³¹ Ambiorix copias suas iudicione non conduxerit, quod proelio dimicandum non existimarit, an tempore exclusus et repentino equitum adventu prohibitus, cum reliquum exercitum subsequi crederet, dubium est. Sed certe dimissis per agros nuntiis sibi

quemque consulere iussit. Quorum pars in Arduennam silvam, pars in continentes paludes profugit; qui proximi Oceano fuerunt, his insulis sese occultaverunt, quas aestus efficere consuerunt: multi ex suis finibus egressi se suaque omnia alienissimis crediderunt. Catuvolcus, rex dimidiae partis Eburonum, qui una cum Ambiorige consilium inierat, aetate iam confectus, cum laborem aut belli aut fugae ferre non posset, omnibus precibus detestatus Ambiorigem, qui eius consilii auctor fuisset, taxo, cuius magna in Gallia Germaniaque copia est, se exanimavit.

32 Segni Condrusique, ex gente et numero Germanorum, qui sunt inter Eburones Treverosque, legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret: nihil se de bello cogitavisse, nulla Ambiorigi auxilia misisse. Caesar explorata re quaestione captivorum, si qui ad eos Eburones ex fuga convenissent, ad se ut reducerentur, imperavit; si ita fecissent, fines eorum se violaturum negavit. Tum copiis in tres partes distributis impedimenta omnium legionum Aduatucam contulit. Id castelli nomen est. Hoc fere est in mediis Eburonum finibus, ubi Titurius atque Aurunculeius hiemandi causa consederant. Hunc cum reliquis rebus locum probabat, tum quod superioris anni munitiones integrae manebant, ut militum laborem sublevaret. Praesidio impedimentis legionem quartamdecimam reliquit, unam ex eis tribus, quas proxime conscriptas ex Italia traduxerat. Ei legioni castrisque Quintum Tullium Ciceronem praeficit ducentosque equites attribuit.

33 Partito exercitu Titum Labienum cum legionibus tribus ad Oceanum versus in eas partes quae Menapios attingunt proficisci iubet; Gaium Trebonium cum pari legionum numero ad eam regionem quae ad Aduatucos adiacet depopulandam mittit; ipse cum

reliquis tribus ad flumen Scaldem, quod influit in Mosam, extremasque Arduennae partis ire constituit, quo cum paucis equitibus profectum Ambiorigem audiebat. Discedens post diem septimum sese reversurum confirmat; quam ad diem ei legioni quae in praesidio relinquebatur deberi frumentum sciebat. Labienum Treboniumque hortatur, si rei publicae commodo facere possint, ad eum diem revertantur, ut rursus communicato consilio exploratisque hostium rationibus aliud initium belli capere possint.

³⁴ Erat, ut supra demonstravimus, manus certa nulla, non oppidum, non praesidium, quod se armis defenderet, sed in omnes partes dispersa multitudo. Ubi cuique aut valles abdita aut locus silvestris aut palus impedita spem praesidi aut salutis aliquam offerebat, consederat. Haec loca vicinitatibus erant nota, magnamque res diligentiam requirebat non in summa exercitus tuenda (nullum enim poterat universis <a> perterritis ac dispersis periculum accidere), sed in singulis militibus conservandis; quae tamen ex parte res ad salutem exercitus pertinebat. Nam et praedae cupiditas multos longius evocabat, et silvae incertis occultisque itineribus confertos adire prohibebant. Si negotium confici stirpemque hominum sceleratorum interfici vellet, dimittendae plures manus diducendique erant milites; si continere ad signa manipulos vellet, ut instituta ratio et consuetudo exercitus Romani postulabat, locus ipse erat praesidio barbaris, neque ex occulto insidiandi et dispersos circumveniendi singulis deerat audacia. Ut in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. Dimittit ad finitimas civitates nuntios Caesar: omnes ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam

legionarius miles periclitetur, simul ut magna multitudine circumfusa pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur. Magnus undique numerus celeriter convenit.

35 Haec in omnibus Eburonum partibus gerebantur, diesque appetebat septimus, quem ad diem Caesar ad impedimenta legionemque reverti constituerat. Hic quantum in bello fortuna possit et quantos adferat casus cognosci potuit. Dissipatis ac perterritis hostibus, ut demonstravimus, manus erat nulla quae parvam modo causam timoris adferret. Trans Rhenum ad Germanos pervenit fama, diripi Eburones atque ultro omnes ad praedam evocari. Cogunt equitum duo milia Sugambri, qui sunt proximi Rheno, a quibus receptos ex fuga Tencteros atque Usipetes supra docuimus. Transeunt Rhenum navibus ratibusque triginta milibus passuum infra eum locum, ubi pons erat perfectus praesidiumque ab Caesare relictum: primos Eburonum fines adeunt; multos ex fuga dispersos excipiunt, magno pecoris numero, cuius sunt cupidissimi barbari, potiuntur. Invitati praeda longius procedunt. Non hos palus in bello latrociniiisque natos, non silvae morantur. Quibus in locis sit Caesar ex captivis quaerunt; profectum longius reperiunt omnemque exercitum discessisse cognoscunt. Atque unus ex captivis “Quid vos,” inquit, “hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamini praedam, quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? Tribus horis Aduatucam venire potestis: huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit: praesidi tantum est, ut ne murus quidem cingi possit, neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat.” Oblata spe Germani quam nacti erant praedam in occulto relinquunt; ipsi Aduatucam contendunt usi eodem duce, cuius haec indicio cognoverant.

36 Cicero, qui omnes superiores dies praeceptis Caesaris cum summa diligentia milites in castris continuisset ac ne calonem

quidem quemquam extra munitionem egredi passus esset, septimo die diffidens de numero dierum Caesarem fidem servaturum, quod longius progressum audiebat, neque ulla de reditu eius fama adferebatur, simul eorum permotus vocibus, qui illius patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant, siquidem ex castris egredi non liceret, nullum eiusmodi casum expectans, quo novem oppositis legionibus maximoque equitatu dispersis ac paene deletis hostibus in milibus passuum tribus offendi posset, quinque cohortes frumentatum in proximas segetes mittit, quas inter et castra unus omnino collis intererat. Complures erant ex legionibus aegri relict; ex quibus qui hoc spatio dierum convaluerant, circiter CCC, sub vexillo una mittuntur; magna praeterea multitudo calonum, magna vis iumentorum, quae in castris subsederant, facta potestate sequitur.

37 Hoc ipso tempore et casu Germani equites interveniunt protinusque eodem illo, quo venerant, cursu ab decumana porta in castra irrumpere conantur, nec prius sunt visi obiectis ab ea parte silvis, quam castris appropinquarent, usque eo ut qui sub vallo tenderent mercatores recipiendi sui facultatem non haberent. Inopinantes nostri re nova perturbantur, ac vix primum impetum cohors in statione sustinet. Circumfunduntur ex reliquis hostes partibus, si quem aditum reperire possent. Aegre portas nostri tuentur, reliquos aditus locus ipse per se munitioque defendit. Totis trepidatur castris, atque alius ex alio causam tumultus quaerit; neque quo signa ferantur neque quam in partem quisque conveniat provident. Alius iam castra capta pronuntiat, alius deleto exercitu atque imperatore victores barbaros venisse contendit; plerique novas sibi ex loco religiones fingunt Cottaque et Tituri calamitatem, qui in eodem occiderint castello, ante oculos ponunt. Tali timore omnibus perterritis confirmatur opinio barbaris, ut ex captivo audierant,

nullum esse intus praesidium. Perrumpere nituntur seque ipsi adhortantur, ne tantam fortunam ex manibus dimittant.

38 Erat aeger cum praesidio relictus Publius Sextius Baculus, qui primum pilum ad Caesarem duxerat, cuius mentionem superioribus proeliis fecimus, ac diem iam quintum cibo caruerat. Hic diffusus suae atque omnium saluti inermis ex tabernaculo prodit: videt imminere hostes atque in summo esse rem discrimine: capit arma a proximis atque in porta consistit. Consequuntur hunc centuriones eius cohortis quae in statione erat: paulisper una proelium sustinent. Relinquit animus Sextium gravibus acceptis vulneribus: aegre per manus tractus servatur. Hoc spatio interposito reliqui sese confirmant tantum, ut in munitionibus consistere audeant speciemque defensorum praebeant.

39 Interim confecta frumentatione milites nostri clamorem exaudiunt: praecurrunt equites; quanto res sit in periculo cognoscunt. Hic vero nulla munitio est quae perterritos recipiat: modo conscripti atque usus militaris imperiti ad tribunum militum centurionesque ora convertunt; quid ab his praecipiat expectant. Nemo est tam fortis quin rei novitate perturbetur. Barbari signa procul conspicati oppugnatione desistunt: redisse primo legiones credunt, quas longius discessisse ex captivis cognoverant; postea despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt.

40 Calones in proximum tumultum procurrunt. Hinc celeriter deiecti se in signa manipulosque coniciunt: eo magis timidos perterrent milites. Alii cuneo facto ut celeriter perrumpant censent, quoniam tam propinqua sint castra, et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt; alii, ut in iugo consistant atque eundem omnes ferant casum. Hoc veteres non probant milites, quos sub vexillo una profectos docuimus. Itaque

inter se cohortati duce Gaio Trebonio, equite Romano, qui eis erat praepositus, per medios hostes perrumpunt incolumesque ad unum omnes in castra perveniunt. Hos subsecuti calones equitesque eodem impetu militum virtute servantur. At ei qui in iugo constiterant, nullo etiam nunc usu rei militaris percepto neque in eo quod probaverant consilio permanere, ut se loco superiore defenderent, neque eam quam prodesse aliis vim celeritatemque viderant imitari potuerunt, sed se in castra recipere conati iniquum in locum demiserunt. Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti, ne ante partam rei militaris laudem amitterent, fortissime pugnantes conciderunt. Militum pars horum virtute summotis hostibus praeter spem incolumis in castra pervenit, pars a barbaris circumventa periit.

41 Germani desperata expugnatione castrorum, quod nostros iam constitisse in munitionibus videbant, cum ea praeda quam in silvis deposuerant trans Rhenum sese receperunt. Ac tantus fuit etiam post discessum hostium terror ut ea nocte, cum Gaius Volusenus missus cum equitatu ad castra venisset, fidem non faceret adesse cum incolumi Caesarem exercitu. Sic omnino animos timor praeoccupaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent neque incolumi exercitu Germanos castra oppugnatuos fuisse contenderent. Quem timorem Caesaris adventus sustulit.

42 Reversus ille eventus belli non ignorans unum, quod cohortes ex statione et praesidio essent emissae, questus ne minimo quidem casu locum relinqui debuisse, multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse iudicavit, multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum barbaros avertisset. Quarum omnium

rerum maxime admirandum videbatur, quod Germani, qui eo consilio Rhenum transierant, ut Ambiorigis fines depopularentur, ad castra Romanorum delati optatissimum Ambiorigi beneficium obtulerunt.

43 Caesar rursus ad vexandos hostes profectus magno coacto numero ex finitimis civitatibus in omnes partes dimittit. Omnes vici atque omnia aedificia quae quisque conspexerat incendebantur; praeda ex omnibus locis agebatur; frumenta non solum tanta multitudine iumentorum atque hominum consumebantur, sed etiam anni tempore atque imbribus procubuerant ut, si qui etiam in praesentia se occultassent, tamen his deducto exercitu rerum omnium inopia pereundum videretur. Ac saepe in eum locum ventum est tanto in omnes partes diviso equitatu, ut modo visum ab se Ambiorigem in fuga circumspicerent captivi nec plane etiam abisse ex conspectu contenderent, ut spe consequendi illata atque infinito labore suscepto, qui se summam ab Caesare gratiam inituros putarent, paene naturam studio vincerent, semperque paulum ad summam felicitatem defuisse videretur, atque ille latebris aut saltibus se eriperet et noctu occultatus alias regiones partesque peteret non maiore equitum praesidio quam quattuor, quibus solis vitam suam committere audebat.

44 Tali modo vastatis regionibus exercitum Caesar duarum cohortium damno Durocortorum Remorum reducit concilioque in eum locum Galliae indicto de coniuratione Senonum et Carnutum quaestionem habere instituit et de Accone, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, graviore sententia pronuntiata more maiorum supplicium sumpsit. Nonnulli iudicium veriti profugerunt. Quibus cum aqua atque igni interdixisset, duas legiones ad fines Treverorum, duas in Lingonibus, sex reliquas in Senonum finibus Agedinci in hibernis collocavit frumentoque exercitui proviso, ut instituerat, in Italiam ad

conventus agendos profectus est.

LIBER VII

1 Quieta Gallia Caesar, ut constituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos proficiscitur. Ibi cognoscit de Clodii caede de senatusque consulto certior factus, ut omnes iuniores Italiae coniurarent, delectum tota provincia habere instituit. Eae res in Galliam Transalpinam celeriter perferuntur. Addunt ipsi et adfingunt rumoribus Galli, quod res poscere videbatur, retineri urbano motu Caesarem neque in tantis dissensionibus ad exercitum venire posse. Hac impulsu occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt. Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis queruntur de Acconis morte; posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant: miserantur communem Galliae fortunam: omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deposcunt qui belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent. In primis rationem esse habendam dicunt, priusquam eorum clandestina consilia efferantur, ut Caesar ab exercitu intercludatur. Id esse facile, quod neque legiones audeant absente imperatore ex hibernis egredi, neque imperator sine praesidio ad legiones pervenire possit. Postremo in acie praestare interfici quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare.

2 His rebus agitatis profitentur Carnutes se nullum periculum communis salutis causa recusare principesque ex omnibus bellum facturos pollicentur et, quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint ne res efferatur, ut iureiurando ac fide sanciantur, petunt, collatis militaribus signis, quo more eorum gravissima caerimonia continetur, ne facto initio belli ab reliquis deserantur. Tum collaudatis Carnutibus, dato iureiurando ab omnibus qui

aderant, tempore eius rei constituto ab concilio disceditur.

3 Ubi ea dies venit, Carnutes Cotuato et Conconnetodumno ducibus, desperatis hominibus, Cenabum signo dato concurrunt civesque Romanos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant, in his Gaium Fufium Citam, honestum equitem Romanum, qui rei frumentariae iussu Caesaris praeerat, interficiunt bonaque eorum diripiunt. Celeriter ad omnes Galliae civitates fama perfertur. Nam ubicumque maior atque illustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant; hunc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accidit. Nam quae Cenabi oriente sole gesta essent, ante primam confectam vigiliam in finibus Arvernorum audita sunt, quod spatium est milium passuum circiter centum LX.

4 Simili ratione ibi Vercingetorix, Celtilli filius, Arvernus, summae potentiae adulescens, cuius pater principatum Galliae totius obtinuerat et ob eam causam, quod regnum appetebat, ab civitate erat interfectus, convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit. Cognito eius consilio ad arma concurritur. Prohibetur ab Gobannitione, patruo suo, reliquisque principibus, qui hanc temptandam fortunam non existimabant; expellitur ex oppido Gergovia; non destitit tamen atque in agris habet dilectum egentium ac perditorum. Hac coacta manu, quoscumque adit ex civitate ad suam sententiam perducit; hortatur ut communis libertatis causa arma capiant, magnisque coactis copiis adversarios suos a quibus paulo ante erat eiectus expellit ex civitate. Rex ab suis appellatur. Dimittit quoque versus legationes; obtestatur ut in fide maneant. Celeriter sibi Senones, Parisios, Pictones, Cadurcos, Turonos, Aulercos, Lemovices, Andos reliquosque omnes qui Oceanum attingunt adiungit: omnium consensu ad eum defertur imperium. Qua oblata potestate omnibus his civitatibus obsides imperat, certum numerum militum ad se celeriter adduci iubet,

armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi quodque ante tempus efficiat constituit; in primis equitatu studet. Summae diligentiae summam imperi severitatem addit; magnitudine supplicii dubitantes cogit. Nam maiore commisso delicto igni atque omnibus tormentis necat, levio de causa auribus desectis aut singulis effossis oculis domum remittit, ut sint reliquis documento et magnitudine poenae perterreant alios.

5 His suppliciis celeriter coacto exercitu Lucterium Cadurcum, summae hominem audaciae, cum parte copiarum in Rutenos mittit; ipse in Bituriges proficiscitur. Eius adventu Bituriges ad Aeduos, quorum erant in fide, legatos mittunt subsidium rogatum, quo facilius hostium copias sustinere possint. Aedui de consilio legatorum, quos Caesar ad exercitum reliquerat, copias equitatus peditatusque subsidio Biturigibus mittunt. Qui cum ad flumen Ligerim venissent, quod Bituriges ab Aeduis dividit, paucos dies ibi morati neque flumen transire ausi domum revertuntur legatisque nostris renuntiant se Biturigum perfidiam veritos revertisse, quibus id consili fuisse cognoverint, ut, si flumen transissent, una ex parte ipsi, altera Arverni se circumsisterent. Id eane de causa, quam legatis pronuntiarunt, an perfidia adducti fecerint, quod nihil nobis constat, non videtur pro certo esse proponendum. Bituriges eorum discessu statim cum Arvernibus iunguntur.

6 His rebus in Italiam Caesari nuntiatis, cum iam ille urbanas res virtute Cn. Pompei commodiorem in statum pervenisse intellexeret, in Transalpinam Galliam profectus est. Eo cum venisset, magna difficultate adficiebatur, qua ratione ad exercitum pervenire posset. Nam si legiones in provinciam arcesseret, se absente in itinere proelio dimicaturas intellegebat; si ipse ad exercitum contenderet, ne eis quidem eo tempore qui quieti viderentur suam salutem recte

committi videbat.

7 Interim Lucterius Cadurcus in Rutenos missus eam civitatem Arvernīs conciliat. Progressus in Nitiobriges et Gabalos ab utrisque obsides accipit et magna coacta manu in provinciam Narbonem versus eruptionem facere contendit. Qua re nuntiata Caesar omnibus consiliis antevertendum existimavit, ut Narbonem proficisceretur. Eo cum venisset, timentes confirmat, praesidia in Rutenis provincialibus, Volcis Arecomicis, Tolosatibus circumque Narbonem, quae loca hostibus erant finitima, constituit; partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque, quod ex Italia adduxerat, in Helvios, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire iubet.

8 His rebus comparatis, represso iam Lucterio et remoto, quod intrare intra praesidia periculosum putabat, in Helvios proficiscitur. Etsi mons Cevenna, qui Arvernos ab Helviis discludit, durissimo tempore anni altissima nive iter impediēbat, tamen discussa nive sex in altitudinem pedum atque ita viis patefactis summo militum sudore ad fines Arvernorum pervenit. Quibus oppressis inopinantibus, quod se Cevenna ut muro munitos existimabant, ac ne singulari quidem umquam homini eo tempore anni semitae patuerant, equitibus imperat, ut quam latissime possint vagentur et quam maximum hostibus terrorem inferant. Celeriter haec fama ac nuntiis ad Vercingetorigem perferuntur; quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumstant atque obsecrant, ut suis fortunis consulat, neve ab hostibus diripiantur, praesertim cum videat omne ad se bellum translatum. Quorum ille precibus permotus castra ex Biturigibus movet in Arvernos versus.

9 At Caesar biduum in his locis moratus, quod haec de Vercingetorige usu ventura opinione praeceperat, per causam supplementi equitatusque cogendi ab exercitu discedit; Brutum

adulescentem his copiis praeficit; hunc monet, ut in omnes partes equites quam latissime pervagentur: daturum se operam, ne longius triduo ab castris absit. His constitutis rebus suis inopinantibus quam maximis potest itineribus Viennam pervenit. Ibi nactus recentem equitatum, quem multis ante diebus eo praemiserat, neque diurno neque nocturno itinere intermisso per fines Aeduorum in Lingones contendit, ubi duae legiones hiemabant, ut, si quid etiam de sua salute ab Aeduis iniretur consili, celeritate praecurreret. Eo cum pervenisset, ad reliquas legiones mittit priusque omnes in unum locum cogit quam de eius adventu Arvernīs nuntiari posset. Hac re cognita Vercingetorix rursus in Bituriges exercitum reducit atque inde profectus Gorgobinam, Boiorum oppidum, quos ibi Helvetico proelio victos Caesar collocaverat Aeduisque attribuerat, oppugnare instituit.

10 Magnam haec res Caesari difficultatem ad consilium capiendum adferebat, si reliquam partem hiemis uno loco legiones contineret, ne stipendiariis Aeduorum expugnatis cuncta Gallia deficeret, quod nullum amicis in eo praesidium videretur positum esse; si maturius ex hibernis educeret, ne ab re frumentaria duris subvectionibus laboraret. Praestare visum est tamen omnis difficultates perpeti, quam tanta contumelia accepta omnium suorum voluntates alienare. Itaque cohortatus Aeduos de supportando commeatu praemittit ad Boios qui de suo adventu doceant hortenturque ut in fide maneant atque hostium impetum magno animo sustineant. Duabus Agedinci legionibus atque impedimentis totius exercitus relictis ad Boios proficiscitur.

11 Altero die cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset, ne quem post se hostem relinqueret, quo expeditiore re frumentaria uteretur, oppugnare instituit idque biduo circumvallavit; tertio die

missis ex oppido legatis de deditione arma conferri, iumenta produci, sescentos obsides dari iubet. Ea qui conficeret, Gaium Trebonium legatum relinquit. Ipse, ut quam primum iter faceret, Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur; qui tum primum allato nuntio de oppugnatione Vellaunoduni, cum longius eam rem ductum iri existimarent, praesidium Cenabi tuendi causa, quod eo mitterent, comparabant. Huc biduo pervenit. Castris ante oppidum positis diei tempore exclusus in posterum oppugnationem differt quaeque ad eam rem usui sint militibus imperat et, quod oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat, veritus ne noctu ex oppido profugerent, duas legiones in armis excubare iubet. Cenabenses paulo ante mediam noctem silentio ex oppido egressi flumen transire coeperunt. Qua re per exploratores nuntiata Caesar legiones quas expeditas esse iusserat portis incensis intromittit atque oppido potitur, perpaucis ex hostium numero desideratis quin cuncti caperentur, quod pontis atque itinerum angustiae multitudinis fugam intercluserant. Oppidum diripit atque incendit, praedam militibus donat, exercitum Ligerem traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit.

12 Vercingetorix, ubi de Caesaris adventu cognovit, oppugnatione destitit atque obviam Caesari proficiscitur. Ille oppidum Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum oppugnare instituerat. Quo ex oppido cum legati ad eum venissent oratum ut sibi ignosceret suaeque vitae consuleret, ut celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus, arma conferri, equos produci, obsides dari iubet. Parte iam obsidum tradita, cum reliqua administrarentur, centurionibus et paucis militibus intromissis, qui arma iumentaue conquirent, equitatus hostium procul visus est, qui agmen Vercingetorigis antecesserat. Quem simul atque oppidani conspexerunt atque in spem auxili venerunt, clamore sublato arma capere, portas claudere,

murum complere coeperunt. Centuriones in oppido, cum ex significatione Gallorum novi aliquid ab eis iniri consili intellexissent, gladiis dstrictis portas occupaverunt suosque omnes incolumes receperunt.

13 Caesar ex castris equitatum educi iubet, proelium equestre committit: laborantibus iam suis Germanos equites circiter CCCC summittit, quos ab initio habere secum instituerat. Eorum impetum Galli sustinere non potuerunt atque in fugam coniecti multis amissis se ad agmen receperunt. Quibus profligatis rursus oppidani perterriti comprehensos eos, quorum opera plebem concitatam existimabant, ad Caesarem perduxerunt seseque ei dederunt. Quibus rebus confectis, Caesar ad oppidum Avaricum, quod erat maximum munitissimumque in finibus Biturigum atque agri fertilissima regione, profectus est, quod eo oppido recepto civitatem Biturigum se in potestatem redacturum confidebat.

14 Vercingetorix tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat. Docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea gestum sit. Omnibus modis huic rei studendum, ut pabulatione et commeatu Romani prohibeantur. Id esse facile, quod equitatu ipsi abundant et quod anni tempore sublevantur. Pabulum secari non posse; necessario dispersos hostes ex aedificiis petere: hos omnes cotidie ab equitibus deleri posse. Praeterea salutis causa rei familiaris commoda negligenda: vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio ab via quoque versus, quo pabulandi causa adire posse videantur. Harum ipsis rerum copiam suppetere, quod, quorum in finibus bellum geratur, eorum opibus sublevantur: Romanos aut inopiam non laturos aut magno periculo longius ab castris processuros; neque interesse, ipsosne interficiant, impedimentisne exuant, quibus amissis bellum

geri non possit. Praeterea oppida incendi oportere, quae non munitione et loci natura ab omni sint periculo tuta, neu suis sint ad detractandam militiam receptacula neu Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus praedamque tollendam. Haec si gravia aut acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimare, liberos, coniuges in servitutem abstrahi, ipsos interfici; quae sit necesse accidere victis.

15 Omnium consensu hac sententia probata uno die amplius XX urbes Biturigum incenduntur. Hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus: in omnibus partibus incendia conspiciuntur; quae etsi magno cum dolore omnes ferebant, tamen hoc sibi solati proponebant, quod se prope explorata victoria celeriter amissa reciperaturos confidebant. Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeret an defendi. Procumbunt omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges, ne pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem, quae praesidio et ornamento sit civitati, suis manibus succendere cogerentur: facile se loci natura defensuros dicunt, quod prope ex omnibus partibus flumine et palude circumdata unum habeat et perangustum aditum. Datur petentibus venia dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi. Defensores oppido idonei deliguntur.

16 Vercingetorix minoribus Caesarem itineribus subsequitur et locum castris deligit paludibus silvisque munitum ab Avarico longe milia passuum XVI. Ibi per certos exploratores in singula diei tempora quae ad Avaricum agerentur cognoscebat et quid fieri vellet imperabat. Omnes nostras pabulationes frumentationesque observabat dispersosque, cum longius necessario procederent, adoriebatur magnoque incommodo adficiebat, etsi, quantum ratione provideri poterat, ab nostris occurrebatur, ut incertis temporibus diversisque itineribus iretur.

17 Castris ad eam partem oppidi positis Caesar, quae intermissa a flumine et a paludibus aditum, ut supra diximus, angustum habebat, aggerem apparare, vineas agere, turres duas constituere coepit: nam circumvallare loci natura prohibebat. De re frumentaria Boios atque Aeduos adhortari non destitit; quorum alteri, quod nullo studio agebant, non multum adiuvabant, alteri non magnis facultatibus, quod civitas erat exigua et infirma, celeriter quod habuerunt consumpserunt. Summa difficultate rei frumentariae adfecto exercitu tenuitate Boiorum, indiligentia Aeduorum, incendiis aedificiorum, usque eo ut complures dies frumento milites caruerint et pecore ex longinquiore vicis adacto extremam famem sustentarent, nulla tamen vox est ab eis audita populi Romani maiestate et superioribus victoriis indigna. Quin etiam Caesar cum in opere singulas legiones appellaret et, si acerbius inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret, universi ab eo, ne id faceret, petebant: sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam acciperent, nusquam infecta re discederent: hoc se ignominiae laturos loco, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent: praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis, qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent, parentarent. Haec eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum mandabant, ut per eos ad Caesarem deferrentur.

18 Cum iam muro turres appropinquassent, ex captivis Caesar cognovit Vercingetorigem consumpto pabulo castra movisse propius Avaricum atque ipsum cum equitatu expeditisque, qui inter equites proeliari consuessent, insidiarum causa eo profectum, quo nostros postero die pabulatum venturos arbitraretur. Quibus rebus cognitis media nocte silentio profectus ad hostium castra mane pervenit. Illi celeriter per exploratores adventu Caesaris cognito carros impedimenta que sua in artiores silvas abdiderunt, copias omnes in

loco edito atque aperto instruxerunt. Qua re nuntiata Caesar celeriter sarcinas conferri, arma expediri iussit.

19 Collis erat leniter ab infimo acclivis. Hunc ex omnibus fere partibus palus difficilis atque impedita cingebat non latior pedibus quinquaginta. Hoc se colle interruptis pontibus Galli fiducia loci continebant generatimque distributi in civitates omnia vada ac saltus eius paludis obtinebant sic animo parati, ut, si eam paludem Romani perrumpere conarentur, haesitantes premerent ex loco superiore; ut qui propinquitatem loci videret paratos prope aequo Marte ad dimicandum existimaret, qui iniquitatem condicionis perspiceret inani simulatione sese ostentare cognosceret. Indignantibus milites Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli exposcentes edocet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam; quos cum sic animo paratos videat, ut nullum pro sua laude periculum recusent, summae se iniquitatis condemnari debere, nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem. Sic milites consolatus eodem die reducit in castra reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinebant oppidi administrare instituit.

20 Vercingetorix, cum ad suos redisset, prodicionis insimulatus, quod castra propius Romanos movisset, quod cum omni equitatu discessisset, quod sine imperio tantas copias reliquisset, quod eius discessu Romani tanta opportunitate et celeritate venissent: non haec omnia fortuito aut sine consilio accidere potuisse; regnum illum Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio — tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit: Quod castra movisset, factum inopia pabuli etiam ipsis hortantibus; quod propius Romanos accessisset, persuasum loci opportunitate, qui se ipsum munitione defenderet: equitum vero operam neque in loco palustri desiderari

debuisset et illic fuisse utilem, quo sint profecti. Summam imperi se consulto nulli discedentem tradidisse, ne is multitudinis studio ad dimicandum impelleretur; cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non possent. Romani si casu intervenerint, fortunae, si alicuius indicio vocati, huic habendam gratiam, quod et paucitatem eorum ex loco superiore cognoscere et virtutem despicere potuerint, qui dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint. Imperium se ab Caesare per prodicionem nullum desiderare, quod habere victoria posset, quae iam esset sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata: quin etiam ipsis remittere, si sibi magis honorem tribuere, quam ab se salutem accipere videantur. “Haec ut intellegatis,” inquit, “a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites.” Producit servos, quos in pabulatione paucis ante diebus exceperat et fame vinculisque excruciataverat. Hi iam ante edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent, milites se esse legionarios dicunt; fame et inopia adductos clam ex castris exisse, si quid frumenti aut pecoris in agris reperire possent: simili omnem exercitum inopia premi, nec iam vires sufficere cuiusquam nec ferre operis laborem posse: itaque statuisset imperatorem, si nihil in oppugnatione oppidi profecissent, triduo exercitum deducere. “Haec,” inquit, “a me,” Vercingetorix, “beneficia habetis, quem prodicionis insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine tantum exercitum victorem fame consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est.”

21 Conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo consuerunt cuius orationem approbant: summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem, nec de eius fide dubitandum, nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse. Statuunt, ut X milia hominum delecta ex omnibus copiis in oppidum mittantur, nec solis Biturigibus

communem salutem committendam censent, quod paene in eo, si id oppidum retinuissent, summam victoriae constare intellegebant.

22 Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia cuiusque modi Gallorum occurrebant, ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab quoque traduntur, aptissimum. Nam et laqueis falces avertebant, quas, cum destinaverant, tormentis introrsus reducebant, et aggerem cuniculis subtrahebant, eo scientius quod apud eos magnae sunt ferrariae atque omne genus cuniculorum notum atque usitatum est. Totum autem murum ex omni parte turribus contabulaverant atque has coriis intexerant. Tum crebris diurnis nocturnisque eruptionibus aut aggeri ignem inferebant aut milites occupatos in opere adoriebantur, et nostrarum turrium altitudinem, quantum has cotidianus agger expresserat, commissis suarum turrium malis adaequabant, et apertos cuniculos praeusta et praeacuta materia et pice fervefacta et maximi ponderis saxis morabantur moenibusque appropinquare prohibebant.

23 Muri autem omnes Gallici hac fere forma sunt. Trabes directae perpetuae in longitudinem paribus intervallis, distantes inter se binos pedes, in solo collocantur. Hae revinciuntur introrsus et multo aggere vestiuntur: ea autem, quae diximus, inter valla grandibus in fronte saxis effarciuntur. His collocatis et coagmentatis alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, sed paribus intermissae spatiis singulae singulis saxis interiectis arte contineantur. Sic deinceps omne opus contextitur, dum iusta muri altitudo expleatur. Hoc cum in speciem varietatemque opus deforme non est alternis trabibus ac saxis, quae rectis lineis suos ordines servant, tum ad utilitatem et defensionem urbium summam habet opportunitatem, quod et ab incendio lapis et ab ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedes quadragenos

plerumque introrsus revincta neque perrumpi neque distrahi potest.

24 His tot rebus impedita oppugnatione milites, cum toto tempore frigore et assiduis imbribus tardarentur, tamen continenti labore omnia haec superaverunt et diebus XXV aggerem latum pedes CCCXXX, altum pedes LXXX extruxerunt. Cum is murum hostium paene contingeret, et Caesar ad opus consuetudine excubaret militesque hortaretur, ne quod omnino tempus ab opere intermitteretur, paulo ante tertiam vigiliam est animadversum fumare aggerem, quem cuniculo hostes succenderant, eodemque tempore toto muro clamore sublato duabus portis ab utroque latere turrium eruptio fiebat, alii faces atque aridam materiem de muro in aggerem eminus iaciebant, picem reliquasque res, quibus ignis excitari potest, fundebant, ut quo primum curreretur aut cui rei ferretur auxilium vix ratio iniri posset. Tamen, quod instituto Caesaris semper duae legiones pro castris excubabant pluresque partitis temporibus erant in opere, celeriter factum est, ut alii eruptionibus resisterent, alii turres reducerent aggeremque inter scinderent, omnis vero ex castris multitudo ad restinguendum concurreret.

25 Cum in omnibus locis consumpta iam reliqua parte noctis pugnaretur, semperque hostibus spes victoriae redintegraretur, eo magis, quod deustos pluteos turrium videbant nec facile adire apertos ad auxiliandum animadvertebant, semperque ipsi recentes defessis succederent omnemque Galliae salutem in illo vestigio temporis positam arbitrarentur, accidit inspectantibus nobis quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non existimavimus. Quidam ante portam oppidi Gallus per manus sebi ac picis traditas glebas in ignem e regione turris proiebat: scorpione ab latere dextro traiectus exanimatusque concidit. Hunc ex proximis unus iacentem transgressus eodem illo munereungebatur; eadem ratione ictu

scorpionis exanimato alteri successit tertius et tertio quartus, nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus quam restincto aggere atque omni ex parte summotis hostibus finis est pugnandi factus.

26 Omnia experti Galli, quod res nulla successerat, postero die consilium ceperunt ex oppido profugere hortante et iubente Vercingetorige. Id silentio noctis conati non magna iactura suorum sese effecturos sperabant, propterea quod neque longe ab oppido castra Vercingetorigis aberant, et palus, quae perpetua intercedebat, Romanos ad insequendum tardabat. Iamque hoc facere noctu apparabant, cum matres familiae repente in publicum procurrerunt flentesque proiectae ad pedes suorum omnibus precibus petierunt, ne se et communes liberos hostibus ad supplicium dederent, quos ad capiendam fugam naturae et virium infirmitas impediret. Ubi eos in sententia perstare viderunt, quod plerumque in summo periculo timor misericordiam non recipit, conclamare et significare de fuga Romanis coeperunt. Quo timore perterriti Galli, ne ab equitatu Romanorum viae praeoccuparentur, consilio destiterunt.

27 Postero die Caesar promota turri perfectisque operibus quae facere instituerat, magno coorto imbre non inutilem hanc ad capiendum consilium tempestatem arbitratus est, quod paulo incautius custodias in muro dispositas videbat, suosque languidius in opere versari iussit et quid fieri vellet ostendit. Legionibusque intra vineas in occulto expeditis, cohortatus ut aliquando pro tantis laboribus fructum victoriae perciperent, eis qui primi murum ascendissent praemia proposuit militibusque signum dedit. Illi subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt.

28 Hostes re nova perterriti muro turribusque deiecti in foro ac locis patentioribus cuneatim constiterunt, hoc animo ut si qua ex

parte obviam contra veniretur acie instructa depugnarent. Ubi neminem in aequum locum sese demittere, sed toto undique muro circumfundi viderunt, veriti ne omnino spes fugae tolleretur, abiectis armis ultimas oppidi partes continenti impetu petiverunt, parsque ibi, cum angusto exitu portarum se ipsi premerent, a militibus, pars iam egressa portis ab equitibus est interfecta; nec fuit quisquam, qui praedae studeret. Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt. Denique ex omni numero, qui fuit circiter milium XL, vix DCCC, qui primo clamore audito se ex oppido eiecerunt, incolumes ad Vercingetorigem pervenerunt. Quos ille multa iam nocte silentio ex fuga excepit, veritus ne qua in castris ex eorum concursu et misericordia vulgi seditio oreretur, ut procul in via dispositis familiaribus suis principibusque civitatum disparandos deducendosque ad suos curaret, quae cuique civitati pars castrorum ab initio obvenerat.

29 Postero die concilio convocato consolatus cohortatusque est ne se admodum animo demitterent, ne perturbarentur incommodo. Non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis, cuius rei fuerint ipsi imperiti. Errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus expectent. Sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum acciperetur. Id tamen se celeriter maioribus commodis sanaturum. Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere. Interea aequum esse ab eis communis salutis causa impetrari ut castra munire

instituerent, quo facilius repentinos hostium impetus sustinerent.

30 Fuit haec oratio non ingrata Gallis, et maxime, quod ipse animo non defecerat tanto accepto incommodo neque se in occultum abdiderat et conspectum multitudinis fugerat; plusque animo providere et praesentire existimabatur, quod re integra primo incendendum Avaricum, post deserendum censuerat. Itaque ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversae auctoritatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in dies augebatur. Simul in spem veniebant eius adfirmatione de reliquis adiungendis civitatibus; primumque eo tempore Galli castra munire instituerunt et sic sunt animo confirmati, homines insueti laboris, ut omnia quae imperarentur sibi patienda existimarent.

31 Nec minus quam est pollicitus Vercingetorix animo laborabat ut reliquas civitates adiungeret, atque eas donis pollicitationibusque alliciebat. Huic rei idoneos homines deligebat, quorum quisque aut oratione subdola aut amicitia facillime capere posset. Qui Avarico expugnato refugerant, armandos vestiendosque curat; simul, ut deminutae copiae redintegrarentur, imperat certum numerum militum civitatibus, quem et quam ante diem in castra adduci velit, sagittariosque omnes, quorum erat permagnus numerus in Gallia, conqueri et ad se mitti iubet. His rebus celeriter id quod Avarici deperierat expletur. Interim Teutomatus, Olloviconis filius, rex Nitiobrigum, cuius pater ab senatu nostro amicus erat appellatus, cum magno equitum suorum numero et quos ex Aquitania conduxerat ad eum pervenit.

32 Caesar Avarici complures dies commoratus summamque ibi copiam frumenti et reliqui commeatus nactus exercitum ex labore atque inopia refecit. Iam prope hieme confecta cum ipso anni tempore ad gerendum bellum vocaretur et ad hostem proficisci

constituisset, sive eum ex paludibus silvisque elicere sive obsidione premere posset, legati ad eum principes Aeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario tempore civitati subveniat: summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat. Horum esse alterum Convictolitavem, florentem et illustrem adolescentem, alterum Cotum, antiquissima familia natum atque ipsum hominem summae potentiae et magnae cognationis, cuius frater Valetiacus proximo anno eundem magistratum gesserit. Civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas. Quod si diutius alatur controversia, fore uti pars cum parte civitatis confligat. Id ne accidat, positum in eius diligentia atque auctoritate.

33 Caesar, etsi a bello atque hoste discedere detrimentosum esse existimabat, tamen non ignorans quanta ex dissensionibus incommoda oriri consuessent, ne tanta et tam coniuncta populo Romano civitas, quam ipse semper aluisset omnibusque rebus ornasset, ad vim atque arma descenderet, atque ea pars quae minus sibi confideret auxilia a Vercingetorige arcesseret, huic rei praevertendum existimavit et, quod legibus Aeduorum eis, qui summum magistratum obtinerent, excedere ex finibus non liceret, ne quid de iure aut de legibus eorum deminuisse videretur, ipse in Aeduos proficisci statuit senatumque omnem et quos inter controversia esset ad se Decetiam evocavit. Cum prope omnis civitas eo convenisset, docereturque paucis clam convocatis alio loco, alio tempore atque oportuerit fratrem a fratre renuntiatum, cum leges duo ex una familia vivo utroque non solum magistratus creari vetarent, sed etiam in senatu esse prohiberent, Cotum imperium deponere

coegit, Convictolitavem, qui per sacerdotes more civitatis intermissis magistratibus esset creatus, potestatem obtinere iussit.

³⁴ Hoc decreto interposito cohortatus Aeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque omnibus omissis his rebus huic bello servirent eaque quae meruissent praemia ab se devicta Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter mitterent, quae in praesidiis rei frumentariae causa disponeret, exercitum in duas partes divisit: quattuor legiones in Senones Parisiosque Labieno ducendas dedit, sex ipse in Arvernos ad oppidum Gergoviam secundum flumen Elaver duxit; equitatus partem illi attribuit, partem sibi reliquit. Qua re cognita Vercingetorix omnibus interruptis eius fluminis pontibus ab altera fluminis parte iter facere coepit.

³⁵ Cum uterque utrimque exisset exercitus, in conspectu fereque e regione castris castra ponebant dispositis exploratoribus, necubi effecto ponte Romani copias traducerent. Erat in magnis Caesaris difficultatibus res, ne maiorem aestatis partem flumine impediretur, quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet. Itaque, ne id accideret, silvestri loco castris positus e regione unius eorum pontium, quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat, postero die cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit; reliquas copias cum omnibus impedimentis, ut consueverat, misit, apertis quibusdam cohortibus, uti numerus legionum constare videretur. His quam longissime possent egredi iussis, cum iam ex diei tempore coniecturam ceperat in castra perventum, isdem sublicis, quarum pars inferior integra remanebat, pontem reficere coepit. Celeriter effecto opere legionibusque traductis et loco castris idoneo delecto reliquas copias revocavit. Vercingetorix re cognita, ne contra suam voluntatem dimicare cogeretur, magnis itineribus antecessit.

36 Caesar ex eo loco quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit equestrique eo die proelio levi facto perspecto urbis situ, quae posita in altissimo monte omnes aditus difficiles habebat, de expugnatione desperavit, de obsessione non prius agendum constituit, quam rem frumentariam expedisset. At Vercingetorix castris, prope oppidum positus, mediocribus circum se intervallis separatim singularum civitatum copias collocaverat atque omnibus eius iugi collibus occupatis, qua despici poterat, horribilem speciem praebebat; principesque earum civitatum, quos sibi ad consilium capiendum delegerat, prima luce cotidie ad se convenire iubebat, seu quid communicandum, seu quid administrandum videretur; neque ullum fere diem intermittebat quin equestri proelio interiectis sagittariis, quid in quoque esset animi ac virtutis suorum perspiceret. Erat e regione oppidi collis sub ipsis radicibus montis, egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcissus; quem si tenerent nostri, et aquae magna parte et pabulatione libera prohibitori hostes videbantur. Sed is locus praesidio ab his non nimis firmo tenebatur. Tamen silentio noctis Caesar ex castris egressus, priusquam subsidio ex oppido venire posset, deiecto praesidio potitus loco duas ibi legiones collocavit fossamque duplicem duodenum pedum a maioribus castris ad minora perduxit, ut tuto ab repentino hostium incursu etiam singuli commeare possent.

37 Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Convictolitavis Aeduus, cui magistratum adiudicatum a Caesare demonstravimus, sollicitatus ab Arvernibus pecunia cum quibusdam adolescentibus colloquitur; quorum erat princeps Litaviccus atque eius fratres, amplissima familia nati adolescentes. Cum his praemium communicat hortaturque, ut se liberos et imperio natos meminerint. Unam esse Aeduum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam detineat;

eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis in Gallia non fore. Esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum, sic tamen, ut iustissimam apud eum causam obtinuerit; sed plus communi libertati tribuere. Cur enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam Romani ad Aeduos veniant? Celeriter adolescentibus et oratione magistratus et praemio deductis, cum se vel principes eius consili fore profiterentur, ratio perficiendi quaerebatur, quod civitatem temere ad suscipiendum bellum adduci posse non confidebant. Placuit ut Litaviccus decem illis milibus, quae Caesari ad bellum mitterentur, praeficeretur atque ea ducenda curaret, fratresque eius ad Caesarem praecurrerent. Reliqua qua ratione agi placeat constituunt.

³⁸ Litaviccus accepto exercitu, cum milia passuum circiter XXX ab Gergovia abesset, convocatis subito militibus lacrimans, “Quo proficiscimur,” inquit, “milites? Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit; principes civitatis, Eporedorix et Viridomarus, insimulati prodicionis ab Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt. Haec ab ipsis cognoscite, qui ex ipsa caede fugerunt: nam ego fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore prohibeor, quae gesta sunt, pronuntiare.” Producuntur hi quos ille edocuerat quae dici vellet, atque eadem, quae Litaviccus pronuntiaverat, multitudini exponunt: multos equites Aeduorum interfectos, quod collocuti cum Arvernīs dicerentur; ipsos se inter multitudinem militum occultasse atque ex media caede fugisse. Conclamant Aedui et Litavicum obsecrant ut sibi consulat. “Quasi vero,” inquit ille, “consili sit res, ac non necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernīs nosmet coniungere. An dubitamus quin nefario facinore admissio Romani iam ad nos interficiendos concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est, persequamur eorum mortem qui indignissime

interierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus.” Ostendit cives Romanos, qui eius praesidi fiducia una erant: magnum numerum frumenti commeatusque diripit, ipsos crudeliter excruciatos interficit. Nuntios tota civitate Aeduorum dimittit, eodem mendacio de caede equitum et principum permovet; hortatur ut simili ratione atque ipse fecerit suas iniurias persequantur.

39 Eporedorix Aeduus, summo loco natus adulescens et summae domi potentiae, et una Viridomarus, pari aetate et gratia, sed genere dispari, quem Caesar ab Diviciaco sibi traditum ex humili loco ad summam dignitatem perduxerat, in equitum numero convenerant nominatim ab eo evocati. His erat inter se de principatu contentio, et in illa magistratuum controversia alter pro Convictolitavi, alter pro Coto summis opibus pugnaverant. Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavici consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem defert; orat ne patiatur civitatem pravis adolescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi Romani deficere; quod futurum provideat, si se tot hominum milia cum hostibus coniunxerint, quorum salutem neque propinqui neglegere, neque civitas levi momento aestimare posset.

40 Magna adfectus sollicitudine hoc nuntio Caesar, quod semper Aeduorum civitati praecipue indulserat, nulla interposita dubitatione legiones expeditas quattuor equitatumque omnem ex castris educit; nec fuit spatium tali tempore ad contrahenda castra, quod res posita in celeritate videbatur; Gaium Fabium legatum cum legionibus duabus castris praesidio relinquit. Fratres Litavici cum comprehendi iussisset, paulo ante reperit ad hostes fugisse. Adhortatus milites, ne necessario tempore itineris labore permoveantur, cupidissimis omnibus progressus milia passuum XXV agmen Aeduorum conspicatus immisso equitatu iter eorum moratur atque impedit interdicique omnibus ne quemquam interficiant. Eporedorigem et

Viridomarum, quos illi interfectos existimabant, inter equites versari suosque appellare iubet. His cognitis et Litavici fraude perspecta Aedui manus tendere, deditionem significare et proiectis armis mortem deprecari incipiunt. Litavicus cum suis clientibus, quibus more Gallorum nefas est etiam in extrema fortuna deserere patronos, Gergoviam profugit.

41 Caesar nuntiis ad civitatem Aeduorum missis, qui suo beneficio conservatos docerent quos iure belli interficere potuisset, tribusque horis noctis exercitui ad quietem datis castra ad Gergoviam movit. Medio fere itinere equites a Fabio missi, quanto res in periculo fuerit, exponunt. Summis copiis castra oppugnata demonstrant, cum crebro integri defessis succederent nostrosque assiduo labore defatigarent, quibus propter magnitudinem castrorum perpetuo esset isdem in vallo permanendum. Multitudine sagittarum atque omnis generis telorum multos vulneratos; ad haec sustinenda magno usui fuisse tormenta. Fabium discessu eorum duabus relictis portis obstruere ceteras pluteosque vallo addere et se in posterum diem similemque casum apparare. His rebus cognitis Caesar summo studio militum ante ortum solis in castra pervenit.

42 Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Aedui primis nuntiis ab Litavico acceptis nullum sibi ad cognoscendum spatium relinquunt. Impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas, quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata, ut levem auditionem habeant pro re comperta. Bona civium Romanorum diripiunt, caedes faciunt, in servitutem abstrahunt. Adiuvat rem proclinatam Convictolitavis plebemque ad furorem impellit, ut facinore admissio ad sanitatem reverti pudeat. Marcum Aristium, tribunum militum, iter ad legionem facientem fide data ex oppido Cabillono educunt: idem facere cogunt eos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant. Hos continuo (in) itinere

adorti omnibus impedimentis exuunt; repugnantes diem noctemque obsident; multis utrimque interfectis maiorem multitudinem armatorum concitant.

43 Interim nuntio allato omnes eorum milites in potestate Caesaris teneri, concurrunt ad Aristium, nihil publico factum consilio demonstrant; quaestionem de bonis direptis decernunt, Litavici fatrumque bona publicant, legatos ad Caesarem sui purgandi gratia mittunt. Haec faciunt recipiendorum suorum causa; sed contaminati facinore et capti compendio ex direptis bonis, quod ea res ad multos pertinebat, timore poenae exterriti consilia clam de bello inire incipiunt civitatesque reliquas legationibus sollicitant. Quae tametsi Caesar intellegebat, tamen quam mitissime potest legatos appellat: nihil se propter inscientiam levitatemque vulgi gravius de civitate iudicare neque de sua in Aeduos benevolentia deminuere. Ipse maiorem Galliae motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumsisteretur, consilia inibat quemadmodum ab Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret, ne profectio nata ab timore defectionis similis fugae videretur.

44 Haec cogitanti accidere visa est facultas bene rei gerendae. Nam cum in minora castra operis perspiciendi causa venisset, animadvertit collem, qui ab hostibus tenebatur, nudatum hominibus, qui superioribus diebus vix prae multitudine cerni poterat. Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam, quorum magnus ad eum cotidie numerus confluebat. Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed hunc silvestrem et angustum, qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; huic loco vehementer illos timere nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur:

ad hunc muniendum omnes a Vercingetorige evocatos.

45 Hac re cognita Caesar mittit complures equitum turmas; eis de media nocte imperat, ut paulo tumultuosius omnibus locis vagarentur. Prima luce magnum numerum impedimentorum ex castris mulorumque produci deque his stramenta detrahi mulionesque cum cassidibus equitum specie ac simulatione collibus circumvehi iubet. His paucos addit equites qui latius ostentationis causa vagarentur. Longo circuitu easdem omnes iubet petere regiones. Haec procul ex oppido videbantur, ut erat a Gergovia despectus in castra, neque tanto spatio certi quid esset explorari poterat. Legionem unam eodem iugo mittit et paulum progressam inferiore constituit loco silvisque occultat. Augetur Gallis suspicio, atque omnes illo ad munitionem copiae traducuntur. Vacua castra hostium Caesar conspiciens tectis insignibus suorum occultatisque signis militaribus raros milites, ne ex oppido animadverterentur, ex maioribus castris in minora traducit legatisque, quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit ostendit: in primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur; quid iniquitas loci habeat incommodi proponit: hoc una celeritate posse mutari; occasionis esse rem, non proeli. His rebus expositis signum dat et ab dextra parte alio ascensu eodem tempore Aeduos mittit.

46 Oppidi murus ab planitie atque initio ascensus recta regione, si nullus anfractus intercederet, MCC passus aberat: quidquid huc circuitus ad molliendum clivum accesserat, id spatium itineris augebat. A medio fere colle in longitudinem, ut natura montis ferebat, ex grandibus saxis sex pedum murum qui nostrorum impetum tardaret praeduxerant Galli, atque inferiore omni spatio vacuo relicto superiorem partem collis usque ad murum oppidi densissimis castris compleverant. Milites dato signo celeriter ad

munitiōnem perveniunt eamque transgressi trinis castris potiuntur; ac tanta fuit in castris capiendis celeritas, ut Teutomatus, rex Nitiobrigum, subito in tabernaculo oppressus, ut meridie conquieverat, superiore corporis parte nudata vulnerato equo vix se ex manibus praedantium militum eriperet.

47 Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat, Caesar receptui cani iussit legionique decimae, quacum erat, continuo signa constituit. Ac reliquarum legionum milites non exaudito sono tubae, quod satis magna valles intercedebat, tamen ab tribunis militum legatisque, ut erat a Caesare praeceptum, retinebantur. Sed elati spe celeris victoriae et hostium fuga et superiorum temporum secundis proeliis nihil adeo arduum sibi esse existimaverunt quod non virtute consequi possent, neque finem prius sequendi fecerunt quam muro oppidi portisque appropinquare. Tum vero ex omnibus urbis partibus orto clamore, qui longius aberant repentino tumultu perterriti, cum hostem intra portas esse existimarent, sese ex oppido eiecerunt. Matres familiae de muro vestem argentumque iactabant et pectore nudo prominentes passis manibus obtestabantur Romanos, ut sibi parcerent neu, sicut Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus quidem atque infantibus abstinerent: nonnullae de muris per manus demissae sese militibus tradebant. Lucius Fabius, centurio legionis VIII, quem inter suos eo die dixisse constabat excitari se Avaricensibus praemiis neque commissurum, ut prius quisquam murum ascenderet, tres suos nactus manipulares atque ab eis sublevatus murum ascendit: hos ipse rursus singulos exceptans in murum extulit.

48 Interim ei qui ad alteram partem oppidi, ut supra demonstravimus, munitiōnis causa convenerant, primo exaudito clamore, inde etiam crebris nuntiis incitati, oppidum a Romanis teneri, praemissis equitibus magno concursu eo contenderunt. Eorum

ut quisque primus venerat, sub muro consistebat suorumque pugnantium numerum augebat. Quorum cum magna multitudo convenisset, matres familiae, quae paulo ante Romanis de muro manus tendebant, suos obtestari et more Gallico passum capillum ostentare liberosque in conspectum proferre coeperunt. Erat Romanis nec loco nec numero aequa contentio; simul et cursu et spatio pugnae defatigati non facile recentes atque integros sustinebant.

49 Caesar, cum iniquo loco pugnari hostiumque augeri copias videret, praemetuens suis ad Titum Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit, ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret, ut, si nostros loco depulsos vidisset, quo minus libere hostes insequerentur terreret. Ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus, ubi constiterat, eventum pugnae expectabat.

50 Cum acerrime comminus pugnaretur, hostes loco et numero, nostri virtute confiderent, subito sunt Aedui visi ab latere nostris aperto, quos Caesar ab dextra parte alio ascensu manus destinandae causa miserat. Hi similitudine armorum vehementer nostros perterruerunt, ac tametsi dextris humeris exsertis animadvertebantur, quod insigne pacatum esse consuevit, tamen id ipsum sui fallendi causa milites ab hostibus factum existimabant. Eodem tempore Lucius Fabius centurio quique una murum ascenderant circumventi atque interfecti muro praecipitabantur. Marcus Petronius, eiusdem legionis centurio, cum portam excidere conatus esset, a multitudine oppressus ac sibi desperans multis iam vulneribus acceptis manipularibus suis, qui illum secuti erant, “Quoniam,” inquit, “me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. Vos data facultate vobis consulite.” Simul in medios hostes irrupit

duobusque interfectis reliquos a porta paulum summovit. Conantibus auxiliari suis “Frustra,” inquit, “meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem recipite.” Ita pugnans post paulum concidit ac suis saluti fuit.

51 Nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deiecti sunt loco. Sed intolerantius Gallos insequentes legio decima tardavit, quae pro subsidio paulo aequiore loco constiterat. Hanc rursus XIII legionis cohortes exceperunt, quae ex castris minoribus eductae cum Tito Sextio legato ceperant locum superiorem. Legiones, ubi primum planitiem attigerunt, infestis contra hostes signis constiterunt. Vercingetorix ab radicibus collis suos intra munitiones reduxit. Eo die milites sunt paulo minus septingenti desiderati.

52 Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque ab tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent. Exposuit quid iniquitas loci posset, quid ipse ad Avaricum sensisset, cum sine duce et sine equitatu deprehensis hostibus exploratam victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione propter iniquitatem loci accideret. Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; nec minus se ab milite modestiam et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare.

53 Hac habita contione et ad extremam orationem confirmatis

militibus, ne ob hanc causam animo permoverentur neu quod iniquitas loci attulisset id virtuti hostium tribuerent, eadem de profectione cogitans quae ante senserat legiones ex castris eduxit aciemque idoneo loco constituit. Cum Vercingetorix nihil magis in aequum locum descenderet, levi facto equestri proelio atque secundo in castra exercitum reduxit. Cum hoc idem postero die fecisset, satis ad Gallicam ostentationem minuendam militumque animos confirmandos factum existimans in Aeduos movit castra. Ne tum quidem insecutis hostibus tertio die ad flumen Elaver venit; pontem refecit exercitumque traduxit.

⁵⁴ Ibi a Viridomaro atque Eporedorige Aeduis appellatus discit cum omni equitatu Litavicum ad sollicitandos Aeduos profectum: opus esse ipsos antecedere ad confirmandam civitatem. Etsi multis iam rebus perfidiam Aeduorum perspectam habebat atque horum discessu admaturari defectionem civitatis existimabat, tamen eos retinendos non constituit, ne aut inferre iniuriam videretur aut dare timoris aliquam suspicionem. Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita exposuit, quos et quam humiles acceperisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio, obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis, et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset, ut non solum in pristinum statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse viderentur. His datis mandatis eos ab se dimisit.

⁵⁵ Noviodunum erat oppidum Aeduorum ad ripas Ligeris opportuno loco positum. Huc Caesar omnes obsides Galliae, frumentum, pecuniam publicam, suorum atque exercitus impedimentorum magnam partem contulerat; huc magnum numerum equorum huius belli causa in Italia atque Hispania coemptum miserat. Eo cum Eporedorix Viridomarusque venissent et de statu

civitatis cognovissent, Litavicum Bibracti ab Aeduis receptum, quod est oppidum apud eos maximae auctoritatis, Convictolitavim magistratum magnamque partem senatus ad eum convenisse, legatos ad Vercingetorigem de pace et amicitia concilianda publice missos, non praetermittendum tantum commodum existimaverunt. Itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant pecuniam atque equos inter se partiti sunt; obsides civitatum Bibracte ad magistratum deducendos curaverunt; oppidum, quod a se teneri non posse iudicabant, ne cui esset usui Romanis, incenderunt; frumenti quod subito potuerunt navibus avexerunt, reliquum flumine atque incendio corruperunt. Ipsi ex finitimis regionibus copias cogere, praesidia custodiasque ad ripas Ligeris disponere equitatumque omnibus locis iniciendi timoris causa ostentare coeperunt, si ab re frumentaria Romanos excludere aut adductos inopia in provinciam expellere possent. Quam ad spem multum eos adiuwabatur, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur.

56 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar maturandum sibi censuit, si esset in perficiendis pontibus periclitandum, ut prius quam essent maiores eo coactae copiae dimicaret. Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, id ne metu quidem necessario faciendum existimabat; cum infamia atque indignitas rei et oppositus mons Cevenna viarumque difficultas impendebat, tum maxime quod abiuncto Labieno atque eis legionibus quas una miserat vehementer timebat. Itaque admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis contra omnium opinionem ad Ligerem venit vadoque per equites invento pro rei necessitate opportuno, ut brachia modo atque humeri ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu qui vim fluminis refringeret, atque hostibus primo aspectu

perturbatis, incolumem exercitum traduxit frumentumque in agris et pecoris copiam nactus repleto his rebus exercitu iter in Senones facere instituit.

57 Dum haec apud Caesarem geruntur, Labienus eo supplemento, quod nuper ex Italia venerat, relicto Agedinci, ut esset impedimentis praesidio, cum quattuor legionibus Lutetiam proficiscitur. Id est oppidum Parisiorum, quod positum est in insula fluminis Sequanae. Cuius adventu ab hostibus cognito magnae ex finitimis civitatibus copiae convenerunt. Summa imperi traditur Camulogeno Aulerco, qui prope confectus aetate tamen propter singularem scientiam rei militaris ad eum est honorem evocatus. Is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem, quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit.

58 Labienus primo vineas agere, cratibus atque aggere paludem explere atque iter munire conabatur. Postquam id difficilius confieri animadvertit, silentio e castris tertia vigilia egressus eodem quo venerat itinere Metiosedum pervenit. Id est oppidum Senonum in insula Sequanae positum, ut paulo ante de Lutetia diximus. Deprensas navibus circiter quinquaginta celeriterque coniunctis atque eo militibus iniectis et rei novitate perterritis oppidanis, quorum magna pars erat ad bellum evocata, sine contentione oppido potitur. Refecto ponte, quem superioribus diebus hostes resciderant, exercitum traducit et secundo flumine ad Lutetiam iter facere coepit. Hostes re cognita ab eis, qui Metiosedo fugerant, Lutetiam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi profecti a palude ad ripas Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni castra considunt.

59 Iam Caesar a Gergovia discessisse audiebatur, iam de Aeduorum defectione et secundo Galliae motu rumores adferebantur,

Gallique in colloquiis interclusum itinere et Ligeri Caesarem inopia frumenti coactum in provinciam contendisse confirmabant. Bellovaci autem defectione Aeduorum cognita, qui ante erant per se infideles, manus cogere atque aperte bellum parare coeperunt. Tum Labienus tanta rerum commutatione longe aliud sibi capiendum consilium atque antea senserat intellegebat, neque iam, ut aliquid acquireret proelioque hostes lacerasset, sed ut incolumem exercitum Agedincum reduceret, cogitabat. Namque altera ex parte Bellovaci, quae civitas in Gallia maximam habet opinionem virtutis, instabant, alteram Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat; tum legiones a praesidio atque impedimentis interclusas maximum flumen distinebat. Tantis subito difficultatibus obiectis ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat.

60 Sub vesperum consilio convocato cohortatus ut ea quae imperasset diligenter industrieque administrarent, naves, quas Metiosedo deduxerat, singulas equitibus Romanis attribuit, et prima confecta vigilia quattuor milia passuum secundo flumine silentio progredi ibique se exspectari iubet. Quinque cohortes, quas minime firmas ad dimicandum esse existimabat, castris praesidio relinquit; quinque eiusdem legionis reliquas de media nocte cum omnibus impedimentis adverso flumine magno tumultu proficisci imperat. Conquirat etiam lintres: has magno sonitu remorum incitatus in eandem partem mittit. Ipse post paulo silentio egressus cum tribus legionibus eum locum petit quo naves appellere iusserat.

61 Eo cum esset ventum, exploratores hostium, ut omni fluminis parte erant dispositi, inopinantes, quod magna subito erat coorta tempestas, ab nostris opprimuntur; exercitus equitatusque equitibus Romanis administrantibus, quos ei negotio praefecerat, celeriter transmittitur. Uno fere tempore sub lucem hostibus nuntiatur in

castris Romanorum praeter consuetudinem tumultuari et magnum ire agmen adverso flumine sonitumque remorum in eadem parte exaudiri et paulo infra milites navibus transportari. Quibus rebus auditis, quod existimabant tribus locis transire legiones atque omnes perturbatos defectione Aeduorum fugam parare, suas quoque copias in tres partes distribuerunt. Nam praesidio e regione castrorum relicto et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa, quae tantum progrediatur, quantum naves processissent, reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt.

62 Prima luce et nostri omnes erant transportati, et hostium acies cernebatur. Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum proeliorum retinerent memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent, dat signum proeli. Primo concursu ab dextro cornu, ubi septima legio constiterat, hostes pelluntur atque in fugam coniciuntur; ab sinistro, quem locum duodecima legio tenebat, cum primi ordines hostium transfixi telis concidissent, tamen acerrime reliqui resistebant, nec dabat suspicionem fugae quisquam. Ipse dux hostium Camulogenus suis aderat atque eos cohortabatur. Incerto nunc etiam exitu victoriae, cum septimae legionis tribunis esset nuntiatum quae in sinistro cornu gererentur, post tergum hostium legionem ostenderunt signaque intulerunt. Ne eo quidem tempore quisquam loco cessit, sed circumventi omnes interfectique sunt. Eandem fortunam tulit Camulogenus. At ei qui praesidio contra castra Labieni erant relictis, cum proelium commissum audissent, subsidio suis ierunt collemque ceperunt, neque nostrorum militum victorum impetum sustinere potuerunt. Sic cum suis fugientibus permixti, quos non silvae montesque texerunt, ab equitatu sunt interfecti. Hoc negotio confecto Labienus revertitur Agedincum, ubi impedimenta totius exercitus relictas erant: inde cum omnibus copiis

ad Caesarem pervenit.

63 Defectione Aeduorum cognita bellum augetur. Legationes in omnes partes circummittuntur: quantum gratia, auctoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas civitates nituntur; nacti obsides, quos Caesar apud eos deposuerat, horum supplicio dubitantes territant. Petunt a Vercingetorige Aedui ut ad se veniat rationesque belli gerendi communicet. Re impetrata contendunt ut ipsis summa imperi tradatur, et re in controversiam deducta totius Galliae concilium Bibracte indicitur. Eodem conveniunt undique frequentes. Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur: ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant imperatorem. Ab hoc concilio Remi, Lingones, Treveri afuerunt: illi, quod amicitiam Romanorum sequebantur; Treveri, quod aberant longius et ab Germanis premebantur, quae fuit causa quare toto abessent bello et neutris auxilia mitterent. Magno dolore Aedui ferunt se deiectos principatu, queruntur fortunae commutationem et Caesaris indulgentiam in se requirunt, neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent. Inviti summae spei adolescentes Eporedorix et Viridomarus Vercingetorigi parent.

64 Ipse imperat reliquis civitatibus obsides diemque ei rei constituit. Omnes equites, quindecim milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet; peditatu quem antea habuerit se fore contentum dicit, neque fortunam temptaturum aut in acie dimicaturum, sed, quoniam abundet equitatu, perfacile esse factu frumentationibus pabulationibusque Romanos prohibere, aequo modo animo sua ipsi frumenta corrumpant aedificiaque incendant, qua rei familiaris iactura perpetuum imperium libertatemque se consequi videant. His constitutis rebus Aeduis Segusiavisque, qui sunt finitimi provinciae, decem milia peditum imperat; huc addit equites octingentos. His

praeficit fratrem Eporedorigis bellumque inferri Allobrogibus iubet. Altera ex parte Gabalos proximosque pagos Arvernorum in Helvios, item Rutenos Cadurcosque ad fines Volcarum Arecomicorum depopulandos mittit. Nihilo minus clandestinis nuntiis legationibusque Allobrogas sollicitat, quorum mentes nondum ab superiore bello resedissee sperabat. Horum principibus pecunias, civitati autem imperium totius provinciae pollicetur.

65 Ad hos omnes casus provisa erant praesidia cohortium duarum et viginti, quae ex ipsa provincia ab Lucio Caesare legato ad omnes partes opponebantur. Helvii sua sponte cum finitimis proelio congressi pelluntur et Gaio Valerio Donnotauro, Caburi filio, principe civitatis, compluribusque aliis interfectis intra oppida ac muros compelluntur. Allobroges crebris ad Rhodanum dispositis praesidiis magna cum cura et diligentia suos fines tuentur. Caesar, quod hostes equitatu superiores esse intellegebat et interclusis omnibus itineribus nulla re ex provincia atque Italia sublevari poterat, trans Rhenum in Germaniam mittit ad eas civitates quas superioribus annis pacaverat, equitesque ab his arcessit et levis armaturae pedites, qui inter eos proeliari consuerant. Eorum adventu, quod minus idoneis equis utebantur, a tribunis militum reliquisque equitibus Romanis atque evocatis equos sumit Germanisque distribuit.

66 Interea, dum haec geruntur, hostium copiae ex Arvernīs equitesque qui toti Galliae erant imperati conveniunt. Magno horum coacto numero, cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret, quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferri posset, circiter milia passuum decem ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit convocatisque ad concilium praefectis equitum venisse tempus victoriae demonstrat. Fugere in provinciam Romanos

Galliaque excedere. Id sibi ad praesentem obtinendam libertatem satis esse; ad reliqui temporis pacem atque otium parum profici: maioribus enim coactis copiis reversuros neque finem bellandi facturos. Proinde agmine impeditos adorirantur. Si pedites suis auxilium ferant atque in eo morentur, iter facere non posse; si, id quod magis futurum confidat, relictis impedimentis suae saluti consulant, et usu rerum necessariarum et dignitate spoliatum iri. Nam de equitibus hostium, quin nemo eorum progredi modo extra agmen audeat, et ipsos quidem non debere dubitare, et quo maiore faciant animo, copias se omnes pro castris habiturum et terrori hostibus futurum. Conclamant equites sanctissimo iureiurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos, ne ad parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium perequitasset.

67 Probata re atque omnibus iureiurando adactis postero die in tres partes distributo equitatu duae se acies ab duobus lateribus ostendunt, una primo agmine iter impedire coepit. Qua re nuntiata Caesar suum quoque equitatum tripartito divisum contra hostem ire iubet. Pugnatur una omnibus in partibus. Consistit agmen; impedimenta intra legiones recipiuntur. Si qua in parte nostri laborare aut gravius premi videbantur, eo signa inferri Caesar aciemque constitui iubebat; quae res et hostes ad insequendum tardabat et nostros spe auxilii confirmabat. Tandem Germani ab dextro latere summum iugum nacti hostes loco depellunt; fugientes usque ad flumen, ubi Vercingetorix cum pedestribus copiis consederat, persequuntur compluresque interficiunt. Qua re animadversa reliqui ne circumirentur veriti se fugae mandant. Omnibus locis fit caedes. Tres nobilissimi Aedui capti ad Caesarem perducuntur: Cotus, praefectus equitum, qui controversiam cum Convictolitavi proximis comitiis habuerat, et Cavarillus, qui post defectionem Litavici pedestribus copiis

praefuerat, et Eporedorix, quo duce ante adventum Caesaris Aedui cum Sequanis bello contenderant.

68 Fugato omni equitatu Vercingetorix copias, ut pro castris collocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam, quod est oppidum Mandubiorum, iter facere coepit celeriterque impedimenta ex castris educi et se subsequi iussit. Caesar impedimentis in proximum collem deductis, duabus legionibus praesidio relictis, secutus quantum diei tempus est passum, circiter tribus milibus hostium ex novissimo agmine interfectis altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit. Perspecto urbis situ perterritisque hostibus, quod equitatu, qua maxime parte exercitus confidebant, erant pulsī, adhortatus ad laborem milites circumvallare instituit.

69 Ipsum erat oppidum Alesia in colle summo admodum edito loco, ut nisi obsidione expugnari non posse videretur; cuius collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina sublebant. Ante id oppidum planities circiter milia passuum tria in longitudinem patebat: reliquis ex omnibus partibus colles mediocri interiecto spatio pari altitudinis fastigio oppidum cingebant. Sub muro, quae pars collis ad orientem solem spectabat, hunc omnem locum copiae Gallorum compleverant fossamque et maceriam sex in altitudinem pedum praeduxerant. Eius munitionis quae ab Romanis instituebatur circuitus XI milia passuum tenebat. Castra opportunis locis erant posita ibique castella viginti tria facta, quibus in castellis interdum stationes ponebantur, ne qua subito eruptio fieret: haec eadem noctu excubitoribus ac firmis praesidiis tenebantur.

70 Opere instituto fit equestre proelium in ea planitie, quam intermissam collibus tria milia passuum in longitudinem patere supra demonstravimus. Summa vi ab utrisque contenditur. Laborantibus nostris Caesar Germanos summittit legionesque pro castris constituit,

ne qua subito irruptio ab hostium peditatu fiat. Praesidio legionum addito nostris animus augetur: hostes in fugam coniecti se ipsi multitudine impediunt atque angustioribus portis relictis coacervantur. Germani acrius usque ad munitiones sequuntur. Fit magna caedes: nonnulli relictis equis fossam transire et maceriam transcendere conantur. Paulum legiones Caesar quas pro vallo constituerat promoveri iubet. Non minus qui intra munitiones erant perturbantur Galli: veniri ad se confestim existimantes ad arma conclamant; nonnulli perterriti in oppidum irrumpunt. Vercingetorix iubet portas claudi, ne castra nudentur. Multis interfectis, compluribus equis captis Germani sese recipiunt.

71 Vercingetorix, priusquam munitiones ab Romanis perficiantur, consilium capit omnem ab se equitatum noctu dimittere. Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant. Sua in illos merita proponit obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem habeant neu se optime de communi libertate meritum in cruciatum hostibus dedant. Quod si indiligentiores fuerint, milia hominum delecta octoginta una secum interitura demonstrat. Ratione inita se exigue dierum triginta habere frumentum, sed paulo etiam longius tolerari posse parcendo. His datis mandatis, qua opus erat intermissum, secunda vigilia silentio equitatum mittit. Frumentum omne ad se referri iubet; capitis poenam eis qui non paruerint constituit: pecus, cuius magna erat copia ab Mandubiis compulsa, viritim distribuit; frumentum parce et paulatim metiri instituit; copias omnes quas pro oppido collocaverat in oppidum recepit. His rationibus auxilia Galliae expectare et bellum parat administrare.

72 Quibus rebus cognitis ex perfugis et captivis, Caesar haec genera munitionis instituit. Fossam pedum viginti directis lateribus

duxit, ut eius fossae solum tantundem pateret quantum summae fossae labra distarent. Reliquas omnes munitiones ab ea fossa pedes quadringentos reduxit, id hoc consilio, quoniam tantum esset necessario spatium complexus, nec facile totum corpus corona militum cingeretur, ne de improvise aut noctu ad munitiones hostium multitudo advolaret aut interdiu tela in nostros operi destinatos conicere possent. Hoc intermisso spatio duas fossas quindecim pedes latas, eadem altitudine perduxit, quarum interiorem campestribus ac demissis locis aqua ex flumine derivata complevit. Post eas aggerem ac vallum duodecim pedum extruxit. Huic loricam pinnaeque adiecit grandibus cervis eminentibus ad commissuras pluteorum atque aggeris, qui ascensum hostium tardarent, et turres toto opere circumdedit, quae pedes LXXX inter se distarent.

73 Erat eodem tempore et materiari et frumentari et tantas munitiones fieri necesse deminutis nostris copiis quae longius ab castris progrediebantur: ac non numquam opera nostra Galli temptare atque eruptionem ex oppido pluribus portis summa vi facere conabantur. Quare ad haec rursus opera addendum Caesar putavit, quo minore numero militum munitiones defendi possent. Itaque truncis arborum aut admodum firmis ramis abscisis atque horum delibratis ac praeacutis cacuminibus perpetuae fossae quinos pedes altae ducebantur. Huc illi stipites demissi et ab infimo revincti, ne revelli possent, ab ramis eminebant. Quini erant ordines coniuncti inter se atque implicati; quo qui intraverant, se ipsi acutissimis vallis induebant. Hos cippos appellabant. Ante quos obliquis ordinibus in quincuncem dispositis scrobes tres in altitudinem pedes fodiebantur paulatim angustiore ad infimum fastigio. Huc teretes stipites feminis crassitudine ab summo praeacuti et praeusti demittebantur, ita ut non amplius digitis quattuor ex terra eminerent; simul confirmandi et

stabiliendi causa singuli ab infimo solo pedes terra exculcabantur, reliqua pars scrobis ad occultandas insidias viminibus ac virgultis integebatur. Huius generis octoni ordines ducti ternos inter se pedes distabant. Id ex similitudine floris liliū appellabant. Ante haec taleae pedem longae ferreis hamis infixis totae in terram infodiebantur mediocribusque intermissis spatiis omnibus locis disserebantur; quos stimulos nominabant.

74 His rebus perfectis regiones secutus quam potuit aequissimas pro loci natura quattuordecim milia passuum complexus pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit, ut ne magna quidem multitudine, si ita accidat, munitionum praesidia circumfundi possent; ac ne cum periculo ex castris egredi cogatur, dierum triginta pabulum frumentumque habere omnes convectum iubet.

75 Dum haec apud Alesiam geruntur, Galli concilio principum indicto non omnes eos qui arma ferre possent, ut censuit Vercingetorix, convocandos statuunt, sed certum numerum cuique ex civitate imperandum, ne tanta multitudine confusa nec moderari nec discernere suos nec frumentandi rationem habere possent. Imperant Aeduis atque eorum clientibus, Segusiavis, Ambivaretis, Aulercis Brannovicibus, Blannoviis, milia XXXV; parem numerum Arvernīs adiunctis Eleutetis, Cadurcis, Gabalis, Vellaviis, qui sub imperio Arvernorum esse consuerunt; Sequanis, Senonibus, Biturigibus, Santonis, Rutenis, Carnutibus duodena milia; Bellovacis X; totidem Lemovicibus; octona Pictonibus et Turonis et Parisiis et Helvetiis; Suessionibus, Ambianis, Mediomatricis, Petrocoriis, Nervii, Morinis, Nitiobrigibus quina milia; Aulercis Cenomanis totidem; Atrebatibus III milibus; Vellocassis, Lexoviis et Aulercis Eburovicibus terna; Rauracis et Boiis bina; XXX milia universis

civitatribus, quae Oceanum attingunt quaeque eorum consuetudine Armoricae appellantur, quo sunt in numero Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, Venelli. Ex his Bellovacii suum numerum non compleverunt, quod se suo nomine atque arbitrio cum Romanis bellum gesturos dicebant neque cuiusquam imperio obtemperaturos; rogati tamen ab Commio pro eius hospitio duo milia una miserunt.

76 Huius opera Commi, ut antea demonstravimus, fideli atque utili superioribus annis erat usus in Britannia Caesar; quibus ille pro meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat. Tamen tanta universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent. Coactis equitum VIII milibus et peditum circiter CCL haec in Aeduum finibus recensebantur, numerusque inibat, praefecti constituebantur. Commio Atrebatii, Viridomarus et Eboracorum Aedui, Vercassivellaunus Arverno, consobrinus Vercingetorigis, summa imperii traditur. His delecti ex civitatibus attribuuntur, quorum consilio bellum administraretur. Omnes alacres et fiduciae pleni ad Alesiam proficiscuntur, neque erat omnium quisquam qui aspectum modo tantae multitudinis sustineri posse arbitraretur, praesertim ancipiti proelio, cum ex oppido eruptione pugnaretur, foris tantae copiae equitatus peditatusque cernerentur.

77 At ei, qui Alesiae obsidebantur praeterita die, qua auxilia suorum exspectaverant, consumpto omni frumento, inscii quid in Aedui gereretur, concilio coacto de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Ac variis dictis sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppeterent, eruptionem censebat, non praetereunda

oratio Critognati videtur propter eius singularem et nefariam crudelitatem. Hic summo in Arvernīs ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis, “Nihil,” inquit, “de eorum sententia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam servitutem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad concilium adhibendos censeo. Cum his mihi res sit, qui eruptionem probant; quorum in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinae residere virtutis memoria videtur. Animi est ista mollitia, non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. Atque ego hanc sententiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae nostrae iacturam fieri viderem: sed in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus. Quid hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis consanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur? Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetuae servituti subicere. An, quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis? Si illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepo, his utimini testibus appropinquare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere versantur. Quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari bello Cimbrorum Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt neque se hostibus tradiderunt. Cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen libertatis causa institui et posteris

prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem. Nam quid illi simile bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaue illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reliquerunt. Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considerare atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt. Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitude.”

78 Sentiis dictis constituunt ut ei qui valetudine aut aetate inutiles sunt bello oppido excedant, atque omnia prius experiantur, quam ad Critognati sententiam descendant: illo tamen potius utendum consilio, si res cogat atque auxilia morentur, quam aut deditionis aut pacis subeundam condicionem. Mandubii, qui eos oppido receperant, cum liberis atque uxoribus exire coguntur. Hi, cum ad munitiones Romanorum accessissent, flentes omnibus precibus orabant, ut se in servitutem receptos cibo iuvarent. At Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recipi prohibebat.

79 Interea Commius reliquique duces quibus summa imperi permissa erat cum omnibus copiis ad Alesiam perveniunt et colle exteriore occupato non longius mille passibus ab nostris munitionibus considunt. Postero die equitatu ex castris educto omnem eam planitiem, quam in longitudinem tria milia passuum patere demonstravimus, complent pedestresque copias paulum ab eo loco abditas in locis superioribus constituunt. Erat ex oppido Alesia despectus in campum. Concurrunt his auxiliis visis; fit gratulatio inter eos, atque omnium animi ad laetitiam excitantur. Itaque

productis copiis ante oppidum considunt et proximam fossam cratibus integunt atque aggere explent seque ad eruptionem atque omnes casus comparant.

80 Caesar omni exercitu ad utramque partem munitionum disposito, ut, si usus veniat, suum quisque locum teneat et noverit, equitatum ex castris educi et proelium committi iubet. Erat ex omnibus castris, quae summum undique iugum tenebant, despectus, atque omnes milites intenti pugnae proventum exspectabant. Galli inter equites raros sagittarios expeditosque levis armaturae interiecerant, qui suis cedentibus auxilio succurrerent et nostrorum equitum impetus sustinerent. Ab his complures de improvviso vulnerati proelio excedebant. Cum suos pugna superiores esse Galli confiderent et nostros multitudine premi viderent, ex omnibus partibus et ei qui munitionibus continebantur et hi qui ad auxilium convenerant clamore et ululatu suorum animos confirmabant. Quod in conspectu omnium res gerebatur neque recte ac turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabant. Cum a meridie prope ad solis occasum dubia victoria pugnaretur, Germani una in parte confertis turmis in hostes impetum fecerunt eosque propulerunt; quibus in fugam coniectis sagittarii circumventi interfectique sunt. Item ex reliquis partibus nostri cedentes usque ad castra insecuti sui colligendi facultatem non dederunt. At ei qui ab Alesia processerant maesti prope victoria desperata se in oppidum receperunt.

81 Uno die intermisso Galli atque hoc spatio magno cratium, scalarum, harpagonum numero effecto media nocte silentio ex castris egressi ad campestris munitiones accedunt. Subito clamore sublato, qua significatione qui in oppido obsidebantur de suo adventu cognoscere possent, crates proicere, fundis, sagittis, lapidibus nostros

de vallo proturbare reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinent parant administrare. Eodem tempore clamore exaudito dat tuba signum suis Vercingetorix atque ex oppido educit. Nostri, ut superioribus diebus, ut cuique erat locus attributus, ad munitiones accedunt; fundis librilibus sudibusque quas in opere disposuerant ac glandibus Gallos proterrent. Prospectu tenebris adempto multa utrimque vulnera accipiuntur. Complura tormentis tela coniciuntur. At Marcus Antonius et Gaius Trebonius legati, quibus hae partes ad defendendum obvenerant, qua ex parte nostros premi intellexerant, his auxilio ex ulterioribus castellis deductos summittebant.

82 Dum longius ab munitione aberant Galli, plus multitudine telorum proficiebant; posteaquam propius successerunt, aut se stimulis inopinantes induebant aut in scrobes delati transfodiebantur aut ex vallo ac turribus traiecti pilis muralibus interibant. Multis undique vulneribus acceptis nulla munitione perrupta, cum lux appeteret, veriti ne ab latere aperto ex superioribus castris eruptione circumvenirentur, se ad suos receperunt. At interiores, dum ea quae a Vercingetorige ad eruptionem praeparata erant proferunt, priores fossas explent, diutius in his rebus administrandis morati prius suos discessisse cognoverunt, quam munitionibus appropinquarent. Ita re infecta in oppidum reverterunt.

83 Bis magno cum detrimento repulsi Galli quid agant consulunt; locorum peritos adhibent: ex his superiorum castrorum situs munitionesque cognoscunt. Erat a septentrionibus collis, quem propter magnitudinem circuitus opere circumplecti non potuerant nostri: necessario paene iniquo loco et leniter declivi castra fecerunt. Haec Gaius Antistius Reginus et Gaius Caninius Rebilus legati cum duabus legionibus obtinebant. Cognitis per exploratores regionibus duces hostium LX milia ex omni numero deligunt earum civitatum

quae maximam virtutis opinionem habebant; quid quoque pacto agi placeat occulte inter se constituunt; adeundi tempus definiunt, cum meridies esse videatur. His copiis Vercassivellaunum Arvernum, unum ex quattuor ducibus, propinquum Vercingetorigis, praeficiunt. Ille ex castris prima vigilia egressus prope confecto sub lucem itinere post montem se occultavit militesque ex nocturno labore sese reficere iussit. Cum iam meridies appropinquare videretur, ad ea castra quae supra demonstravimus contendit; eodemque tempore equitatus ad campestris munitiones accedere et reliquae copiae pro castris sese ostendere coeperunt.

84 Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur; crates, longurios, musculos, falces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat profert. Pugnatur uno tempore omnibus locis, atque omnia temptantur: quae minime visa pars firma est, huc concurritur. Romanorum manus tantis munitionibus distinetur nec facile pluribus locis occurrit. Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui post tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident salute constare: omnia enim plerumque quae absunt vehementius hominum mentes perturbant.

85 Caesar idoneum locum nactus quid quaque ex parte geratur cognoscit; laborantibus summittit. Utrisque ad animum occurrit unum esse illud tempus, quo maxime contendere conveniat: Galli, nisi perfregerint munitiones, de omni salute desperant; Romani, si rem obtinuerint, finem laborum omnium expectant. Maxime ad superiores munitiones laboratur, quo Vercassivellaunum missum demonstravimus. Iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium magnum habet momentum. Alii tela coniciunt, alii testudine facta subeunt; defatigatis in vicem integri succedunt. Agger ab universis in munitionem coniectus et ascensum dat Gallis et ea quae in terra

occultaverant Romani contegit; nec iam arma nostris nec vires suppetunt.

86 His rebus cognitis Caesar Labienum cum cohortibus sex subsidio laborantibus mittit: imperat, si sustinere non posset, deductis cohortibus eruptione pugnaret; id nisi necessario ne faciat. Ipse adit reliquos, cohortatur ne labori succumbant; omnium superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere. Interiores desperatis campestribus locis propter magnitudinem munitionum loca praeupta ex ascensu temptant: huc ea quae paraverant conferunt. Multitudine telorum ex turribus propugnantes deturbant, aggere et cratibus fossas explent, falcibus vallum ac loricam rescindunt.

87 Mittit primo Brutum adolescentem cum cohortibus Caesar, post cum aliis Gaium Fabium legatum; postremo ipse, cum vehementius pugnaretur, integros subsidio adducit. Restituto proelio ac repulsis hostibus eo quo Labienum miserat contendit; cohortes quattuor ex proximo castello deducit, equitum partem sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et ab tergo hostes adoriri iubet. Labienus, postquam neque aggeres neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidis deductas fors obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios facit certiore quid faciendum existimet. Accelerat Caesar, ut proelio intersit.

88 Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat, turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt. Utrunque clamore sublato excipit rursus ex vallo atque omnibus munitionibus clamor. Nostri omissis pilis gladiis rem gerunt. Repente post tergum equitatus cernitur; cohortes aliae appropinquant. Hostes terga vertunt; fugientibus equites

occurrunt. Fit magna caedes. Sedulius, dux et princeps Lemovicum, occiditur; Vercassivellaunus Arvernus vivus in fuga comprehenditur; signa militaria septuaginta quattuor ad Caesarem referuntur: pauci ex tanto numero se incolumes in castra recipiunt. Conspicati ex oppido caedem et fugam suorum desperata salute copias a munitionibus reducunt. Fit protinus hac re audita ex castris Gallorum fuga. Quod nisi crebris subsidiis ac totius diei labore milites essent defessi, omnes hostium copiae deleri potuissent. De media nocte missus equitatus novissimum agmen consequitur: magnus numerus capitur atque interficitur; reliqui ex fuga in civitates discedunt.

89 Postero die Vercingetorix concilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatum, sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat, et quoniam sit fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint. Mittuntur de his rebus ad Caesarem legati. Iubet arma tradi, principes produci. Ipse in munitione pro castris consedit: eo duces producuntur; Vercingetorix deditur, arma proiciuntur. Reservatis Aeduis atque Arvernīs, si per eos civitates recipere posset, ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singula praedae nomine distribuit.

90 His rebus confectis in Aeduos proficiscitur; civitatem recipit. Eo legati ab Arvernīs missi quae imperaret se facturos pollicentur. Imperat magnum numerum obsidum. Legiones in hiberna mittit. Captivorum circiter viginti milia Aeduis Arvernisque reddit. Titum Labienum duabus cum legionibus et equitatu in Sequanos proficisci iubet: huic Marcum Sempronium Rutilum attribuit. Gaium Fabium legatum et Lucium Minucium Basilum cum legionibus duabus in Remis collocat, ne quam ab finitimis Bellovacis calamitatem accipiant. Gaium Antistium Reginum in Ambivaretos, Titum

Sextium in Bituriges, Gaium Caninium Rebilum in Rutenos cum singulis legionibus mittit. Quintum Tullium Ciceronem et Publium Sulpicium Cabilloni et Matiscone in Aeduis ad Ararim rei frumentariae causa collocat. Ipse Bibracte hiemare constituit. His litteris cognitis Romae dierum viginti supplicatio redditur.

LIBER VIII

Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum cotidiana mea recusatio non difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur deprecationem habere, rem difficillimam suscepi. Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius scriptis, contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris. Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis. Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur: qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur. Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus. Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum. Mihi ne illud quidem accidit, ut Alexandrino atque Africano bello interessem; quae bella quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro testimonio sumus dicturi. Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis causas colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo, quod me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare comparari. Vale.

1 Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore aestate nullum

bellandi tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete reficere a tantis laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere. Cuius rei verisimilis causa adferebatur, quod Gallis omnibus cognitum esset neque ulla multitudine in unum locum coacta resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa bella complures eodem tempore intulissent civitates, satis auxilii aut spatii aut copiarum habiturum exercitum populi Romani ad omnia persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem incommodi recusandam, si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in libertatem.

2 Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur, Caesar Marcum Antonium quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum praesidio pridie Kal. Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem XIII, quam non longe a finibus Aeduum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum, eique adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat. Binis cohortibus ad impedimenta tuenda relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros Biturigum inducit, qui, cum latos fines et complura oppida haberent, unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent.

3 Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod imparatis disiectisque accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes prius ab equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent. Namque etiam illud vulgare incursionis hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes incendiis terrerentur. Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere Romanorum, in finitimas civitates aut privatis hospitibus confisi aut societate consiliorum confugerant. Frustra: nam Caesar magnis

itineribus omnibus locis occurrit nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de domestica salute cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et dubitantes terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat. Tali condicione proposita Bituriges, cum sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius amicitiam finitimasque civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in fidem receptas esse, idem fecerunt.

4 Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac patientia, qui brumalibus diebus itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus intolerandis studiosissime permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios, centurionibus tot milia nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur legionibusque in hiberna remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte. Ibi cum ius diceret, Bituriges ad eum legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos intulisse bellum sibi querebantur. Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius decem et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIII et VI ex hibernis ab Arare educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa superiore commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad persequendos Carnutes proficiscitur.

5 Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata, calamitate ceterorum ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae hiemis causa constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant (nuper enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiunt. Caesar erumpentes eo maxime tempore acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites nolle, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo castra ponit atque in tecta partim Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter stramentis tentoriorum integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites compegit. Equites tamen et auxiliarios pedites in omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse dicebantur hostes; nec

frustra: nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri revertuntur. Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum praesidio tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte amissa suorum dissipantur in finitimas civitates.

6 Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis haberet convenientes manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur, quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum summum bellum posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit; ipse, cum crebris legationibus Remorum certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque praestabant, finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco et Commio Atrebate exercitus comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut omni multitudine in fines Suessionum, qui Remis erant attributi, facerent impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad dignitatem sed etiam ad salutem suam iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime de re publica meritos accipere, legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus undecimam; litteras autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum legiones duas quas habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit. Ita, quantum hibernorum opportunitas bellicae ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo labore in vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat.

7 His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos proficiscitur castrisque in eorum finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in omnes partes ad aliquos excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia cognosceret. Equites officio functi renuntiant paucos in aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui agrorum colendorum causa remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter demigratum), sed qui speculandi causa essent

remissi. A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse, itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses, Atrebates; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in ultiores silvas contulisse. Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent. Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita. Constituisset autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebis cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur; si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos.

8 Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum cognosset atque ea quae proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a temeritate barbarorum remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum statuit, quo celerius hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem. Singularis enim virtutis veterrimas legiones VII, VIII, VIII habebat, summae spei delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo iam stipendio tamen in collatione reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac virtutis ceperat opinionem. Itaque consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad se essent delatae omnibus expositis animos multitudinis confirmat. Si forte hostes trium legionum numero posset elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio septima, octava, nona ante

omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium impedimentorum agmen, quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse consuevit, cogeret undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere hostibus posset quam ipsi depoposcissent. Hac ratione paene quadrato agmine instructo in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum adducit.

9 Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo gradu legiones accedere Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiducia consilia perlata, sive certaminis periculo sive subito adventu sive exspectatione nostri consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore decedunt. Caesar, etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium valle intermissa magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente castra castris hostium confert. Haec imperat vallo pedum XII muniri, lorikulam pro haec ratione eius altitudinis inaedificari; fossam duplicem pedum denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in altitudinem trium tabulorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi, quorum frontes viminea loracula munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa, duplici propugnatorum ordine defenderentur, quorum alter ex pontibus, quo tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque permetteret tela, alter, qui propior hostem in ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus telis tegetetur. Portis fores altioresque turres imposuit.

10 Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium. Namque et operum magnitudinem et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris allaturum, et cum pabulatum frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis copiis castra munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi. Interim crebro paucis utrimque procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam tamen paludem

nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque transibant acriusque hostes insequabantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem transgressi nostros longius summovebant. Accidebat autem cotidianis pabulationibus (id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex aedificiis pabulum conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi pabulatores circumvenirentur; quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes incitabat barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad auxilia Germanorum arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi numero non amplius erant quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari nitebantur.

11 Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures dies castris palude et loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra eorum sine dimicatione perniciose nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset legionem XIII, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat, arcesseret atque ita cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se veniret; ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum reliquarumque civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio pabulationibus mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent.

12 Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine diligentia minueretur, quod plerumque accidit diuturnitate, Bellovaci delecta manu peditum cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum silvestribus locis insidias disponunt eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum elicerent nostros, deinde circumventos aggredierentur. Cuius mali sors incidit Remis, quibus ille dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi, cum repente hostium equites animadvertissent ac numero superiores paucitatem

contempsissent, cupidius insecuti peditibus undique sunt circumdati. Quo facto perturbati celerius quam consuetudo fert equestris proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe civitatis, praefecto equitum; qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti, tamen consuetudine Gallorum neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda praefectura usus erat neque dimicari sine se voluerat. Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto, nostrique detrimento admonentur diligentius exploratis locis stationes disponere ac moderatius cedentem insequi hostem.

13 Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia in conspectu utrorumque castrorum, quae ad vada transitusque fiebant paludis. Qua contentione Germani, quos propterea Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi proeliarentur, cum constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque resistantibus interfectis pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui aut comminus opprimebantur aut eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius subsidiari consueverant, turpiter refugerunt, nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli pudore coacti longius profugerent. Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus insolentiores an adverso mediocri casu timidiores essent.

14 Compluribus diebus isdem in castris consumptis, cum propius accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum cognossent, duces Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu dimittunt eos quos aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant, unaque reliqua impedimenta. Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant agmen (magna enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit), oppressi luce copias armatorum pro suis

instruunt castris, ne prius Romani persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum processisset. At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos tanto collis ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut discedere ex eo loco sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non possent. Ita, cum palude impedita a castris castra dividi videret, quae transeundi difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare posset, atque id iugum quod trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri valle a castris eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata legiones traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi fastigio duobus ab lateribus munebatur. Ibi legionibus instructis ad ultimum iugum pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa tela in hostium cuneos conici possent.

15 Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare non recusarent, si forte Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias distributas dimittere non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie permanserunt. Quorum pertinacia cognita Caesar XX cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco mutatis muniri iubet castra. Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit. Bellovacii, cum Romanos ad insequendum paratos viderent neque pernoctare aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem loco possent, tale consilium sui recipiendi ceperunt. Fasces, ut consueverant (namque in acie sedere Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia, inter se traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo pronuntiato uno tempore incenderunt. Ita continens flamma copias omnes repente a conspectu textit Romanorum. Quod ubi accidit, barbari vehementissimo cursu refugerunt.

16 Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit. Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt. Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt. Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites peditesque disponent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus inferebant.

17 Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo quodam comperit Caesar Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex peditum delegisse equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco collocaret, quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros suspicaretur. Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam solebat educit equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio consuerat, praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum legionibus quam potest maxime appropinquat.

18 Hostes in insidiis dispositi, cum sibi delegissent campum ad rem gerendam non amplius patentem in omnes partes passibus mille, silvis undique aut impeditissimo flumine munitum, velut indagine hunc insidiis circumdederunt. Explorato hostium consilio nostri ad proeliandum animo atque armis parati, cum subsequentibus legionibus nullam dimicationem recusarent, turmatim in eum locum devenerunt. Quorum adventu cum sibi Correas oblatam occasionem rei gerendae existimaret, primum cum paucis se ostendit atque in proximas turmas impetum fecit. Nostri constanter incursum sustinent

insidiatorum neque plures in unum locum conveniunt; quod plerumque equestribus proeliis cum propter aliquem timorem accidit, tum multitudine ipsorum detrimentum accipitur.

19 Cum dispositis turmis in vicem rari proeliarentur neque ab lateribus circumveniri suos paterentur, erumpunt ceteri Correo proeliante ex silvis. Fit magna contentione diversum proelium. Quod cum diutius pari Marte iniretur, paulatim ex silvis instructa multitudo procedit peditum, quae nostros coegit cedere equites. Quibus celeriter subveniunt levis armaturae pedites, quos ante legiones missos docui, turmisque nostrorum interpositi constanter proeliantur. Pugnatur aliquamdiu pari contentione; deinde, ut ratio postulabat proeli, qui sustinuerant primos impetus insidiarum hoc ipso fiunt superiores, quod nullum ab insidiantibus imprudentes acceperant detrimentum. Accedunt propius interim legiones, crebrique eodem tempore et nostris et hostibus nuntii adferuntur, imperatorem instructis copiis adesse. Qua re cognita praesidio cohortium confisi nostri acerrime proeliantur, ne, si tardius rem gessissent, victoriae gloriam communicasse cum legionibus viderentur; hostes concidunt animis atque itineribus diversis fugam quaerunt. Nequiquam: nam quibus difficultatibus locorum Romanos claudere voluerant, eis ipsi tenebantur. Victi tamen percussique maiore parte amissa consternati profugiunt partim silvis petitis, partim flumine (qui tamen in fuga a nostris acriter insequentibus conficiuntur), cum interim nulla calamitate victus Correas excedere proelio silvasque petere aut invitantibus nostris ad deditionem potuit adduci, quin fortissime proeliando compluresque vulnerando cogeret elatos iracundia victores in se tela conicere.

20 Tali modo re gesta recentibus proeli vestigiis ingressus Caesar, cum victos tanta calamitate existimaret hostes nuntio accepto locum

castrorum relicturos, quae non longius ab ea caede abesse plus minus octo milibus dicebantur, tametsi flumine impeditum transitum videbat, tamen exercitu traducto progreditur. At Bellovaci reliquaeque civitates repente ex fuga paucis atque his vulneratis receptis, qui silvarum beneficio casum evitaverant, omnibus adversis, cognita calamitate, interfecto Correo, amisso equitatu et fortissimis peditibus, cum adventare Romanos existimarent, concilio repente cantu tubarum convocato conclamant, legati obsidesque ad Caesarem mittantur.

21 Hoc omnibus probato consilio Commius Atrebas ad eos confugit Germanos, a quibus ad id bellum auxilia mutuatus erat. Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. Afflictas opes equestri proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios caedis. Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse.

22 Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditione esse perductos. Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent.

23 Nocte insequenti legati responsa ad suos referunt, obsides conficiunt. Concurrunt reliquarum civitatum legati, quae Bellovacorum speculabantur eventum; obsides dant, imperata faciunt excepto Commio, quem timor prohibebat cuiusquam fidei suam committere salutem. Nam superiore anno Titus Labienus, Caesare in Gallia citeriore ius dicente, cum Commium comperisset sollicitare civitates et coniurationem contra Caesarem facere, infidelitatem eius sine ulla perfidia iudicavit comprimi posse. Quem quia non arbitrabatur vocatum in castra venturum, ne temptando cautiorem faceret, Gaium Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum per simulationem colloqui curaret interficiendum. Ad eam rem delectos idoneos ei tradit centuriones. Cum in colloquium ventum esset, et, ut convenerat, manum Commi Volusenus arripuisset, centurio vel insueta re permotus vel celeriter a familiaribus prohibitus Commi conficere hominem non potuit; graviter tamen primo ictu gladio caput percussit. Cum utrimque gladii destricti essent, non tam pugnandi quam diffugiendi fuit utrorumque consilium: nostrorum, quod mortifero vulnere Commium credebant adfectum; Gallorum, quod insidiis cognitis plura quam videbant extimescebant. Quo facto statuisset Commius dicebatur numquam in conspectum cuiusquam Romani venire.

24 Bellicosissimis gentibus devictis Caesar, cum videret nullam iam esse civitatem quae bellum pararet quo sibi resisteret, sed nonnullos ex oppidis demigrare, ex agris diffugere ad praesens imperium evitandum, plures in partes exercitum dimittere constituit. M. Antonium quaestorem cum legione duodecima sibi coniungit. C. Fabium legatum cum cohortibus XXV mittit in diversissimam partem Galliae, quod ibi quasdam civitates in armis esse audiebat neque C. Caninium Rebilum legatum, qui in illis regionibus erat,

satis firmas duas legiones habere existimabat. Titum Labienum ad se evocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis, in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias civium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentino latrocinio atque impetu illorum erant oppressi. Ipse ad vastandos depopulandosque fines Ambiorigis proficiscitur; quem perterritum ac fugientem cum redigi posse in suam potestatem desperasset, proximum suae dignitatis esse ducebat, adeo fines eius vastare civibus, aedificiis, pecore, ut odio suorum Ambiorix, si quos fortuna reliquos fecisset, nullum reditum propter tantas calamitates haberet in civitatem.

25 Cum in omnes partes finium Ambiorigis aut legiones aut auxilia dimisisset atque omnia caedibus, incendiis, rapinis vastasset, magno numero hominum interfecto aut capto Labienum cum duabus legionibus in Treveros mittit, quorum civitas propter Germaniae vicinitatem cotidianis exercitata bellis cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebat neque imperata umquam nisi exercitu coacta faciebat.

26 Interim Gaius Caninius legatus, cum magnam multitudinem convenisse hostium in fines Pictonum litteris nuntiisque Durati cognosceret, qui perpetuo in amicitia manserat Romanorum, cum pars quaedam civitatis eius defecisset, ad oppidum Lemonum contendit. Quo cum adventaret atque ex captivis certius cognosceret multis hominum milibus a Dumnaco, duce Andium, Duratium clausum Lemoni oppugnari neque infirmas legiones hostibus committere auderet, castra posuit loco munito. Dumnacus, cum appropinquare Caninium cognosset, copiis omnibus ad legiones conversis castra Romanorum oppugnare instituit. Cum complures dies in oppugnatione consumpsisset et magno suorum detrimento

nullam partem munitionum convellere potuisset, rursus ad obsidendum Lemonum redit.

27 Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem recipit, obsidibus firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in Pictonibus gerantur. Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus adventu Fabi cognito desperata salute, si tempore eodem coactus esset et Romanum externum sustinere hostem et respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine Ligeri, quod erat ponte propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset. Fabius, etsi nondum in conspectum venerat hostibus neque se Caninio coniunxerat, tamen doctus ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum credidit hostes perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros. Itaque cum copiis ad eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum procedere ante agmen imperat legionum, quantum cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in eadem se reciperet castra. Consecuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum, invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in itinere adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur. Ita re bene gesta se recipiunt in castra.

28 Insequenti nocte Fabius equites praemittit sic paratos ut confligerent atque omne agmen morarentur, dum consequeretur ipse. Cuius praeceptis ut res gereretur, Quintus Atius Varus, praefectus equitum, singularis et animi et prudentiae vir, suos hortatur agmenque hostium consecutus turmas partim idoneis locis disponit, parte equitum proelium committit. Confligit audacius equitatus hostium succedentibus sibi peditibus, qui toto agmine subsistentes equitibus suis contra nostros ferunt auxilium. Fit proelium acri certamine. Namque nostri contemptis pridie superatis hostibus, cum

subsequi legiones meminissent, et pudore cedendi et cupiditate per se conficiendi proeli fortissime contra pedites proeliantur, hostesque nihil amplius copiarum accessurum credentes, ut pridie cognoverant, delendi equitatus nostri nacti occasionem videbantur.

29 Cum aliquamdiu summa contentione dimicaretur, Dumnacus instruit aciem quae suis esset equitibus in vicem praesidio, cum repente confertae legiones in conspectum hostium veniunt. Quibus visis percussae barbarorum turmae ac perterritae acies hostium, perturbato impedimentorum agmine, magno clamore discursuque passim fugae se mandant. At nostri equites, qui paulo ante cum resistantibus fortissime conflixerant, laetitia victoriae elati magno undique clamore sublato cedentibus circumfusi, quantum equorum vires ad persequendum dextraeque ad caedendum valent, tantum eo proelio interficiunt. Itaque amplius milibus XII aut armatorum aut eorum qui eo timore arma proiecerant interfectis omnis multitudo capitur impedimentorum.

30 Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, servis ad libertatem vocatis, exulibus omnium civitatum adscitis, receptis latronibus impedimenta et commeatus Romanorum interceperat, non amplius hominum duobus milibus ex fuga collectis provinciam petere unaque consilium cum eo Lucterium Cadurcum cepisse, quem superiore commentario prima defectione Galliae facere in provinciam voluisse impetum cognitum est, Caninius legatus cum legionibus duabus ad eos persequendos contendit, ne detrimento aut timore provinciae magna infamia perditorum hominum latrociniis caperetur.

31 Gaius Fabius cum reliquo exercitu in Carnutes ceterasque proficiscitur civitates, quarum eo proelio, quod cum Dumnaco

fecerat, copias esse accisas sciebat. Non enim dubitabat quin recenti calamitate summissiores essent futurae, dato vero spatio ac tempore eodem instigante Dumnaco possent concitari. Qua in re summa felicitas celeritasque in recipiendis civitatibus Fabium consequitur. Nam Carnutes, qui saepe vexati numquam pacis fecerant mentionem, datis obsidibus veniunt in deditionem, ceteraeque civitates positae in ultimis Galliae finibus Oceano coniunctae, quae Aremoricae appellantur, auctoritate adductae Carnutum adventu Fabi legionumque imperata sine mora faciunt. Dumnacus suis finibus expulsus errans latitansque solus extremas Galliae regiones petere est coactus.

32 At Drappes unaque Lucterius, cum legiones Caniniumque adesse cognoscerent nec se sine certa pernicie persequente exercitu putarent provinciae fines intrare posse nec iam libere vagandi latrociniorumque faciendorum facultatem haberent, in finibus consistunt Cadurcorum. Ibi cum Lucterius apud suos cives quondam integris rebus multum potuisset, semperque auctor novorum consiliorum magnam apud barbaros auctoritatem haberet, oppidum Uxellodunum, quod in clientela fuerat eius, egregie natura loci munitum, occupat suis et Drappetis copiis oppidanosque sibi coniungit.

33 Quo cum confestim Gaius Caninius venisset animadverteretque omnes oppidi partes praeuptissimis saxis esse munitas, quo defendente nullo tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile, magna autem impedimenta oppidanorum videret, quae si clandestina fuga subtrahere conarentur, effugere non modo equitatum, sed ne legiones quidem possent, tripertito cohortibus divisus trina excelsissimo loco castra fecit; a quibus paulatim, quantum copiae patiebantur, vallum in oppidi circuitum ducere instituit.

34 Quod cum animadverterent oppidani miserrimaeque Alesiae memoria solliciti similem casum obsessionis vererentur, maximeque ex omnibus Lucterius, qui fortunae illius periculum fecerat, moneret frumenti rationem esse habendam, constituunt omnium consensu parte ibi relictâ copiarum ipsi cum expeditis ad importandum frumentum proficisci. Eo consilio probato proxima nocte duobus milibus armatorum relictis reliquos ex oppido Drappes et Lucterius educunt. Hi paucos dies morati ex finibus Cadurcorum, qui partim re frumentaria sublevare eos cupiebant, partim prohibere quo minus sumerent non poterant, magnum numerum frumenti comparant, nonnumquam autem expeditionibus nocturnis castella nostrorum adoriuntur. Quam ob causam Gaius Caninius toto oppido munitiones circumdare moratur, ne aut opus effectum tueri non possit aut plurimis in locis infirma disponat praesidia.

35 Magna copia frumenti comparata considunt Drappes et Lucterius non longius ab oppido X milibus, unde paulatim frumentum in oppidum supportarent. Ipsi inter se provincias partiuntur: Drappes castris praesidio cum parte copiarum restitit; Lucterius agmen iumentorum ad oppidum ducit. Dispositis ibi praesidiis hora noctis circiter decima silvestribus angustisque itineribus frumentum importare in oppidum instituit. Quorum strepitum vigiles castrorum cum sensissent, exploratoresque missi quae gererentur renuntiassent, Caninius celeriter cum cohortibus armatis ex proximis castellis in frumentarios sub ipsam lucem impetum fecit. Ei repentino malo perterriti diffugiunt ad sua praesidia; quae nostri ut viderunt, acrius contra armatos incitati neminem ex eo numero vivum capi patiuntur. Profugit inde cum paucis Lucterius nec se recipit in castra.

36 Re bene gesta Caninius ex captivis comperit partem copiarum

cum Drappete esse in castris a milibus longe non amplius XII. Qua re ex compluribus cognita, cum intellexeret fugato duce altero perterritos reliquos facile opprimi posse, magnae felicitatis esse arbitrabatur neminem ex caede refugisse in castra qui de accepta calamitate nuntium Drappeti perferret. Sed in experiendo cum periculum nullum videret, equitatum omnem Germanosque pedites, summae velocitatis homines, ad castra hostium praemittit; ipse legionem unam in trina castra distribuit, alteram secum expeditam ducit. Cum propius hostes accessisset, ab exploratoribus quos praemiserat cognoscit castra eorum, ut barbarorum fere consuetudo est, relictis locis superioribus ad ripas fluminis esse demissa; at Germanos equitesque imprudentibus omnibus de improvise advolasse proeliumque commisisse. Qua re cognita legionem armatam instructamque adducit. Ita repente omnibus ex partibus signo dato loca superiora capiuntur. Quod ubi accidit, Germani equitesque signis legionis visis vehementissime proeliantur. Confestim cohortes undique impetum faciunt omnibusque aut interfectis aut captis magna praeda potiuntur. Capitur ipse eo proelio Drappes.

³⁷ Caninius felicissime re gesta sine ullo paene militis vulnere ad obsidendos oppidanos revertitur externoque hoste deleta, cuius timore antea dividere praesidia et munitione oppidanos circumdare prohibitus erat, opera undique imperat administrari. Venit eodem cum suis copiis postero die Gaius Fabius partemque oppidi sumit ad obsidendum.

³⁸ Caesar interim M. Antonium quaestorem cum cohortibus XV in Bellovacis relinquit, ne qua rursus novorum consiliorum capiendorum Belgis facultas daretur. Ipse reliquas civitates adit, obsides plures imperat, timentes omnium animos consolatione sanat.

Cum in Carnutes venisset, quorum in civitate superiore commentario Caesar exposuit initium belli esse ortum, quod praecipue eos propter conscientiam facti timere animadvertibat, quo celerius civitatem timore liberaret, principem sceleris illius et concitorem belli, Gutruatum, ad supplicium depoposcit. Qui etsi ne civibus quidem suis se committebat, tamen celeriter omnium cura quaesitus in castra perducitur. Cogitur in eius supplicium Caesar contra suam naturam concursu maximo militum, qui ei omnia pericula et detrimenta belli accepta referebant, adeo ut verberibus exanimatum corpus securi feriretur.

39 Ibi crebris litteris Canini fit certior quae de Drappete et Lucterio gesta essent, quoque in consilio permanerent oppidani. Quorum etsi paucitatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficiendam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad resistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in libertatem, cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aetatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur. Itaque Q. Calenum legatum cum legionibus reliquit qui iustis itineribus subsequeretur; ipse cum omni equitatu quam potest celerrime ad Caninium contendit.

40 Cum contra expectationem omnium Caesar Uxellodunum venisset oppidumque operibus clausum animadverteret neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla condicione posse, magna autem copia frumenti abundare oppidanos ex perfugis cognosset, aqua prohibere hostem temptare coepit. Flumen infimam vallem dividebat, quae totum paene montem cingebat, in quo positum erat praeruptum undique oppidum Uxellodunum. Hoc avertere loci natura prohibebat: in infimis enim sic radicibus montis ferebatur, ut nullam in partem

depressis fossis derivari posset. Erat autem oppidanis difficilis et praeruptus eo descensus, ut prohibentibus nostris sine vulneribus ac periculo vitae neque adire flumen neque arduo se recipere possent ascensu. Qua difficultate eorum cognita Caesar sagittariis funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra facillimos descensus collocatis aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos.

41 Quorum omnis postea multitudo aquatorum unum in locum conveniebat sub ipsius oppidi murum, ubi magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat. Hoc fonte prohiberi posse oppidanos cum optarent reliqui, Caesar unus videret, e regione eius vineas agere adversus montem et aggerem instruere coepit magno cum labore et continua dimicatione. Oppidani enim loco superiore decurrunt et eminus sine periculo proeliantur multosque pertinaciter succedentes vulnerant; non deterrentur tamen milites nostri vineas proferre et labore atque operibus locorum vincere difficultates. Eodem tempore cuniculos tectos ab vineis agunt ad caput fontis; quod genus operis sine ullo periculo, sine suspicione hostium facere licebat. Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris decem tabulatorum, non quidem quae moenibus aequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae superare fontis fastigium posset. Ex ea cum tela tormentis iacerentur ad fontis aditum, nec sine periculo possent aquari oppidani, non tantum pecora atque iumenta, sed etiam magna hostium multitudo siti consumebatur.

42 Quo malo perterriti oppidani cupas sebo, pice, scandulis complent; eas ardentes in opera provolvunt eodemque tempore acerrime proeliantur, ut ab incendio restinguendo dimicationis periculo deterreant Romanos. Magna repente in ipsis operibus flamma exstitit. Quaecumque enim per locum praecipitem missa

erant, ea vineis et aggere suppressa comprehendebant id ipsum quod morabatur. Milites contra nostri, quamquam periculoso genere proeli locoque iniquo premebantur, tamen omnia fortissimo sustinebant animo. Res enim gerebatur et excelso loco et in conspectu exercitus nostri, magnusque utrimque clamor oriebatur. Ita quam quisque poterat maxime insignis, quo notior testatiorque virtus esset eius, telis hostium flammaeque se offerebat.

43 Caesar cum complures suos vulnerari videret, ex omnibus oppidi partibus cohortes montem ascendere et simulatione moenium occupandorum clamorem undique iubet tollere. Quo facto perterriti oppidani, cum quid ageretur in locis reliquis essent suspensi, revocant ab impugnandis operibus armatos murisque disponunt. Ita nostri fine proeli facto celeriter opera flamma comprehensa partim restinguunt, partim interscindunt. Cum pertinaciter resisterent oppidani, magna etiam parte amissa siti suorum in sententia permanerent, ad postremum cuniculis venae fontis intercisae sunt atque aversae. Quo facto repente perennis exaruit fons tantamque attulit oppidanis salutis desperationem, ut id non hominum consilio, sed deorum voluntate factum putarent. Itaque se necessitate coacti tradiderunt.

44 Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur ne quid crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse, neque exitum consiliorum suorum animadverteret, si tali ratione diversis in locis plures consilia inissent, exemplo supplici deterrendos reliquos existimavit. Itaque omnibus qui arma tulerant manus praecidit vitamque concessit, quo testatior esset poena improborum. Drappes, quem captum esse a Caninio docui, sive indignitate et dolore vinculorum sive timore gravioris supplici paucis diebus cibo se abstinuit atque ita interiit. Eodem tempore Lacterius, quem

profugisse ex proelio scripsi, cum in potestatem venisset Epasnacti Arverni (crebro enim mutandis locis multorum fidei se committebat, quod nusquam diutius sine periculo commoraturus videbatur, cum sibi conscius esset, quam inimicum deberet Caesarem habere), hunc Epasnactus Arvernus, amicissimus populi Romani, sine dubitatione ulla vinctum ad Caesarem deduxit.

45 Labienus interim in Treveris equestre proelium facit secundum compluribusque Treveris interfectis et Germanis, qui nullis adversus Romanos auxilia denegabant, principes eorum vivos redigit in suam potestatem atque in his Surum Aeduum, qui et virtutis et generis summam nobilitatem habebat solusque ex Aeduis ad id tempus permanserat in armis.

46 Ea re cognita Caesar, cum in omnibus partibus Galliae bene res geri videret iudicaretque superioribus aestivis Galliam devictam subactamque esse, Aquitaniam numquam adisset, per Publium Crassum quadam ex parte devicisset, cum duabus legionibus in eam partem Galliae est profectus, ut ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum. Quam rem sicuti cetera celeriter feliciterque confecit. Namque omnes Aquitaniae civitates legatos ad Caesarem miserunt obsidesque ei dederunt. Quibus rebus gestis ipse equitum praesidio Narbonem profecto est, exercitum per legatos in hiberna deduxit: quattuor legiones in Belgio collocavit cum M. Antonio et C. Trebonio et P. Vatinio legatis, duas legiones in Aeduos deduxit, quorum in omni Gallia summam esse auctoritatem sciebat, duas in Turonis ad fines Carnutum posuit, quae omnem illam regionem coniunctam Oceano continerent, duas reliquas in Lemovicum finibus non longe ab Arvernīs, ne qua pars Galliae vacua ab exercitu esset. Paucos dies ipse in provincia moratus, cum celeriter omnes conventus percucurrisset, publicas controversias cognosset, bene

meritis praemia tribuisset (cognoscendi enim maximam facultatem habebat, quali quisque fuisset animo in totius Galliae defectione, quam sustinuerat fidelitate atque auxiliis provinciae illius), his confectis rebus ad legiones in Belgium se recipit hibernatque Nemetocennae.

⁴⁷ Ibi cognoscit Commium Atrebatem proelio cum equitatu suo contendisse. Nam cum Antonius in hiberna venisset, civitasque Atrebatum in officio esset, Commius, qui post illam vulnerationem, quam supra commemoravi, semper ad omnes motus paratus suis civibus esse consuesset, ne consilia belli quaerentibus auctor armorum duxque deesset, parente Romanis civitate cum suis equitibus latrociniis se suosque alebat infestisque itineribus commeatus complures, qui comportabantur in hiberna Romanorum, intercipiebat.

⁴⁸ Erat attributus Antonio praefectus equitum C. Volusenus Quadratus qui cum eo hibernaret. Hunc Antonius ad persequendum equitatum hostium mittit. Volusenus ad eam virtutem, quae singularis erat in eo, magnum odium Commi adiungebat, quo libentius id faceret quod imperabatur. Itaque dispositis insidiis saepius equites eius adgressus secunda proelia faciebat. Novissime, cum vehementius contenderetur, ac Volusenus ipsius intercipiendi Commi cupiditate pertinacius eum cum paucis insecutus esset, ille autem fuga vehementi Volusenum produxisset longius, inimicus homini suorum invocat fidem atque auxilium, ne sua vulnera per fidem imposita paterentur impunita, conversoque equo se a ceteris incautius permittit in praefectum. Faciunt hoc idem omnes eius equites paucosque nostros convertunt atque insequuntur. Commius incensum calcaribus equum coniungit equo Quadrati lanceaque infesta magnis viribus medium femur traicit Voluseni. Praefecto

vulnerato non dubitant nostri resistere et conversis equis hostem pellere. Quod ubi accidit, complures hostium magno nostrorum impetu perculsi vulnerantur ac partim in fuga proteruntur, partim intercipiuntur; quod ubi malum dux equi velocitate evitavit, ac si proelio secundo graviter ab eo vulneratus praefectus, ut vitae periculum aditurus videretur, refertur in castra. Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus firmat; unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani. Cuius postulationem Antonius cum iudicaret ab iusto nasci timore, veniam petenti dedit, obsides accepit.

Scio Caesarem singulorum annorum singulos commentarios confecisse; quod ego non existimavi mihi esse faciendum, propterea quod insequens annus, L. Paulo C. Marcello consulibus, nullas habet magnopere Galliae res gestas. Ne quis tamen ignoraret, quibus in locis Caesar exercitusque eo tempore fuissent, pauca esse scribenda coniungendaque huic commentario statui.

49 Caesar in Belgio cum hiemaret, unum illud propositum habebat, continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum. Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo susciperet. Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace continuit.

50 Ipse hibernis peractis contra consuetudinem in Italiam quam maximis itineribus est profectus, ut municipia et colonias appellaret,

quibus M. Antoni quaestoris sui, commendaverat sacerdoti petitionem. Contendebat enim gratia cum libenter pro homine sibi coniunctissimo, quem paulo ante praemiseraat ad petitionem, tum acriter contra factionem et potentiam paucorum, qui M. Antoni repulsa Caesaris decedentis gratiam convellere cupiebant. Hunc etsi augurem prius factum quam Italiam attingeret in itinere audierat, tamen non minus iustam sibi causam municipia et colonias adeundi existimavit, ut eis gratias ageret, quod frequentiam atque officium suum Antonio praestitissent, simulque se et honorem suum sequentis anni commendaret, propterea quod insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragiisque valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset.

51 Exceptus est Caesaris adventus ab omnibus municipiis et coloniis incredibili honore atque amore. Tum primum enim veniebat ab illo universae Galliae bello. Nihil relinquebatur quod ad ornatum portarum, itinerum, locorum omnium qua Caesar iturus erat excogitari poterat. Cum liberis omnis multitudo obviam procedebat, hostiae omnibus locis immolabantur, tricliniis stratis fora templaque occupabantur, ut vel exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset. Tanta erat magnificentia apud opulentiores, cupiditas apud humiliores.

52 Cum omnes regiones Galliae togatae Caesar percucurrisset, summa celeritate ad exercitum Nemetocennam rediit legionibusque ex omnibus hibernis ad fines Treverorum evocatis eo profectus est ibique exercitum lustravit. T. Labienum Galliae togatae praefecit, quo maiore commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. Ipse tantum itinerum faciebat, quantum satis esse ad mutationem

locorum propter salubritatem existimabat. Ibi quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab inimicis suis sollicitari certiorque fiebat id agi paucorum consiliis, ut interposita senatus auctoritate aliqua parte exercitus spoliaretur, tamen neque de Labieno credidit quicquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem ut aliquid faceret potuit adduci. Iudicabat enim liberis sentiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri. Nam C. Curio, tribunus plebis, cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris laederet, et quoniam Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrorem foro inferrent, discederet uterque ab armis exercitusque dimitteret: fore eo facto liberam et sui iuris civitatem. Neque hoc tantum pollicitus est, sed etiam per se discessionem facere coepit; quod ne fieret consules amicie Pompei iusserunt atque ita rem morando discusserunt.

53 Magnum hoc testimonium senatus erat universi conveniensque superiori facto. Nam Marcellus proximo anno, cum impugnaret Caesaris dignitatem, contra legem Pompei et Crassi rettulerat ante tempus ad senatum de Caesaris provinciis, sentiisque dictis discessionem faciente Marcello, qui sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat, senatus frequens in alia omnia transiit. Quibus non frangebantur animi inimicorum Caesaris, sed admonebantur quo maiores pararent necessitates, quibus cogi posset senatus id probare, quod ipsi constituissent.

54 Fit deinde senatus consultum, ut ad bellum Parthicum legio una a Cn. Pompeio, altera a C. Caesare mitteretur; neque obscure duae legiones uni detrahuntur. Nam Cn. Pompeius legionem primam, quam ad Caesarem miserat, confectam ex delectu provinciae Caesaris, eam tamquam ex suo numero dedit. Caesar tamen, cum de voluntate minime dubium esset adversariorum suorum, Pompeio

legionem remisit et suo nomine quintam decimam, quam in Gallia citeriore habuerat, ex senatus consulto iubet tradi. In eius locum tertiam decimam legionem in Italiam mittit quae praesidia tueretur, ex quibus praesidiis quinta decima deducebatur. Ipse exercitui distribuit hiberna: C. Trebonium cum legionibus quattuor in Belgio collocat, C. Fabium cum totidem in Aeduos deducit. Sic enim existimabat tutissimam fore Galliam, si Belgae, quorum maxima virtus, Aedui, quorum auctoritas summa esset, exercitibus continerentur. Ipse in Italiam profectus est.

55 Quo cum venisset, cognoscit per C. Marcellum consulem legiones duas ab se remissas, quae ex senatus consulto deberent ad Parthicum bellum duci, Cn. Pompeio traditas atque in Italia retentas esse. Hoc facto quamquam nulli erat dubium, quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belli gerendi. Contendit...

DE BELLO CIVILI

LIBER I

1 Litteris C. Caesaris consulibus redditis aegre ab his impetratum est summa tribunorum plebis contentione, ut in senatu recitarentur; ut vero ex litteris ad senatum referretur, impetrari non potuit. Referunt consules de re publica in civitate. Incitat L. Lentulus consul senatu rei publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum: habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, senatum imploraturum.

2 Haec Scipionis oratio, quod senatus in urbe habebatur Pompeiusque aberat, ex ipsius ore Pompei mitti videbatur. Dixerat aliquis leniorem sententiam, ut primo M. Marcellus, ingressus in eam orationem, non oportere ante de ea re ad senatum referri, quam dilectus tota Italia habiti et exercitus conscripti essent, quo praesidio tuto et libere senatus, quae vellet, decernere auderet; ut M. Calidius, qui censebat, ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficisceretur, ne qua esset armorum causa: timere Caesarem ereptis ab eo duabus legionibus, ne ad eius periculum reservare et retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur; ut M. Rufus, qui sententiam Calidii paucis fere mutatis rebus sequebatur. Hi omnes convicio L. Lentuli consulis correpti exagitabantur. Lentulus sententiam Calidii pronuntiaturum se omnina negavit. Marcellus perterritus conviciis a sua sententia discessit. Sic vocibus consulis, terrore praesentis exercitus, minis amicorum Pompei plerique compulsi inviti et coacti Scipionis

sententiam sequuntur: uti ante certam diem Caesar exercitum dimittat; si non faciat, eum adversus rem publicam facturum videri. Intercedit M. Antonius, Q. Cassius, tribuni plebis. Refertur confestim de intercessione tribunorum. Dicuntur sententiae graves; ut quisque acerbissime crudelissimeque dixit, ita quam maxime ab inimicis Caesaris collaudatur.

3 Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes, qui sunt eius ordinis, a Pompeio evocantur. Laudat promptos Pompeius atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque incitat. Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, multi ex duabus legionibus, quae sunt traditae a Caesare, arcessuntur. Completur urbs et ipsum comitium tribunis, centurionibus, evocatis. Omnes amici consulum, necessarii Pompei atque eorum, qui veteres inimicitias cum Caesare gerebant, in senatum coguntur; quorum vocibus et concursu terrentur infirmiores, dubii confirmantur, plerisque vero libere decernendi potestas eripitur. Pollicetur L. Piso censor sese iturum ad Caesarem, item L. Roscius praetor, qui de his rebus eum doceant: sex dies ad eam rem conficiendam spatii postulant. Dicuntur etiam ab nonnullis sententiae, ut legati ad Caesarem mittantur, qui voluntatem senatus ei proponant.

4 Omnibus his resistitur, omnibusque oratio consulis, Scipionis, Catonis opponitur. Catonem veteres inimicitiae Caesaris incitant et dolor repulsae. Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionibus movetur, seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperii redeat. Scipionem eadem spes provinciae atque exercituum impellit, quos se pro necessitudine partitum cum Pompeio arbitratur, simul iudiciorum metus, adulatio atque ostentatio sui et potentium, qui in re

publica iudiciisque tum plurimum pollebant. Ipse Pompeius, ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus, et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat, totum se ab eius amicitia averterat et cum communibus inimicis in gratiam redierat, quorum ipse maximam partem illo affinitatis tempore iniunxerat Caesari; simul infamia duarum legionum permotus, quas ab itinere Asiae Syriaeque ad suam potentiam dominatumque converterat, rem ad arma deduci studebat.

5 His de causis aguntur omnia raptim atque turbate. Nec docendi Caesaris propinquis eius spatium datur, nec tribunis plebis sui periculi deprecandi neque etiam extremi iuris intercessione retinendi, quod L. Sulla reliquerat, facultas tribuitur, sed de sua salute septimo die cogitare coguntur, quod illi turbulentissimi superioribus temporibus tribuni plebis octavo denique mense suarum actionum respicere ac timere consueverant. Decurritur ad illud extremum atque ultimum senatus consultum, quo nisi paene in ipso urbis incendio atque in desperatione omnium salutis sceleratorum audacia numquam ante descensum est: dent operam consules, praetores, tribuni plebis, quique pro consulibus sint ad urbem, ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat. Haec senatusconsulto perscribuntur a.d. VII Id. Ian. Itaque V primis diebus, quibus haberi senatus potuit, qua ex die consulatum iniit Lentulus, biduo excepto comitali et de imperio Caesaris et de amplissimis viris, tribunis plebis, gravissime acerbissimeque decernitur. Profugiunt statim ex urbe tribuni plebis seseque ad Caesarem conferunt. Is eo tempore erat Ravennae exspectabatque suis lenissimis postulatis responsa, si qua hominum aequitate res ad otium deduci posset.

6 Proximis diebus habetur extra urbem senatus. Pompeius eadem illa, quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit; senatus virtutem constantiamque collaudat; copias suas exponit; legiones habere sese

paratas X; praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in Caesarem milites neque eis posse persuaderi, uti eum defendant aut sequantur. Statim de reliquis rebus ad senatum refertur: tota Italia delectus habeatur; Faustus Sulla propere in Mauretanium mittatur; pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur. Refertur etiam de rege Iuba, ut socius sit atque amicus; Marcellus vero passurum se in praesentia negat. De Fausto impedit Philippus, tribunus plebis. De reliquis rebus senatusconsulta perscribuntur. Provinciae privatis decernuntur duae consulares, reliquae praetoriae. Scipioni obvenit Syria, L. Domitio Gallia; Philippus et Cotta privato consilio praetereuntur, neque eorum sortes deiciuntur. In reliquas provincias praetores mittuntur. Neque exspectant, quod superioribus annis acciderat, ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur paludatique votis nuncupatis exeant. Consules, quod ante id tempus accidit nunquam, ex urbe proficiscuntur, lictoresque habent in urbe et Capitolio privati contra omnia vetustatis exempla. Tota Italia delectus habentur, arma imperantur; pecuniae a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tolluntur: omnia divina humanaque iura permiscetur.

7 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur, quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta. Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen intercessionem liberam reliquisse. Pompeium, qui amissa restituisset videatur, dona etiam, quae ante habuerint, ademisse. Quotiescumque sit decretum, darent operam magistratus, ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet (qua voce et quo

senatus consulto populus Romanus ad arma sit vocatus), factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia, in secessione populi templis locisque editoribus occupatis: atque haec superioris aetatis exempla expiata Saturnini atque Gracchorum casibus docet; quarum rerum illo tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem. nulla lex promulgata, non cum populo agi coeptum, nulla secessio facta. Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. Conclamant legionis XIII, quae aderat, milites — hanc enim initio tumultus evocaverat, reliquae nondum convenerant — sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere.

8 Cognita militum voluntate Ariminum cum ea legione proficiscitur ibique tribunos plebis, qui ad eum profugerant, convenit; reliquas legiones ex hibernis evocat et subsequi iubet. Eo L. Caesar adulescens venit, cuius pater Caesaris erat legatus. Is reliquo sermone confecto, cuius rei causa venerat, habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea, quae rei publicae causa egerit, in suam contumeliam vertat. Semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis, ut, cum illis nocere se speret, rei publicae noceat. Pauca eiusdem generis addit cum excusatione Pompei coniuncta. Eadem fere atque eisdem verbis praetor Roscius agit cum Caesare sibi Pompeium commemorasse demonstrat.

9 Quae res etsi nihil ad levandas iniurias pertinere videbantur, tamen idoneos nactus homines, per quos ea, quae vellet, ad eum

preferrentur, petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua quoque ad eum postulata deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint. Sibi semper primam rei publicae fuisse dignitatem vitaeque potioem. Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset. Tamen hanc iacturam honoris sui rei publicae causa aequo animo tulisse; cum litteras ad senatum miserit, ut omnes ab exercitibus discederent, ne id quidem impetravisse. Tota Italia delectus haberi, retineri legiones II, quae ab se simulatione Parthici belli sint abductae, civitatem esse in armis. Quoniam haec omnia nisi ad suam perniciem pertinere? Sed tamen ad omnia se descendere paratum atque omnia pati rei publicae causa. Proficiscatur Pompeius in suas provincias, ipsi exercitus dimittant, discedant in Italia omnes ab armis, metus e civitate tollatur, libera comitia atque omnis res publica senatui populoque Romano permittatur. Haec quo facilius certisque condicionibus fiant et iureiurando sanciantur, aut ipse propius accedat aut se patiatur accedere: fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur.

10 Acceptis mandatis Roscius cum L. Caesare Capuam pervenit ibique consules Pompeiumque invenit; postulata Caesaris renuntiat. Illi deliberata re respondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt; quorum haec erat summa: Caesar in Galliam reverteretur, Arimino excederet, exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset, Pompeium in Hispanias iturum. Interea, quoad fides esset data Caesarem facturum, quae polliceretur, non intermissuros consules Pompeiumque delectus.

11 Erat iniqua condicio postulare, ut Caesar Arimino excederet

atque in provinciam reverteretur, ipsum et provincias et legiones alienas tenere; exercitum Caesaris velle dimitti, delectus habere; polliceri se in provinciam iturum neque, ante quem diem iturus sit, definire, ut, si peracto consulatu Caesar profectus esset, nulla tamen mendacii religione obstrictus videretur; tempus vero colloquio non dare neque accessurum polliceri magnam pacis desperationem afferebat. Itaque ab Arimino M. Antonium cum cohortibus V Arretium mittit; ipse Arimini cum duabus subsistit ibique delectum habere instituit; Pisaurum, Fanum, Anconam singulis cohortibus occupat.

12 Interea certior factus Iguvium Thermum praetorem cohortibus V tenere, oppidum munire, omniumque esse Iguvinorum optimam erga se voluntatem, Curionem cum tribus cohortibus, quas Pisauri et Arimini habebat, mittit. Cuius adventu cognito diffusus municipii voluntati Thermus cohortes ex urbe reducit et profugit. Milites in itinere ab eo discedunt ac domum revertuntur. Curio summa omnium voluntate Iguvium recepit. Quibus rebus cognitis confisus municipiorum voluntatibus Caesar cohortes legionis XIII ex praesidiis deducit Auximumque proficiscitur; quod oppidum Attius cohortibus introductis tenebat delectumque toto Piceno circummissis senatoribus habebat.

13 Adventu Caesaris cognito decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt; docent sui iudicii rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui. Quorum oratione permotus Varus praesidium, quod introduxerat, ex oppido educit ac profugit. Hunc ex primo ordine pauci Caesaris consecuti milites consistere coegerunt. Commisso proelio deseritur a

suis Varus; nonnulla pars militum domum discedit; reliqui ad Caesarem perveniunt, atque una cum eis deprensus L. Pupius, primi pili centurio, adducitur, qui hunc eundem ordinem in exercitu Cn. Pompei antea duxerat. At Caesar milites Attianos collaudat, Pupium dimittit, Auximatibus agit gratias seque eorum facti memorem fore pollicetur.

14 Quibus rebus Romam nuntiatis tantus repente terror invasit, ut cum Lentulus consul ad aperiendum aerarium venisset ad pecuniamque Pompeio ex senatusconsulto proferendam, protinus aperto sanctiore aerario ex urbe profugeret. Caesar enim adventare iam iamque et adesse eius equites falso nuntiabantur. Hunc Marcellus collega et plerique magistratus consecuti sunt. Cn. Pompeius pridie eius diei ex urbe profectus iter ad legiones habebat, quas a Caesare acceptas in Apulia hibernorum causa disposuerat. Delectus circa urbem intermittuntur; nihil citra Capuam tutum esse omnibus videtur. Capuae primum se confirmant et colligunt delectumque colonorum, qui lege Iulia Capuam deducti erant, habere instituunt; gladiatoresque, quos ibi Caesar in ludo habebat, ad forum productos Lentulus spe libertatis confirmat atque iis equos attribuit et se sequi iussit; quos postea monitus ab suis, quod ea res omnium iudicio reprehendebatur, circum familias conventus Campani custodiae causa distribuit.

15 Auximo Caesar progressus omnem agrum Picenum percurrit. Cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant. Etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat, ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur. Milites imperat: mittunt. Interea legio XII Caesarem consequitur. Cum his duabus Asculum Picenum proficiscitur. Id

oppidum Lentulus Spinther X cohortibus tenebat; qui Caesaris adventu cognito profugit ex oppido cohortesque secum abducere conatus magna parte militum deseritur. Relictus in itinere cum paucis incidit in Vibullium Rufum missum a Pompeio in agrum Picenum confirmandorum hominum causa. A quo factus Vibullius certior, quae res in Piceno gererentur, milites ab eo accipit, ipsum dimittit. Item ex finitimis regionibus quas potest contrahit cohortes ex delectibus Pompeianis; in his Camerino fugientem Lucilium Hirrum cum sex cohortibus, quas ibi in praesidio habuerat, excipit; quibus coactis XII efficit. Cum his ad Domitium Ahenobarbum Corfinium magnis itineribus pervenit Caesaremque adesse cum legionibus duabus nuntiat. Domitius per se circiter XX cohortes Alba, ex Marsis et Paelignis, finitimis ab regionibus coegerat.

16 Recepto Firmo expulsoque Lentulo Caesar conquiri milites, qui ab eo discesserant, delectumque institui iubet; ipse unum diem ibi rei frumentariae causa moratus Corfinium contendit. Eo cum venisset, cohortes V praemissae a Domitio ex oppido pontem fluminis interrompebant, qui erat ab oppido milia passuum circiter III. Ibi cum antecursoribus Caesaris proelio commisso celeriter Domitiani a ponte repulsi se in oppidum receperunt. Caesar legionibus transductis ad oppidum constitit iuxtaque murum castra posuit.

17 Re cognita Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito praemio cum litteris mittit, qui petant atque orent, ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi posse frumentoque prohiberi. Quod nisi fecerit, se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum. Interim suos cohortatus tormenta in muris disponit certasque cuique partes ad custodiam urbis attribuit; militibus in

contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, quaterna in singulos iugera, et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque.

18 Interim Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses, quod oppidum a Corfinio VII milium intervallo abest, cupere ea facere, quae vellet, sed a Q. Lucretio senatore et Attio Peligno prohiberi, qui id oppidum VII cohortium praesidio tenebant. Mittit eo M. Antonium cum legionis XIII cohortibus V. Sulmonenses simul atque signa nostra viderunt, portas aperuerunt universique, et oppidani et milites, obviam gratulantes Antonio exierunt. Lucretius et Attius de muro se deiecerunt. Attius ad Antonium deductus petit ut ad Caesarem mitteretur. Antonius cum cohortibus et Attio eodem die, quo profectus erat, revertitur. Caesar eas cohortes cum exercitu suo coniunxit Attiumque incolumem dimisit. Caesar primis diebus castra magnis operibus munire et ex finitimis municipiis frumentum comportare reliquasque copias exspectare instituit. Eo triduo legio VIII ad eum venit cohortesque ex novis Galliae dilectibus XXII equitesque ab rege Norico circiter CCC. Quorum adventu altera castra ad alteram oppidi partem ponit; his castris Curionem praefecit. Reliquis diebus oppidum vallo castellisque circummunire instituit. Cuius operis maxima parte effecta eodem fere tempore missi a Pompeio revertuntur.

19 Litteris perlectis Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum hortaturque eos, ne animo deficiant quaeque usui ad defendendum oppidum sint parent. Ipse arcano cum paucis familiaribus suis colloquitur consiliumque fugae capere constituit. Cum vultus Domiti cum oratione non consentiret, atque omnia trepidantius timidiusque ageret, quam superioribus diebus consuesset, multumque cum suis consiliandi causa secreto praeter consuetudinem colloqueretur, concilia conventusque

hominum fugeret, res diutius tegi dissimularique non potuit. Pompeius enim rescripserat: sese rem in summum periculum deducturum non esse, neque suo consilio aut voluntate Domitium se in oppidum Corfinium contulisse; proinde, si qua fuisset facultas, ad se cum omnibus copiis veniret. Id ne fieri posset, obsidione atque oppidi circummunitione fiebat.

20 Divulgato Domiti consilio milites, qui erant Corfinii, prima vesperi secessionem faciunt atque ita inter se per tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui generis colloquuntur: obsideri se a Caesare, opera munitionesque prope esse perfectas; ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium capere: debere se suae salutis rationem habere. Ab his primo Marsi dissentire incipiunt eamque oppidi partem, quae munitissima videretur, occupant, tantaque inter eos dissensio exsistit, ut manum conserere atque armis dimicare conentur; post paulo tamen internuntiis ultro citroque missis quae ignorabant, de L. Domiti fuga, cognoscunt. Itaque omnes uno consilio Domitium productum in publicum circumstant et custodiunt legatosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas aperire, quaeque imperaverit facere et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestati tradere.

21 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, etsi magni interesse arbitrabatur quam primum oppido potiri cohortesque ad se in castra traducere, ne qua aut largitionibus aut animi confirmatione aut falsis nuntiis commutatio fieret voluntatis, quod saepe in bello parvis momentis magni casus intercederent, tamen veritus, ne militum introitu et nocturni temporis licentia oppidum diriperetur, eos, qui venerant, collaudat atque in oppidum dimittit, portas murosque adservari iubet. Ipse eis operibus, quae facere instituerat, milites disponit non certis

spatiis intermissis, ut erat superiorum dierum consuetudo, sed perpetuis vigiliis stationibusque, ut contingant inter se atque omnem munitionem expleant; tribunos militum et praefectos circummittit atque hortatur, non solum ab eruptionibus caveant, sed etiam singulorum hominum occultos exitus adservent. Neque vero tam remisso ac languido animo quisquam omnium fuit, qui ea nocte conquieverit. Tanta erat summae rerum expectatio, ut alius in aliam partem mente atque animo traheretur, quid ipsis Corfiniensibus, quid Domitio, quid Lentulo, quid reliquis accideret, qui quosque eventus exciperent.

22 Quarta vigilia circiter Lentulus Spinther de muro cum vigiliis custodibusque nostris colloquitur; velle, si sibi fiat potestas, Caesarem convenire. Facta potestate ex oppido mittitur, neque ab eo prius Domitiani milites discedunt, quam in conspectum Caesaris deducatur. Cum eo de salute sua agit, orat atque obsecrat, ut sibi parcat, veteremque amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se beneficia exponit; quae erant maxima: quod per eum in collegium pontificum venerat, quod provinciam Hispaniam ex praetura habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus erat sublevatus. Cuius orationem Caesar interpellat: se non maleficii causa ex provincia egressum, sed uti se a contumeliis inimicorum defenderet, ut tribunos plebis in ea re ex civitate expulsos in suam dignitatem restitueret, ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret. Cuius oratione confirmatus Lentulus, ut in oppidum reverti liceat, petit: quod de sua salute impetraverit, fore etiam reliquis ad suam spem solatio; adeo esse perterritos nonnullos, ut suae vitae durius consulere cogantur. Facta potestate discedit.

23 Caesar, ubi luxit, omnes senatores senatorumque liberos, tribunos militum equitesque Romanos ad se produci iubet. Erant

quinquaginta; ordinis senatorii L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Caecilius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus quaestor, L. Rubrius; praeterea filius Domiti alique complures adulescentes et magnus numerus equitum Romanorum et decurionum, quos ex municipiis Domitius evocaverat. Hos omnes productos a contumeliis militum conviciisque prohibet; pauca apud eos loquitur, queritur quod sibi a parte eorum gratia relata non sit pro suis in eos maximis beneficiis; dimittit omnes incolumes. HS [LX], quod advexerat Domitius atque in publico deposuerat, allatum ad se ab IIII viris Corfiniensibus Domitio reddit, ne continentior in vita hominum quam in pecunia fuisse videatur, etsi eam pecuniam publicam esse constabat datamque a Pompeio in stipendium. Milites Domitianos sacramentum apud se dicere iubet atque eo die castra movet iustumque iter conficit VII omnino dies ad Corfinium commoratus, et per fines Marrucinatorum, Frentanorum, Larinatum in Apuliam pervenit.

24 Pompeius his rebus cognitis, quae erant ad Corfinium gestae, Luceria proficiscitur Canusium atque inde Brundisium. Copias undique omnes ex novis dilectibus ad se cogi iubet; servos, pastores armat atque eis equos attribuit; ex his circiter CCC equites conficit. L. Manlius praetor Alba cum cohortibus sex profugit, Rutilius Lupus praetor Tarracina cum tribus; quae procul equitatum Caesaris conspicatae, cui praeerat Vibius Curius, relicto praetore signa ad Curium transferunt atque ad eum transeunt. Item reliquis itineribus nonnullae cohortes in agmen Caesaris, aliae in equites incidunt. Reducitur ad eum depensus ex itinere N. Magius Cremona, praefectus fabrum Cn. Pompei. Quem Caesar ad eum remittit cum mandatis: quoniam ad id tempus facultas colloquendi non fuerit, atque ipse Brundisium sit venturus, interesse rei publicae et communis salutis se cum Pompeio colloqui; neque vero idem profici

longo itineris spatio, cum per alios condiciones ferantur, ac si coram de omnibus condicionibus disceptetur.

25 His datis mandatis Brundisium cum legionibus VI pervenit, veteranis III et reliquis, quas ex novo dilectu confecerat atque in itinere compleverat; Domitianas enim cohortes protinus a Corfinio in Siciliam miserat. Reperit consules Dyrrachium profectos cum magna parte exercitus, Pompeium remanere Brundisii cum cohortibus viginti; neque certum inveniri poterat, obtinendine Brundisii causa ibi remansisset, quo facilius omne Hadriaticum mare ex ultimis Italiae partibus regionibusque Graeciae in potestate haberet atque ex utraque parte bellum administrare posset, an inopia navium ibi restitisset, veritusque ne ille Italiam dimittendam non existimaret, exitus administrationesque Brundisini portus impedire instituit. Quorum operum haec erat ratio. Qua fauces erant angustissimae portus, moles atque aggerem ab utraque parte litoris iaciebat, quod his locis erat vadosum mare. Longius progressus, cum agger altiore aqua contineri non posset, rates duplices quoquo versus pedum XXX e regione molis collocabat. Has quaternis ancoris ex IIII angulis destinabat, ne fluctibus moverentur. His perfectis collocatisque alias deinceps pari magnitudine rates iungebat. Has terra atque aggere integebat, ne aditus atque incursus ad defendendum impediretur. A fronte atque ab utroque latere cratibus ac pluteis protegebat; in quarta quaque earum turres binorum tabulatorum excitabat, quo commodius ab impetu navium incendiisque defenderet.

26 Contra haec Pompeius naves magnas onerarias, quas in portu Brundisino deprehenderat, adornabat. Ibi turres cum ternis tabulatis erigebat easque multis tormentis et omni genere telorum completas ad opera Caesaris adpellebat, ut rates perrumperet atque opera disturbaret. Sic cotidie utrimque eminus fundis, sagittis reliquisque

telis pugnabatur. Atque haec Caesar ita administrabat, ut condiciones pacis dimittendas non existimaret; ac tametsi magnopere admirabatur Magium, quem ad Pompeium cum mandatis miserat, ad se non remitti, atque ea res saepe temptata etsi impetus eius consiliaque tardabat, tamen omnibus rebus in eo perseverandum putabat. Itaque Caninium Rebilum legatum, familiarem necessariumque Scriboni Libonis, mittit ad eum colloquii causa; mandat, ut Libonem de concilianda pace hortetur; imprimis, ut ipse cum Pompeio colloqueretur, postulat; magnopere sese confidere demonstrat, si eius rei sit potestas facta, fore, ut aequis condicionibus ab armis discedatur. Cuius rei magnam partem laudis atque existimationis ad Libonem perventuram, si illo auctore atque agente ab armis sit discessum. Libo a colloquio Canini digressus ad Pompeium proficiscitur. Paulo post renuntiat, quod consules absint, sine illis non posse agi de compositione. Ita saepius rem frustra temptatam Caesar aliquando dimittendam sibi iudicat et de bello agendum.

27 Prope dimidia parte operis a Caesare effecta diebusque in ea re consumptis VIII naves a consulibus Dyrrachio remissae, quae priorem partem exercitus eo deportaverant, Brundisium revertuntur. Pompeius sive operibus Caesaris permotus sive etiam quod ab initio Italia excedere constituerat, adventu navium profectionem parare incipit et, quo facilius impetum Caesaris tardaret, ne sub ipsa profectione milites oppidum irrumperent, portas obstruit, vicos plateasque inaedificat, fossas transversas viis praeducit atque ibi sudes stipitesque praeacutos defigit. Haec levibus cratibus terraque inaequat; aditus autem atque itinera duo, quae extra murum ad portum ferebant, maximis defixis trabibus atque eis praeacutis praesepit. His paratis rebus milites silentio naves conscendere iubet, expeditos autem ex evocatis, sagittariis funditoribusque raros in

muro turribusque disponit. Hos certo signo revocare constituit, cum omnes milites naves conscendissent, atque eis expedito loco actuaria navigia relinquit.

28 Brundisini Pompeianorum militum iniuriis atque ipsius Pompei contumeliis permoti Caesaris rebus favebant. Itaque cognita Pompei profectione concursantibus illis atque in ea re occupatis vulgo ex tectis significabant. Per quos re cognita Caesar scalas parari militesque armari iubet, ne quam rei gerendae facultatem dimittat. Pompeius sub noctem naves solvit. Qui erant in muro custodiae causa collocati, eo signo, quod convenerat, revocantur notisque itineribus ad naves decurrunt. Milites positis scalis muros ascendunt, sed moniti a Brundisinis, ut vallum caecum fossasque caveant, subsistunt et longo itinere ab his circumducti ad portum perveniunt duasque naves cum militibus, quae ad moles Caesaris adhaeserant, scaphis lintribusque reprehendunt, reprehensas excipiunt.

29 Caesar etsi ad spem conficiendi negotii maxime probabat coactis navibus mare transire et Pompeium sequi, priusquam ille sese transmarinis auxiliis confirmaret, tamen eius rei moram temporisque longinquitatem timebat, quod omnibus coactis navibus Pompeius praesentem facultatem insequendi sui ademerat. Relinquebatur, ut ex longinquiore regionibus Galliae Picenique et a freto naves essent exspectandae. Id propter anni tempus longum atque impeditum videbatur. Interea veterem exercitum, duas Hispanias confirmari, quarum erat altera maximis beneficiis Pompei devincta, auxilia, equitatum parari, Galliam Italiamque temptari se absente nolebat.

30 Itaque in praesentia Pompei sequendi rationem omittit, in Hispaniam proficisci constituit: duumviris municipiorum omnium imperat, ut naves conquirant Brundisiumque deducendas curent. Mittit in Sardiniam cum legione una Valerium legatum, in Siciliam

Curionem pro praetore cum legionibus duabus; eundem, cum Siciliam recepisset, protinus in Africam traducere exercitum iubet. Sardiniam obtinebat M. Cotta, Siciliam M. Cato; Africam sorte Tubero obtinere debebat. Caralitani, simul ad se Valerium mitti audierunt, nondum profecto ex Italia sua sponte Cottam ex oppido eiciunt. Ille perterritus, quod omnem provinciam consentire intellegebat, ex Sardinia in Africam profugit. Cato in Sicilia naves longas veteres reficiebat, novas civitatibus imperabat. Haec magno studio agebat. In Lucanis Brutiisque per legatos suos civium Romanorum delectus habebat, equitum peditumque certum numerum a civitatibus Siciliae exigebat. Quibus rebus paene perfectis adventu Curionis cognito queritur in contione sese proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio, qui omnibus rebus imparatissimis non necessarium bellum suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset. Haec in contione questus ex provincia fugit.

³¹ Nacti vacuas ab imperiis Sardiniam Valerius, Curio Siciliam, cum exercitibus eo perveniunt. Tubero cum in Africam venisset, invenit in provincia cum imperio Attium Varum; qui ad Auximum, ut supra demonstravimus, amissis cohortibus protinus ex fuga in Africam pervenerat atque eam sua sponte vacuam occupaverat delectuque habito duas legiones effecerat, hominum et locorum notitia et usu eius provinciae nactus aditus ad ea conanda, quod paucis ante annis ex praetura eam provinciam obtinuerat. Hic venientem Uticam navibus Tuberone portu atque oppido prohibet neque adfectum valetudine filium exponere in terra patitur, sed sublatis ancoris excedere eo loco cogit.

³² His rebus confectis Caesar, ut reliquum tempus a labore intermitteretur, milites in proxima municipia deducit; ipse ad urbem

proficiscitur. Coacto senatu iniurias inimicorum commemorat. Docet se nullum extraordinarium honorem appetisse, sed exspectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo fuisse contentum, quod omnibus civibus pateret. Latum ab X tribunis plebis contradicentibus inimicis, Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina consuetudine dicendi mora dies extrahente, ut sui ratio absentis haberetur, ipso consule Pompeio ; qui si improbasset, cur ferri passus esset? Si probasset, cur se uti populi beneficio prohibuisset? Patientiam proponit suam, cum de exercitibus dimittendis ultro postulavisset; in quo iacturam dignitatis atque honoris ipse facturus esset. Acerbitatem inimicorum docet, qui, quod ab altero postularent, in se recusarent, atque omnia permisceri mallent, quam imperium exercitusque dimittere. Iniuriam in eripiendis legionibus praedicat, crudelitatem et insolentiam in circumscribendis tribunis plebis; condiciones a se latas, expetita colloquia et denegata commemorat. Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat, ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum administrent. Sin timore defugiant, illis se oneri non futurum et per se rem publicam administraturum. Legatos ad Pompeium de compositione mitti oportere, neque se reformidare, quod in senatu Pompeius paulo ante dixisset, ad quos legati mitterentur, his auctoritatem attribui timoremque eorum, qui mitterent significari. Tenuis atque infirmi haec animi videri. Se vero, ut operibus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate velle superare.

33 Probat rem senatus de mittendis legatis: sed, qui mitterentur, non reperiebantur, maximeque timoris causa pro se quisque id munus legationis recusabat. Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco, qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent. Sic triduum disputationibus excusationibusque extrahitur. Subicitur etiam L. Metellus, tribunus

plebis, ab inimicis Caesaris, qui hanc rem distrahat, reliquasque res, quascumque agere instituerit, impediat. Cuius cognito consilio Caesar frustra diebus aliquot consumptis, ne reliquum tempus amittat, infectis eis, quae agere destinaverat, ab urbe proficiscitur atque in ulteriorem Galliam pervenit.

³⁴ Quo cum venisset, cognoscit missum a Pompeio Vibullium Rufum, quem paucis ante diebus Corfinio captum ipse dimiserat; profectum item Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis septem, quas Igilii et in Cosano a privatis coactas servis, libertis, colonis suis compleverat; praemissos etiam legatos Massilienses domum, nobiles adulescentes, quos ab urbe discedens Pompeius erat adhortatus, ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent. Quibus mandatis acceptis Massilienses portas Caesari clausuerant; Albicos, barbaros homines, qui in eorum fide antiquitus erant montesque supra Massiliam incolebant, ad se vocaverant; frumentum ex finitimis regionibus atque ex omnibus castellis in urbem convexerant; armorum officinas in urbe instituerant; muros portas classem reficiebant.

³⁵ Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos; cum his agit, ne initium inferendi belli a Massiliensibus oriatur: debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. Reliqua, quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur, commemorat. Cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec Caesari renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum Romanum in partes duas; neque sui iudicii neque suarum esse virium discernere, utra pars iustiore habeat causam. Principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem patronos civitatis; quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et

Helviorum publice iis concesserit, alter bello victos Sallyas attribuerit vectigaliaque auxerit. Quare paribus eorum beneficiis parem se quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare aut urbe aut portibus recipere.

³⁶ Haec dum inter eos aguntur, Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit atque ab eis receptus urbi praeficitur; summa ei belli administrandi permittitur. Eius imperio classem quoquo versus dimittunt; onerarias naves, quas ubique possunt, deprehendunt atque in portum deducunt, parum clavis aut materia atque armamentis instructis ad reliquas armandas reficiendasque utuntur; frumenti quod inventum est, in publicum conferunt; reliquas merces commeatusque ad obsidionem urbis, si accadat, reservant. Quibus iniuriis permotus Caesar legiones tres Massiliam adducit; turres vineasque ad oppugnationem urbis agere, naves longas Arelate numero XII facere instituit. Quibus effectis armatisque diebus XXX, a qua die materia caesa est, adductisque Massiliam his D. Brutum praeficit, C. Trebonium legatum ad oppugnationem Massiliae relinquit.

³⁷ Dum haec parat atque administrat, C. Fabium legatum cum legionibus III, quas Narbone circumque ea loca hiemandi causa disposuerat, in Hispaniam praemittit celeriterque saltus Pyrenaeos occupari iubet, qui eo tempore ab L. Afranio legato praesidiis tenebantur. Reliquas legiones, quae longius hiemabant, subsequi iubet. Fabius, ut erat imperatum, adhibita celeritate praesidium ex saltu deiecit magnisque itineribus ad exercitum Afrani contendit.

³⁸ Adventu L. Vibulli Rufi, quem a Pompeio missum in Hispaniam demonstratum est, Afranius et Petreius et Varro, legati Pompei, quorum unus Hispaniam citeriorem tribus legionibus, alter ulteriorem a saltu Castulonensi ad Anam duabus legionibus, tertius ab Ana Vettonum agrum Lusitaniamque pari numero legionum optinebat,

officia inter se partiuntur, uti Petreius ex Lusitania per Vettones cum omnibus copiis ad Afranium proficiscatur, Varro cum eis, quas habebat, legionibus omnem ulteriorem Hispaniam tueatur. His rebus constitutis equites auxiliaque toti Lusitaniae a Petreio, Celtiberiae, Cantabris barbarisque omnibus, qui ad Oceanum pertinent, ab Afranio imperantur. Quibus coactis celeriter Petreius per Vettones ad Afranium pervenit, constituuntque communi consilio bellum ad Ilerdam propter ipsius opportunitatem gerere.

39 Erant, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones Afranii tres, Petreii duae, praeterea scutatae citerioris provinciae et caetratae ulterioris Hispaniae cohortes circiter LXXX equitumque utriusque provinciae circiter V milia. Caesar legiones in Hispaniam praemiserat VI, auxilia peditum V milia, equitum III milia, quae omnibus superioribus bellis habuerat, et parem ex Gallia numerum, quam ipse pacaverat, nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo et fortissimo quoque evocato, huc optimi generis hominum ex Aquitanis montanisque, qui Galliam provinciam attingunt addiderat. Audierat Pompeium per Mauretanium cum legionibus iter in Hispaniam facere confestimque esse venturum. Simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit; has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit.

40 Fabius finitimarum civitatum animos litteris nuntiisque temptabat. In Sicori flumine pontes effecerat duos distantes inter se milia passuum IIII. His pontibus pabulatum mittebat, quod ea quae citra flumen fuerant, superioribus diebus consumpserat. Hoc idem fere atque eadem de causa Pompeiani exercitus duces faciebant, crebroque inter se equestribus proeliis contendebant. Huc cum cotidiana consuetudine congressae pabulatoribus praesidio propiore

ponte legiones Fabianae duae flumen transissent, impedimenta et omnis equitatus sequeretur, subito vi ventorum et aquae magnitudine pons est interruptus et reliqua multitudo equitum interclusa. Quo cognito a Petreio et Afranio ex aggere atque cratibus, quae flumine ferebantur, celeriter suo ponte Afranius, quem oppido castrisque coniunctum habebat, legiones IIII equitatumque omnem traiecit duabusque Fabianis occurrit legionibus. Cuius adventu nuntiato L. Plancus, qui legionibus praeerat, necessaria re coactus locum capit superiorem diversamque aciem in duas partes constituit, ne ab equitatu circumveniri posset. Ita congressus impari numero magnos impetus legionum equitatusque sustinet. Commisso ab equitibus proelio signa legionum duarum procul ab utrisque conspiciuntur, quas C. Fabius ulteriore ponte subsidio nostris miserat suspicatus fore id, quod accidit, ut duces adversariorum occasione et beneficio fortunae ad nostros opprimendos uterentur. Quarum adventu proelium dirimitur, ac suas uterque legiones reducit in castra.

41 Eo biduo Caesar cum equitibus DCCCC, quos sibi praesidio reliquerat, in castra pervenit. Pons, qui fuerat tempestate interruptus, paene erat refectus; hunc noctu perfici iussit. Ipse cognita locorum natura ponti castrisque praesidio sex cohortes reliquit atque omnia impedimenta et postero die omnibus copiis triplici instructa acie ad Ilerdam proficiscitur et sub castris Afranii constitit et ibi paulisper sub armis moratus facit aequo loco pugnandi potestatem. Potestate facta Afranius copias educit et in medio colle sub castris constituit. Caesar, ubi cognovit per Afranium stare, quo minus proelio dimicaretur, ab infimis radicibus montis intermissis circiter passibus CCCC castra facere constituit et, ne in opere faciundo milites repentino hostium incursu exterrerentur atque opere prohiberentur, vallo muniri vetuit, quod eminere et procul videri necesse erat, sed a

fronte contra hostem pedum XV fossam fieri iussit. Prima et secunda acies in armis, ut ab initio constituta erat, permanebat; post has opus in occulto a III acie fiebat. Sic omne prius est perfectum, quam intellegeretur ab Afranio castra muniri. Sub vesperum Caesar intra hanc fossam legiones reducit atque ibi sub armis proxima nocte conquiescit.

42 Postero die omnem exercitum intra fossam continet et, quod longius erat agger petendus, in praesentia similem rationem operis instituit singulaque latera castrorum singulis attribuit legionibus munienda fossasque ad eandem magnitudinem perfici iubet; reliquas legiones in armis expeditas contra hostem constituit. Afranius Petreiusque terrendi causa atque operis impediendi copias suas ad infimas montis radices producunt et proelio lacesunt, neque idcirco Caesar opus intermittit confisus praesidio legionum trium et munitione fossae. Illi non diu commorati nec longius ab infimo colle progressi copias in castra reducant. Tertio die Caesar vallo castra communit; reliquas cohortes, quas in superioribus castris reliquerat, impedimenta ad se traduci iubet.

43 Erat inter oppidum Ilerdam et proximum collem, ubi castra Petreius atque Afranius habebant, planities circiter passuum CCC, atque in hoc fere medio spatio tumulus erat paulo editior; quem si occupavisset Caesar et communisset, ab oppido et ponte et commeatu omni, quem in oppidum contulerant, se interclusurum adversarios confidebat. Hoc sperans legiones III ex castris educit acieque in locis idoneis instructa unius legionis antesignanos procurrere atque eum tumulum occupare iubet. Qua re cognita celeriter quae in statione pro castris erant Afranii cohortes breviori itinere ad eundem occupandum locum mittuntur. Contenditur proelio, et quod prius in tumulum Afraniani venerant, nostri

repelluntur atque aliis submissis subsidiis terga vertere seque ad signa legionum recipere coguntur.

44 Genus erat pugnae militum illorum, ut magno impetu primo procurrerent, audacter locum caperent, ordines suos non magnopere servarent, rari dispersique pugnarent; si premerentur, pedem referre et loco excedere non turpe existimarent cum Lusitanis reliquisque barbaris barbaro genere quodam pugnae assuefacti; quod fere fit, quibus quisque in locis miles inveteraverit, ut multum earum regionum consuetudine moveatur. Haec tum ratio nostros perturbavit insuetos huius generis pugnae: circumiri enim sese ab aperto latere procurrentibus singulis arbitrabantur; ipsi autem suos ordines servare neque ab signis discedere neque sine gravi causa eum locum, quem ceperant, dimitti censuerant oportere. Itaque perturbatis antesignanis legio, quae in eo cornu constiterat, locum non tenuit atque in proximum collem sese recepit.

45 Caesar paene omni acie perterrita, quod praeter opinionem consuetudinemque acciderat, cohortatus suos legionem nonam subsidio ducit; hostem insolenter atque acriter nostros insequentem supprimit rursusque terga vertere seque ad oppidum Ilerdam recipere et sub muro consistere cogit. Sed nonae legionis milites elati studio, dum sarcire acceptum detrimentum volunt, temere insecuti longius fugientes in locum iniquum progrediuntur et sub montem, in quo erat oppidum positum Ilerda, succedunt. Hinc se recipere cum vellent, rursus illi ex loco superiore nostros premebant. Praeruptus locus erat utraque ex parte directus ac tantum in latitudinem patebat, ut tres instructae cohortes eum locum explerent, ut neque subsidia ab lateribus submitti neque equites laborantibus usui esse possent. Ab oppido autem declivis locus tenui fastigio vergebat in longitudinem passuum circiter CCCC. Hac nostris erat receptus, quod eo incitati

studio inconsultius processerant; hoc pugnabatur loco, et propter angustias iniquo et quod sub ipsis radicibus montis constiterant, ut nullum frustra telum in eos mitteretur. Tamen virtute et patientia nitebantur atque omnia vulnera sustinebant. Augebatur illis copia, atque ex castris cohortes per oppidum crebro submittebantur, ut integri defessis succederent. Hoc idem Caesar facere cogebatur, ut submissis in eundem locum cohortibus defessos reciperet.

46 Hoc cum esset modo pugnatum continenter horis quinque nostrique gravius a multitudine premerentur, consumptis omnibus telis gladiis dstrictis impetum adversus montem in cohortes faciunt, paucisque deiectis reliquos sese convertere cogunt. Submotis sub murum cohortibus ac nonnullam partem propter terrorem in oppidum compulsis facilis est nostris receptus datus. Equitatus autem noster ab utroque latere, etsi deiectis atque inferioribus locis constiterat, tamen summa in iugum virtute connititur atque inter duas acies perequitans commodiorem ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat. Ita vario certamine pugnatum est. Nostri in primo congressu circiter LXX ceciderunt, in his Q. Fulginius ex primo hastato legionis XIII, qui propter eximiam virtutem ex inferioribus ordinibus in eum locum pervenerat; vulnerantur amplius DC. Ex Afranianis interficiuntur T. Caecilius, primi pili centurio, et praeter eum centuriones III, milites amplius CC.

47 Sed haec eius diei praefertur opinio, ut se utrique superiores discessisse existimarent: Afraniani, quod, cum esse omnium iudicio inferiores viderentur, comminus tam diu stetissent et nostrorum impetum sustinuissent et initio locum tumulumque tenuissent, quae causa pugnandi fuerat, et nostros primo congressu terga vertere coegissent; nostri autem, quod iniquo loco atque impari congressi numero quinque horis proelium sustinuissent, quod montem gladiis

dstrictis ascendissent, quod ex loco superiore terga vertere adversarios coegissent atque in oppidum compulissent. Illi eum tumultum, pro quo pugnatum est, magnis operibus munierunt praesidiumque ibi posuerunt.

48 Accidit etiam repentinum incommodum biduo, quo haec gesta sunt. Tanta enim tempestas cooritur, ut numquam illis locis maiores aquas fuisse constaret. Tum autem ex omnibus montibus nives proluit ac summas ripas fluminis superavit pontesque ambo, quos C. Fabius fecerat, uno die interruptit. Quae res magnas difficultates exercitui Caesaris attulit. Castra enim, ut supra demonstratum est, cum essent inter flumina duo, Sicorim et Cingam, spatio milium XXX, neutrum horum transiri poterat, necessarioque omnes his angustiis continebantur. Neque civitates, quae ad Caesaris amicitiam accesserant, frumentum supportare, neque ei, qui pabulatum longius progressi erant, interclusi fluminibus reverti neque maximi commeatus, qui ex Italia Galliaque veniebant, in castra pervenire poterant. Tempus erat autem difficillimum, quo neque frumenta in hibernis erant neque multum a maturitate aberant; ac civitates exinanitae, quod Afranius paene omne frumentum ante Caesaris adventum Ilerdam convexerat, reliqui si quid fuerat, Caesar superioribus diebus consumpserat; pecora, quod secundum poterat esse inopiae subsidium, propter bellum finitimae civitates longius removerant. Qui erant pabulandi aut frumentandi causa progressi, hos levis armaturae Lusitani peritique earum regionum cetrati citerioris Hispaniae consecrabantur; quibus erat proclive tranare flumen, quod consuetudo eorum omnium est, ut sine utribus ad exercitum non eant.

49 At exercitus Afranii omnium rerum abundabat copia. Multum erat frumentum provisum et convectum superioribus temporibus,

multum ex omni provincia comportabatur; magna copia pabuli suppetebat. Harum omnium rerum facultates sine ullo periculo pons Ilerdae praebebat et loca trans flumen integra, quo omnino Caesar adire non poterat.

50 Hae permanserunt aquae dies complures. Conatus est Caesar reficere pontes; sed nec magnitudo fluminis permittebat, neque ad ripam dispositae cohortes adversariorum perfici patiebantur. Quod illis prohibere erat facile cum ipsius fluminis natura atque aquae magnitudine, tum quod ex totis ripis in unum atque angustum locum tela iaciebantur; atque erat difficile eodem tempore rapidissimo flumine opera perficere et tela vitare.

51 Nuntiatur Afranio magnos commeatus, qui iter habebant ad Caesarem, ad flumen constitisse. Venerant eo sagittarii ex Rutenis, equites ex Gallia cum multis carris magnisque impedimentis, ut fert Gallica consuetudo. Erant praeterea cuiusque generis hominum milia circiter VI cum servis liberisque; sed nullus ordo, nullum imperium certum, cum suo quisque consilio uteretur atque omnes sine timore iter facerent usi superiorum temporum atque itinerum licentia. Erant complures honesti adulescentes, senatorum filii et ordinis equestris; erant legationes civitatum; erant legati Caesaris. Hos omnes flumina continebant. Ad hos opprimendos cum omni equitatu tribusque legionibus Afranius de nocte proficiscitur imprudentesque ante missis equitibus aggreditur. Celeriter sese tamen Galli equites expediunt proeliumque committunt. Ei, dum pari certamine res geri potuit, magnum hostium numerum pauci sustinuerunt; sed ubi signa legionum appropinquare coeperunt, paucis amissis sese in proximos montes conferunt. Hoc pugnae tempus magnum attulit nostris ad salutem momentum; nacti enim spatium se in loca superiora receperunt. Desiderati sunt eo die sagittarii circiter CC, equites pauci,

calonum atque impedimentorum non magnus numerus.

52 His tamen omnibus annona crevit; quae fere res non solum inopia praesentis, sed etiam futuri temporis timore ingravescere consuevit. Iamque ad denarios L in singulos modios annona pervenerat, et militum vires inopia frumenti deminuerat, atque incommoda in dies augebantur; et ita paucis diebus magna erat facta rerum commutatio ac se fortuna inclinaverat, ut nostri magna inopia necessariorum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur. Caesar eis civitatibus, quae ad eius amicitiam accesserant, quod minor erat frumenti copia, pecus imperabat; calones ad longinquoiores civitates dimittebat; ipse praesentem inopiam quibus poterat subsidiis tutabatur.

53 Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant; multa rumor affingebat, ut paene bellum confectum videretur. Quibus litteris nuntiisque Romam perlatis magni domum concursus ad Afranium magnaeque gratulationes fiebant; multi ex Italia ad Cn. Pompeium proficiscebantur, alii, ut principes talem nuntium attulisse, alii ne eventum belli exspectasse aut ex omnibus novissimi venisse viderentur.

54 Cum in his angustiis res esset, atque omnes viae ab Afranianis militibus equitibusque obsiderentur, nec pontes perfici possent, imperat militibus Caesar, ut naves faciant, cuius generis eum superioribus annis usus Britanniae docuerat. Carinae ac prima statumina ex levi materia fiebant; reliquum corpus navium viminibus contextum coriis integebatur. Has perfectas carris iunctis devehit noctu milia passuum a castris XXII militesque his navibus flumen transportat continentemque ripae collem improvise occupat. Hunc celeriter, priusquam ab adversariis sentiatur, communit. Huc

legionem postea traicit atque ex utraque parte pontem instituit, biduo perficit. Ita commeatus et qui frumenti causa processerant tuto ad se recipit et rem frumentariam expedire incipit.

55 Eodem die equitum magnam partem flumen traiecit. Qui inopinantes pabulatores et sine ullo dissipatos timore aggressi magnum numerum iumentorum atque hominum intercipiunt cohortibusque cetratis subsidio missis scienter in duas partes sese distribuunt, alii ut praedae praesidio sint, alii ut venientibus resistant atque eos propellant, unamque cohortem, quae temere ante ceteras extra aciem procurrebat, seclusam ab reliquis circumveniunt atque interficiunt incolumesque cum magna praeda eodem ponte in castra revertuntur.

56 Dum haec ad Ilerdam geruntur, Massilienses usi L. Domitii consilio naves longas expediunt numero XVII, quarum erant XI tectae. Multa huc minora navigia addunt, ut ipsa multitudine nostra classis terreatur. Magnum numerum sagittariorum, magnum Albicorum, de quibus supra demonstratum est, imponunt atque hos praemiis pollicitationibusque incitant. Certas sibi deposcit naves Domitius atque has colonis pastoribusque, quos secum adduxerat, complet. Sic omnibus rebus instructa classe magna fiducia ad nostras naves procedunt, quibus praeerat D. Brutus. Hae ad insulam, quae est contra Massiliam, stationes obtinebant.

57 Erat multo inferior numero navium Brutus; sed electos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros, antesignanos, centuriones, Caesar ei classi attribuerat, qui sibi id muneris depoposcerant. Hi manus ferreas atque harpagones paraverant magnoque numero pilorum, tragularum reliquorumque telorum se instruxerant. Ita cognito hostium adventu suas naves ex portu educunt, cum Massiliensibus confligunt. Pugnatum est utrimque fortissime atque

acerrime; neque multum Albici nostris virtute cedebant, homines asperi et montani, exercitati in armis; atque hi modo digressi a Massiliensibus recentem eorum pollicitationem animis continebant, pastoresque Domitii spe libertatis excitati sub oculis domini suam probare operam studebant.

58 Ipsi Massilienses et celeritate navium et scientia gubernatorum confisi nostros eludebant impetusque eorum excipiebant et, quoad licebat latiore uti spatio, producta longius acie circumvenire nostros aut pluribus navibus adoriri singulas aut remos transcurrentes detergere, si possent, contendebant; cum propius erat necessario ventum, ab scientia gubernatorum atque artificiis ad virtutem montanorum confugiebant. Nostri cum minus exercitatis remigibus minusque peritis gubernatoribus utebantur, qui repente ex onerariis navibus erant producti neque dum etiam vocabulis armamentorum cognitis, tum etiam tarditate et gravitate navium impediabantur; factae enim subito ex humida materia non eundem usum celeritatis habebant. Itaque, dum locus comminus pugnandi daretur, aequo animo singulas binis navibus obiciebant atque iniecta manu ferrea et retenta utraque nave diversi pugnabant atque in hostium naves transcendebant et magno numero Albicorum et pastorum interfecto partem navium deprimunt, nonnullas cum hominibus capiunt, reliquas in portum compellunt. Eo die naves Massiliensium cum eis, quae sunt captae, intereunt VIII.

59 Hoc primum Caesari ad Ilerdam nuntiatur; simul perfecto ponte celeriter fortuna mutatur. Illi perterriti virtute equitum minus libere, minus audacter vagabantur, alias non longo a castris progressi spatio, ut celerem receptum haberent, angustius pabulabantur, alias longiore circuitu custodias stationesque equitum vitabant, aut aliquo accepto detrimento aut procul equitatu viso ex medio itinere proiectis sarcinis

fugiebant. Postremo et plures intermittere dies et praeter consuetudinem omnium noctu constituerant pabulari.

60 Interim Oscenses et Calagurritani, qui erant Oscensibus contributi, mittunt ad eum legatos seseque imperata facturos pollicentur. Hos Tarraconenses et Iacetani et Ausetani et paucis post diebus Illurgavonenses, qui flumen Hiberum attingunt, insequuntur. Petit ab his omnibus, ut se frumento iuvent. Pollicentur atque omnibus undique conquisitis iumentis in castra deportant. Transit etiam cohors Illurgavonensis ad eum cognito civitatis consilio et signa ex statione transfert. Magna celeriter commutatio rerum. Perfecto ponte, magnis quinque civitatibus ad amicitiam adiunctis, expedita re frumentaria, extinctis rumoribus de auxiliis legionum, quae cum Pompeio per Mauritaniam venire dicebantur, multae longinquiores civitates ab Afranio desciscunt et Caesaris amicitiam sequuntur.

61 Quibus rebus perterritis animis adversariorum Caesar, ne semper magno circuitu per pontem equitatus esset mittendus, nactus idoneum locum fossas pedum XXX in latitudinem complures facere instituit, quibus partem aliquam Sicoris averteret vadumque in eo flumine efficeret. His paene effectis magnum in timorem Afranius Petreiusque perveniunt, ne omnino frumento pabuloque intercluderentur, quod multum Caesar equitatu valebat. Itaque constituunt illis locis excedere et in Celtiberiam bellum transferre. Huic consilio suffragabatur etiam illa res, quod ex duobus contrariis generibus, quae superiore bello cum Sertorio steterant civitates, victae nomen atque imperium absentis Pompei timebant, quae in amicitia manserant, magnis affectae beneficiis eum diligebant; Caesaris autem erat in barbaris nomen obscurius. Hic magnos equitatus magnaque auxilia exspectabant et suis locis bellum in

hiemem ducere cogitabant. Hoc inito consilio toto flumine Hibernaues conquiri et Octogesam adduci iubent. Id erat oppidum positum ad Hiberum miliaque passuum a castris aberat XXX. Ad eum locum fluminis navibus iunctis pontem imperant fieri legionesque duas flumen Sicorim traducunt, castraque muniunt vallo pedum XII.

62 Qua re per exploratores cognita summo labore militum Caesar continuato diem noctemque opere in flumine avertendo huc iam rem deduxerat, ut equites, etsi difficulter atque aegre fiebat, possent tamen atque auderent flumen transire, pedites vero tantummodo umeris ac summo pectore exstarent et cum altitudine aquae tum etiam rapiditate fluminis ad transeundum impedirentur. Sed tamen eodem fere tempore pons in Hiberno prope effectus nuntiabatur, et in Sicori vadum reperiebatur.

63 Iam vero eo magis illi maturandum iter existimabant. Itaque duabus auxiliaribus cohortibus Ilerdae praesidio relictis omnibus copiis Sicorim transeunt et cum duabus legionibus, quas superioribus diebus traduxerant, castra coniungunt. Relinquebatur Caesari nihil, nisi uti equitatu agmen adversariorum male haberet et carperet. Pons enim ipsius magnum circuitum habebat, ut multo breviori itinere illi ad Hiberum pervenire possent. Equites ab eo missi flumen transeunt et, cum de tertia vigilia Petreius atque Afranius castra movissent, repente sese ad novissimum agmen ostendunt et magna multitudine circumfusa morari atque iter impedire incipiunt.

64 Prima luce ex superioribus locis, quae Caesaris castris erant coniuncta, cernebatur equitatus nostri proelio novissimos illorum premi vehementer ac nonnumquam sustineri extremum agmen atque interrompi, alias inferri signa et universarum cohortium impetu nostros propelli, dein rursus conversos insequi. Totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum non

necessario longius duci; centuriones tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare, ut per eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen, qua traductus esset equitatus. Quorum studio et vocibus excitatus Caesar, etsi timebat tantae magnitudini fluminis exercitum obicere, conandum tamen atque experiendum iudicat. Itaque infirmiores milites ex omnibus centuriis deligi iubet, quorum aut animus aut vires videbantur sustinere non posse. Hos cum legione una praesidio castris relinquit; reliquas legiones expeditas educit magnoque numero iumentorum in flumine supra atque infra constituto traducit exercitum. Pauci ex his militibus abrepti vi fluminis ab equitatu excipiuntur ac sublevantur; interit tamen nemo. Traducto incolumi exercitu copias instruit triplicemque aciem ducere incipit. Ac tantum fuit in militibus studii, ut milium sex ad iter addito circuitu magnaue ad vadum fluminis mora interposita eos, qui de tertia vigilia exissent, ante horam diei VIII consequerentur.

65 Quos ubi Afranius procul visos cum Petreio conspexit, nova re perterritus locis superioribus constitit aciemque instruit. Caesar in campis exercitum reficit, ne defessum proelio obiciat; rursus conantes progredi insequitur et moratur. Illi necessario maturius, quam constituerant, castra ponunt. Suberant enim montes, atque a milibus passuum V itinera difficilia atque angusta excipiebant. Hos montes intrasse cupiebant, ut equitatum effugerent Caesaris praesidiisque in angustiis collocatis exercitum itinere prohiberent, ipsi sine periculo ac timore Hiberum copias traducerent. Quod fuit illis conandum atque omni ratione efficiendum; sed totius diei pugna atque itineris labore defessi rem in posterum diem distulerunt. Caesar quoque in proximo colle castra ponit.

66 Media circiter nocte eis, qui aquandi causa longius a castris

processerant, ab equitibus correptis fit ab his certior Caesar duces adversariorum silentio copias castris educere. Quo cognito signum dari iubet et vasa militari more conclamari. Illi exaudito clamore veriti, ne noctu impediti sub onere configere cogerentur aut ne ab equitatu Caesaris in angustius tenerentur, iter supprimunt copiasque in castris continent. Postero die Petreius cum paucis equitibus occulte ad exploranda loca proficiscitur. Hoc idem fit ex castris Caesaris. Mittitur L. Decidius Sasa cum paucis, qui loci naturam perspiciat. Uterque idem suis renuntiat: V milia passuum proxima intercedere itineris campestris, inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui prior has angustias occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negotii.

⁶⁷ Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. Plerique censebant, ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam sentiretur. Alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris, argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam exiri. Circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaue proelia esse vitanda, quod perterritus miles in civili dissensione timori magis quam religioni consulere consuerit. At lucem multum per se pudorem omnium oculis, multum etiam tribunorum militum et centurionum praesentiam afferre; quibus rebus coerceri milites et in officio contineri soleant. Quare omni ratione esse interdium perrumpendum: etsi aliquo accepto detrimento, tamen summa exercitus salva locum, quem petant, capi posse. Haec vincit in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proficisci.

⁶⁸ Caesar exploratis regionibus albente caelo omnes copias castris educit magnoque circuitu nullo certo itinere exercitum ducit. Nam quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Octogesam pertinebant castris hostium oppositis tenebantur. Ipsi erant transcendendae valles

maximae ac difficillimae; saxa multis locis praerupta iter impediabant, ut arma per manus necessario traderentur, militesque inermes sublevatique alii ab aliis magnam partem itineris conficerent. Sed hunc laborem recusabat nemo, quod eum omnium laborum finem fore existimabant, si hostem Hiberno intercludere et frumento prohibere potuissent.

69 Ac primo Afraniani milites visendi causa laeti ex castris procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus prosequerentur nostros: necessarii victus inopia coactos fugere atque ad Ilerdam reverti. Erat enim iter a proposito diversum, contrariamque in partem iri videbatur. Duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus efferebant, quod se castris tenuissent; multumque eorum opinionem adiuwabatur, quod sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant, ut non posse inopiam diutius sustinere confiderent. Sed, ubi paulatim retorqueri agmen ad dextram conspexerunt iamque primos superare regionem castrorum animum adverterunt, nemo erat adeo tardus aut fugiens laboris, quin statim castris exeundum atque occurrendum putaret. Conclamatur ad arma, atque omnes copiae paucis praesidio relictis cohortibus exeunt rectoque ad Hiberum itinere contendunt.

70 Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montesque occuparent; sed exercitum Caesaris viarum difficultates tardabant, Afranii copias equitatus Caesaris insequens morabatur. Res tamen ab Afranianis huc erat necessario deducta, ut, si priores montes, quos petebant, attigissent, ipsi periculum vitarent, impedimenta totius exercitus cohortesque in castris relictas servare non possent; quibus interclusis exercitu Caesaris auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat. Confecit prior iter Caesar atque ex magnis rupibus nactus planitiem in hac contra hostem aciem instruit. Afranius, cum ab equitatu novissimum agmen premeretur, ante se hostem videret,

collem quendam nactus ibi constitit. Ex eo loco IIII cetratorum cohortes in montem, qui erat in conspectu omnium excelsissimus, mittit. Hunc magno cursu concitatos iubet occupare, eo consilio, uti ipse eodem omnibus copiis contenderet et mutato itinere iugis Octogesam perveniret. Hunc cum obliquo itinere cetrati peterent, conspicatus equitatus Caesaris in cohortes impetum fecit; nec minimam partem temporis equitum vim cetrati sustinere potuerunt omnesque ab eis circumventi in conspectu utriusque exercitus interficiuntur.

71 Erat occasio bene gerendae rei. Neque vero id Caesarem fugiebat, tanto sub oculis accepto detrimento perterritum exercitum sustinere non posse, praesertim circumdatum undique equitatu, cum in loco aequo atque aperto confligeretur; idque ex omnibus partibus ab eo flagitabatur. Concurrerant legati, centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos. Afranianos contra multis rebus sui timoris signa misisse: quod suis non subvenissent, quod de colle non decederent, quod vix equitum incursus sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis conferti neque ordines neque signa servarent. Quod si iniquitatem loci timeret, datum iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio nec sine aqua permanere posset.

72 Caesar in eam spem venerat, se sine pugna et sine vulnere suorum rem conficere posse, quod re frumentaria adversarios interclusisset. Cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? praesertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio superare quam gladio. Movebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat; quibus salvis atque incolumibus

rem obtinere malebat. Hoc consilium Caesaris plerisque non probabatur: milites vero palam inter se loquebantur, quoniam talis occasio victoriae dimitteretur, etiam cum vellet Caesar, sese non esse pugnatos. Ille in sua sententia perseverat et paulum ex eo loco digreditur, ut timorem adversariis minuat. Petreius atque Afranius oblata facultate in castra sese referunt. Caesar praesidiis montibus dispositis omni ad Hiberum intercluso itinere quam proxime potest hostium castris castra communit.

73 Postero die duces adversariorum perturbati, quod omnem rei frumentariae fluminisque Hiberi spem dimiserant, de reliquis rebus consultabant. Erat unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti vellent; alterum, si Tarraconem peterent. Haec consiliantibus eis nuntiantur aquatores ab equitatu premi nostro. Qua re cognita crebras stationes disponunt equitum et cohortium alariarum legionariasque intericiunt cohortes vallumque ex castris ad aquam ducere incipiunt, ut intra munitionem et sine timore et sine stationibus aquari possent. Id opus inter se Petreius atque Afranius partiuntur ipsique perficiundi operis causa longius progrediuntur.

74 Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, et quem quisque in castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirunt atque evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnibus, quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde de imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint, queruntur. His provocati sermonibus fidem ab imperatore de Petreii atque Afranii vita petunt, ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu suos prodidisse videantur. Quibus confirmatis rebus se statim signa transluros confirmant legatosque de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt. Interim

alii suos in castra invitandi causa adducunt, alii ab suis abducuntur, adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur; compluresque tribuni militum et centuriones ad Caesarem veniunt seque ei commendant. Idem hoc fit a principibus Hispaniae, quos evocaverant et secum in castris habebant obsidum loco. Hi suos notos hospitesque quaerebant, per quem quisque eorum aditum commendationis haberet ad Caesarem. Afranii etiam filius adulescens de sua ac parentis sui salute cum Caesare per Sulpicium legatum agebat. Erant plena laetitia et gratulatione omnia, eorum, qui tanta pericula vitasse, et eorum, qui sine vulnere tantas res confecisse videbantur, magnumque fructum suae pristinae lenitatis omnium iudicio Caesar ferebat, consiliumque eius a cunctis probabatur.

75 Quibus rebus nuntiatis Afranius ab instituto opere discedit seque in castra recipit, sic paratus, ut videbatur, ut, quicumque accidisset casus, hunc quieto et aequo animo ferret. Petreius vero non deserit sese. Armat familiam; cum hac et praetoria cohorte cetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficiariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consuerat, improvise ad vallum advolat, colloquia militum interrumpit, nostros repellit a castris, quos deprendit interficit. Reliqui coeunt inter se et repentino periculo exterriti sinistras sagis involvunt gladiosque destringunt atque ita se a cetratis equitibusque defendunt castrorum propinquitate confisi seque in castra recipiunt et ab eis cohortibus, quae erant in statione ad portas, defenduntur.

76 Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu se neu Pompeium, imperatorem suum, adversariis ad supplicium tradant, obsecrat. Fit celeriter concursus in praetorium. Postulat, ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium

capturos. Princeps in haec verba iurat ipse; idem iusiurandum adigit Afranium; subsequuntur tribuni militum centurionesque; centuriatim producti milites idem iurant. Edicunt, penes quem quisque sit Caesaris miles, ut producat: productos palam in praetorio interficiunt. Sed plerosque ei, qui receperant, celant noctuque per vallum emittunt. Sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in supplicio, nova religio iurisiurandi spem praesentis deditionis sustulit mentesque militum convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit.

77 Caesar, qui milites adversariorum in castra per tempus colloqui venerant, summa diligentia conquiri et remitti iubet. Sed ex numero tribunorum militum centurionumque nonnulli sua voluntate apud eum remanserunt. Quos ille postea magno in honore habuit; centuriones in priores ordines, equites Romanos in tribunicium restituit honorem.

78 Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur aegre. Frumenti copiam legionarii nonnullam habebant, quod dierum XXII ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant efferre, cetrati auxiliaresque nullam, quorum erant et facultates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera portanda. Itaque magnus eorum cotidie numerus ad Caesarem perfugiebat. In his erat angustia res. Sed ex propositis consiliis duobus explicitius videbatur Ilerdam reverti, quod ibi paulum frumenti reliquerant. Ibi se reliquum consilium explicaturos confidebant. Tarraco aberat longius; quo spatio plures rem posse casus recipere intellegebant. Hoc probato consilio ex castris proficiscuntur. Caesar equitatu praemisso, qui novissimum agmen carperet atque impediret, ipse cum legionibus subsequitur. Nullum intercedebat tempus, quin extremi cum equitibus proeliarentur.

79 Genus erat hoc pugnae. Expeditae cohortes novissimum agmen

claudabant pluresque in locis campestribus subsistebant. Si mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat, quod ex locis superioribus, qui antecesserant, suos ascendentes protegebant; cum vallis aut locus declivis suberat, neque ei, qui antecesserant, morantibus opem ferre poterant, equites vero ex loco superiore in aversos tela coniciebant, tum magno erat in periculo res. Relinquebatur, ut, cum eiusmodi locis esset appropinquatum, legionum signa consistere iuberent magnoque impetu equitatum repellerent, eo submoto repente incitati cursu sese in valles universi demitterent atque ita transgressi rursus in locis superioribus consisterent. Nam tantum ab equitum suorum auxiliis aberant, quorum numerum habebant magnum, ut eos superioribus perterritos proeliis in medium reciperent agmen ultroque eos tuerentur; quorum nulli ex itinere excedere licebat, quin ab equitatu Caesaris exciperetur.

80 Tali dum pugnatur modo, lente atque paulatim proceditur, crebroque, ut sint auxilio suis, subsistunt; ut tum accidit. Milia enim progressi IIII vehementiusque peragitati ab equitatu montem excelsum capiunt ibique una fronte contra hostem castra muniunt neque iumentis onera deponunt. Ubi Caesaris castra posita tabernaculaque constituta et dimissos equites pabulandi causa animum adverterunt, sese subito proripiunt hora circiter sexta eiusdem diei et spem nacti morae discessu nostrorum equitum iter facere incipiunt. Qua re animum adversa Caesar reffectis legionibus subsequitur, praesidio impedimentis paucas cohortes relinquit; hora x subsequi pabulatores equitesque revocari iubet. Celeriter equitatus ad cotidianum itineris officium revertitur. Pugnatur acriter ad novissimum agmen, adeo ut paene terga convertant, compluresque milites, etiam nonnulli centuriones, interficiuntur. Instabat agmen

Caesaris atque universum imminebat.

81 Tum vero neque ad explorandum idoneum locum castris neque ad progrediendum data facultate consistunt necessario et procul ab aqua et natura iniquo loco castra ponunt. Sed isdem de causis Caesar, quae supra sunt demonstratae, proelio non lacescit et eo die tabernacula statui passus non est, quo paratiores essent ad insequendum omnes, sive noctu sive interdiu erumperent. Illi animadverso vitio castrorum tota nocte munitiones proferunt castraque castris convertunt. Hoc idem postero die a prima luce faciunt totumque in ea re diem consumunt. Sed quantum opere processerant et castra protulerant, tanto aberant ab aqua longius, et praesenti malo aliis malis remedia dabantur. Prima nocte aquandi causa nemo egreditur ex castris; proximo die praesidio in castris relicto universas ad aquam copias educunt, pabulatum emittitur nemo. His eos suppliciis male haberi Caesar et necessariam subire deditionem quam proelio decertare malebat. Conatur tamen eos vallo fossaque circummunire, ut quam maxime repentinas eorum eruptiones demoretur; quo necessario descensuros existimabat. Illi et inopia pabuli adducti et, quo essent expeditiores, omnia sarcinaria iumenta interfici iubent.

82 In his operibus consiliisque biduum consumitur; tertio die magna iam pars operis Caesaris processerat. Illi impediendae reliquae munitionis causa hora circiter VIII signo dato legiones educunt aciemque sub castris instruunt. Caesar ab opere legiones revocat, equitatum omnem convenire iubet, aciem instruit; contra opinionem enim militum famamque omnium videri proelium defugisse magnum detrimentum afferebat. Sed eisdem de causis, quae sunt cognitae, quo minus dimicare vellet, movebatur, atque hoc etiam magis, quod spatii brevitatem etiam in fugam coniectis

adversariis non multum ad summam victoria iuvare poterat. Non enim amplius pedum milibus duobus ab castris castra distabant; hinc duas partes acies occupabant duae; tertia vacabat ad incursum atque impetum militum relictā. Si proelium committeretur, propinquitās castrorum celerem superatis ex fuga receptum dabat. Hac de causa constituerat signa inferentibus resistere, prior proelio non lacessere.

83 Acies erat Afraniana duplex legionum V; tertium in subsidiis locum alariae cohortes obtinebant; Caesaris triplex; sed primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex V legionibus tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cuiusque legionis subsequēbantur; sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat. Tali instructa acie tenere uterque propositum videbatur: Caesar, ne nisi coactus proelium committeret; ille, ut opera Caesaris impediret. Producitur tamen res, aciesque ad solis occasum continentur; inde utrique in castra discedunt. Postero die munitiones institutas Caesar parat perficere; illi vadum fluminis Sicoris temptare, si transire possent. Qua re animadversa Caesar Germanos levis armaturae equitumque partem flumen traicit crebrasque in ripis custodias disponit.

84 Tandem omnibus rebus obsessi, quartum iam diem sine pabulo retentis iumentis, aquae, lignorum, frumenti inopia colloquium petunt et id, si fieri possit, semoto a militibus loco. Ubi id a Caesare negatum et, palam si colloqui vellent, concessum est, datur obsidis loco Caesari filius Afranii. Venitur in eum locum, quem Caesar delegit. Audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut ipsis aut militibus succensendum, quod fidem erga imperatorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint. Sed satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplicii tulisse perpressos omnium rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi

ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. Itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, si qui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeat. Haec quam potest demississime et subiectissime exponit.

85 Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partes vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: se, qui etiam bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, configere noluerit, ut quam integerrima essent ad pacem omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservarit et texerit; illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partes in misericordia constitisse: ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; eos neque colloqui neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse. Accidisse igitur his, quod plerumque hominum nimia pertinacia atque arrogantia accidere soleat, uti eo recurrant et id cupidissime petant, quod paulo ante contempserint. Neque nunc se illorum humilitate neque aliqua temporis opportunitate postulare, quibus rebus opes augeantur suae; sed eos exercitus, quos contra se multos iam annos aluerint, velle dimitti. Neque enim sex legiones alia de causa missas in Hispaniam septimamque ibi conscriptam neque tot tantasque classes paratas neque submissos duces rei militaris peritos. Nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil ad usum provinciae provisum, quae propter diuturnitatem pacis nullum auxilium desiderarit. Omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annis obtineat; in

se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur; in se etiam aetatis excusationem nihil valere, cum superioribus bellis probati ad obtinendos exercitus evocentur; in se uno non servari, quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus, ut rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore aliquo aut certe sine ignominia domum revertantur exercitumque dimittant. Quae tamen omnia et se tulisse patienter et esse laturum; neque nunc id agere, ut ab illis abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod tamen sibi difficile non sit, sed ne illi habeant, quo contra se uti possint. Proinde, ut esset dictum, provinciis excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se nociturum nemini. Hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem.

86 Id vero militibus fuit pergratum et iucundum, ut ex ipsa significatione cognosci potuit, ut, qui aliquid iusti incommodi exspectavissent, ultro praemium missionis ferrent. Nam cum de loco et tempore eius rei controversia inferretur, et voce et manibus universi ex vallo, ubi constiterant, significare coeperunt, ut statim dimitterentur, neque omni interposita fide firmum esse posse, si in aliud tempus differretur. Paucis cum esset in utramque partem verbis disputatum, res huc deducitur, ut ei, qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania, statim, reliqui ad Varum flumen dimittantur; ne quid eis noceatur, neu quis invitus sacramentum dicere cogatur, a Caesare cavetur.

87 Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniatur, se frumentum daturum pollicetur. Addit etiam, ut, quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes milites suos, eis, qui amiserint, restituatur; militibus aequa facta aestimatione pecuniam pro his rebus dissolvit. Quascumque postea controversias inter se milites

habuerunt, sua sponte ad Caesarem in ius adierunt. Petreius atque Afranius cum stipendium ab legionibus paene seditione facta flagitarentur, cuius illi diem nondum venisse dicerent, Caesar ut cognosceret, postulatum est, eoque utrique, quod statuit, contenti fuerunt. Parte circiter tertia exercitus eo biduo dimissa duas legiones suas antecedere, reliquas subsequi iussit, ut non longo inter se spatio castra facerent, eique negotio Q. Fufium Calenum legatum praeficit. Hoc eius praescripto ex Hispania ad Varum flumen est iter factum, atque ibi reliqua pars exercitus dimissa est.

LIBER II

1 Dum haec in Hispania geruntur, C. Trebonius legatus, qui ad oppugnationem Massiliae relictus erat, duabus ex partibus aggerem, vineas turresque ad oppidum agere instituit. Una erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad portam, qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania, ad id mare, quod adiacet ad ostium Rhodani. Massilia enim fere tribus ex oppidi partibus mari alluitur; reliqua quarta est, quae aditum habeat ab terra. Huius quoque spatii pars ea, quae ad arcem pertinet, loci natura et valle altissima munita longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem. Ad ea perficienda opera C. Trebonius magnam iumentorum atque hominum multitudinem ex omni provincia vocat; vimina materiamque comportari iubet. Quibus comparatis rebus aggerem in altitudinem pedum LXXX exstruit.

2 Sed tanti erant antiquitus in oppido omnium rerum ad bellum apparatus tantaque multitudo tormentorum, ut eorum vim nullae contextae viminibus vineae sustinere possent. Asseres enim pedum XII cuspidibus praefixi atque hi maximis ballistis missi per IIII ordines cratium in terra defigebantur. Itaque pedalibus lignis coniunctis inter se porticus integebantur, atque hac agger inter manus proferebatur. Antecedebat testudo pedum LX aequandi loci causa facta item ex fortissimis lignis, convoluta omnibus rebus, quibus ignis iactus et lapides defendi possent. Sed magnitudo operum, altitudo muri atque turrium, multitudo tormentorum omnem administrationem tardabat. Crebrae etiam per Albicos eruptiones fiebant ex oppido ignesque aggeri et turribus inferebantur; quae facile nostri milites repellebant magnisque ultro illatis detrimentis eos, qui eruptionem fecerant, in oppidum reiciebant.

3 Interim L Nasidius, a Cn. Pompeio cum classe navium XVI, in

quibus paucae erant aeratae, L. Domitio Massiliensibusque subsidio missus, freto Siciliae imprudente atque inopinante Curione pervehitur appulsisque Messanam navibus atque inde propter repentinum terrorem principum ac senatus fuga facta navem ex navalibus eorum deducit. Hac adiuncta ad reliquas naves cursum Massiliam versus perficit praemissaque clam navicula Domitium Massiliensesque de suo adventu certiores facit eosque magnopere hortatur, ut rursus cum Bruti classe additis suis auxiliis confligant.

4 Massilienses post superius incommodum veteres ad eundem numerum ex navalibus productas naves refecerant summaque industria armaverant (remigum, gubernatorum magna copia suppetebat) piscatoriasque adiecerant atque contexerant, ut essent ab ictu telorum remiges tuti; has sagittariis tormentisque compleverunt. Tali modo instructa classe omnium seniorum, matrum familiae, virginum precibus et fletu excitati, extremo tempore civitati subvenirent, non minore animo ac fiducia, quam ante dimicaverant, naves conscendunt. Communi enim fit vitio naturae, ut inusitatis atque incognitis rebus magis confidamus vehementiusque exterreamur; ut tum accidit. Adventus enim L. Nasidii summa spe et voluntate civitatem compleverat. Nacti idoneum ventum ex portu exeunt et Tauroenta, quod est castellum Massilensium, ad Nasidium perveniunt ibique naves expediunt rursusque se ad confligendum animo confirmant et consilia communicant. Dextra pars attribuitur Massiliensibus, sinistra Nasidio.

5 Eodem Brutus contendit aucto navium numero. Nam ad eas, quae factae erant Arelate per Caesarem, captivae Massiliensium accesserant sex. Has superioribus diebus refecerat atque omnibus rebus instruxerat. Itaque suos cohortatus, quos integros superarissent ut victos contemnerent, plenus spei bonae atque animi adversus eos

proficiscitur. Facile erat ex castris C. Trebonii atque omnibus superioribus locis prospicere in urbem, ut omnis iuventus, quae in oppido remanserat, omnesque superioris aetatis cum liberis atque uxoribus ex publicis locis custodiisque aut e muro ad caelum manus tenderent, aut templa deorum immortalium adirent et ante simulacra proiecti victoriam ab diis exposcerent. Neque erat quisquam omnium, quin in eius diei casu suarum omnium fortunarum eventum consistere existimaret. Nam et honesti ex iuventute et cuiusque aetatis amplissimi nominatim evocati atque obsecrati naves conscenderant ut, si quid adversi accidisset, ne ad conandum quidem sibi quicquam reliqui fore viderent; si superavissent, vel domesticis opibus vel externis auxiliis de salute urbis confiderent.

6 Commisso proelio Massiliensibus res nulla ad virtutem defuit; sed memores eorum praeceptorum, quae paulo ante ab suis aeceperant, hoc animo decertabant, ut nullum aliud tempus ad conandum habituri viderentur, et quibus in pugna vitae periculum accideret, non ita multo se reliquorum civium fatum antecedere existimarent, quibus urbe capta eadem esset belli fortuna patienda. Diductisque nostris paulatim navibus et artificio gubernatorum et mobilitati navium locus dabatur, et si quando nostri facultatem nacti ferreis manibus iniectis navem religaverant, undique suis laborantibus succurrebant. Neque vero coniuncti Albici comminus pugnando deficiebant neque multum cedebant virtute nostris. Simul ex minoribus navibus magna vis eminus missa telorum multa nostris de improvise imprudentibus atque impeditis vulnera inferebant. Conspicataeque naves triremes duae navem D. Bruti, quae ex insigni facile agnosci poterat, duabus ex partibus sese in eam incitaverant. Sed tantum re provisa Brutus celeritate navis enisus est, ut parvo momento antecederet. Illae adeo graviter inter se incitatae

confluxerunt, ut vehementissime utraque ex concursu laborarent, altera vero prae fracto rostro tota collabefieret. Qua re animadversa, quae proximae ei loco ex Bruti classe naves erant, in eas impeditas impetum faciunt celeriterque ambas deprimunt.

7 Sed Nasidianae naves nullo usui fuerunt celeriterque pugna excesserunt; non enim has aut conspectus patriae aut propinquorum praecepta ad extremum vitae periculum adire cogebant. Itaque ex eo numero navium nulla desiderata est: ex Massiliensium classe V sunt depressae, IV captae, una cum Nasidianis profugit; quae omnes citeriorem Hispaniam petiverunt. At ex reliquis una praemissa Massiliam huius nuntii perferendi gratia cum iam appropinquaret urbi, omnis sese multitudo ad cognoscendum effudit, et re cognita tantus luctus excepit, ut urbs ab hostibus capta eodem vestigio videretur. Massilienses tamen nihilo secius ad defensionem urbis reliqua apparare coeperunt.

8 Est animadversum ab legionibus, qui dextram partem operis administrabant, ex crebris hostium eruptionibus magno sibi esse praesidio posse, si ibi pro castello ac receptaculo turrim ex latere sub muro fecissent. Quam primo ad repentinos incursus humilem parvamque fecerunt. Huc se referebant; hinc, si qua maior oppresserat vis, propugnabant; hinc ad repellendum et prosequendum hostem procurrebant. Patebat haec quoquo versus pedes XXX, sed parietum crassitudo pedes V. Postea vero, ut est rerum omnium magister usus, hominum adhibita sollertia inventum est magno esse usui posse, si haec esset in altitudinem turris elata. Id hac ratione perfectum est.

9 Ubi turris altitudo perducta est ad contabulationem, eam in parietes instruxerunt, ita ut capita tignorum extrema parietum structura tegerentur, ne quid emineret, ubi ignis hostium

adhaeresceret. Hanc super contignationem, quantum tectum plutei ac vinearum passum est, laterculo adstruxerunt supraque eum locum duo tigna transversa iniecerunt non longe ab extremis parietibus, quibus suspenderent eam contignationem, quae turri tegimento esset futura, supraque ea tigna directo transversas trabes iniecerunt easque axibus religaverunt (has trabes paulo longiores atque eminentiores, quam extremi parietes erant, effecerant, ut esset ubi tegimenta praependere possent ad defendendos ictus ac repellendos, cum infra eam contignationem parietes exstruerentur) eamque contabulationem summam lateribus lutoque constraverunt, ne quid ignis hostium nocere posset, centonesque insuper iniecerunt, ne aut tela tormentis immissa tabulationem perfringerent, aut saxa ex catapultis latericium discuterent. Storias autem ex funibus ancorariis tres in longitudinem parietum turris latas IIII pedes fecerunt easque ex tribus partibus, quae ad hostes vergebant, eminentibus trabibus circum turrim praependentes religaverunt; quod unum genus tegimenti aliis locis erant experti nullo telo neque tormento traici posse. Ubi vero ea pars turris, quae erat perfecta, tecta atque munita est ab omni ictu hostium, pluteos ad alia opera abduxerunt; turris tectum per se ipsum pressionibus ex contignatione prima suspendere ac tollere coeperunt. Ubi, quantum storiarum demissio patiebatur, tantum elevarant, intra haec tegimenta abditi atque muniti parietes lateribus exstruebant rursusque alia pressione ad aedificandum sibi locum expediebant. Ubi tempus alterius contabulationis videbatur, tigna item ut primo tecta extremis lateribus instruebant exque ea contignatione rursus summam contabulationem storiasque elevabant. Ita tuto ac sine ullo vulnere ac periculo sex tabulata exstruxerunt fenestrasque, quibus in locis visum est, ad tormenta mittenda in struendo reliquerunt.

10 Ubi ex ea turri, quae circum essent opera, tueri se posse confisi

sunt, musculum pedes LX longum ex materia bipedali, quem a turri latericia ad hostium turrim murumque perducerent, facere instituerunt; cuius musculi haec erat forma. Duae primum trabes in solo aequae longae distantes inter se pedes IIII collocantur, inque eis columellae pedum in altitudinem V defiguntur. Has inter se capreolis molli fastigio coniungunt, ubi tigna, quae musculi tegendi causa ponant, collocantur. Eo super tigna bipedalia iniciunt eaque laminis clavisque religant. Ad extremum musculi tectum trabesque extremas quadratas regulas IIII patentes digitos defigunt, quae lateres, qui super musculo struantur, contineant. Ita fastigato atque ordinatim structo, ut trabes erant in capreolis collocatae, lateribus lutoque musculus, ut ab igni, qui ex muro iaceretur, tutus esset, contegitur. Super lateres coria inducuntur, ne canalibus aqua immissa lateres diluere posset Coria autem, ne rursus igni ac lapidibus corrumpantur, centonibus conteguntur. Hoc opus omne tectum vineis ad ipsam turrim perficiunt subitoque inopinantibus hostibus machinatione navali, phalangis subiectis, ad turrim hostium admovent, ut aedificio iungatur.

11 Quo malo perterriti subito oppidani saxa quam maxima possunt vectibus promovent praecipitataque muro in musculum devolvunt. Ictum firmitas materiae sustinet, et quicquid incidit fastigio musculi elabitur. Id ubi vident, mutant consilium: cupas taeda ac pice refertas incendunt easque de muro in musculum devolvunt. Involutae labuntur, delapsae ab lateribus longuriis furcisque ab opere removentur. Interim sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium, quibus fundamenta continebantur, convellunt. Musculus ex turri latericia a nostris telis tormentisque defenditur; hostes ex muro ac turibus submoventur: non datur libera muri defendendi facultas. Compluribus iam lapidibus ex ea, quae suberat, turri subductis

repentina ruina pars eius turris concidit, pars reliqua consequens procumbebat: cum hostes urbis direptione perterriti inermes cum infulis se porta foras universi proripiunt ad legatos atque exercitum supplices manus tendunt.

12 Qua nova re oblata omnis administratio belli consistit, militesque aversi a proelio ad studium audiendi et cognoscendi feruntur. Ubi hostes ad legatos exercitumque pervenerunt, universi se ad pedes proiciunt; orant, ut adventus Caesaris exspectetur: captam suam urbem videre: opera perfecta, turrim subrutam; itaque ab defensione desistere. Nullam exoriri moram posse, quominus, cum venisset, si imperata non facerent ad nutum, e vestigio diriperentur. Docent, si omnino turris concidisset, non posse milites contineri, quin spe praedae in urbem irrumperent urbemque delerent. Haec atque eiusdem generis complura ut ab hominibus doctis magna cum misericordia fletuque pronuntiantur.

13 Quibus rebus commoti legati milites ex opere deducunt, oppugnatione desistunt; operibus custodias relinquunt. Indutiarum quodam genere misericordia facto adventus Caesaris exspectatur. Nullum ex muro, nullum a nostris mittitur telum; ut re confecta omnes curam et diligentiam remittunt. Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat, ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui et diutino labore omnes puberes interficerent; quod se facturos minabantur, aegreque tunc sunt retenti, quin oppidum irrumperent, graviterque eam rem tulerunt, quod stetisse per Trebonium, quominus oppido potirentur, videbatur.

14 At hostes sine fide tempus atque occasionem fraudis ac doli quaerunt interiectisque aliquot diebus nostris languentibus atque animo remissis subito meridiano tempore, cum alius discessisset,

alius ex diutino labore in ipsis operibus quieti se dedisset, arma vero omnia reposita contactaque essent, portis se foras erumpunt, secundo magnoque vento ignem operibus inferunt. Hunc sic distulit ventus, uti uno tempore agger, plutei, testudo, turris, tormenta flammam conciperent et prius haec omnia consumerentur, quam, quemadmodum accidisset, animadverti posset. Nostri repentina fortuna permoti arma, quae possunt, arripiunt; alii ex castris sese incitant. Fit in hostes impetus; sed de muro sagittis tormentisque fugientes persequi prohibentur. Illi sub murum se recipiunt ibique musculum turrimque latericiam libere incendunt. Ita multorum mensium labor hostium perfidia et vi tempestatis puncto temporis interiit. Temptaverunt hoc idem Massilienses postero die. Eandem nacti tempestatem maiore cum fiducia ad alteram turrim aggeremque eruptione pugnaverunt multumque ignem intulerunt. Sed ut superioris temporis contentionem nostri omnem remiserant, ita proximi diei casu admoniti omnia ad defensionem paraverant. Itaque multis interfectis reliquos infecta re in oppidum reppulerunt.

15 Trebonius ea, quae sunt amissa, multo maiore militum studio administrare et reficere instituit. Nam ubi tantos suos labores et apparatus male cecidisse viderunt indutiisque per scelus violatis suam virtutem irrisui fore perdoluerunt, quod, unde agger omnino comportari posset, nihil erat reliquum, omnibus arboribus longe lateque in finibus Massiliensium excisis et convectis, aggerem novi generis atque inauditum ex latericiis duobus muris senum pedum crassitudine atque eorum murorum contignatione facere instituerunt aequa fere altitudine, atque ille congesticius ex materia fuerat agger. Ubi aut spatium inter muros aut imbecillitas materiae postulare videretur, pilae interponuntur, traversaria tigna iniciuntur, quae firmamento esse possint, et quicquid est contignatum cratibus

consternitur, crates luto integuntur. Sub tecto miles dextra ac sinistra muro tectus, adversus plutei obiectu, operi quaecumque sunt usui sine periculo supportat. Celeriter res administratur; diuturni laboris detrimentum sollertia et virtute militum brevi reconciliatur. Portae, quibus locis videtur, eruptionis causa in muro relinquuntur.

16 Quod ubi hostes viderunt, ea, quae vix longinquo spatio refici non posse sperassent, paucorum dierum opera et labore ita refecta, ut nullus perfidiae neque eruptioni locus esset nec quicquam omnino relinqueretur, qua aut telis militibus aut igni operibus noceri posset, eodemque exemplo sentiunt totam urbem, qua sit aditus ab terra, muro turribusque circumiri posse, sic ut ipsis consistendi in suis munitionibus locus non esset, cum paene inaedificata muris ab exercitu nostro moenia viderentur ac telum manu coniceretur, suorumque tormentorum usum, quibus ipsi magna speravissent, spatio propinquitatis interire parique condicione ex muro ac turribus bellandi data se virtute nostris adaequare non posse intellegunt, ad easdem deditionis condiciones recurrunt.

17 M. Varro in ulteriore Hispania initio cognitis eis rebus, quae sunt in Italia gestae, diffidens Pompeianis rebus amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: praecoccupatum sese legatione ab Cn. Pompeio teneri obstrictum fide; necessitudinem quidem sibi nihilo minorem cum Caesare intercedere, neque se ignorare, quod esset officium legati, qui fiduciarium operam obtineret, quae vires suae, quae voluntas erga Caesarem totius provinciae. Haec omnibus ferebat sermonibus neque se in ullam partem movebat. Postea vero, cum Caesarem ad Massiliam detineri cognovit, copias Petreii cum exercitu Afranii esse coniunctas, magna auxilia convenisse, magna esse in spe atque exspectari et consentire omnem citeriorem provinciam, quaeque postea acciderant, de angustiis ad Ilerdam rei

fumentariae, accepit, atque haec ad eum latius atque inflatius Afranius perscribebat, se quoque ad motus fortunae movere coepit.

18 Delectum habuit tota provincia, legionibus completis duabus cohortes circiter XXX alarias addidit. Frumenti magnum numerum coegit, quod Massiliensibus, item quod Afranio Petreioque mitteret. Naves longas X Gaditanis ut facerent imperavit, complures praeterea Hispali faciendas curavit. Pecuniam omnem omniaque ornamenta ex fano Herculis in oppidum Gades contulit; eo sex cohortes praesidii causa ex provincia misit Gaiumque Gallonium, equitem Romanum, familiarem Domitii, qui eo procurandae hereditatis causa venerat missus a Domitio, oppido Gadibus praefecit; arma omnia privata ac publica in domum Gallonii contulit. Ipse habuit graves in Caesarem contiones. Saepe ex tribunali praedicavit adversa Caesarem proelia fecisse, magnum numerum ab eo militum ad Afranium perfugisse: haec se certis nuntiis, certis auctoribus comperisse. Quibus rebus perterritos cives Romanos eius provinciae sibi ad rem publicam administrandam HS | CLXXX | 18,000,000 et argenti pondo XX milia, tritici modium CXX milia polliceri coegit. Quas Caesari esse amicas civitates arbitrabatur, his graviora onera iniungebat praesidiaque eo deducebat et iudicia in privatos reddebat qui verba atque orationem adversus rem publicam habuissent: eorum bona in publicum addicebat, Provinciam omnem in sua et Pompei verba iusiurandum adigebat. Cognitis eis rebus, quae sunt gestae in citeriore Hispania, bellum parabat. Ratio autem haec erat belli, ut se cum II legionibus Gades conferret, naves frumentumque omne ibi contineret; provinciam enim omnem Caesaris rebus favere cognoverat. In insula frumento navibusque comparatis bellum duci non difficile existimabat. Caesar, etsi multis necessariisque rebus in Italiam revocabatur, tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispaniis

relinquere, quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat.

19 Itaque duabus legionibus missis in ulteriorem Hispaniam cum Q. Cassio, tribuno plebis, ipse DC cum equitibus magnis itineribus progreditur edictumque praemittit, ad quam diem magistratus principesque omnium civitatum sibi esse praesto Cordubae vellet. Quo edicto tota provincia pervulgato nulla fuit civitas, quin ad id tempus partem senatus Cordubam mitteret, non civis Romanus paulo notior, quin ad diem conveniret. Simul ipse Cordubae conventus per se portas Varroni clausit, custodias vigiliisque in turribus muroque disposuit, cohortes duas, quae colonicae appellabantur, cum eo casu venissent, tuendi oppidi causa apud se retinuit. Eisdem diebus Carmo nenses, quae est longe firmissima totius provinciae civitas, deductis tribus in arcem oppidi cohortibus a Varrone praesidio, per se cohortes eiecit portasque praeclosit.

20 Hoc vero magis properare Varro, ut cum legionibus quam primum Gades contenderet, ne itinere aut traiectu intercluderetur: tanta ac tam secunda in Caesarem voluntas provinciae reperiebatur. Progresso ei paulo longius litterae Gadibus redduntur: simulatque sit cognitum de edicto Caesaris, consensisse Gaditanos principes eum tribunis cohortium, quae essent ibi in praesidio, ut Gallonium ex oppido expellerent, urbem insulamque Caesari servarent. Hoc inito consilio denuntiavisse Gallonio, ut sua sponte, dum sine periculo liceret, excederet Gadibus; si id non fecisset, sibi consilium capturos. Hoc timore adductum Gallonium Gadibus excessisse. His cognitis rebus altera ex duabus legionibus, quae vernacula appellabatur, ex castris Varronis adstante et inspectante ipso signa sustulit seseque Hispalim recepit atque in foro et porticibus sine maleficio consedit. Quod factum adeo eius conventus cives Romani comprobaverunt, ut

domum ad se quisque hospitio cupidissime reciperet. Quibus rebus perterritus Varro, cum itinere converso sese Italicam venturum praemisisset, certior ab suis factus est praeclusas esse portas. Tum vero omni interclusus itinere ad Caesarem mittit, paratum se esse legionem, cui iusserit, tradere. Ille ad eum Sextum Caesarem mittit atque huic tradi iubet. Tradita legione Varro Cordubam ad Caesarem venit; relatis ad eum publicis cum fide rationibus quod penes eum est pecuniae tradit et, quid ubique habeat frumenti et navium, ostendit.

21 Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus Romanis, quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere; Hispanis, quod praesidia expulissent; Gaditanis, quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque in libertatem vindicassent; tribunis militum centurionibusque, qui eo praesidii causa venerant, quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmassent. Pecunias, quas erant in publicum Varroni cives Romani polliciti, remittit; bona restituit eis, quos liberius locutos hanc poenam tulisse cognoverat. Tributis quibusdam populis publicis privatisque praemiis reliquos in posterum bona spe complet biduumque Cordubae commoratus Gades proficiscitur; pecunias monumentaque, quae ex fano Herculis collata erant in privatam domum, referri in templum iubet. Provinciae Q. Cassium praeficit; huic III legiones attribuit. Ipse eis navibus, quas M. Varro quasque Gaditani iussu Varronis fecerant, Tarraconem paucis diebus pervenit. Ibi totius fere citerioris provinciae legationes Caesaris adventum expectabant. Eadem ratione privatim ac publice quibusdam civitatibus habitis honoribus Tarracone discedit pedibusque Narbonem atque inde Massiliam pervenit. Ibi legem de dictatore latam seseque dictatorem dictum a M. Lepido praetore cognoscit.

22 Massilienses omnibus defessi malis, rei frumentariae ad

summam inopiam adducti, bis navali proelio superati, crebris eruptionibus fusi, gravi etiam pestilentia conflictati ex diutina conclusione et mutatione victus (panico enim vetere atque hordeo corrupto omnes alebantur, quod ad huiusmodi casus antiquitus paratum in publicum contulerant) deiecta turri, labefacta magna parte muri, auxiliis provinciarum et exercituum desperatis, quos in Caesaris potestatem venisse cognoverant, sese dedere sine fraude constituunt. Sed paucis ante diebus L. Domitius cognita Massiliensium voluntate navibus III comparatis, ex quibus duas familiaribus suis attribuerat, unam ipse conscenderat nactus turbidam tempestatem profectus est. Hunc conspicatae naves, quae iussu Bruti consuetudine cotidiana ad portum excubabant, sublatis ancoris sequi coeperunt. Ex his unum ipsius navigium contendit et fugere perseveravit auxilioque tempestatis ex conspectu abiit, duo perterrita concursu nostrarum navium sese in portum receperunt. Massilienses arma tormenta ex oppido, ut est imperatum, proferunt, naves ex portu navalibusque educunt, pecuniam ex publico tradunt. Quibus rebus confectis Caesar magis eos pro nomine et vetustate, quam pro meritis in se civitatis conservans duas ibi legiones praesidio relinquit, ceteras in Italiam mittit; ipse ad urbem proficiscitur.

23 Eisdem temporibus C. Curio in Africam profectus ex Sicilia et iam ab initio copias P. Attii Vari despiciens duas legiones ex IIII, quas a Caesare acceperat, D equites transportabat biduoque et noctibus tribus navigatione consumptis appellit ad eum locum, qui appellatur Anquillaria. Hic locus abest a Clupeis passuum XXII milia habetque non incommodam aestate stationem et duobus eminentibus promuntoriis continetur. Huius adventum L. Caesar filius cum X longis navibus ad Clupea praestolans, quas naves Uticae ex praedonum bello subductas P. Attius reficiendas huius belli causa

curaverat, veritus navium multitudinem ex alto refugerat appulsaque ad proximum litus trireme constrata et in litore relictas pedibus Adrumetum perfugerat. Id oppidum C. Considius Longus unius legionis praesidio tuebatur. Reliquae Caesaris naves eius fuga se Adrumetum receperunt. Hunc secutus Marcius Rufas quaestor navibus XII, quas praesidio onerariis navibus Curio ex Sicilia eduxerat, postquam in litore relictam navem conspexit, hanc remulco abstraxit; ipse ad C. Curionem cum classe rediit.

24 Curio Marcium Uticam navibus praemittit; ipse eodem cum exercitu proficiscitur biduique iter progressus ad flumen Bagradam pervenit. Ibi C. Caninium Rebilum legatum cum legionibus reliquit; ipse cum equitatu antecedit ad castra exploranda Cornelia, quod is locus peridoneus castris habebatur. Id autem est iugum directum eminens in mare, utraque ex parte praeruptum atque asperum, sed tamen paulo leniore fastigio ab ea parte, quae ad Uticam vergit. Abest directo itinere ab Utica paulo amplius passuum milibus III. Sed hoc itinere est fons, quo mare succedit longius, lateque is locus restagnat; quem si qui vitare voluerit, sex milium circuitu in oppidum pervenit.

25 Hoc explorato loco Curio castra Vari conspiciit muro oppidoque coniuncta ad portam, quae appellatur Belica, admodum munita natura loci, una ex parte ipso oppido Utica, altero a theatro, quod est ante oppidum, substructionibus eius operis maximis, aditu ad castra difficili et angusto. Simul animadvertit multa undique portari atque agi plenissimis viis, quae repentini tumultus timore ex agris in urbem conferantur. Huc equitatum mittit, ut diriperet atque haberet loco praedae; eodemque tempore his rebus subsidio DC Numidae ex oppido peditesque CCCC mittuntur a Varo, quos auxilii causa rex Iuba paucis diebus ante Uticam miserat. Huic et paternum hospitium

cum Pompeio et simultas cum Curione intercedebat, quod tribunus plebis legem promulgaverat, qua lege regnum Iubae publicaverat. Concurrunt equites inter se; neque vero primum impetum nostrorum Numidae ferre potuerunt, sed interfectis circiter CXX reliqui se in castra ad oppidum receperunt. Interim adventu longarum navium Curio pronuntiare onerariis navibus iubet, quae stabant ad Uticam numero circiter CC, se in hostium habiturum loco, qui non e vestigio ad castra Cornelia naves traduxisset. Qua pronuntiatione facta temporis puncto sublatis ancoris omnes Uticam relinquunt et quo imperatum est transeunt. Quae res omnium rerum copia complevit exercitum.

26 His rebus gestis Curio se in castra ad Bagradam recipit atque universi exercitus conclamatione imperator appellatur posteroque die exercitum Uticam ducit et prope oppidum castra ponit. Nondum opere castrorum perfecto equites ex statione nuntiant magna auxilia equitum peditumque ab rege missa Uticam venire; eodemque tempore vis magna pulveris cernebatur, et vestigio temporis primum agmen erat in conspectu. Novitate rei Curio permotus praemittit equites, qui primum impetum sustineant ac morentur; ipse celeriter ab opere deductis legionibus aciem instruit. Equitesque committunt proelium et, priusquam plane legiones explicari et consistere possent, tota auxilia regis impedita ac perturbata, quod nullo ordine et sine timore iter fecerant, in fugam coniciunt equitatuque omni fere incolumi, quod se per litora celeriter in oppidum recepit, magnum peditum numerum interficiunt.

27 Proxima nocte centuriones Marsi duo ex castris Curionis cum manipularibus suis XXII ad Attium Varum perfugiunt. Hi, sive vere quam habuerant opinionem ad eum perferunt, sive etiam auribus Vari serviunt (nam, quae volumus, et credimus libenter et, quae sentimus

ipsi, reliquos sentire speramus), confirmant quidem certe totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione maximeque opus esse in conspectum exercitus venire et colloquendi dare facultatem. Qua opinione adductus Varus postero die mane legiones ex castris educit. Facit idem Curio, atque una valle non magna interiecta suas uterque copias instruit.

28 Erat in exercitu Vari Sextus Quintilius Varus, quem fuisse Corfinii supra demonstratum est. Hic dimissus a Caesare in Africam venerat, legionesque eas traduxerat Curio, quas superioribus temporibus Corfinio receperat Caesar, adeo ut paucis mutatis centurionibus eidem ordines manipuli constarent. Hanc nactus appellationis causam Quintilius circuire aciem Curionis atque obsecrare milites coepit, ne primam sacramenti, quod apud Domitium atque apud se quaestorem dixissent, memoriam deponerent, neu contra eos arma ferrent, qui eadem essent usi fortuna eademque in obsidione perpassi, neu pro his pugnarent, a quibus cum contumelia perfugae appellarentur. Huc pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae ab sua liberalitate, si se atque Attium secuti essent, exspectare deberent. Hac habita oratione nullam in partem ab exercitu Curionis fit significatio, atque ita suas uterque copias reducit.

29 At in castris Curionis magnus omnium incessit timor animis. Is variis hominum sermonibus celeriter augetur. Unusquisque enim opiniones fingeat et ad id, quod ab alio audierat, sui aliquid timoris addebat. Hoc ubi uno auctore ad plures permanerat, atque alius alii tradiderat, plures auctores eius rei videbantur. Civile bellum; genus hominum, cui liceret libere facere et sequi, quod vellet; legiones eae, quae paulo ante apud adversarios fuerant, nam etiam Caesaris beneficium mutaverat consuetudo, qua offerrentur; municipia etiam

diversis partibus coniuncta, namque ex Marsis Pelignisque veniebant ei qui superiore nocte: haec in contuberniis commilitesque nonnulli graviora; sermones militum dubii durius accipiebantur, nonnulli etiam ab eis, qui diligentiores videri volebant, fingeantur.

30 Quibus de causis consilio convocato de summa rerum deliberare incipit. Erant sententiae, quae conandum omnibus modis castraque Vari oppugnanda censerent, quod in huiusmodi militum consiliis otium maxime contrarium esse arbitrantur; postremo praestare dicebant per virtutem in pugna belli fortunam experiri, quam desertos et circumventos ab suis gravissimum supplicium perpeti. Erant, qui censerent de tertia vigilia in castra Cornelia recedendum, ut maiore spatio temporis interiecto militum mentes sanarentur, simul, si quid gravius accidisset, magna multitudine navium et tutius et facilius in Siciliam receptus daretur.

31 Curio utrumque improbens consilium, quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi, tantum alteri superesse dicebat: hos turpissimae fugae rationem habere, illos etiam iniquo loco dimicandum putare. “Qua enim,” inquit, “fiducia et opere et natura loci munitissima castra expugnari posse confidimus? Aut vero quid proficimus, si accepto magno detrimento ab oppugnatione castrorum discedimus? Quasi non et felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia colligant! Castrorum autem mutatio quid habet nisi turpem fugam et desperationem omnium et alienationem exercitus? Nam neque prudentes suspicari oportet sibi parum credi, neque improbos scire sese timeri, quod his licentiam timor augeat noster, illis studia deminuat.” “Quod si iam,” inquit, “haec explorata habeamus, quae de exercitus alienatione dicuntur, quae quidem ego aut omnino falsa aut certe minora opinione esse confido, quanto haec dissimulari et occultari, quam per nos

confirmari praestet? An non, uti corporis vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda sunt tegenda, ne spem adversariis augeamus? At etiam, ut media nocte proficiscamur, addunt, quo maiorem, credo, licentiam habeant, qui peccare conentur. Namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur; quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Quare neque tanti sum animi, ut sine spe castra oppugnanda censeam, neque tanti timoris, uti spe deficiam, atque omnia prius experienda arbitror magna ex parte iam me una vobiscum de re iudicium facturum confido.”

32 Dimisso consilio contionem advocat militum. Commemorat, quo sit eorum usus studio ad Corfinium Caesar, ut magnam partem Italiae beneficio atque auctoritate eorum suam fecerit. “Vos enim vestrumque factum omnia,” inquit, “deinceps municipia sunt secuta, neque sine causa et Caesar amicissime de vobis et illi gravissime iudicaverunt. Pompeius enim nullo proelio pulsus vestri facti praeiudicio demotus Italia excessit; Caesar me, quem sibi carissimum habuit, provinciam Siciliam atque Africam, sine quibus urbem atque Italiam tueri non potest, vestrae fidei commisit. At sunt, qui vos hortentur, ut a nobis desciscatis. Quid enim est illis optatius, quam uno tempore et nos circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere? aut quid irati gravius de vobis sentire possunt, quam ut eos prodatis, qui se vobis omnia debere iudicant, in eorum potestatem veniatis, qui se per vos perisse existimant? An vero in Hispania res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos exercitus, duos superatos duces, duas receptas provincias? haec acta diebus XL, quibus in conspectum adversariorum venerit Caesar? An, qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt, perditum resistant? vos autem incerta victoria Caesarem secuti diiudicata iam belli fortuna victum sequamini, cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis? Desertos

enim se ac proditos a vobis dicunt et prioris sacramenti mentionem faciunt. Vosne vero L. Domitium, an vos Domitius deseruit? Nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos proiecit ille? nonne sibi clam salutem fuga petivit? nonne proditi per illum Caesaris beneficio estis conservati? Sacramento quidem vos tenere qui potuit, cum proiectis fascibus et deposito imperio privatus et captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem? Relinquitur nova religio, ut eo neglecto sacramento, quo tenemini, respiciatis illud, quod deditione ducis et capitis deminutione sublatum est. At, credo, si Caesarem probatis, in me offenditis. Qui de meis in vos meritis praedicaturus non sum, quae sunt adhuc et mea voluntate et vestra exspectatione leviora; sed tamen sui laboris milites semper eventu belli praemia petiverunt, qui qualis sit futurus, ne vos quidem dubitatis: diligentiam quidem nostram aut, quem ad finem adhuc res processit, fortunam cur praeteream? An poenitet vos, quod salvum atque incolumem exercitum nulla omnino nave desiderata traduxerim? quod classem hostium primo impetu adveniens profligaverim? quod his per biduum equestri proelio superaverim? quod ex portu sinuque adversariorum CC naves oneratas abduxerim eoque illos compulerim, ut neque pedestri itinere neque navibus commeatu iuvare possint? Hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis Corfiniensem ignominiam, Italiae fugam, Hispaniarum deditionem, Africi belli praeiudicia, sequimini! Equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. Cuius si vos poenitet, vestrum vobis beneficium remitto, mihi meum nomen restituite, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini.”

33 Qua oratione permoti milites crebro etiam dicentem interpellabant, ut magno cum dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur, discedentem vero ex contione universi

cohortantur, magno sit animo, necubi dubitet proelium committere et suam fidem virtutemque experiri. Quo facto commutata omnium et voluntate et opinione consensu summo constituit Curio, cum primum sit data potestas, proelio rem committere posteroque die productos eodem loco, quo superioribus diebus constiterat, in acie collocat. Ne Varus quidem dubitat copias producere, sive sollicitandi milites sive aequo loco dimicandi detur occasio, ne facultatem praetermittat.

34 Erat vallis inter duas acies, ut supra demonstratum est, non ita magna, at difficili et arduo ascensu. Hanc uterque, si adversariorum copiae transire conarentur, exspectabat, quo aequiore loco proelium committeret. Simul ab sinistro cornu P. Attii equitatus omnis et una levis armaturae interiecti complures, cum se in vallem demitterent, cernebantur. Ad eos Curio equitatum et duas Marrucinatorum cohortes mittit; quorum primum impetum equites hostium non tulerunt, sed admissis equis ad suos refugerunt; relictis ab his, qui una procurrerant levis armaturae, circumveniebantur atque interficiebantur ab nostris. Huc tota Vari conversa acies suos fugere et concidi videbat. Tunc Rebilus, legatus Caesaris, quem Curio secum ex Sicilia duxerat, quod magnum habere usum in re militari sciebat, “perterritum,” inquit, “hostem vides, Curio: quid dubitas uti temporis opportunitate?” Ille unum elocutus, ut memoria tenerent milites ea, quae pridie sibi confirmassent, sequi sese iubet et praecurrit ante omnes. Adeo erat impedita vallis, ut in ascensu nisi sublevati a suis primi non facile eniterentur. Sed praeoccupatus animus Attianorum militum timore et fuga et caede suorum nihil de resistendo cogitabat, omnesque se iam ab equitatu circumveniri arbitrabantur. Itaque priusquam telum abici posset, aut nostri propius accederent, omnis Vari acies terga vertit seque in castra recepit.

35 Qua in fuga Fabius Pelignus quidam ex infimis ordinibus de

exercitu Curionis primus agmen fugientium consecutus magna voce Varum nomine appellans requirebat, uti unus esse ex eius militibus et monere aliquid velle ac dicere videretur. Ubi ille saepius appellatus aspexit ac restitit et, quis esset aut quid vellet, quaesivit, umerum apertum gladio appetit paulumque afuit, quin Varum interficeret; quod ille periculum sublato ad eius conatum scuto vitavit. Fabius a proximis militibus circumventus interficitur. Hac fugientium multitudine ac turba portae castrorum occupantur atque iter impeditur, pluresque in eo loco sine vulnere quam in proelio aut fuga intereunt, neque multum afuit, quin etiam castris expellerentur, ac nonnulli protinus eodem cursu in oppidum contenderunt. Sed cum loci natura et munitio castrorum aditum prohibebant, tum quod ad proelium egressi Curionis milites eis rebus indigebant, quae ad oppugnationem castrorum erant usui. Itaque Curio exercitum in castra reducit suis omnibus praeter Fabium incolumibus, ex numero adversariorum circiter DC interfectis ac mille vulneratis; qui omnes discessu Curionis multique praeterea per simulationem vulnere ex castris in oppidum propter timorem sese recipiunt. Qua re animadversa Varus et terrore exercitus cognito bucinatore in castris et paucis ad speciem tabernaculis relictis de tertia vigilia silentio exercitum in oppidum reducit.

36 Postero die Curio obsidere Uticam et vallo circummunire instituit. Erat in oppido multitudo insolens belli diuturnitate otii, Uticenses pro quibusdam Caesaris in se beneficiis illi amicissimi, conventus is, qui ex variis generibus constaret, terror ex superioribus proeliis magnus. Itaque de deditione omnes palam loquebantur et cum P. Attio agebant, ne sua pertinacia omnium fortunas perturbari vellet. Haec cum agerentur, nuntii praemissi ab rege Iuba venerunt, qui ilium adesse cum magnis copiis dicerent et de custodia ac

defensione urbis hortarentur. Quae res eorum perterritos animos confirmavit.

³⁷ Nuntiabantur haec eadem Curioni, sed aliquamdiu fides fieri non poterat: tantam habebat suarum rerum fiduciam. Iamque Caesaris in Hispania res secundae in Africam nuntiis ac litteris perferebantur. Quibus omnibus rebus sublatus nihil contra se regem nisurum existimabat. Sed ubi certis auctoribus comperit minus V et XX milibus longe ab Utica eius copias abesse, relictis munitionibus sese in castra Cornelia recepit. Huc frumentum comportare, castra munire, materiam conferre coepit statimque in Siciliam misit, uti duae legiones reliquusque equitatus ad se mitteretur. Castra erant ad bellum ducendum aptissima natura loci et munitione et maris propinquitate et aquae et salis copia, cuius magna vis iam ex proximis erat salinis eo congesta. Non materia multitudine arborum, non frumentum, cuius erant plenissimi agri, deficere poterat. Itaque omnium suorum consensu Curio reliquas copias exspectare et bellum ducere parabat.

³⁸ His constitutis rebus probatisque consiliis ex perfugis quibusdam oppidanis audit Iubam revocatum finitimo bello et controversiis Leptitanorum restitisse in regno, Saburram, eius praefectum, cum mediocribus copiis missum Uticae appropinquare. His auctoribus temere credens consilium commutat et proelio rem committere constituit. Multum ad hanc rem probandam adiuvat adulescentia, magnitudo animi, superioris temporis proventus, fiducia rei bene gerendae. His rebus impulsus equitatum omnem prima nocte ad castra hostium mittit ad flumen Bagradam, quibus praeerat Saburra, de quo ante erat auditum; sed rex omnibus copiis insequabatur et sex milium passuum intervallo a Saburra consederat. Equites missi nocte iter conficiunt, imprudentes atque inopinantes

hostes aggrediuntur. Numidae enim quadam barbara consuetudine nullis ordinibus passim consederant. Hos oppressos somno et dispersos adorti magnum eorum numerum interficiunt; multi perterriti profugiunt. Quo facto ad Curionem equites revertuntur captivosque ad eum reducunt.

39 Curio cum omnibus copiis quarta vigilia exierat cohortibus V castris praesidio relictis. Progressus milia passuum VI equites convenit, rem gestam cognovit; e captivis quaerit, quis castris ad Bagram praesit: respondent Saburram. Reliqua studio itineris conficiendi quaerere praetermittit proximaque respiciens signa, “videtisne,” inquit, “milites, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire? abesse regem, exiguas esse copias missas, quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? Proinde ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus.” Erant per se magna, quae gesserant equites, praesertim cum eorum exiguus numerus cum tanta multitudine Numidarum confertur. Haec tamen ab ipsis inflatius commemorabantur, ut de suis homines laudibus libenter praedicant. Multa praeterea spolia praeferebantur, capti homines equique producebantur, ut, quicquid intercederet temporis, hoc omne victoriam morari videretur. Ita spei Curionis militum studia non deerant. Equites sequi iubet sese iterque accelerat, ut quam maxime ex fuga perterritos adoriri posset. At illi itinere totius noctis confecti subsequi non poterant, atque alii alio loco resistebant. Ne haec quidem Curionem ad spem morabantur.

40 Iuba certior factus a Saburra de nocturno proelio II milia Hispanorum et Gallorum equitum, quos suae custodiae causa circum se habere consuevit, et peditum eam partem, cui maxime confidebat, Saburrae submisit; ipse cum reliquis copiis elephantisque LX lentius subsequitur. Suspensus praemissis equitibus ipsum affore Curionem

Saburra copias equitum peditumque instruit atque his imperat, ut simulatione timoris paulatim cedant ac pedem referant: sese, cum opus esset, signum proelii daturum et, quod rem postulare cognovisset, imperaturum. Curio ad superiorem spem addita praesentis temporis opinione hostes fugere arbitratus copias ex locis superioribus in campum deducit.

41 Quibus ex locis cum longius esset progressus, confecto iam labore exercitu XII milium spatio constitit. Dat suis signum Saburra, aciem constituit et circumire ordines atque hortari incipit; sed peditatu dumtaxat procul ad speciem utitur, equites in aciem immittit. Non deest negotio Curio suosque hortatur, ut spem omnem in virtute reponant. Ne militibus quidem ut defessis neque equitibus ut paucis et labore confectis studium ad pugnandum virtusque deerat; sed hi erant numero CC, reliqui in itinere substiterant. Hi, quamcumque in partem impetum fecerant, hostes loco cedere cogebant, sed neque longius fugientes prosequi neque vehementius equos incitare poterant. At equitatus hostium ab utroque cornu circuire aciem nostram et aversos proterere incipit. Cum cohortes ex acie procucurrissent, Numidae integri celeritate impetum nostrorum effugiebant rursusque ad ordines suos se recipientes circuibant et ab acie excludebant. Sic neque in loco manere ordinesque servare neque procurrere et casum subire tutum videbatur. Hostium copiae submissis ab rege auxiliis crebro augebantur; nostros vires lassitudine deficiebant, simul ei, qui vulnera acceperant, neque acie excedere neque in locum tutum referri poterant, quod tota acies equitatu hostium circumdata tenebatur. Hi de sua salute desperantes, ut extremo vitae tempore homines facere consuerunt, aut suam mortem miserabantur aut parentes suos commendabant, si quos ex eo periculo fortuna servare potuisset. Plena erant omnia timoris et

luctus.

42 Curio, ubi perterritis omnibus neque cohortationes suas neque preces audiri intellegit, unam ut in miseris rebus spem reliquam salutis esse arbitratus, proximos colles capere universos atque eo signa inferri iubet. Hos quoque praeoccupat missus a Saburra equitatus. Tum vero ad summam desperationem nostri perveniunt et partim fugientes ab equitatu interficiuntur, partim integri procumbunt. Hortatur Curionem Cn. Domitius, praefectus equitum, cum paucis equitibus circumstans, ut fuga salutem petat atque in castra contendat, et se ab eo non discessurum pollicetur. At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quem a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur. Equites ex proelio perpauca se recipiunt; sed ei, quos ad novissimum agmen equorum reficiendorum causa substitisse demonstratum est, fuga totius exercitus procul animadversa sese incolumes in castra conferunt. Milites ad unum omnes interficiuntur.

43 His rebus cognitis Marcius Rufus quaestor in castris relictus a Curione cohortatur suos, ne animo deficiant. Illi orant atque obsecrant, ut in Siciliam navibus reportentur. Pollicetur magistrisque imperat navium, ut primo vespere omnes scaphas ad litus appulsas habeant. Sed tantus fuit omnium terror, ut alii adesse copias Iubae dicerent, alii cum legionibus instare Varum iamque se pulverem venientium cernere, quarum rerum nihil omnino acciderat, alii classem hostium celeriter advolaturam suspicarentur. Itaque perterritis omnibus sibi quisque consulebat. Qui in classe erant, proficisci properabant. Horum fuga navium onerariarum magistros incitabat; pauci lenunculi ad officium imperiumque conveniebant. Sed tanta erat completis litoribus contentio, qui potissimum ex magno numero conscenderent, ut multitudine atque onere nonnulli

deprimerentur, reliqui hoc timore propius adire tardarentur.

44 Quibus rebus accidit, ut pauci milites patresque familiae, qui aut gratia aut misericordia valerent aut naves adnare possent, recepti in Siciliam incolumes pervenirent. Reliquae copiae missis ad Varum noctu legatorum numero centurionibus sese ei dediderunt. Quarum cohortium milites postero die ante oppidum Iuba conspicatus suam esse praedicans praedam magnam partem eorum interfici iussit, paucos electos in regnum remisit, cum Varus suam fidem ab eo laedi quereretur neque resistere auderet. Ipse equo in oppidum vectus prosequentibus compluribus senatoribus, quo in numero erat Ser. Sulpicius et Licinius Damasippus paucis, quae fieri vellet, Uticae constituit atque imperavit diebusque post paucis se in regnum cum omnibus copiis recepit.

LIBER III

¹ Dictatore habente comitia Caesare consules creantur Iulius Caesar et P. Servilius: is enim erat annus, quo per leges ei consulem fieri liceret. His rebus confectis, cum fides tota Italia esset angustior neque creditae pecuniae solverentur, constituit, ut arbitri darentur; per eos fierent aestimationes possessionum et rerum, quanti quaeque earum ante bellum fuisset, atque eae creditoribus traderentur. Hoc et ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum minuendumve, qui fere bella et civiles dissensiones sequi consuevit, et ad debitorum tuendam existimationem esse aptissimum existimavit. Itemque praetoribus tribunisque plebis rogationes ad populum ferentibus nonnullos ambitus Pompeia lege damnatos illis temporibus, quibus in urbe praesidia legionum Pompeius habuerat, quae iudicia aliis audientibus iudicibus, aliis sententiam ferentibus singulis diebus erant perfecta, in integrum restituit, qui se illi initio civilis belli obtulerant, si sua opera in bello uti vellet, proinde aestimans, ac si usus esset, quoniam sui fecissent potestatem. Statuerat enim prius hos iudicio populi debere restitui, quam suo beneficio videri receptos, ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in praeripiendo populi beneficio videretur.

² His rebus et feriis Latinis comitiisque omnibus perficiendis XI dies tribuit dictaturaque se abdicat et ab urbe proficiscitur Brundisiumque pervenit. Eo legiones XII, equitatum omnem venire iusserat. Sed tantum navium repperit, ut anguste XV milia legionariorum militum, DC equites transportari possent. Hoc unum Caesari ad celeritatem conficiendi belli defuit. Atque hae ipsae copiae hoc infrequentiores imponuntur, quod multi Gallicis tot bellis defecerant, longumque iter ex Hispania magnum numerum

deminuerat, et gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium ex saluberrimis Galliae et Hispaniae regionibus omnem exercitum valetudine temptaverat.

3 Pompeius annum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus, quod vacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat, magnam ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis, Corcyra, Athenis, Ponto, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice, Aegypto classem coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curaverat; magnam imperatam Asiae, Syriae regibusque omnibus et dynastis et tetrarchis et liberis Achaiae populis pecuniam exegerat, magnam societates Carum provinciarum, quas ipse obtinebat, sibi numerare coegerat.

4 Legiones effecerat civium Romanorum VIII: V ex Italia, quas traduxerat; unam ex Cilicia veteranam, quam factam ex duabus gemellam appellabat; unam ex Creta et Macedonia ex veteranis militibus, qui dimissi a superioribus imperatoribus in his provinciis consederant; duas ex Asia, quas Lentulus consul conscribendas curaverat. Praeterea magnum numerum ex Thessalia, Boeotia, Achaia Epiroque supplementi nomine in legiones distribuerat: his Antonianos milites admiscuerat. Praeter has exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones II. Sagittarios Creta, Lacedaemone, ex Ponto atque Syria reliquisque civitatibus III milia numero habebat, funditorum cohortes sescenarias II, equitum VII milia. Ex quibus DC Gallos Deiotarus adduxerat, D Ariobarzanes ex Cappadocia; ad eundem numerum Cotys ex Thracia dederat et Sadalam filium miserat; ex Macedonia CC erant, quibus Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute; D ex Gabinianis Alexandria, Gallos Germanosque, quos ibi A. Gabinius praesidii causa apud regem Ptolomaeum reliquerat, Pompeius filius eum classe adduxerat; DCCC ex servis suis pastorumque suorum numero coegerat; CCC Tarcondarius

Castor et Domnilaus ex Gallograecia dederant (horum alter una venerat, alter filium miserat); CC ex Syria a Commageno Antiocho, cui magna Pompeius praemia tribuit, missi erant, in his plerique hippotoxotae. Huc Dardanos, Bessos partim mercenarios, partim imperio aut gratia comparatos, item Macedones, Thessalos ac reliquarum gentium et civitatum adiecerat atque eum, quem supra demonstravimus, numerum expleverat.

5 Frumenti vim maximam ex Thessalia, Asia, Aegypto, Creta, Cyrenis reliquisque regionibus comparaverat. Hiemare Dyrrachii, Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat, ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritima classem disposuerat. Praeerat Aegyptiis navibus Pompeius filius, Asiaticis D. Laelius et C. Triarius, Syriacis C. Cassius, Rhodiis C. Marcellus cum C. Coponio, Liburnicae atque Achaicae classi Scribonius Libo et M. Octavius. Toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat; ad hunc summa imperii respiciebat.

6 Caesar, ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus omnibus, imperaret, quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse facturos, II. Non. Ian. naves solvit. Impositae, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones VII. Postridie terram attigit. Inter Cerauniorum saxa et alia loca periculosa quietam nactus stationem et portus omnes timens, quos teneri ab adversariis arbitrabatur, ad eum locum, qui appellabatur Palaeste, omnibus navibus ad unam incolumibus milites exposuit.

7 Erat Orici Lucretius Vespillo et Minucius Rufus cum Asiaticis navibus XVIII, quibus iussu D. Laelii praeerant, M. Bibulus cum navibus ex Corcyrae. Sed neque illi sibi confisi ex portu prodire sunt ausi, cum Caesar omnino XII naves longas praesidio duxisset, in quibus erant constratae IIII, neque Bibulus impeditis navibus dispersisque remigibus satis mature occurrit, quod prius ad continentem visus est Caesar, quam de eius adventu fama omnino in eas regiones perferretur.

8 Eitis militibus naves eadem nocte Brundisium a Caesare remittuntur, ut reliquae legiones equitatusque transportari possent. Huic officio praepositus erat Fufius Calenus legatus, qui celeritatem in transportandis legionibus adhiberet. Sed serius a terra provectae naves neque usae nocturna aura in redeundo offenderunt. Bibulus enim Corcyrae certior factus de adventu Caesaris, sperans alicui se parti onustarum navium occurrere posse, inanibus occurrit et nactus circiter XXX in eas indiligentiae suae ac doloris iracundiam erupit omnesque incendit eodemque igne nautas dominosque navium interfecit, magnitudine poenae reliquos terreri sperans. Hoc confecto negotio a Sasonis ad Curici portum stationes litoraue omnia longe lateque classibus occupavit custodiisque diligentius dispositis ipse gravissima hieme in navibus excubans neque ullum laborem aut munus despiciens, neque subsidium exspectans si in Caesaris complexum venire posset . . .

9 Discessu Liburnarum ex Illyrico M. Octavius cum eis, quas habebat, navibus Salonas pervenit. Ibi concitatis Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris Issam a Caesaris amicitia avertit; conventum Salonis cum neque pollicitationibus neque denuntiatione periculi permovere posset, oppidum oppugnare instituit. Est autem oppidum et loci natura et colle munitum. Sed celeriter cives Romani ligneis

effectis turribus his sese munierunt et, cum essent infirmi ad resistendum propter paucitatem hominum crebris confecti vulneribus, ad extremum auxilium descenderunt servosque omnes puberes liberaverunt et praeseclis omnium mulierum crinibus tormenta effecerunt. Quorum cognita sententia Octavius quinis castris oppidum circumdedit atque uno tempore obsidione et oppugnationibus eos premere coepit. Illi omnia perpeti parati maxime a re frumentaria laborabant. Cui rei missis ad Caesarem legatis auxilium ab eo petebant; reliqua, ut poterant, incommoda per se sustinebant. Et longo interposito spatio cum diuturnitas oppugnationis neglegentiores Octavianos effecisset, nacti occasionem meridiani temporis discessu eorum pueris mulieribusque in muro dispositis, ne quid cotidiana consuetudinis desideraretur, ipsi manu facta cum eis, quos nuper liberaverant, in proxima Octavii castra irruperunt. His expugnatis eodem impetu altera sunt adorti, inde tertia et quarta et deinceps reliqua omnibusque eos castris expulerunt et magno numero interfecto reliquos atque ipsum Octavium in naves confugere coegerunt. Hic fuit oppugnationis exitus. Iamque hiems appropinquabat, et tantis detrimentis acceptis Octavius desperata oppugnatione oppidi Dyrrachium sese ad Pompeium recepit.

10 Demonstravimus L. Vibullium Rufum, Pompei praefectum, bis in potestatem pervenisse Caesaris atque ab eo esse dimissum, semel ad Corfinium, iterum in Hispania. Hunc pro suis beneficiis Caesar idoneum iudicaverat, quem cum mandatis ad Cn. Pompeium mitteret, eundemque apud Cn. Pompeium auctoritatem habere intellegebat. Erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrumque pertinaciae finem facere et ab armis discedere neque amplius fortunam periclitari. Satis esse magna utrimque incommoda accepta, quae pro

disciplina et praeceptis habere possent, ut reliquos casus timerent: illum Italia expulsum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis et cohortibus in Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum centum atque XXX; se morte Curionis et detrimento Africani exercitus tanto militumque deditione ad Curictam. Proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent, cum, quantum in bello fortuna posset, iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent documento. Hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si vero alteri paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum confideret. Condiciones pacis, quoniam antea convenire non potuissent, Romae ab senatu et a populo peti debere. Interea et rei publicae et ipsis placere oportere, si uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum. Depositis armis auxiliisque, quibus nunc confiderent, necessario populi senatusque iudicio fore utrumque contentum. Haec quo facilius Pompeio probari possent, omnes suas terrestres ubique copias dimissurum . . .

11 Vibullius his expositis Corcyrae non minus necessarium esse existimavit de repentino adventu Caesaris Pompeium fieri certiore, uti ad id consilium capere posset, antequam de mandatis agi inciperetur, atque ideo continuato nocte ac die itinere atque omnibus oppidis mutatis ad celeritatem iumentis ad Pompeium contendit, ut adesse Caesarem nuntiaret. Pompeius erat eo tempore in Candavia iterque ex Macedonia in hiberna Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque habebat. Sed re nova perturbatus maioribus itineribus Apolloniam petere coepit, ne Caesar orae maritimae civitates occuparet. At ille expositis militibus eodem die Oricum proficiscitur. Quo cum venisset, L. Torquatus, qui iussu Pompei oppido praeerat

praesidiumque ibi Parthinorum habebat, conatus portis clausis oppidum defendere, cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnatos esse negarent, oppidani autem etiam sua sponte Caesarem recipere conarentur, desperatis omnibus auxiliis portas aperuit et se atque oppidum Caesari dedit incolumisque ab eo conservatus est.

12 Recepto Caesar Orico nulla interposita mora Apolloniam proficiscitur. Cuius adventu audito L. Staberius, qui ibi praeerat, aquam comportare in arcem atque eam munire obsidesque ab Apolloniatibus exigere coepit. Illi vero daturos se negare, neque portas consuli praeclusuros, neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populusque Romanus indicavisset. Quorum cognita voluntate clam profugit Apollonia Staberius. Illi ad Caesarem legatos mittunt oppidoque recipiunt. Hos sequuntur Bullidenses, Amantini et reliquae finitimae civitates totaque Epiros et legatis ad Caesarem missis, quae imperaret, facturos pollicentur.

13 At Pompeius cognitis his rebus, quae erant Orici atque Apolloniae gestae, Dyrrachio timens diurnis eo nocturnisque itineribus contendit. Simul Caesar appropinquare dicebatur, tantusque terror incidit eius exercitui, quod properans noctem diei coniunxerat neque iter intermiserat, ut paene omnes ex Epiro finitimisque regionibus signa relinquerent, complures arma proicerent ac fugae simile iter videretur. Sed cum prope Dyrrachium Pompeius constitisset castraque metari iussisset, perterritus etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset. Hoc idem reliqui iurant legati; tribuni militum centurionesque sequuntur, atque idem omnis exercitus iurat. Caesar praeoccupato itinere ad Dyrrachium finem properandi facit castraque ad flumen Apsum ponit

in finibus Apolloniatium, ut bene meritae civitates tutae essent praesidio, ibique reliquarum ex Italia legionum adventum exspectare et sub pellibus hiemare constituit. Hoc idem Pompeius fecit et trans flumen Apsum positis castris eo copias omnes auxiliaque conduxit.

14 Calenus legionibus equitibusque Brundisii in naves impositis, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, quantum navium facultatem habebat, naves solvit paulumque a portu progressus litteras a Caesare accipit, quibus est certior factus portus litoraue omnia classibus adversariorum teneri. Quo cognito se in portum recipit navesque omnes revocat. Una ex his, quae perseveravit neque imperio Caleni obtemperavit, quod erat sine militibus privatoque consilio administrabatur, delata Oricum atque a Bibulo expugnata est; qui de servis liberisque omnibus ad impuberes supplicium sumit et ad unum interficit. Ita exiguo tempore magnoque casu totius exercitus salus constitit.

15 Bibulus, ut supra demonstratum est, erat cum classe ad Oricum et, sicuti mari portibusque Caesarem prohibebat, ita ipse omni terra earum regionum prohibebatur; praesidiis enim dispositis omnia litora a Caesare tenebantur, neque lignandi atque aquandi neque naves ad terram religandi potestas fiebat. Erat res in magna difficultate, summisque angustiis rerum necessariarum premebantur, adeo ut cogerentur sicuti reliquum commeatum ita ligna atque aquam Corcyra navibus onerariis supportare; atque etiam uno tempore accidit, ut difficilioribus usi tempestatibus ex pellibus, quibus erant tectae naves, nocturnum excipere rorem cogerentur; quas tamen difficultates patienter atque aequo animo ferebant neque sibi nudanda litora et relinquendos portus existimabant. Sed cum essent in quibus demonstravi angustiis, ac se Libo cum Bibulo coniunxisset, loquuntur ambo ex navibus cum M. Acilio et Statio Murco legatis;

quorum alter oppidi muris, alter praesidiis terrestribus praeerat: velle se de maximis rebus cum Caesare loqui, si sibi eius rei facultas detur. Huc addunt pauca rei confirmandae causa, ut de compositione acturi viderentur. Interim postulant ut sint indutiae, atque ab eis impetrant. Magnum enim, quod afferebant, videbatur, et Caesarem id summe sciebant cupere, et profectum aliquid Vibulli mandatis existimabatur.

16 Caesar eo tempore cum legione una profectus ad recipiendas ultiores civitates et rem frumentariam expediendam, qua angusta utebatur, erat ad Buthrotum, oppidum oppositum Corcyrae. Ibi certior ab Acilio et Murco per litteras factus de postulatis Libonis et Bibuli legionem relinquit; ipse Oricum revertitur. Eo cum venisset, evocantur illi ad colloquium. Prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum, quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas: ob eam causam colloquium vitasse, ne res maximae spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia impedirentur. Suam summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem, ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur, sed potestatem eius rei nullam habere, propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint. Sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium, atque illum reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis. Interea manerent indutiae, dum ab illo rediri posset, neve alter alteri noceret. Huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque suis.

17 Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Caesar existimavit, neque nunc, ut memoriae prodantur, satis causae putamus. Postulabat Caesar, ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium sine periculo mittere liceret, idque ipsi fore reciperent aut acceptos per se ad eum perducerent. Quod ad indutias pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam, ut illi classe naves auxiliaque sua impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos

prohiberet. Si hoc sibi remitti vellent, remitterent ipsi de maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent, se quoque id retenturum. Nihilo minus tamen agi posse de compositione, ut haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi esse impedimento. Libo neque legatos Caesaris recipere neque periculum praestare eorum, sed totam rem ad Pompeium reicere: unum instare de indutiis vehementissimeque contendere. Quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis periculi atque inopiae vitandae causa omnem orationem instituisse neque ullam spem aut condicionem pacis afferre, ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit.

18 Bibulus multos dies terra prohibitus et graviore morbo ex frigore et labore implicitus, cum neque curari posset neque susceptum officium deserere vellet, vim morbi sustinere non potuit. Eo mortuo ad neminem unum summa imperii redit, sed separatim suam quisque classem ad arbitrium suum administrabat. Vibullius sedato tumultu, quem repentinus adventus Caesaris concitaverat, ubi primum e re visum est, adhibito Libone et L. Luceio et Theophane, quibuscum communicare de maximis rebus Pompeius consueverat, de mandatis Caesaris agere instituit. Quem ingressum in sermonem Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit. “Quid mihi,” inquit, “aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum, reductus existimabor bello periecto.” Ab eis Caesar haec facta cognovit, qui sermoni interfuerunt; conatus tamen nihilo minus est aliis rationibus per colloquia de pace agere.

19 Inter bina castra Pompei atque Caesaris unum flumen tantum intererat Apsus, crebraque inter se colloquia milites habebant, neque ullum interim telum per pactiones loquentium traiciebatur. Mittit P. Vatinium legatum ad ripam ipsam fluminis, qui ea, quae maxime ad

pacem pertinere viderentur, ageret et crebro magna voce pronuntiaret, liceretne civibus ad cives de pace legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim eum id agerent, ne cives cum civibus armis decertarent? Multa suppliciter locutus est, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus. Responsum est ab altera parte Aulum Varronem profiteri se altera die ad colloquium venturum atque una visurum, quemadmodum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent; certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. Quo cum esset postero die ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaue erat exspectatio eius rei, atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur. Qua ex frequentia, Titus Labienus prodit, sed missa oratione de pace, loqui atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit. Quorum mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa; quae ille obtectus armis militum vitavit; vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, centuriones militesque nonnulli. Tum Labienus: “desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest.”

20 Eisdem temporibus M. Caelius Rufus praetor causa debitorum suscepta initio magistratus tribunal suum iuxta C. Treboni, praetoris urbani, sellam collocavit et, si quis appellavisset de aestimatione et de solutionibus, quae per arbitrum fierent, ut Caesar praesens constituerat, fore auxilio pollicebatur. Sed fiebat aequitate decreti et humanitate Treboni, qui his temporibus clementer et moderate ius dicendum existimabat, ut reperiri non possent, a quibus initium appellandi nasceretur. Nam fortasse inopiam excusare et calamitatem aut propriam suam aut temporum queri et difficultates auctionandi proponere etiam mediocris est animi; integras vero tenere

possessiones, qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae est? Itaque, hoc qui postularet reperiebatur nemo. Atque ipsis, ad quorum commodum pertinebat, durior inventus est Caelius. Et ab hoc profectus initio, ne frustra ingressus turpem causam videretur, legem promulgavit, ut sexenni die sine usuris creditae pecuniae solvantur.

21 Cum resisteret Servilius consul reliquique magistratus, et minus opinione sua efficeret, ad hominum excitanda studia sublata priore lege duas promulgavit: unam, qua mercedes habitationum annuas conductoribus donavit, aliam tabularum novarum, impetuque multitudinis in C. Trebonium facto et nonnullis vulneratis eum de tribunali deturbavit. De quibus rebus Servilius consul ad senatum rettulit, senatusque Caelium ab re publica removendum censuit. Hoc decreto eum consul senatu prohibuit et contionari conantem de rostris deduxit. Ille ignominia et dolore permotus palam se proficisci ad Caesarem simulavit; clam nuntiis ad Milonem missis, qui Clodio interfecto eo nomine erat damnatus, atque eo in Italiam evocato, quod magnis muneribus datis gladiatoriae familiae reliquias habebat, sibi coniunxit atque eum in Thurinum ad sollicitandos pastores praemisit. Ipse cum Casilinum venisset, unoque tempore signa eius militaria atque arma Capuae essent comprehensa et familia Neapoli visa, quae prodicionem oppidi appararet, patefactis consiliis exclusus Capua et periculum veritus, quod conventus arma ceperat atque eum hostis loco habendum existimabat, consilio destitit atque eo itinere sese avertit.

22 Interim Milo dimissis circum municipia litteris, se ea, quae faceret, iussu atque imperio facere Pompei, quae mandata ad se per Vibullium delata essent, quos ex acre alieno laborare arbitrabatur, sollicitabat. Apud quos cum proficere nihil posset, quibusdam solutis

ergastulis Cosam in agro Thurino oppugnare coepit. Eo cum a Q. Pedio praetore cum legione . . . lapide ictus ex muro periit. Et Caelius profectus, ut dictitabat, ad Caesarem pervenit Thurios. Ubi cum quosdam eius municipii sollicitaret equitibusque Caesaris Gallis atque Hispanis, qui eo praesidii causa missi erant, pecuniam polliceretur, ab his est interfectus. Ita magnarum initia rerum, quae occupatione magistratuum et temporum sollicitam Italiam habebant, celerem et facilem exitum habuerunt.

23 Libo profectus ab Orico cum classe, cui praeerat, navium L, Brundisium venit insulamque, quae contra portum Brundisinum est, occupavit, quod praestare arbitrabatur unum locum, qua necessarius nostris erat egressus, quam omnia litora ac portus custodia clausos teneri. Hic repentino adventu naves onerarias quasdam nactus incendit et unam frumento onustam abduxit magnumque nostris terrorem iniecit et noctu militibus ac sagittariis in terram expositis praesidium equitum deiecit et adeo loci opportunitate profecit, uti ad Pompeium litteras mitteret, naves reliquas, si vellet, subduci et refici iuberet: sua classe auxilia sese Caesaris prohibiturum.

24 Erat eo tempore Antonius Brundisii; is virtute militum confisus scaphas navium magnarum circiter LX cratibus pluteisque contextit eoque milites delectos imposuit atque eas in litore pluribus locis separatim disposuit navesque triremes duas, quas Brundisii faciendas curaverat, per causam exercendorum remigum ad fauces portus prodire iussit. Has cum audacius progressas Libo vidisset, sperans intercipi posse, quadriremes V ad eas misit. Quae cum navibus nostris appropinquassent, nostri veterani in portum refugiebant: illi studio incitati incautius sequebantur. Iam ex omnibus partibus subito Antonianae scaphae signo dato se in hostes incitaverunt primoque impeto unam ex his quadriremibus cum remigibus defensoribusque

suis ceperunt, reliquas turpiter refugere coegerunt. Ad hoc detrimentum accessit, ut equitibus per oram maritimam ab Antonio dispositis aquari prohiberentur. Qua necessitate et ignominia permotus Libo discessit a Brundisio obsessionemque nostrorum omisit.

25 Multi iam menses erant et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant. Ac nonnullae eius rei praetermissae occasiones Caesari videbantur, quod certi saepe flaverant venti, quibus necessario committendum existimabat. Quantoque eius amplius processerat temporis, tanto erant alacriores ad custodias, qui classibus praeerant, maioremque fiduciam prohibendi habebant, et crebris Pompei litteris castigabantur, quoniam primo venientem Caesarem non prohibuissent, ut reliquos eius exercitus impedirent, duriusque cotidie tempus ad transportandum lenioribus ventis exspectabant. Quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad suos severius scripsit, nacti idoneum ventum ne occasionem navigandi dimitterent, sive ad litora Apolloniatium sive ad Labeatium cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere possent. Haec a custodiis classium loca maxime vacabant, quod se longius a portibus committere non audebant.

26 Illi adhibita audacia et virtute administrantibus M. Antonio et Fufio Caleno, multum ipsis militibus hortantibus neque ullum periculum pro salute Caesaris recusantibus nacti austrum naves solvunt atque altero die Apolloniam praetervehuntur. Qui cum essent ex continenti visi, Coponius, qui Dyrrachii classi Rhodiae praeerat, naves ex portu educit, et cum iam nostris remissiore vento appropinquasset, idem auster increbuit nostrisque praesidio fuit. Neque vero ille ob eam causam conatu desistebat, sed labore et perseverantia nautarum etiam vim tempestatis superari posse

sperabat praetervectosque Dyrrachium magna vi venti nihilo secius sequebatur. Nostri usi fortunae beneficio tamen impetum classis timebant, si forte ventus remisisset. Nacti portum, qui appellatur Nymphaeum, ultra Lissum milia passuum III, eo naves introduxerunt (qui portus ab Africo tegebatur, ab austro non erat tutus) leviusque tempestatis quam classis periculum aestimaverunt. Quo simulatque introitum est, incredibili felicitate auster, qui per biduum flaverat, in Africum se vertit.

27 Hic subitam commutationem fortunae videre licuit. Qui modo sibi timuerant, hos tutissimus portus recipiebat; qui nostris navibus periculum intulerant, de suo timere cogeantur. Itaque tempore commutato tempestas et nostros texit et naves Rhodias afflixit, ita ut ad unam omnes, constratae numero XVI, eliderentur et naufragio interirent, et ex magno remigum propugnatorumque numero pars ad scopulos allisa interficeretur, pars ab nostris detraheretur; quos omnes conservatos Caesar domum dimisit.

28 Nostrae naves duae tardius cursu confecto in noctem coniectae, cum ignorarent, quem locum reliquae cepissent, contra Lissum in ancoris constituerunt. Has scaphis minoribusque navigiis compluribus immissis Otacilius Crassus, qui Lissi praeerat, expugnare parabat; simul de deditione eorum agebat et incolumitatem deditis pollicebatur. Harum altera navis CCXX e legione tironum sustulerat, altera ex veterana paulo minus CC. Hic cognosci licuit, quantum esset hominibus praesidii in animi firmitudine. Tirones enim multitudine navium perterriti et salo nauseaque confecti iureiurando accepto, nihil eis nocituros hostes, se Otacilio dediderunt; qui omnes ad eum producti contra religionem iurisiurandi in eius conspectu crudelissime interficiuntur. At veteranae legionis milites, item conflictati et tempestatis et sentinae vitiis, neque ex pristina virtute

remittendum aliquid putaverunt, et tractandis condicionibus et simulatione deditionis extracto primo noctis tempore gubernatorem in terram navem eicere cogunt, ipsi idoneum locum nacti reliquam noctis partem ibi confecerunt et luce prima missis ad eos ab Otacilio equitibus, qui eam partem orae maritimae asservabant, circiter CCCC, quique eos armati ex praesidio secuti sunt, se defenderunt et nonnullis eorum interfectis incolumes se ad nostros receperunt.

29 Quo facto conventus civium Romanorum, qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum eis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat, Antonium recepit omnibusque rebus iuvit. Otacilius sibi timens ex oppido fugit et ad Pompeium pervenit. Eitis omnibus copiis Antonius, quarum erat summa veteranarum trium legionum uniusque tironum et equitum DCCC, plerasque naves in Italiam remittit ad reliquos milites equitesque transportandos, pontones, quod est genus navium Gallicarum, Lissi relinquit, hoc consilio, ut si forte Pompeius vacuum existimans Italiam eo traiecisset exercitum, quae opinio erat edita in vulgus, aliquam Caesar ad insequendum facultatem haberet, nuntiosque ad eum celeriter mittit, quibus regionibus exercitum euisset et quid militum transvexisset.

30 Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi, ut iter secundum eas terra direxerant, sed quo essent eae delatae, primus diebus ignorabant. Cognitaque re diversa sibi ambo consilia capiunt: Caesar, ut quam primum se cum Antonio coniungeret; Pompeius, ut venientibus in itinere se opponeret, si imprudentes ex insidiis, adoriri posset, eodemque die uterque eorum ex castris stativis a flumine Apso exercitum educunt: Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque interdiu. Sed Caesari circuitu maiore iter erat longius,

adverso flumine, ut vado transire posset; Pompeius, quia expedito itinere flumen ei transeundum non erat, magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit atque eum ubi appropinquare cognovit, idoneum locum nactus ibi copias collocavit suosque omnes in castris continuit ignesque fieri prohibuit, quo occultior esset eius adventus. Haec ad Antonium statim per Graecos deferuntur. Ille missis ad Caesarem nuntiis unum diem sese castris tenuit; altero die ad eum pervenit Caesar. Cuius adventu cognito Pompeius, ne duobus circumcluderetur exercitibus, ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium Dyrrachinorum pervenit atque ibi idoneo loco castra ponit.

³¹ His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat. Quo facto civitatibus tyrannisque magnas imperaverat pecunias, item a publicanis suae provinciae debitam biennii pecuniam exegerat et ab eisdem insequentis anni mutuam praeceperat equitesque toti provinciae imperaverat. Quibus coactis, finitimis hostibus Parthis post se relictis, qui paulo ante M. Crassum imperatorem interfecerant et M. Bibulum in obsidione habuerant, legiones equitesque ex Syria deduxerat. Summamque in sollicitudinem ac timorem Parthici belli provincia cum venisset, ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur, sese, contra hostem si ducerentur, ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturus, deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit.

³² Interim acerbissime imperatae pecuniae tota provincia exigebantur. Multa praeterea generatim ad avaritiam excogitabantur. In capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur; columnaria, ostiaria, frumentum, milites, arma, remiges, tormenta,

vecturae imperabantur; cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat, hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur. Non solum urbibus, sed paene vicis castellisque singulis cum imperio praeficiebantur. Qui horum quid acerbissime crudelissimeque fecerat, is et vir et civis optimus habebatur. Erat plena lictorum et imperiorum provincia, differta praefectis atque exactoribus: qui praeter imperatas pecunias suo etiam privato compendio serviebant; dictitabant enim se domo patriaque expulsos omnibus necessariis egere rebus, ut honesta praescriptione rem turpissimam tegerent. Accedebant ad haec gravissimae usurae, quod in bello plerumque accidere consuevit universis imperatis pecuniis; quibus in rebus prolationem diei donationem esse dicebant. Itaque aes alienum provinciae eo biennio multiplicatum est. Neque minus ob eam causam civibus Romanis eius provinciae, sed in singulos conventus singulasque civitates certae pecuniae imperabantur, mutuasque illas ex senatusconsulto exigere dictitabant; publicanis, ut in Syria fecerant, insequentis anni vectigal promutuum.

33 Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiquitus pecunias Scipio tolli iubebat. Certa quoque eius rei die constituta cum in fanum ventum esset adhibitis compluribus ordinis senatorii, quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei redduntur a Pompeio, mare transisse cum legionibus Caesarem: properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque posthaberet. His litteris acceptis quos advocaverat dimittit; ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque post diebus est profectus. Haec res Ephesiae pecuniae salutem attulit.

34 Caesar Antonii exercitu coniuncto deducta Orico legione, quam tuendae orae maritimae causa posuerat, temptandas sibi provincias longiusque procedendum existimabat et, cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati venissent, qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum

gentium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur XXVII, atque equitibus CC in Thessaliam, C. Calvisium Sabinum cum cohortibus V paucisque equitibus in Aetoliam misit; maxime eos, quod erant propinquae regiones, de re frumentaria ut providerent, hortatus est. Cn. Domitium Calvinum cum legionibus duabus, XI et XII, et equitibus D in Macedoniam proficisci iussit; cuius provinciae ab ea parte, quae libera appellabatur, Menedemus, princeps earum regionum, missus legatus omnium suorum excellens studium profitebatur.

35 Ex his Calvisius primo adventu summa omnium Aetolorum receptus voluntate, praesidiis adversariorum Calydone et Naupacto eiectis, omni Aetolia potitus est. Cassius in Thessaliam cum legione pervenit. Hic cum essent factiones duae, varia voluntate civitatum utebatur: Hegesaretos, veteris homo potentiae, Pompeianis rebus studebat; Petraeus, summae nobilitatis adulescens, suis ac suorum opibus Caesarem enixe iuvabat.

36 Eodemque tempore Domitius in Macedoniam venit; et cum ad eum frequentes civitatum legationes convenire coepissent, nuntiatum est adesse Scipionem cum legionibus, magna opinione et fama omnium; nam plerumque in novitate rem fama antecedit. Hic nullo in loco Macedoniae moratus magno impetu tetendit ad Domitium et, cum ab eo milia passuum XX afuisset, subito se ad Cassium Longinum in Thessaliam convertit. Hoc adeo celeriter fecit, ut simul adesse et venire nuntiaretur, et quo iter expeditius faceret, M. Favonium ad flumen Aliacmonem, quod Macedonia a Thessalia dividit, cum cohortibus VIII praesidio impedimentis legionum reliquit castellumque ibi muniri iussit. Eodem tempore equitatus regis Cotyis ad castra Cassii advolavit, qui circum Thessaliam esse consuevit. Tum timore perterritus Cassius cognito Scipionis adventu

visisque equitibus, quos Scipionis esse arbitrabatur, ad montes se convertit, qui Thessaliam cingunt, atque ex his locis Ambraciam versus iter facere coepit. At Scipionem properantem sequi litterae sunt consecutae a M. Favonio, Domitium cum legionibus adesse neque se praesidium, ubi constitutus esset, sine auxilio Scipionis tenere posse. Quibus litteris acceptis consilium Scipio iterque commutat; Cassium sequi desistit, Favonio auxilium ferre contendit. Itaque die ac nocte continuato itinere ad eum pervenit, tam opportuno tempore, ut simul Domitiani exercitus pulvis cerneretur, et primi antecursores Scipionis viderentur. Ita Cassio industria Domitii, Favonio Scipionis celeritas salutem attulit.

³⁷ Scipio biduum castris stativis moratus ad flumen, quod inter eum et Domitii castra fluebat, Aliacmonem, tertio die prima luce exercitum vado traducit et castris positus postero die mane copias ante frontem castrorum instruit. Domitius tum quoque sibi dubitandum non putavit, quin productis legionibus proelio decertaret. Sed cum esset inter bina castra campus circiter milium passuum II, Domitius castris Scipionis aciem suam subiecit; ille a vallo non discedere perseveravit. Ac tamen aegre retentis Domitianis militibus est factum, ne proelio contenderetur, et maxime, quod rivus difficilibus ripis subiectus castris Scipionis progressus nostrorum impediabat. Quorum studium alacritatemque pugnandi cum cognovisset Scipio, suspicatus fore, ut postero die aut invitus dimicare cogeretur aut magna cum infamia castris se contineret, qui magna exspectatione venisset, temere progressus turpem habuit exitum et noctu ne conclamatis quidem vasis flumen transit atque in eandem partem, ex qua venerat, redit ibique prope flumen edito natura loco castra posuit. Paucis diebus interpositis noctu insidias equitum collocavit, quo in loco superioribus fere diebus nostri

pabulari consueverant; et cum cotidiana consuetudine Qu. Varus, praefectus equitum Domitii, venisset, subito illi ex insidiis consurrexerunt. Sed nostri fortiter impetum eorum tulerunt, celeriterque ad suos quisque ordines rediit, atque ultro universi in hostes impetum fecerunt; ex his circiter LXXX interfectis, reliquis in fugam coniectis, duobus amissis in castra se receperunt.

38 His rebus gestis Domitius, sperans Scipionem ad pugnam elici posse, simulavit sese angustiis rei frumentariae adductum castra movere, vasisque militari more conclamatis progressus milia passuum III loco idoneo et occulto omnem exercitum equitatumque collocavit. Scipio ad sequendum paratus equitum magnam partem ad explorandum iter Domitii et cognoscendum praemisit. Qui cum essent progressi, primaeque turmae insidias intravissent, ex fremitu equorum illata suspicione ad suos se recipere coeperunt, quique hos sequebantur celerem eorum receptum conspicati restiterunt. Nostri, cognitis insidiis, ne frustra reliquos exspectarent, duas nacti turmas exceperunt (in his fuit M. Opimius, praefectus equitum), reliquos omnes aut interfecerunt aut captos ad Domitium deduxerunt.

39 Deductis orae maritimae praesidiis Caesar, ut supra demonstratum est, III cohortes Orici oppidi tuendi causa reliquit isdemque custodiam navium longarum tradidit, quas ex Italia traduxerat. Huic officio oppidoque Acilius Caninus legatus praeerat. Is naves nostras interiorum in portum post oppidum reduxit et ad terram deligavit faucibusque portus navem onerariam submersam obiecit et huic alteram coniunxit; super quam turrim effectam ad ipsum introitum portus opposuit et militibus complevit tuendamque ad omnes repentinos casus tradidit.

40 Quibus cognitis rebus Cn. Pompeius filius, qui classi Aegyptiae praeerat, ad Oricum venit submersamque navim remulco multisque

contendens funibus adduxit atque alteram navem, quae erat ad custodiam ab Acilio posita, pluribus aggressus navibus, in quibus ad libram fecerat turres, ut ex superiore pugnans loco integrosque semper defatigatis submittens et reliquis partibus simul ex terra scalis et classe moenia oppidi temptans, uti adversariorum manus diduceret, labore et multitudine telorum nostros vicit, deiectisque defensoribus, qui omnes scaphis excepti refugerant, eam navem expugnavit, eodemque tempore ex altera parte molem tenuit naturalem obiectam, quae paene insulam oppidum effecerat, et IIII biremes subiectis scutulis impulsas vectibus in interiorem portum traduxit. Ita ex utraque parte naves longas aggressus, quae erant deligatae ad terram atque inanes, IIII ex his abduxit, reliquas incendit. Hoc confecto negotio D. Laelium ab Asiatica classe abductum reliquit, qui commeatus Bullide atque Amantia importari in oppidum prohibebat. Ipse Lissum profectus naves onerarias XXX a M. Antonio relictas intra portum aggressus omnes incendit; Lissum expugnare conatus defendentibus civibus Romanis, qui eius conventus erant, militibusque, quos praesidii causa miserat Caesar, triduum moratus paucis in oppugnatione amissis re infecta inde discessit.

⁴¹ Caesar, postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse cognovit, eodem cum exercitu profectus expugnato in itinere oppido Parthinorum, in quo Pompeius praesidium habebat, tertio die ad Pompeium pervenit iuxtaque eum castra posuit et postridie eductis omnibus copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit. Ubi illum suis locis se tenere animadvertit, reducto in castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit. Itaque postero die omnibus copiis magno circuitu difficili angustoque itinere Dyrrachium profectus est sperans Pompeium aut Dyrrachium

compelli aut ab eo intercludi posse, quod omnem commeatum totiusque belli apparatus eo contulisset; ut accidit Pompeium enim primo ignorans eius consilium, quod diverso ab ea regione itinere profectum videbat, angustiis rei frumentariae compulsus discessisse existimabat; postea per exploratores certior factus postero die castra movit, breviori itinere se occurrere ei posse sperans. Quod fore suspicatus Caesar militesque adhortatus, ut aequo animo laborem ferrent, parvam partem noctis itinere intermisso mane Dyrrachium venit, cum primum agmen Pompei procul cerneretur, atque ibi castra posuit.

42 Pompeium interclusus Dyrrachio, ubi propositum tenere non potuit, secundo usus consilio edito loco, qui appellatur Petra aditumque habet navibus mediocrem atque eas a quibusdam protegit ventis, castra communit. Eo partem navium longarum convenire, frumentum commeatumque ab Asia atque omnibus regionibus, quas tenebat, comportari imperat. Caesar longius bellum ductum iri existimans et de Italicis commeatibus desperans, quod tanta diligentia omni litora a Pompeianis tenebantur, classesque ipsius, quas hieme in Sicilia, Gallia, Italia fecerat, morabantur, in Epirum rei frumentariae causa Q. Tillium et L. Canuleium legatum misit, quodque hae regiones aberant longius, locis certis horrea constituit vecturasque frumenti finitimis civitatibus descripsit. Item Lisso Parthinisque et omnibus castellis quod esset frumenti conquiri iussit. Id erat perexiguum cum ipsius agri natura, quod sunt loca aspera ac montuosa ac plerumque frumento utuntur importato, tum quod Pompeius haec providerat et superioribus diebus praedae loco Parthinos habuerat frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus per equites comportarat.

43 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar consilium capit ex loci natura.

Erant enim circum castra Pompei permulti editi atque asperi colles. Hos primum praesidiis tenuit castellaque ibi communit. Inde, ut loci cuiusque natura ferebat, ex castello in castellum perducta munitione circumvallare Pompeium instituit, haec spectans, quod angusta re frumentaria utebatur quodque Pompeius multitudine equitum valebat, quo minore periculo undique frumentum commeatumque exercitui supportare posset, simul, uti pabulatione Pompeium prohiberet equitatumque eius ad rem gerendam inutilem efficeret, tertio, ut auctoritatem qua ille maxime apud exteris nationes niti videbatur, minueret, cum fama per orbem terrarum percrebuisset, illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.

44 Pompeius neque a mari Dyrrachioque discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatus belli, tela, arma, tormenta ibi collocaverat frumentumque exercitui navibus supportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat, nisi proelio decertare vellet; quod eo tempore statuerat non esse faciendum. Relinquebatur, ut extremam rationem belli sequens quam plurimos colles occuparet et quam latissimas regiones praesidiis teneret Caesarisque copias, quam maxime posset, distineret; idque accidit. Castellis enim XXIII effectis XV milia passuum circuitu amplexus hoc spatio pabulabatur; multaue erant intra eum locum manu sata, quibus interim iumenta pasceret. Atque ut nostri perpetua munitione providebant, ne quo loco erumperent Pompeiani ac nostros post tergum adorirentur, ita illi interiore spatio perpetuas munitiones efficiebant, ne quem locum nostri intrare atque ipsos a tergo circumvenire possent. Sed illi operibus vincebant, quod et numero militum praestabant et interiore spatio minorem circuitum habebant. Quaecumque erant loca Caesari capienda, etsi prohibere Pompeius totis copiis et dimicare non constituerat, tamen suis locis sagittarios funditoresque mittebat,

quorum magnum habebat numerum, multique ex nostris vulnerabantur, magnusque incesserat timor sagittarum, atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent.

45 In occupandis praesidiis magna vi uterque nitebatur: Caesar, ut quam angustissime Pompeium contineret; Pompeius, ut quam plurimos colles quam maximo circuitu occuparet, crebraque ob eam causam proelia fiebant. In his cum legio Caesaris nona praesidium quoddam occupavisset et munire coepisset, huic loco propinquum et contrarium collem Pompeius occupavit nostrosque opere prohibere coepit et, cum una ex parte prope aequum aditum haberet, primum sagittariis funditoribusque circumiectis, postea levis armaturae magna multitudine missa tormentisque prolatis munitiones impediabat; neque erat facile nostris uno tempore propugnare et munire. Caesar, cum suos ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret, recipere se iussit et loco excedere. Erat per declive receptus. Illi autem hoc acrius instabant neque regredi nostros patiebantur, quod timore adducti locum relinquere videbantur. Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse: non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae.

46 Caesar receptui suorum timens crates ad extremum tumulum contra hostem proferri et adversas locari, intra has mediocri latitudine fossam tectis militibus obduci iussit locumque in omnes partes quam maxime impediri. Ipse idoneis locis funditores instruxit, ut praesidio nostris se recipientibus essent. His rebus comparatis legionem reduci iussit. Pompeiani hoc insolentius atque audacius nostros premere et instare coeperunt cratesque pro munitione obiectas propulerunt, ut fossas transcenderent. Quod cum

animadvertisset Caesar, veritus, ne non reducti, sed reiecti viderentur, maiusque detrimentum caperetur, a medio fere spatio suos per Antonium, qui ei legioni praeerat, cohortatus tuba signum dari atque in hostes impetum fieri iussit. Milites legionis VIII subito conspirati pila coniecerunt et ex inferiore loco adversus clivum incitati cursu praecipites Pompeianos egerunt et terga vertere coegerunt; quibus ad recipiendum crates deiectae longuriique obiecti et institutae fossae magno impedimento fuerunt. Nostri vero, qui satis habebant sine detrimento discedere, compluribus interfectis V omnino suorum amissis quietissime se receperunt pauloque citra eum locum aliis comprehensis collibus munitiones perfecerunt.

⁴⁷ Erat nova et inusitata belli ratio cum tot castellorum numero tantoque spatio et tantis munitionibus et toto obsidionis genere, tum etiam reliquis rebus. Nam quicumque alterum obsidere conati sunt, percussos atque infirmos hostes adorti aut proelio superatos aut aliqua offensione permotos continuerunt, cum ipsi numero equitum militumque praestarent; causa autem obsidionis haec fere esse consuevit, ut frumento hostes prohiberent. At tum integras atque incolumes copias Caesar inferiore militum numero continebat, cum illi omnium rerum copia abundarent; cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus conveniebat, quae commeatum supportarent, neque ullus flare ventus poterat, quin aliqua ex parte secundum cursum haberent. Ipse autem consumptis omnibus longe lateque frumentis summis erat in angustiis. Sed tamen haec singulari patientia milites ferebant. Recordabantur enim eadem se superiore anno in Hispania perpressos labore et patientia maximum bellum confecisse, meminerant ad Alesiam magnam se inopiam perpressos, multo etiam maiorem ad Avaricum, maximarum gentium victores discessisse. Non illi hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recusabant; pecus vero

cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant.

48 Est autem genus radicis inventum ab eis, qui fuerant vacui ab operibus, quod appellatur chara, quod admixtum lacte multum inopiam levabat. Id ad similitudinem panis efficiebant. Eius erat magna copia. Ex hoc effectos panes, cum in colloquiis Pompeiani famem nostris obiectarent, vulgo in eos iaciebant, ut spem eorum minuerent.

49 Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant, atque ipsa spes inopiam sustentabat, quod celeriter se habituros copiam confidebant; crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur, prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros. Libenter etiam ex perfugis cognoscebant equos eorum tolerari, reliqua vero iumenta interisse; uti autem ipsos valetudine non bona, cum angustiis loci et odore taetro ex multitudine cadaverum et cotidianis laboribus insuetos operum, tum aquae summa inopia affectos. Omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos, qui ad mare pertinebant, Caesar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant loca montuosa et aspera, angustias vallium publicis in terram demissis praesaepserat terramque aggresserat, ut aquam contineret. Itaque illi necessario loca sequi demissa ac palustria et puteos fodere cogebantur atque hunc laborem ad cotidiana opera addebant; qui tamen fontes a quibusdam praesidiis aberant longius et celeriter aestibus exarescebant. At Caesaris exercitus optima valetudine summaque aquae copia utebatur, tum commeatus omni genere praeter frumentum abundabat; quibus cotidie melius succedere tempus maioremque spem maturitate frumentorum proponi videbant.

50 In novo genere belli novae ab utrisque bellandi rationes reperiebantur. Illi, cum animadvertissent ex ignibus noctu cohortes

nostras ad munitiones excubare, silentio aggressi universi intra multitudinem sagittas coniciebant et se confestim ad suos recipiebant. Quibus rebus nostri usu docti haec reperiebant remedia, ut alio loco ignes facerent . . .

51 Interim certior factus P. Sulla, quem discedens catris praefecerat Caesar, auxillo cohorti venit cum legionibus duabus; cuius adventu facile sunt repulsi Pompeiani. Neque vero conspectum aut impetum nostrorum tulerunt, primisque deiectis reliqui se verterunt et loco cesserunt. Sed insequentes nostros, ne longius prosequerentur, Sulla revocavit. At plerique existimant, si acrius insequi voluisset, bellum eo die potuisse finire. Cuius consilium reprehendendum non videtur. Aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. Sulla a Caesare in castris relictus liberatis suis hoc fuit contentus neque proelio decertare voluit, quae res tamen fortasse aliquem reciperet casum, ne imperatorias sibi partes sumpsisse videretur. Pompeianis magnam res ad receptum difficultatem afferebat. Nam ex iniquo progressi loco in summo constiterant; si per declive sese reciperent, nostros ex superiore insequentes loco verebantur; neque multum ad solis occasum temporis supererat; spe enim conficiendi negotii prope in noctem rem duxerant. Ita necessario atque ex tempore capto consilio Pompeius tumultum quendam occupavit, qui tantum aberat a nostro castello, ut telum tormento missum adigi non posset. Hoc consedit loco atque eum communivit omnesque ibi copias continuit.

52 Eodem tempore duobus praeterea locis pugnatum est: nam plura castella Pompeius pariter distinendae manus causa temptaverat, ne ex proximis praesidiis succurri posset. Uno loco Volcatius Tullus impetum legionis sustinuit cohortibus tribus atque eam loco depulit;

altero Germani munitiones nostras egressi compluribus interfectis sese ad suos incolumes receperunt.

53 Ita uno die VI proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium, tribus ad munitiones, cum horum omnium ratio haberetur, ad duorum milium numero ex Pompeianis cecidisse reperiēbamus, evocatos centurionesque complures (in eo fuit numero Valerius Flaccus, L. filius, eius, qui praetor Asiam obtinuerat); signaque sunt militaria sex relata. Nostri non amplius XX omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. Sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum, quin vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt. Et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium afferre vellent, milia sagittarum circiter XXX in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina CXX. Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritis et de re publica, donatum milibus CC collaudatumque ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit (eius enim opera castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat) cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, veste, cibariis militaribusque donis amplissime donavit

54 Pompeius noctu magnis additis munitionibus reliquis diebus turres exstruxit, et in altitudinem pedum XV effectis operibus vineis eam partem castrorum obtexit, et quinque intermissis diebus alteram noctem subnubilam nactus obstructis omnibus castrorum portis et ad impediendum obicibus obiectis tertia inita vigilia silentio exercitum eduxit et se in antiquas munitiones recepit.

55 Omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet, ut paene castris Pompei legiones subiceret; tantumque a vallo eius prima acies aberat, uti ne telum tormento adigi posset. Pompeius autem, ut famam opinionemque hominum teneret, sic pro castris exercitum

constituebat, ut tertia acies vallum contingeret, omnis quidem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo coniectis protegi posset.

56 Aetolia, Acarnania, Amphilochis per Cassium Longinum et Calvisium Sabinum, ut demonstravimus, receptis temptandam sibi Achaïam ac paulo longius progrediendum existimabat Caesar. Itaque eo Calenum misit eique Sabinum et Cassium cum cohortibus adiungit. Quorum cognito adventu Rutilius Lupus, qui Achaïam missus a Pompeio obtinebat, Isthmum praemunire instituit, ut Achaïa Fufium prohiberet. Calenus Delphos, Thebas, Orchomenum voluntate ipsarum civitatum recepit, nonnullas urbes per vim expugnavit, reliquas civitates circummissis legationibus amicitia Caesari conciliare studebat. In his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus.

57 Haec cum in Achaïa atque apud Dyrrachium gererentur, Scipionemque in Macedoniam venisse constaret, non oblitus pristini instituti Caesar mittit ad eum A. Clodium, suum atque illius familiarem, quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero habere instituerat. Huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum; quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc effecisse: hoc arbitrari vitio factum eorum, quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur. Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere quae probasset exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellere atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet. Quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii uni omnes acceptam relatueros. Haec ad eum mandata Clodius refert ac primis diebus, ut videbatur, libenter auditus reliquis ad colloquium non admittitur, castigato Scipione a Favonio, ut postea confecto bello reperiebamus,

infectaque re sese ad Caeaarem recepit.

58 Caesar, quo facilius equitatum Pompeianum ad Dyrrachium contineret et pabulatione prohiberet, aditus duos, quos esse angustos demonstravimus, magnis operibus praemunivit castellaque his locis posuit. Pompeius, ubi nihil profici equitatu cognovit, paucis intermissis diebus rursus eum navibus ad se intra munitiones recipit. Erat summa inopia pabuli, adeo ut foliis ex arboribus strictis et teneris harundinum radicibus contusis equos alerent (frumenta enim, quae fuerant intra munitiones sata, consumpserant); cogebantur Corcyra atque Acarnania longo interiecto navigationis spatio pabulum supportare, quodque erat eius rei minor copia, hordeo adaugere atque his rationibus equitatum tolerare. Sed postquam non modo hordeum pabulumque omnibus locis herbaeque desectae, sed etiam frons ex arboribus deficiebat, corruptis equis macie conandum sibi aliquid Pompeius de eruptione existimavit.

59 Erant apud Caesarem in equitum numero Allobroges duo fratres, Raucillus et Egus, Adbucilli filii, qui principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat, singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimaque erat usus. His domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. Hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant, sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur; sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertabant. Quibus illi rebus permoti universi Caesarem adierunt palamque de eorum iniuriis sunt questi et ad cetera addiderunt falsum ab his equitum numerum deferri, quorum

stipendium averterent.

⁶⁰ Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam distulit; illos secreto castigavit, quod quaestui equites haberent, monuitque, ut ex sua amicitia omnia exspectarent et ex praeteritis suis officiis reliqua sperarent. Magnam tamen haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad omnes attulit, idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectationibus tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia intellegebant. Quo pudore adducti et fortasse non se liberari, sed in aliud tempus reservari arbitrati discedere a nobis et novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri constituerunt. Et cum paucis collocuti clientibus suis, quibus tantum facinus committere audebant, primum conati sunt praefectum equitum C. Volusenum interficere, ut postea bello confecto cognitum est, ut cum munere aliquo perfugisse ad Pompeium viderentur; postquam id difficilius visum est neque facultas perficiendi dabatur, quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mutuati, proinde ac si suis satisfacere et fraudata restituere vellent, multis coemptis equis ad Pompeium transierunt cum eis, quos sui consilii participes habebant.

⁶¹ Quos Pompeius, quod erant honesto loco nati et instructi liberaliter magnoque comitatu et multis iumentis venerant virique fortes habebantur et in honore apud Caesarem fuerant, quodque novum et praeter consuetudinem acciderat, omnia sua praesidia circumduxit atque ostentavit. Nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a Pompeio ad Caesarem perfugerent, vulgo vero universi in Epiro atque Aetolia conscripti milites earumque regionum omnium, quae a Caesare tenebantur. Sed hi cognitis omnibus rebus, seu quid in munitionibus perfectum non erat, seu quid a peritioribus rei militaris

desiderari videbatur, temporibusque rerum et spatiis locorum, custodiarum varia diligentia animadversa, prout cuiusque eorum, qui negotiis praeerant, aut natura aut studium ferebat, haec ad Pompeium omnia detulerunt.

62 Quibus ille cognitis rebus eruptionisque iam ante capto consilio, ut demonstratum est, tegimenta galeis milites ex viminibus facere atque aggerem iubet comportare. His paratis rebus magnum numerum levis armaturae et sagittariorum aggeremque omnem noctu in scaphas et naves actuarias imponit et de media nocte cohortes LX ex maximis castris praesidiisque deductas ad eam partem munitionum ducit, quae pertinebant ad mare longissimeque a maximis castris Caesaris aberant. Eodem naves, quas demonstravimus, aggere et levis armaturae militibus completas, quasque ad Dyrrachium naves longas habebat, mittit et, quid a quoque fieri velit, praecipit. Ad eas munitiones Caesar Lentulum Marcellinum quaestorem cum legione VIII posuit habebat. Huic, quod valetudine minus commoda utebatur, Fulvium Postumum adiutorem submiserat.

63 Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat: ab eo intermisso spatio pedum DC alter conversus in contrariam partem erat vallus humiliore paulo munitione. Hoc enim superioribus diebus timens Caesar, ne navibus nostri circumvenirentur, duplicem eo loco fecerat vallum, ut, si ancipiti proelio dimicaretur, posset resisti. Sed operum magnitudo et continens omnium dierum labor, quod milium passuum in circuitu XVII munitiones erat complexus, perficiendi spatium non dabat. Itaque contra mare transversum vallum, qui has duas munitiones coniungeret, nondum perfecerat. Quae res nota erat Pompeio delata

per Allobrogas perfugas, magnumque nostris attulerat incommodum. Nam ut ad mare duo cohortes nonae legionis excubuerant, accessere subito prima luce Pompeiani; simul navibus circumvecti milites in exteriorem vallum tela iaciebant, fossaeque aggere complebantur, et legionarii interioris munitionis defensores scalis admotis tormentis cuiusque generis telisque terrebant, magnaue multitudo sagittariorum ab utraque parte circumfundebatur. Multum autem ab ictu lapidum, quod unum nostris erat telum, viminea tegimenta galeis imposita defendebant. Itaque cum omnibus rebus nostri premerentur atque aegre resisterent animadversum est vitium munitionis, quod supra demonstratum est, atque inter duos vallos, qua perfectum opus non erat, Pompeiani navibus eiti in aversos nostros impetum fecerunt atque ex utraque munitione deiectos terga vertere coegerunt

64 Hoc tumultu nuntiato Marcellinus cohortes subsidio nostris laborantibus submittit ex castris; quae fugientes conspicatae neque illos suo adventu confirmare potuerunt neque ipsae hostium impetum tulerunt. Itaque quodcumque addebatur subsidii, id corruptum timore fugientium terrorem et periculum augebat; hominum enim multitudine receptus impediabatur. In eo proelio cum gravi vulnere esset affectus aquilifer et a viribus deficeretur, conspicatus equites nostros, “hanc ego,” inquit, “et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum deferte.” Hoc casu aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem.

65 Iamque Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabant non mediocri terrore illato reliquis cohortibus, et M. Antonius, qui proximum locum praesidiorum tenebat, ea re nuntiata

cum cohortibus XII descendens ex loco superiore cernebatur. Cuius adventus Pompeianos compressit nostrosque firmavit, ut se ex maximo timore colligerent. Neque multo post Caesar significatione per castella fumo facta, ut erat superioris temporis consuetudo, deductis quibusdam cohortibus ex praesidiis eodem venit. Qui cognito detrimento eum animadvertisset Pompeium extra munitiones egressum, castra secundum mare munire, ut libere pabulari posset nec minus aditum navibus haberet, commutata ratione belli, quoniam propositum non tenuerat, castra iuxta Pompeium munire iussit.

66 Qua perfecta munitione animadversum est a speculatoribus Caesaris, cohortes quasdam, quod instar legionis videretur, esse post silvam et in vetera castra duci. Castrorum sic situs erat. Superioribus diebus nona Caesaris legio, cum se obiecisset Pompeianis copiis atque opere, ut demonstravimus, circummuniret, castra eo loco posuit. Haec silvam quandam contingebant neque longius a mari passibus CCC aberant. Post mutato consilio quibusdam de causis Caesar paulo ultra eum locum castra transtulit, paucisque intermissis diebus eadem Pompeius occupaverat et, quod eo loco plures erat legiones habiturus, relicto interiore vallo maiorem adiecerat munitionem. Ita minora castra inclusa maioribus castelli atque arcis locum obtinebant. Item ab angulo castrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passus CCCC, quo liberius a periculo milites aquarentur. Sed is quoque mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, quas commemorari necesse non est, eo loco excesserat. Ita complures dies inania manserant castra; munitiones quidem omnes integrae erant.

67 Eo signa legionis illata speculatores Caesari renuntiarunt. Hoc idem visum ex superioribus quibusdam castellis confirmaverunt. Is locus aberat a novis Pompei castris circiter passus quingentos. Hanc

legionem sperans Caesar se opprimere posse et cupiens eius diei detrimentum sarcire, reliquit in opere cohortes duas, quae speciem munitionis praeberent; ipse diverso itinere quam potuit occultissime reliquas cohortes, numero XXXIII, in quibus erat legio nona multis amissis centurionibus deminutoque militum numero, ad legionem Pompei castraque minora duplici acie eduxit. Neque eum prima opinio fefellit. Nam et pervenit prius, quam Pompeius sentire posset, et tametsi erant munitiones castrorum magnae, tamen sinistro cornu, ubi erat ipse, celeriter aggressus Pompeianos ex vallo deturbavit. Erat obiectus portis ericius. Hic paulisper est pugnatum, cum irrumpere nostri conarentur, illi castra defenderent, fortissime T. Pulieone, cuius opera proditum exercitum C. Antoni demonstravimus, eo loco propugnante. Sed tamen nostri virtute vicerunt excisoque ericio primo in maiora castra, post etiam in castellum, quod erat inclusum maioribus castris, irruperunt, quo pulsa legio sese receperat, et nonnullos ibi repugnantes interfecerunt.

68 Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. Munitionem, quam pertinere a castris ad flumen supra demonstravimus, dextri Caesaris cornu cohortes ignorantia loci sunt secutae, cum portam quaererent castrorumque eam munitionem esse arbitrarentur. Quod cum esset animadversum coniunctam esse flumini, prorutis munitionibus defendente nullo transcenderunt, omnisque noster equitatus eas cohortes est secutus.

69 Interim Pompeius hac satis longa interiecta mora et re nuntiata V legiones ab opere deductas subsidio suis duxit, eodemque tempore equitatus eius nostris equitibus appropinquabat, et acies instructa a nostris, qui castra occupaverant, cernebatur, omniaque sunt subito mutata. Legio Pompeiana celeris spe subsidii confirmata ab

decumana porta resistere conabatur atque ultro in nostros impetum faciebat. Equitatus Caesaris, quod angusto itinere per aggeres ascendebat, receptui suo timens initium fugae faciebat. Dextrum cornu, quod erat a sinistro seclusum, terrore equitum animadverso, ne intra munitionem opprimeretur, ea parte, quam proruerat, sese recipiebat, ac plerique ex his, ne in angustias inciderent, ex X pedum munitione se in fossas praecipitabant, primisque oppressis reliqui per horum corpora salutem sibi atque exitum pariebant. Sinistro cornu milites, cum ex vallo Pompeium adesse et suos fugere cernerent, veriti, ne angustis intercluderentur, cum extra et intus hostem haberent, eodem, quo venerant, receptu sibi consulebant, omniaque erant tumultus, timoris, fugae plena, adeo ut, cum Caesar signa fugientium manu prenderet et consistere iuberet, alii admissis equis eodem cursu confugerent, alii metu etiam signa dimitterent, neque quisquam omnino consisteret.

70 His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant, quo minus omnis deleretur exercitus, quod Pompeius insidias timens, credo, quod haec praeter spem acciderant eius, qui paulo ante ex castris fugientes suos conspexerat, munitionibus appropinquare aliquamdiu non audebat, equitesque eius angustis spatiis atque his ab Caesaris militibus occupatis ad insequendum tardabantur. Ita parvae res magnum in utramque partem momentum habuerunt. Munitiones enim a castris ad flumen perductae expugnatis iam castris Pompei prope iam expeditam Caesaris victoriam interpellaverunt, eadem res celeritate insequentium tardata nostris salutem attulit.

71 Duobus his unius diei proeliis Caesar desideravit milites DCCCCLX et notos equites Romanos Tuticanum Gallum, senatoris filium, C. Fleginatem Placentia, A. Granium Puteolis, M. Sacrativirum Capua, tribunos militum et centuriones XXXII; sed

horum omnium pars magna in fossis munitionibusque et fluminis ripis oppressa suorum in terrore ac fuga sine ullo vulnere interiit; signaque sunt militaria amissa XXXII. Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus. Hoc nomen obtinuit atque ita se postea salutare passus est, sed neque in litteris scribere est solitus, neque in fascibus insignia laureae praetulit. At Labienus, cum ab eo impetravisset, ut sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes productos ostentationis, ut videbatur, causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit.

72 His rebus tantum fiducia ac spiritus Pompeianis accessit, ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse iam viderentur. Non illi paucitatem nostrorum militum, non iniquitatem loci atque angustias praeoccupatis castris et ancipitem terrorem intra extraque munitiones, non abscisum in duas partes exercitum, cum altera alteri auxilium ferre non posset, causae fuisse cogitabant. Non ad haec addebant non concursu acri facto, non proelio dimicatum, sibi que ipsos multitudine atque angustiis maius attulisse detrimentum, quam ab hoste accepissent. Non denique communes belli casus recordabantur, quam parvulae saepe causae vel falsae suspicionis vel terroris repentini vel obiectae religionis magna detrimenta intulissent, quotiens vel ducis vitio vel culpa tribuni in exercitu esset offensum; sed, proinde ac si virtute vicissent, neque ulla commutatio rerum posset accidere, per orbem terrarum fama ac litteris victoriam eius diei concelebrabant.

73 Caesar a superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit. Itaque uno tempore praesidiis omnibus deductis et oppugnatione dimissa coactoque in unum locum exercitu contionem apud milites habuit hortatusque est,

ne ea, quae accidissent, graviter ferrent neve his rebus terrerentur multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum et id mediocre opponerent. Habendam fortunae gratiam, quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere cepissent, quod duas Hispanias bellicosissimorum hominum peritissimis atque exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in potestatem redegissent; denique recordari debere, qua felicitate inter medias hostium classes oppletis non solum portibus, sed etiam litoribus omnes incolumes essent transportati. Si non omnia caderent secunda, fortunam esse industria sublevandam. Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpae debere tribui. Locum se aequum ad dimicandum dedisse, potitum esse hostium castris, expulisse ac superasse pugnantes. Sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam fortuna partam iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset, dandam omnibus operam, ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur. Quod si esset factum, futurum, uti ad Gergoviam contigisset, ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, atque qui ante dimicare timuissent, ultro se proelio offerrent.

74 Hac habita contione nonnullos signiferos ignominia notavit ac loco movit. Exercitui quidem omni tantus incessit ex incommodo dolor tantumque studium infamiae sarciendae, ut nemo aut tribuni aut centurionis imperium desideraret, et sibi quisque etiam poenae loco graviores imponeret labores, simulque omnes arderent cupiditate pugnandi, cum superioris etiam ordinis nonnulli ratione permoti manendum eo loco et rem proelio committendam existimarent. Contra ea Caesar neque satis militibus perterritis confidebat spatiumque interponendum ad recreandos animos putabat, et relictis munitionibus magnopere rei frumentariae timebat.

75 Itaque nulla interposita mora sauciorum modo et aegrorum

habita ratione impedimenta omnia silentio prima nocte ex castris Apolloniam praemisit. Haec conquiescere ante iter confectum vetuit. His una legio missa praesidio est. His explicitis rebus duas in castris legiones retinuit, reliquas de quarta vigilia compluribus portis eductas eodem itinere praemisit parvoque spatio intermisso, ut et militare institutum servaretur, et quam serissime eius profectio cognosceretur conclamari iussit statimque egressus et novissimum agmen consecutus celeriter ex conspectu castrorum discessit. Neque vero Pompeius cognito consilio eius moram ullam ad insequendum intulit; sed eodem spectans, si itinere impeditos perterritos apprehendere posset, exercitum e castris eduxit equitatumque praemisit ad novissimum agmen demorandum, neque consequi potuit, quod multum expedito itinere antecesserat Caesar. Sed cum ventum esset ad flumen Genusum, quod ripis erat impeditis, consecutus equitatus novissimos proelio detinebat. Huic suos Caesar equites opposuit expeditosque antesignanos admiscuit CCCC; qui tantum profecerunt, ut equestri proelio commisso pellerent omnes compluresque interficerent ipsique incolumes se ad agmen reciperent.

76 Confecto iusto itinere eius diei Caesar traductoque exercitu flumen Genusum veteribus suis in castris contra Asparagium consedit militesque omnes intra vallum continuit equitatumque per causam pabulandi emissum confestim decumana porta in castra se recipere iussit. Simili ratione Pompeius confecto eius diei itinere in suis veteribus castris ad Asparagium consedit. Eius milites, quod ab opere integris munitionibus vacabant, alii lignandi pabulandique causa longius progrediebantur, alii, quod subito consilium profectionis ceperant magna parte impedimentorum et sarcinarum relictas, ad haec repetenda invitati propinquitate superiorum

castrorum, depositis in contubernio armis, vallum relinquebant. Quibus ad sequendum impeditis Caesar, quod fore providerat, meridiano fere tempore signo profectionis dato exercitum educit duplicatoque eius diei itinere VIII milia passuum ex eo loco procedit; quod facere Pompeius discessu militum non potuit.

77 Postero die Caesar similiter praemissis prima nocte impedimentis de quarta vigilia ipse egreditur, ut, si qua esset imposita dimicandi necessitas, subitum casum expedito exercitu subiret. Hoc idem reliquis fecit diebus. Quibus rebus perfectum est, ut altissimis fluminibus atque impeditissimis itineribus nullum acciperet incommodum. Pompeius primi diei mora illata et reliquorum dierum frustra labore suscepto, cum se magnis itineribus extenderet et praegressos consequi cuperet, quarto die finem sequendi fecit atque aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.

78 Caesari ad saucios deponendos, stipendium exercitui dandum, socios confirmandos, praesidium urbibus relinquendum necesse erat adire Apolloniam. Sed his rebus tantum temporis tribuit, quantum erat properanti necesse; timens Domitio, ne adventu Pompei praeoccuparetur, ad eum omni celeritate et studio incitatus ferebatur. Totius autem rei consilium his rationibus explicabat, ut, si Pompeius eodem contenderet, abductum illum a mari atque ab eis copiis, quas Dyrrachii comparaverat, abstractum pari condicione belli secum decertare cogeret; si in Italiam transiret, coniuncto exercitu cum Domitio per Illyricum Italiae subsidio proficisceretur; si Apolloniam Oricumque oppugnare et se omni maritima ora excludere conaretur, obsesso Scipione necessario illum suis auxilium ferre cogeret. Itaque praemissis nuntiis ad Cn. Domitium Caesar ei scripsit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit, praesidioque Apolloniae cohortibus IIII, Lissi I, III Orici relictis, quique erant ex vulneribus aegri depositis, per Epirum

atque Athamaniam iter facere coepit. Pompeius quoque de Caesaris consilio coniectura iudicans ad Scipionem properandum sibi existimabat: si Caesar iter illo haberet, ut subsidium Scipioni ferret; si ab ora maritima Oricoque discedere nollet, quod legiones equitatumque ex Italia exspectaret, ipse ut omnibus copiis Domitium aggrederetur.

79 His de causis uterque eorum celeritati studebat, et suis ut esset auxilio, et ad opprimendos adversarios ne occasione temporis deesset. Sed Caesarem Apollonia a directo itinere averterat; Pompeius per Candaviam iter in Macedoniam expeditum habebat. Accessit etiam ex improvise aliud incommodum, quod Domitius, qui dies complures castris Scipionis castra collata habuisset, rei frumentariae causa ab eo discesserat et Heracliam, quae est subiecta Candaviae, iter fecerat, ut ipsa fortuna illum obicere Pompeio videretur. Haec ad id tempus Caesar ignorabat. Simul a Pompeio litteris per omnes provincias civitatesque dimissis proelio ad Dyrrachium facto latius inflatusque multo, quam res erat gesta, fama percrebuerat, pulsum fugere Caesarem paene omnibus copiis amissis; haec itinera infesta reddiderat, haec civitates nonnullas ab eius amicitia avertebat. Quibus accidit rebus, ut pluribus dimissi itineribus a Caesare ad Domitium et a Domitio ad Caesarem nulla ratione iter conficere possent. Sed Allobroges, Raucilli atque Egi familiares, quos perfugisse ad Pompeium demonstravimus, conspicati in itinere exploratores Domitii, seu pristina sua consuetudine, quod una in Gallia bella gesserant, seu gloria elati cuncta, ut erant acta, euerunt et Caesaris profectionem et adventum Pompei docuerunt. A quibus Domitius certior factus vix IIII horarum spatio antecedens hostium beneficio periculum vitavit et ad Aeginium, quod est oppidum obiectum Thessaliae, Caesari venienti occurrit.

80 Coniuncto exercitu Caesar Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae venientibus ab Epiro; quae gens paucis ante mensibus ultro ad Caesarem legatos miserat, ut suis omnibus facultatibus uteretur, praesidiumque ab eo militum petierat. Sed eo fama iam praecurrerat, quam supra docuimus, de proelio Dyrrachino, quod multis auxerat partibus. Itaque Androstenes, praetor Thessaliae, cum se victoriae Pompei comitem esse mallet quam socium Caesaris in rebus adversis, omnem ex agris multitudinem servorum ac liberorum in oppidum cogit portasque praeccludit et ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit, ut sibi subsidio veniant: se confidere munitionibus oppidi, si celeriter succurratur; longinquam oppugnationem sustinere non posse. Scipio discessu exercituum ab Dyrrachio cognito Larisam legiones adduxerat; Pompeius nondum Thessaliae appropinquabat. Caesar castris munitis scalas musculosque ad repentinam oppugnationem fieri et crates parari iussit. Quibus rebus effectis cohortatus milites docuit, quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, priusquam auxilia concurrerent. Itaque usus singulari militum studio eodem, quo venerat, die post horam nonam oppidum altissimis moenibus oppugnare aggressus ante solis oocasum expugnavit et ad diripiendum militibus concessit statimque ab oppido castra movit et Metropolim venit, sic ut nuntios expugnati oppidi famamque antecederet.

81 Metropolitae primum eodem usu consilio isdem permoti rumoribus portas clausurunt murosque armatis compleverunt; sed postea casu civitatis Gomphensis cognito ex captivis, quos Caesar ad murum producendos curaverat, portas aperuerunt. Quibus diligentissime conservatis collata fortuna Metropolitum cum casu

Gomphensium nulla Thessaliae fuit civitas praeter Larisaeos, qui magnis exercitibus Scipionis tenebantur, quin Caesari parerent atque imperata facerent. Ille idoneum locum in agris nactus, qua prope iam matura frumenta erant, ibi adventum expectare Pompei eoque omnem belli rationem conferre constituit.

82 Pompeius paucis post diebus in Thessaliam pervenit contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes, receptisque omnibus in una castra legionibus suum cum Scipione honorem partitur classicumque apud eum cani et alterum illi iubet praetorium tendi. Auctis copiis Pompei duobusque magnis exercitibus coniunctis pristina omnium confirmatur opinio, et spes victoriae augetur, adeo ut, quicquid intercederet temporis, id morari reditum in Italiam videretur, et si quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. Iamque inter se palam de praemiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum, qui in castris erant Caesaris, petebant; magnaue inter eos in consilio fuit controversia, oporteretne Lucili Hirri, quod is a Pompeio ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetoriis absentis rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implorarent Pompei, praestaret, quod proficiscenti recepisset, ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur, reliqui, in labore pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet, recusarent.

83 Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris Domitius, Scipio Spintherque Lentulus cotidianis contentionibus ad gravissimas verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentulus aetatis honorem ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gratiam dignitatemque iactaret, Scipio

affinitate Pompei confideret. Postulavit etiam L. Afranium prodicionis exercitus Acutius Rufus apud Pompeium, quod gestum in Hispania diceret. Et L. Domitius in consilio dixit placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas dari ad iudicandum eis, qui ordinis essent senatorii belloque una cum ipsis interfuissent, sententiasque de singulis ferrent, qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent: unam fore tabellam, qui liberandos omni periculo censerent; alteram, qui capitis damnarent; tertiam, qui pecunia multarent. Postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimiciis agebant nec, quibus rationibus superare possent, sed, quemadmodum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant.

84 Re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus et satis longo spatio temporis a Dyrrachinis proeliis intermisso, quo satis perspectum habere militum animum videretur, temptandum Caesar existimavit, quidnam Pompeius propositi aut voluntatis ad dimicandum haberet. Itaque exercitum ex castris eduxit aciemque instruxit, primum suis locis pauloque a castris Pompei longius, continentibus vero diebus, ut progredere a castris suis collibusque Pompeianis aciem subiceret. Quae res in dies confirmationem eius exercitum efficiebat. Superius tamen institutum in equitibus, quod demonstravimus, servabat, ut, quoniam numero multis partibus esset inferior, adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis electis ad pernecitatem armis inter equites proeliari iuberet, qui cotidiana consuetudine usum quoque eius generis proeliorum perciperent. His erat rebus effectum, ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis VII milium Pompeianorum impetum, cum adesset usus, sustinere auderent neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrerentur. Namque etiam per eos dies proelium secundum equestre fecit atque unum

Allobrogem ex duobus, quos perfugisse ad Pompeium supra docuimus, cum quibusdam interfecit.

85 Pompeius, qui castra in colle habebat, ad infimas radices montis aciem instruebat semper, ut videbatur, exspectans, si iniquis locis Caesar se subiceret. Caesar nulla ratione ad pugnam elici posse Pompeium existimans hanc sibi commodissimam belli rationem iudicavit, uti castra ex eo loco moveret semperque esset in itineribus, haec spectans, ut movendis castris pluribusque adeundis locis commodiore re frumentaria uteretur, simulque in itinere ut aliquam occasionem dimicandi nancisceretur et insolitum ad laborem Pompei exercitum cotidianis itineribus defatigaret. His constitutis rebus, signo iam profectionis dato tabernaculisque detensis animadversum est paulo ante extra cotidianam consuetudinem longius a vallo esse aciem Pompei progressam, ut non iniquo loco posse dimicari videretur. Tum Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, “differendum est” inquit, “iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus; animo simus ad dimicandum parati: non facile occasionem postea reperiemus”; confestimque expeditas copias educit.

86 Pompeius quoque, ut postea cognitum est, suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare. Namque etiam in consilio superioribus diebus dixerat, priusquam concurrerent acies, fore uti exercitus Caesaris pelleretur. Id cum essent plerique admirati, “scio me,” inquit, “paene incredibilem rem polliceri; sed rationem consilii mei accipite, quo firmiore animo in proelium prodeatis. Persuasi equitibus nostris (idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt), ut, cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggrederentur et circumventa ab tergo acie prius perturbatum exercitum pellerent, quam a nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. Ita sine

periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem difficile non est, cum tantum equitatu valeamus.” Simul denuntiavit, ut essent animo parati in posterum et, quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe rogitavissent, ne suam neu reliquorum opinionem fallerent.

87 Hunc Labienus excepit et, cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferret, “ noli,” inquit, “existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. Perexigua pars illius exercitus superest; magna pars deperiit, quod accidere tot proeliis fuit necesse, multos autumnus pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi domum discesserunt, multi sunt relict in continenti. An non audistis ex eis, qui per causam valetudinis remanserunt, cohortes esse Brundisi factas? Hae copiae, quas videtis, ex dilectibus horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt refectae, et plerique sunt ex coloniis Transpadanis. Ac tamen quod fuit roboris duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis interiit.” Haec cum dixisset, iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum reliquosque, ut idem facerent, hortatus est. Hoc laudans Pompeius idem iuravit; nec vero ex reliquis fuit quisquam, qui iurare dubitaret. Haec cum facta sunt in consilio, magna spe et laetitia omnium discessum est; ac iam animo victoriam praecipiebant, quod de re tanta et a tam perito imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur.

88 Caesar, cum Pompei castris appropinquasset, ad hunc modum aciem eius instructam animadvertit. Erant in sinistro cornu legiones duae traditae a Caesare initio dissensionis ex senatus consulto; quarum una prima, altera tertia appellabatur. In eo loco ipse erat Pompeius. Mediam aciem Scipio cum legionibus Syriacis tenebat. Ciliciensis legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis, quas traductas

ab Afranio docuimus, in dextro cornu erant collocatae. Has firmissimas se habere Pompeius existimabat. Reliquas inter aciem mediam cornuaque interiecerat numeroque cohortes CX expleverat. Haec erant milia XLV, evocatorum circiter duo, quae ex beneficiariis superiorum exercituum ad eum convenerant; quae tot acie disperserat. Reliquas cohortes VII castris propinquisque castellis praesidio disposuerat. Dextrum cornu eius rivus quidam impeditis ripis muniebat; quam ob causam cunctum equitatum, sagittarios funditoresque omnes sinistro cornu obiecerat.

89 Caesar superius institutum servans decimam legionem in dextro cornu, nonam in sinistro collocaverat, tametsi erat Dyrrachinis proeliis vehementer attenuata, et huic sic adiunxit octavam, ut paene unam ex duabus efficeret, atque alteram alteri praesidio esse iusserat. Cohortes in acie LXXX constitutas habebat, quae summa erat milium XXII; cohortes VII castris praesidio reliquerat. Sinistro cornu Antonium, dextro P. Sullam, media acie Cn. Domitium praeposuerat. Ipse contra Pompeium constitit. Simul his rebus animadversis, quas demonstravimus, timens, ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuque opposuit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare. Simul tertiae aciei totique exercitui imperavit, ne iniussu suo concurreret: se, cum id fieri vellet, vexillo signum daturum.

90 Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaeque in eum perpetui temporis officia praedicaret, imprimis commemoravit: testibus se militibus uti posse, quanto studio pacem petisset; quae per Vatinius in colloquiis, quae per Aulum Clodium eum Scipione egisset, quibus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis legatis

contendisset. Neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse. Hac habita oratione exposcentibus militibus et studio pugnae ardentibus tuba signum dedit.

91 Erat C. Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum in legione X duxerat, vir singulari virtute. Hic signo dato, “sequimini me,” inquit, “manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro imperatori quam constituistis operam date. Unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus.” Simul respiciens Caesarem, “faciam,” inquit, “hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas.” Haec cum dixisset, primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit, atque eum electi milites circiter CXX voluntarii eiusdem cohortis sunt prosecuti.

92 Inter duas acies tantum erat relictum spatii, ut satis esset ad concursum utriusque exercitus. Sed Pompeius suis praedixerat, ut Caesaris impetum exciperent neve se loco moverent aciemque eius distrahi paterentur; idque admonitu C. Triarii fecisse dicebatur, ut primus incursus visque militum infringeretur aciesque distenderetur, atque in suis ordinibus dispositi dispersos adorirentur; leviusque casura pila sperabat in loco retentis militibus, quam si ipsi immissis telis occurrissent, simul fore, ut duplicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur et lassitudine conficerentur. Quod nobis quidem nulla ratione factum a Pompeio videtur, propterea quod est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent; neque frustra antiquitus institutum est, ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque universi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostes terreri et suos incitari existimaverunt.

93 Sed nostri milites dato signo cum infestis pilis procucurrissent atque animum advertissent non concurrere a Pompeianis, usu periti ac superioribus pugnis exercitati sua sponte cursum represserunt et ad medium fere spatium constiterunt, ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent, parvoque intermisso temporis spatio ac rursus renovato cursu pila miserunt celeriterque, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, gladios strinxerunt. Neque vero Pompeiani huic rei defuerunt. Nam et tela missa exceperunt et impetum legionum tulerunt et ordines suos servarunt pilisque missis ad gladios redierunt. Eodem tempore equites ab sinistro Pompei cornu, ut erat imperatum, universi procucurrerunt, omnisque multitudo sagittariorum se profudit. Quorum impetum noster equitatus non tulit, sed paulatim loco motus cessit, equitesque Pompei hoc acrius instare et se turmatim explicare aciemque nostram a latere aperto circumire coeperunt. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, quartae aciei, quam instituerat sex cohortium, dedit signum. Illi celeriter procucurrerunt infestisque signis tanta vi in Pompei equites impetum fecerunt, ut eorum nemo consisteret, omnesque conversi non solum loco excederent, sed protinus incitati fuga montes altissimos peterent. Quibus submotis omnes sagittarii funditoresque destituti inermes sine praesidio interfecti sunt. Eodem impetu cohortes sinistrum cornu pugnantibus etiam tum ac resistentibus in acie Pompeianis circumierunt eosque a tergo sunt adorti.

94 Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar, quae quiescente fuerat et se ad id tempus loco tenuerat, procurrere iussit. Ita cum recentes atque integri defessis successissent, alii autem a tergo adorirentur, sustinere Pompeiani non potuerunt, atque universi terga verterunt. Neque vero Caesarem fefellit, quin ab eis cohortibus, quae contra equitatum in quarta acie collocatae essent, initium victoriae oriretur, ut ipse in

cohortandis militibus pronuntiaverat. Ab his enim primum equitatus est pulsus, ab isdem factae caedes sagittariorum ac funditorum, ab isdem acies Pompeiana a sinistra parte circumita atque initium fugae factum. Sed Pompeius, ut equitatum suum pulsum vidit atque eam partem, cui maxime confidebat, perterritam animadvertit, aliis quoque diffusus acie excessit protinusque se in castra equo contulit et eis centurionibus, quos in statione ad praetoriam portam posuerat, clare, ut milites exaudirent, “tuemini,” inquit, “castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo.” Haec cum dixisset, se in praetorium contulit summae rei diffidens et tamen eventum exspectans.

95 Caesar Pompeianis ex fuga intra vallum compulsis nullum spatium perterritis dari oportere existimans milites cohortatus est, ut beneficio fortunae uterentur castraque oppugnarent. Qui, etsi magno aestu fatigati (nam ad meridiem res erat perducta), tamen ad omnem laborem animo parati imperio paruerunt. Castra a cohortibus, quae ibi praesidio erant relictas, industrie defendebantur, multo etiam acrius a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis. Nam qui acie refugerant milites, et animo perterriti et lassitudine confecti, missis plerique armis signisque militaribus, magis de reliqua fuga quam de castrorum defensione cogitabant. Neque vero diutius, qui in vallo constiterant, multitudinem telorum sustinere potuerunt, sed confecti vulneribus locum reliquerunt, protinusque omnes ducibus usi centurionibus tribunisque militum in altissimos montes, qui ad castra pertinebant, confugerunt.

96 In castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Lucii etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta edera, multaue praeterea, quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae

fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse, qui non necessarias conquirent voluptates. At hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitui Caesaris luxuriam obiecebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent. Pompeius, iam cum intra vallum nostri versarentur, equum nactus, detractis insignibus imperatoris, decumana porta se ex castris eiecit protinusque equo citato Larisam contendit. Neque ibi constitit, sed eadem celeritate, paucos suos ex fuga nactus, nocturno itinere non intermisso, comitatu equitum XXX ad mare pervenit navemque frumentariam conscendit, saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse, ut, a quo genere hominum victoriam sperasset, ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur.

97 Caesar castris potitus a militibus contendit, ne in praeda occupati reliqui negotii gerendi facultatem dimitterent. Qua re impetrata montem opere circummunire instituit. Pompeiani, quod is mons erat sine aqua, diffisi ei loco relicto monte universi iugis eius Larisam versus se recipere coeperunt. Qua re animadversa Caesar copias suas divisit partemque legionum in castris Pompei remanere iussit, partem in sua castra remisit, IIII secum legiones duxit commodioreque itinere Pompeianis occurrere coepit et progressus milia passuum VI aciem instruxit. Qua re animadversa Pompeiani in quodam monte constiterunt. Hunc montem flumen subbluebat. Caesar milites cohortatus, etsi totius diei continenti labore erant confecti noxque iam suberat, tamen munitione flumen a monte seclisit, ne noctu aquari Pompeiani possent. Quo perfecto opere illi de deditione missis legatis agere coeperunt. Pauci ordinis senatorii, qui se cum eis coniunxerant, nocte fuga salutem petiverunt.

98 Caesar prima luce omnes eos, qui in monte consederant, ex superioribus locis in planiciem descendere atque arma proicere iussit.

Quod ubi sine recusatione fecerunt passisque palmis proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt, consolatus consurgere iussit et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur, neu quid sui desiderarent. Hac adhibita diligentia ex castris sibi legiones alias occurrere et eas, quas secum duxerat, in vicem requiescere atque in castra reverti iussit eodemque die Larisam pervenit.

99 In eo proelio non amplius CC milites desideravit, sed centuriones, fortes viros, circiter XXX amisit. Interfectus est etiam fortissime pugnans Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto. Neque id fuit falsum, quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat. Sic enim Caesar existimabat, eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse, optimeque eum de se meritum iudicabat. Ex Pompeiano exercitu circiter milia XV cecidisse videbantur, sed in deditionem venerunt amplius milia XXIII (namque etiam cohortes, quae praesidio in castellis fuerant, sese Sullae dediderunt), multi praeterea in finitimas civitates refugerunt; signaque militaria ex proelio ad Caesarem sunt relata CLXXX et aquilae VIII. L. Domitius ex castris in montem refugiens, cum vires eum lassitudine defecissent, ab equitibus est interfectus.

100 Eodem tempore D. Laelius cum classe ad Brundisium venit eademque ratione, qua factum a Libone antea demonstravimus, insulam obiectam portui Brundisino tenuit. Similiter Vatinius, qui Brundisio praeerat, tectis instructisque scaphis elicuit naves Laelianas atque ex his longius productam unam quinqueregrem et minores duas in angustiis portus cepit itemque per equites dispositos aqua prohibere classarios instituit. Sed Laelius tempore anni

commodiore usus ad navigandum onerariis navibus Corcyra Dyrrachioque aquam suis supportabat, neque a proposito deterrebat neque ante proelium in Thessalia factum cognitum aut ignominia amissarum navium aut necessariorum rerum inopia ex portu insulaque expelli potuit.

101 Isdem fere temporibus C. Cassius cum classe Syrorum et Phoenicum et Cilicum in Siciliam venit, et cum esset Caesaris classis divisa in duas partes, dimidia parti praeesset P. Sulpicius praetor ad Vibonem, dimidia M. Pomponius ad Messanam, prius Cassius ad Messanam navibus advolavit, quam Pomponius de eius adventu cognosceret, perturbatumque eum nactus nullis custodiis neque ordinibus certis, magno vento et secundo completas onerarias naves taeda et pice et stupa reliquisque rebus, quae sunt ad incendia, in Pomponianam classem immisit atque omnes naves incendit XXXV, e quibus erant XX constratae. Tantusque eo facto timor incessit, ut, cum esset legio praesidio Messanae, vix oppidum defenderetur, et nisi eo ipso tempore quidam nuntii de Caesaris victoria per dispositos equites essent allati, existimabant plerique futurum fuisse, uti amitteretur. Sed opportunissime nuntiis allatis oppidum est defensum; Cassiusque ad Sulpicianam inde classem profectus est Vibonem, applicatisque nostris ad terram navibus pari atque antea ratione Cassius secundum nactus ventum onerarias naves praeparatas ad incendium immisit, et flamma ab utroque cornu comprehensa naves sunt combustae quinque. Cumque ignis magnitudine venti latius serperet, milites, qui ex veteribus legionibus erant relictis praesidio navibus ex numero aegrorum, ignominiam non tulerunt, sed sua sponte naves conscenderunt et a terra solverunt impetuque facto in Cassianam classem quinqueres duas, in quarum altera erat Cassius, ceperunt; sed Cassius exceptus scapha refugit; praeterea

duae sunt depressae triremes. Neque multo post de proelio facto in Thessalia cognitum est, ut ipsis Pompeianis fides fieret; nam ante id tempus fingi a legatis amicisque Caesaris arbitrabantur. Quibus rebus cognitis ex his locis Cassius cum classe discessit.

102 Caesar omnibus rebus relictis persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit, quascumque in partes se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset, et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat, cotidie progrediebatur legionemque unam minoribus itineribus subsequi iussit. Erat edictum Pompei nomine Amphipoli propositum, uti omnes eius provinciae iuniores, Graeci civesque Romani, iurandi causa convenirent. Sed utrum avertendae suspicionis causa Pompeius proposuisset, ut quam diutissime longioris fugae consilium occultaret, an ut novis dilectibus, si nemo premeret, Macedoniam tenere conaretur, existimari non poterat. Ipse ad ancoram unam noctem constitit et vocatis ad se Amphipoli hospitibus et pecunia ad necessarios sumptus corrogata, cognito Caesaris adventu, ex eo loco discessit et Mytilenas paucis diebus venit. Biduum tempestate retentus navibusque aliis additis actuariis in Ciliciam atque inde Cyprum pervenit. Ibi cognoscit consensu omnium Antiochensium civiumque Romanorum, qui illic negotiarentur, arma capta esse excludendi sui causa nuntiosque dimissos ad eos, qui se ex fuga in finitimas civitates recepisse dicerentur, ne Antiochiam adirent: id si fecissent, magno eorum capitis periculo futurum. Idem hoc L. Lentulo, qui superiore anno consul fuerat, et P. Lentulo consulari ac nonnullis aliis acciderat Rhodi; qui cum ex fuga Pompeium sequerentur atque in insulam venissent, oppido ac portu recepti non erant missisque ad eos nuntiis, ut ex his locis discederent contra voluntatem suam naves solverant. Iamque de Caesaris adventu fama ad civitates perferebatur.

103 Quibus cognitis rebus Pompeius deposito adeundae Syriae consilio pecunia societatis sublata et a quibusdam privatis sumpta et aeris magno pondere ad militarem usum in naves imposito duobusque milibus hominum armatis, partim quos ex familiis societatum delegerat, partim a negotiatoribus coegerat, quosque ex suis quisque ad hanc rem idoneos existimabat, Pelusium pervenit. Ibi casu rex erat Ptolomaeus, puer aetate, magnis copiis cum sorore Cleopatra bellum gerens, quam paucis ante mensibus per suos propinquos atque amicos regno expulerat; castraque Cleopatrae non longo spatio ab eius castris distabant. Ad eum Pompeius misit, ut pro hospitio atque amicitia patris Alexandria reciperetur atque illius opibus in calamitate tegeretur. Sed qui ab eo missi erant, confecto legationis officio liberius cum militibus regis colloqui coeperunt eosque hortari, ut suum officium Pompeio praestarent, neve eius fortunam despicerent. In hoc erant numero complures Pompei milites, quos ex eius exercitu acceptos in Syria Gabinius Alexandriam traduxerat belloque confecto apud Ptolomaeum, patrem pueri, reliquerat.

104 His tum cognitis rebus amici regis, qui propter aetatem eius in procuratione erant regni, sive timore adducti, ut postea praedicabant, sollicitato exercitu regio ne Pompeius Alexandriam Aegyptumque occuparet, sive despecta eius fortuna, ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis inimici exsistunt, his, qui erant ab eo missi, palam liberaliter responderunt eumque ad regem venire iusserunt; ipsi clam consilio inito Achillam, praefectum regium, singulari hominem audacia, et L. Septimium, tribunum militum, ad interficiendum Pompeium miserunt. Ab his liberaliter ipse appellatus et quadam notitia Septimii productus, quod bello praedonum apud eum ordinem duxerat, naviculam parvulam conscendit cum paucis suis: ibi ab Achilla et

Septimio interficitur. Item L. Lentulus comprehenditur ab rege et in custodia necatur.

105 Caesar, cum in Asiam venisset, reperiebat T. Ampium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano Dianae eiusque rei causa senatores omnes ex provincia evocasse, ut his testibus in summa pecuniae uteretur, sed interpellatum adventu Caesaris profugisse. Ita duobus temporibus Ephesiae pecuniae Caesar auxilium tulit. Item constabat Elide in templo Minervae repetitis atque enumeratis diebus, quo die proelium secundum Caesar fecisset, simulacrum Victoriae, quod ante ipsam Minervam collocatum esset et ante ad simulacrum Minervae spectavisset, ad valvas se templi limenque convertisse. Eodemque die Antiochiae in Syria bis tantus exercitus clamor et signorum sonus exauditus est, ut in muris armata civitas discurreret. Hoc idem Ptolomaide accidit. Pergami in occultis ac reconditis templi, quo praeter sacerdotes adire fas non est, quae Graeci *adyta* appellant, tympana sonuerunt. Item Trallibus in templo Victoriae, ubi Caesaris statuam consecraverant, palma per eos dies inter coagmenta lapidum ex pavimento exstitisse ostendebatur.

106 Caesar paucos dies in Asia moratus, cum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum in Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines regni reliquasque eius loci opportunitates cum legione una, quam se ex Thessalia sequi iusserat, et altera, quam ex Achaia a Q. Fufio legato evocaverat, equitibusque DCCC et navibus longis Rhodiis X et Asiaticis paucis Alexandriam pervenit. In his erant legionibus hominum milia tria CC; reliqui vulneribus ex proeliis et labore ac magnitudine itineris confecti consequi non potuerant. Sed Caesar confisus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non dubitaverat, aequae omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimans. Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit atque ibi primum e nave

egrediens clamorem militum audit, quos rex in oppido praesidii causa reliquerat, et concursum ad se fieri videt, quod fasces anteferrentur. In hoc omnis multitudo maiestatem regiam minui praedicabat. Hoc sedato tumultu crebrae continuis diebus ex concursu multitudinis concitationes fiebant, compluresque milites huius urbis omnibus partibus interficiebantur.

107 Quibus rebus animadversis legiones sibi alias ex Asia adduci iussit, quas ex Pompeianis militibus confecerat. Ipse enim necessario etesiis tenebatur, qui navigantibus Alexandria flant adversissimi venti. Interim controversias regum ad populum Romanum et ad se, quod esset consul, pertinere existimans atque eo magis officio suo convenire, quod superiore consulatu cum patre Ptolomaeo et lege et senatusconsulto societas erat facta, ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram exercitus, quos haberent, dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.

108 Erat in procuratione regni propter aetatem pueri nutricius eius, eunuchus nomine Pothinus. Is primum inter suos queri atque indignari coepit regem ad causam dicendam evocari; deinde adiutores quosdam consilii sui nactus ex regis amicis exercitum a Pelusio clam Alexandriam evocavit atque eundem Achillam, cuius supra meminimus, omnibus copiis praefecit. Hunc incitatum suis et regis inflatum pollicitationibus, quae fieri vellet, litteris nuntiisque edocuit. In testamento Ptolomaei patris heredes erant scripti ex duobus filiis maior et ex duabus filiabus ea, quae aetate antecedebat. Haec uti fierent, per omnes deos perque foedera, quae Romae fecisset, eodem testamento Ptolomaeus populum Romanum obtestabatur. Tabulae testamenti unae per legatos eius Romam erant allatae, ut in aerario ponerentur (hic cum propter publicas

occupationes poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositae), alterae eodem exemplo relictae atque obsignatae Alexandriae proferebantur.

109 De his rebus cum ageretur apud Caesarem, isque maxime vellet pro communi amico atque arbitro controversias regum componere, subito exercitus regius equitatusque omnis venire Alexandriam nuntiatur. Caesaris copiae nequaquam erant tantae, ut eis, extra oppidum si esset dimicandum, confideret. Relinquebatur, ut se suis locis oppido teneret consiliumque Achillae cognosceret. Milites tamen omnes in armis esse iussit regemque hortatus est, ut ex suis necessariis, quos haberet maximae auctoritatis, legatos ad Achillam mitteret et, quid esset suae voluntatis, ostenderet. A quo missi Dioscorides et Serapion, qui ambo legati Romae fuerant magnamque apud patrem Ptolomaeum auctoritatem habuerant, ad Achillam pervenerunt. Quos ille, cum in conspectum eius venissent, priusquam audiret aut, cuius rei causa missi essent, cognosceret, corripere atque interficere iussit; quorum alter accepto vulnere occupatus per suos pro occiso sublatus, alter interfectus est. Quo facto regem ut in sua potestate haberet, Caesar efficit, magnam regum nomen apud suos auctoritatem habere existimans et ut potius privato paucorum et latronum quam regio consilio susceptum bellum videretur.

110 Erant cum Achilla eae copiae, ut neque numero neque genere hominum neque usu rei militaris contemnendae viderentur. Milia enim XX in armis habebat. Haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant. Huc accedebant collecti ex praedonibus latronibusque Syriae Ciliciaeque provinciae finitimarumque regionum. Multi praeterea capitis damnati exulesque

convenerant; fugitivis omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus certaue vitae condicio, ut dato nomine militum essent numero; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu militum eripiebatur, qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant. Hi regum amicos ad mortem deprecare, hi bona locupletum diripere, stipendii augendi causa regis domum obsidere, regno expellere alios, alios arcessere vetere quodam Alexandrini exercitus instituto consueverant. Erant praeterea equitum milia duo. Inveteraverant hi omnes compluribus Alexandriae bellis; Ptolomaeum patrem in regnum reduxerant, Bibuli filios duos interfecerant, bella cum Aegyptiis gesserant. Hunc usum rei militaris habebant.

¹¹¹ His copiis fidens Achilles paucitatemque militum Caesaris despiciens occupabat Alexandriam praeter eam oppidi partem, quam Caesar cum militibus tenebat, primo impetu domum eius irrumpere conatus; sed Caesar dispositis per vias cohortibus impetum eius sustinuit. Eodemque tempore pugnatum est ad portum, ac longe maximam ea res attulit dimicationem. Simul enim diductis copiis pluribus viis pugnabatur, et magna multitudine naves longas occupare hostes conabantur; quarum erant L auxilio missae ad Pompeium proelioque in Thessalia facto domum redierant, quadriremes omnes et quinqueremes aptae instructaeque omnibus rebus ad navigandum, praeter has XXII, quae praesidii causa Alexandriae esse consueverant, constratae omnes; quas si occupavissent, classe Caesari erepta portum ac mare totum in sua potestate haberent, commeatu auxiliisque Caesarem prohiberent. Itaque tanta est contentione actum, quanta agi debuit, cum illi celerem in ea re victoriam, hi salutem suam consistere viderent. Sed rem obtinuit Caesar omnesque eas naves et reliquas, quae erant in

navalibus, incendit, quod tam late tueri parva manu non poterat, confestimque ad Pharum navibus milites euit.

112 Pharus est in insula turris magna altitudine, mirificis operibus exstructae; quae nomen ab insula accepit. Haec insula obiecta Alexandriae portum efficit; sed a superioribus regibus in longitudinem passuum a DCCC in mare iactis molibus angusto itinere ut ponte cum oppido coniungitur. In hac sunt insula domicilia Aegyptiorum et vicus oppidi magnitudine; quaeque ibi naves imprudentia aut tempestate paulum suo cursu decesserunt, has more praedonum diripere consuerunt. Eis autem invitis, a quibus Pharus tenetur, non potest esse propter angustias navibus introitus in portum. Hoc tum veritus Caesar, hostibus in pugna occupatis, militibus expositis Pharumprehendit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Quibus est rebus effectum, uti tuto frumentum auxiliaque navibus ad eum supportari possent. Dimisit enim circum omnes propinquas provincias atque inde auxilia evocavit. Reliquis oppidi partibus sic est pugnatum, ut aequo proelio discederetur et neutri pellerentur (id efficiebant angustiae loci), paucisque utrimque interfectis Caesar loca maxime necessaria complexus noctu praemuniit. In eo tractu oppidi pars erat regiae exigua, in quam ipse habitandi causa initio erat inductus, et theatrum coniunctum domui quod arcis tenebat locum aditusque habebat ad portum et ad reliqua navalia. Has munitiones insequentibus auxit diebus, ut pro muro obiectas haberet ne dimicare invitus cogeretur. Interim filia minor Ptolomaei regis vacuum possessionem regni sperans ad Achillam sese ex regia traiecit unaque bellum administrare coepit. Sed celeriter est inter eos de principatu controversia orta; quae res apud milites largitiones auxit; magnis enim iacturis sibi quisque eorum animos conciliabat. Haec dum apud hostes geruntur, Pothinus, nutricius pueri et

procurator regni in parte Caesaris, cum ad Achillam nuntios mitteret hortareturque, ne negotio desisteret neve animo deficeret, indicatis deprehensisque internuntiis a Caesare est interfectus. Haec initia belli Alexandrini fuerunt.

DE BELLO ALEXANDRINO

1 Bello Alexandrino conflato Caesar Rhodo atque ex Syria Ciliciaque omnem classem arcessit; Creta sagittarios, equites ab rege Nabataeorum Malcho evocat; tormenta undique conqueri et frumentum mitti, auxilia adduci iubet. Interim munitiones cotidie operibus augentur atque omnes oppidi partes, quae minus esse firmae videntur, testudinibus ac musculis aptantur; ex aedificiis autem per foramina in proxima aedificia arietes immittuntur, quantumque aut ruinis deicitur aut per vim recipitur loci, in tantum munitiones proferuntur. Nam incendio fere tuta est Alexandria, quod sine contignatione ac materia sunt aedificia et structuris ac fornicibus continentur tectaque sunt rudere aut pavimentis. Caesar maxime studebat ut, quam angustissimam partem oppidi palus a meridie interiecta efficiebat, hanc operibus vineisque agendis ab reliqua parte urbis excluderet, illud spectans primum ut, cum in duas partis esset urbis divisa acies, uno consilio atque imperio administraretur, deinde ut laborantibus succurri atque ex altera oppidi parte auxilium ferri posset, in primis vero ut aqua pabuloque abundaret, quarum alterius rei copiam exiguam, alterius nullam omnino facultatem habebat; quod utrumque large palus praebere poterat.

2 Neque vero Alexandrinis in gerendis negotiis cunctatio ulla aut mora inferebatur. Nam in omnis partis, per quas fines Aegypti regnumque pertinet, legatos conquisitoresque dilectus habendi causa miserant magnumque numerum in oppidum telorum atque tormentorum convexerant et innumerabilem multitudinem adduxerant. Nec minus in urbe maximae armorum erant institutae officinae. Servos praeterea puberes armaverant; quibus domini locupletiores victum cotidianum stipendiumque praebebant. Hac

multitudine disposita munitiones semotarum partium tuebantur; veteranas cohortis vacuas in celeberrimis urbis locis habebant, ut quacumque regione pugnaretur integris viribus ad auxilium ferendum opponi possent. Omnibus viis atque angiportis triplicem vallum obduxerant — erat autem quadrato exstructus saxo neque minus XL pedes altitudinis habebat — quaeque partes urbis inferiores erant, has altissimis turribus denorum tabulatorum munierant. Praeterea alias ambulatorias totidem tabulatorum confixerant subiectisque eas rotis funibus iumentisque obiectis directis plateis in quamcumque erat visum partem movebant.

3 Urbs fertilissima et copiosissima omnium rerum apparatus suggerebat. Ipsi homines ingeniosi atque acutissimi quae a nobis fieri viderant ea sollertia efficiebant ut nostri illorum opera imitati viderentur, et sua sponte multa reperiebant unoque tempore et nostras munitiones infestabant et suas defendebant. Atque haec principes in consiliis contionibusque agitabant: populum Romanum paulatim in consuetudinem eius regni occupandi venire. Paucis annis ante A. Gabinium cum exercitu fuisse in Aegypto; Pompeium se ex fuga eodem recepissee; Caesarem venisse cum copiis, neque morte Pompei quicquam profectum quo minus apud se Caesar commoraretur. Quem si non expulissent, futuram ex regno provinciam; idque agendum mature: namque eum interclusum tempestatibus propter anni tempus recipere transmarina auxilia non posse.

4 Interim dissensione orta inter Achillan, qui veterano exercitui praeerat, et Arsinoen, regis Ptolomaei minorem filiam, ut supra demonstratum est, cum uterque utrique insidiaretur et summam imperi ipse obtinere vellet, praeoccupat Arsinoe per Ganymeden eunuchum, nutricium suum, atque Achillan interficit. Hoc occiso sine ullo socio et custode ipsa omne imperium obtinebat; exercitus

Ganymedi traditur. Is suscepto officio largitionem in militem auget; reliqua pari diligentia administrat.

5 Alexandria est fere tota suffossa specusque habet a Nilo pertinentis, quibus aqua in privatas domos inducitur, quae paulatim spatio temporis liquescit ac subsidit. Hac uti domini aedificiorum atque eorum familiae consuerunt: nam quae flumine Nilo fertur adeo est limosa ac turbida ut multos variosque morbos efficiat; sed ea plebes ac multitudo contenta est necessario, quod fons urbe tota nullus est. Hoc tamen flumen in ea parte erat urbis quae ab Alexandrinis tenebatur. Quo facto est admonitus Ganymedes posse nostros aqua intercludi; qui distributi munitionum tuendarum causa vicatim ex privatis aedificiis specubus ac puteis extracta aqua utebantur.

6 Hoc probato consilio magnum ac difficile opus aggreditur. Intersaeptis enim specubus atque omnibus urbis partibus exclusis quae ab ipso tenebantur, aquae magnam vim ex mari rotis ac machinationibus exprimere contendit: hanc locis superioribus fundere in partem Caesaris non intermittebat. Quam ob causam salsior paulo praeter consuetudinem aqua trahebatur ex proximis aedificiis magnamque hominibus admirationem praebebat, quam ob rem id accidisset; nec satis sibi ipsi credebant, cum se inferiores eiusdem generis ac saporis aqua dicerent uti atque ante consuissent, vulgoque inter se conferebant et degustando quantum inter se differrent aquae cognoscebant. Parvo vero temporis spatio haec propior bibi omnino non poterat, illa inferior corruptior iam salsiorque reperiiebatur.

7 Quo facto dubitatione sublata tantus incessit timor ut ad extremum casum periculi omnes deducti viderentur atque alii morari Caesarem dicerent quin navis conscendere iuberent, alii multo

gravius extimescerent, quod neque celari Alexandrini possent in apparanda fuga, cum tam parvo spatio distarent ab ipsis, neque illis imminentibus atque insequentibus ullus in navis receptus daretur. Erat autem magna multitudo oppidanorum in parte Caesaris, quam domiciliis ipsorum non moverat, quod ea se fidelem palam nostris esse simulabat et descivisse a suis videbatur: at mihi *si* defendendi essent Alexandrini neque fallaces esse neque temerarii, multa oratio frustra absumeretur; cum vero uno tempore et natio eorum et natura cognoscatur, aptissimum esse hoc genus ad prodicionem dubitare nemo potest.

8 Caesar suorum timorem consolatione et ratione minuebat. Nam puteis fossis aquam dulcem reperiri posse adfirmabat: omnia enim litora naturaliter aquae dulcis venas habere. Quod si alia esset litoris Aegypti natura atque omnium reliquorum, tamen, quoniam mare libere tenerent, neque hostes classem haberent, prohiberi sese non posse quo minus cotidie navibus aquam peterent vel a sinistra parte a Paraetonio vel a dextra ab insula, quae diversae navigationes numquam uno tempore adversis ventis praecluderentur. Fugae vero nullum esse consilium non solum eis qui primam dignitatem haberent, sed ne eis quidem qui nihil praeterquam de vita cogitarent. Magno negotio impetus hostium adversos ex munitionibus sustinere; quibus relictis nec loco nec numero pares esse posse. Magnam autem moram et difficultatem ascensum in navis habere, praesertim ex scaphis; summam esse contra in Alexandrinis velocitatem locorumque et aedificiorum notitiam. Hos praecipue in victoria insolentis praecursuros et loca excelsiora atque aedificia occupaturos: ita fuga navibusque nostros prohibituos. Proinde eius consili obliviscerentur atque omni ratione esse vincendum cogitarent.

9 Hac oratione apud suos habita atque omnium mentibus excitatis

dat centurionibus negotium ut reliquis operibus intermissis ad fodiendos puteos animum conferant neve quam partem nocturni temporis intermittant. Quo suscepto negotio atque omnium animis ad laborem incitatis magna una nocte vis aquae dulcis inventa est. Ita operosis Alexandrinorum machinationibus maximisque conatibus non longi temporis labore occursum est. Eo biduo legio XXXVII ex dediticiis Pompeianis militibus cum frumento, armis, telis, tormentis imposita in navis a Domitio Calvino ad litora Africae paulo supra Alexandream delata est. Hae naves Euro, qui multos dies continenter flabat, portum capere prohibebantur; sed loca sunt egregia omni illa regione ad tenendas ancoras. Hi cum diu retinerentur atque aquae inopia premerentur, navigio actuario Caesarem faciunt certiore.

10 Caesar, ut per se consilium caperet quid faciendum videretur, navem conscendit atque omnem classem se sequi iussit nullis nostris militibus impositis, quod, cum longius paulo discederet, munitiones nudare nolebat. Cumque ad eum locum accessissent, qui appellatur Chersonensus, aquandique causa remiges in terram euissent, non nulli ex eo numero, cum longius a navibus praedatum processissent, ab equitibus hostium sunt excepti. Ex his cognoverunt Caesarem ipsum in classe venisse nec ullos milites in navibus habere. Qua re comperta magnam sibi facultatem fortunam obtulisse bene gerendae rei crediderunt. Itaque navis omnis quas paratas habuerant ad navigandum propugnatoribus instruxerunt Caesarique redeunti cum classe occurrerunt. Qui duabus de causis eo die dimicare nolebat, quod et nullos milites in navibus habebat et post horam X diei res agebatur, nox autem allatura videbatur maiorem fiduciam illis, qui locorum notitia confidebant; sibi etiam hortandi suos auxilium defuturum, quod nulla satis idonea esset hortatio quae neque virtutem posset notare neque inertiam. Quibus de causis navis quas potuit

Caesar ad terram detrahit, quem in locum illos successuros non existimabat.

¹¹ Erat una navis Rhodia in dextro Caesaris cornu longe ab reliquis collocata. Hanc conspicati hostes non tenuerunt sese, magnoque impetu IIII ad eam constratae naves et complures apertae contenderunt. Cui coactus est Caesar ferre subsidium, ne turpem in conspectu hostium contumeliam acciperet, quamquam, si quid gravius illis accidisset, merito casurum iudicabat. Proelium commissum est magna contentione Rhodiorum; qui cum in omnibus dimicationibus et scientia et virtute praestitissent, tum maxime illo tempore totum onus sustinere non recusabant, ne quod suorum culpa detrimentum acceptum videretur. Ita proelium secundissimum est factum. Capta est una hostium quadriremis, depressa est altera, duae omnibus epihatis nudatae; magna praeterea multitudo in reliquis navibus propugnatorum est interfecta. Quod nisi nox proelium diremisset, tota classe hostium Caesar potitus esset. Hac calamitate perterritis hostibus adverso vento leniter flante navis onerarias Caesar remulco victricibus suis navibus Alexandream deducit.

¹² Eo detrimento adeo sunt fracti Alexandrini, cum iam non virtute propugnatorum, sed scientia classiariorum se victos viderent, quibus et superioribus locis sublevabantur, ut ex aedificiis defendi possent et materiam cunctam obicerent, quod nostrae classis oppugnationem etiam ad terram verebantur. Idem, postea quam Ganymedes in concilio confirmavit sese et eas quae essent amissae restitutum et numerum adaucturum, magna spe et fiducia veteres reficere navis accuratiusque huic rei studere atque inservire instituerunt. Ac tametsi amplius CX navibus longis in portu navalibusque amiserant, non tamen reparandae classis cogitationem deposuerunt. Videbant enim non auxilia Caesari, non commeatus supportari posse, si classe ipsi

valerent; praeterea nautici homines urbis et regionis maritimae cotidianoque usu a pueris exercitati ad naturale ac domesticum bonum refugere cupiebant et quantum parvulis navigiis profecissent sentiebant; itaque omni studio ad parandam classem incubuerunt.

13 Erant omnibus ostiis Nili custodiae exigendi portorii causa dispositae; naves veteres erant in occultis regiae navalibus, quibus multis annis ad navigandum non erant usi: has reficiebant, illas Alexandream revocabant. Deerant remi: porticus, gymnasia, publica aedificia detegebant, asseres remorum usum obtinebant; aliud naturalis sollertia, aliud urbis copia sumministrabat. Postremo non longam navigationem parabant, sed praesentis temporis necessitati serviebant et in ipso portu confligendum videbant. Itaque paucis diebus contra omnium opinionem quadriremis XXII, quinquere mis V confecerunt; ad has minores apertasque compluris adiecerunt et in portu periclitati remigio quid quaeque earum efficere posset idoneos milites imposuerunt seque ad confligendum omnibus rebus paraverunt. Caesar Rhodias navis VIII habebat — nam decem missis una in cursu litore Aegypto defecerat — , Ponticas VIII, Lycias V, ex Asia XII. Ex his erant quinquere mis et quadriremes decem, reliquae infra hanc magnitudinem et pleraeque apertae. Tamen virtute militum confisus cognitis hostium copiis se ad dimicandum parabat.

14 Postquam eo ventum est ut sibi uterque eorum confideret, Caesar Pharon classe circumvehitur adversasque navis hostibus constituit: in dextro cornu Rhodias collocat, in sinistro Ponticas. Inter has spatium CCCC passuum relinquit, quod satis esse ad explicandas navis videbatur. Post hunc ordinem reliquas navis subsidio distribuit; quae quamque earum sequatur et cui subveniat constituit atque imperat. Non dubitanter Alexandrini classem producunt atque

instruunt: in fronte collocant XXII, reliquas subsidiarias in secundo ordine constituunt. Magnum praeterea numerum minorum navigiorum et scapharum producant cum malleolis ignibusque, si quid ipsa multitudo et clamor et flamma nostris terroris adferre possent. Erant inter duas classis vada transitu angusto, quae pertinent ad regionem Africae — sic enim praedicant, partem esse Alexandriae dimidiam Africae — satisque diu inter ipsos est exspectatum ab utris transeundi fieret initium, propterea quod ei qui intrassent et ad explicandam classem et ad receptum, si durior accidisset casus, impeditiores fore videbantur.

15 Rhodiis navibus praeerat Euphranor, animi magnitudine ac virtute magis cum nostris hominibus quam cum Graecis comparandus. Hic ob notissimam scientiam atque animi magnitudinem delectus est ab Rhodiis qui imperium classis obtineret. Qui ubi Caesaris animum advertit, ‘Videris, mihi,’ inquit, ‘Caesar, vereri, si haec vada primis navibus intraris, ne prius dimicare cogaris quam reliquam classem potueris explicare. Nobis rem committe: nos proelium sustinebimus — neque tuum iudicium fallemus — dum reliqui subsequantur. Hos quidem diutius in nostro conspectu gloriari magno nobis et dedecori et dolori est.’ Caesar illum adhortatus atque omnibus laudibus prosecutus dat signum pugnae. Progressas ultra vadum IIII Rhodias navis circumsistunt Alexandrini atque in eas impetum faciunt. Sustinent illi atque arte sollertiaque se explicant; ac tantum doctrina potuit ut in dispari numero nulla transversa hosti obiceretur, nullius remi detergerentur, sed semper venientibus adversae occurrerent. Interim sunt reliquae subsecutae. Tum necessario discessum ab arte est propter angustias loci, atque omne certamen in virtute constitit. Neque vero Alexandriae fuit quisquam aut nostrorum aut oppidanorum, qui aut in opere aut in pugna

occupatum animum haberent, quin altissima tecta peteret atque ex omni prospectu locum spectaculo caperet precibusque et votis victoriam suis ab dis immortalibus eceret.

16 Minime autem par erat proeli certamen. Nostris enim pulsus neque terra neque mari effugium dabatur victis, omniaque victoribus erant futura in incerto; cum illi, si superassent navibus, omnia tenerent, si inferiores fuissent, reliquam tamen fortunam periclitarentur. Simul illud grave ac miserum videbatur, perpauca de summa rerum ac de salute omnium decertare; quorum si qui aut animo aut virtute cessisset, reliquis etiam esset cavendum, quibus pro se pugnandi facultas non fuisset. Haec superioribus diebus saepenumero Caesar suis euerat, ut hoc maiore animo contenderent, quod omnium salutem sibi commendatam viderent. Eadem suum quisque contubernalem, amicum, notum prosequens erat obtestatus, ne suam atque omnium falleret opinionem, quorum iudicio delectus ad pugnam proficisceretur. Itaque hoc animo est decertatum, ut neque maritimis nauticisque sollertia atque ars praesidium ferret, neque numero navium praestantibus multitudo prodesset, neque electi ad virtutem e tanta multitudine viri virtuti nostrorum possent adaequare. Capitur hoc proelio quinquere mis una et biremis cum defensoribus remigibusque, et deprimuntur tres, nostris incolumibus omnibus. Reliquae propinquam fugam ad oppidum capiunt; quas protexerunt ex molibus atque aedificiis imminetibus et nostros adire propius prohibuerunt.

17 Hoc ne sibi saepius accidere posset, omni ratione Caesar contendendum existimavit ut insulam molemque ad insulam pertinentem in suam redigeret potestatem. Perfectis enim magna ex parte munitionibus in oppido et insulam et urbem uno tempore temptari posse confidebat. Quo capto consilio cohortis X et levis

armaturae electos, quosque idoneos ex equitibus Gallis arbitrabatur, in navigia minora scaphasque imponit; in alteram insulae partem distinendae manus causa constratis navibus aggreditur, praemiis magnis propositis qui primus insulam cepisset. Ac primo impetum nostrorum pariter sustinuerunt: uno enim tempore et ex tectis aedificiorum propugnabant et litora armati defendebant, quo propter asperitatem loci non facilis nostris aditus dabatur, et scaphis navibusque longis quinque mobiliter et scienter angustias loci tuebantur. Sed ubi primurn locis cognitis vadisque pertemptatis pauci nostri in litore constiterunt atque hos sunt alii subsecuti constanterque in eos qui in litore aequo institerant impetum fecerunt, omnes Pharitae terga verterunt. His pulsus custodia portus relicta navis ad litora et vicum applicarunt seque ex navibus ad tuenda aedificia eiecerunt.

18 Neque vero diutius ea munitione se continere potuerunt, etsi erat non dissimile atque Alexandreae genus aedificiorum, ut minora maloribus conferantur, turresque editae et coniunctae muri locum obtinebant, neque nostri aut scalis aut cratibus aut reliquis rebus parati venerant ad oppugnandum. Sed terror hominibus mentem consiliumque eripit et membra debilitat; ut tum accidit. Qui se in aequo loco ac plano pares esse confidebant, idem perterriti fuga suorum et caede paucorum XXX pedum altitudine in aedificiis consistere ausi non sunt seque per molem in mare praecipitaverunt et DCCC passuum intervallum ad oppidum enataverunt. Multi tamen ex his capti interfectique sunt; sed numerus captivorum omnino fuit sex milium.

19 Caesar praeda militibus concessa aedificia diripi iussit castellumque ad pontem, qui propior erat Pharo, communivit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Hunc fuga Pharitae reliquerant; artiozem illum

propiozemque oppido Alexandrini tuebantur. Sed eum postero die simili ratione aggreditur, quod his obtentis duobus omnem navigiorum excursum et repentina latrocinia sublatum iri videbatur. Iamque eos qui praesidio eum locum tenebant tormentis ex navibus sagittisque depulerat atque in oppidum redegerat et cohortium trium instar in terram euerat — non enim pluris consistere angustiae loci patiebantur — ; reliquae copiae in navibus stationem obtinebant. Quo facto imperat pontem adversus hostem praevallari et, qua exitus navibus erat fornice exstructo, quo pons sustinebatur, lapidibus oppleri atque obstrui. Quorum altero opere effecto, ut nulla omnino scapha egredi posset, altero instituto omnes Alexandrinorum copiae ex oppido se eiecerunt et contra munitiones pontis latiore loco constiterunt, eodemque tempore quae consueverant navigia per pontis ad incendia onerariarum emittere ad molem constituerunt. Pugnabatur a nobis ex ponte, ex mole; ab illis ex area, quae erat adversus pontem, et ex navibus contra molem.

20 In his rebus occupato Caesare militesque hortante remigum magnus numerus et classiariorum ex longis navibus nostris in molem se eiecit. Pars eorum studio spectandi ferebatur, pars etiam cupiditate pugnandi. Hi primum navigia hostium lapidibus ac fundis a mole repellebant ac multum proficere multitudine telorum videbantur. Sed postquam ultra eum locum ab latere eorum aperto ausi sunt egredi ex navibus Alexandrini pauci, ut sine signis certisque ordinibus, sine ratione prodierant, sic temere in navis refugere coeperunt. Quorum fuga incitati Alexandrini plures ex navibus egrediebantur nostrosque acrius perturbatos insequabantur. Simul qui in navibus longis remanserant scalas rapere navisque a terra repellere properabant, ne hostes navibus potirentur. Quibus omnibus rebus perturbati milites nostri cohortium trium quae in ponte ac prima mole constiterant, cum

post se clamorem exaudirent, fugam suorum viderent, magnam vim telorum adversi sustinerent, veriti ne ab tergo circumvenirentur et discessu navium omnino reditu intercluderentur munitionem in ponte institutam reliquerunt et magno cursu incitati ad navis contenderunt. Quorum pars proximas nacta navis multitudine hominum atque onere depressa est, pars resistens et dubitans quid esset capiendum consili ab Alexandrinis interfecta est; non nulli feliciore exitu expeditas ad ancoram navis consecuti incolumes discesserunt, pauci allevatis scutis et animo ad conandum nisi ad proxima navigia adnatarunt.

21 Caesar quoad potuit cohortando suos ad pontem ac munitiones continere, eodem in periculo versatus est; postquam universos cedere animadvertit, in suum navigium se recepit. Quo multitudo hominum insecuta cum irrumperet neque administrandi neque repellendi a terra facultas daretur, fore quod accidit suspicatus sese ex navigio eiecit atque ad eas quae longius constiterant navis adnavit. Hinc suis laborantibus subsidio scaphas mittens non nullos conservavit. Navigium quidem eius multitudine depressum militum una cum hominibus interiit. Hoc proelio desiderati sunt ex numero legionariorum militum circiter CCCC et Paulo ultra eum numerum classarii et remiges. Alexandrini eo loco castellum magnis munitionibus multisque tormentis confirmarunt atque egestis ex mari lapidibus libere sunt usi postea ad mittenda navigia.

22 Hoc detrimento milites nostri tantum afuerunt ut perturbarentur, ut incensi atque incitati magnas accessiones fecerint in operibus hostium expugnandis. In proeliis cotidianis, quandocumque fors obtulerat, procurrentibus et erumpentibus Alexandrinis, manum comprehendi multum operibus et ardentibus studiis militum; nec divulgata Caesaris hortatio subsequi legionum aut laborem aut pugnandi poterat cupiditatem, ut magis deterrendi et continendi a

periculosissimis essent dimicationibus quam incitandi ad pugnandum.

23 Alexandrini cum Romanos et secundis rebus confirmari et adversis incitari viderent neque ullum belli tertium casum nossent quo possent esse firmiores, ut coniectura consequi possumus, aut admoniti a regis amicis qui in Caesaris erant praesidiis, aut suo priore consilio per occultos nuntios regi probato legatos ad Caesarem miserunt, ut dimitteret regem transireque ad suos pateretur: paratam enim omnem multitudinem esse, confectam taedio puellae, fiduciario regno, dominatione crudelissima Ganymedis, facere id quod rex imperasset; quo si auctore in Caesaris fidem amicitiamque venturi essent, nullius periculi timorem multitudini fore impedimento quo minus se dederent.

24 Caesar etsi fallacem gentem semperque alia cogitantem, alia simulantem bene cognitam habebat, tamen petentibus dare veniam utile esse statuit, quod, si quo pacto sentirent ea quae postularent, mansurum in fide dimissum regem credebat, sin, id quod magis illorum naturae conveniebat, ducem ad bellum gerendum regem habere vellent, splendidius atque honestius se contra regem quam contra convenarum ac fugitivorum manum bellum esse gesturum. Itaque regem cohortatus ut consuleret regno paterno, parceret praeclarissimae patriae, quae turpibus incendiis et ruinis esset deformata, civis suos primum ad sanitatem revocaret, deinde conservaret, fidem populo Romano sibi praeestaret, cum ipse tantum ei crederet ut ad hostis armatos eum mitteret, dextra dextram tenens dimittere coepit adulta iam aetate puerum. At regius animus disciplinis fallacissimis eruditus, ne a gentis suae moribus degeneraret, flens orare contra Caesarem coepit ne se dimitteret: non enim sibi regnum ipsum conspectu Caesaris esse iucundius.

Compressis pueri lacrimis Caesar ipse commotus celeriter, si illa sentiret, fore eum secum adfirmans ad suos dimisit. Ille, ut ex carceribus in liberum cursum emissus, adeo contra Caesarem acriter bellum gerere coepit ut lacrimas quas in colloquio proiecerat gaudio videretur profudisse. Accidisse hoc complures Caesaris legati, amici, centuriones militesque laetabantur, quod nimia bonitas eius fallaciis pueri elusa esset. Quasi vero id Caesar bonitate tantum adductus ac non prudentissimo consilio fecisset.

25 Cum duce assumpto Alexandrini nihilo se firmiores factos aut languidiores Romanos animadverterent eludentibusque militibus regis aetatem atque infirmitatem magnum dolorem acciperent neque se quicquam proficere viderent, rumoresque exsisterent magna Caesari praesidia terrestri itinere ex Syria Ciliciaque adduci, quod nondum auditum Caesari erat, commeatum, qui mari nostris supportabatur, intercipere statuerunt. Itaque expeditis navigiis locis idoneis ad Canopum in statione dispositis navibus insidiabantur nostris commeatuque. Quod ubi Caesari nuntiatum est, universam classem iubet expediri atque instrui. Praeficit huic Tiberium Neronem. Proficiscuntur in ea classe Rhodiae naves atque in his Euphranor, sine quo nulla umquam dimicatio maritima, nulla etiam parum feliciter confecta erat. At fortuna, quae plerumque eos quos plurimis beneficiis ornavit ad duriores casus reservat, superiorum temporum dissimilis Euphranorem prosequabatur. Nam cum ad Canopum ventum esset instructaque utrimque classis conflisset et sua consuetudine Euphranor primus proelium commisisset et quadriremem hostium perforasset ac demersisset, proximam longius insecutus parum celeriter insequentibus reliquis circumventus est ab Alexandrinis. Cui subsidium nemo tulit, sive quod in ipso satis praesidi pro virtute ac felicitate eius putarent esse, sive quod ipsi sibi

timebant. Ita, qui unus ex omnibus eo proelio bene rem gessit, solus cum sua quadriremi victrice perit.

26 Sub idem tempus Mithridates Pergamenus, magnae nobilitatis domi scientiaeque in bello et virtutis, fidei dignitatisque in amicitia Caesaris, missus in Syriam Ciliciamque initio belli Alexandrini ad auxilia arcessenda, cum magnis copiis, quas celeriter et propensissima civitatum voluntate et sua diligentia confecerat, itinere pedestri, quo coniungitur Aegyptus Syriae, Pelusium adducit: idque oppidum firmo praesidio occupatum Achillae propter opportunitatem loci — namque tota Aegyptus maritimo accessu Pharo, pedestri Pelusio velut claustris munita existimatur —, repente magnis circumdatum copiis multiplici praesidio pertinaciter propugnantibus et copiarum magnitudine, quas integras vulneratis defessisque subiciebat, et perseverantia constantiaque oppugnandi quo die est aggressus in suam redegit potestatem praesidiumque ibi suum collocavit. Inde re bene gesta Alexandream ad Caesarem contendit omnisque eas regiones per quas iter faciebat auctoritate ea quae plerumque adest victori pacarat atque in amicitiam Caesaris redegerat.

27 Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandria, qui nominatur Delta; quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit: nam pars quaedam fluminis Nili derivata inter se duobus itineribus paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diversissimo ad litus intervallo mari coniungitur. Cui loco cum appropinquare Mithridaten rex cognovisset et transeundum ei flumen sciret, magnas adversus eum copias misit, quibus vel superari delerique Mithridaten vel sine dubio retineri posse credebat. Quem ad modum autem optabat eum vinci, sic satis habebat interclusum a Caesare a se retineri. Quae primae copiae flumen a Delta transire et Mithridati

occurrere potuerunt, proelium commiserunt festinantes praeripere subsequentibus victoriae societatem. Quorum impetum Mithridates magna cum prudentia constantiaque virtutum et Alexandrinorum imprudentia consuetudine nostra castris vallatis sustinuit; cum vero incaute atque insolenter succedere eos munitionibus videret, eruptione undique facta magnum numerum eorum interfecit. Quod risi locorum notitia reliqui se texissent partimque in navis quibus flumen transierant recepissent, funditus deleti essent. Qui ut paulum ab illo timore se recrearunt, adiuncti eis qui subsequebantur rursus oppugnare Mithridaten coeperunt.

28 Mittitur a Mithridate nuntius Caesari qui rem gestam perferret. Cognoscit ex suis eadem haec accidisse rex. Ita paene sub idem tempus et rex ad opprimendum Mithridaten proficiscitur et Caesar ad recipiendum. Celeriore fluminis Nili navigatione rex est usus, in quo magnam et paratam classem habebat. Caesar eodem itinere uti noluit, ne navibus in flumine dimicaret, sed circumvectus est eo mari, quod Africae partis esse dicitur, sicuti supra demonstravimus; prius tamen regis copiis occurrit, quam is Mithridaten aggredi posset, eumque ad se victorem incolumi exercitu recepit. Consederat cum copiis rex loco natura munito, quod erat ipse excelsior planitie ex omnibus partibus subiecta; tribus autem ex lateribus variis genere munitionibus tegebatur: unum latus erat adiectum flumini Nilo, alterum editissimo loco ductum, ut partem castrorum obtineret, tertium palude cingebatur.

29 Inter castra et Caesaris iter flumen intercedebat angustum altissimis ripis, quod in Nilum influebat, aberat autem ab regis castris milia passuum circiter VII. Rex cum hoc itinere venire Caesarem comperisset, equitatum omnem expeditosque delectos pedites ad id flumen misit qui transitu Caesarem prohiberent et eminus ex ripis

proelium impar inirent: nullum enim processum virtus habebat aut periculum ignavia subibat. Quae res incendit dolore milites equitesque nostros, quod tam diu pari proelio cum Alexandrinis certaretur. Itaque eodem tempore equites Germani dispersi vada fluminis quaerentes partim demissioribus ripis flumen tranarunt, et legionarii magnis arboribus excisis, quae longitudine utramque ripam contingerent, proiectis eis repentinoque aggere iniecto flumen transierunt. Quorum impetum adeo pertimuerunt hostes ut in fuga spem salutis collocarent; sed id frustra: namque ex ea fuga pauci ad regem refugerunt paene omni reliqua multitudine interfecta.

30 Caesar re praeclarissime gesta, cum subitum adventum suum iudicaret magnum terrorem Alexandrinis iniecturum, protinus victor ad castra regis pertendit. Haec cum et opere magno vallata et loci natura munita animadverteret confertamque armatorum multitudinem collocatam in vallo videret, lassos itinere ac proeliando milites ad oppugnanda castra succedere noluit. Itaque non magno intervallo relicto ab hoste castra posuit. Postero die castellum, quod rex in proximo vico non longe a suis castris munierat bracchiisque cum opere castrorum coniunxerat vici obtinendi causa, Caesar aggressus omnibus copiis expugnat, non quo id minore numero militum consequi difficile factu putaret, sed ut ab ea victoria perterritis Alexandrinis protinus castra regis oppugnaret. Itaque eo cursu, quo refugientis Alexandrinos ex castello in castra sunt milites insecuti, munitionibus successerunt acerrimeque eminus proeliari coeperunt. Duabus ex partibus aditus oppugnationis nostris dabatur: una, quam liberum accessum habere demonstravi, altera, quae mediocre intervallum inter castra et flumen Nilum habebat. Maxima et electissima multitudo Alexandrinorum defendebat eam partem, quae facillimum aditum habebat; plurimum proficiebant in repellendis

vulnerandisque nostris, qui regione fluminis Nili propugnabant: diversis enim telis nostri figebantur, adversi ex vallo castrorum, aversi ex flumine, in quo multae naves instructae funditoribus et sagittariis nostros impugnabant.

³¹ Caesar cum videret milites acrius proeliari non posse nec tamen multum profici propter locorum difficultatem, cumque animum adverteret excelsissimum locum castrorum relictum esse ab Alexandrinis, quod et per se munitus esset et studio partim pugnandi partim spectandi decucurrissent in eum locum in quo pugnabatur, cohortis illo circumire castra et summum locum aggredi iussit eisque Carfulenum praefecit, et animi magnitudine et rei militaris scientia virum praestantem. Quo ut ventum est, paucis defendentibus munitionem, nostris contra militibus acerrime pugnantibus, diverso clamore et proelio perterriti Alexandrini trepidantes in omnis partis castrorum discurrere coeperunt. Quorum perturbatione nostrorum animi adeo sunt incitati ut paene eodem tempore ex omnibus partibus, primi tamen editissimum castrorum locum caperent; ex quo decurrentes magnam multitudinem hostium in castris interfecerunt. Quod periculum plerique Alexandrini fugientes acervatim se de vallo praecipitarunt in eam partem quae flumini erat adiuncta. Horum primis in ipsa fossa munitionis magna ruina oppressis ceteri faciliorem fugam habuerunt. Constat fugisse ex castris regem ipsum receptumque in navem multitudine eorum qui ad proximas navis adnatabant demerso navigio perisse.

³² Re felicissime celerrimeque gesta Caesar magnae victoriae fiducia proximo terrestri itinere Alexandream cum equitibus contendit atque ea parte oppidi victor introiit quae praesidio hostium tenebatur. Neque eum consilium suum fefellit quin hostes eo proelio audito nihil iam de bello essent cogitaturi. Dignum adveniens

fructum virtutis et animi magnitudinis tulit: omnis enim multitudo oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionibusque suis relictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis deprecari consuerunt, sacrisque omnibus prolatis quorum religione precari offensos iratosque animos regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt seque ei dediderunt. Caesar in fidem receptos consolatus per hostium munitiones in suam partem oppidi magna gratulatione venit suorum, qui non tantum bellum ipsum ac dimicationem sed etiam talem adventum eius felicem fuisse laetabantur.

³³ Caesar Aegypto atque Alexandria potitus reges constituit quos Ptolomaeus testamento scripserat atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum ne mutarentur. Nam maiore ex duobus pueris, rege, amisso minori tradidit regnum maiorique ex duabus filiis, Cleopatrae, quae manserat in fide praesidiisque eius; minorem, Arsinoen, cuius nomine diu regnasse impotenter Ganymeden docuimus, deducere ex regno statuit, ne qua rursus nova dissensio, prius quam diuturnitate confirmarentur regibus imperia, per homines seditiosos nasceretur. Legiones ibi veterana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit, quo firmitus esset eorum regum imperium, qui neque amorem suorum habere poterant, quod fideliter permanserant in Caesaris amicitia, neque vetustatis auctoritatem, paucis diebus reges constituti. Simul ad imperi nostri dignitatem utilitatemque publicam pertinere existimabat, si permanerent in fide reges, praesidiis eos nostris esse tutos; si essent ingrati, posse isdem praesidiis coerceri. Sic rebus omnibus confectis et collocatis ipse itinere terrestri profectus est in Syriam.

³⁴ Dum haec in Aegypto geruntur, rex Deiotarus ad Domitium Calvinum, cui Caesar Asiam finitimasque provincias administrandas tradiderat, venit oratum ne Armeniam minorem, regnum suum, neve

Cappadociam, regnum Ariobarzanis, possideri vastarique pateretur a Pharnace; quo malo nisi liberarentur, imperata se facere pecuniamque promissam Caesari non posse persolvere. Domitius, non tantum ad explicandos sumptus rei militaris cum pecuniam necessariam esse iudicaret, sed etiam turpe populo Romano et C. Caesari victori sibi infame esse statueret regna sociorum atque amicorum ab externo rege occupari, nuntios confestim ad Pharnacem misit, Armenia Cappadociaque decederet neve occupatione belli civilis populi Romani ius maiestatemque temptaret. Hanc denuntiationem cum maiorem vim habituram existimaret, si propius eas regiones cum exercitu accessisset, ad legiones profectus unam ex tribus, XXXVI, secum ducit, duas in Aegyptum ad Caesarem mittit litteris eius evocatas; quarum altera bello Alexandrino non occurrit, quod itinere terrestri per Syriam erat missa. Adiungit Cn. Domitius legioni XXXVI duas ab Deiotaro, quas ille disciplina atque armatura nostra compluris annos constitutas habebat, equitesque C, totidemque ab Ariobarzane sumit. Mittit P. Sestium ad C. Plaetorium quaestorem, ut legionem adduceret quae ex tumultuariis militibus in Ponto confecta erat, Quintumque Patisium in Ciliciam ad auxilia arcessenda. Quae copiae celeriter omnes iussu Domiti Comana convenerunt.

35 Interim legati a Pharnace responsa referunt: Cappadocia se decessisse, Armeniam minorem recepissee, quam paterno nomine iure obtinere deberet. Denique eius regni causa integra Caesari servaretur: paratum enim se facere quod is statuisset. Cn. Domitius cum animadverteret eum Cappadocia decessisse non voluntate adductum sed necessitate, quod facilius Armeniam defendere posset subiectam suo regno quam Cappadociam longius remotam, quodque omnis tris legiones adducturum Domitium putasset, ex quibus cum duas ad

Caesarem missas audisset, audacius in Armenia substitisse, perseverare coepit, ut eo quoque regno decederet; neque enim aliud ius esse Cappadociae atque Armeniae, nec iuste eum postulare ut in Caesaris adventum res integra differretur; id enim esse integrum quod ita esset ut fuisset. His responsis datis cum eis copiis quas supra scripsi profectus est in Armeniam locisque superioribus iter facere instituit: nam ex Ponto a Comanis iugum editum silvestre est, pertinens in Armeniam minorem, quo Cappadocia finitur ab Armenia; cuius itineris has esse certas opportunitates vidit, quod in locis superioribus nullus impetus repentinus accidere hostium poterat, et quod Cappadocia his iugis subiecta magnam commeatus copiam erat sumministratura.

36 Compluris interim legationes Pharnaces ad Domitium mittit quae de pace agerent regiaque munera Domitio ferrent. Ea constanter omnia aspernabatur nec sibi quicquam fore antiquius quam dignitatem populi Romani et regna sociorum recipere legatis respondebat. Magnis et continuis itineribus confectis cum adventaret ad Nicopolim, quod oppidum positum in Armenia minore est plano ipso loco, montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis satis magno intervallo ab oppido remotis, castra posuit longe a Nicopoli circiter milia passuum VII. Quibus ex castris cum locus angustus atque impeditus esset transeundus, Pharnaces in insidiis delectos pedites omnisque paene disposuit equites, magnam autem multitudinem pecoris intra eas fauces dissipari iussit paganosque et oppidanos in his locis obversari, ut sive amicus Domitius eas angustias transiret, nihil de insidiis suspicaretur, cum in agris et pecora et homines animum adverteret versari tamquam amicorum adventu, sive inimicus ut in hostium finis veniret, praeda diripienda milites dissiparentur dispersique caederentur.

37 Haec cum administraret, numquam tamen intermittebat legatos de pace atque amicitia mittere ad Domitium, cum hoc ipso crederet facilius eum decipi posse. At contra spes pacis Domitio in isdem castris morandi attulit causam. Ita Pharnaces, amissa proximi temporis occasione cum vereretur ne cognoscerentur insidiae, suos in castra revocavit. Domitius postero die propius Nicopolim accessit castraque oppido contulit. Quae dum muniunt nostri, Pharnaces aciem instruxit suo more atque instituto. In fronte enim simplici directa acie cornua trinis firmabantur subsidiis; eadem ratione haec media collocabantur acie duobus dextra sinistraque intervallis simplicibus ordinibus instructis. Perfecit inceptum castrorum opus Domitius parte copiarum pro vallo constituta.

38 Proxima nocte Pharnaces interceptis tabellariis, qui de Alexandrinis rebus litteras ad Domitium ferebant, cognoscit Caesarem magno in periculo versari flagitarique ab Domitio ut quam primum Caesari subsidia mitteret propiusque ipse Alexandream per Syriam accederet. Qua cognita re Pharnaces victoriae loco ducebat, si trahere tempus posset, cum discedendum Domitio celeriter putaret. Itaque ab oppido, qua facillimum accessum et aequissimum ad dimicandum nostris videbat, fossas duas directas non ita magno medio intervallo relicto IIII pedum altitudinis in eum locum deduxit quo longius constituerat suam non producere aciem. Inter has fossas aciem semper instruebat, equitatum autem omnem ab lateribus extra fossam collocabat; qui neque aliter utilis esse poterat et multum numero anteibat nostrum equitatum.

39 Domitius autem, cum Caesaris magis periculo quam suo commoveretur neque se tuto discessurum arbitraretur, si condiciones quas reiecerat rursus appeteret aut sine causa discederet, ex propinquis castris in aciem exercitum eduxit; XXXVI legionem in

dextro cornu collocavit, Ponticam in sinistro, Deiotari legiones in mediam aciem contulit, quibus tamen angustissimum intervallum frontis reliquit reliquis cohortibus in subsidiis collocatis. Sic utrimque acie instructa processum est ad dimicandum.

40 Signo sub idem tempus ab utroque dato concurritur: acriter varieque pugnatur. Nam XXXVI legio, cum extra fossam in equites regis impetum fecisset, adeo secundum proelium fecit ut moenibus oppidi succederet fossamque transiret aversosque hostis aggrederetur. At Pontica ex altera parte legio, cum paulum aversa hostibus cessisset, fossam autem circumire acies secundo conata esset, ut aperto latere aggrederetur hostem, in ipso transitu fossae confixa et oppressa est. Deiotari vero legiones vix impetum sustinuerunt. Ita victrices regiae copiae cornu suo dextro mediaque acie converterunt se ad XXXVI legionem. Quae tamen fortiter vincentium impetum sustinuit, magnis copiis hostium circumdata praesentissimo animo pugnans in orbem se recepit ad radices montium; quo Pharnaces insequi propter iniquitatem loci noluit. Ita Pontica legione paene tota amissa, magna parte Deiotari militum interfecta XXXVI legio in loca se superiora contulit non amplius CCL desideratis. Ceciderunt eo proelio splendidi atque inlustres viri non nulli, equites Romani. Quo tamen incommodo Domitius accepto reliquias exercitus dissipati collegit itineribusque tutis per Cappadociam se in Asiam recepit.

41 Pharnaces rebus secundis elatus, cum de Caesare ea quae optabat speraret, Pontum omnibus copiis occupavit ibique et victor et crudelissimus rex, cum sibi fortunam paternam feliciore eventu destinaret, multa oppida expugnavit, bona civium Romanorum Ponticorumque diripuit, supplicia constituit in eos qui aliquam formae atque aetatis commendationem habebant ea quae morte

essent miseriora, Pontumque nullo defendente patrum regnum glorians se recepisse obtinebat.

42 Sub idem tempus in Illyrico est incommodum acceptum, quae provincia superioribus mensibus retenta non tantum sine ignominia sed etiam cum laude erat. Namque eo missus aestate cum duabus legionibus Q. Cornificius, Caesaris quaestor, pro praetore, quamquam erat provincia minime copiosa ad exercitus alendos et finitimo bello ac dissensionibus confecta et vastata, tamen prudentia ac diligentia sua. quod magnam curam suscipiebat ne quo temere progrediretur, et recepit et defendit. Namque et castella complura locis editis posita, quorum opportunitas castellanos impellebat ad decursiones faciendas et bellum inferendum, expugnavit eaque praeda milites donavit, quae etsi erat tenuis, tamen in tanta provinciae desperatione erat grata, praesertim virtute parta, et cum Octavius ex fuga Pharsalici proeli magna classe in illum se sinum contulisset, paucis navibus Iadertinorum, quorum semper in rem publicam singulare constiterat officium, dispersis Octavianis navibus erat potitus, ut vel classe dimicare posset adiunctis captivis navibus sociorum. Cum diversissima parte orbis terrarum Cn. Pompeium Caesar victor sequeretur complurisque adversarios in Illyricum propter Macedoniae propinquitatem se reliquiis ex fuga collectis contulisse audiret, litteras ad Gabinium mittit, uti cum legionibus tironum, quae nuper erant conscriptae, proficisceretur in Illyricum coniunctisque copiis cum Q. Cornificio, si quod periculum provinciae inferretur, depelleret; sin ea non magnis copiis tuta esse posset, in Macedoniam legiones adduceret. Omnem enim illam partem regionemque vivo Cn. Pompeio bellum instauraturam esse credebat.

43 Gabinus ut in Illyricum venit hiberno tempore anni ac difficili

sive copiosiore provinciam existimans sive multum fortunae victoris Caesaris tribuens sive virtute et scientia sua confisus, quae saepe in bellis periclitatus magnas res et secundas ductu ausuque suo gesserat, neque provinciae facultatibus sublevabatur, quae partim erat exinanita partim infidelis, neque navibus intercluso mari tempestatibus commeatus supportari poterat; magnisque difficultatibus coactus non ut volebat sed ut necesse erat bellum gerebat. Ita cum durissimis tempestatibus propter inopiam castella aut oppida expugnare cogeretur, crebro incommoda accipiebat adeoque est a barbaris contemptus ut Salonam se recipiens in oppidum maritimum, quod cives Romani fortissimi fidelissimique incolebant, in agmine dimicare sit coactus. Quo proelio duobus milibus militum amplius amissis, centurionibus XXXVIII, tribunis IIII, cum reliquis copiis Salonam se recepit summaque ibi difficultate rerum omnium pressus paucis mensibus morbo periit. Cuius et infelicitas vivi et subita mors in magnam spem Octavium adduxit provinciae potiendae; quem tamen diutius in rebus secundis et fortuna, quae plurimum in bellis potest, diligentiaque Cornifici et virtus Vatini versari passa non est.

44 Vatinius Brundisi cum esset, cognitis rebus quae gestae erant in Illyrico, cum crebris litteris Cornifici ad auxilium provinciae ferendum evocaretur et M. Octavium audiret cum barbaris foedera percussisse compluribusque locis nostrorum militum oppugnare praesidia partim classe per se partim pedestribus copiis per barbaros, etsi gravi valetudine adfectus vix corporis viribus animum sequebatur, tamen virtute vicit incommodum naturae difficultatesque et hiemis et subitae praeparationis. Nam cum ipse paucas in portu navis longas haberet, litteras in Achaïam ad Q. Calenum misit, uti sibi classem mitteret. Quod cum tardius fieret quam periculum

nostrorum flagitabat, qui sustinere impetum Octavi non poterant, navibus actuariis, quarum numerus erat satis magnus, magnitudo nequaquam satis iusta ad proeliandum, rostra imposuit. His adiunctis navibus longis et numero classis aucto militibus veteranis impositis, quorum magnam copiam habebat ex omnibus legionibus, qui numero aegrorum relictis erant Brundisi, cum exercitus in Graeciam transportaretur, profectus est in Illyricum maritimasque non nullas civitates, quae defecerant Octavioque se tradiderant, partim recipiebat, partim remanentis in suo consilio praetervehebatur nec sibi ullius rei moram necessitatemque iniungebat quin quam celerrime posset ipsum Octavium persequeretur. Hunc oppugnantem Epidaurum terra marique, ubi nostrum erat praesidium, adventu suo discedere ab oppugnatione coegit praesidiumque nostrum recepit.

45 Octavius cum Vatinium classem magna ex parte confectam ex naviculis actuariis habere cognosset, confisus sua classe substitit ad insulam Tauridem; qua regione Vatinus insequens navigabat, non quo Octavium ibi restitisse sciret, sed quod eum longius progressum insequi decreverat. Cum propius Tauridem accessisset distensis suis navibus, quod et tempestas erat turbulenta et nulla suspicio hostis, repente adversam ad se venientem navem antemnis ad medium malum demissis instructam propugnatoribus animum advertit. Quod ubi conspexit, celeriter vela subduci demittique antemnas iubet et milites armari et vexillo sublato, quo pugnandi dabat signum, quae primae naves subsequebantur idem ut facerent significabat. Parabant se Vatiniani repente oppressi; parati deinceps Octaviani ex portu procedebant. Instruitur utrimque acies, ordine disposita magis Octaviana, paratior militum animis Vatiniana.

46 Vatinus cum animum adverteret neque navium se magnitudine neque numero parem esse fortuitae dimicationi, fortunae rem

committere maluit. Itaque primus sua quinquerei in quadriremem ipsius Octavi impetum fecit. Celerrime fortissimeque contra illo remigante naves adversae rostris concurrerunt adeo vehementer ut navis Octaviana rostro discusso ligno contineretur. Committitur acriter reliquis locis proelium concurreturque ad duces maxime: nam cum suo quisque auxilium ferret, magnum comminus in angusto mari proelium factum est. Quantoque coniunctis magis navibus confligendi potestas dabatur, tanto superiores erant Vatiniani; qui admiranda virtute ex suis navibus in hostium navis transilire non dubitabant et dimicatione aequata longe superiores virtute rem feliciter gerebant. Deprimitur ipsius Octavi quadriremis, multae praeterea capiuntur aut rostris pefforatae merguntur; propugnatores Octaviani partim in navibus iugulantur, partim in mare praecipitantur. Ipse Octavius se in scapham confert; in quam plures cum confugerent, depressa scapha vulneratus tamen adnatat ad suum myoparonem. Eo receptus, cum proelium nox dirimeret, tempestate magna velis profugit. Sequuntur hunc suae naves non nullae, quas casus ab illo periculo vindicarat.

⁴⁷ At Vatinius re bene gesta receptui cecinit suisque omnibus incolumibus in eum se portum victor recepit, quo ex portu classis Octavi ad dimicandum processerat. Capit ex eo proelio penterem unam, triremis duas, dicrotas VIII complurisque remiges Octavianos posteroque ibi die, dum suas captivasque navis reficeret, consumpto post diem tertium contendit in insulam Issam, quod eo se recepisse ex fuga credebat Octavium. Erat in eum nobilissimum regionum earum oppidum coniunctissimumque Octavio. Quo ut venit, oppidani supplices se Vatinio dediderunt, comperitque ipsum Octavium parvis paucisque navigiis vento secundo regionem Graeciae petisse, inde ut Siciliam, deinde Africam caperet. Ita brevi spatio re praeclarissime

gesta, provincia recepta et Cornificio reddita, classe adversariorum ex illo toto sinu expulsa victor se Brundisium incolumi exercitu et classe recepit.

48 Eis autem temporibus quibus Caesar ad Dyrrachium Pompeium obsidebat et Palaepharsali rem feliciter gerebat Alexandriaeque cum periculo magno tum etiam maiore periculi fama dimicabat, Q. Cassius Longinus, in Hispania pro praetore provinciae ulterioris obtinendae causa relictus, sive consuetudine naturae suae sive odio quod in illam provinciam susceperat quaestor ex insidiis ibi vulneratus, magnas odi sui fecerat accessiones, quod vel ex conscientia sua, cum de se mutuo sentire provinciam crederet, vel multis signis et testimoniis eorum qui difficulter odia dissimulabant animum advertere poterat, et compensare offensionem provinciae exercitus amore cupiebat. Itaque, cum primum in unum locum exercitum conduxit, sestertios centenos militibus est pollicitus, nec multo post, cum in Lusitania Medobregam oppidum montemque Herminium expugnasset, quo Medobregenses confugerant, ibique imperator esset appellatus, sestertiis centenis milites donavit. Multa praeterea et magna praemia singulis concedebat; quae speciosum reddebant praesentem exercitus amorem, paulatim tamen et occulte militarem disciplinam severitatemque minuebant.

49 Cassius legionibus in hiberna dispositis ad ius dicendum Cordubam se recepit contractumque in ea aes alienum gravissimis oneribus provinciae constituit exsolvere; et ut largitionis postulat consuetudo, per causam liberalitatis speciosam plura largitori quaerebantur. Pecuniae locupletibus imperabantur, quas Longinus sibi expensas ferri non tantum patiebatur sed etiam cogebat, in gregem locupletium simultatum causa tenues coiciebantur, neque ullum genus quaestus aut magni et evidentis aut minimi et sordidi

praetermittebatur quo domus et tribunal imperatoris vacaret. Nemo erat, qui modo aliquam iacturam facere posset, quin aut vadimonio teneretur aut in reos referretur. Ita magna etiam sollicitudo periculorum ad iacturas et detrimenta rei familiaris adiungebatur.

50 Quibus de causis accidit ut, cum Longinus imperator eadem faceret quae fecerat quaestor, similia rursus de morte eius provinciales consilia inirent. Horum odium confirmabant non nulli familiares eius qui, cum in illa societate versarentur rapinarum, nihilo minus oderant eum cuius nomine peccabant, sibi quod rapuerant acceptum referebant, quod interciderat aut erat interpellatum Cassio assignabant. Quintam legionem novam conscribit. Augetur odium et ex ipso dilectu et sumptu additae legionis. Complentur equitum III milia maximisque ornantur impensis: nec provinciae datur ulla requies.

51 Interim litteras accepit a Caesare, ut in Africam exercitum traiceret perque Mauretanium ad finis Numidiae perveniret, quod magna Cn. Pompeio Iuba miserat auxilia maioraque missurus existimabatur. Quibus litteris acceptis insolenti voluptate efferebatur, quod sibi novarum provinciarum et fertilissimi regni tanta oblata esset facultas. Itaque ipse in Lusitaniam proficiscitur ad legiones arcessendas auxiliaque adducenda; certis hominibus dat negotium ut frumentum navesque C praepararentur pecuniaeque describerentur atque imperarentur, ne qua res cum redisset moraretur. Reditus eius fuit celerior omnium opinione: non enim labor aut vigilantia cupienti praesertim aliquid Cassio deerat.

52 Exercitu coacto in unum locum castris ad Cordubam positis pro contione militibus exponit quas res Caesaris iussu gerere deberet, polliceturque eis, cum in Mauretanium traiecisset, sestertios centenos se daturum; quintam fore in Hispania legionem. Ex contione se

Cordubam recepit eoque ipso die tempore postmeridiano, cum in basilicam iret, quidam Minucius Silo cliens L. Racili libellum, quasi aliquid ab eo postularet, ut miles ei tradit, deinde post Racilium — nam is latus Cassi tegebat — , quasi responsum peteret, celeriter dato loco cum se insinuasset, sinistra corripit aversum dextraque bis ferit pugione. Clamore sublato fit a coniuratis impetus universis. Munatius Flaccus proximum gladio traicit lictorem; hoc interfecto Q. Cassium legatum vulnerat. Ibi T. Vasius et L. Mercello simili confidentia Flaccum, municipem suum, adiuvant: erant enim omnes Italicensis. Ad ipsum Longinum L. Licinius Squillus involat iacentemque levibus sauciat plagis.

53 Concurritur ad Cassium defendendum: semper enim Berones complurisque evocatos cum telis secum habere consuevit. A quibus ceteri intercluduntur qui ad caedem faciendam subsequabantur; quo in numero fuit Calpurnius Salvianus et Manilius Tuscus. Minucius inter saxa quae iacebant in itinere fugiens opprimitur et relato domum Cassio ad eum deducitur. Racilius in proximam se domum familiaris sui confert, dum certum cognosceret confectusne Cassius esset. L. Laterensis, cum id non dubitaret, accurrit laetus in castra militibusque vernaculis et secundae legionis, quibus odio sciebat praecipue Cassium esse, gratulatur; tollitur a multitudine in tribunal, praetor appellatur. Nemo enim aut in provincia natus, ut vernaculae legionis milites, aut diuturnitate iam factus provincialis, quo in numero erat secunda legio, non cum omni provincia consenserat in odio Cassi: nam legionem XXX et XXI paucis mensibus in Italia scriptas Caesar attribuerat Longino, quinta legio nuper ibi erat confecta.

54 Interim nuntiatur Laterensi vivere Cassium. Quo nuntio dolore magis permotus quam animo perturbatus reficit se celeriter et ad

Cassium visendum proficiscitur. Re cognita XXX legio signa Cordubam infert ad auxilium ferendum imperatori suo. Facit hoc idem XXI. Subsequitur has V. Cum duae legiones reliquae essent in castris, secundani, veriti ne soli relinquerentur atque ex eo quid sensissent iudicaretur, secuti sunt factum superiorum. Permansit in sententia legio vernacula nec ullo timore de gradu deiecta est.

55 Cassius eos qui nominati erant conscii caedis iubet comprehendi; legiones V in castra remittit cohortibus XXX retentis. Indicio Minuci cognoscit L. Racilium et L. Laterensem et Annium Scapulam, maximae dignitatis et gratiae provincialem hominem sibi tam familiarem quam Laterensem et Racilium, in eadem fuisse coniuratione, nec diu moratur dolorem suum quin eos interfici iubeat. Minucium libertis tradit excruciantum, item Calpurnium Salvianum, qui profitetur indicium coniuratorumque numerum auget, vere, ut quidam existimant, ut non nulli queruntur, coactus. Isdem cruciatibus adfectus L. Mercello . . . Squillus nominat pluris; quos Cassius interfici iubet exceptis eis qui se pecunia redemerunt. Nam palam HS LX cum Calpurnio paciscitur et cum Q. Sestio L. Qui si maxime nocentes sunt multati, tamen periculum vitae dolorque vulnere pecuniae remissus crudelitatem cum avaritia certasse significabat.

56 Aliquot post diebus litteras a Caesare missas accipit, quibus cognoscit Pompeium in acie victum amissis copiis fugisse. Qua re cognita mixtam dolore voluptatem capiebat: victoriae nuntius laetitiam exprimebat, confectum bellum licentiam temporum intercludebat. Sic erat dubius animus utrum nihil timere an omnia licere mallet. Sanatis vulneribus arcessit omnis qui sibi pecunias expensas tulerant, acceptasque eas iubet referri; quibus parum videbatur imposuisse oneris, ampliorem pecuniam imperat. Equitum

autem Romanorum dilectum instituit; quos ex omnibus conventibus coloniisque conscriptos transmarina militia perterritos ad sacramenti redemptionem vocabat. Magnum hoc fuit vectigal, maius tamen creabat odium. His rebus confectis totum exercitum lustrat; legiones quas in Africam ducturus erat et auxilia mittit ad traiectum. Ipse classem quam parabat ut inspiceret, Hispalim accedit ibique moratur, propterea quod edictum tota provincia proposuerat, quibus pecunias imperasset neque contulissent, se adirent. Quae evocatio vehementer omnis turbavit.

57 Interim L. Titius, qui eo tempore tribunus militum in legione vernacula fuerat, nuntiat eam a legione XXX, quam Q. Cassius legatus simul ducebat, cum ad oppidum Ilipam castra haberet, seditione facta centurionibus aliquot occisis qui signa tolli non patiebantur, discessisse et ad secundam legionem contendisse, quae ad fretum alio itinere ducebatur. Cognita re noctu cum V cohortibus unetvicesimanorum egreditur, mane pervenit noctu. Ibi eum diem, ut quid ageretur perspiceret, moratus Carmonem contendit. Hic, cum legio XXX et XXI et cohortes IIII ex V legione totusque convenisset equitatus, audit IIII cohortis a vernaculis oppressas ad Obuculam cum his ad secundam pervenisse legionem omnisque ibi se coniunxisse et T. Thorium Italicensem ducem delegisse. Celeriter habito consilio M. Marcellum quaestorem Cordubam, ut eam in potestate retineret, Q. Cassium legatum Hispalim mittit. Paucis ei diebus affertur conventum Cordubensem ab eo defecisse Marcellumque aut voluntate aut necessitate adductum — namque id varie nuntiabatur — consentire cum Cordubensibus; duas cohortis legionis V, quae fuerant Cordubae in praesidio, idem facere. Cassius his rebus incensus movet castra et postero die Segoviam ad flumen Singiliense venit. Ibi habita contione militum temptat animos; quos

cognoscit non sua sed Caesaris absentis causa sibi fidissimos esse nullumque periculum deprecaturus, dum per eos Caesari provincia restitueretur.

58 Interim Thorius ad Cordubam veteres legiones adducit ac, ne dissensionis initium natum seditiosa militum suaeque natura videretur, simul ut contra Q. Cassium, qui Caesaris nomine maioribus viribus uti videbatur, aequae potentem opponeret dignitatem, Cn. Pompeio se provinciam recipere velle palam dictitabat. Et forsitan etiam hoc fecerit odio Caesaris et amore Pompei, cuius nomen multum poterat apud eas legiones quas M. Varro obtinuerat. Sed id qua mente, communis erat coniectura: certe hoc prae se Thorius ferebat; milites adeo fatebantur, ut Cn. Pompei nomen in scutis inscriptum haberent. Frequens legionibus conventus obviam prodit, neque tantum virorum sed etiam matrum familias ac praetextatorum, deprecaturque ne hostili adventu Cordubam diriperent: nam se contra Cassium consentire cum omnibus; contra Caesarem ne facere cogerentur orare.

59 Tanta multitudinis precibus et lacrimis exercitus commotus cum videret ad Cassium persequendum nihil opus esse Cn. Pompei nomine et memoria tamque omnibus Caesarianis quam Pompeianis Longinum esse in odio neque se conventum neque M. Marcellum contra Caesaris causam posse perducere, nomen Pompei ex scutis detraxerunt, Marcellum, qui se Caesaris causam defensurum profitebatur, ducem asciverunt praetoremque appellarunt et conventum sibi adiunxerunt castraque ad Cordubam posuerunt. Cassius eo biduo circiter IIII milia passuum a Corduba citra flumen Baetim in oppidi conspectu loco excelso facit castra; litteras ad regem Bogudem in Mauretanium et ad M. Lepidum proconsulem in Hispaniam citeriorem mittit, subsidio sibi provinciaeque Caesaris

causa quam primum veniret. Ipse hostili modo Cordubensium agros vastat, aedificia incendit.

60 Cuius rei deformitate atque indignitate legiones quae Marcellum sibi ducem ceperant ad eum concurrerunt, ut in aciem educerentur orant, priusque configendi sibi potestas fieret quam cum tanta contumelia nobilissimae carissimaeque possessiones Cordubensium in conspectu suo rapinis, ferro flammaque consumerentur. Marcellus cum configere miserrimum putaret, quod et victoris et victi detrimentum ad eundem Caesarem esset redundaturum neque suae potestatis esset, legiones Baetim traducit aciemque instruit. Cum Cassium contra pro suis castris aciem instruxisse loco superiore videret, causa interposita, quod is in aequum non descenderet, Marcellus militibus persuadet ut se recipiant in castra. Itaque copias reducere coepit. Cassius, quo bono valebat Marcellumque infirmum esse sciebat, aggressus equitatu legionarios se recipientis compluris novissimos in fluminis ripis interfecit. Cum hoc detrimento quid transitus fluminis viti difficultatisque haberet cognitum esset, Marcellus castra Baetim transfert, crebroque uterque legiones in aciem educit; neque tamen configitur propter locorum difficultates.

61 Erat copiis pedestribus multo firmior Marcellus; habebat enim veteranas nultisque proeliis expertas legiones. Cassius fidei magis quam virtuti legionum confidebat. Itaque, cum castra castris collata essent et Marcellus locum idoneum castello cepisset quo prohibere aqua Cassianos posset, Longinus, veritus ne genere quodam obsidionis clauderetur in regionibus alienis sibique infestis, noctu silentio ex castris proficiscitur celerique itinere Uliam contendit, quod sibi fidele esse oppidum credebat. Ibi adeo coniuncta ponit moenibus castra ut et loci natura — namque Ulia in edito monte

posita est — et ipsa munitione urbis undique ab oppugnatione tutus esset. Hunc Marcellus insequitur et quam proxime potest Uliam castra castris confert locorumque cognita natura, quo maxime rem deducere volebat, necessitate est deductus ut neque confligeret — cuius si rei facultas esset, resistere incitatis militibus non poterat — neque vagari Cassium latius pateretur, ne plures civitates ea paterentur quae passi erant Cordubenses. Castellis idoneis locis collocatis operibusque in circuitu oppidi continuatis Uliam Cassiumque munitionibus clausit. Quae prius quam perficerentur, Longinus omnem suum equitatum emisit; quem magno sibi usu fore credebat, si pabulari frumentarique Marcellum non pateretur, magno autem fore impedimento, si clausus obsidione et inutilis necessarium consumeret frumentum.

62 Paucis diebus Q. Cassi litteris acceptis rex Bogus cum copiis venit adiungitque ei legioni quam secum adduxerat compluris cohortis auxilias Hispanorum. Namque ut in civilibus dissensionibus accidere consuevit, ita temporibus illis in Hispania non nullae civitates rebus Cassi studebant, plures Marcellum fovebant. Accedit cum copiis Bogus ad exteriores Marcelli munitiones. Pugnatur utrimque acriter, crebroque id accidit fortuna saepe ad utrumque victoriam transferente; nec tamen umquam ab operibus depellitur Marcellus.

63 Interim Lepidus ex citeriore provincia cum cohortibus legionariis XXXV magnoque numero equitum et reliquorum auxiliorum venit ea mente Uliam, ut sine ullo studio contentiones Cassi Marcellique componeret. Huic venienti sine dubitatione Marcellus se credit atque offert; Cassius contra suis se tenet praesidiis, sive eo quod plus sibi iuris deberi quam Marcello existimabat, sive eo quod ne praeoccupatus animus Lepidi esset

obsequio adversarii verebatur. Ponit ad Uliam castra Lepidus neque habet a Marcello quicquam divisi. Ne pugnetur interdicat; ad exeundum Cassium invitat fidemque suam in re omni interponit. Cum diu dubitasset Cassius quid sibi faciendum quidve Lepido esset credendum, neque ullum exitum consili sui reperiret si permaneret in sententia, postulat uti munitiones disicerentur sibi que liber exitus daretur. Non tantum indutiis factis sed prope iam pace constituta opera cum complanarent custodiaeque munitionum essent deductae, auxilia regis in id castellum Marcelli quod proximum erat regis castris, neque opinantibus omnibus — si tamen in omnibus fuit Cassius: nam de huius conscientia dubitabatur — , impetum fecerunt complurisque ibi milites oppresserunt. Quod nisi celeriter indignatione et auxilio Lepidi proelium esset diremptum, maior calamitas esset accepta.

64 Cum iter Cassio patefactum esset, castra Marcellus cum Lepido coniungit. Lepidus eodem tempore Marcellusque Cordubam cum suis, Cassius proficiscitur Carmonem. Sub idem tempus Trebonius proconsul ad provinciam obtinendam venit. De cuius adventu ut cognovit Cassius, legiones quas secum habuerat equitatumque in hiberna distribuit; ipse omnibus suis rebus celeriter correptis Malacam contendit ibique adverso tempore navigandi navis conscendit, ut ipse praedicabat, ne se Lepido et Trebonio et Marcello committeret, ut amici eius dictitabant, ne per eam provinciam minore cum dignitate iter faceret cuius magna pars ab eo defecerat, ut ceteri existimabant, ne pecunia illa ex infinitis rapinis confecta in potestatem cuiusquam veniret. Progressus secunda ut hiberna tempestate cum in Hiberum flumen noctis vitandae causa se contulisset, inde paulo vehementiore tempestate, nihilo periculosius se navigaturum credens, profectus, adversis fluctibus occurrentibus

ostio fluminis, in ipsis faucibus, cum neque flectere navem propter vim fluminis neque directam tantis fluctibus tenere posset, demersa nave periit.

65 Cum in Syriam Caesar ex Aegypto venisset atque ab eis qui Roma venerant ad eum cognosceret litterisque urbanis animadverteret multa Romae male et inutiliter administrari neque ullam partem rei publicae satis commode geri, quod et contentionibus tribuniciiis perniciosae seditiones orirentur et ambitione atque indulgentia tribunorum militum et qui legionibus praeerant multa contra morem consuetudinemque militarem fierent, quae dissolvendae disciplinae severitatisque essent, eaque omnia flagitare adventum suum videret, tamen praeferendum existimabat, quas in provincias regionesque venisset, eas ita relinquere constitutas ut domesticis dissensionibus liberarentur, iura legesque acciperent, externorum hostium metum deponerent. Haec in Syria, Cilicia, Asia celeriter se confecturum sperabat, quod hae provinciae nullo bello premebantur; in Bithynia ac Ponto plus oneris videbat sibi impendere. Non excessisse enim Ponto Pharnacen audiebat neque excessurum putabat, cum secundo proelio vehementer esset inflatus quod contra Domitium Calvinum fecerat. Commoratus fere in omnibus civitatibus quae maiore sunt dignitate, praemia bene meritis et viritim et publice tribuit, de controversiis veteribus cognoscit ac statuit; reges, tyrannos, dynastas provinciae finitimos, qui omnes ad eum concurrerant, receptos in fidem condicionibus impositis provinciae tuendae ac defendendae dimittit et sibi et populo Romano amicissimos.

66 Paucis diebus in ea provincia consumptis Sextum Caesarem, amicum et necessarium suum, legionibus Syriaeque praeficit; ipse eadem classe qua venerat proficiscitur in Ciliciam. Cuius provinciae

civitates omnis evocat Tarsum, quod oppidum fere totius Ciliciae nobilissimum fortissimumque est. Ibi rebus omnibus provinciae et finitimarum civitatum constitutis cupiditate proficiscendi ad bellum gerendum non diutius moratur, magnisque itineribus per Cappadociam confectis biduum Mazacae commoratus Comana venit, vetustissimum et sanctissimum in Cappadocia Bellonae templum, quod tanta religione colitur ut sacerdos eius deae maiestate, imperio, potentia secundus a rege consensu gentis illius habeatur. Id homini nobilissimo Lycomedi Bithyno adiudicavit, qui regio Cappadocum genere ortus iure minime dubio, vetustate tamen propter adversam fortunam maiorum suorum mutationemque generis intermisso sacerdotium id repetebat. Fratri autem Ariobarzanis Ariarathi, cum bene meritis uterque eorum de re publica esset, ne aut regni hereditas Ariarathen sollicitaret aut heres regni terreret Ariobarzani attribuit qui sub eius imperio ac ditione esset. Ipse iter inceptum simili velocitate conficere coepit.

67 Cum propius Pontum finisque Gallograeciae accessisset, Deiotarus, tetrarches Gallograeciae tum quidem paene totius, quod ei neque legibus neque moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contendebant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab senatu appellatus, depositis regiis insignibus neque tantum privato vestitu sed etiam reorum habitu supplex ad Caesarem venit oratum ut sibi ignosceret, quod in ea parte positus terrarum quae nulla praesidia Caesaris habuisset exercitibus imperiisque coactus in Cn. Pompei castris fuisset: neque enim se debuisse iudicem esse controversiarum populi Romani, sed parere praesentibus imperiis.

68 Contra quem Caesar, cum plurima sua commemorasset officia quae consul ei decretis publicis tribuisset, cumque defensionem eius nullam posse excusationem eius imprudentiae recipere coarguisset,

quod homo tantae prudentiae ac diligentiae scire potuisset quis urbem Italiamque teneret, ubi senatus populusque Romanus, ubi res publica esset, quis denique post L. Lentulum, C. Marcellum consul esset, tamen se concedere id factum superioribus suis beneficiis, veteri hospitio atque amicitiae, dignitati aetatique hominis, precibus eorum qui frequentes concurrissent hospites atque amici Deiotari ad deprecandum, de controversiis tetrarcharum postea se cogniturum esse dixit, regium vestitum ei restituit. Legionem autem eam quam ex genere civium suorum Deiotarus armatura disciplinaque nostra constitutam habebat equitatumque omnem ad bellum gerendum adducere iussit.

69 Cum in Pontum venisset copiasque omnis in unum locum coegisset, quae numero atque exercitatione bellorum mediocres erant — excepta enim legione sexta, quam secum abduxerat Alexandria veteranam multis laboribus periculisque functam multisque militibus partim difficultate itinerum ac navigationum partim crebritate bellorum adeo deminutam, ut minus mille hominibus in ea esset, reliquae erant tres legiones, una Deiotari, duae quae in eo proelio quod Cn. Domitium fecisse cum Pharnace scripsimus fuerant — , legati a Pharnace missi Caesarem adeunt atque imprimis deprecantur ne eius adventus hostilis esset: facturum enim omnia Pharnacen quae imperata essent. Maximeque commemorabant nulla Pharnacen auxilia contra Caesarem Pompeio dare voluisse, cum Deiotarus, qui dedisset, tamen ei satisfacisset.

70 Caesar respondit se fore aequissimum Pharnaci, si quae polliceretur repraesentaturus esset. Monuit autem, ut solebat, mitibus verbis legatos, ne aut Deiotarum sibi obicerent aut nimis eo gloriarentur beneficio, quod auxilia Pompeio non misissent. Nam se neque libentius facere quicquam quam supplicibus ignoscere neque

provinciarum publicas iniurias condonare eis posse qui non fuissent in se officiosi. Quin id ipsum quod commemorarent officium fuisse utilius Pharnaci, qui providisset ne vinceretur, quam sibi, cui di immortales victoriam tribuissent. Itaque se magnas et gravis iniurias civium Romanorum qui in Ponto negotiati essent, quoniam in integrum restituere non posset, concedere Pharnaci. Nam neque interfectis amissam vitam neque exsectis virilitatem restituere posse; quod quidem supplicium gravius morte cives Romani subissent. Ponto vero decederet confestim familiasque publicanorum remitteret ceteraque restitueret sociis civibusque Romanis quae penes eum essent. Si fecisset, iam tunc sibi mitteret munera ac dona quae bene rebus gestis imperatores ab amicis accipere consuessent. Miserat enim ei Pharnaces coronam auream. His responsis datis legatos remisit.

71 At Pharnaces liberaliter omnia pollicitus, cum festinantem ac praecurrentem Caesarem speraret libentius etiam crediturum suis promissis quam res pateretur, quo celerius honestiusque ad res magis necessarias proficisceretur — nemini enim erat ignotum plurimis de causis ad urbem Caesarem revocar — , lentius agere, decedendi diem postulare longiorem, pactiones interponere, in summa frustrari coepit. Caesar cognita calliditate hominis, quod aliis temporibus natura facere consueverat tunc necessitate fecit adductus, ut celerius omnium opinione manum consereret.

72 Zela est oppidum in Ponto positum, ipsum ut in plano loco satis munitum: tumulus enim naturalis, velut manu factus, excelsiore undique fastigio sustinet murum. Circumpositi sunt huic oppido magni multique intercisi vallibus colles; quorum editissimus unus, qui propter victoriam Mithridatis et infelicitatem Triari detrimentumque exercitus nostri magnam in illis partibus habet

nobilitatem, superioribus locis atque itineribus paene coniunctus est oppido nec multo longius milibus passuum III abest ab Zela. Hunc locum Pharnaces veteribus paternorum felicitum castrorum reffectis operibus copiis suis omnibus occupavit.

73 Caesar cum ab hoste milia passuum V castra posuisset videretque eas vallis quibus regia castra munirentur eodem intervallo sua castra munituras, si modo ea loca hostes priores non cepissent quae multo erant propiora regis castris, aggerem comportari iubet intra munitiones. Quo celeriter collato proxima nocte vigilia quarta legionibus omnibus expeditis impedimentisque in castris relictis prima luce neque opinantibus hostibus eum ipsum locum cepit, in quo Mithridates secundum proelium adversus Triarium fecerat. Huc omnem comportatum aggerem ex castris servitia agerentur iussit, ne quis ab opere miles discederet, cum spatio non amplius passuum mille intercisa vallis castra hostium divideret ab opere incepto Caesaris castrorum.

74 Pharnaces, cum id repente prima luce animadvertisset, copias suas omnis pro castris instruxit. Quas interposita tanta locorum iniquitate consuetudine magis pervulgata militari credebat instrui Caesar vel ad opus suum tardandum, quo plures in armis tenerentur, vel ad ostentationem regiae fiducia, ne munitione magis quam manu defendere locum Pharnaces videretur. Itaque deterritus non est quo minus prima acie pro vallo instructa reliqua pars exercitus opus faceret. At Pharnaces impulsus sive loci felicitate sive auspiciis et religionibus inductus, quibus obtemperasse eum postea audiebamur, sive paucitate nostrorum qui in armis erant comperta, cum more operis cotidiani magnam illam servorum multitudinem quae aggerem portabat militum esse credidisset, sive etiam fiducia veterani exercitus sui, quem bis et vicies in acie confluxisse et vicisse legati

eius gloriabantur, simul contemptu exercitus nostri, quem pulsum a se Domitio duce sciebat, inito consilio dimicandi descendere praerupta valle coepit. Cuius aliquamdiu Caesar irridebat inanem ostentationem et eo loco militum coartationem, quem in locum nemo sanus hostis subiturus esset: cum interim Pharnaces eodem gradu quo in praeruptam descenderat vallem ascendere adversus arduum collem instructis copiis coepit.

75 Caesar incredibili eius vel temeritate vel fiducia commotus neque opinans imparatusque oppressus eodem tempore milites ab opere revocat, arma capere iubet, legiones opponit aciemque instruit; cuius rei subita trepidatio magnum terrorem attulit nostris. Nondum ordinibus instructis falcatae regiae quadrigae permixtos milites perturbant; quae tamen celeriter multitudine telorum opprimuntur. Insequitur has acies hostium, et clamore sublato confligitur multum adiuvante natura loci, plurimum deorum immortalium benignitate; qui cum omnibus casibus bellicis intersunt, tum praecipue eis quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.

76 Magno atque acri proelio comminus facto dextro cornu, quo veterana legio sexta erat collocata, initium victoriae natum est. Ab ea parte cum in proclive detruderentur hostes, multo tardius, sed tamen isdem dis adiuvantibus sinistro cornu mediaque acie totae profligantur copiae regis. Quae quam facile subierant iniquum locum, tam celeriter gradu pulsae premebantur loci iniquitate. Itaque multis militibus partim interfectis partim suorum ruina oppressis, qui velocitate effugere poterant, armis tamen proiectis vallem transgressi nihil ex loco superiore inermi proficere poterant. At nostri victoria elati subire iniquum locum munitionesque aggredi non dubitarunt. Defendentibus autem eis cohortibus castra quas Pharnaces praesidio reliquerat, celeriter castris hostium sunt potiti. Interfecta multitudine

omni suorum aut capta Pharnaces cum paucis equitibus profugit; cui nisi castrorum oppugnatio facultatem attulisset liberius profugiendi, vivus in Caesaris potestatem adductus esset.

77 Tali victoria totiens victor Caesar incredibili est laetitia adfectus, quod maximum bellum tanta celeritate confecerat, quodque subiti periculi recordatione laetior quod victoria facilis ex difficillimis rebus acciderat. Ponto recepto praeda omni regia militibus condonata postero die cum expeditis equitibus ipse proficiscitur, legionem sextam decedere ad praemia atque honores accipiendos in Italiam iubet, auxilia Deiotari domum remittit, duas legiones cum Caelio Viniciano in Ponto relinquit.

78 Ita per Gallograeciam Bithyniamque in Asiam iter facit omniumque earum provinciarum de controversiis cognoscit et statuit; iura in tetrarchas, reges, civitates distribuit. Mithridaten Pergamenum, a quo rem feliciter celeriterque gestam in Aegypto supra scripsimus, regio genere ortum, disciplinis etiam regiis educatum — nam eum Mithridates, rex Asiae totius, propter nobilitatem Pergamo parvulum secum asportaverat in castra multosque retinuerat annos — regem Bosphori constituit, quod sub imperio Pharnacis fuerat, provinciasque populi Romani a barbaris atque inimicis regibus interposito amicissimo rege munivit. Eidem tetrarchian legibus Gallograecorum iure gentis et cognationis adiudicavit occupatam et possessam paucis ante annis a Deiotaro. Neque tamen usquam diutius moratus est quam necessitas urbanarum seditionum pati videbatur. Rebus felicissime celerrimeque confectis in Italiam celerius omnium opinione venit.

DE BELLO AFRICO

¹ Caesar itineribus iustis confectis nullo die intermisso a. d. XIII Kal. Ian. Lilybaeum pervenit statimque ostendit sese naves velle conscendere, cum non amplius legionem tironum haberet unam, equites vix DC. Tabernaculum secundum litus ipsum constituit, ut prope fluctus verberaret. Hoc eo consilio fecit nequis sibi morae quicquam fore speraret et ut omnes in dies horasque parati essent. Incidit per id tempus ut tempestates ad navigandum idoneas non haberet. Nihilo tamen minus in navibus remiges militesque continere et nullam praetermittere occasionem profectionis, cum praesertim ab incolis eius provinciae nuntiarentur adversariorum copiae: equitatus infinitus, legiones regiae IIII, levis armaturae magna vis, Scipionis legiones X, elephanti CXX classesque esse complures. Tamen non deterrebatur animoque et spe confidebat. Interim in dies et naves longae adaugeri et onerariae complures eodem concurrere et legiones tironum convenire IIII, veterana legio quinta, equitum ad II milia.

² Legionibus collectis VI et equitum II milibus, ut quaeque prima legio venerat, in naves longas imponebatur, equites autem in onerarias. Ita maiorem partem navium antecedere iussit et insulam petere Aponianam quae est a Lilybaeo... commoratus bona paucorum publice vendit, deinde Allieno praetori qui Siciliam obtinebat, de omnibus rebus praecipit et de reliquo exercitu celeriter imponendo. Datis mandatis ipse navem conscendit a. d. VI Kal. Ian. et reliquas naves statim est consecutus. Ita vento certo celerique navigio vectus post diem quartum cum longis paucis navibus in conspectum Africae venit. Namque onerariae reliquae praeter paucas vento dispersae atque errabundae diversa loca petierunt. Clupeam classe praetervehitur, dein Neapolim; complura praeterea castella et

oppida non longe a mari relinquit.

3 Postquam Hadrumetum accessit, ubi praesidium erat adversariorum cui praeerat C. Considius, et a Clupeis secundum oram maritimam cum equitatu Hadrumetum Cn. Piso cum Maurorum circiter tribus milibus apparuit, ibi paulipser Caesar ante portum commoratus dum reliquae naves convenirent, exponit exercitum, cuius numerus in praesentia fuit peditum III milia, equites CL, castrisque ante oppidum positus sine iniuria cuiusquam considit cohibetque omnes a praeda. Oppidani interim muros armatis complent, ante portam frequentes considunt ad se defendendum; quorum numerus duarum legionum instar erat. Caesar circum oppidum vectus natura loci perspecta rediit in castra. Non nemo culpa eius imprudentiaeque adsignabat quod neque circum loca gubernatoribus praefectisque quid peterent praeceperat, neque ut more ipsius consuetudo superioribus temporibus fuerat, tabellas signatas dederat, ut in tempore his perlectis locum certum peterent universi. Quod minime Caesarem fefellerat; namque nullum portum terrae Africae quo classes decurrerent, pro certo tutum ab hostium praesidio fore suspicabatur, sed fortuitu oblatam occasionem egressus aucupabatur.

4 L. Plancus interim legatus petit a Caesare, uti sibi daret potestatem cum Considio agendi, si posset aliqua ratione perducere ad sanitatem. Itaque data facultate litteras conscribit et eas captivo dat perferendas in oppidum ad Considium. Quo simulatque captivus cum pervenisset litterasque, ut erat mandatum, Considio porrigere coepisset, priusquam acciperet ille, 'Unde' inquit 'istas?' Tum captivus: 'Imperatore a Caesare.' Tum Considius, 'Unus est' inquit 'Scipio imperator hoc tempore populi Romani'; deinde in conspectu suo statim captivum interfici iubet litterasque nondum perlectas, sicut

erant signatae, dat homini certo ad Scipionem perferendas.

5 Postquam una nocte et die ad oppidum consumpta neque responsum ullum a Considio dabatur neque ei reliquae copiae succurrebant neque equitatu abundabat et ad oppidum oppugnandum non satis copiarum habebat et eas tironum neque primo adventu convulnerari exercitum volebat et oppidi egregia munitio et difficilis ad oppugnandum erat accessus et nuntiabatur auxilia magna equitatus oppidanis suppetias venire, non est visa ratio ad oppugnandum oppidum commorandi, ne dum in ea re Caesar esset occupatus, circumventus a tergo ab equitatu hostium laboraret.

6 Itaque castra cum movere vellet, subito ex oppido erupit multitudo atque equitatus subsidio uno tempore eis casu succurrit qui erat missus a Iuba ad stipendium accipiendum, castraque unde Caesar egressus et iter facere coeperat, occupant et eius agmen extremum insequi coeperunt. Quae res cum animadversa esset, subito legionarii consistunt, et equites quamquam erant pauci, tamen contra tantam multitudinem audacissime concurrunt. Accidit res incredibilis, ut equites minus XXX Galli Maurorum equitum II milia loco pellerent fugarentque in oppidum. Postquam repulsi et coniecti erant intra munitiones, Caesar iter constitutum ire contendit. Quod cum saepius facerent et modo insequerentur, modo rursus ab equitibus in oppidum repellerentur, cohortibus paucis, ex veteranis quas secum habebat, in extremo agmine collocatis et parte equitatus iter leniter cum reliquis facere coepit. Ita quanto longius ab oppido discedebatur, tanto tardiores ad insequendum erant Numidae. Interim in itinere ex oppidis et castellis legationes venire et pollicere frumentum paratosque esse quae imperasset facere. Itaque eo die castra posuit ad oppidum Ruspina.

7 Kal. Ianuariis inde movit et pervenit ad oppidum Leptim liberam

civitatem et immunem. Legati ex oppido obviam veniunt, libenter se omnia facturos quae vellet pollicentur. Itaque centurionibus ad portas oppidi et custodiis impositis, nequis miles in oppidum introiret aut iniuriam faceret cuiquam incolae, non longe ab oppido secundum litus facit castra. Eodemque naves onerariae et longae nonnullae casu advenerunt; reliquae, ut est ei nuntiatum, incertae locorum Uticam versus petere visae sunt. Interim Caesar a mari non digredi neque mediterranea petere propter navium errorem equitatumque in navibus omnem continere, ut arbitror ne agri vastarentur; aquam in naves iubet comportari. Remiges interim qui aequatum e navibus exierant, subito equites Mauri neque opinantibus Caesarianis adorti multos iaculis convulnerarunt, nonnullos interfecerunt. Latent enim in insidiis cum equis inter convalles et subito existunt, non ut in campo comminus depugnent.

8 Caesar interim in Sardiniam nuntios cum litteris et in reliquis provincias finitimas dimisit, ut sibi auxilia commeatus frumentum, simulatque litteras legissent, mittenda curarent, exoneratisque partim navibus longis Rabirium Postumum in Siciliam ad secundum commeatum arcessendum mittit. Interim cum X navibus longis ad reliquas naves onerarias conquirendas quae deerrassent, et simul mare tuendum ab hostibus iubet proficisci. Item C. Sallustium Crispum praetorem ad Cercinam insulam versus quam adversarii tenebant, cum parte navium ire iubet, quod ibi magnum numerum frumenti esse audiebat. Haec ita imperabat unicuique, ita praecipiebat ut si fieri posset necne, locum excusatio nullum haberet nec moram tergiversatio. Ipse interea ex perfugis et incolis cognitis condicionibus Scipionis et qui cum eo bellum contra se gerebant, mirari – regium enim equitatum Scipio ex provincia Africa alebat – tanta homines esse dementia ut malint regis esse vectigales quam

cum civibus in patria in suis fortunis esse incolumes.

9 Caesar a. d. IIII Non. Ian. castra movet; Lepti sex cohortium praesidio cum Saserna relicto ipse rursus unde pridie venerat, Ruspina cum reliquis copiis convertit ibique sarcinis exercitus relictis ipse cum expedita manu proficiscitur circum villas frumentatum oppidanisque imperat ut plostra iumentaue omnia sequantur. Itaque magno numero frumenti invento Ruspina redit. Hoc eum idcirco existimo recepisse ut maritima oppida post se ne vacua relinqueret praesidioque firmata ad classis receptacula muniret.

10 Itaque ibi relicto P. Saserna fratre eius quem Lepti proximo oppido reliquerat, cum legione iubet comportari ligna in oppidum quam plurima. Ipse cum cohortibus vii quae ex veteranis legionibus in classe cum Sulpicio et Vatinio rem gesserant, ex oppido Ruspina egressus proficiscitur ad portum qui abest ab oppido milia passuum duo, ibique classem sub vesperum cum ea copia conscendit. Omnibus in exercitu insciis et requirentibus imperatoris consilium, magno metu ac tristimonia sollicitabantur. Parva enim cum copia et ea tironum neque omni eita in Africa contra magnas copias et insidiosae nationis equitatumque innumerabilem se eitos videbant neque quicquam solacium in praesentia neque auxilium in suorum consilio animum advertabant, nisi in ipsius imperatoris vultu vigore mirabilique hilaritate; animum enim altum et erectum prae se gerebat. Huic adquiescebant homines et in eius scientia et consilio omnia sibi proclivia omnes fore sperabant.

11 Caesar una nocte in navibus consumpta iam caelo albente cum proficisci conaretur, subito navium pars de qua timebat, ex errore eodem conferebatur. Hac re cognita Caesar celeriter de navibus imperat omnes egredi atque in litore armatos reliquos advenientes milites expectare. Itaque sine mora navibus eis in portum receptis et

advectis militum equitumque copiis rursus ad oppidum Ruspinae redit atque ibi castris constitutis ipse cum cohortibus expeditis XXX frumentatum est profectus. Ex eo est cognitum Caesaris consilium, illum cum classe navibus onerariis quae deerrassent, subsidio ire clam hostibus voluisse, ne casu imprudentes suae naves in classem adversariorum inciderent, neque eam rem eos voluisse scire qui in praesidiis relictis sui milites fuissent, uti nihil propter suorum paucitatem et hostium multitudinem metu deficerent.

12 Interim cum iam Caesar progressus esset a castris circiter milia passuum III, per speculatores et antecessores equites nuntiatur ei copias hostium haud longe ab sese visas. Et hercule cum eo nuntio pulvis ingens conspici coeptus est. Hac re cognita Caesar celeriter iubet equitatum universum cuius copiam habuit in praesentia non magnam, et sagittarios quorum parvus numerus, ex castris arcessi, atque ordinatim signa se leniter consequi; ipse antecedere cum paucis armatis. Iamque cum procul hostis conspici posset, milites in campo iubet galeari et ad eam pugnam parari; quorum omnino numerus fuit XXX cohortium cum equitibus CCCC, sagittariis CL.

13 Hostes interim quorum dux erat Labienus et duo Pacidei, aciem derigunt mirabili longitudine non peditum, sed equitum confertam, et inter eos levis armaturae Numidas et sagittarios pedites interposuerant et ita condensaverant ut procul Caesariani pedestres copias arbitrarentur; dextrum ac sinistrum cornu magnis equitum copiis firmaverant. Interim Caesar aciem derigit simplicem ut poterat propter paucitatem; sagittarios ante aciem constituit, equites dextro sinistroque cornu opponit et ita praecipit ut providerent ne multitudine equitatus hostium circumvenirentur: existimabat enim se acie instructa cum pedestribus copiis dimicaturum.

14 14 Cum utrimque expectatio fieret neque Caesar sese moveret

et cum suorum paucitate contra magnam vim hostium artificio magis quam viribus decernendum videret, subito adversariorum equitatus sese extendere et in latitudinem promovere collesque complecti et Caesaris equitatum extenuare simulque ad circumeundum comparare se coeperunt. Caesariani equites eorum multitudinem aegre sustinebant. Acies interim mediae cum concurrere conarentur, subito ex condensis turmis pedites Numidae levis armaturae cum equitibus procurrunt et inter legionarios pedites iacula coniciunt. Hic cum Caesariani in eos impetum fecissent, illorum equites refugiebant. Pedites interim resistebant, dum equites rursus cursu renovato peditibus suis succurrerent.

15 Caesar novo genere pugnae oblato cum animum adverteret ordines suorum in procurando turbari – pedites enim, dum equites longius ab signis persequuntur, latere nudato a proximis Numidis iaculis vulnerabantur, equites autem hostium pilum militis cursu facile vitabant – edicit per ordines nequis miles ab signis IIII pedes longius procederet. Equitatus interim Labieni suorum multitudine confisus Caesaris paucitatem circuire conatur: qui equites Iuliani pauci multitudine hostium defessi equis convulneratis paulatim cedere, hostis magis magisque instare. Ita puncto temporis omnibus legionariis ab hostium equitatu circumventis Caesarisque copiis in orbem compulsis intra cancellos omnes coniecti pugnare cgebantur.

16 Labienus in equo capite nudo versari in prima acie, simul suos cohortari, nonnumquam legionarios Caesaris ita appellare: ‘Quid tu’ inquit ‘miles tiro, tam feroculus es? Vos quoque iste verbis infatuavit? In magnum mehercule vos periculum impulit. Misereor vestri.’ Tum miles, ‘Non sum’ inquit ‘tiro Labiene, sed de legione X veteranus.’ Tum Labienus, ‘Non agnosco’ inquit ‘signa decumanorum.’ Tum ait miles: ‘Iam me quis sim intelleges’; simul

cassidem de capite deiecit ut cognosci ab eo posset, atque ita pilum viribus contortum, dum in Labienum mittere contendit, equi graviter adverso pectori adfixit et ait: 'Labiene, decumanum militem qui te petit scito esse.' Omnium tamen animi in terrorem coniecti, et maxime tironum: circumspicere enim Caesarem neque amplius facere nisi hostium iacula vitare.

17 Caesar interim consilio hostium cognito iubet aciem in longitudinem quam maximam porrigi et alternis conversis cohortibus ut una post, altera ante signa tenderet, ita coronam hostium dextro sinistroque cornu mediam dividit et unam partem ab altera exclusam equitibus intrinsecus adortus cum peditatu telis coniectis in fugam vertit neque longius progressus veritus insidias se ad suos recipit. Idem altera pars equitum peditumque Caesaris fecit. His rebus gestis ac procul hostibus repulsis convulneratisque ad sua praesidia sese, sicut erat instructus, recipere coepit.

18 Interim M. Petreius et Cn. Piso cum equitibus Numidis MC electis peditatuque eiusdem generis satis grandi ex itinere recta subsidio suis occurrunt. Atque hostes suis ex terrore firmatis rursusque renovatis animis legionarios conversis equitibus recipientes novissimos adoriri et impedire coeperunt quominus se in castra reciperent. Hac re animadversa Caesar iubet signa converti et medio campo redintegrari proelium. Cum ab hostibus eodem modo pugnaretur nec comminus ad manus rediretur Caesarisque equites iumenta ex nausea recenti siti languore paucitate vulneribus defatigata ad insequendum hostem perseverandumque cursum tardiora haberent dieique pars exigua esset iam reliqua, cohortibus equitibusque circumitis cohortatus ut uno ictu contenderent neque remitterent, donec ultra ultimos colles hostes reppulissent atque eorum essent potiti. Itaque signo dato cum iam hoste languide tela

neglegenterque mittente, subito immittit cohortes turmasque suorum; atque puncto temporis hostibus nullo negotio campo pulsus, post colle deiectis nacti locum atque ibi paulisper commorati, ita uti erant instructi, leniter se ad suas recipiunt munitiones. Itemque adversarii male accepti tum demum se ad sua praesidia contulerunt.

19 Interim ea re gesta et proelio dirempto ex adversariis perfugae plures ex omni genere hominum, et praeterea intercepti hostium complures equites peditesque. Ex quibus cognitum est consilium hostium, eos hac mente et conatu venisse, ut novo atque inusitato genere proelii tirones legionarii paucique perturbati Curionis exemplo ab equitatu circumventi opprimerentur, et ita Iubam dixisse pro contione, tantam se multitudinem auxiliorum adversariis Caesaris subministraturum, ut etiam caedendo in ipsa victoria defatigati vincerentur atque a suis superarentur, quippe quis in illorum sibi confideret, primum quod audierat Romae legiones veteranas dissentire neque in Africam velle transire; deinde quod triennio in Africa suos milites consuetudine retentos fideles sibi iam effecisset, maxima autem auxilia haberet Numidarum equitum levisque armaturae, praeterea ex fuga proelioque Pompeiano Labienus quos secum a Brundisio transportaverat equites Germanos Gallosque ibique postea ex hybridis libertinis servisque conscripserat, armaverat equoque uti frenato condocfecerat, praeterea regia auxilia, elephantis CXX equitatusque innumerabilis, deinde legiones conscriptas ex cuiusquemodi generis amplius XII milibus. Hac spe atque ea audacia inflammatus Labienus cum equitibus Gallis Germanisque MDC, Numidarum sine frenis VIII milibus, praeterea Petreiano auxilio adhibito equitibus MDC, peditum ac levis armaturae quater tanto, sagittariis ac funditoribus hippotoxotisque compluribus: his copiis prid. Non. Ian., post diem VI quam Africam

Caesar attigit, in campis planissimis purissimisque ab hora diei quinta usque ad solis occasum est decertatum. In eo proelio Petreius graviter ictus ex acie recessit.

20 Caesar interim castra munire diligentius, praesidia firmare copiis maioribus vallumque ab oppido Ruspina usque ad mare ducere et a castris alterum eodem, quo tutius ultro citroque commovere auxiliaque sine periculo sibi succurrere possent, tela tormenta ex navibus in castra comportare, remigum partem ex classe Gallorum Rhodiorum epibatarumque armare et in castra evocare, uti si posset eadem ratione qua adversarii, levis armatura interiecta inter equites suos interponeretur, sagittariisque ex omnibus navibus Itryaeis Syris et cuiusque generis ductis in castra compluribus frequentabat suas copias – audiebat enim Scipionem post diem tertium eius diei quo proelium factum erat adpropinquare, copias suas cum Labieno et Petreio coniungere; cuius copiae legionum VIII et equitum III milium esse nuntiabantur – officinas ferrarias instruere, sagittas telaque uti fierent complura curare, glandes fundere, sudes comparare, litteras in Siciliam nuntiosque mittere ut sibi crates materiemque congererent ad arietes, cuius inopia in Africa esset, praeterea ferrum plumbum mitteretur. Etiam animum advertebat frumento se in Africa nisi importatio uti non posse: priore anno enim propter adversariorum dilectus, quod stipendiarii aratores milites essent facti, messem non esse factam; praeterea ex omni Africa frumentum adversarios in pauca oppida et bene munita comportasse omnemque regionem Africae exinanisse frumento, oppida praeter ea pauca quae ipsi suis praesidiis tueri poterant, reliqua dirui ac deseri, et eorum incolas intra sua praesidia coegisse commigrare, agros desertos ac vastatos esse.

21 Hac necessitate Caesar coactus privatos ambiendo et blande

appellando aliquantum numerum frumenti in sua praesidia congesserat. Eo parce utebantur. Opera interim ipse cotidie circuire et alteras cohortes in statione habere propter hostium multitudinem. Labienus saucios suos, quorum maximus numerus fuit, iubet in plostris delegatos Hadrumentum deportari. Naves interim Caesaris onerariae errabundae male vagabantur incertae locorum atque castrorum suorum. Quas singulas scaphae adversariorum complures adortae incendebant atque expugnabant. Hac re nuntiata Caesari classes circum insulas portusque disposuit, quo tutius commeatus subportari posset.

22 M. Cato interim qui Uticae praeerat, Cn. Pompeium filium multis verbis assidueque obiurgare non desistebat. ‘tuus’ inquit ‘pater istuc aetatis cum esset et animadvertisset rem publicam ab nefariis sceleratisque civibus oppressam bonosque aut interfectos aut exilio multatos patria civitateque carere, gloria et animi magnitudine elatus privatus atque adulescentulus paterni exercitus reliquiis collectis paene oppressam funditus et deletam Italiam urbemque Romanum in libertatem vindicavit, idemque Siciliam Africam Numidiam Mauretanium mirabili celeritate armis recepit. Quibus ex rebus sibi eam dignitatem quae est per gentes clarissima notissimaque, conciliavit adulescentulusque atque eques Romanus triumphavit. Atque ille non ita amplis rebus patris gestis neque tam excellenti dignitate maiorum parta neque tantis clientelis nominisque claritate praeditus in rem publicam est ingressus. Tu contra et patris nobilitate et dignitate et per te ipse satis animi magnitudine diligentiaque praeditus nonne eniteris et proficisceris ad paternas clientelas auxilium tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique efflagitatum?’

23 His verbis hominis gravissimi incitatus adulescentulus cum

naviculis cuiusquemodi generis XXX, inibi paucis rostratis, profectus ab Utica in Mauretanium regnumque Bogudis est ingressus expeditoque exercitu numero servorum liberorum II milium, cuius partem inermem, partem habuerat armatam, ad oppidum Ascurum accedere coepit. In quo oppido praesidium fuit regium. Pompeio adveniente oppidani usque eo passi propius accedere, donec ad ipsas portas ac murum adpropinquaret, subito eruptione facta prostratos perterritosque Pompeianos in mare navesque passim compulerunt. Ita re male gesta Cn. Pompeius filius naves inde avertit neque postea litus adtigit classemque ad insulas Baleares versus convertit.

24 Scipio interim cum his copiis quas paulo ante demonstravimus, Uticae grandi praesidio relicto profectus primum Hadrumeti castra ponit, deinde ibi paucos dies commoratus noctu itinere facto cum Labieni et Petrei copiis coniungit, atque unis castris factis III milia passuum longe considunt. Equitatus interim eorum circum Caesaris munitiones vagari atque eos qui pabulandi atque aquandi gratia extra vallum progressi essent, excipere. Ita omnes adversarios intra munitiones continere. Quare Caesariani gravi annona sunt conflictati, ideo quod nondum neque ab Sicilia neque ab Sardinia commeatus subportatus erat, neque per anni tempus in mari classes sine periculo vagari poterant. Neque amplius milia passuum VI terrae Africae quoque versus tenebant pabulique inopia premebantur. Qua necessitate coacti veterani milites equitesque qui multa terra marique bella confecissent et periculis inopiaque tali saepe essent conflictati, alga e litore collecta et aqua dulci elota et ita iumentis esurientibus data vitam eorum producebant.

25 Dum haec ita fierent, rex Iuba cognitis Caesaris difficultatibus copiarumque paucitate non est visum dari spatium convalescendi augendarumque eius opum. Itaque comparatis equitum magnis

peditumque copiis subsidio sociis egressus e regno ire contendit. P. Sittius interim et rex Bocchus coniunctis suis copiis cognito regis Iubae egressu propius eius regnum copias suas admove, Cirtamque oppidum opulentissimum eius regni adortus paucis diebus pugnando capit et praeterea duo oppida Gaetulorum. Quibus cum condicionem ferret ut oppido excederent idque sibi vacuum traderent, condicionemque repudiassent, postea ab eo capti interfectique sunt omnes. Inde progressus agros oppidaque vexare non destitit. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba cum iam non longe ab Scipione atque eius ducibus abesset, capit consilium satius esse sibi suoque regno subsidio ire, quam dum alios adiuturus proficisceretur, ipse suo regno expulsus forsitan utraque re expelleretur. Itaque rursus recipere atque auxilia etiam ab Scipione abduxit sibi suisque rebus timens elephantisque XXX relictis suis finibus oppidisque suppetias profectus est.

26 Caesar interim, cum de suo adventu dubitatio in provincia esset neque quisquam crederet ipsum, sed aliquem legatum in Africam cum copiis venisse, conscriptis litteris circum provinciam omnes civitates facit de suo adventu certiores. Interim nobiles homines ex suis oppidis profugere et in castra Caesaris devenire et de adversariorum eius crudelitate acerbitateque commemorare coeperunt. Quorum lacrimis querelisque Caesar commotus, cum antea constituisset stativis castris aestate inita cunctis copiis auxiliisque accitis bellum cum suis adversariis gerere,... instituit litterisque celeriter in Siciliam ad Allienum et Rabirium Postumum conscriptis et per catasopum missis, ut sine mora ac nulla excusatione hiemis ventorumque quam celerrime exercitus sibi transportaretur: Africam provinciam perire funditusque everti ab suis inimicis; quod nisi celeriter sociis foret subventum, praeter ipsam

Africam terram nihil, ne tectum quidem quo se reciperent, ab illorum scelere insidiisque reliquum futurum. Atque ipse erat in tanta festinatione et exspectatione ut postero die quam misisset litteras nuntiumque in Siciliam, classem exercitumque morari diceret, dies noctesque oculos mentemque ad mare depositos directosque haberet. Nec mirum: animum advertebat enim villas exuri, agros vastari, pecus diripi, trucidari, oppida castellaque dirui deserique, principesque civitatum aut interfici aut in catenis teneri, liberos eorum obsidum nomine in servitutem abripi; eis se in miseris suamque fidem implorantibus auxilio propter copiarum paucitatem esse non posse. Milites interim in opere exercere atque castra munire, turres castella facere molesque iacere in mare non intermittere.

27 Scipio interim elephantos hoc modo condocere facere instituit. Duas instruxit acies, unam funditorum contra elephantos quae quasi adversariorum locum obtineret et contra eorum frontem adversam lapillos minutos mitteret; deinde in ordine elephantos constituit, post illos autem suam aciem instruxit, ut cum ab adversariis lapides mitti coepissent et elephanti perterriti se ad suos convertissent, rursus ab sua acie lapidibus missis eos converterent adversus hostem. Quod aegre tardeque fiebat; rudes enim elephanti multorum annorum doctrina usuque vetusto vix edocti tamen communi periculo in aciem producuntur.

28 Dum haec ad Ruspinam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, C. Vergilius praetorius qui Thapsi oppido maritimo praeerat, cum animum advertisset naves singulas cum exercitu Caesaris incertas locorum atque castrorum suorum vagari, occasionem nactus navem quam ibi habuit actuariam complet militibus et sagittariis et eidem scaphas de navibus adiungit ac singulas naves Caesarianas consecrari coepit. Et cum plures adortus esset, pulsus fugatusque inde

discessisset nec tamen desisteret periclitari, forte incidit in navem in qua erant duo Titi Hispani adolescentes, tribuni legionis V quorum patrem Caesar in senatum legerat, et cum his T. Salienus centurio legionis eiusdem qui M. Messalam legatum obsederat Messanae et seditiosissima oratione apud eum usus idemque pecuniam et ornamenta triumphī Caesaris retinenda et custodienda curarat et ob has causas sibi timebat. Hic propter conscientiam peccatorum suorum persuasit adolescentibus, ne repugnarent seseque Vergilio traderent. Itaque deducti a Vergilio ad Scipionem custodibus traditi et post diem tertium sunt interfecti. Qui cum ducerentur ad necem, petisse dicitur maior Titius a centurionibus uti se priorem quam fratrem interficerent, idque ab eis facile impetrasse, atque ita esse interfectos.

29 Turmae interim equitum quae pro vallo in stationibus esse solebant ab utrisque ducibus, cotidie minutis proeliis inter se depugnare non intermittunt. Nonnumquam etiam Germani Gallique Labieniani cum Caesaris equitibus fide data inter se colloquebantur. Labienus interim cum parte equitatus Leptim oppi dum cui praeerat Saserna cum cohortibus VI, oppugnare ac vi inrumpere conabatur. Quod ab defensoribus propter egregiam munitionem oppidi et multitudinem tormentorum facile et sine periculo defendebatur. Quod ubi saepius eius equitatus facere non intermittebat, et cum forte ante portam turma densa adstitisset, scorpione accuratius misso atque eorum decurione percusso et ad eum adfixo, reliqui perterriti fuga se in castra recipiunt. Quo facto postea sunt deterriti oppidum temptare.

30 Scipio interim fere cotidie non longe a suis castris passus CCC instruere aciem ac maiore parte diei consumpta rursus in castra se recipere. Quod cum saepius fieret, neque ex Caesaris castris quisquam prodiret neque propius eius copias accederet, despecta

patientia Caesaris exercitusque eius, Iuba universis copiis productis elephantisque turritis XXX ante aciem instructis quam latissime potuit porrecta equitum peditumque multitudine uno tempore progressus haud ita longe a Caesaris castris constitit in campo.

³¹ Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar iubet milites qui extra munitiones processerant quique pabulandi lignandique aut etiam muniendi gratia quique vallum petierant quaeque ad eam rem opus erant, omnes intra munitiones minutatim modesteque sine tumultu aut terrore se recipere atque in opere consistere. Equitibus autem qui in statione fuerant, praecipit ut usque eo locum optinerent in quo paulo ante constitissent, donec ab hoste telum missum ad se perveniret. Quodsi propius accederetur, quam honestissime se intra munitiones reciperent. Alii quoque equitatu edicit uti suo quisque loco paratus armatusque praesto esset. Atque haec non ipse per se coram, cum de vallo prospicerebatur, sed mirabili peritus scientia bellandi in praetorio sedens per speculatores et nuntios imperabat quae fieri volebat. Animadvertibat enim quamquam magnis essent copiis adversarii freti, tamen saepe a se fugatis pulsus perterritisque et concessam vitam et ignota peccata; quibus rebus numquam tanta suppeteret ex ipsorum inertia conscientiaque animi victoriae fiducia ut castra sua adoriri auderent. Praeterea ipsius nomen auctoritasque magna ex parte eorum exercitus minuebat audaciam. Tum egregiae munitiones castrorum atque valli fossarumque altitudo et extra vallum stili caeci mirabilem in modum consiti vel sine defensoribus aditum adversariis prohibebant: scorpionum catapultarum ceterorumque telorum quae ad defendendum solent parari, magnam copiam habebat. Atque haec propter exercitus sui praesentis paucitatem et tirocinium praeparaverat, non hostium vi et metu commotus patientem se timidumque hostium opinioni praebebat.

Neque idcirco copias quamquam erant paucae tironumque, non educebat in aciem quod victoriae suorum diffideret, sed referre arbitrabatur cuiusmodi victoria esset futura; turpe enim sibi existimabat tot rebus gestis tantisque exercitibus devictis, tot tam claris victoriis partis, ab reliquis copiis adversariorum suorum ex fuga collectis se cruentam adeptum existimari victoriam. Itaque constituerat gloriam exultationemque eorum pati, donec sibi veteranarum legionum pars aliqua in secundo commeatu occurrisset.

32 Scipio interim paulisper ut antea dixi in eo loco commoratus, ut quasi despexisse Caesarem videretur, paulatim reducit suas copias in castra et contione advocata de terrore suo desperationeque exercitus Caesaris facit verba et cohortatus suos victoriam propriam se eis brevi daturum pollicetur. Caesar iubet milites rursus ad opus redire et per causam munitionum tirones in labore defatigare non intermittit. Interim Numidae Gaetulique diffugere cotidie ex castris Scipionis et partim in regnum se conferre, partim quod ipsi maioresque eorum beneficio C. Marii usi fuissent Caesaremque eius adfinem esse audiebant, in eius castra perfugere catervatim non intermittunt. Quorum ex numero electis hominibus inlustrioribus Gaetulos et litteris ad suos cives datis cohortatus uti manu facta se suosque defenderent, ne suis inimicis adversariisque dicto audientes essent, mittit.

33 Dum haec ad Ruspinae fiunt, legati ex Acylla civitate libera et immune, ad Caesarem veniunt seque paratos quaecumque imperasset, et libenti animo facturos pollicentur; tantum orare et petere ab eo uti sibi praesidium daret, quo tutius id et sine periculo facere possent; se et frumentum et quaecumque res eis suppetere, communis salutis gratia ministraturos. Quibus rebus facile a Caesare impetratis praesidioque dato, C. Messium aedilicia functum

potestate Acyllam iubet proficisci. Quibus rebus cognitis Considius Longus qui Hadrumeti cum duabus legionibus et equitibus DCC praeerat, celeriter ibi parte praesidii relicta cum VIII cohortibus ad Acyllam ire contendit. Messius celerius itinere confecto prior Acyllam cum cohortibus pervenit. Considius interim cum ad urbem cum copiis accessisset et animadvertisset praesidium Caesaris ibi esse, non ausus periculum suorum facere nulla re gesta pro multitudine hominum rursus se Hadrumetum recepit; deinde paucis post diebus equestribus copiis a Labieno adductis rursus Acyllitanos castris positus obsidere coepit.

34 Per id tempus C. Sallustius Crispus quem paucis ante diebus missum a Caesare cum classe demonstravimus, Cercinam pervenit. Cuius adventu C. Decimius quaestorius qui ibi cum grandi familiae suae praesidio praeerat commeatui, parvulum navigium nactus conscendit ac se fugae commendat. Sallustius interim praetor a Cercinitanis receptus magno numero frumenti invento naves onerarias quarum ibi satis magna copia fuit, complet atque in castra ad Caesarem mittit. Allienus interim pro consule Lilybaeo in navis onerarias imponit legionem XIII et XIII et equites Gallos DCCC, funditorum sagittariorumque mille ac secundum commeatum in Africam mittit ad Caesarem. Quae naves ventum secundum nactae quarto die in portum ad Ruspina, ubi Caesar castra habuerat, incolumes pervenerunt. Ita Caesar duplici laetitia ac voluptate uno tempore auctus, frumento auxiliisque, tandem suis hilaratis annonaque levata sollicitudinem deponit, legiones equitesque ex navibus egressos iubet ex languore nauseaque reficere, dimissos in castella munitionesque disponit.

35 Quibus rebus Scipio quique cum eo essent comites mirari et requirere: C. Caesarem qui ultro consuesset bellum inferre ac

lacersse proelio, subito commutatum non sine magno consilio suspicabantur. Itaque ex eius patientia in magnum timorem coniecti ex Gaetulis duos quos arbitrabantur suis rebus amicissimos, magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque propositis pro perfugis speculandi gratia in castra Caesaris mittunt. Qui simul ad eum sunt deducti, petierunt ut sibi liceret vera sine periculo proloqui. Potestate facta 'saepenumero' inquit 'imperator, complures Gaetuli qui sumus clientes C. Marii et propemodum omnes cives Romani, qui sunt in legione III et VI, ad te volumus in tuaque praesidia confugere. Sed custodiis equitum Numidarum quo id sine periculo minus faceremus impediabamur. Nunc data facultate pro speculatoribus missi ab Scipione ad te cupidissime venimus ut perspiceremus, numquae fossae aut insidiae elephantis ante castra portasque valli factae essent, simulque consilia vestra contra easdem bestias comparisonemque pugnae cognosceremus atque eis renuntiarem.' qui collaudati a Caesare stipendioque donati ad reliquos perfugas deducuntur. Quorum orationem celeriter veritas comprobavit: namque postero die ex legionibus his quas Gaetuli nominarunt, milites legionarii complures ab Scipione in castra Caesaris perfugerunt.

³⁶ Dum haec ad Ruspina geruntur, M. Cato qui Uticae praeerat, dilectus cotidie libertinorum Afrorum, servorum denique et cuiusquemodi generis hominum qui modo per aetatem arma ferre poterant, habere atque sub manum Scipioni in castra submittere non intermittit. Legati interim ex oppido Thysdrae, in quod tritici modium milia CCC comportata fuerant a negotiatoribus Italicis aratoribusque, ad Caesarem venire, quantaque copia frumenti apud se sit docent, simulque orant ut sibi praesidium mittat, quo facilius et frumentum et copiae suae conserventur. Quibus Caesar in praesentia

gratias egit praesidiumque brevi tempore se missurum dixit cohortatusque ad suos cives iubet proficisci. P. Sittius interim cum copiis Numidiaefines ingressus castellum in montis loco munito locatum, in quod Iuba belli gerendi gratia et frumentum et res ceteras quae ad bellum usui solent esse comportaverat, vi expugnando est potitus.

37 Caesar postquam legionibus veteranis duabus equitatu levique armatura copias suas ex secundo commeatu auxerat, naves exoneratas statim iubet Lilybaeum ad reliquum exercitum transportandum proficisci; ipse VI Kal. Febr. circiter vigilia prima imperat, speculatores apparitoresque omnes ut sibi praesto essent. Itaque omnibus insciis neque suspicantibus vigilia tertia iubet omnes legiones extra castra educi atque se consequi ad oppidum Ruspinae versus, in quo ipse praesidium habuit et quod primum ad amicitiam eius accessit. Inde parvulam proclivitatem degressus sinistra parte campi propter mare legiones ducit. Hic campus mirabili planitie patet milia passuum XV; quem iugum cingens a mari ortum neque ita praealtum velut theatri efficit speciem. In hoc iugo colles sunt excelsi pauci, in quibus singulae turres speculaeque singulae perveteres erant collocatae, quarum apud ultimam praesidium et statio fuit Scipionis.

38 Postquam Caesar ad iugum de quo docui, ascendit atque in unumquemque collem turrem castellaque facere coepit atque ea minus semihora effecit, et postquam non ita longe ab ultimo colle turrique fuit, quae proxima fuit castris adversariorum, in qua docui esse praesidium stationemque Numidarum, paulisper commoratus perspectaque natura loci equitatu in statione disposito legionibus opus adtribuit brachiumque medio iugo ab eo loco ad quem pervenerat, usque ad eum unde egressus erat, iubet derigi ac muniri. Quod postquam Scipio Labienusque animadverterant, equitatu omni

ex castris educto acieque equestri instructa a suis munitionibus circiter passus mille progrediuntur pedestremque copiam in secunda acie minus passus CCCC a suis castris constituunt.

39 Caesar in opere milites adhortari neque adversariorum copiis moveri. Iam cum non amplius passus md inter hostium aciem suasque munitiones esse animadvertisset intellexissetque ad impediendos milites suos et ab opere depellendos hostem propius accedere et necesse haberet legiones a munitionibus deducere, imperat turmae Hispanorum ut ad proximum collem propere accurrerent praesidiumque inde deturbarent locumque caperent, eodemque iubet levis armaturae paucos consequi subsidio. Qui missi celeriter Numidas adorti partim vivos capiunt, nonnullos equites fugientes convulneraverunt locumque sunt potiti. Postquam id Labienus animadvertit, quo celerius iis auxilium ferret, ex acie instructa equitatus sui prope totum dextrum cornu avertit atque suis fugientibus suppetias ire contendit. Quod ubi Caesar conspexit, Labienum ab suis copiis longius iam abscessisse, equitatus sui alam sinistram ad intercludendos hostes immisit.

40 Erat in eo campo ubi ea res gerebatur, villa permagna turribus IIII exstructa. Quae Labieni prospectum impediabat ne posset animum advertere ab equitatu Caesaris se intercludi. Itaque non prius vidit turmas Iulianas quam suos caedi a tergo sentit. Ex qua re subito in terrorem converso equitatu Numidarum recta in castra fugere contendit. Galli Germanique qui restiterant, ex superiore loco et post tergum circumventi fortiterque resistentes conciduntur universi. Quod ubi legiones Scipionis quae pro castris erant instructae animum adverterunt, metu ac terrore obcaecatae omnibus portis in sua castra fugere coeperunt. Postquam Scipione eiusque copiis campo collibusque exturbatis atque in castra compulsis cum receptui Caesar

cani iussisset equitatumque omnem intra suas munitiones recepisset, campo purgato animadvertit mirifica corpora Gallorum Germanorumque qui partim eius auctoritatem erant ex Gallia secuti, partim pretio pollicitationibus adducti ad eum se contulerant, nonnulli qui ex Curionis proelio capti conservatique parem gratiam in fide praebenda praestare voluerant. Horum corpora mirifica specie amplitudineque caesa toto campo ac prostrata diverse iacebant.

41 His rebus gestis Caesar postero die ex omnibus praesidiis cohortes eduxit atque omnes suas copias in campo instruxit. Scipio suis male acceptis occisis convulneratisque intra suas continere se munitiones coepit. Caesar instructa acie secundum infimas iugi radices propius munitiones leniter accessit. Iamque minus mille passus ab oppido Uzitta quod Scipio tenebat aberant legiones Iulianae, cum Scipio veritus ne oppidum amitteret, unde aquari reliquisque rebus sublevari eius exercitus consuerat, eductis omnibus copiis quadruplici acie instructa, ex instituto suo prima equestri turmatim directa elephantisque turritis interpositis armatisque, suppetias ire contendit. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, arbitratus Scipionem ad dimicandum paratum ad se certo animo venire, in eo loco quo paulo ante commemoravi, ante oppidum constitit suamque aciem mediam eo oppido textit, dextrum sinistrumque cornu, ubi elephanti erant, in conspectu patenti adversariorum constituit.

42 Cum iam prope solis occasum Caesar exspectavisset neque ex eo loco quo constiterat Scipionem progredi propius se animadvertisset locoque se magis defendere, si res coegisset, quam in campo comminus consistere audere, non est visa ratio propius accedendi eo die ad oppidum, quoniam ibi praesidium grande Numidarum esse cognoverat, hostesque mediam aciem suam oppido texisse et sibi difficile factu esse intellexit simul et oppidum uno

tempore oppugnare et in acie in cornu dextro ac sinistro ex iniquiore loce pugnare, praesertim cum milites a mane diei ieiuni sub armis stetissent defatigati. Itaque reductis suis copiis in castra postero die propius eorum aciem instituit exporrigere munitiones.

43 Interim Considius qui Acyllam et VIII cohortibus stipendiariis Numidis Gaetulisque obsidebat, ubi C. Messius qui cohortibus praeerat, diu multumque expertus magnisque operibus saepe admotis et his ab oppidanis incensis cum proficeret nihil, subito nuntio de equestri proelio adlato commotus, frumento cuius in castris copiam habuerat incenso, vino oleo ceterisque rebus quae ad victum parari solent corruptis Acyllam quam obsidebat deseruit atque itinere per regnum Iubae facto copias cum Scipione partitus Hadrumetum se recepit.

44 Interea ex secundo commeatu quem a Sicilia miserat Alienus, navis una, in qua fuerat Q. Cominius et L. Ticida, eques Romanus, ab residua classe cum erravisset delataque esset vento ad Thapson, a Vergilio scaphis naviculisque actuariis excepta est et ad Scipionem adducta. Item altera navis trieris ex eadem classe errabunda ac tempestate delata ad Aegimurum a classe Vari et M. Octavi est capta, in quo milites veterani cum uno centurione et nonnulli tirones fuerunt; quos Varus adservatos sine contumelia deducendos curavit ad Scipionem. Qui postquam ad eum pervenerunt et ante suggestum eius constiterunt, ‘non vestra’ inquit ‘sponte vos certo scio, sed illius scelerati vestri imperatoris impulsu et imperio coactos cives et optimum quemque nefarie consecrari. Quos quoniam fortuna in nostram detulit potestatem, si, id quod facere debetis, rem publicam cum optimo quoque defendetis, certum est vobis vitam et pecuniam donare. Quapropter quid sentiatis proloquimini.’

45 Hac habita oratione Scipio cum existimasset pro suo beneficio

sine dubio ab his gratias sibi actum iri, potestatem eis dicundi fecit. Ex eis centurio legionis xiv ‘pro tuo’ inquit ‘summo beneficio Scipio, tibi gratias ago – non enim imperatorem te appello – quod mihi vitam incolumitatemque belli iure capto polliceris, et forsitan isto uterer beneficio, si non ei summum scelus adiungeretur. Egone contra Caesarem imperatorem meum apud quem ordinem duxi, eiusque exercitum pro cuius dignitate victoriaque amplius XXXVI annos depugnavi, adversus armatusque consistam? Neque ego istud facturum sum et te magnopere ut de negotio desistas adhortor. Contra cuius enim copias contendas, si minus antea expertus es, licet nunc cognoscas. Elige ex tuis cohortem unam quam putas esse firmissimam, et constitue contra me; ego autem ex meis commilitonibus quos nunc in tua tenes potestate, non amplius X sumam. Tunc ex virtute nostra intelleges, quid ex tuis copiis sperare debeas.’

46 Postquam haec centurio praesenti animo adversus opinionem eius est locutus, ira percitus Scipio atque animi dolore incensus annuit centurionibus quid fieri vellet, atque ante pedes centurionem interficit reliquosque veteranos a tironibus iubet secerni. ‘ab ducite istos’ inquit ‘nefario scelere contaminatos et caede civium saginatos.’ sic extra vallum deducti sunt et cruciabiliter interfecti. Tirones autem iubet inter legiones dispertiri et Cominium cum Ticida in conspectum suum prohibet adduci. Qua ex re Caesar commotus eos quos in stationibus cum longis navibus apud Thapsum custodiae causa in salo esse iusserat, ut suis onerariis longisque navibus praesidio essent, ob negligentiam ignominiae causa dimittendos ab exercitu gravissimumque in eos edictum proponendum curavit.

47 Per id tempus fere Caesaris exercitui res accidit incredibilis auditu. Namque vergiliarum signo confecto circiter vigilia secunda

noctis nimbus cum saxeae grandine subito est exortus ingens. Ad hoc autem incommodum accesserat quod Caesar non more superiorum temporum in hibernis exercitum continebat, sed in tertio quartoque die procedendo propiusque hostem accedendo castra communibat, opereque faciendo milites se circumspiciendi non habebant facultatem. Praeterea ita ex Sicilia exercitum transportabat ut praeter ipsum militem et arma nec vas nec mancipium neque ullam rem quae usu militi esse consuevit in naves imponi pateretur. In Africa autem non modo sibi quicquam non adquisierant aut paraverant, sed etiam propter annonae caritatem ante parta consumpserant. Quibus rebus attenuati oppido perquam pauci sub pellibus adquiescebant; reliqui ex vestimentis tentoriolis factis atque harundinibus storiisque contextis permanebant. Itaque subito imbre grandineque consecuta gravatis pondere tentoriis aquarumque vi subrutis deiectisque, nocte intempesta ignibus extinctis, rebus quae ad victum pertinent omnibus corruptis per castra passim vagabantur scutisque capita contegebant. Eadem nocte V legionis pilorum acumina sua sponte arserunt.

48 Rex interim Iuba de equestri proelio Scipionis certior factus evocatusque ab eodem litteris praefecto Saburra cum parte exercitus contra Sittium relicto, ut secum ipse aliquid auctoritatis adderet exercitu Scipionis ac terrorem Caesaris, cum tribus legionibus equitibusque frenatis DCCC, Numidis sine frenis peditibusque levis armaturae grandi numero, elephantis XXX egressus e regno ad Scipionem est profectus. Postquam ad eum pervenit, castris regiis seorsum positis cum eis copiis quas commemoravi haud ita longe ab Scipione consedit. – erat in castris Caesaris superiore tempore magnus terror, et exspectatione copiarum regiarum exercitus eius magis suspensiore animo ante adventum Iubae commovebatur.

Postquam vero castra castris contulit, despectis eius copiis omnem timorem deponit. Ita quam antea absens habuerat auctoritatem, eam omnem praesens dimiserat. – Quo facto cuivis facile fuit intellectu Scipioni additum animum fiduciamque regis adventu. Nam postero die universas suas regisque copias cum elephantis LX productas in aciem quam speciosissime potuit instruxit ac paulo longius progressus ab suis munitionibus haud ita diu commoratus se recepit in castra.

49 Caesar postquam animadvertit Scipioni auxilia fere quae exspectasset omnia convenisse neque moram pugnandi ullam fore, per iugum summum cum copiis progredi coepit et brachia protinus ducere et castella munire propiusque Scipionem capiendo loca excelsa occupare contendit. Adversarii magnitudine copiarum confisi proximum collem occupaverant atque ita longius sibi progrediendi eripuerunt facultatem. Eiusdem collis occupandi gratia Labienus consilium ceperat et quo propiore loco fuerat, eo celerius occurrerat.

50 Erat convallis satis magna latitudine, altitudine praerupta, crebris locis speluncae in modum subrutis, quae erat transgredienda Caesari antequam ad eum collem quem capere volebat perveniretur. ultraque eam convallem olivetum vetus crebris arboribus condensum. Hic cum Labienus animadvertisset Caesarem si vellet eum locum occupare, prius necesse esse convallem olivetumque transgredi, eorum locorum peritus in insidiis cum parte equitatus levique armatura consedit et praeterea post montem collesque Caesari se subito ostenderet equites in occulto collocaverat, ut cum ipse ex improvviso legionarios adortus esset, ex colle se equitatus ostenderet, ut re duplici perturbatus Caesar eiusque exercitus neque retro regrediundi neque ultra procedendi oblata facultate circumventus concideretur. Caesar postquam equitatu ante praemisso inscius

insidiarum cum ad eum locum venisset, adversarii sive obliti praeceptorum Labieni sive veriti ne in fossa ab equitibus opprimerentur, rari ac singuli de rupe prodire et summa petere collis. Quos Caesaris equites consecuti partim interfecerunt, partim vivorum sunt potiti. Deinde protinus collem petere contenderunt atque eum decusso Labieni praesidio celeriter occupaverunt. Labienus cum parte equitum vix fuga sibi peperit salutem.

51 Hac re per equites gesta Caesar legionibus opera distribuit atque in eo colle quo erat potitus castra munivit. Deinde ab suis maximis castris per medium campum e regione oppidi Uzittae, quod inter sua castra et Scipionis in planitie positum erat tenebaturque a Scipione, duo brachia instituit ducere et ita derigere ut ad angulum dextrum sinistrumque eius oppidi convenirent. Id hac ratione opus instruebat, ut cum propius oppidum copias admovisset oppugnareque coepisset, tecta latera suis munitionibus haberet, ne ab equitatus multitudine circumventus ab oppugnatione deterreretur, praeterea quo facilius colloquia fieri possent, et siqui perfugere vellent, id quod antea saepe accidebat magno cum eorum periculo, tum facile et sine periculo fieret. Voluit etiam experiri, cum propius hostem accessisset, haberetne in animo dimicare. Accedebat etiam ad reliquas causas quod is locus depressus erat puteique ibi non nulli fieri complures poterant: aquatione enim longa et angusta utebantur. Dum haec opera quae ante dixi fiebant a legionibus, interim pars acie ante opus instructa sub hoste stabat; equites barbari levisque armaturae proeliis minutis comminus dimicabant.

52 Caesar ab eo opere cum iam sub vesperum copias in castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu levique armatura Iuba Scipio Labienus in legionarios impetum fecerunt. Equites Caesariani vi universae subitaeque hostium multitudinis pulsii parumper

cesserunt. Quae res aliter adversariis cecidit: namque Caesar ex medio itinere copiis reductis equitibus suis auxilium tulit; equites autem adventu legionum animo addito conversis equis in Numidas cupide insequentes dispersosque impetum fecerunt atque eos convulneratos usque in castra regia reppulerunt multosque ex his interfecerunt. Quodni in noctem proelium esset coniectum pulvisque vento elatus omnium prospectu offecisset, Iuba cum Labieno capti in potestatem Caesaris venissent, equitatusque cum levi armatura funditus ad internecionem deletus esset. Interim incredibiliter ex legione III et VI Scipionis milites diffugere partim in castra Caesaris, partim in quas quisque poterat regiones pervenire. Itemque equites Curioniani diffusi Scipioni eiusque copiis complures se eodem conferebant.

53 Dum haec circum Uzittam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, legiones duae, X et VIII, ex Sicilia navibus onerariis profectae, cum iam non longe a portu Ruspinae abessent, conspicati naves Caesarianas quae in statione apud Thapsum stabant, veriti ne in adversariorum ut insidiandi gratia ibi commorantium classem inciderent imprudentes, vela in altum dederunt ac diu multumque iactati tandem multis post diebus siti inopiaque confecti ad Caesarem perveniunt.

54 Quibus legionibus expositis memor in Italia pristinae licentiae militaris ac rapinarum certorum hominum parvulam modo causulam nactus, quod C. Avienus tribunus militum X legionis navem ex commeatu familia sua atque iumentis occupavisset neque militem unum ab Sicilia sustulisset, postero die de suggestu convocatis omnium legionum tribunis centurionibusque 'Maxime vellem' inquit 'homines suae petulantiae nimiaeque libertatis aliquando finem fecissent meaeque lenitatis modestiae patientiaeque rationem

habuissent. Sed quoniam ipsi sibi neque modum neque terminum constituunt, quo ceteri dissimiliter se gerant, egomet ipse documentum more militari constituam. C. Aviene, quod in Italia milites populi Romani contra rem publicam instigasti rapinasque per municipia fecisti quodque mihi reique publicae inutilis fuisti et pro militibus tuam familiam iumentaue in naves imposuisti tuaque opera militibus tempore necessario res publica caret, ob eas res ignominiae causa ab exercitu meo te removeo hodieque ex Africa abesse et quantum pote proficisci iubeo. Itemque te Aule Fontei, quod tribunus militum seditiosus malusque civis fuisti, te ab exercitu dimitto. Tite Saliene M. Tiro C. Clusinas, cum ordines in meo exercitu beneficio, non virtute sitis consecuti ita vos gesseritis ut neque bello fortes neque pace boni aut utiles fueritis et magis in seditione concitandisque militibus adversum vestrum imperatorem quam pudoris modestiaeque fueritis studiosiores, indignos vos esse arbitror qui in meo exercitu ordines ducatis, missosque facio et quantum pote abesse ex Africa iubeo.’ Itaque traditos centurionibus et singulis non amplius singulos additos servos in navem imponendos separatim curavit.

55 Gaetuli interim perfugae quos cum litteris mandatisque a Caesare missos supra docuimus, ad suos cives perveniunt. Quorum auctoritate facile adducti Caesarisque nomine persuasi a rege Iuba desciscunt celeriterque cuncti arma capiunt contraque regem facere non dubitant. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba distentus triplici bello necessitateque coactus de suis copiis quas contra Caesarem adduxerat, sex cohortes in fines regni sui mittit quae essent praesidio contra Gaetulos.

56 Caesar brachiis perfectis promotisque usque eo ut telum ex oppido adigi non posset, castra munit, ballistis scorpionibusque

crebris ante frontem castrorum contra oppidum collocatis defensores muri deterrire non intermittit eoque quinque legiones ex superioribus castris deducit. Qua facultate oblata inlustriores notissimique conspectum amicorum propinquorumque efflagitabant atque inter se colloquebantur. Quae res quid utilitatis haberet, Caesarem non fallebat. Namque Gaetuli ex equitatu regio nobiliores equitumque praefecti quorum patres cum Mario ante meruerant eiusque beneficio agris finibusque donati post Sullae victoriam sub Hiempsalis regis erant dati potestatem, occasione capta nocte iam luminibus accensis cum equis calonibusque suis circiter mille perfugiunt in Caesaris castra quae erant in campo proxime locum Uzittae locata.

⁵⁷ Quod postquam Scipio quique cum eo erant cognoverunt, cum commoti ex tali incommodo essent, fere per id tempus M. Aquinium cum C. Saserna colloquentem viderunt. Scipio mittit ad Aquinium, nihil adtinere eum cum adversariis colloqui. Cum nihilo minus eius sermonem nuntius ad Scipionem referret sed restaret ut reliqua quae sibi vellet perageret, viator praeterea ab Iuba ad eum est missus qui diceret audiente Saserna ‘vetat te rex colloqui’. Quo nuntio perterritus discessit et dicto audiens fuit regi. Usu venisse hoc civi Romano et ei qui ab populo Romano honores accepisset, incolumi patria fortunisque omnibus Iubae barbaro potius oboedientem fuisse quam aut Scipionis obtemperasse nuntio aut caesis eiusdem partis civibus incolumem reverti malle! Atque etiam et superbius Iubae factum non in M. Aquinium hominem novum parvumque senatorem, sed in Scipionem hominem illa familia dignitate honoribus praestantem. Namque cum Scipio sagulo purpureo ante regis adventum uti solitus esset, dicitur Iuba cum eo egisse, non oportere illum eodem uti vestitu atque ipse uteretur. Itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese vestitum transferret et Iubae homini

superbissimo ineptissimoque obtemperaret.

58 Postero die universas omnium copias de castris omnibus educunt et supercilium quoddam excelsum nacti non longe a Caesaris castris aciem constituunt atque ibi consistunt. Caesar item producit copias celeriterque eis instructis ante suas munitiones quae erant in campo consistit, sine dubio existimans ultro adversarios, cum tam magnis copiis auxiliisque regis essent praediti promptiusque prosiluissent, acie secum concursuros propiusque se accessuros. Equo circumvectus legionesque cohortatus signo dato accessum hostium aucupabatur. Ipse enim a suis munitionibus longius non sine ratione non procedebat, quod in oppido Uzittae quod Scipio tenebat, hostium erant cohortes armatae; eidem autem oppido ad dextrum latus eius cornu erat oppositum, verebaturque ne si praetergressus esset, ex oppido eruptione facta ab latere eum adorti conciderent. Praeterea haec quoque eum causa tardavit, quod erat locus quidam perimpeditus ante aciem Scipionis quem suis impedimento ad ultro occurrendum fore existimabat.

59 Non arbitror esse praetermittendum quemadmodum exercitus utriusque fuerint in aciem instructi. Scipio hoc modo aciem derexit: collocarat in fronte suas et Iubae legiones, post eas autem Numidas in subsidiaria acie ita extenuatos et in longitudinem directos ut procul simplex esse acies media ab legionariis militibus videretur in cornibus autem duplex esse existimabatur. Elefantos dextro sinistroque cornu collocaverat aequalibus inter eos intervallis interiectis, post autem elefantos armaturas leves Numidasque auxiliares substituerat. Equitatum frenatum universum in suo dextro cornu disposuerat: sinistrum enim cornu oppido Uzitta claudebatur, neque erat spatium equitatus explicandi. Praeterea Numidas levisque armaturae infinitam multitudinem ad dextram partem suae aciei

opposuerat fere interiecto non minus mille passum spatio et ad collis radices magis adpulerat longiusque ab adversariorum suisque copiis promovebat, id hoc consilio ut cum acies duae inter se concurrissent, initio certaminis paulo longius eius equitatus circumvectus ex improvise clauderet multitudine sua exercitum Caesaris atque perturbatum iaculis configeret. Haec fuit ratio Scipionis eo die proeliandi.

⁶⁰ Caesaris autem acies hoc modo fuit collocata: ut ab sinistro eius cornu ordiar et ad dextrum perveniam, habuit legionem X et VIII in sinistro cornu, XXV XXVIII XIII XIV XXVIII XXVI in media acie. Fere ipsum dextrum cornu secundam autem aciem fere in earum legionum parte cohortium collocaverat, praeterea ex tironum adiecerat paucas. Tertiam autem aciem in sinistrum suum cornu contulerat et usque ad aciei suae mediam legionem porrexerat et ita collocaverat uti sinistrum suum cornu esset triplex. Id eo consilio fecerat quod suum dextrum latus munitionibus adiuwabatur, sinistrum autem equitatus hostium multitudini uti resistere posset laborabat, eodemque suum omnem equitatum contulerat, et quod ei parum confidebat, praesidio his equitibus legionem V praemiserat levemque armaturam inter equites interposuerat. Sagittarios varie passimque locis certis maximeque in cornibus collocaverat.

⁶¹ Sic utrorumque exercitus instructi non plus passum CCC interiecto spatio, quod forsitan ante id tempus acciderit numquam quin dimicaretur, a mane usque ad horam X die perstiterunt. Itemque Caesar dum exercitum intra munitiones suas reducere coepisset, subito universus equitatus ulterior Numidarum Gaetulorumque sine frenis ad dextram partem se movere propiusque Caesaris castra quae erant in colle se conferre coepit, frenatus autem Labieni eques in loco permanere legionesque distinere: cum subito pars equitatus Caesaris

cum levi armatura contra Gaetulos iniussu ac temere longius progressi paludemque transgressi multitudinem hostium pauci sustinere non potuerunt levisque armatura deserta ac convulneratique uno equite amisso, multis equis sauciis, levis armaturae XXVII occisis ad suos refugerunt. Quo secundo equestri proelio facto Scipio laetus in castra nocte copias reduxit. Quod proprium gaudium bellantibus Fortuna tribuere non decrevit. Namque postero die Caesar cum partem equitatus sui frumentandi gratia Leptim misisset, in itinere praedatores equites Numidas Gaetulosque ex improvise adorti circiter centum partim occiderunt, partim vivorum potiti sunt. Caesar interim cotidie legiones in campum deducere atque opus facere vallumque et fossam per medium campum ducere adversariorumque excursionibus iter officere non intermittit. Scipio item munitiones contra facere et ne iugo a Caesare excluderetur adproperare, ita ut duces utrique et in operibus occupati essent, et nihilo minus equestribus proeliis inter se cotidie dimicabant.

62 Interim Varus classem quam antea Uticae hiemis gratia subduxerat, cognito legionis VII et VIII ex Sicilia adventu celeriter deducit ibique Gaetulis remigibus epibatisque complet insidiandique gratia ab Utica progressus Hadrumetum cum IV navibus pervenit. Cuius adventus inscius Caesar Lucium Cispium cum classe XXVII navium ad Thapsum versus in stationem praesidii gratia commeatus sui mittit itemque Quintum Aquilam cum XIII navibus longis Hadrumetum eadem de causa praemittit. Cispium quo erat missus celeriter pervenit, Aquila tempestate iactatus promunturium superare non potuit atque angulum quendam tutum a tempestate nactus cum classe se longius a prospectu removit. Reliqua classis in salo ad Leptim egressis remigibus passimque in litore vagantibus, partim in oppidum victus sui mercandi gratia progressis vacua a defensoribus

stabat. Quibus rebus Varus ex perfugis cognitis occasionem nactus vigilia secunda Hadrumeto ex cothone egressus primo mane Leptim cum universa classe vectus naves onerarias quae longius a portu in salo stabant vacuas a defensoribus incendit et penteres duas nullo repugnante cepit.

63 Caesar interim celeriter per nuntios in castris, cum opera circumiret, certior factus, quae aberant a portu milia passuum vi, equo admisso omissis omnibus rebus celeriter pervenit Leptim ibique hortatur omnes ut se naves consequerentur; postea ipse parvulum navigiolum conscendit, in cursu Aquilam multitudine navium perterritum atque trepidantem nactus hostium classem sequi coepit. Interim Varus celeritate Caesaris audaciaque commotus cum universa classe conversis navibus Hadrumetum versus fugere contendit. Quem Caesar in milibus passuum IIII consecutus recuperata quinqueremi cum suis omnibus epibatis atque etiam hostium custodibus CXXX in ea nave captis triremem hostium proximam quae in repugnando erat commorata, onustam remigum epibatarumque cepit. Reliquae naves hostium promunturium superarunt atque Hadrumetum in cothonem se universae contulerunt. Caesar eodem vento promunturium superare non potuit atque in salo in ancoris ea nocte commoratus prima luce Hadrumetum accedit ibique navibus onerariis quae erant extra cothonem incensis omnibusque reliquis ab eis aut subductis aut in cothonem compulsis paulisper commoratus, si forte vellent classe dimicare, rursus se recepit in castra.

64 In ea nave captus est P. Vestrius eques Romanus et P. Ligarius Afranianus quem Caesar in Hispania cum reliquis dimiserat, et postea se ad Pompeium contulerat, inde ex proelio effugerat in Africamque ad Varum venerat; quem ob periurium perfidiamque

Caesar iussit necari. P. Vestrio autem quod eius frater Romae pecuniam imperatam numeraverat, et quod ipse suam causam probaverat Caesari, se a Nasidi classe captum, cum ad necem duceretur, beneficio Vari esse servatum, postea sibi facultatem nullam datam transeundi, ignovit.

65 Est in Africa consuetudo incolarum, ut in agris et in omnibus fere villis sub terra specus frumenti condendi gratia clam habeant, atque id propter bella maxime hostiumque subitum adventum praeparant. Qua de re Caesar per indicem certior factus tertia vigilia legiones duas cum equitatu mittit a castris suis milia passuum X atque inde magno numero frumenti onustos recipit in castra. Quibus rebus cognitis Labienus progressus a suis castris milia passuum VII per iugum et collem per quem Caesar pridie iter fecerat, ibi castra duarum legionum facit atque ipse cotidie existimans Caesarem eadem saepe frumentandi gratia commeaturum cum magno equitatu levique armatura insidiaturus locis idoneis considit.

66 Caesar interim de insidiis Labieni ex perfugis certior factus paucos dies ibi commoratus, dum hostes cotidiano instituto saepe idem faciendo in negligentiam adducerentur, subito mane imperat porta decumana legiones se VIII veteranas cum parte equitatus sequi atque equitibus praemissis neque opinantes insidiatores subito in convallibus latentes ex levi armatura concidit circiter D, reliquos in fugam turpissimam coniecit. Interim Labienus cum universo equitatu fugientibus suis suppetias occurrit. Cuius vim multitudinis cum equites pauci Caesariani iam sustinere non possent, Caesar instructas legiones hostium copiis ostendit. Quo facto perterrita Labieno ac retardato suos equites recepit incolumes. Postero die Iuba Numidas eos qui loco amisso fuga se receperant in castra, in cruce omnes suffixit.

67 Caesar interim quoniam inopia frumenti premebatur, copias omnes in castra conducit atque praesidio Lepti Ruspinae Acyllae relicto, Cispio Aquilaeque classe tradita, ut alter Hadrumetum, alter Thapsum mari obsiderent, ipse castris incensis quarta noctis vigilia acie instructa impedimentis in sinistra parte collocatis ex eo loco proficiscitur et pervenit ad oppidum Aggar, quod a Gaetulis saepe antea oppugnatum summaque vi per ipsos oppidanos erat defensum. Ibi in campo castris unis positis ipse frumentatum circum villas cum parte exercitus profectus magno invento hordei olei vini fici numero, pauco tritici, atque recreato exercitu redit in castra. Scipio interim cognito Caesaris discessu cum universis copiis per iugum Caesarem subsequi coepit atque ab eius castris milia passuum VI longe trinis castris dispertitis copiis consedit.

68 Oppidum erat Zeta quod aberat a Scipione milia passuum X, ad eius regionem et partem castrorum collocatum, a Caesare autem diversum ac remotum, quod erat ab eo longe milia passuum XIII. Huc Scipio legiones duas frumentandi gratia misit. Quod postquam Caesar ex perfuga cognovit, castris ex campo in collem ac tutiora loca collatis atque ibi praesidio relicto ipse quarta vigilia egressus praeter hostium castra proficiscitur cum copiis et oppidum potitur. Legiones Scipionis comperit longius in agris frumentari, et cum eo contendere conaretur, animadvertit copias hostium his legionibus occurrere suppetias. Quae res eius impetum retardavit. Itaque capto C. ~biocio Regino equite Romano Scipionis familiarissimo qui ei oppido praeerat, et P. Atrio equite Romano de conventu Uticensi, et camelis XXII regis abductis, praesidio ibi cum Oppio legato relicto ipse se recipere coepit ad castra.

69 Cum iam non longe a castris Scipionis abesset, quae eum necesse erat praetergredi, Labienus Afraniusque cum omni equitatu

levique armatura ex insidiis adorti agmini eius extremo se offerunt atque ex collibus proximis existunt. Quod postquam Caesar animum advertit, equitibus suis hostium vi oppositis sarcinas legionarios in acervum iubet comportare atque celeriter signa hostibus inferre. Quod postquam coeptum est fieri, primo impetu legionum equitatus et levis armatura hostium nullo negotio loco pulsa et deiecta est de colle. Cum iam Caesar existimasset hostes pulsos deterritosque finem lacesse facturos et iter coeptum pergere coepisset, iterum celeriter ex proximis collibus erumpunt atque eadem ratione qua ante dixi in Caesaris legionarios impetum faciunt Numidae levisque armaturae mirabili velocitate praediti, qui inter equites pugnabant et una pariterque cum equitibus accurrere et refugere consueverant. Cum hoc saepius facerent et proficiscentes Iulianos insequerentur, refugerent instantes, propius non accederent et singulari genere pugnae uterentur eosque iaculis convulnerare satis esse existimarent, Caesar intellexit nihil aliud eos conari nisi ut se cogerent castra eo loco ponere, ubi omnino aquae nihil esset, ut exercitus ieunus, qui a quarta vigilia usque ad horam X diei nihil gustasset, ac iumenta siti perirent.

70 Cum iam ad solis occasum esset, et non totos C passus in horis III esset progressus, equitatu suo propter equorum interitum extremo agmine remoto legiones in vicem ad extremum agmen evocabat. Ita vim hostium placide leniterque procedens per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. Interim equitum Numidarum copiae dextra sinistraque per colles praecurrere coronaque in modum cingere multitudine sua Caesaris copias, pars agmen extremum insequi. Caesaris interim non amplius III aut IIII milites veterani si se convertissent et pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duum milium numero ad unum terga vertebant

ac rursus ad aciem passim conversis equis se colligebant atque in spatio consequebantur et iacula in legionarios coiciebant. Ita Caesar modo procedendo modo resistendo tardius itinere confecto noctis hora prima omnes suos ad unum in castra incolumes sauciis X factis reduxit. Labienus circiter CCC amissis, multis vulneratis ac defessis, instando omnibus ad suos se recepit. Scipio interim legiones productas cum elephantis quos ante castra in acie terroris gratia in conspectu Caesaris collocaverat, reducit in castra.

71 Caesar contra eiusmodi hostium genera copias suas non ut imperator exercitum veteranum victoremque maximis rebus gestis, sed ut lanista tirones gladiatores condocere: quot pedes se reciperent ab hoste et quemadmodum obversi adversariis et in quantulo spatio resisterent, modo procurrerent modo recederent comminarenturque impetum, ac prope quo loco et quemadmodum tela mitterent praecipere. Mirifice enim hostium levis armatura anxium exercitum nostrum atque sollicitum habebat, quia et equites deterrebat proelium inire propter equorum interitum, quod eos iaculis interficiebat, et legionarium militem defatigabat propter velocitatem: gravis enim armaturae miles simulatque ab eis insectatus constiterat in eosque impetum fecerat, illi veloci cursu periculum facile vitabant.

72 Quibus ex rebus Caesar vehementer commovebatur, quod quotienscumque proelium erat commissum, equitatu suo sine legionario milite hostium equitatu levique armaturae eorum nullo modo par esse poterat. Sollicitabatur autem his rebus, quod nondum legiones hostium cognoverat, et quonam modo sustinere se posset ab eorum equitatu levique armatura, quae erant mirifica, si legiones quoque accessissent. Accedebat etiam haec causa quod elephantorum magnitudo multitudoque militum animos detinebat in terrore. Cui uni rei tamen invenerat remedium. Namque elephantos ex Italia

transportari iusserat, quos et miles nosset speciemque et virtutem bestiae cognosceret, et cui parti corporis eius telum facile adigi posset, ornatusque ac loricatus cum esset elephans, quae pars corporis eius sine tegmine nuda relinqueretur, ut eo tela conicerentur; praeterea ut iumenta bestiarum odorem stridorem speciem consuetudine capta earum non reformidarent. Quibus ex rebus largiter erat consecutus. Nam et milites bestias manibus pertractabant earumque tarditatem cognoscebant, equitesque in eos pila praepilata coiciebant, atque in consuetudinem equos patientia bestiarum adduxerat.

73 Ob has causas quas supra commemoravi solli citabatur Caesar tardiorque et consideratior erat factus et ex pristina bellandi consuetudine celeritateque excesserat. Neque mirum: copias enim habebat in Gallia bellare consuetas locis campestribus et contra Gallos homines apertos minimeque insidiosos, qui per virtutem, non per dolum dimicare consuerunt; tum autem erat ei laborandum ut consuefaceret milites hostium dolos insidias artificia cognoscere, et quid sequi, quid vitare conveniret. Itaque quo haec celerius conciperent, dabat operam ut legiones non in uno loco contineret, sed per causam frumentandi huc atque illuc rapsaret, ideo quod hostium copias ab se suisque vestigium non discessuras existimabat. Atque post diem tertium productis accuratius suis copiis sicut instruxerat, propter hostium castra praetergressus aequo loco invitat ad dimicandum. Postquam eos abhorrire videt, reducit sub vesperum legiones in castra.

74 Legati interim ex oppido Vaga quod finitimum fuit Zetae, cuius Caesarem potitum esse demonstravimus, veniunt. Petunt obsecrant ut sibi praesidium mittat: se res complures quae utiles bello sint administraturos. Per id tempus deorum voluntate studioque erga

Caesarem transfuga suos cives facit certiores Iubam regem celeriter cum copiis suis, antequam Caesaris praesidium eo perveniret, ad oppidum adcurrisse atque advenientem multitudine circumdata eo potitum omnibusque eius oppidi incolis ad unum interfectis dedisse oppidum diripiendum delendumque militibus.

75 Caesar interim lustrato exercitu a. d. XII Kal. April. postero die productis universis copiis processus ab suis castris milia passuum V, a Scipionis circiter duum milium interiecto spatio, in acie constitit. Postquam satis diu adversarios ab se ad dimicandum invitatos supersedere pugnae animadvertit, reducit copias posteroque die castra movet atque iter ad oppidum Sassuram, ubi Scipio Numidarum habuerat praesidium frumentumque comportaverat, ire contendit. Quod ubi Labienus animadvertit, cum equitatu levique armatura agmen eius extremum carpere coepit atque ita lixarum mercatorumque qui plostris merces portabant, sarcinis interceptis addito animo propius audaciusque accedit ad legiones, quod existimabat milites sub onere ac sub sarcinis defatigatos pugnare non posse. Quae res Caesarem non fefellerat: namque expeditos ex singulis legionibus trecenos milites esse iusserat. Itaque eos in equitatum Labieni immissos turmis suorum suppetias mittit. Tum Labienus conversis equis signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime fugere contendit. Multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis milites legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signa atque iter inceptum ire coeperunt. Labienus per iugum summum collis dextrorsus procul subsequi non destitit.

76 Postquam Caesar ad oppidum Sassuram venit, inspectantibus adversariis interfecto praesidio Scipionis, cum suis auxilium ferre non auderent, fortiter repugnante P. Cornelio evocato Scipionis qui ibi praeerat atque a multitudine circumvento interfectoque oppido

potitur atque ibi frumento exercitui dato postero die ad oppidum Thysdram pervenit. In quo Considius per id tempus fuerat cum grandi praesidio cohorteque sua gladiatorum. Caesar oppidi natura perspecta aquae inopia ab oppugnatione eius deterritus protinus profectus circiter milia passuum IIII ad aquam facit castra atque inde quarta vigilia egressus redit rursus ad ea castra quae ad Aggar habuerat. Idem facit Scipio atque in antiqua castra copias reducit.

77 Thabenenses interim qui sub ditione et potestate Iubae esse consuessent in extrema eius regni regione maritima locati, interfecto regio praesidio legatos ad Caesarem mittunt, rem male gestam docent, petunt orantque ut suis fortunis populus Romanus quod bene meriti essent, auxilium ferret. Caesar eorum consilio probato Marcium Crispum tribus cum cohortibus et sagittariis tormentisque compluribus praesidio Thabenam mittit. Eodem tempore ex legionibus omnibus milites qui aut morbo impediti aut commeatu dato cum signis non potuerant ante transire in Africam, ad milia IIII, equites CCCC, funditores sagittarii que mille uno commeatu Caesari occurrerunt. Itaque cum his copiis et omnibus legionibus eductis, sicut erat instructus, VIII milibus passuum ab suis castris, ab Scipionis vero II passuum longe constitit in campo.

78 Erat oppidum infra castra Scipionis nomine Tegea, ubi praesidium equestre circiter II milium numero habere consuevit. Eo equitatu dextra sinistra directo ab oppidi lateribus ipse legiones ex castris eductas atque in iugo inferiore instructas non longius fere mille passus ab suis munitionibus progressus in acie constituit. Postquam diutius in uno loco Scipio commorabatur et tempus diei in otio consumebatur, Caesar equitum turmas suorum iubet in hostium equitatum qui ad oppidum in statione erant, facere impressionem levemque armaturam sagittarios funditoresque eodem submittit.

Quod ubi coeptum est fieri et equis concitatis Iuliani impetum fecissent, Pacideius suos equites exporrigere coepit in longitudinem, ut haberent facultatem turmas Iulianas circumeundi, et nihilo minus fortissime acerrimeque pugnare. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, CCC quos ex legionibus habere expeditos consuerat, ex legione quae proxima ei proelio in acie constiterat, iubet equitatu succurrere. Labienus interim suis equitibus auxilia equestria submittere sauciisque ac defatigatis integros recentioribusque viribus equites subministrare. Postquam equites Iuliani CCCC vim hostium ad III milia numero sustinere non poterant et ab levi armatura Numidarum vulnerabantur minutatimque cedebant, Caesar alteram alam mittit qui satagentibus celeriter occurrerent. Quo facto sui sublatis universi in hostes impressione facta in fugam adversarios dederunt; multis occisis, compluribus vulneratis insecuti per III milia passuum usque ad collem hostibus adactis se ad suos recipiunt. Caesar in horam X commoratus, sicut erat instructus, se ad sua castra recepit omnibus incolumibus. In quo proelio Pacideius graviter pilo per cassidem caput ictus compluresque duces ac fortissimus quisque interfecti vulneratique sunt.

79 Postquam nulla condicione cogere adversarios poterat, ut in aequum locum descenderent legionumque periculum facerent, neque ipse propius hostem castra ponere propter aquae penuriam se posse animadvertibat, adversarios non virtute eorum confidere, sed aquarum inopia fretos despicere se intellexit, II Non. Apr. tertia vigilia egressus, ab Aggar XVI milia nocte progressus, ad Thapsum ubi Vergilius cum grandi praesidio praeerat, castra ponit oppidumque eo die circummunire coepit locaque idonea opportunaque complura praesidiis occupare, hostes ne intrare ad se ac loca interiora capere possent. Scipio interim cognitis Caesaris consiliis ad necessitatem

adductus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus fidissimos suis rebus Thapsitanos et Vergilium amitteret, confestim Caesarem per superiora loca consecutus milia passuum VIII a Thapso binis castris consedit.

80 Erat stagnum salinarum inter quod et mare angustiae quaedam non amplius mille et D passus intererant; quas Scipio intrare et Thapsitanis auxilium ferre conabatur. Quod futurum Caesarem non fefellerat. Namque pridie in eo loco castello munito ibique III... praesidio relicto ipse cum reliquis copiis lunatis castris Thapsum operibus circummunivit. Scipio interim exclusus ab incepto itinere supra stagnum postero die et nocte confecta caelo albente non longe a castris praesidioque quod supra commemoravi md passibus ad mare versus consedit et castra munire coepit. Quod postquam Caesari nuntiatum est, milite ab opere deducto, castris praesidio Asprenate pro consule cum legionibus duabus relicto ipse cum expedita copia in eum locum citatim contendit, classisque parte ad Thapsum relicta reliquas naves iubet post hostium tergum quam maxime ad litus adpelli signumque suum observare, quo signo dato subito clamore facto ex improvise hostibus aversis incuterent terrorem, ut perturbati ac perterriti respicere post terga cogerentur.

81 Quo postquam Caesar pervenit et animadvertit aciem pro vallo Scipionis contra elephantis dextro sinistroque cornu collocatis, et nihilo minus partem militum castra non ignaviter munire, ipse acie triplici collocata, legione X secundaque dextro cornu, VIII et VIII sinistro oppositis, quinque legiones in quarta acie ad ipsa cornua quinis cohortibus contra bestias collocatis, sagittariis funditoribus in utrisque cornibus dispositis, levique armatura inter equites interiecta, ipse pedibus circum milites concursans virtutesque veteranorum proeliaque superiora commemorans blandeque appellans animos

eorum excitabat. Tirones autem qui numquam in acie dimicassent, hortabatur ut veteranorum virtutem aemularentur eorumque famam locum nomen victoria parta cuperent possidere.

82 Itaque in circumeundo exercitu animadvertit hostes circa vallum trepidare atque ultro citroque pavidos concursare et modo se intra portas recipere, modo inconstanter immoderateque prodire. Cum idem a pluribus animadverti coeptum esset, subito legati evocatique obsecrare Caesarem ne dubitaret signum dare: victoriam sibi propriam a dis immortalibus portendi. Dubitante Caesare atque eorum studio cupiditatieque resistente sibi eruptione pugnari non placere clamitante, etiam atque etiam aciem sustentante, subito dextro cornu iniussu Caesaris tubicen a militibus coactus canere coepit. Quo facto ab universis cohortibus signa in hostem coepere inferri, cum centuriones pectore adverso resisterent vique continerent milites ne iniussu imperatoris concurrerent, nec quicquam proficerent.

83 Quod postquam Caesar intellexit incitatis militum animis resisti nullo modo posse, signo Felicitatis dato equo admisso in hostem inter principes ire contendit. A dextro interim cornu funditores sagittariiue concita tela in elephantos frequenter iniciunt. Quo facto bestiae stridore fundarum, lapidum plumbique itata perterritae sese convertere et suos post se frequentes stipatosque proterere et in portas valli semifactas ruere contendunt. Item Mauri equites qui in eodem cornu elephantis erant praesidio, deserti praecipites fugiunt. Ita celeriter bestiis circumitis legiones vallo hostium sunt potitae, et paucis acriter repugnantibus interfectisque reliqui concitati in castra, unde pridie erant egressi, confugiunt.

84 Non videtur esse praetermittendum de virtute militis veterani V legionis. Nam cum in sinistro cornu elephans vulnere ictus et dolore

concitatus in lixam inermem impetum fecisset eumque sub pede subditum dein genu innixus pondere suo proboscide erecta vibrantique stridore maximo premeret atque enecaret, miles hic non potuit pati quin se armatus bestiae offerret. Quem postquam elephans ad se telo infesto venire animadvertit, relicto cadavere militem proboscide circumdat atque in sublime extollit. Armatus qui in eiusmodi periculo constanter agendum sibi videret, gladio proboscidem qua erat circumdatus, caedere quantum viribus poterat non destitit. Quo dolore adductus elephans milite abiecto maximo cum stridore cursuque conversus ad reliquas bestias se recepit.

85 Interim Thapso qui erant praesidio, ex oppido eruptionem porta maritima faciunt, et sive ut suis subsidio occurrerent, sive ut oppido deserto fuga salutem sibi parerent, egrediuntur, atque ita per mare umbilici fine ingressi terram petebant. Qui a servitiis puerisque qui in castris erant, lapidibus pilisque prohibiti terram attingere rursus se in oppidum receperunt. Interim Scipionis copiis prostratis passimque toto campo fugientibus confestim Caesaris legiones consequi spatiumque se non dare colligendi. Qui postquam ad ea castra quae petebant perfugerunt, ut refecti castris rursus sese defenderent ducemque aliquem requirerent quem respicerent, cuius auctoritate imperioque rem gererent: – qui postquam animadverterunt neminem ibi esse praesidio, protinus armis abiectis in regia castra fugere contendunt. Quo postquam pervenerunt, ea quoque ab Iulianis teneri vident. Desperata salute in quodam colle consistunt atque armis demissis salutationem more militari faciunt. Quibus miseris ea res parvo praesidio fuit. Namque milites veterani ira et dolore incensi non modo ut parcerent hosti non poterant adduci sed etiam ex suo exercitu inlustres urbanos quos auctores appellabant, compluris aut vulnerarunt aut interfecerunt; in quo numero fuit Tullius Rufus

quaestorius qui pilo traiectus consulto a milite interiit; item Pompeius Rufus brachium gladio percussus, nisi celeriter ad Caesarem accucurrisset, interfectus esset. Quo facto complures equites Romani senatoresque perterriti ex proelio se receperunt, ne a militibus qui ex tanta victoria licentiam sibi adsumpsissent immoderate peccandi impunitatis spe propter maximas res gestas, ipsi quoque interficerentur. Itaque ii omnes Scipionis milites cum fidem Caesaris implorarent, inspectante ipse Caesare et a militibus deprecante uti eis parcerent, ad unum sunt interfecti.

86 Caesar trinis castris potitus occisisque hostium X milibus fugatisque compluribus se recepit L militibus amissis, paucis sauciis in castra, ac statim ex itinere ante oppidum Thapsum constitit elephantosque LXIII ornatos armatosque cum turribus ornamentisque capit, captos ante oppidum instructos constituit. Id hoc consilio, si posset Vergilius quique cum eo obsidebantur, rei male gestae suorum indicio a pertinacia deduci. Deinde ipse Vergilium appellavit invitavitque ad deditionem suamque lenitatem et clementiam commemoravit. Quem postquam animadvertit responsum sibi non dare, ab oppido discessit. Postero die divina re facta contione advocata in conspectu oppidanorum milites collaudat totumque exercitum veteranum donavit, praemia fortissimo cuique ac bene merenti pro suggestu tribuit, ac statim inde digressus Rebilo proconsule cum III ad Thapsum legionibus et Cn. Domitio cum duabus Thysdrae ubi Considius praeerat ad obsidendum relictis, M. Messala Uticam ante praemisso cum equitatu, ipse eodem iter facere contendit.

87 Equites interim Scipionis qui ex proelio fugerant, cum Uticam versus iter facerent, perveniunt ad oppidum Paradae. ubi cum ab incolis non reciperentur, ideo quod fama de victoria Caesaris

praecucurrisset, vi oppido potiti in medio foro lignis coacervatis omnibusque rebus eorum congestis ignem subiciunt atque eius oppidi incolas cuiusque generis aetatisque vivos constrictosque in flammam coiciunt atque ita acerbissimo adficiunt supplicio. Deinde protinus Uticam perveniunt. Superiore tempore M. Cato, quod in Uticensibus propter beneficium legis Iuliae parum suis partibus praesidii esse existimaverat, plebem inermem oppido eiecerat et ante portam Belicam castris fossaque parvula dumtaxat muniverat ibique custodiis circumdatis habitare coegerat; senatum autem oppidi custodia tenebat. Eorum castra ei equites adorti expugnare coeperunt, ideo quod eos Caesaris partibus favisse sciebant, ut eis interfectis eorum pernicie dolorem suum ulciscerentur. Uticenses animo addito ex Caesaris victoria lapidibus fustibusque equites reppulerunt. Itaque posteaquam castra non potuerant potiri, Uticam se in oppidum coniecerunt atque ibi multos Uticenses interfecerunt domosque eorum expugnaverunt ac diripuerunt. Quibus cum Cato persuadere nulla ratione quiret, ut secum oppidum defenderent et caede rapinisque desisterent, et quid sibi vellent sciret, sedandae eorum importunitatis gratia singulis C divisit. Idem Sulla Faustus fecit ac de sua pecunia largitus est unaque cum his ab Utica proficiscitur atque in regnum ire intendit.

88 Complures interim ex fuga Uticam perveniunt. Quos omnes Cato convocatos una cum CCC, qui pecuniam Scipioni ad bellum faciendum contulerant, hortatus ut servitia manu mitterent oppidumque defenderent. Quorum cum partem adsentire, partem animum mentemque perterritam atque in fugam destinatam habere intellexisset, amplius de ea re agere destitit navesque his attribuit, ut in quas quisque partes vellet proficisceretur. Ipse omnibus rebus diligentissime constitutis, liberis suis L. Caesari qui tum ei pro

quaestore fuerat commendatis, et sine suspicione, vultu atque sermone quo superiore tempore usus fuerat dum dormitum isset, ferrum intro clam in cubiculum tulit atque ita se traiecit. Qui cum anima nondum exspirata concidisset, et impetu facto in cubiculum ex suspicione medicus familiaresque continere atque vulnus obligare coepissent, ipse suis manibus vulnus crudelissime divellit atque animo praesenti se interemit. Quem Uticenses quamquam oderant partium gratia, tamen propter eius singularem integritatem et quod dissimillimus reliquorum ducum fuerat quodque Uticam mirificis operibus munierat turribusque auxerat, sepultura adficiunt. Quo interfecto L. Caesar ut aliquid sibi ex ea re auxilii pararet convocato populo contione habita cohortatus omnes ut portae aperirentur: se in C. Caesaris clementia magnam spem habere. Itaque portis patefactis Utica egressus Caesari imperatori obviam proficiscitur. Messala, ut erat imperatum, Uticam pervenit omnibusque portis custodias ponit.

89 Caesar interim ab Thapso progressus Ussetam pervenit, ubi Scipio magnum frumenti numerum armorum telorum ceterarumque rerum cum parvo praesidio habuerat. Id adveniens potitur, deinde Hadrumetum pervenit. Quo cum sine mora introisset, armis frumento pecuniaque considerata Q. Ligario C. Considio filio qui tum ibi fuerant vitam concessit. Deinde eodem die Hadrumeto egressus Livineio Regulo cum legione ibi relicto Uticam ire contendit. Cui in itinere fit obviu L. Caesar subitoque se ad genua proiecit vitamque sibi neque amplius quicquam deprecatur. Cui Caesar facile et pro natura sua et instituto concessit, item Caecinae, C. Ateio, P. Atrio, L. Cellae patri et filio, M. Eppio, M. Aquinio, Catonis filio Damasippique liberis ex sua consuetudine tribuit circiterque luminibus accensis Uticam pervenit atque extra oppidum ea nocte mansit.

90 Postero die mane in oppidum introit contioneque advocata Uticenses incolas cohortatus gratias pro eorum erga se studio agit, cives autem Romanos negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC, pecunias contulerant Varo et Scipioni multis verbis accusat et de eorum sceleribus longiore habita oratione ad extremum ut sine metu prodirent edicit: se eis dumtaxat vitam concessurum; bona quidem eorum se venditurum, ita tamen qui eorum ipse sua bona redemisset, se bonorum venditionem inducturum et pecuniam multae nomine relaturum, ut incolumitatem retinere posset. Quibus metu exsanguibus de vitaeque ex suo promerito desperantibus subito oblata salute libentes cupidique condicionem acceperunt petieruntque a Caesare ut universis CCC uno nomine pecuniam imperaret. Itaque bis miliens sestertio his imposito, ut per triennium sex pensionibus populo Romano solverent, nullo eorum recusante ac se eo demum die natos praedicantes laeti gratias agunt Caesari.

91 Rex interim Iuba ut ex proelio fugerat, una cum Petreio interdum in villis latitando tandem nocturnis itineribus confectis in regnum pervenit atque ad oppidum Zamam, ubi ipse domicilium coniuges liberosque habebat, quo ex cuncto regno omnem pecuniam carissimasque res comportaverat quodque inito bello operibus maximis muniverat, accedit. Quem antea oppidani rumore exoptato de Caesaris victoria audito ob has causas oppido prohibuerunt quod bello contra populum Romanum suscepto in oppido Zamae lignis congestis maximam in medio foro pyram construxerat, ut si forte bello foret superatus, omnibus rebus eo coacervatis, dein civibus cunctis interfectis eodemque proiectis igne subiecto tum demum se ipse insuper interficeret atque una cum liberis coniugibus civibus cunctaque gaza regia cremaretur. Postquam Iuba ante portas diu multumque primo minis pro imperio egisset cum Zamensibus, dein

cum se parum proficere intellexisset, precibus orasset uti se ad suos deos penates admitterent, ubi eos perstare in sententia animadvertit nec minis nec precibus suis moveri quo magis se reciperent, tertio petit ab eis, ut sibi coniuges liberosque redderent ut secum eos asportaret. Postquam sibi nihil omnino oppidanos responsum reddere animadvertit, nulla re ab his impetrata ab Zama discedit atque ad villam suam cum M. Petreio paucisque equitibus confert se.

92 Zamenses interim legatos de his rebus ad Caesarem Uticam mittunt, petuntque ab eo uti antequam rex manum colligeret seseque oppugnaret, sibi auxilium mitteret: se tamen paratos esse, sibi quoad vita suppeteret, oppidum seque ei reservare. Legatos collaudatos Caesar domum iubet antecedere ac suum adventum praenuntiare. Ipse postero die Utica egressus cum equitatu in regnum ire contendit. Interim in itinere ex regiis copiis duces complures ad Caesarem veniunt orantque ut sibi ignoscat. Quibus supplicibus venia data Zamam perveniunt. Rumore interim perlato de eius lenitate clementiaque propemodum omnes regni equites Zamam perveniunt ad Caesarem ab eoque sunt metu periculoque liberati.

93 Dum haec utrobique geruntur, Considius qui Thysdrae cum familia sua gladiatoria manu Gaetulisque praeerat, cognita caede suorum Domitii et legionum adventu perterritus desperata salute oppidum deserit seque clam cum paucis barbaris pecunia onustus subducit atque in regnum fugere contendit. Quem Gaetuli sui comites in itinere praedae cupidi concidunt seque in quascumque potuere partes conferunt. C. Interim Vergilius postquam terra marique clausus se nihil proficere intellexit suosque interfectos aut fugatos, M. Catonem Uticae sibi ipsum manus attulisse, regem vagum ab suisque desertum ab omnibus aspernari, Saburram eiusque copias ab Sittio esse deletas, Uticae Caesarem sine mora receptum, de tanto

exercitu reliquias esse nullas, ipse sibi suisque liberis a C. Caninio proconsule qui eum obsidebat, fide accepta seque et sua omnia et oppidum proconsuli tradit.

94 Rex interim ab omnibus civitatibus exclusus desperata salute, cum iam cenatus esset, cum Petreio, ut cum virtute interfecti esse viderentur, ferro inter se depugnant, atque firmior imbecillioem Iubam Petreius facile ferro consumpsit. Deinde ipse sibi cum conaretur gladio traicere pectus nec posset, precibus a servo suo impetravit ut se interficeret, idque obtinuit.

95 P. Sittius interim pulso exercitu Saburrae praefecti Iubae ipsoque interfecto cum iter cum paucis per Mauretaniam ad Caesarem faceret, forte incidit in Faustum Afraniumque qui eam manum habebant qua Uticam diripuerant, iterque in Hispaniam intendebant et erant numero circiter mille. Itaque celeriter nocturno tempore insidiis dispositis eos prima luce adortus praeter paucos equites qui ex primo agmine fugerant, reliquos aut interfecit aut in deditionem accepit, Afranium et Faustum cum coniuge et liberis vivos capit. Paucis post diebus dissensione in exercitu orta Faustus et Afranius interficiuntur; Pompeiae cum Fausti liberis Caesar incolumitatem suaque omnia concessit.

96 Scipio interim cum Damasippo et Torquato et Plaetorio Rustiano navibus longis diu multumque iactati cum Hispaniam peterent, ad Hipponem Regium deferuntur, ubi classis P. Sitti ad id tempus erat. A qua pauciora ab amplioribus circumventa navigia deprimuntur, ibique Scipio cum quos paulo ante nominavi interiit.

97 Caesar interim Zamae auctione regia facta bonisque eorum venditis qui cives Romani contra populum Romanum arma tulerant, praemiisque Zamensibus qui de rege excludendo consilium ceperant tributis, vectigalibusque regiis irrogatis ex regnoque provincia facta

atque ibique Sallustio pro consule cum imperio relicto ipse Zama egressus Uticam se recepit. Ibi bonis venditis eorum qui sub Iuba Petreioque ordines duxerant, Thapsitanis HS XX, conventui eorum HS XXX, itemque Hadrumetinis HS XXX, conventui eorum HS L multae nomine imponit; civitates bonaque eorum ab omni iniuria rapinisque defendit. Leptitanos quorum superioribus annis bona Iuba diripuerat, et ad senatum questi per legatos atque arbitris a senatu datis sua receperant, XXX centenis milibus pondo olei in annos singulos multat, ideo quod initio per dissensionem principum societatem cum Iuba inierant eumque armis militibus pecunia iuverant. Thysdritanos propter humilitatem civitatis certo numero frumenti multat.

⁹⁸ His rebus gestis Idibus Iun. Uticae classem conscendit et post diem tertium Caralis in Sardiniam pervenit. Ibi Sulcitanos quod Nasidium eiusque classem receperant copiisque iuverant, HS C multat et pro decumis octavas pendere iubet bonaque paucorum vendit et ante diem IIII Kal. Quint. navis conscendit et a Caralibus secundum terram proventus duodetricensimo die, ideo quod tempestatibus in portibus cohibebatur, ad urbem Romam venit.

DE BELLO HISPANIENSI

1 Pharnace superato, Africa recepta, qui ex his proeliis cum adulescente Cn. Pompeio profugissent, cum ... et ulterioris Hispaniae potitus esset, dum Caesar muneribus dandis in Italia detinetur, ... quo facilius praesidia contra compararet, Pompeius in fidem uniuscuiusque civitatis confugere coepit. Ita partim precibus partim vi bene magna comparata manu provinciam vastare. Quibus in rebus non nullae civitates sua sponte auxilia mittebant, item non nullae portas contra cludebant. Ex quibus si qua oppida vi ceperat, cum aliquis ex ea civitate optime de Cn. Pompeio meritis civis esset, propter pecuniae magnitudinem alia qua ei inferebatur causa, ut eo de medio sublato ex eius pecunia latronum largitio fieret. Ita pacis commoda hoste hortato maiores augebantur copiae. Hoc crebris nuntiis in Italiam missis civitates contrariae Pompeio auxilia sibi deprecabantur.

2 C. Caesar dictator tertio, designatus dictator quarto multis iterante diebus coniectis cum celeri festinatione ad bellum conficiendum in Hispaniam cum venisset, legatique Cordubenses, qui a Cn. Pompeio discessissent, Caesari obviam venissent, a quibus nuntiabatur nocturno tempore oppidum Cordubam capi posse, quod nec opinantibus adversariis eius provinciae potitus esset, simulque quod tabellariis, qui a Cn. Pompeio dispositi omnibus locis essent, qui certiores Cn. Pompeium de Caesaris adventu facerent... multa praeterea veri similia proponebant. Quibus rebus adductus quos legatos ante exercitui praefecerat Q. Pedium et Q. Fabium Maximum de suo adventu facit certiores, utque sibi equitatus qui ex provincia fuisset praesidio esset. Ad quos celerius quam ipsi opinati sunt appropinquavit neque, ut ipse voluit, equitatum sibi praesidio habuit.

3 Erat idem temporis Sex. Pompeius frater qui cum praesidio Cordubam tenebat, quod eius provinciae caput esse existimabatur; ipse autem Cn. Pompeius adulescens Uliam oppidum oppugnabat et fere iam aliquot mensibus ibi detinebatur. Quo ex oppido cognito Caesaris adventu legati clam praesidia Cn. Pompei Caesarem cum adissent, petere coeperunt uti sibi primo quoque tempore subsidium mitteret. Caesar – eam civitatem omni tempore optime de populo Romano meritam esse – celeriter sex cohortis secunda vigilia iubet proficisci, pari equites numero. Quibus praefecit hominem eius provinciae notum et non parum scientem, L. Vibiurn Paciaecum. Qui cum ad Cn. P praesidia venisset, incidit idem temporis ut tempestate adversa vehementique vento adflicaretur; aditusque vis tempestatis ita obscurabat ut vix proximum agnoscere possent. Cuius incommodum summam utilitatem ipsis praebebat. Ita cum ad eum locum venerunt, iubet binos equites conscendere, et recta per adversariorum praesidia ad oppidum contendunt. Mediisque eorum praesidiis cum essent, cum quaereretur qui essent unus ex nostris respondit, ut sileat verbum facere: nam id temporis conari ad murum accedere, ut oppidum capiant; et partim tempestate impediti vigiles non poterant diligentiam praestare, partim illo responso deterrebantur. Cum ad portam appropinquassent, signo dato ab oppidanis sunt recepti, et pedites dispositi partim ibi remanserunt, equites clamore facto eruptionem in adversariorum castra fecerunt. Sic in illo facto, cum inscientibus accidisset, existimabant prope magna pars hominum qui in his castris fuissent se prope captos esse.

4 Hoc misso ad Uliam praesidio Caesar, ut Pompeium ab ea oppugnatione deducercet, ad Cordubam contendit, ex quo itinere loricatos viros fortis cum equitatu ante praemisit. Qui simul in conspectum oppidi se dederunt, cum equis recipiuntur. Hoc a

Cordubensibus nequaquam poterat animadverti. Appropinquantibus ex oppido bene magna multitudo ad equitatum concidendum cum exissent, loricati, ut supra scripsimus, ex equis descenderunt et magnum proelium fecerunt, sic uti ex infinita hominum multitudine pauci in oppidum se reciperent. Hoc timore adductus Sex. Pompeius litteras fratri misit ut celeriter sibi subsidio veniret, ne prius Caesar Cordubam caperet quam ipse illo venisset. Itaque Cn. Pompeius Ulia prope capta litteris fratris excitus cum coplis ad Cordubam iter facere coepit.

5 Caesar, cum ad flumen Bacetim venisset neque propter altitudinem fluminis transire posset, lapidibus corbis plenos demisit: insuper ponit trabes; ita ponte facto copias ad castra tripertito traduxit. Tendebat adversum oppidum e regione pontis, ut supra scripsimus, tripertito. Huc cum Pompeius cum suis copiis venisset, ex adverso pari ratione castra ponit. Caesar, ut eum ab oppido comineatuque excluderet, bracchium ad pontem ducere coepit: pari idem condicione Pompeius facit. Hic inter duces duos fit contentio uter prius pontem occuparet; ex qua contentione cotidiana minuta proelia fiebant, ut modo hi, non numquam illi superiores discederent. Quae res cum ad maiorem contentionem venisset, ab utrisque comminus pugna inita, dum cupidius locum student tenere, propter pontem coagulabantur, fluminis ripas appropinquantes coangustati praecipitabantur. Hic alternis non solum morti mortem exaggerabant, sed tumultos tumultis exaequabant. Ita diebus compluribus consumptis cupiebat Caesar, si qua condicione posset, adversarios in aequum locum deducere et primo quoque tempore de bello decernere.

6 Id cum animadverteret adversarios minime velle, quos quoniam a avia retraxerat, ut in aequum deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu iubet ignis fieri magnos: ita firmissimum eius praesidium

Ateguam proficiscitur. Id cum Pompeius ex perfugis rescisset, qua die facultatem... et angustias, carra complura multosque lanistas retraxit et ad Cordubam se recepit. Caesar munitionibus Ateguam oppugnare et bracchia circumducere coepit. Cui de Pompeio cum nuntius esset allatus eo die proficisci, cuius in adventum praesidi causa Caesar complura castella occupasset, partim ubi equitatus, partim ubi pedestres copiae in statione et in excubitu castris praesidio esse possent, hic in adventu Pompei incidit ut matutino tempore nebula esset crassissima. Ita illa obscuracione cum aliquot cohortibus et equitum turmis circumcludunt Caesaris equites et concidunt, sic ut vix in ea caede pauci effugerent.

7 Insequenti nocte castra sua incendit Pompeius et trans flumen Salsum per convallis castra inter duo oppida Ateguam et Ucubim in monte constituit. Caesar in munitionibus ceterisque quae ad oppidum opus fuerunt aggerem vineasque agere instituit. Haec loca sunt montuosa et natura impedita ad rem militarem; quae planitie dividuntur, Salso flumine, proxime tamen Ateguam ut flumen sit circiter passus duo milia. Ex ea regione oppidi in montibus castra habuit posita Pompeius in conspectu utrorumque oppidorum, neque suis ausus est subsidio venire. Aquilas et signa habuit XIII legionum; sed ex quibus aliquid firmamenti se existimabat habere duae fuerunt vernaculae, quae a Trebonio transfugerant; una facta ex coloniis quae fuerunt in his regionibus; quarta fuit Afraniana ex Africa quam secum adduxerat; reliquae ex fugitivis auxiliares consistebant: nam de levi armatura et equitatu longe et virtute et numero nostri erant superiores.

8 Accedebat hoc ut longius duceret bellum Pompeius, quod loca sunt edita et ad castrorum munitiones non parum idonea. nam fere totius ulterioris Hispaniae regio propter terrae fecunditatem inopem

difficilemque habet oppugnationem et non nimis copiosam aquationem. Hic etiam propter barbarorum crebras excursiones omnia loca quae sunt ab oppidis remota, turribus et munitionibus retinentur, sicut in Africa; rudere, non tegulis teguntur. simulque in his habent speculas et propter altitudinem late longeque prospiciunt. Item oppidorum magna pars eius provinciae montibus fere munita et natura excellentibus locis est constituta, ut simul aditus ascensusque habeat difficiles. Ita ab oppugnationibus natura loci distinentur ut civitates Hispaniae non facile ab hoste capiantur. Id quod in hoc contigit bello. Nam cum inter Ateguam et Ucubim, quae oppida supra sunt scripta, Pompeius ut habuit castra constituta in conspectu duorum oppidorum, ab suis castris circiter milia passuum IIII grumus est excellens natura qui appellatur Castra Postumiana. Ibi praesidii causa castellum Caesar habuit constitutum.

9 Quod Pompeius quod eodem iugo tegebatur loci natura et remotum erat a castris Caesaris, animadvertibat loci difficultatem et quia flumine Salso intercludebatur, non esse commissurum Caesarem ut in tanta loci difficultate ad subsidium committendum se demitteret. Ita fretus opinione tertia vigilia profectus castellum oppugnare coepit ut laborantibus succurreret nostris. Cum adpropinquassent, clamore repentino telorumque multitudine iactus facere coeperunt, uti magnam partem hominum vulneribus adficerent. Quo facto cum ex castello repugnare coepissent maioribusque castris Caesaris nuntius esset adlatus, cum III legionibus est profectus, ut laborantibus succurreret nostris. Et cum ad eos adpropinquasset, fuga perterriti multi sunt interfecti, complures capti, in quibus duo centuriones. Multi praeterea armis exuti fugerunt, quorum scuta sunt relata LXXX.

10 Insequenti luce Arguetius ex Italia cum equitatu venit. is signa

Saguntinorum rettulit quinque quae ab oppidanis cepit. Suo loco praeteritumst quod equites ex Italia cum Asprenate ad Caesarem venissent. ea nocte Pompeius castra sua incendit et ad Cordubam versus iter facere coepit. Rex nomine Indo qui cum equitatu suas copias adduxerat, dum cupidius agmen adversariorum insequitur, a vernaculis legionariis exceptus est et interfectus.

11 Postero die equites nostri longius ad Cordubam versus prosecuti sunt eos qui commeatus ad castra Pompei ex oppido portabant. Ex his capti 1 cum iumentis ad nostra adducti sunt castra. eo die Q. Marcius, tribunus militum qui fuisset Pompei, ad nos transfugit, et noctis tertia vigilia in oppido acerrime pugnatum est, ignemque multum miserunt, sic ut omne genus telorum consumeretur quibus ignis per iactus solitus est mitti. Hoc praeterito tempore C. Fundanius eques Romanus ex castris adversariorum ad nos transfugit.

12 Postero die ex legione vernacula milites sunt capti ab equitibus nostris duo qui dixerunt se servos esse. Cum venirent, cogniti sunt a militibus qui antea cum Fabio et Pedio fuerant... et a Trebonio transfugerant. Eis ad ignoscendum nulla facultas est data et a militibus nostris interfecti sunt. Idem temporis capti tabellarii qui a Corduba ad Pompeium missi erant perperamque ad nostra castra pervenerant, praecisis manibus missi sunt facti. Pari consuetudine vigilia secunda ex oppido ignem multum telorumque multitudinem iactando bene magnum tempus consumpserunt compluresque vulneribus adfecerunt. Praeterito noctis tempore eruptionem ad legionem vi fecerunt, cum in opere nostri distenti essent, acriterque pugnare coeperunt. Quorum vis repressa a nostris, etsi oppidani superiore loco defendebantur. Hi cum eruptionem facere coepissent, tamen virtute militum nostrorum qui etsi inferiore loco premebantur, tamen repulsi adversarii bene multis vulneribus adfecti in oppidum

se contulerunt.

13 Postero die Pompeius ex castris suis brachium coepit ad flumen Salsum; et cum nostri equites pauci in statione fuissent a pluribus reperti, de statione sunt deiecti et occisi tres. Eo die A. Valgius senatoris filius, cuius frater in castris Pompei fuisset, omnibus suis rebus relictis equum conscendit et fugit. Speculator de legione II Pompeiana captus a militibus et interfectus. Idemque temporis glans missa est inscripta: quo die ad oppidum capiundum accederent, se scutum esse positurum. Qua spe nonnulli dum sine periculo murum ascendere et oppido potiri posse se sperant, postero die ad murum opus facere coeperunt, et bene magna prioris muri parte deiecta in oppidum intraverunt. Quo facto ab oppidanis ac si suarum partium essent, conservati... missos facere loricanos qui praesidii causa praepositi oppido a Pompeio essent orabant. Quibus respondit Caesar se condiciones dare, non accipere consuevisse. Qui cum in oppidum revertissent, relato responso clamore sublato, omni genere telorum misso pugnare pro muro toto coeperunt. Propter quod fere magna pars hominum qui in castris nostris essent, non dubitarunt quia eruptionem eo die essent facturi. Ita corona circumdata pugnatum est aliquamdiu vehementissime, simulque balista missa a nostris turrem deiecit, qua adversariorum qui in ea turre fuerant, quinque deiecti sunt et puer qui balistam solitus erat observare.

14 Eius praeteriti temporis Pompeius trans flumen Salsum castellum constituit neque a nostris prohibitus falsaue illa opinione gloriatus est quod prope in nostris partibus locum tenuisset. Item insequenti die eadem consuetudine dum longius prosequitur, quo loco equites nostri stationem habuerant, aliquot turmae cum levi armatura impetu facto loco sunt deiecti et propter paucitatem nostrorum equitum simul cum levi armatura inter turmas

adversariorum protriti. Hoc in conspectu utrorumque castrorum gerebatur, et maiore Pompeiani exultabant gloria quod... longiusque cedentibus nostris prosequi coepissent. Qui cum aequo loco a nostris recepti essent, ut consuessent, ex simili virtute clamore facto, aversati sunt proelium facere.

15 Fere apud exercitus haec est equestris proelii consuetudo: cum eques ad dimicandum dimisso equo cum pedite congregitur, nequaquam par habetur. Id quod accidit in hoc proelio. Cum pedites levi armatura electi ad pugnam equitibus nostris necopinantibus venissent, idque in proelio animadversum esset, complures ex equis descenderunt. Ita exiguo tempore eques pedestre, pedes equestre proelium facere coepit, usque eo ut caedem proxime a vallo fecerint. In quo proelio adversariorum ceciderunt CXXIII, compluresque armis exuti, multi vulneribus adfecti in castra sunt redacti. Nostri ceciderunt III, saucii XII pedites et equites V. Eius diei insequenti tempore pristina consuetudine pro muro pugnari coeptum est. Cum bene magnam multitudinem telorum ignemque nostris defendentibus iniecissent, nefandum crudelissimumque facinus sunt adgressi in conspectuque nostro hospites qui in oppido erant, iugulare et de muro praecipites mittere coeperunt, sicuti apud barbaros, quod post hominum memoriam numquam est factum.

16 Huius diei extremo tempore a Pompeianis clam nostros ad oppidum tabellarius est missus, ut ea nocte turres aggeremque incenderent et tertia vigilia eruptionem facerent. Ita igne telorumque multitudine iacta cum bene magnam partem operum consumpsissent, portam quae e regione et in conspectu Pompei castrorum fuerat aperuerunt, copiaeque totae eruptionem fecerunt secumque extulerunt virgulta crates ad fossas complendas et harpagones ad casas quae stramenticiae ab nostris hibernorum causa aedificatae

erant, diruendas et incendendas, praeterea argentum vestimenta, ut dum nostri in praeda detinentur, illi caede facta ad praesidia Pompei se reciperent. Nam quod existimabat eos posse conata efficere, nocta tota ultra stabat flumen Salsum in acie. Quod factum licet necopinantibus nostris esset gestum, tamen virtute freti repulsos multisque vulneribus adfectos oppido represserunt, praedam armaque eorum sunt potiti vivosque aliquos ceperunt; qui postero die sunt interfecti. Eodemque tempore transfuga nuntiavit ex oppido Iunium qui in cuniculo fuisset, iugulatione oppidanorum facta clamasse facinus se nefandum et scelus fecisse; nam eos nihil meruisse quare tali poena adficerentur, qui eos ad aras et focos suos recepissent, eosque hospitium scelere contaminasse; multa praeterea dixisse; qua oratione deterritos amplius iugulationem non fecisse.

17 Ita postero die Tullius legatus cum Catone Lusitano venit et apud Caesarem verba fecit: ‘Utinam quidem di immortales fecissent ut tuus potius miles quam Cn. Pompei factus essem et hanc virtutis constantiam in tua victoria, non in illius calamitate praestarem! Cuius funestae laudes quoniam ad hanc fortunam reciderunt ut cives Romani indigentes praesidii, et propter patriae luctuosam perniciem ducimur hostium numero qui neque in illius prospera acie primam fortunam neque in adversa secundam obtinuimus, vix tuarum legionum tot impetus sustentantes, nocturnis diurnisque operibus gladiatorum ictus telorumque missus exceptantes, relictis et deserti a Pompeio, tua virtute superati salutem a tua clementia deprecamur et petimusque ut vitam nobis concedas’. Quibus Caesar respondit: ‘qualem gentibus me praestiti, similem in civium deditione praestabo.’

18 Remissis legatis, cum ad portam venissent, constitit Ti. Tullius, et cum introeuntem Catonem insecutus non esset, revertit ad portam

et hominem adprehendit. Quod Tiberius cum fieri animadvertit, simul pugionem eduxit et manum eius incidit. Ita refugerunt ad Caesarem. Eodemque tempore signifer de legione prima transfugit, et innotuit quo die equestre proelium factum esset, suo signo perisse homines XXXV, neque licere castris Cn. Pompei nuntiare neque dicere perisse quemquam. Servos cuius dominus in Caesaris castris fuisset – uxorem et filios in oppido reliquerat – dominum iugulavit et ita clam a Caesaris praesidiis in Pompei castra discessit... Et indicium glande scriptum misit, per quod certior fieret Caesar, quae in oppido ad defendendum compararentur. Ita litteris acceptis cum in oppidum revertisset, qui mittere glandem inscriptam solebat... Insequenti tempore duo Lusitani fratres transfugenuntiaruntque Pompeium contionem habuisse: quoniam oppido subsidio non posset venire, noctu ex adversariorum conspectu se deducerent ad mare verum; unum respondisse, ut potius ad dimicandum descenderet quam signum fugae ostenderet; eum qui ita locutus esset iugulatum. Eodem tempore tabellarii eius deprehensi qui ad oppidum veniebant. Quorum litteras Caesar oppidanis obiecit et qui vitam sibi peteret, iussit turrem ligneam oppidanorum incendere; id si fecisset, ei se promisit omnia concessurum. Quod difficile erat factu ut eam turrem sine periculo quis incenderet. Ita fine diei turrem ligneam cum propius accessisset, ab oppidanis est occisus. Eadem nocte transfuga nuntiavit Pompeium et Labienum de iugulatione oppidanorum indignatos esse.

19 Vigilia secunda propter multitudinem telorum turris lignea quae nostra fuisset, ab imo vitium fecit usque ad tabulatum secundum et tertium. Eodem tempore pro muro pugnarunt acerrime et turrim nostram ut superiorem incenderunt, idcirco quod ventum oppidani secundum habuerunt. Insequenti luce materfamilias de muro se

deiecit et ad nos transsiliit dixitque se cum familia constitutum habuisse ut una transfugerent ad Caesarem, illam oppressam et iugulatam. Hoc praeterito tempore tabellae de muro sunt deiectae in quibus scriptum est inventum: 'L. Munatius Caesari. Si mihi vitam tribues, quoniam ab Cn. Pompeio sum desertus, qualem me illi praestiti, tali virtute et constantia futurum me in te esse praestabo'. Eodem tempore oppidani legati qui antea exierant, Caesarem adierunt: si sibi vitam concederet, sese insequenti luce oppidum esse dedituros. Quibus respondit se Caesarem esse fidemque praestaturum. Ita ante diem XI Kalendas Martias oppido potitus imperator est appellatus.

20 Quod Pompeius ex perfugis cum deditionem oppidi factam esse scisset, castra movit Ucubim versus et circum ea loca castella disposuit et munitionibus se continere coepit. Caesar movit et propius castra castris contulit. Eodem tempore mane loricator unus ex legione vernacula ad nos transfugit et nuntiavit Pompeium oppidanos Ucubenses convocasse eisque ita imperavisse ut diligentia adhibita perquirerent qui essent suarum partium itemque adversariorum victoriae fautores. Hoc praeterito tempore in oppido quod fuit captum, servus est pressus in cuniculo quem supra demonstravimus dominum iugulasse; is vivus est combustus. Idemque temporis centuriones loricati VIII ad Caesarem transfugerunt ex legione vernacula, et equites nostri cum adversariorum equitibus congressi sunt, et saucii aliquot occiderunt levi armatura. Ea nocte speculatores prensi servi III et unus ex legione vernacula. Servi sunt in crucem sublatis, militi cervices abscisae.

21 Postero die equites cum levi armatura ex adversariorum castris ad nos transfugerunt. Et eo tempore circiter XL equites ad aquatores

nostros excucurrerunt, nonnullos interfecerunt, item alios vivos abduxerunt; e quibus capti sunt equites VIII. Insequenti die Pompeius securi percussit homines LXXIII qui dicebantur esse fautores Caesaris victoriae, reliquos versum oppidum iussit deduci. Ex quibus effugerunt CXX et ad Caesarem venerunt.

22 Hoc praeterito tempore qui in oppido Ategua Bursavonenses capti sunt, legati profecti sunt cum nostris, uti rem gestam Bursavonensibus referrent; quid sperarent de Cn. Pompeio, cum viderent hospites iugulari; praeterea multa scelera ab iis fieri qui praesidii causa ab iis reciperentur. Qui ad oppidum cum venissent, nostri qui fuissent equites Romani et senatores, non sunt ausi introire in oppidum, praeterquam qui eius civitatis fuissent. Quorum responsis ultro citroque acceptis et redditis cum ad nostros se reciperent qui extra oppidum fuissent illi praesidio insecuti ex Bursavone legatos iugularunt. Duo reliqui ex eis fugerunt et Caesari rem gestam detulerunt... Et speculatores ad oppidum Ateguam miserunt. Qui cum certum conperissent, legatorum responsa ita esse gesta quemadmodum illi rettulissent, ab oppidanis concursu facto, eum qui legatos iugulasset, lapidare et ei manus intentare coeperunt: illius opera se perisse. Ita vix periculo liberatus petiit ab oppidanis ut ei liceret legatum ad Caesarem proficisci: illi se satis facturum. Potestate data cum inde esset profectus, praesidio comparato, cum bene magnam manum fecisset et nocturno tempore per fallaciam in oppidum esset receptus, iugulationem magnam facit principibusque qui sibi contrarii fuissent interfectis oppidum in suam potestatem recepit. Hoc praeterito tempore servi transfugae nuntiaverunt oppidanorum bona vendere edictumque ne cui extra vallum liceret exire nisi discinctum, idcirco quod ex quo die oppidum Ategua esset captum, metu conterritos complures profugere Baeturiam; neque sibi

ullam spem victoriae propositam habere, et siqui ex nostris transfugerent, in levem armaturam conici eumque non amplius XVII accipere.

23 Insequenti tempore Caesar castris castra contulit et brachium ad flumen Salsum ducere coepit. Hic dum in opere nostri distenti essent, complures ex superiori loco adversariorum decucurrerunt nec detinentibus nostros multis telis iniectis complures vulneribus adfecere. Hic tum, ut ait Ennius, nostri 'cessere parumper'. Itaque praeter consuetudinem cum a nostris animadversum esset cedere, centuriones ex legione v flumen transgressi duo restituerunt aciem, acriterque eximia virtute plures cum agerent, ex superiore loco multitudine telorum alter eorum concidit. Ita cum eius compar proelium facere coepisset, cum undique se circumveniri animum advertisset, integer regressus pedem offendit. Huius concidentis temporis aquari fortis insignia cum complures adversariorum concursum facerent, equites nostri transgressi inferiori loco adversarios ad vallum agere coeperunt. Ita cupidius dum intra praesidia illorum student caedem facere, a turmis et levi armatura sunt interclusi. Quorum nisi summa virtus fuisset, vivi capti essent. Nam et munitione praesidii ita coangustabantur, ut eques spatio intercluso vix se defendere posset. Ex utroque genere pugnae complures sunt vulneribus adfecti, in quis etiam Clodius Arquitius. Inter quos ita comminus est pugnatum ut ex nostris praeter duos centuriones sit nemo desideratus gloria se efferentes.

24 Postero die ad Soricariam utrorumque convenere copiae. Nostri brachia ducere coeperunt. Pompeius cum animadverteret castello se excludi Aspavia, quod est ab Ucubi milia passuum V, haec res necessario devocabat ut ad dimicandum descenderet. Neque tamen aequo loco sui potestatem faciebat, sed ex grumo... Excelsum

tumulum capiebant, usque eo ut necessario cogeretur iniquum locum subire. Quo de facto cum utrorumque copiae tumulum excellentem petissent, prohibiti a nostris sunt deiecti planitie. Quae res secundum nostris efficiebat proelium. undique cedentibus adversariis non parum magna in caede versabantur. Quibus mons, non virtus saluti fuit. Quo sub sidio paulum modo restiterunt, sic ut nisi advesperasset, a paucioribus nostris omni auxilio privati essent. Nam ceciderunt ex levi armatura CCCXXIII, ex legionariis CXXXVIII, praeterquam quorum arma et spolia sunt ablata. Ita pridie duorum centurionum interitio hac adversariorum poena est litata.

25 Insequenti die pari consuetudine cum ad eundem locum eius praesidium venisset, pristino illo suo utebantur instituto; nam praeter equites nullo loco aequo se committere audebant. Cum nostri in opere essent, equitum copiae concursus facere coeperunt, simulque vociferantibus legionariis, cum locum efflagitarent ex consuetudine insequendi, existimare posses paratissimos esse ad dimicandum. Nostri ex humili convalle bene longe sunt egressi et planitie in aequiori loco constiterunt. Illi tamen procul dubio ad congregiendum in aequum locum non sunt ausi descendere praeter unum Antistium Turpionem. Qui fidens viribus ex adversariis sibi parem esse neminem agitare coepit. Hic, ut fertur Achillis Memnonisque congressus, Q. Pompeius Niger eques Romanus Italicensis ex acie nostra ad congregiendum progressus. Quoniam ferocitas Antistii omnium mentes converterat ab opere ad spectandum, acies sunt dispositae. Nam inter bellatores principesque dubia erat posita victoria, ut prope videretur finem bellandi duorum dirimere pugna. Ita avidi cupidique suarum quisque ex partium virorum fautorumque voluntate habebatur. Quorum virtute alacri, cum ad dimicandum in planitiem se contulissent, laudis insignia scutorumque praefulgens

opus caelatum... quorum certamine pugna esset prope profecto dirempta, nisi propter equitum concessum, ut supra demonstravimus... levem armaturam praesidii causa non longe ab opere castra constituit. Ut, nostri equites in receptu dum ad castra redeunt, adversarii cupidius sunt insecuti, universi clamore facto impetum dederunt. Ita metu peterriti, cum in fuga essent multis amissis in castra se recipiunt.

26 Caesar ob virtutem turmae Cassianae donavit milia XIII et praefecto torques aureos V et levi armaturae milia XII. Hoc die A. Baebius et C. Flavius et A. Trebellius equites Romani Hastenses argento prope tecti equites ad Caesarem transfugerunt. Qui nuntiaverunt equites Romanos coniurasse omnis qui in castris Pompei essent, ut transitionem facerent; servi indicio omnes in custodiam esse coniectos; e quibus occasione capta se transfugisse. Item hoc die litterae sunt deprensae quas mittebat Ursaonem Cn. Pompeius: ‘S. V. G. E. V. Etsi prout nostra felicitas, ex sententia adversarios propulsos... Qui si aequo loco sui potestatem facerent, celerius quam vostra opinio fert. bellum confecissem. Sed exercitum tironem non audent in campum deducere nostrisque adhuc freti praesidiis bellum ducunt. Nam singulas civitates circumsederunt ut inde sibi commeatus capiant. Quare et civi tates nostrarum partium conservabo et bellum primo quoque tempore conficiam. Cohortes ... in animo habeo ad vos mittere. Profecto nostro commeatu privati necessario ad dimicandum descendent.’

27 Insequenti tempore cum nostri in opere distenti essent, equites in oliveto dum lignantur, interfecti sunt aliquot. Servi transfugerunt qui nuntiaverunt a. d. III Non. Mart. proelium ad Soricariam quod factum est, ex eo tempore metum esse magnum et Attium Varum circum castella praeesse. Eo die Pompeius castra movit et contra

Spalim in oliveto constituit. Caesar priusquam eodem est profectus, luna hora circiter sexta visa est. Ita castris motis Ucubim Pompeius praesidium quod reliquit, iussit incendere, ut deusto oppido in castra maiora se reciperent. Insequenti tempore Ventiponem oppidum cum oppugnare coepisset, deditione facta iter fecit in Carrucam, contra Pompeium castra posuit. Pompeius oppidum quod contra sua praesidia portas clausisset incendit; milesque qui fratrem suum in castris iugulasset, interceptus est a nostris et fusti percussus. Hinc itinere facto in campum Mundensem cum esset ventum, castra contra Pompeium constituit.

28 Sequentique die cum iter facere Caesar cum copiis vellet, renuntiatum est a speculatoribus Pompeium de tertia vigilia in acie stetisse. Hoc nuntio adlato vexillum proposuit. Idcirco enim copias eduxerat quod Ursaonensium civitati qui sui fuissent fautores, antea litteras miserat Caesarem nolle in convallem descendere, quod maiorem partem exercitus tironem haberet. Hae litterae vehementer confirmabant mentes oppidanorum. Ita hac opinione fretus tuto se facere posse existimabat. Etenim et natura loci defendebantur et ipsius oppido munitione ubi castra habuit constituta. Namque ut superius demonstravimus, loca excellentia tumultis contineri, interim nulla planities edividit; id quod eo incidit tempore.

29 Planities inter utraque castra intercedebat circiter milia passuum V, ut auxilia Pompei duabus defenderentur rebus, oppido et excelsi loci natura. Hinc derigens proxima planities aequabatur. Cuius decursum antecedeat rivus qui ad eorum accessum summam efficiebat loci iniquitatem. Nam palustri et voraginoso solo currens erat ad dextrum. Id quod Caesar cum aciem directam vidisset, non habuit dubium quin mediae planities in aequum ad dimicandum adversarii procederent. Hoc erat in omnium conspectu. Hoc

accedeat ut locus illa planitie aequitate ornaretur, et diei solisque serenitate ut mirificum, ut optandum tempus prope ab diis immortalibus illud tributum esset ad proelium committendum. Nostri laetari, nonnulli etiam timere, quod in eum locum res fortunaeque omnium deducerentur ut quicquid post horam casus tribuisset, in dubio poneretur. Itaque nostri ad dimicandum procedunt, id quod adversarios existimabamus esse facturos. Qui tamen a munitione oppidi longius non audebant procedere, in quo sibi prope murum adversarii constituebant. Itaque nostri procedunt. Interdum aequitas loci adversarios efflagitabat ut tali contenderent condicione ad victoriam. Neque tamen illi a sua consuetudine discedebant, ut aut ab excelso loco aut oppido discederent. Nostri pede presso propius rivum cum adpropinquassent, adversarii patrocinari loco iniquo non desinunt.

30 Erat acies XIII aquilis constituta, quae lateribus equitatu tegebatur, cum levi armatura milibus sex; praeterea auxiliares accedebant prope alterum tantum. Nostra praesidia LXXX cohortibus, octo milibus equitum. Ita cum in extrema planitie iniquum in locum nostri adpropinquassent, paratus hostis erat superior, ut transeundum superius iter vehementer esset periculosum. Quod cum a Caesare esset animadversum, nequid temere culpa secus admitteretur, eum locum definire coepit. Quod cum hominum auribus esset obiectum, moleste et acerbe accipiebant se inpediri quominus proelium conficere possent. Haec mora adversarios alacriores efficiebat: Caesaris copias timore inpediri ad committendum proelium. Ita se efferentes iniquo loco sui potestatem faciebant, ut magno tamen periculo accessus eorum haberetur. Hic decumani suum locum, cornum dextrum, tenebant, sinistrum III et V, itemque et cetera auxilia equitatus. Proelium clamore facto committitur.

31 Hic etsi virtute nostri antecedeabant, adversarii loco superiore se defendebant acerrime, et vehemens fiebat ab utrisque clamor telorumque missu concursus, sic ut nostri prope diffiderent victoriae. Congressus enim et clamor, quibus rebus maxime hostis conterretur, in conlatu pari erat condicione. Ita ex utroque genere cum parem virtutem ad bellandum contulissent, pilorum missu fixa cumulatur et concidit adversariorum multitudo. Dextrum ut demonstravimus decumanos cornum tenuisse. Qui etsi erant pauci, tamen propter virtutem magno adversarios timore eorum opera adficiebant, quod a suo loco hostes vehementer premere coeperunt, ut ad subsidium, ne ab latere nostri occuparent, legio adversariorum traduci coepta sit ad dextrum. Quae simul est mota, equitatus Caesaris sinistrum cornum premere coepit, ita uti eximia virtute proelium facere possent ut locus in aciem ad subsidium veniundi non daretur. Ita cum clamor esset intermixtus gemitu gladiatorumque crepitus auribus oblati, inperitorum mentes timore praepediebat. Hic, ut ait Ennius, pes pede premitur, armis teruntur arma, adversariosque vehementissime pugnantes nostri agere coeperunt. Quibus oppidum fuit subsidio. Ita ipsis Liberalibus fusi fugatique non superfuissent, nisi in eum locum confugissent, ex quo erant egressi. In quo proelio ceciderunt milia hominum circiter XXX et siquid amplius, praeterea Labienus, Attius Varus, quibus occisis utrisque funus est factum, itemque equites Romani partim ex urbe, partim ex provincia ad milia III. Nostri desiderati ad hominum mille partim peditum, partim equitum, saucii ad D adversariorum aquilae sunt ablatae XIII et signa . . et fasces... praeterea hos habuit...

32... ex fuga hac qui oppidum Mundam sibi constituissent praesidium, nostrique cogeantur necessario eos circumvallare. Ex hostium armis pro caespite cadavera conlocabantur, scuta et pila pro

vallo. Insuper occisorum in gladiatorum mucronibus capita hominum ordinata ad oppidum conversa. Universa hostium timorem... virtutisque insignia proposita viderent, et vallo circumcluderentur adversarii. Ita Galli tragulis iaculisque oppidum quod vallo facto ex hostium cadaveribus sunt circumplexi, oppugnare coeperunt. Ex hoc proelio Valerius adulescens Cordubam cum paucis equitibus fugit, Sex. Pompeio qui Cordubae fuisset, rem gestam refert. Cognito hoc negotio, quos equites secum habuit, quod pecuniae secum habuit eis distribuit et oppidanis dixit se de pace ad Caesarem proficisci et secunda vigilia ab oppido discessit. Cn. Pompeius cum equitibus paucis nonnullisque peditibus ad navale praesidium Carteiam contendit, quod oppidum abest ab Corduba milia passuum CLXX. Quo cum ad octavum miliarium venisset, P. Caucilius qui castris antea Pompei praepositus esset, eius verbis nuntium mittit, eum minus belle habere, ut mitterent lecticam qua in oppidum deferri posset. litteris missis Pompeius Carteiam defertur. Qui illarum partium fautores essent, conveniunt in domum quo erat delatus, qui arbitrati sunt clanculum venisse, ut ab eo quae vellent de bello requirerent. Cum frequentia convenisset, de lectica Pompeius in eorum fidem confugit.

33 Caesar ex proelio Munda munitione circumdata Cordubam venit. Qui ex caede eo refugerunt, pontem occuparunt. Cum eo ventum esset, conviciare coeperunt, nos ex proelio paucos superesse; quo fugeremus? Ita pugnare coeperunt de ponte. Caesar flumen traiecit et castra posuit. Scapula totius seditionis familiae ac libertinorum caput ex proelio Cordubam cum venisset, familiam et liberos convocavit, pyram sibi extruxit, cenam adferri quam optimam imperavit, item optimis insternendum vestimentis; pecuniam et argentum in praesentia familiae donavit. Ipse de

tempore cenare, resinam et nardum identidem sibi infundit. Ita novissimo tempore servum iussit et libertum qui fuisset eius concubinus, alterum se iugulare, alterum pyram incendere.

³⁴ Oppidani autem, simul Caesar castra contra ad oppidum posuit, discordare coeperunt, usque eo ut clamor in castra nostra perveniret, rixa orta fere inter Caesarianos et inter Pompeianos. Erant hic legiones, quae ex perfugis conscriptae, partim oppidanorum servi qui erant a Pompeio Sexto manumissi. Qui in Caesaris adventum descendere coeperunt. legio XIII oppidum defendere coepit, nostri cum iam depugnarent, turrets ex parte et murum occuparunt. Denuo legatos ad Caesarem mittunt ut sibi legiones subsidio intromitteret. Hoc cum animadverterent homines fugitivi, oppidum incendere coeperunt. Qui superati a nostris sunt interfecti hominum milia XXII, praeterquam extra murum qui perierunt. Ita Caesar oppido potitus. Dum hic detinetur, ex proelio quos circummunitos superius demonstravimus, eruptionem fecerunt et bene multi interfecti; in oppidum sunt redacti.

³⁵ Caesar Hispalim cum contendisset, legati de precatum venerunt. Ita cum ad oppidum esset ventum, Caninium cum praesidio legatum intromittit, ipse castra ad oppidum ponit. Erat bene magna manus intra Pompeianarum partium quae praesidium receptum indignaretur clam quendam Philonem, illum qui Pompeianarum partium fuisset defensor acerrimus. Is tota Lusitania notissimus erat. Hic clam praesidia Lusitaniam proficiscitur et Caecilium Nigrum hominem barbarum ad Lennium convenit, qui bene magnam manum Lusitanorum haberet. rursus Hispalim oppidum denuo noctu per murum recipitur. Praesidium, vigiles iugulant, portas praecludunt, de integro pugnare coeperunt.

³⁶ Dum haec geruntur, legati Carteienses renuntiaverunt quod

Pompeium in potestatem haberent. Quod ante Caesari portas praeclusissent, illo beneficio suum maleficio existimabant se lucrificare. Lusitani Hispali pugnare nullo tempore desistebant. Quod Caesar cum animum adverteret, si oppidum capere contenderet, timuit ne homines periti incenderent et moenia delerent. Ita consilio habito noctu patitur Lusitanos eruptionem facere; id quod consulto non existimabant fieri. Ita erumpendo navis quae ad Baetim flumen fuissent, incendunt. Nostri dum incendio detinentur, illi profugiunt et ab equitibus conciduntur. Quo facto oppido recuperato Hastam iter facere coepit. Ex qua civitate legati ad deditionem venerunt. Mundenses qui ex proelio in oppidum confugerant, cum diutius circumsederentur, bene multi deditionem faciunt, et cum essent in legionem distributi, coniurant inter sese ut noctu signo dato qui in oppido fuissent eruptionem facerent, illi caedem in castris administrarent. Hac re cognita insequenti nocte vigilia tertia tessera data extra vallum omnes sunt concisi.

³⁷ Carteienses, dum Caesar in itinere reliqua oppida oppugnat, propter Pompeium dissentire coeperunt. Pars erat quae legatos ad Caesarem miserat, pars erat quae Pompeianarum partium fautores essent. Seditione concitata portas occupant. Caedes fit magna; saucius Pompeius naves viginti occupat longas et profugit. Didius qui ad Gadis classi prae fuisset... ad quem simul nuntius adlatus est, confestim sequi coepit. Partim pedibus et equitatu ad persequendum celeriter iter faciebant, item confestim consequentes. Quarto die navigationis quod imparati a Carteia profecti sine aqua fuissent, ad terram adplicant. Dum aquantur, Didius classe accurrit, navis incendit, nonnullas capit.

³⁸ Pompeius cum paucis profugit et locum quendam munitum natura occupat. Equites et cohortes quae ad persequendum missi

essent, speculatoribus ante missis certiores fiunt, diem et noctem iter faciunt. Pompeius umero et sinistro crure vehementer erat saucius. Hoc accedebat ut etiam talum intorsisset; quae res maxime inpediebat. Ita lectica ad turrem quendam cum esset ablatas, in ea ferebatur Lusitanis more militari. Cum Caesaris praesidio fuisset conspectus, celeriter equitatu cohortibusque circumcluditur. Erat accessus loci difficultas. Nam idcirco propter suo praesidio fuisset conspectus celeriter ad munitum locum natura ceperat sibi Pompeius, quamvis magna multitudine adducta ut pauci homines ex superiore loco defendere possent. Subeunt in adventu nostri depellunturque telis. Quibus cedentibus cupidius insequabantur adversarii et confestim tardabant ab accessu. Hoc saepius facto animum advertebatur nostro magno id fieri periculo. opere circummunire instituit. Pari autem cupiditate ex celeri festinatione circummunitiones iugo derigunt, ut aequo pede cum adversariis congredi possent. a quibus cum animadversum esset, fuga sibi praesidium capiunt.

39 Pompeius, ut supra demonstravimus, saucius et intorto talo idcirco tardabatur ad fugiendum, itemque propter loci difficultatem neque equo neque vehiculo salutis suae praesidium parare poterat. Caedes a nostris undique administrabatur. Exclusus a munitione amissisque auxiliis ad convallem exesumque locum in speluncam Pompeius se occultare coepit, ut a nostris non facile inveniretur nisi captivorum indicio. Ita ibi interficitur. Cum Caesar Gadibus fuisset, Hispalim pridie Idus Apriles caput adlatum et populo datum est in conspectum.

40 Interfecto Cn. Pompeio adolescente Didius quem supra demonstravimus, illa adfectus laetitia proximo se recepit castello nonnullasque naves ad reficiendum subduxit et quodvis essent...

brachium ex utrisque partibus... Lusitani qui ex pugna superfuerunt, ad signum se receperunt et bene magna manu comparata ad Didium se reportant. Huic etsi non aberat diligentia ad naves tuendas, tamen nonnumquam ex castello propter eorum crebras excursiones eliciebatur et prope cotidianis pugnis cum Lusitanis confligebat. tum illi insidias ponunt et tripertito signa distribuunt. Erant parati qui naves incenderent, incensisque qui subsidium repellerent; hi sic dispositi erant ut a nullo conspici possent. reliqui in conspectu omnium ad pugnam contendunt. Ita cum ex castello Didius ad propellendum processisset cum copiis, signum a Lusitanis tollitur, naves incenduntur, simulque qui in castello ad pugnam processerant, eodem signo fugientes latrones dum persequuntur, a tergo insidiae clamore sublato circumveniunt. Didius magna cum virtute cum compluribus interficitur. Nonnullique ea pugna scaphas quae ad litus fuerant occupant, item complures nando ad naves quae in salo fuerunt, se recipiunt, ancoris sublati pelagus remis petere coeperunt. Quae res eorum vitae fuit subsidio. Lusitani praeda potiuntur. Caesar Gadibus rursus ad Hispalim recurrit.


41 Fabius Maximus quem ad Mundam praesidium oppugnandum reliquerat, operibus adsiduis diurnis et nocturnis circumsedit. Interclusi inter se decernere; facta bene magna... faciunt. Nostri ad oppidum recuperandum occasionem non praetermittunt et reliquos vivos capiunt, XIII milia. Ursaonem proficiscuntur. Quod oppidum magna munitione continebatur, sic ut ipse locus non solum opere, sed etiam natura adiutus ad oppugnandum hostem impediret. Hoc accedebat ut aqua praeterquam in ipso oppido unam circumcirca nusquam reperiretur propius milia passuum VIII. Quae res magno erat adiumento oppidanis. tum praeterea accedebat ut aggerem... materiesque unde soliti sunt turris agi, propius milia passuum vi non

reperiebatur. Hoc Pompeius ut oppidi oppugnationem tutiorem efficeret, omnem materiem circum oppidum succisam intro conegessit. Ita necessario deducebantur nostri, ut a Munda quod proxime ceperant, materiem illo deportarent.

42 Dum haec ad Mundam geruntur et Ursaonem, Caesar ad Hispalim cum Gadibus se recepisset, insequenti die contione advocata: Initio quaesturae suae eam provinciam ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse. Insequente praetura ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus inposuisset, a senatu petisse et eius pecuniae provinciam liberasse simulque patrocínio suscepto multis legationibus ab se in senatum inductis simul publicis privatisque causis multorum inimiciis susceptis defendisse. Suo item consulatu absentem quae potuisset commoda provinciae tribuisse. Eorum omnium commodorum et immemores et ingratos in se et in populum Romanum hoc bello et praeterito tempore cognosse. ‘Vos iure gentium et civiumque Romanorum institutis cognitis more barbarorum populi Romani magistratibus sacrosanctis manus semel et saepius attulistis et luce clara Cassium in medio foro nefarie interficere voluistis. Vos ita pacem semper odistis ut nullo tempore legiones desitae populi Romani in hac provincia haberi. Apud vos beneficia pro maleficiis et maleficia pro beneficiis habentur. Ita neque in otio concordiam neque in bello virtutem ullo tempore retinere potuistis. Privatus ex fuga Cn. Pompeius adulescens a vobis receptus fasces imperiumque sibi arripuit, multis interfectis civibus auxilia contra populum Romanum conparavit, agros provinciamque vestro impulsu depopulavit. In quo vos victores extabatis? An me deletio non animum advertetis decem habere legiones populum Romanum quae non solum vobis obsistere, sed etiam caelum diruere possent?

Quarum laudibus est virtute...

The Dual Texts



A Victorian depiction of Julius Caesar

DUAL LATIN AND ENGLISH TEXTS



Translated by H. J. Edwards, W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn

In this section, readers can view a chapter by chapter text of Caesar's works, alternating between the original Latin and the English translations of H. J. Edwards, W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn.

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**THE GALLIC WARS, H. J. EDWARDS
TRANSLATION**

BOOK I

[1] 1 Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. 2 Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt. Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen, a Belgis Matrona et Sequana dividit. 3 Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important, 4 proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt. 5 Eorum una pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano, continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum, attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum, vergit ad septentriones. 6 Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur, pertinent ad inferiorem partem fluminis Rheni, spectant in septentrionem et orientem solem. 7 Aquitania a Garumna flumine ad Pyrenaeos montes et eam partem Oceani quae est ad Hispaniam pertinet; spectat inter occasum solis et septentriones.

[1] Gaul is a whole divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and a third by a people called in their own tongue Celtae, in the Latin Galli. All these are different one from another in language, institutions, and laws. The Galli (Gauls) are separated from the Aquitani by the river Garonne, from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. Of all these peoples the Belgae are the most courageous, because they are farthest removed

from the culture and civilization of the Province, and least often visited by merchants introducing the commodities that make for effeminacy; and also because they are nearest to the Germans dwelling beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually at war. For this cause the Helvetii also excel the rest of the Gauls in valour, because they are struggling in almost daily fights with the Germans, either endeavouring to keep them out of Gallic territory or waging an aggressive warfare in German territory. The separate part of the country which, as has been said, is occupied by the Gauls, starts from the river Rhone, and is bounded by the river Garonne, the Ocean, and the territory of the Belgae; moreover, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, it touches on the river Rhine; and its general trend is northward. The Belgae, beginning from the edge of the Gallic territory, reach to the lower part of the river Rhine, bearing towards the north and east. Aquitania, starting from the Garonne, reaches to the Pyrenees and to that part of the Ocean which is by Spain: its bearing is between west and north.

[2] 1 Apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus fuit et ditissimus Orgetorix. Is M. Messala, [et P.] M. Pisone consulibus regni cupiditate inductus coniurationem nobilitatis fecit et civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent: 2 perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri. 3 Id hoc facilius iis persuasit, quod undique loci natura Helvetii continentur: una ex parte flumine Rheno latissimo atque altissimo, qui agrum Helvetium a Germanis dividit; altera ex parte monte Iura altissimo, qui est inter Sequanos et Helvetios; tertia lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit. 4 His rebus fiebat ut et minus late vagarentur et minus facile finitimis bellum inferre possent; 5 qua ex parte homines bellandi cupidi magno dolore

adficiebantur. 6 Pro multitudine autem hominum et pro gloria belli atque fortitudinis angustos se fines habere arbitrantur, qui in longitudinem milia passuum CCXL, in latitudinem CLXXX patebant.

[2] Among the Helvetii the noblest man by far and the most wealthy was Orgetorix. In the consulship of Marcus Messalla and Marcus Piso, his desire for the kingship led him to form a conspiracy of the nobility, and he persuaded the community to march out of their territory in full force, urging that as they excelled all in valour it was easy enough to secure the sovereignty of all Gaul. In this he persuaded them the more easily, because the Helvetii are closely confined by the nature of their territory. On one side there is the river Rhine, exceeding broad and deep, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on another the Jura range, exceeding high, lying between Sequani and the Helvetii; on the third, the Lake of Geneva and the river Rhone, which separates the Roman Province from the Helvetii. In such circumstances their range of movement was less extensive, and their chances of waging war on their neighbours were less easy; and on this account they were greatly distressed, for they were men that longed for war. Nay, they could not but consider that the territory they occupied — to an extent of 240 miles long and 180 broad — was all too narrow for their population and for their renown of courage in war.

[3] 1 His rebus adducti et auctoritate Orgetorigis permoti constituerunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinerent comparare, iumentorum et carrorum quam maximum numerum coemere, sementes quam maximas facere, ut in itinere copia frumenti suppeteret, cum proximis civitatibus pacem et amicitiam confirmare.

2 Ad eas res conficiendas biennium sibi satis esse duxerunt; in tertium annum profectionem lege confirmant. 3 Ad eas res conficiendas Orgetorix deligitur. Is sibi legationem ad civitates suscipit. In eo itinere persuadet Castico, Catamantaloedis filio, Sequano, cuius pater regnum in Sequanis multos annos obtinuerat et a senatu populi Romani amicus appellatus erat, ut regnum in civitate sua occuparet, quod pater ante habuerit; 4 itemque Dumnorigi Haeduo, fratri Diviciaci, qui eo tempore principatum in civitate obtinebat ac maxime plebi acceptus erat, ut idem conaretur persuadet eique filiam suam in matrimonium dat. 5 Perfacile factu esse illis probat conata perficere, propterea quod ipse suae civitatis imperium obtenturus esset: 6 non esse dubium quin totius Galliae plurimum Helvetii possent; se suis copiis suoque exercitu illis regna conciliaturum confirmat. 7 Hac oratione adducti inter se fidem et ius iurandum dant et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant.

[3] Swayed by these considerations and stirred by the influence of Orgetorix, they determined to collect what they needed for taking the field, to buy up as large a number as they could of draught-cattle and carts, to sow as much corn^o as possible so as to have a sufficient supply thereof on the march, and to establish peace and amity with the nearest communities. For the accomplishment of these objects they considered that two years were sufficient, and pledged themselves by an ordinance to take the field in the third year. For the accomplishment of these objectives Orgetorix was chosen, and he took upon himself an embassy to the communities. In the course of his travels he persuaded Casticus, of the Sequani, son of Catamantaloedes, who had held for many years the kingship of the Sequani, and had been called by the Senate “the friend of the Roman

people,” to seize in his own state the kingship which his father had held before him; and Dumnorix also, of the Aedui, brother of Diviciacus, at that time holding the chieftaincy of the state and a great favourite with the common people, he persuaded to a like endeavour, and gave him his own daughter in marriage. He convinced them that it was easy enough to accomplish such endeavours, because he himself (so he said) was about to secure the sovereignty of his own state. There was no doubt, he observed, that the Helvetii were the most powerful tribe in all Gaul, and he gave a pledge that he would win them their kingdoms with his own resources and his own army. Swayed by this speech, they gave a mutual pledge, confirming it by oath; and they hoped that when they had seized their kingship they would be able, through the efforts of three most powerful and most steadfast tribes, to master the whole of Gaul.

[4] 1 Ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata. Moribus suis Orgetoricem ex vinculis causam dicere coegerunt; damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni cremaretur. 2 Die constituta causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit; per eos ne causam diceret se eripuit. 3 Cum civitas ob eam rem incitata armis ius suum exsequi conaretur multitudinemque hominum ex agris magistratus cogerent, Orgetorix mortuus est; 4 neque abest suspicio, ut Helvetii arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem consciverit.

[4] The design was revealed to the Helvetii by informers. In accordance with their custom they compelled Orgetorix to take his trial in bonds. If he were condemned, the penalty of being burnt alive

was the consequence. On the day appointed for his trial Orgetorix gathered from every quarter to the place of judgment all his retainers, to the number of some ten thousand men, and also assembled there all his clients and debtors, of whom he had a great number, and through their means escaped from taking his trial. The state, being incensed at this, essayed to secure its due rights by force of arms, and the magistrates were bridging together a number of men from the country parts, when Orgetorix died, not without suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of suicide.

[5] 1 Post eius mortem nihilo minus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur, ut e finibus suis exeant. 2 Ubi iam se ad eam rem paratos esse arbitrati sunt, oppida sua omnia, numero ad duodecim, vicos ad quadringentos, reliqua privata aedificia incendunt; 3 frumentum omne, praeter quod secum portaturi erant, comburunt, ut domum reditionis spe sublata paratiores ad omnia pericula subeunda essent; trium mensum molita cibaria sibi quemque domo efferre iubent. Persuadent Rauracis et Tulingis et Latobrigis finitimis, uti eodem usu consilio oppidis suis vicisque exustis una cum iis proficiscantur, Boiosque, qui trans Rhenum incoluerant et in agrum Noricum transierant Noreiamque oppugnabant, receptos ad se socios sibi adsciscunt.

[5] After his death the Helvetii essayed none the less to accomplish their determination to march forth from their borders. When at length they deemed that they were prepared for that purpose, they set fire to all their strongholds, in number about twelve; their villages, in number about four hundred, and the rest of their private buildings; they burnt up all their corn save that which they were to carry with them, to the intent that by removing all hope of returning homeward

they might prove the readier to undergo any perils;a and they commanded every man to take for himself from home a three months' provision of victuals. They persuaded their neighbours, the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, to adopt the same plan, burn up their strongholds and villages, and march out with them; and they received as partners of their alliance the Boii, who had been dwellers beyond the Rhine, but had crossed over into Noricum and attacked Noreia.

[6] 1 Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent: unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, inter montem Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur, mons autem altissimus impendebat, ut facile perpauci prohibere possent; 2 alterum per provinciam nostram, multo facilius atque expeditius, propterea quod inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum, qui nuper pacati erant, Rhodanus fluit isque non nullis locis vado transitur. 3 Extremum oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque Helvetiorum finibus Genava. Ex eo oppido pons ad Helvetios pertinet. Allobrogibus sese vel persuasuros, quod nondum bono animo in populum Romanum viderentur, existimabant vel vi coacturos ut per suos fines eos ire paterentur. Omnibus rebus ad profectionem comparatis diem dicunt, qua die ad ripam Rhodani omnes conveniant. Is dies erat a. d. V. Kal. Apr. L. Pisone, A. Gabinio consulibus.

[6] There were two routes, and no more, by which they could leave their homeland. One lay through the territory of the Sequani, betwixt the Jura range and the river Rhone, a narrow route and a difficult, where carts could scarce be drawn up in single file; with an exceeding high mountain overhanging it, so that a very few men

might easily check them. The other route, through the Roman Province, was far more easy and convenient, forasmuch as the Rhone flows between the borders of the Helvetii and the Allobroges (who had lately been brought to peace), and is in some places fordable. The last town of the Allobroges, the nearest to the borders of the Helvetii, is Geneva, from which a bridge stretches across to the Helvetii. These supposed that either they would persuade the Allobroges (deeming them not yet well disposed toward the Roman people), or would compel them perforce to suffer a passage through their borders. Having therefore provided all things for their departure, they named a day by which all should assemble upon the bank of the Rhone. The day was the 28th of March, in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius.

[7] 1 Caesari cum id nuntiatum esset, eos per provinciam nostram iter facere conari, maturat ab urbe proficisci et quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem contendit et ad Genavam pervenit. 2 Provinciae toti quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat (erat omnino in Gallia ulteriore legio una), pontem, qui erat ad Genavam, iubet rescindi. 3 Ubi de eius adventu Helvetii certiores facti sunt, legatos ad eum mittunt nobilissimos civitatis, cuius legationis Nammeius et Verucloetius principem locum obtinebant, qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per provinciam facere, propterea quod aliud iter haberent nullum: rogare ut eius voluntate id sibi facere liceat. Caesar, quod memoria tenebat L. Cassium consulem occisum exercitumque eius ab Helvetiis pulsum et sub iugum missum, concedendum non putabat; 4 neque homines inimico animo, data facultate per provinciam itineris faciundi, temperaturos ab iniuria et maleficio existimabat. 5 Tamen, ut spatium intercedere posset dum milites quos imperaverat convenirent, legatis

respondit diem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: si quid vellent, ad Id. April. reverterentur.

[7] When Caesar was informed that they were endeavouring to march through the Roman Province, he made speed to leave Rome, and hastening to Further Gaul by as rapid stages as possible, arrived near Geneva. From the whole Province he requisitioned the largest possible number of troops (there was in Further Gaul no more than a single legion), and ordered the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii learned of his coming, they sent as deputies to him the noblest men of the state. Nammeius and Verucloetius held the chief place in the deputation, with instructions to say that their purpose was to march through the Province without any mischief, because they had no other route; and they asked that they might have leave so to do of his good will. Remembering that the consul Lucius Cassius had been slain, and his army routed and sent under the yoke, by the Helvetii, Caesar considered that no concession should be made; nor did he believe that men of unfriendly disposition, if granted an opportunity of marching through the Province, would refrain from outrage and mischief. However, to gain an interval for the assembly of the troops he had levied, he replied to the deputies that he would take a space of time for consideration; if they wished for anything, they were to return on the 13th of April.

[8] 1 Interea ea legione quam secum habebat militibusque, qui ex provincia convenerant, a lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, milia passuum XVIII murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit. 2 Eo opere perfecto praesidia disponit, castella communit, quo facilius, si se invito transire conentur, prohibere

possit. 3 Ubi ea dies quam constituerat cum legatis venit et legati ad eum reverterunt, negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et, si vim facere conentur, prohibitorium ostendit. 4 Helvetii ea spe deiecti navibus iunctis ratibusque compluribus factis, alii vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, non numquam interdium, saepius noctu, si perrumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum concursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu destiterunt.

[8] In the meanwhile he used the legion which he had with him, and the troops which had concentrated from the Province, to construct a continuous wall, sixteen feet high, and a trench, from the Lake of Geneva, which flows into the river Rhone, to the Jura range, which separates the territory of the Sequani from the Helvetii, a distance of nineteen miles. This work completed, he posted separate garrisons, in entrenched forts, in order that he might more easily be able to stop any attempt of the enemy to cross against his wish. When the day which he had appointed with the deputies arrived, and the deputies returned to him, he said that, following the custom and precedent of the Roman people, he could not grant anyone a passage through the Province; and he made it plain that he would stop any attempt to force the same. Disappointed of this hope, the Helvetii attempted, sometimes by day, more often by night, to break through, either by joining boats together and making a number of rafts, or by fording the Rhone where the depth of the stream was least. But they were checked by the line of the entrenchment and, as the troops concentrated rapidly, by missiles, and so abandoned the attempt.

[9] 1 Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invitis propter angustias ire non poterant. 2 His cum sua sponte persuadere

non possent, legatos ad Dumnorigem Haeduum mittunt, ut eo deprecatore a Sequanis impetrarent. 3 Dumnorix gratia et largitione apud Sequanos plurimum poterat et Helvetiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in matrimonium duxerat, et cupiditate regni adductus novis rebus studebat et quam plurimas civitates suo beneficio habere obstrictas volebat. 4 Itaque rem suscipit et a Sequanis impetrat ut per fines suos Helvetios ire patiantur, obsidesque uti inter sese dent perficit: Sequani, ne itinere Helvetios prohibeant, Helvetii, ut sine maleficio et iniuria transeant.

[9] There remained one other line of route, through the borders of the Sequani, by which they could not march, on account of the narrow ways, without the consent of the Sequani. When they could not of their own motion persuade the Sequani, they sent deputies to Dumnorix the Aeduan, in order that they might attain their object through his intercession. Now Dumnorix had very great weight with the Sequani, for he was both popular and open-handed, and he was friendly to the Helvetii, because from that state he had taken the daughter of Orgetorix to wife; and, spurred by the desire of the kingship, he was anxious for a revolution, and eager to have as many states as might be beholden to his own beneficence. Therefore he accepted the business, and prevailed on the Sequani to suffer the Helvetii to pass through their borders, and arranged that they should give hostages each to other — the Sequani, not to prevent the Helvetii from their march; the Helvetii, to pass through without mischief or outrage.

[10] 1 Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. Id si

fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet. 3 Ob eas causas ei munitioni quam fecerat T. Labienum legatum praeficit; ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit duasque ibi legiones conscribit et tres, quae circum Aquileiam hiemabant, ex hibernis educit et, qua proximum iter in ulteriorem Galliam per Alpes erat, cum his quinque legionibus ire contendit. 4 Ibi Ceutrones et Graioceli et Caturiges locis superioribus occupatis itinere exercitum prohibere conantur. Compluribus his proeliis pulsus ab Ocelo, quod est oppidum citerioris provinciae extremum, in fines Vocontiorum ulterioris provinciae die septimo pervenit; inde in Allobrogum fines, ab Allobrogibus in Segusiavos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.

[10] The news was brought back to Caesar that the Helvetii were minded to march through the land of the Sequani and the Aedui into the borders of the Santones, which are not far removed from the borders of the Tolosates, a state in the Province. He perceived that this event would bring great danger upon the Province; for it would have a warlike tribe, unfriendly to the Roman people, as neighbours to a district which was at once unprotected and very rich in corn. For these reasons he set Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general, in command of the fortification which he had made, and himself hurried by forced marches into Italy. There he enrolled two legions, and brought out of winter quarters three that were wintering about Aquileia; and with these five legions made speed to march by the shortest route to Further Gaul, over the Alps. In that region the Ceutrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges, seizing points on the higher ground, essayed to stop the march of his army. They were repulsed in several

actions; and on the seventh day he moved from Ocelum, the last station of Hither Gaul, into the borders of the Vocontii in Further Gaul. Thence he led his army into the borders of the Allobroges, and from thence into the country of the Segusiavi, the first tribe outside the Province, across the Rhone.

[11] 1 Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias traduxerant et in Haeduorum fines pervenerant eorumque agros populabantur. 2 Haedui, cum se suaque ab iis defendere non possent, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium: 3 ita se omni tempore de populo Romano meritos esse ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi [eorum] in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint. Eodem tempore [quo Haedui] Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Haeduorum, Caesarem certiore faciant sese depopulatis agris non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere. 4 Item Allobroges, qui trans Rhodanum vicis possessionesque habebant, fuga se ad Caesarem recipiunt et demonstrant sibi praeter agri solum nihil esse reliqui. 2 Quibus rebus adductus Caesar non expectandum sibi statuit dum, omnibus fortunis sociorum consumptis, in Santonos Helvetii pervenirent.

[11] By this time the Helvetii, having brought their own forces through the defiles and through the borders of the Sequani, had reached the borders of the Aedui, and were engaged in laying waste their lands. Unable to defend their persons and their property from the invaders, the Aedui sent deputies to Caesar to ask for aid. These pleaded that the Aedui had always deserved too well of the Roman people to merit the devastation of their lands, the removal of their children into slavery, and the capture of their towns, almost in sight of the Roman army. At the same time the Aedui Ambarri, close allies

and kinsmen of the Aedui, informed Caesar that their lands had been laid waste, and that they could not easily safeguard their towns from the violence of the enemy. The Allobroges also, who had villages and settlements across the Rhone, fleet to Caesar, affirming that they had nothing left to them save the bare ground. All these events drove Caesar to the decision that he must not wait till the Helvetii, having wasted all the substance of the Roman allies, should penetrate into the land of the Santoni.

[12] 1 Flumen est Arar, quod per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit, incredibili lenitate, ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iudicari non possit. Id Helvetii ratibus ac lintribus iunctis transibant. 2 Ubi per exploratores Caesar certior factus est tres iam partes copiarum Helvetios id flumen traduxisse, quartam vero partem citra flumen Ararim reliquam esse, de tertia vigilia cum legionibus tribus e castris profectus ad eam partem pervenit quae nondum flumen transierat. 3 Eos impeditos et inopinantes adgressus magnam partem eorum concidit; reliqui sese fugae mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdiderunt. 4 Is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus; nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est. 5 Hic pagus unus, cum domo exisset, patrum nostrorum memoria L. Cassium consulem interfecerat et eius exercitum sub iugum miserat. 6 Ita sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenam persolvit. 7 Qua in re Caesar non solum publicas, sed etiam privatas iniurias ultus est, quod eius soceri L. Pisonis avum, L. Pisonem legatum, Tigurini eodem proelio quo Cassium interfecerant.

[12] There is a river Arar (Saône), which flows through the borders of the Aedui and the Sequani into the Rhone: its sluggishness is beyond

belief, for the eye cannot determine in which direction the stream flows. This river the Helvetii proceeded to cross by rafts and boats fastened together. When Caesar's scouts informed him that three-quarters of the Helvetian forces had actually crossed, and that about a quarter remained on the near side of the river Saône, he left camp in the third watch with three legions and came up to the division of the enemy which had not yet crossed. He attacked them unawares when they were heavily loaded, and put a great number of them to the sword; the remainder betook themselves to flight and hid in the nearest woods. The name of the canton was the Tigurine; for the whole state of Helvetia is divided into four cantons. In the recollection of the last generation this canton had marched out alone from its homeland, and had slain the consul Lucius Cassius and sent his army under the yoke. And so, whether by accident or by the purpose of the immortal gods, the section of the Helvetian state which had brought so signal a calamity upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty in full. Therein Caesar avenged private as well as national outrages; for in the same battle with Cassius the Tigurini had slain Lucius Piso, the general, grandfather of Lucius Piso, Caesar's father-in-law.

[13] 1 Hoc proelio facto, reliquas copias Helvetiorum ut consequi posset, pontem in Arari faciendum curat atque ita exercitum traducit. 2 Helvetii repentino eius adventu commoti cum id quod ipsi diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellegerent, legatos ad eum mittunt; cuius legationis Divico princeps fuit, qui bello Cassiano dux Helvetiorum fuerat. 3 Is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque esse voluisset; 4 sin bello persequi perseveraret,

reminisceretur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. Quod improvise unum pagum adortus esset, cum ii qui flumen transissent suis auxilium ferre non possent, ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere virtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret. Se ita a patribus maioribusque suis didicisse, ut magis virtute contenderent quam dolo aut insidiis niterentur. 5 Quare ne committeret ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi Romani et internecone exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet.

[13] This action over, he caused a bridge to be made over the Saône and sent his army across thereby, in order to pursue the remainder of the Helvetian forces. Alarmed at his sudden approach — for they perceived that the business of crossing the river, which they themselves had accomplished with the greatest difficulty in twenty days, had been despatched by Caesar in a single one — the Helvetii sent deputies to him. The leader of the deputation was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in the campaign against Cassius. He treated with Caesar as follows: If the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii, they would go whither and abide where Caesar should determine and desire; if on the other hand he should continue to visit them with war, he was advised to remember the earlier disaster of the Roman people and the ancient valour of the Helvetii. He had attacked one canton unawares, when those who had crossed the river could not bear assistance to their fellows; but that event must not induce him to rate his own valour highly or to despise them. The Helvetii had learnt from their parents and ancestors to fight their battles with courage, not with cunning nor reliance upon stratagem. Caesar therefore must not allow the place of their conference to derive renown or perpetuate remembrance by a disaster to the Roman people and the destruction of an army.

[14] 1 His Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii commemorassent memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent; 2 qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellexeret quare timeret neque sine causa timendum putaret. 3 Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, memoriam deponere posse? 4 Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere. 5 Consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. 6 Cum ea ita sint, tamen, si obsides ab iis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur facturos intellegat, et si Haeduis de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allobrogibus satisfaciant, sese cum iis pacem esse facturum. 7 Divico respondit: ita Helvetios a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare, consuerint; eius rei populum Romanum esse testem. Hoc responso dato discessit.

[14] To these remarks Caesar replied as follows: As he remembered well the events which the Helvetian deputies had mentioned, he had therefore the less need to hesitate; and his indignation was the more vehement in proportion as the Roman people had not deserved the misfortune. If the Romans had been conscious of some outrage done, it would not have been hard to take precaution; but they had been misled, because they did not understand that they had done anything to cause them apprehension, and they thought that they should not

feel apprehension without cause. And even if he were willing to forget an old affront, could he banish the memory of recent outrages — their attempts to march by force against his will through the Province, their ill-treatment of the Aedui, the Ambarri, the Allobroges? Their insolent boast of their own victory, their surprise that their outrages had gone on so long with impunity, pointed the same way; for it was the wont of the immortal gods to grant a temporary prosperity and a longer impunity to make men whom they purposed to punish for their crime smart the more severely from a change of fortune. Yet, for all this, he would make peace with the Helvetii, if they would offer him hostages to show him that they would perform their promises, and if they would give satisfaction to the Aedui in respect of the outrages inflicted on them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges. Divico replied: It was the ancestral practice and the regular custom of the Helvetii to receive, not to offer, hostages; the Roman people was witness thereof. With this reply he departed.

[15] 1 Postero die castra ex eo loco movent. Idem facit Caesar equitatumque omnem, ad numerum quattuor milium, quem ex omni provincia et Haeduis atque eorum sociis coactum habebat, praemittit, qui videant quas in partes hostes iter faciant. Qui cupidius novissimum agmen insecuti alieno loco cum equitatu Helvetiorum proelium committunt; et pauci de nostris cadunt. 2 Quo proelio sublati Helvetii, quod quingentis equitibus tantam multitudinem equitum propulerant, audacius subsistere non numquam et novissimo agmine proelio nostros lacessere coeperunt. Caesar suos a proelio continebat, ac satis habebat in praesentia hostem rapinis, pabulationibus populationibusque prohibere. 3 Ita dies circiter XV iter fecerunt uti inter novissimum hostium agmen et nostrum primum

non amplius quinis aut senis milibus passuum interesset.

[15] Next day the Helvetii moved their camp from that spot. Caesar did likewise, sending forward the whole of his cavalry, four thousand in number, which he had raised from the whole of the Province, from the Aedui, and from their allies, to observe in which direction the enemy were marching. The cavalry, following up the rearguard too eagerly, engaged in a combat on unfavourable ground with the cavalry of the Helvetii, and a few of ours fell. Elated by this engagement, because five hundred of their horsemen had routed so large a host of ours, the Helvetii began on occasion to make a bolder stand, and with their rearguard to provoke the Romans to a fight. Caesar kept his troops from fighting, accounting it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from plundering, foraging, and devastation. The march continued for about a fortnight with no more interval than five or six miles a day between the rearguard of the enemy and the vanguard of the Romans.

[16] 1 Interim cotidie Caesar Haeduos frumentum, quod essent publice polliciti, flagitare. 2 Nam propter frigora [quod Gallia sub septentrionibus, ut ante dictum est, posita est,] non modo frumenta in agris matura non erant, sed ne pabuli quidem satis magna copia suppetebat; 3 eo autem frumento quod flumine Arari navibus subvexerat propterea uti minus poterat quod iter ab Arari Helvetii averterant, a quibus discedere nolebat. 4 Diem ex die ducere Haedui: conferri, comportari, adesse dicere. 5 Ubi se diutius duci intellexit et diem instare quo die frumentum militibus metiri oporteret, convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Diviciaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerat, quem *vergobretum* appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae

necisque in suos habet potestatem, graviter eos accusat, 6 quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit, tam necessario tempore, tam propinquis hostibus ab iis non sublevetur, praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum suscepit[; multo etiam gravius quod sit destitutus queritur].

[16] Meanwhile Caesar was daily pressing the Aedui for the corn that they had promised as a state. For by reason of cold weather (since Gaul, as has been said above, lies under the northern heaven) not only were the corn-crops in the fields unripe, but there was not even a sufficient supply of forage to be had. At the same time he was less able to use the corn-supply that he had brought up the river Saône in boats, because the Helvetii had diverted their march from the Saône, and he did not wish to lose touch with them. The Aedui put him off day by day, declaring that the corn was being collected, was being brought in, was at hand. He perceived that he was being put off too long, and that the day was close upon him whereon it was proper to issue the corn-ration to the troops: accordingly he summoned together the Aeduan chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Diviciacus and Liscus, who had the highest magnify, called Vergobret by the Aedui: the magistrate is elected annually, and holds the power of life and death over his fellow-countrymen. Caesar called them severely to account because they offered no relief in a time of stress, with the enemy close at hand, when corn could neither be purchased nor taken from the fields. And just because he had undertaken the war largely in response to their entreaties, he complained the more severely of their desertion.

[17] 1 Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: esse non nullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem

plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus possint quam ipsi magistratus. 2 Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem deterrere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant: 3 praestare, si iam principatum Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre, 4 neque dubitare [debeant] quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una cum reliqua Gallia Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi. 5 Ab isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse. 6 Quin etiam, quod necessariam rem coactus Caesari enuntiarit, intellegere sese quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam causam quam diu potuerit tacuisse.

[17] Then, and not till then, the remarks of Caesar induced Liscus to reveal a fact concealed before. There were, he said, certain persons, of paramount influence with the common folk, and of more power in their private capacity than the actual magistrates. These persons, by seditious and insolent language, were intimidating the population against the collection of corn as required, on the plea that it was better for the Aedui, if they could not now enjoy the primacy of Gaul, to submit to the commands of Gauls rather than of Romans; for they did not doubt that, if the Romans overcame the Helvetii, they meant to deprive the Aedui of liberty, in common with the rest of Gaul. These, again, were the men, who informed the enemy of the Roman plans and all the doings of the camp; nor had he power to restrain them. Nay, more, he perceived with what risk he had acted in informing Caesar, under sheer force of necessity; and for that reason he had held his peace as long as he could.

[18] 1 Caesar hac oratione Lisci Dumnorigem, Diviciaci fratrem, designari sentiebat, sed, quod pluribus praesentibus eas res iactari nolebat, celeriter concilium dimittit, Liscum retinet. 2 Quaerit ex solo

ea quae in conventu dixerat. Dicit liberius atque audacius. Eadem secreto ab aliis quaerit; reperit esse vera: 3 ipsum esse Dumnorigem, summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum. Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Haeduum vectigalia parvo pretio redempta habere, propterea quod illo licente contra liceri audeat nemo. 4 His rebus et suam rem familiarem auxisse et facultates ad largiendum magnas comparasse; 5 magnum numerum equitatus suo sumptu semper alere et circum se habere, 6 neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates largiter posse, atque huius potentiae causa matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo conlocasse; 7 ipsum ex Helvetiis uxorem habere, sororum ex matre et propinquas suas nuptum in alias civitates conlocasse. 8 Favere et cupere Helvetiis propter eam adfinitatem, odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos, quod eorum adventu potentia eius deminuta et Diviciacus frater in antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris sit restitutus. 9 Si quid accidat Romanis, summam in spem per Helvetios regni obtinendi venire; imperio populi Romani non modo de regno, sed etiam de ea quam habeat gratia desperare. 10 Reperiebat etiam in quaerendo Caesar, quod proelium equestre adversum paucis ante diebus esset factum, initium eius fugae factum a Dumnorige atque eius equitibus (nam equitatui, quem auxilio Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix praeerat): eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum.

[18] Caesar felt that Dumnorix, the brother of Diviciacus, was indicated in these remarks of Liscus; but as he would not have those matters threshed out in presence of a company, he speedily dismissed the meeting. He kept Liscus back, and questioned him separately on his statement in the assembly. Liscus now spoke with greater

freedom and boldness. Caesar questioned others privately upon the same matters, and found that it was so — that Dumnorix was the man who, unequalled in boldness, and strong in the influence that his generosity gave him over the common folk, desired a revolution. For several years, it was said, he had contracted at a low price for the customs and all the rest of the Aeduan taxes, for the simple reason that when he made a bid none durst bid against him. By this means he had at once increased his own property and acquired ample resources for bribery; he maintained a considerable body of horse permanently at his own charges, and kept them about his person; not only in his own but even in neighbouring states his power was extensive. To secure this power he had given his mother in marriage to the noblest and most powerful man among the Bituriges, he had taken himself a wife from the Helvetii, and had married his half-sister and his female relations to men of other states. This connection made him a zealous supporter of the Helvetii; moreover, he hated Caesar and the Romans on his own account, because their arrival had diminished his power and restored his brother Diviciacus to his ancient place of influence and honour. If anything should happen to the Romans, he entertained the most confident hope of securing the kingship by means of the Helvetii: it was the empire of the Roman people which caused him to despair not only of the kingship, but even of the influence he now possessed. Caesar discovered also in the course of his questioning, as concerning the unsuccessful cavalry engagement of a few days before, that Dumnorix and his horsemen (he was commander of the body of horse sent by the Aedui to the aid of Caesar) had started the retreat, and that by their retreat the remainder of the horse had been stricken with panic.

[19] 1 Quibus rebus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciones certissimae res

accederent, quod per fines Sequanorum Helvetios traduxisset, quod obsides inter eos dando curasset, quod ea omnia non modo iniussu suo et civitatis sed etiam inscientibus ipsis fecisset, quod a magistratu Haeduorum accusaretur, satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitatem animadvertere iuberet. 2 His omnibus rebus unum repugnabat, quod Diviciaci fratris summum in populum Romanum studium, summum in se voluntatem, egregiam fidem, iustitiam, temperantiam cognoverat; nam ne eius supplicio Diviciaci animum offenderet verebatur. 3 Itaque prius quam quicquam conaretur, Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet et, cotidianis interpretibus remotis, per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo conloquitur; 4 simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio [Gallorum] de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit. 5 Petit atque hortatur ut sine eius offensione animi vel ipse de eo causa cognita statuatur vel civitatem statuere iubeat.

[19] All this Caesar learnt, and to confirm these suspicions he had indisputable facts. Dumnorix had brought the Helvetii through the borders of the Sequani; he had caused hostages to be given between them; he had done all this not only without orders from his state or from Caesar, but even without the knowledge of either; he was now accused by the magistrate of the Aedui. Caesar deemed all this to be cause enough for him either to punish Dumnorix himself, or to command the state so to do. To all such procedure there was one objection, the knowledge that Diviciacus, the brother of Dumnorix, showed the utmost zeal for the Roman people, the utmost goodwill towards himself, in loyalty, in justice, in prudence alike remarkable; for Caesar apprehended that the punishment of Dumnorix might

offend the feelings of Diviciacus. Therefore, before attempting anything in the matter, Caesar ordered Diviciacus to be summoned to his quarters, and, having removed the regular interpreters, conversed with him through the mouth of Gaius Valerius Procillus, a leading man in the Province of Gaul and his own intimate friend, in whom he had the utmost confidence upon all matters. Caesar related the remarks which had been uttered in his presence as concerning Dumnorix at the assembly of the Gauls, and showed what each person had said severally to him upon the same subject. He asked and urged that without offence to the feelings of Diviciacus he might either hear his case himself and pass judgment upon him, or order the state so to do.

[20] 1 Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: 2 scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset; 3 quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri. 4 Quod si quid ei a Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, neminem existimaturum non sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se averterentur. 5 Haec cum pluribus verbis flens a Caesare peteret, Caesar eius dextram prendit; consolatus rogat finem orandi faciat; tanti eius apud se gratiam esse ostendit uti et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius voluntati ac precibus condonet. Dumnorigem ad se vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse intellegat, quae civitas queratur proponit; monet ut in reliquum tempus omnes suspiciones vitet; praeterita se Diviciaco fratri

condonare dicit. Dumnorigi custodes ponit, ut quae agat, quibuscum loquatur scire possit.

[20] With many tears Diviciacus embraced Caesar, and began to beseech him not to pass too severe a judgment upon his brother. “I know,” said he, “that the reports are true, and no one is more pained thereat than I, for at a time when I had very great influence in my own state and in the rest of Gaul, and he very little, by reason of his youth, he owed his rise to me; and now he is using his resources and his strength not only to the diminution of my influence, but almost to my destruction. For all that, I feel the force of brotherly love and public opinion. That is to say, if too severe a fate befalls him at your hands, no one, seeing that I hold this place in your friendship, will opine that it has been done without *my* consent; and this will turn from me the feelings of all Gaul.” While he was making this petition at greater length, and with tears, Caesar took him by the hand and consoled him, bidding him end his entreaty, and showing that his influence with Caesar was so great that he excused the injury to Rome and the vexation felt by himself, in consideration for the goodwill and the entreaties of Diviciacus. Then he summoned Dumnorix to his quarters, and in the presence of his brother he pointed out what he had to blame in him; he set forth what he himself perceived, and the complaints of the state; he warned him to avoid all occasions of suspicion for the future, and said that he excused the past in consideration for his brother Diviciacus. He posted sentinels over Dumnorix, so as to know what he did and with whom he spoke.

[21] 1 Eodem die ab exploratoribus certior factus hostes sub monte consedissee milia passuum ab ipsius castris octo, qualis esset natura montis et qualis in circuitu ascensus qui cognoscerent misit. 2

Renuntiatum est facilem esse. De tertia vigilia T. Labienum, legatum pro praetore, cum duabus legionibus et iis ducibus qui iter cognoverant summum iugum montis ascendere iubet; quid sui consilii sit ostendit. 3 Ipse de quarta vigilia eodem itinere quo hostes ierant ad eos contendit equitatumque omnem ante se mittit. 4 P. Considius, qui rei militaris peritissimus habebatur et in exercitu L. Sullae et postea in M. Crassi fuerat, cum exploratoribus praemittitur.

[21] On the same day his scouts informed him that the enemy had halted close under a height eight miles from the Roman camp. A party was sent to reconnoitre the height, and to see what kind of ascent a detour might afford: the report was that it was easy. Caesar ordered Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general and chief of the staff, to move in the third watch with two legions and the guides who knew the route, and to climb the topmost ridge of the height; and he showed him his own intention. He himself, starting in the fourth watch, marched speedily against the enemy by the same route which they had taken, sending forward the whole of the horse. Publius Considius, reputed a past master in the art of war, who had seen service in the army of Lucius Sulla and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, was sent forward with the scouts.

[22] 1 Prima luce, cum summus mons a [Lucio] Labieno teneretur, ipse ab hostium castris non longius mille et quingentis passibus abesset neque, ut postea ex captivis comperit, aut ipsius adventus aut Labieni cognitus esset, 2 Considius equo admisso ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse. 3 Caesar suas copias in proximum collem subducit, aciem instruit. Labienus, ut erat ei praeceptum a Caesare ne proelium committeret, nisi ipsius copiae

prope hostium castra visae essent, ut undique uno tempore in hostes impetus fieret, monte occupato nostros expectabat proelioque abstinebat. 4 Multo denique die per exploratores Caesar cognovit et montem a suis teneri et Helvetios castra movisse et Considium timore perterritum quod non vidisset pro viso sibi renuntiavisse. Eo die quo consuerat intervallo hostes sequitur et milia passuum tria ab eorum castris castra ponit.

[22] At dawn Labienus was in possession of the summit of the height, and Caesar was no more than a mile and a half from the enemy's camp; and, as he learnt afterwards from prisoners, neither his own approach nor that of Labienus was discovered. At this moment Considius galloped back to him, saying that the mountain he had wished Labienus to seize was in possession of the enemy: he knew it by the Gallic arms and badges. Caesar withdrew his own troops to the nearest hill, and formed line of battle. Labienus had instructions from Caesar not to join battle unless his own troops appeared near the enemy's camp, so that a simultaneous assault might be made upon the enemy from all sides; accordingly, having seized the height, he awaited the main body and refrained from engaging. At length, when the day was far spent, Caesar learnt from his scouts that the height was in possession of his own troops, and that the Helvetii had shifted their camp, and therefore that Considius in sheer panic had reported to him as seen that which he had not seen. On that day he followed the enemy at the customary interval, and pitched his camp three miles from theirs.

[23] 1 Postridie eius diei, quod omnino biduum supererat, cum exercitui frumentum metiri oporteret, et quod a Bibracte, oppido Haeduorum longe maximo et copiosissimo, non amplius milibus

passuum XVIII aberat, rei frumentariae prospiciendum existimavit; itaque iter ab Helvetiis avertit ac Bibracte ire contendit. 2 Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemilii, decurionis equitum Gallorum, hostibus nuntiatur. 3 Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacescere coeperunt.

[23] On the morrow, as no more than two days remained before it was proper to issue the corn-ration to the troops, and as he was no more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and the best-provided of the Aeduan towns, he considered that he must attend to the corn-supply. He therefore turned his line of march away from the Helvetii, and made with all speed for Bibracte. The change was reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a troop-leader of the Gallic horse. Now the Helvetii may have supposed that the Romans were moving away from them because of sheer panic, the more so because on the day before they had not joined battle after seizing the higher ground; or they may have believed that the Romans could be cut off from their corn-supply. Whichever the reason, they changed their plan, altered their route, and began to pursue and to annoy the Roman rearguard.

[24] 1 Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subduxit equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium impetum, misit. 2 Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas legiones quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat et omnia auxilia conlocavit, 3 ita ut supra se totum montem hominibus compleret; impedimenta

sarcinasque in unum locum conferri et eum ab iis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit. 4 Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie, reiecto nostro equitatu, phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt.

[24] As soon as he remarked this, Caesar withdrew his troops to the nearest hill, and sent the horse to check the enemy's charge. Meanwhile he himself drew up his four legions of veterans in triple linea half-way up the hill: but he ordered the two legions which he had last enlisted in Nearer Gaul and all the auxiliary troops to be posted on the top of the ridge, so as to fill the hill-side entirely with men: in the meantime the packs were to be collected in one place, which was to be entrenched by the troops posted in line on the higher ground. The Helvetii followed with all their carts, and collected their baggage in one place: the fighting men, in a densely-crowded line, repulsed the Roman horse, then formed massb and moved up against our first line.

[25] 1 Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium commisit. 2 Milites loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Ea disiecta gladiis destrictis in eos impetum fecerunt. 3 Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et conligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant, 4 multi ut diu iactato brachio praeoptarent scutum manu emitte et nudo corpore pugnare. 5 Tandem vulneribus defessi et pedem referre et, quod mons suberit circiter mille passuum spatio, eo se recipere coeperunt. 6 Capto

monte et succedentibus nostris, Boi et Tulingi, qui hominum milibus circiter XV agmen hostium claudebant et novissimis praesidio erant, ex itinere nostros ab latere aperto adgressi circumvenire, et id conspicati Helvetii, qui in montem sese receperant, rursus instare et proelium redintegrare coeperunt. 7 Romani conversa signa bipertito intulerunt: prima et secunda acies, ut victis ac submotis resisteret, tertia, ut venientes sustineret.

[25] Caesar first had his own horse and then those of all others sent out of sight, thus to equalise the danger of all and to take away hope of flight. Then after a speech to encourage his troops he joined battle. The legionaries, from the upper ground, easily broke the mass-formation of the enemy by a volley of javelins, and, when it was scattered, drew their swords and charged. The Gauls were greatly encumbered for the fight because several of their shields would be pierced and fastened together by a single javelin-cast; and as the iron became bent, they could not pluck it forth, nor fight handily with the left arm encumbered. Therefore many of them preferred, after continued shaking of the arm, to cast off the shield and so to fight bare-bodied. At length, worn out with wounds, they began to retreat, retiring towards a height about a mile away. They gained the height; and as the Romans followed up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with some fifteen thousand men brought up the rear and formed the rearguard, turned from their march to attack the Romans on the exposed flank, and overlapped them. Remarking this, the Helvetii, who had retired to the height, began to press again and to renew the fight. The Romans wheeled, and advanced in two divisions, the first and second line to oppose the part of the enemy which had been defeated and driven off, the third to check the fresh assault.

[26] 1 Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt. 2 Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit. 3 Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pugnatum est, propterea quod pro vallo carros obiecerunt et e loco superiore in nostros venientes tela coniciebant et non nulli inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque vulnerabant. 4 Diu cum esset pugnatum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti sunt. Ibi Orgetorigis filia atque unus e filiis captus est. 5 Ex eo proelio circiter hominum milia CXXX superfuerunt eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt [nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso]; in fines Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt, cum et propter vulnera militum et propter sepulturam occisorum nostri [triduum morati] eos sequi non potuissent. 6 Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re iuvarent: qui si iuvissent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum. Ipse triduo intermisso cum omnibus copiis eos sequi coepit.

[26] Thus the engagement became twofold, and the fight was fierce and long. When the enemy could no longer hold out against our attacks, one division continued to retire to the height, the other concentrated upon their baggage and carts. There was no rout, for throughout the action, though it lasted from the seventh hour to eventide, no one could have seen the back of an enemy. Even round the baggage the fight was continued far into the night, as the enemy had constructed a rampart of carts, and from the higher ground they continued to hurl missiles upon our advancing lines, while some of them kept discharging native pikes and darts from underneath the carts and wheels, wounding our men. However, after a long fight, our

troops gained possession of the baggage and the camp, where the daughter of Orgetorix and one of his sons were taken prisoners. Some 130,000 persons survived the action, and marched continuously the whole of that night; the march was not interrupted for any part of the night, and three days after they reached the borders of the Lingones; for our own troops had not been able to pursue them, having halted for three days to tend their wounds and to bury the dead. Caesar despatched letters and messages to the Lingones, ordering them not to give assistance by corn and otherwise, and affirming that, if they gave such assistance, he would treat them in the same fashion as the Helvetii. He himself, after the three days' interval, began to follow them with all his forces.

[27] 1 Helvetii omnium rerum inopia adducti legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt. 2 Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, paruerunt. 3 Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent, poposcit. 4 Dum ea conquiruntur et conferuntur, [nocte intermissa] circiter hominum milia VI eius pagi qui Verbigenus appellatur, sive timore perterriti, ne armis traditis supplicio adficerentur, sive spe salutis inducti, quod in tanta multitudine dediticiorum suam fugam aut occultari aut omnino ignorari posse existimarent, prima nocte e castris Helvetiorum egressi ad Rhenum finesque Germanorum contenderunt.

[27] The Helvetii were compelled by lack of all provision to send deputies to him to treat of surrender. These found him on the march, and, throwing themselves at his feet, in suppliant tones besought peace with tears. He bade them await his arrival in their present

station, and they obeyed. Upon arrival there Caesar demanded the surrender of hostages and arms, and of the slaves who had deserted to them. While these were sought out and collected together night intervened; and about six thousand men of the canton called Verbigene — it may be in sheer panic, lest after the surrender of their arms they might be put to the sword; or else they were tempted by the hope of escape, and the thought that in so vast a multitude of prisoners their own flight could be concealed or even unnoticed — left the Helvetian camp at nightfall and hastened to the Rhine and the borders of the Germans.

[28] 1 Quod ubi Caesar rescit, quorum per fines ierant his uti conquirent et reducerent, si sibi purgati esse vellent, imperavit; reductos in hostium numero habuit; 2 reliquos omnes obsidibus, armis, perfugis traditis in deditionem accepit. 3 Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, et, quod omnibus frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, restituere iussit. Id ea maxime ratione fecit, quod noluit eum locum unde Helvetii discesserant vacare, ne propter bonitatem agrorum Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, ex suis finibus in Helvetiorum fines transirent et finitimi Galliae provinciae Allobrogibusque essent. 4 Boios petentibus Haeduis, quod egregia virtute erant cogniti, ut in finibus suis conlocarent, concessit; quibus illi agros dederunt quosque postea in parem iuris libertatisque condicionem atque ipsi erant receperunt.

[28] So soon as Caesar came to know of this he commanded the inhabitants through whose borders they had marched to seek them out and bring them back, if they wished to clear themselves from

complicity in his sight. When the runaways were brought back he treated them as enemies; all the remainder, upon delivery of hostages, arms, and deserters, he admitted to surrender. He commanded the Helvetii, Tulingi, and Latobrigi to return to their own borders, whence they had started; and as they had lost all their produce, and had no means at home of sustaining hunger, he required the Allobroges to give them a supply of corn. He also ordered them to restore with their own hands the towns and villages which they had burnt. His chief reason for so doing was that he did not wish the district which the Helvetii had left to be unoccupied, lest the excellence of the farmlands might tempt the Germans who dwell across the Rhine to cross from their own into the Helvetian borders, and so to become neighbours to the Province of Gaul and to the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui that they might establish the Boii, known to be of remarkable courage, in their own borders. The Aedui gave them farmlands, and afterwards admitted them to like measure of privilege and liberty with themselves.

[29] 1 In castris Helvetiorum tabulae repertae sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim, quot pueri, senes mulieresque. 2 [Quarum omnium rerum] summa erat capitum Helvetiorum milium CCLXIII, Tulingorum milium XXXVI, Latobrigorum XIII, Rauracorum XXIII, Boiorum XXXII; ex his qui arma ferre possent ad milia nonaginta duo. 3 Summa omnium fuerunt ad milia CCCLXVIII. Eorum qui domum redierunt censu habito, ut Caesar imperaverat, repertus est numerus milium C et X.

[29] In the camp of the Helvetii were found, and brought to Caesar,

records written out in Greek letters, wherein was drawn up a nominal register showing what number of them had gone out from their homeland, who were able to bear arms, and also separately children, old men, and women. On all these counts the total showed 263,000 persons of the Helvetii, 36,000 of the Tulingi, 14,000 of the Latobrigi, 23,000 of the Rauraci, 32,000 of the Boii; of these there were about 92,000 able to bear arms. The grand total was about 368,000. Of those who returned home a census was taken in accordance with Caesar's command, and the number was found to be 110,000.

[30] 1 Bello Helvetiorum confecto totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt: 2 intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu [terrae] Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse, 3 propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent. 4 Petierunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent. 5 Ea re permissa diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt.

[30] Upon the conclusion of the Helvetian campaign deputies from well-nigh the whole of Gaul, the chief men of the various states, assembled in Caesar's camp to congratulate him. They perceived, they said, that, although Caesar had by the campaign required

satisfaction of the Helvetii for past outrages suffered by the Roman people at their hands, the result had been as beneficial to the land of Gaul as to the Roman people; for the Helvetii had left their homes at a time of exceeding prosperity with the express design of making war upon the whole of Gaul and obtaining empire; they purposed from an ample field to select for their abode the spot which they judged to be the most convenient and the most productive in all Gaul, and to make the rest of the states tributary. The deputies asked that they might be allowed to announce — and that with Caesar's consent — a convention of all Gaul for a certain day, for they had certain petitions which, after general agreement, they wished to ask of him. Permission was given, and they appointed a day for the convention, pledging themselves by an oath that no man should publish its proceedings save the persons authorised by their general consent.

[31] 1 Eo concilio dimisso, idem princeps civitatum qui ante fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret. 2 Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: non minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent. 3 Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduus: Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos. 4 Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab Arvernibus Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur. 5 Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad C et XX milium numerum. 6 Cum his Haeduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum

armis contendisse; magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse. 7 Quibus proeliis calamitatibusque fractos, qui et sua virtute et populi Romani hospitio atque amicitia plurimum ante in Gallia potuissent, coactos esse Sequanis obsides dare nobilissimos civitatis et iure iurando civitatem obstringere sese neque obsides repetituros neque auxilium a populo Romano imploratorios neque recusatorios quo minus perpetuo sub illorum ditione atque imperio essent. 8 Unum se esse ex omni civitate Haeduum qui adduci non potuerit ut iuraret aut liberos suos obsides daret. 9 Ob eam rem se ex civitate profugisse et Romam ad senatum venisse auxilium postulatam, quod solus neque iure iurando neque obsidibus teneretur. 10 Sed peius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis accidisse, propterea quod Ariovistus, rex Germanorum, in eorum finibus consedisset tertiamque partem agri Sequani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupavisset et nunc de altera parte tertia Sequanos decedere iuberet, propterea quod paucis mensibus ante Harudum milia hominum XXIII ad eum venissent, quibus locus ac sedes pararentur. 11 Futurum esse paucis annis uti omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent; neque enim conferendum esse Gallicum cum Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem victus cum illa comparandam. 12 Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque liberos poscere et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad voluntatem eius facta sit. 13 Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium: non posse eius imperia diutius sustineri. 14 Nisi quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit auxilii, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut domo emigrent, aliud

domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a Germanis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accadat, experiantur. Haec si enuntiata Ariovisto sint, non dubitare quin de omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint gravissimum supplicium sumat. 15 Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Romani deterrere posse ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere.

[31] The convention having been held and dissolved, the same chiefs of states as before returned to Caesar with a petition that they might be allowed to discuss with him apart, in private, the question of their own and the general welfare. The petition was granted, and they all threw themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, declaring that they were as anxious and as much concerned to prevent the publication of their utterances as to obtain their desires; for he saw that publication must expose them to the most cruel vengeance. Diviciacus the Aeduan spoke on their behalf. "In all Gaul," he said, "there are two parties; in one of them the Aedui have the primacy, in the other the Arverni. For many years there was a vehement struggle between the two for the dominion; then it came about that the Arverni and the Sequani summoned the Germans to their aid for a price. About fifteen thousand of them crossed the Rhine in the first instance; then, when those fierce barbarians had got a liking for the farmlands, the civilization, and the wealth of the Gauls, more were brought over, and at the present time there are about 120,000 of them in Gaul.

"With them the Aedui and their dependents have repeatedly fought in battle: defeat has brought great disaster, the loss of all our nobility, our senate, and our knights. It is these battles and disasters that have broken the men who by their own valour, and by the courtesy and the

friendship of Rome, were formerly paramount in Gaul, and have obliged them to give as hostages to the Sequani the noblest men of the state, and to bind the state by oath not to require the return of the hostages, not to entreat the assistance of Rome, nor to refuse eternal submission to the sway and sovereignty of the Sequani. I am the one man of all the state of the Aedui upon whom it has not been possible to prevail to take the oath or give his children as hostages. It was for that reason that I fled from the state and came to the Senate at Rome to demand assistance, because I was the only man not bound by oath or hostages. But a worse fate has befallen the victorious Sequani than the conquered Aedui: Ariovistus, king of the Germans, has settled within their borders and seized a third part of their territory, the best in all Gaul; and now he orders them to evacuate another third, because a few months since 24,000 of the Harudes joined him, for whom he had to provide a settlement and a home. In a few years all the natives will have been driven from the borders of Gaul, and all the Germans will have crossed the Rhine; for there can be no comparison between the Gallic and the German territory, none between our usual scale of living and theirs. Having once conquered the forces of the Gauls in battle near Magetobriga, Ariovistus is exercising a proud and cruel tyranny, demanding as hostages the children of the greatest nobles, and perpetrating upon them all the direst forms of torture, if anything be not performed at his nod or at his pleasure. He is a passionate, a reckless barbarian: we can endure his tyrannies no longer. Unless some means of assistance is to be found in Caesar and in the Roman people, all the Gauls must needs do just what the Helvetii have done — emigrate, to seek another habitation, other abodes far from the Germans, and risk any fortune that may befall them. If these remarks of mine be reported to

Ariovistus, I make no doubt that he will inflict the severest punishment on all the hostages in his keeping. You, Caesar, by your own and your army's influence, or by your late victory, or by the name of the Roman people, can prevent the crossing of a larger host of Germans over the Rhine, and defend the whole of Gaul from the outrage of Ariovistus."

[32] 1 Hac oratione ab Diviciaco habita omnes qui aderant magno fletu auxilium a Caesare petere coeperunt. 2 Animadvertit Caesar unos ex omnibus Sequanos nihil earum rerum facere quas ceteri facerent sed tristes capite demisso terram intueri. Eius rei quae causa esset miratus ex ipsis quaesiit. 3 Nihil Sequani respondere, sed in eadem tristitia taciti permanere. Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque ullam omnino vocem exprimere posset, idem Diviacus Haedus respondit: 4 hoc esse miseriorem et graviolem fortunam Sequanorum quam reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem, 5 velut si coram adesset, horrerent, propterea quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas daretur, Sequanis vero, qui intra fines suos Ariovistum recepissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestate eius essent, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi.

[32] When Diviciacus had delivered this speech all who were present began with loud weeping to seek assistance from Caesar. He noticed, however, that of all the company the Sequani alone did not act like the rest, but with head downcast stared sullenly upon the ground. He asked them, wondering, what might be the cause thereof. The Sequani made no reply, but continued in the same sullen silence. When repeated questioning could extract not a word from them, Diviciacus the Aeduan made further reply. "The lot of the Sequani,"

he said, “is more pitiable, more grievous than that of the rest, inasmuch as they alone dare not even in secret make complaint or entreat assistance, dreading the cruelty of Ariovistus as much in his absence as if he were present before them. The rest, for all their suffering, have still a chance of escape; but the Sequani, who have admitted Ariovistus within their borders, and whose towns are all in his power, must needs endure any and every torture.”

[33] 1 His rebus cognitis Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum. Hac oratione habita, concilium dimisit. 2 Et secundum ea multae res eum hortabantur quare sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, in primis quod Haeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepe numero a senatu appellatos, in servitute atque [in] ditione videbat Germanorum teneri eorumque obsides esse apud Ariovistum ac Sequanos intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur. 3 Paulatim autem Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire et in Galliam magnam eorum multitudinem venire populo Romano periculosum videbat, neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros temperaturos existimabat quin, cum omnem Galliam occupavissent, ut ante Cimbri Teutonique fecissent, in provinciam exirent atque inde in Italiam contenderent [, praesertim cum Sequanos a provincia nostra Rhodanus divideret]; quibus rebus quam maturime occurrendum putabat. 4 Ipse autem Ariovistus tantos sibi spiritus, tantam arrogantiam sumpserat, ut ferendus non videretur.

[33] When he had learnt this Caesar comforted the Gauls with his words, promising that he would concern himself with this matter: he

had, he said, great hope that by his good offices and his authority he would induce Ariovistus to put a stop to his outrages. With this speech he dissolved the convention. And straightway many considerations induced him to suppose that he must take thought and action in the matter. In the first place, he could see that the Aedui, often hailed by the Senate as brethren and kinsmen, were fast bound in slavery and subjection to the Germans, and he was aware that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani. This, considering the greatness of the Roman empire, he deemed to be an utter disgrace to himself and to the state. Next, he could see that the Germans were becoming gradually accustomed to cross over the Rhine, and that the arrival of a great host of them in Gaul was dangerous for the Roman people. Nor did he suppose that barbarians so fierce would stop short after seizing the whole of Gaul; but rather, like the Cimbri and Teutoni before them, they would break forth into the Province, and push on thence into Italy, especially as there was but the Rhone to separate the Sequani from the Roman Province. All this, he felt, must be faced without a moment's delay. As for Ariovistus himself, he had assumed such airs, such arrogance, that he seemed insufferable.

[34] 1 Quam ob rem placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis utriusque rebus cum eo agere. 2 Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se venire oportere. 3 Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno commeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse. 4 Sibi autem mirum videri quid in sua Gallia, quam bello vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Romano negotii esset.

[34] He resolved, therefore, to send deputies to Ariovistus to request of him the choice of some half-way station between them for a parley, as it was his desire to discuss with him matters of state and of the highest importance to each of them. To the deputation Ariovistus made reply that if he had had need of aught from Caesar, he would have come to him, and if Caesar desired aught of him, he ought to come to him. Moreover, he did not venture without an army to come into those parts of Gaul which Caesar was occupying, and he could not concentrate his army without great exertion in the matter of supply. And he found himself wondering what business either Caesar or the Roman people might have in that Gaul which he had made his own by conquest in war.

[35] 1 His responsis ad Caesarem relatis, iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit: 2 quoniam tanto suo populi que Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, hanc sibi populo que Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eo postularet: 3 primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis redderet Sequanisque permetteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret. 4 Si [id] ita fecisset, sibi populo que Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum.

[35] When this reply had been brought back to Caesar, he sent deputies again to him with the following message: Forasmuch as, after great kindness of treatment from Caesar himself and from the Roman people (for it was in Caesar's year of consulship that he had been saluted as king and friend by the Senate), he expressed his thanks to Caesar and the Roman people by reluctance to accept the invitation to come to a parley and by thinking it needless to say or learn anything as touching their mutual concerns, Caesar's demand of him was, first, that he should not bring any further host of men across the Rhine into Gaul; second, that he should restore the hostages he held from the Aedui and grant the Sequani entire freedom to restore to the Aedui with his full consent the hostages they held; further, that he should not annoy the Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies. If he did as requested, Caesar and the Roman people would maintain a lasting kindness and friendship towards him. If Caesar's request were not granted, then, forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messalla and Marcus Piso the Senate had decided that the governor of the Province of Gaul should protect, as far as he could do so with advantage to the state, the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people, Caesar would not disregard the outrages suffered by the Aedui.

[36] 1 Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. 2 Si ipse populo Romano non praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in suo iure impediri. 3 Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortunam temptassent et armis congressi ac superati essent, stipendiarios esse factos. 4 Magnam Caesarem iniuriam facere, qui suo adventu

vectigalia sibi deteriora faceret. 5 Haeduis se obsides redditurum non esse neque his neque eorum sociis iniuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo manerent quod convenisset stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id non fecissent, longe iis fraternum nomen populi Romani afuturum. 6 Quod sibi Caesar denuntiaret se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse. Cum vellet, congregaretur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos XIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent.

[36] To this Ariovistus replied as follows: It was the right of war that conquerors dictated as they pleased to the conquered; and the Roman people also were accustomed to dictate to those whom they conquered, not according to the order of a third party, but according to their own choice. If he, for his part, did not ordain how the Roman people should exercise their own right, he ought not to be hindered by the Roman people in the enjoyment of his own right. The Aedui, having risked the fortune of war and having been overcome in a conflict of arms, had been made tributary to himself. Caesar was doing him a serious injury, for his advance was damaging his revenues. He would not restore their hostages to the Aedui, nor would he make war on them nor on their allies without cause, if they stood to their agreement and paid tribute yearly; if not, they would find it of no assistance whatever to be called "Brethren of the Roman people." As for Caesar's declaration that he would not disregard outrages suffered by the Aedui, no one had fought with Ariovistus save to his own destruction. He might join issue when he pleased: he would learn what invincible Germans, highly trained in arms, who in a period of fourteen years had never been beneath a roof, could accomplish by their valour.

[37] 1 Haec eodem tempore Caesari mandata referebantur et legati ab Haeduis et a Treveris veniebant: 2 Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse; 3 Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedissee, qui Rhenum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres. Quibus rebus Caesar vehementer commotus maturandum sibi existimavit, ne, si nova manus Sueborum cum veteribus copiis Ariovisti sese coniunxisset, minus facile resisti posset. 4 Itaque re frumentaria quam celerrime potuit comparata magnis itineribus ad Ariovistum contendit.

[37] At the same hour in which this message was brought back to Caesar, deputies arrived from the Aedui and the Treveri. The Aedui came to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul, were devastating their borders, and that they themselves had not been able to purchase peace from Ariovistus even by the delivery of hostages. The Treveri reported that one hundred cantons of the Suebi had settled on the banks of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross the river, under the command of two brothers, Nasua and Cimberius. At this Caesar was exceedingly disquieted, and determined that he must make speed, for fear that, if the new company of Suebi joined the old forces of Ariovistus, resistance might be more difficult. Therefore he secured his corn^o-supply with all possible speed, and pushed on with forced marches to meet Ariovistus.

[38] 1 Cum tridui viam processisset, nuntiatum est ei Ariovistum cum suis omnibus copiis ad occupandum Vesontionem, quod est oppidum maximum Sequanorum, contendere [triduique viam a suis finibus

processisse]. Id ne accideret, magnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimabat. Namque omnium rerum quae ad bellum usui erant summa erat in eo oppido facultas, 2 idque natura loci sic muniebatur ut magnam ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propterea quod flumen [alduas] Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit, 3 reliquum spatium, quod est non amplius pedum MDC, qua flumen intermittit, mons continet magna altitudine, ita ut radices eius montis ex utraque parte ripae fluminis contingant, 4 hunc murus circumdatus arcem efficit et cum oppido coniungit. 5 Huc Caesar magnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus contendit occupatoque oppido ibi praesidium conlocat.

[38] He had advanced a three days' march when news was brought to him that Ariovistus with all his forces was pushing on to seize Vesontio (Besançon), the largest town of the Sequani, and had already advanced a three days' march from his own borders. Caesar considered that a great effort on his part was needed to prevent this occurrence. For there was in that town an abundant supply of all things needful for war, and the place was so well fortified by Nature as to afford great facilities for the conduct of a campaign. The river Dubis (Doubs), with a circuit that might have been traced by compasses, surrounds well-nigh the whole town: the remaining space of not more than sixteen hundred feet, where the river breaks off, is closed in by a height of great eminence, so placed that its foundations touch the river-bank on either side. This height is surrounded by a wall to form a citadel and join it with the town. It was to this place that Caesar pushed on with forced marches by night and day, and, seizing the town, posted a garrison in it.

[39] 1 Dum paucos dies ad Vesontionem rei frumentariae

commeatusque causa moratur, ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse praedicabant (saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse), tantus subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit ut non mediocriter omnium mentes animosque perturbaret. 2 Hic primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis, reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant: 3 quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret; non nulli pudore adducti, ut timoris suspicionem vitarent, remanebant. 4 Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant: abdit in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis commune periculum miserabantur. Vulgo totis castris testamenta obsignabantur. 5 Horum vocibus ac timore paulatim etiam ii qui magnum in castris usum habebant, milites centurionesque quique equitatu praeebant, perturbabantur. 6 Qui se ex his minus timidos existimari volebant, non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam, ut satis commode supportari posset, timere dicebant. 7 Non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientes milites neque propter timorem signa laturos.

[39] During a few days' halt near Vesontio for the provision of corn and other supplies, a panic arose from inquiries made by our troops and remarks uttered by Gauls and traders, who affirmed that the Germans were men of a mighty frame and an incredible valour and skill at arms; for they themselves (so they said) at meetings with the

Germans had often been unable even to endure their look and the keenness of their eyes. So great was the panic, and so suddenly did it seize upon all the army, that it affected in serious fashion the intelligence and the courage of all ranks. It began first with the tribunes, the contingent-commanders, and the others who had followed Caesar from Rome to court his friendship, without any great experience in warfare. Advancing various reasons which, according to their own statement, obliged them to depart, some sought his permission to leave; some were compelled by very shame to stay, to avoid the suspicion of cowardice. They were unable to disguise their looks, or even at times to restrain their tears; they hid in their tents to complain of their own fate, or to lament in company with their friends the common danger. Everywhere throughout the camp there was signing of wills. By the cowardly utterances of such as these even men who had long experience in the field, soldiers, centurions, and cavalry commanders, were gradually affected. Those of them who desired to be thought less timid would declare that they were not afraid of the enemy, but feared the narrow defiles and the vast forests which lay between themselves and Ariovistus, or a possible failure of proper transport for the corn-supply. Some had even gone so far as to declare to Caesar that when he gave the order for camp to be shifted and standards advanced the soldiers would not obey, and by reason of cowardice would not move forward.

[40] 1 Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitibus centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent. 2 Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret? 3 Sibi

quidem persuaderi cognitis suis postulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi Romani gratiam repudiaturum. 4 Quod si furore atque amentia impulsus bellum intulisset, quid tandem vererentur? Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent? 5 Factum eius hostis periculum patrum nostrorum memoria Cimbris et Teutonis a C. Mario pulsus [cum non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritis videbatur]; factum etiam nuper in Italia servili tumultu, quos tamen aliquid usus ac disciplina, quam a nobis acceperant, sublevarint. 6 Ex quo iudicari posse quantum haberet in se boni constantia, propterea quod quos aliquamdiu inermes sine causa timuissent hos postea armatos ac victores superassent. 7 Denique hos esse eosdem Germanos quibuscum saepe numero Helvetii congressi non solum in suis sed etiam in illorum finibus plerumque superarint, qui tamen pares esse nostro exercitui non potuerint. 8 Si quos adversum proelium et fuga Gallorum commoveret, hos, si quaerent, reperire posse diuturnitate belli defatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset neque sui potestatem fecisset, desperantes iam de pugna et dispersos subito adortum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse. 9 Cui rationi contra homines barbaros atque imperitos locus fuisset, hac ne ipsum quidem sperare nostros exercitus capi posse. 10 Qui suum timorem in rei frumentariae simulationem angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum aut de officio imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur. 11 Haec sibi esse curae; frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura; de itinere ipsos brevi tempore iudicatuuros. 12 Quod non fore dicto audientes neque signa laturos dicantur, nihil se ea re commoveri: scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re

gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. 13 Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. 14 Itaque se quod in longiorem diem conlaturus fuisset repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta vigilia castra moturum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an timor plus valeret. 15 Quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua non dubitet, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem futuram. Huic legioni Caesar et indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime.

[40] Remarking this, he convened a council of war, and summoned thereto the centurions of all grades. Then indignantly he reprimanded them, first and foremost because they thought it their business to ask or to consider in which direction or with what purpose they were being led. "Ariovistus," he said, "in my own consulship sought most eagerly the friendship of the Roman people. Why should anyone conclude that he intends so recklessly to depart from his duty? For myself, I am persuaded that, when my demands are made known, and the fairness of my terms understood, Ariovistus will not reject the goodwill of myself or the Roman people. Even if, in a fit of rage and madness, he makes war, what, pray, have you to fear? Why do you despair of your own courage or of my competence? We have made trial of this foe in the time of our fathers, on the occasion when, in the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutoni by Gaius Marius, the army was deemed to have deserved no less praise than the commander himself. We have made further trial of late in Italy in the slave revolt, and yet the slaves had the practice and training which they had learnt from us to give them some measure of support. You may judge from this what profit there is in a good courage, for the

very men whom you had feared without cause during a long time, when they had no arms, you subsequently subdued, though they had taken up arms and won victories. Finally, these are the selfsame men with whom the Helvetii have had frequent encounters, and they have often subdued them, not only in Helvetian territory but also in Germany; yet the Helvetii have not proved a match for *our* army. If there be any who are concerned at the defeat and flight of the Gauls, they can discover for the asking that when the Gauls were worn out by the length of the campaign Ariovistus, who had kept himself for many months within his camp in the marshes, without giving a chance of encounter, attacked them suddenly when they had at last dispersed in despair of a battle, and conquered them rather by skill and stratagem than by courage. Even Ariovistus himself does not expect that our own armies can be caught by tactics for which there was a chance against unskilled barbarians. Those persons who ascribe their own cowardice to a pretended anxiety for the corn-supply or to the defiles on the route are guilty of presumption, for they appear either to despair of the commander's doing his duty or to instruct him in it. These matters are my own concern; corn is being supplied by the Sequani, the Leuci, the Lingones, and the corn-crops in the fields are already ripe; of the route you yourselves will shortly be able to judge. As for the statement that the soldiers will not obey orders nor move forward, I am not in the least concerned by that; in any cases where an army has not obeyed its general, either fortune has failed because of some actual blunder, or else some crime shall be discovered and a charge of avarice has been brought home. My own blamelessness has been clearly seen throughout my life, my good fortune in the Helvetian campaign. Accordingly I intend to execute at once what I might have put off to a more distant day, and

to break camp in the fourth watch of this next night, to the intent that I may perceive at once whether honour and duty, or cowardice, prevail in your minds. Even if no one else follows, I shall march with the Tenth Legion alone; I have no doubt of its allegiance, and it will furnish the commander-in-chief's escort." Caesar had shown special favour to this legion, and he placed the greatest reliance in it because of its courage.

[41] 1 Hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi innata est, 2 princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit. 3 Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satis facerent: se neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed imperatoris esse existimavisse. 4 Eorum satisfactione accepta et itinere exquisito per Diviciacum, quod ex Gallis ei maximam fidem habebat, ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret, de quarta vigilia, ut dixerat, profectus est. 5 Septimo die, cum iter non intermitteret, ab exploratoribus certior factus est Ariovisti copias a nostris milia passuum IIII et XX abesse.

[41] By the delivery of this speech the spirit of all ranks was changed in a remarkable fashion; the greatest keenness and eagerness for active service was engendered, and the Tenth Legion was the first to express thanks to Caesar, through its tribunes, for the excellent opinion he had formed of it, and to affirm its complete readiness for active service. Then the remaining legions moved their tribunes and senior centurions to give satisfactory explanation to Caesar that they

had felt neither doubt nor panic, and had regarded it as the commander's business, not their own, to decide the plan of campaign. Their explanation was accepted, and through Diviciacus (the one person in whom Caesar had absolute confidence) a route was found out to lead the army through open country, by a detour of more than fifty miles. In the fourth watch, as Caesar had said, the march began. On the seventh day of continuous marching the scouts reported that the forces of Ariovistus were four-and-twenty miles away from our own.

[42] 1 Cognito Caesaris adventu Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse existimaret. 2 Non respuit condicionem Caesar iamque eum ad sanitatem reverti arbitrabatur, cum id quod antea petenti denegasset ultro polliceretur, 3 magnamque in spem veniebat pro suis tantis populique Romani in eum beneficiis cognitis suis postulatis fore uti pertinacia desisteret. 4 Dies conloquio dictus est ex eo die quintus. 5 Interim saepe cum legati ultro citroque inter eos mitterentur, Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar adduceret: vereri se ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu veniret: alia ratione sese non esse venturum. 6 Caesar, quod neque conloquium interposita causa tolli volebat neque salutem suam Gallorum equitatu committere audebat, commodissimum esse statuit omnibus equis Gallis equitibus detractis eo legionarios milites legionis X., cui quam maxime confidebat, imponere, ut praesidium quam amicissimum, si quid opus facto esset, haberet. 7 Quod cum fieret, non inridicule quidam ex militibus X. legionis dixit: plus quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum se in cohortis praetoriae loco X. legionem habiturum ad equum rescribere.

[42] When he learnt of Caesar's approach Ariovistus sent deputies to him to announce that he was now ready to do what Caesar had before demanded as touching a parley, because he had come nearer, and Ariovistus believed that he could comply without risk. Caesar did not reject the proposal, and he was inclined to think that Ariovistus was at length returning to a proper frame of mind, inasmuch as of his own motion he proffered what he had previously refused on request. Moreover, he began to have a good hope that, in consideration of the signal benefits conferred upon him by Caesar and the Roman people, Ariovistus would abandon his obstinacy when he knew Caesar's demands. A day — the fifth after that — was appointed for the parley. Meanwhile there was continual sending of deputies to and fro between them; and Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should bring no infantry with him to the parley, as he was afraid Caesar might surround him by treachery; let each party, therefore, come with an escort of horse; otherwise he would not come at all. Caesar did not wish parley to be broken off upon an excuse thus interposed; at the same time he could not venture to entrust his personal safety to Gallic horse. He decided, therefore, that the best plan was to take the horses from Gallic troopers and mount upon them soldiers of the Tenth Legion, in which he had absolute confidence; thus, if there were need of action, he would have an escort of the truest friends he could find. As the order was being carried out, one of the soldiers of the Tenth Legion remarked with some wit that Caesar was doing better than his promise; for he had promised to treat the Tenth Legion as the commander-in-chief's escort, and he was making new "cavalry" of them.

[43] 1 Planities erat magna et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis. Hic locus aequum fere spatium a castris Ariovisti et Caesaris aberat. Eo,

ut erat dictum, ad colloquium venerunt. 2 Legionem Caesar, quam equis devexerat, passibus CC ab eo tumulo constituit. Item equites Ariovisti pari intervallo constiterunt. 3 Ariovistus ex equis ut conloquerentur et praeter se denos ad colloquium adducerent postulavit. 4 Ubi eo ventum est, Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex appellatus esset a senatu, quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat; 5 illum, cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iustam haberet, beneficio ac liberalitate sua ac senatus ea praemia consecutum. 6 Docebat etiam quam veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercederent, 7 quae senatus consulta quotiens quamque honorifica in eos facta essent, ut omni tempore totius Galliae principatum Haedui tenuissent, prius etiam quam nostram amicitiam adpetissent. 8 Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse; quod vero ad amicitiam populi Romani attulissent, id iis eripi quis pati posset? 9 Postulavit deinde eadem quae legatis in mandatis dederat: ne aut Haeduis aut eorum sociis bellum inferret, obsides redderet, si nullam partem Germanorum domum remittere posset, at ne quos amplius Rhenum transire pateretur.

[43] There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable size. The place was about equally distant from the camps of Caesar and of Ariovistus. Thither, as agreed, they came for the parley. Caesar stationed the legion which he had brought on horseback two hundred paces from the mound. The horsemen of Ariovistus halted at an equal distance. Ariovistus demanded that they should parley on horseback, and that each should bring with him to

the parley ten men besides himself. When they arrived at the spot Caesar began his speech by relating the benefits conferred upon Ariovistus by himself and by the Senate; the Senate had called him king and friend, and had sent gifts with a most lavish hand. This privilege, as he pointed out, had fallen to the lot of but few, and was usually granted in consideration of great personal services. Ariovistus, though he had no right to audience of the Senate, and no just cause of claim, had obtained the rewards in question by the favour and generosity of Caesar and of the Senate. He proceeded to show how long-established and how just were the reasons for a close relationship between Rome and the Aedui; the frequency and the distinction of the Senate's decrees in respect of them; the manner in which, even before they had sought the friendship of Rome, the Aedui had always held the primacy of all Gaul. It was the tradition of the Roman people to desire that its allies and friends should not only lose none of their possessions, but should enjoy increase of influence, dignity, and distinction; on the other hand, who, he asked, could endure that they should be despoiled of what they had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people? He then made the same demands as those which he had given in his instructions to the deputies — that is to say, Ariovistus must not make war on the Aedui or on their allies; he must restore the hostages; and if he could not send back home any part of the Germans, at any rate he must not suffer any more to cross the Rhine.

[44] 1 Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit: 2 transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed rogatum et arcessitum a Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; stipendium capere

iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint. 3 Non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas esse. 4 Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerit. 5 Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, atque se hac spe petisse. Si per populum Romanum stipendium remittatur et dediticii subtrahantur, non minus libenter sese recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam quam adpetierit. 6 Quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam traducat, id se sui muniendi, non Galliae oppugnandae causa facere; eius rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogatus non venerit et quod bellum non intulerit sed defenderit. 7 Se prius in Galliam venisse quam populum Romanum. Numquam ante hoc tempus exercitum populi Romani Galliae provinciae finibus egressum. 8 Quid sibi vellet? Cur in suas possessiones veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut illam nostram. Ut ipsi concedi non oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos, quod in suo iure se interpellaremus. 9 Quod fratres a senatu Haeduos appellatos diceret, non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos in iis contentionibus quas Haedui secum et cum Sequanis habuissent auxilio populi Romani usos esse. 10 Debere se suspicari simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi causa habere. 11 Qui nisi decedat atque exercitum deducat ex his regionibus, sese illum non pro amico sed pro hoste habiturum. 12 Quod si eum interfecerit, multis sese nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum (id se

ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere), quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset. 13 Quod si decessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi tradidisset, magno se illum praemio remuneraturum et quaecumque bella geri vellet sine ullo eius labore et periculo confecturum.

[44] To the demands of Caesar Ariovistus replied in brief, but he dilated at length upon his own good qualities. He had crossed the Rhine, he said, not of his own desire, but upon the request and summons of the Gauls; not without great hope of great rewards had he left home and kindred; the settlements he occupied in Gaul were granted by the natives, the hostages had been given with the consent of the natives; the tribute he took was by right of war, as customarily enforced by conquerors upon conquered. He had not made war upon the Gauls, but they upon him; all the states of Gaul had come to attack him and had set up their camp against him; all their forces had been beaten and overcome by him in a single action. If they wished to try the issue again, he was prepared to fight it out again; if they wished to enjoy peace, it was unjust to refuse the payment of tribute which of their own consent they had paid hitherto. The friendship of the Roman people ought to be a distinction and a security to him, not a hindrance; and he had sought it with that hope. If through the agency of the Roman people the tribute were to be remitted and the surrendered persons withdrawn, he would refuse the friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As for the host of Germans that he was bringing over into Gaul, his object was to protect himself, not to attack Gaul; and the proof thereof was that he had not come except upon request, and that his warfare had been defensive, not offensive. He had come into Gaul before the Roman people. Never heretofore had an army of the Roman people left the

borders of the Province of Gaul. What did Caesar mean? Why did he come into his sphere of occupation? This was his province of Gaul, as the other was the Roman. As it was not right to give way to him, if he made an attack on Roman territory, so likewise the Romans were unjust in obstructing him in his own jurisdiction. As for Caesar's statement that the Aedui were called "brothers," Ariovistus was not such a barbarian, not so ignorant of affairs as not to know that neither in the last campaign against the Allobroges had the Aedui rendered assistance to the Romans, nor in the disputes of the Aedui with himself and the Sequani had they enjoyed the assistance of the Roman people. He was bound to suspect, in spite of pretended friendship, that Caesar had an army in Gaul for the purpose of crushing him. Unless, therefore, Caesar departed and withdrew his army from this locality, he would regard him, not as a friend, but as an enemy. And if he put Caesar to death, he would gratify many nobles and leaders of the Roman people: this he knew for certain from themselves, by the messengers sent on behalf of all whose favour and friendship he could purchase by Caesar's death. If, however, Caesar departed and resigned to him the uninterrupted occupation of Gaul, he would recompense him by a great reward, and would, without any exertion or risk on his part, execute any campaigns he might wish to be carried out.

[45] 1 Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. 2 Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium posuisset. 3 Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus

spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset.

[45] Caesar spoke at length for the purpose of showing why he could not give up the task in hand. His own practice, he said, and the practice of the Roman people did not suffer the abandonment of allies who had deserved so well, nor did he admit that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people. The Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in a campaign by Quintus Fabius Maximus: the Roman people had pardoned them, and had not formed them into a province nor imposed a tribute. If priority of time was to be the standard, then the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul had complete justification; if the decision of the Senate was to be observed, Gaul should be free, for after conquest of the country the Senate had willed that it should continue to observe its own laws.

[46] 1 Dum haec in conloquio geruntur, Caesari nuntiatum est equites Ariovisti propius tumultum accedere et ad nostros adequitare, lapides telaque in nostros coicere. 2 Caesar loquendi finem fecit seque ad suos recepit suisque imperavit ne quod omnino telum in hostes reicerent. 3 Nam etsi sine ullo periculo legionis delectae cum equitatu proelium fore videbat, tamen committendum non putabat ut, pulsus hostibus, dici posset eos ab se per fidem in conloquio circumventos. 4 Postea quam in vulgus militum elatum est qua arrogantia in conloquio Ariovistus usus omni Gallia Romanis interdixisset, impetumque in nostros eius equites fecissent, eaque res conloquium ut diremisset, multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum est.

[46] During the progress of the parley Caesar was informed that the

horsemen of Ariovistus were approaching nearer the mound, riding up to our troops, and discharging stones and darts at them. Caesar made an end of speaking, and, withdrawing to his own men, commanded them not to discharge a single dart against the enemy in reply. For, although he could see that a fight between the chosen legion and the horsemen would involve no danger, still he did not think proper, by so beating the enemy, to make possible the report that after pledge given they had been surrounded by him during a parley. As soon as the common soldiers learnt how arrogantly at the parley Ariovistus had forbidden all Gaul to the Romans, how his horsemen had attacked our troops, and how this action had broken off the parley, the army was inspired with far greater eagerness and enthusiasm for battle.

[47] 1 Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter eos agi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret. 2 Conloquendi Caesari causa visa non est, et eo magis quod pridie eius diei Germani retineri non potuerant quin tela in nostros coicerent. 3 Legatum ex suis sese magno cum periculo ad eum missurum et hominibus feris obiecturum existimabat. 4 Commodissimum visum est C. Valerium Procillum, C. Valerii Caburi filium, summa virtute et humanitate adulescentem, cuius pater a C. Valerio Flacco civitate donatus erat, et propter fidem et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam, qua multa iam Ariovistus longinqua consuetudine utebatur, et quod in eo peccandi Germanis causa non esset, ad eum mittere, et una M. Metium, qui hospitio Ariovisti utebatur. 5 His mandavit quae diceret Ariovistus cognoscerent et ad se referrent. Quos cum apud se in castris Ariovistus conspexisset, exercitu suo praesente conclamavit: quid ad

se venirent? an speculandi causa? Conantes dicere prohibuit et in catenas coniecit.

[47] Two days afterwards Ariovistus sent deputies to Caesar. He desired, he said, to discuss with him the matters which they had begun to discuss together but had not settled. Let him therefore again appoint a day for a parley, or, if he did not so wish, let him send to him one of his staff. Caesar thought there was no occasion for a parley, the more so as on the previous day the Germans could not be restrained from discharging darts upon our men. He thought it would be very dangerous to send one of his staff to him and so to expose a man to the ferocious Germans. The best plan seemed to be to send to him Gaius Valerius Procillus, son of Gaius Valerius Caburus. He was a young man of exemplary courage and courtesy, and his father had been presented with the citizenship by Gaius Valerius Flaccus. Caesar selected him because of his fidelity and his knowledge of the Gallic tongue (which from long practice Ariovistus could now use freely), and also because the Germans had in his case no reason for outrage; and with him he chose Marcus Mettius, who enjoyed the intimacy of Ariovistus. He gave them instructions that they should ascertain and bring back to him the views of Ariovistus. But when Ariovistus saw them near him in his camp he called aloud in the presence of his army, "Why come you to me? To spy?" When they tried to speak he prevented them and flung them into chains.

[48] 1 Eodem die castra promovit et milibus passuum VI a Caesaris castris sub monte consedit. 2 Postridie eius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copias traduxit et milibus passuum duobus ultra eum castra fecit eo consilio uti frumento commeatuque qui ex Sequanis et Haeduis supportaretur Caesarem intercluderet. 3 Ex eo die dies

continuos V Caesar pro castris suas copias produxit et aciem instructam habuit, ut, si vellet Ariovistus proelio contendere, ei potestas non deesset. 4 Ariovistus his omnibus diebus exercitum castris continuit, equestri proelio cotidie contendit. Genus hoc erat pugnae, quo se Germani exercuerant: 5 equitum milia erant VI, totidem numero pedites velocissimi ac fortissimi, quos ex omni copia singuli singulos suae salutis causa delegerant: 6 cum his in proeliis versabantur, ad eos se equites recipiebant; hi, si quid erat durius, concurrebant, si qui graviore vulnere accepto equo deciderat, circumsistebant; 7 si quo erat longius prodeundum aut celerius recipiendum, tanta erat horum exercitatione celeritas ut iubis sublevati equorum cursum adaequarent.

[48] On the same day he advanced and pitched his camp under a hill-side six miles from Caesar's. The next day he led his forces past the camp of Caesar, and formed camp two miles beyond him, for the purpose of cutting Caesar off from the corn and supplies that were to be brought up from the borders of the Sequani and the Aedui. For five days in succession Caesar brought his own forces out in front of camp and kept them formed in line of battle, so that if Ariovistus wished to engage he might not lack the chance. On all these days Ariovistus kept his army in camp, but engaged daily in a cavalry encounter. The kind of fighting in which the Germans had trained themselves was as follows. There were six thousand horsemen, and as many footmen, as swift as they were brave, who had been chosen out of the whole force, one by each horseman for his personal protection. With them they worked in encounters; on them the horseman would retire, and they would concentrate speedily if any serious difficulty arose; they would form round any trooper who fell from his horse severely wounded; and if it was necessary to advance

farther in some direction or to retire more rapidly, their training made them so speedy that they could support themselves by the manes of the horses and keep up their pace.

[49] 1 Ubi eum castris se tenere Caesar intellexit, ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur, ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant, circiter passus DC ab his, castris idoneum locum delegit acieque triplici instructa ad eum locum venit. 2 Primam et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit. 3 [Hic locus ab hoste circiter passus DC, uti dictum est, aberat.] Eo circiter hominum XVI milia expedita cum omni equitatu Ariovistus misit, quae copiae nostros terrent et munitione prohiberent. 4 Nihilo setius Caesar, ut ante constituerat, duas acies hostem propulsare, tertiam opus perficere iussit. Munitis castris duas ibi legiones reliquit et partem auxiliorum, quattuor reliquas legiones in castra maiora reduxit.

[49] When Caesar observed that Ariovistus kept to his camp, to prevent further interruption of supplies he chose a suitable spot for a camp beyond that in which the Germans had pitched and about six hundred paces distant. Thither he marched in triple-line formation. The first and second line he ordered to keep under arms, the third to entrench a camp. The spot, as has been said, was about six hundred paces away from the enemy. Towards it Ariovistus sent some sixteen thousand light-armed troops with all the horse, as a force to frighten our men and to prevent their entrenching work. None the less Caesar kept to his previous decision, ordering two lines to drive back the enemy, the third to complete the work. When the camp was entrenched he left two legions there and a part of the auxiliaries; the remaining four he brought back to the larger camp.

[50] 1 Proximo die instituto suo Caesar ex castris utrisque copias suas

eduxit paulumque a maioribus castris progressus aciem instruxit hostibusque pugnandi potestatem fecit. 2 Ubi ne tum quidem eos prodire intellexit, circiter meridiem exercitum in castra reduxit. Tum demum Ariovistus partem suarum copiarum, quae castra minora oppugnaret, misit. Acriter utrimque usque ad vesperum pugnatum est. Solis occasu suas copias Ariovistus multis et inlatis et acceptis vulneribus in castra reduxit. 3 Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, hanc reperiebat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset ut matres familiae eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent utrum proelium committi ex usu esset necne; eas ita dicere: 4 non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam lunam proelio contendissent.

[50] The next day, in accordance with his practice, Caesar moved out his forces from both camps, and, advancing a little from the larger camp, he formed line to give the enemy a chance of battle. Perceiving that they did not even come forth, he brought his army back to camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent a part of his own forces to attack the lesser camp, and both sides fought in spirited fashion till eventide. At sunset, when many blows had been dealt and taken, Ariovistus led his forces back to camp. By questioning the prisoners why Ariovistus did not fight a decisive action, Caesar found out the reason. It was a custom among the Germans that their matrons should declare by lots and divinations whether it was expedient or not to engage, and the matrons declared that heaven forbade the Germans to win a victory, if they fought an action before the new moon.

[51] 1 Postridie eius diei Caesar praesidio utrisque castris quod satis esse visum est reliquit, alios omnes in conspectu hostium pro

castris minoribus constituit, quod minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur; ipse triplici instructa acie usque ad castra hostium accessit. 2 Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Tribocos, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur. 3 Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes milites passis manibus flentes implorabant ne se in servitutem Romanis traderent.

[51] On the next day Caesar left what he deemed a sufficient garrison for each camp; in front of the lesser camp, in full view of the enemy, he posted all the allied troops, intending to use them for a demonstration, because the total strength of his legionary troops was none too great in view of the enemy's numbers. He himself, with triple line deployed, advanced right up to the enemy's camp. Then at last, compelled by necessity, the Germans led their own forces out of camp and posted them at equal intervals according to their tribes, Harudes, Marcomani, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi; and their whole line they set about with wagons and carts, to leave no hope in flight. Upon these they set their women, who with tears and outstretched hands entreated the men, as they marched out to fight, not to deliver them into Roman slavery.

[52] 1 Caesar singulis legionibus singulos legatos et quaestorem praefecit, uti eos testes suae quisque virtutis haberet; 2 ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit. 3 Ita nostri acriter in hostes signo dato impetum fecerunt itaque hostes repente celeriterque

procurrerunt, ut spatium pila in hostes coiciendi non daretur. 4 Relictis pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est. At Germani celeriter ex consuetudine sua phalange facta impetus gladiatorum exceperunt. 5 Reperti sunt complures nostri qui in phalanga insilirent et scuta manibus revellerent et desuper vulnerarent. 6 Cum hostium acies a sinistro cornu pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, a dextro cornu vehementer multitudo suorum nostram aciem premebant. 7 Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus adolescens, qui equitatui praeerat, quod expeditior erat quam ii qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem laborantibus nostris subsidio misit.

[52] Caesar put the lieutenant-generals and the quartermaster-general each in command of a legion, that every man might have their witness of his valour. He himself took station on the right wing, having noticed that the corresponding division of the enemy was the least steady, and joined battle. Our troops attacked the enemy so fiercely when the signal was given, and the enemy dashed forward so suddenly and swiftly, that there was no time to discharge javelins upon them. So javelins were thrown aside, and it was a sword-fight at close quarters. But the Germans, according to their custom, speedily formed mass, and received the sword-attack. Not a few of our soldiers were found brave enough to leap on to the masses of the enemy, tear the shields from their hands, and deal a wound from above. The left wing of the enemy's line was beaten and put to flight, but their right wing, by sheer weight of numbers, was pressing our line hard. Young Publius Crassus, commanding our cavalry, noticed this, and as he could move more freely than the officers who were occupied in and about the line of battle, he sent the third line in support of our struggling troops.

[53] 1 Ita proelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga verterunt nec prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter L pervenerunt. 2 Ibi perpauci aut viribus confisi tranare contenderunt aut lintribus inventis sibi salutem reppererunt. 3 In his fuit Ariovistus, qui naviculam deligatam ad ripam nactus ea profugit; reliquos omnes consecuti equites nostri interfecerunt. 4 Duae fuerunt Ariovisti uxores, una Sueba natione, quam domo secum eduxerat, altera Norica, regis Voccionis soror, quam in Gallia duxerat a fratre missam: utraque in ea fuga periit; duae filiae: harum altera occisa, altera capta est. 5 C. Valerius Procillus, cum a custodibus in fuga trinis catenis vinctus traheretur, in ipsum Caesarem hostes equitatu insequentem incidit. 6 Quae quidem res Caesari non minorem quam ipsa victoria voluptatem attulit, quod hominem honestissimum provinciae Galliae, suum familiarem et hospitem, ereptum ex manibus hostium sibi restitutum videbat neque eius calamitate de tanta voluptate et gratulatione quicquam fortuna deminuerat. 7 Is se praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur an in aliud tempus reservaretur: sortium beneficio se esse incolumem. 8 Item M. Metius repertus et ad eum reductus est.

[53] So the battle was restored, and all the enemy turned and ran: nor did they cease in their flight until they reached the river Rhine, some five miles from that spot. There a very few, trusting to their strength, set themselves to swim across, or discovered boats and so won safety. Among these was Ariovistus, who found a skiff moored to the bank and escaped therein; all the rest of our cavalry caught and slew. There were two wives of Ariovistus, one of Suebian nationality, whom he had brought with him from home; the other a woman of Noricum, sister to King Voccio, and sent by him to be married to

Ariovistus in Gaul. Both wives perished in the rout; of his two daughters one was slain, and the other taken prisoner. Gaius Valerius Procillus, bound with a threefold chain, was being dragged by his keepers in the rout, when he chanced to meet Caesar himself pursuing the enemy with the cavalry. And indeed it brought Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself, to see a most distinguished member of the Province of Gaul, his own close friend and guest, snatched from the hands of the enemy and restored to himself; and to feel that fortune had in no wise lessened, by the loss of his friend, his own great pleasure and satisfaction. Procillus said that in his own presence the lots had been thrice consulted to see whether he should be burnt to death at once or saved for another time: to the favour of the lots he owed his safety. Marcus Mettius also was discovered and brought back to Caesar.

[54] 1 Hoc proelio trans Rhenum nuntiato, Suebi, qui ad ripas Rheni venerant, domum reverti coeperunt; quos ubi qui proximi Rhenum incolunt perterritos senserunt, insecuti magnum ex iis numerum occiderunt. 2 Caesar una aestate duobus maximis bellis confectis maturius paulo quam tempus anni postulabat in hiberna in Sequanos exercitum deduxit; hibernis Labienum praeposuit; 3 ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

[54] When the news of this battle was carried across the Rhine, the Suebi who had come to the banks of the river began to return homewards; and when the tribes which dwell next to the Rhine perceived their panic, they pursued and slew a great number of them. Two capital campaigns were thus finished in a single summer, and Caesar therefore withdrew his army a little earlier than the season required into winter cantonments among the Sequani, leaving

Labienus in command thereof, while he himself set off for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.

BOOK II

[1] 1 Cum esset Caesar in citeriore Gallia [in hibernis], ita uti supra demonstravimus, crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat omnes Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra populum Romanum coniurare obsidesque inter se dare. 2 Coniurandi has esse causas: primum quod vererentur ne, omni pacata Gallia, ad eos exercitus noster adduceretur; 3 deinde quod ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui, ut Germanos diutius in Gallia versari noluerant, ita populi Romani exercitum hiemare atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant, partim qui mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant; 4 ab non nullis etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro consequi poterant.

[1] While Caesar was wintering in Hither Gaul, as has been shown above, frequent rumours were brought to him, and despatches also from Labienus informed him, that all the Belgae (whom I have already described as a third of Gaul) were conspiring against Rome and giving hostages each to other. The causes of their conspiracy, it was said, were as follow. In the first place, they feared that when all Gaul was pacified they might themselves be brought face to face with a Roman army; in the second, they were being stirred up by certain of the Gauls, who had either been unwilling that the Germans should stay longer in Gaul, and were now no less distressed that a Roman army should winter and establish itself in Gaul, or who for sheer fickleness and inconstancy were set upon a change of rule; in certain cases, too, the agitation was due to the fact that in Gaul the more powerful chiefs, and such as had the means to hire men, commonly

endeavoured to make themselves kings, and this they could not so readily effect under our empire.

[2] 1 His nuntiis litterisque commotus Caesar duas legiones in citeriore Gallia novas conscripsit et inita aestate in ulteriorem Galliam qui deduceret Q. Pedium legatum misit. 2 Ipse, cum primum pabuli copia esse inciperet, ad exercitum venit. 3 Dat negotium Senonibus reliquisque Gallis qui finitimi Belgis erant uti ea quae apud eos gerantur cognoscant seque de his rebus certiores faciant. 4 Hi constanter omnes nuntiaverunt manus cogi, exercitum in unum locum conduci. Tum vero dubitandum non existimavit quin ad eos proficisceretur. Re frumentaria provisa castra movet diebusque circiter XV ad fines Belgarum pervenit.

[2] These reports and despatches prompted Caesar to enrol two new legions in Hither Gaul, and at the beginning of summer he sent Quintus Pedius, lieutenant-general, to lead them into Inner Gaul. He himself, as soon as there began to be a supply of forage, came to the army. He charged the Senones and the rest of the Gauls who were neighbours of the Belgae to find out what the latter were about and to keep him informed thereof. They all with one consent reported that bands were being collected, and an army assembled in one place. Then accordingly he determined that he must no longer hesitate about moving against them. He secured his corn^o-supply, struck his camp, and in about a fortnight reached the borders of the Belgae.

[3] 1 Eo cum de improvviso celeriusque omnium opinione venisset, Remi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum legatos Iccium et Andebrogium, primos civitatis, miserunt, 2 qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra populum Romanum

coniurasse, 3 paratosque esse et obsides dare et imperata facere et oppidis recipere et frumento ceterisque rebus iuvare; 4 reliquos omnes Belgas in armis esse, Germanosque qui cis Rhenum incolant sese cum his coniunxisse, 5 tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem ut ne Suessiones quidem, fratres consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, detertere potuerint quin cum iis consentirent.

[3] He arrived there unexpectedly, and with more speed than anyone had looked for. The Remi, the Belgic tribe nearest to Gaul, sent as deputies to him Iccius and Andecumborius, the first men of the community, to tell him that they surrendered themselves and all their stuff to the protection and power of Rome; that they had neither taken part with the rest of the Belgae, nor conspired against Rome; and that they were ready to give hostages, to do his commands, to receive him in their towns, and to assist him with corn and everything else. All the rest of the Belgae, they said, were under arms, and the Germans dwelling on the hither side of the Rhine had joined with them; and the infatuation of them all was so great that the Remi had not been able to dissuade even the Suessiones from taking part with them, though these were their own brethren and kinsfolk, observing the same law and ordinances, and sharing one government, one ruler with themselves.

[4] 1 Cum ab iis quaereret quae civitates quantaque in armis essent et quid in bello possent, sic reperiebat: plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter loci fertilitatem ibi consedis Gallosque qui ea loca incolerent expulisse, solosque esse qui, 2 patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata, Teutonos Cimbrosque intra suos fines ingredi prohibuerint; 3 qua ex re fieri uti

earum rerum memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent. 4 De numero eorum omnia se habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus adfinitatibusque coniuncti quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint. 5 Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia centum, pollicitos ex eo numero electa milia LX totiusque belli imperium sibi postulare. 6 Suessiones suos esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere. 7 Apud eos fuisse regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae potentissimum, qui cum magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse regem Galbam: ad hunc propter iustitiam prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium voluntate deferri; oppida habere numero XII, polliceri milia armata L; totidem Nervios, 8 qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint; 9 XV milia Atrebatas, Ambianos X milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios VII milia, Caletos X milia, Vellocasses et Viromandos totidem, Atuaticos XVIII milia; 10 Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur, arbitrari ad XL milia.

[4] Caesar asked them what states were under arms, what was their size and their war-strength. He discovered that most of the Belgae were of German origin, and had been brought over the Rhine a long while ago, and had settled in their present abode by reason of the fruitfulness of the soil, having driven out the Gauls who inhabited the district. The Belgae, they said, were the only nation who, when all Gaul was harassed in the last generation, had prevented the Teutoni and Cimbri from entering within their borders; and for this cause

they relied on the remembrance of those events to assume great authority and great airs in military matters. As concerning their numbers, the Remi affirmed that they had exact information in all particulars, because, as they were closely connected by relationship and intermarriage, they had learnt how large a contingent each chief had promised for the present campaign in the general council of the Belgae. Among these the Bellovaci had a predominant influence by courage, by authority, by numbers; they could furnish a hundred thousand men-at-arms, and of that number had promised sixty thousand picked men, demanding for themselves the command of the whole campaign. The Suessiones, the Remi said, were their own immediate neighbours; they occupied lands as extensive as they were productive. Among them, even within living memory, Diviciacus had been king, the most powerful man in the whole of Gaul, who had exercised sovereignty alike over a great part of these districts, and even over Britain. Galba was now king; to him, by reason of his justice and sagacity, the supreme charge of the campaign was delivered by general consent; he had twelve towns, and promised fifty thousand men-at-arms. An equal number were promised by the Nervii, accounted the fiercest among the Belgae, and dwelling farthest away; fifteen thousand by the Atrebates, ten by the Ambiani, five-and-twenty by the Morini, seven by the Menapii, ten by the Caleti, as many by the Vellocasses and the Viromandui, nineteen by the Aduatuci. The Condrusi, Eburones, Caeroesi, and Paemani (who are indiscriminately called Germans), had promised, it was thought, some forty thousand men.

[5] 1 Caesar Remos cohortatus liberaliterque oratione prosecutus omnem senatum ad se convenire principumque liberos obsides ad se adduci iussit. Quae omnia ab his diligenter ad diem facta sunt. 2 Ipse

Diviciacum Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet quanto opere rei publicae communisque salutis intersit manus hostium distineri, ne cum tanta multitudine uno tempore confligendum sit. 3 Id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum agros populari coeperint. 4 His datis mandatis eum a se dimittit. Postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se venire vidit neque iam longe abesse ab iis quos miserat exploratoribus et ab Remis cognovit, flumen Axonam, quod est in extremis Remorum finibus, exercitum traducere maturavit atque ibi castra posuit. 5 Quae res et latus unum castrorum ripis fluminis muniebat et post eum quae erant tuta ab hostibus reddebat et commeatus ab Remis reliquisque civitatibus ut sine periculo ad eum portari possent efficiebat. 6 In eo flumine pons erat. Ibi praesidium ponit et in altera parte fluminis Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum sex cohortibus relinquit; castra in altitudinem pedum XII vallo fossaque duodeviginti pedum muniri iubet.

[5] Caesar addressed the Remi in a speech of generous encouragement; then he commanded their whole senate to assemble at his headquarters, and the children of their chieftains to be brought thither as hostages. All these commands were punctiliously and punctually performed. He made a powerful and a personal appeal to Diviciacus the Aeduan, showing him how important an advantage it was for the Roman state, and for the welfare of both parties, to keep the contingents of the enemy apart, so as to avoid the necessity of fighting at one time against so large a host. This could be done if the Aedui led their own forces into the borders of the Bellovaci and began to lay waste their lands. With these instructions he dismissed them. So soon as he perceived that all the forces of the Belgae had been concentrated and were coming against him, and learnt from the

scouts he had sent and from the Remi that they were now not far distant, he made haste to lead his army across the river Axona (Aisne), which is upon the outermost borders of the Remi, and there pitched camp. By so doing, he had the banks of the river to protect one side of the camp, rendered his rear safe from the enemy, and made it possible for supplies to be brought up to him from the Remi and the rest of the states without danger. There was a bridge over the river; he set a guard there, and on the other side of the river he left Quintus Titurius Sabinus, lieutenant-general, with six cohorts. He ordered him to entrench a camp, with a rampart twelve feet high and a ditch eighteen feet broad.

[6] 1 Ab his castris oppidum Remorum nomine Bibrax aberat milia passuum VIII. Id ex itinere magno impetu Belgae oppugnare coeperunt. Aegre eo die sustentatum est. 2 Gallorum eadem atque Belgarum oppugnatio est haec: ubi circumiecta multitudine hominum totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt murusque defensoribus nudatus est, testudine facta portas succedunt murumque subruunt. Quod tum facile fiebat. 3 Nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela coicerent, in muro consistendi potestas erat nulli. 4 Cum finem oppugnandi nox fecisset, Iccius Remus, summa nobilitate et gratia inter suos, qui tum oppido praeerat, unus ex iis qui legati de pace ad Caesarem venerant, nuntium ad eum mittit, nisi subsidium sibi submittatur, sese diutius sustinere non posse.

[6] From this camp a town of the Remi called Bibrax was eight miles distant. The Belgae turned direct from their march to attack this town with great violence. The defence was with difficulty maintained on that day. The Gauls and the Belgae use one method of attack. A host of men is set all round the ramparts, and when a rain of stones from

all sides upon the wall has begun, and the wall is stripped of defenders, the attackers form a “tortoise,” move up to the gates, and undercut the wall. This was easily done on the present occasion; for when so vast a host hurled stones and missiles, no man might stand firm on the wall. When night made an end of the assault, Iccius of the Remi, pre-eminent among his tribesmen in rank and favour, who was the officer in charge of the town at this time, and one of those who had come as deputies to Caesar to treat of peace, sent a report to him to the effect that unless a reinforcement were sent up to him he could no longer hold his position.

[7] 1 Eo de media nocte Caesar isdem ducibus usus qui nuntii ab Iccio venerant, Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Baleares subsidio oppidanis mittit; 2 quorum adventu et Remis cum spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit et hostibus eadem de causa spes potiundi oppidi discessit. 3 Itaque paulisper apud oppidum morati agrosque Remorum depopulati, omnibus vicis aedificiisque quo adire potuerant incensis, ad castra Caesaris omnibus copiis contenderunt et a milibus passuum minus duobus castra posuerunt; 4 quae castra, ut fumo atque ignibus significabatur, amplius milibus passuum VIII latitudinem patebant.

[7] Using again as guides the men who had come from Iccius to report, Caesar sent off to Bibrax in the middle of the night Numidian and Cretan archers and Balearic slingers, to reinforce the townsfolk. Their arrival brought the Remi not only hope of defence but heart for counter-attack, and for the same reason dissipated the enemy's hope of gaining the town. Therefore, halting for a short space near the town, they laid waste the lands of the Remi and set fire to all the hamlets and farm-buildings they could come nigh unto, and then

with all their forces sped on to the camp of Caesar and pitched their own less than two miles from it. Their camp, as smoke and watch-fires showed, extended for more than eight miles in breadth.

[8] 1 Caesar primo et propter multitudinem hostium et propter eximiam opinionem virtutis proelio supersedere statuit; 2 cotidie tamen equestribus proeliis quid hostis virtute posset et quid nostri auderent periclitabatur. 3 Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura oportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis ubi castra posita erant paululum ex planitie editus tantum adversus in latitudinem patebat quantum loci acies instructa occupare poterat, atque ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat et in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit circiter passuum CCCC 4 et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta conlocavit, ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes, quod tantum multitudine poterant, ab lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent. 5 Hoc facto, duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis ut, si quo opus esset, subsidio duci possent, reliquas VI legiones pro castris in acie constituit. Hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerunt.

[8] At first Caesar determined, because of the vast numbers of the enemy and their excellent reputation for valour, to avoid an engagement. By cavalry combats, however, he sought daily to prove what the valour of the enemy could do and what our men could dare. Then, perceiving that our men were not inferior, he chose a ground before the camp naturally suitable and appropriate for forming line of battle; for the hill where the camp had been pitched, standing up but a little from the plain, offered to the front as broad a space as a line

deployed could occupy; on either flank it fell away, while in front by a gentle slope it came down gradually to the level of the plain. On either flank of that hill he dug at right angles a protecting trench of about four hundred paces, and at the ends of the trenches he constructed forts and there posted his artillery, so that, when he had formed line, the enemy might not be able, because of their great superiority of numbers, to surround the Romans fighting on the flanks. This done, he left in camp the two legions he had last enrolled, that they might be brought up in support wherever needed, and he put the remaining six in line of battle before the camp. The enemy likewise had led their forces out of camp and drawn them up.

[9] 1 Palus erat non magna inter nostrum atque hostium exercitum. Hanc si nostri transirent hostes expectabant; nostri autem, si ab illis initium transeundi fieret, ut impeditos adgrederentur, parati in armis erant. 2 Interim proelio equestri inter duas acies contendebatur. Ubi neutri transeundi initium faciunt, secundiore equitum proelio nostris Caesar suos in castra reduxit. 3 Hostes protinus ex eo loco ad flumen Axonam contenderunt, quod esse post nostra castra demonstratum est. 4 Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt eo consilio ut, si possent, castellum, cui praeerat Q. Titurius legatus, expugnarent pontemque interscinderent; 5 si minus potuissent, agros Remorum popularentur, qui magno nobis usui ad bellum gerendum erant, commeatuque nostros prohiberent.

[9] Between our own and the enemy's army was a marsh of no great size. The enemy waited to see whether our men would cross it; but our men stood to arms, ready to attack them when in difficulties, should they be the first to attempt the crossing. Meanwhile a cavalry combat was taking place between the two lines. Neither army began

to cross the marsh, and the cavalry combat tended to favour our side; so Caesar led his troops back to camp. The enemy hurried immediately from their station to the river Aisne, which, as has been shown, was behind our camp. There they found fords, and endeavoured to throw part of their forces across, intending if they could to storm the fort commanded by the lieutenant-general, Quintus Titurius, and break down the bridge; or, if they found that impossible, to lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great service to us for the conduct of the campaign, and so to cut off our supplies.

[10] 1 [Caesar] certior factus ab Titurio omnem equitatum et levis armaturae Numidas, funditores sagittariosque pontem traducit atque ad eos contendit. Acriter in eo loco pugnatum est. 2 Hostes impeditos nostri in flumine adgressi magnum eorum numerum occiderunt; 3 per eorum corpora reliquos audacissime transire conantes multitudine telorum reppulerunt primosque, qui transierant, equitatu circumventos interfecerunt. 4 Hostes, ubi et de expugnando oppido et de flumine transeundo spem se fefellisse intellexerunt neque nostros in locum iniquiorem progredi pugnandi causa viderunt atque ipsos res frumentaria deficere coepit, concilio convocato constituerunt optimum esse domum suam quemque reverti, et quorum in fines primum Romani exercitum introduxissent, ad eos defendendos undique convenirent, ut potius in suis quam in alienis finibus decertarent et domesticis copiis rei frumentariae uterentur. 5 Ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod Diviciacum atque Haeduos finibus Bellovacorum adpropinquare cognoverant. His persuaderi ut diutius morarentur neque suis auxilium ferrent non poterat.

[10] This was reported by Titurius, and Caesar led all the cavalry and the light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, across the bridge, and hastened against the enemy. Fierce was the engagement fought there. Our troops attacked the enemy while in difficulties in the river, and slew a great number of them; the remainder, as they endeavoured with the utmost gallantry to cross over the bodies of their comrades, they drove back with a cloud of missiles; the first party, who were already across, the cavalry surrounded and slew. The enemy were now aware that they had been deceived in their hope of storming the town and of crossing the river, and saw that our men did not advance to unfavourable ground for the sake of a battle; moreover, their own corn-supply began to fail. They summoned a council, therefore, and decided that it was best for each man to return home, and to assemble from all quarters to the defence of the tribe into whose territory the Romans should first introduce their army, in order that they might fight in their own rather than in others' territory, and use native for their corn-supply. To this opinion they were brought, among the other reasons, by this particular consideration, that they had learnt of the approach of Diviciacus and the Aedui to the borders of the Bellovacii. The latter could not be induced to tarry longer, and thereby to fail in bringing assistance to their own tribe.

[11] 1 Ea re constituta, secunda vigilia magno cum, strepitu ac tumultu castris egressi nullo certo ordine neque imperio, cum sibi quisque primum itineris locum peteret et domum pervenire properaret, fecerunt ut consimilis fugae profectio videretur. 2 Hac re statim Caesar per speculatores cognita insidias veritus, quod qua de causa discederent nondum perspexerat, exercitum equitatumque castris continuit. 3 Prima luce, confirmata re ab exploratoribus, omnem equitatum, qui novissimum agmen moraretur, praemisit. His Q.

Pedium et L. Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praefecit; T. Labienum legatum cum legionibus tribus subsequi iussit. 4 Hi novissimos adorti et multa milia passuum prosecuti magnam multitudinem eorum fugientium conciderunt, cum ab extremo agmine, ad quos ventum erat, consisterent fortiterque impetum nostrorum militum sustinerent, 5 priores, quod abesse a periculo viderentur neque ulla necessitate neque imperio continerentur, exaudito clamore perturbatis ordinibus omnes in fuga sibi praesidium ponerent. 6 Ita sine ullo periculo tantam eorum multitudinem nostri interfecerunt quantum fuit diei spatium; sub occasum solis sequi destiterunt seque in castra, ut erat imperatum, receperunt.

[11] This, then, being determined, they decamped in the second watch with great uproar and commotion, in no definite order, under no command, each seeking for himself the first place on the road, and hurrying to reach home, so that they made their departure seem like to a flight. Caesar learnt this at once through his scouts; and fearing an ambush, because he had not yet perceived the cause of their departure, he kept the army and the cavalry in camp. At break of day, when the information had been confirmed by reconnaissance, he sent forward all the cavalry to delay the rearguard. He appointed the lieutenant-generals Quintus Pedius and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta to command the cavalry; and ordered the lieutenant-general Titus Labienus to follow in support with three legions. The cavalry attacked the rearguard, and, pursuing for many miles, they struck down a great host of them as they fled; for while the men at the end of the main column, which had been overtaken, stood at bay, bravely sustaining the attack of our troops, the men in front, thinking themselves clear of danger and restrained by no complication or command, broke ranks as soon as they heard the shouting, and all

sought safety in flight. Thus without any danger our men slew as great a host of them as daytime allowed, and, ceasing at sunset, retired according to orders into camp.

[12] 1 Postridie eius diei Caesar, prius quam se hostes ex terrore ac fuga reciperent, in fines Suessionum, qui proximi Remis erant, exercitum duxit et magno itinere [confecto] ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit. 2 Id ex itinere oppugnare conatus, quod vacuum ab defensoribus esse audiebat, propter latitudinem fossae murique altitudinem paucis defendentibus expugnare non potuit. 3 Castris munitis vineas agere quaeque ad oppugnandum usui erant comparare coepit. 4 Interim omnis ex fuga Suessionum multitudo in oppidum proxima nocte convenit. 5 Celeriter vineis ad oppidum actis, aggere iacto turribusque constitutis, magnitudine operum, quae neque viderant ante Galli neque audierant, et celeritate Romanorum permoti legatos ad Caesarem de deditione mittunt et petentibus Remis ut conservarentur impetrant.

[12] The next day, or ever the enemy could recover from their panic and rout, Caesar led the army into the borders of the Suessiones, next the Remi, and making a forced march pressed on to the town of Noviodunum. He endeavoured to assault it direct from the march, hearing that it was undefended; but, by reason of the breadth of its trench and the height of its wall he was not able to take it by storm, though there were few men to defend it. He entrenched his camp, therefore, and began to move up mantlets and to make ready the appliances needed for assault. Meanwhile all the host of the Suessiones returned from the rout and concentrated next night in the town. When the mantlets were speedily moved up to the town, a ramp cast up, and towers constructed, the Gauls were prevailed on by

the size of the siege-works, which they had not seen or heard of before, and by the rapidity of the Romans, to send deputies to Caesar to treat of surrender; and upon the Remi interceding for their salvation, they obtained their request.

[13] 1 Caesar, obsidibus acceptis primis civitatis atque ipsius Galbae regis duobus filiis armisque omnibus ex oppido traditis, in deditionem Suessiones accipit exercitumque in Bellovacos ducit. 2 Qui cum se suaque omnia in oppidum Bratuspantium contulissent atque ab eo oppido Caesar cum exercitu circiter milia passuum V abesset, omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum Romanum armis contendere. 3 Item, cum ad oppidum accessisset castraque ibi poneret, pueri mulieresque ex muro passis manibus suo more pacem ab Romanis petierunt.

[13] The leading men of the state and the two sons of King Galba himself were accepted as hostages, and all arms were delivered up from the town; then Caesar admitted the Suessiones to surrender, and led the army into the territory of the Bellovaci. These had collected themselves and all their stuff in the town of Bratuspantium; and when Caesar with his army was about five miles from the place, all the older men came out of the town. They began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and with loud voice to declare that they would come into his protection and power, and were making no armed effort against Rome. Likewise, when he was come up to the town and was pitching camp, the women and children, with hands outstretched from the wall, after their fashion, besought peace from the Romans.

[14] 1 Pro his Diviciacus (nam post discessum Belgarum dimissis Haeduorum copiis ad eum reverterat) facit verba: 2 Bellovacos omni

tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse; 3 impulsos ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitutem redactos. Omnes indignitates contumeliasque perferre, et ab Haeduis defecisse et populo Romano bellum intulisse. 4 Qui eius consilii principes fuissent, quod intellegerent quantam calamitatem civitati intulissent, in Britanniam profugisse. 5 Petere non solum Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Haeduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur. 6 Quod si fecerit, Haeduum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare consuerint.

[14] On their behalf Diviciacus (who, after the departure of the Belgae, had disbanded the forces of the Aedui and returned to Caesar) spake as follows: "The Bellovaci have always enjoyed the protection and friendship of the Aeduan state. They have been incited by their chiefs, who declared that the Aedui have been reduced to slavery by Caesar and are suffering from every form of indignity and insult, both to revolt from the Aedui and to make war on the Roman people. The leaders of the plot, perceiving how great a disaster they have brought on the state, have fled to Britain. Not only the Bellovaci, but the Aedui also on their behalf, beseech you to show your wonted mercy and kindness towards them. By so doing you will enlarge the authority of the Aedui among all the Belgae, for it is by the succours and the resources of Aedui that they have been used to sustain the burden of any wars that may have occurred."

[15] 1 Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduum causa sese eos in fidem recepturum et conservaturum dixit, et quod erat civitas magna inter Belgas auctoritate atque hominum multitudine praestabat, DC obsides poposcit. 2 His traditis omnibusque armis ex oppido conlatis,

ab eo loco in fines Ambianorum pervenit; qui se suaque omnia sine mora dediderunt. 3 Eorum fines Nervii attingebant. Quorum de natura moribusque Caesar cum quaereret, sic reperiebat: 4 nullum esse aditum ad eos mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarumque rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium inferri, quod his rebus relanguescere animos eorum et remitti virtutem existimarent; 5 esse homines feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent; 6 confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem pacis accepturos.

[15] Caesar replied that for the respect he had towards Diviciacus and the Aedui he would receive them into his protection and save them alive. As their state was possessed of great authority among the Belgae and was largest in population, he demanded six hundred hostages. These were delivered, and all the arms were collected from the town. Then he left the place, and came into the borders of the Ambiani, who surrendered themselves natural their stuff without delay. Their next neighbours were the Nervii, and when Caesar inquired as touching the nature and character of these, he discovered as follows. Traders had no means of access unto them, for they allowed no wine nor any of the other appurtenances of luxury to be imported, because they supposed that their spirit was like to be enfeebled and their courage relaxed thereby. Fierce men they were, of a great courage, denouncing and accusing the rest of the Belgae for that they had surrendered to Rome and cast away the courage of their sires. For themselves they affirmed that they would send no deputies and accept no terms of peace.

[16] 1 Cum per eorum fines triduum iter fecisset, inveniebat ex

captivis Sabim flumen a castris suis non amplius milibus passuum X abesse; 2 trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedissee adventumque ibi Romanorum expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis 3 (nam his utrisque persuaserant uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur); 4 expectari etiam ab iis Aduatucorum copias atque esse in itinere; 5 mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam inutiles viderentur in eum locum coniecisse quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non esset.

[16] After a three days' march through their borders Caesar found out from prisoners that the river Sabis (Sambre) was not more than ten miles from his camp, and that across the river all the Nervii were in position, awaiting there the coming of the Romans, along with the Atrebates and the Viromandui, their neighbours (for the Nervii had persuaded both of these tribes to try with them the chance of war); further, that they were awaiting forces of the Aduatuci, already on the march, and that the women and all who by reason of age were deemed useless for battle had been collected together in a district to which there was no approach for an army by reason of the marshes.

[17] 1 His rebus cognitis, exploratores centurionesque praemittit qui locum castris idoneum deligant. 2 Cum ex dediticiis Belgis reliquisque Gallis complures Caesarem secuti una iter facerent, quidam ex his, ut postea ex captivis cognitum est, eorum dierum consuetudine itineris nostri exercitus perspecta, nocte ad Nervios pervenerunt atque his demonstrarunt inter singulas legiones impedimentorum magnum numerum intercedere, neque esse quicquam negotii, cum prima legio in castra venisset reliquaeque legiones magnum spatium abessent, hanc sub sarcinis adoriri; 3 qua pulsa impedimentisque direptis, futurum ut reliquae contra consistere

non auderent. 4 Adiuuabat etiam eorum consilium qui rem deferebant quod Nervii antiquitus, cum equitatu nihil possent (neque enim ad hoc tempus ei rei student, sed quicquid possunt, pedestribus valent copiis), quo facilius finitimorum equitatum, si praedandi causa ad eos venissent, impedirent, teneris arboribus incisis atque inflexis crebrisque in latitudinem ramis enatis [et] rubis sentibusque interiectis effecerant ut instar muri hae saepes munimentum praeberent, quo non modo non intrari sed ne perspici quidem posset. 5 His rebus cum iter agminis nostri impediretur, non omittendum sibi consilium Nervii existimaverunt.

[17] Upon this information Caesar sent forward scouts and centurions to choose a fit place for the camp. Now a considerable number of the surrendered Belgae and of the other Gauls were in the train of Caesar and marched with him; and certain of these, as was afterwards learnt from prisoners, having remarked the usual order of our army's march during those days, came by night to the Nervii and showed to them that between legion and legion a great quantity of baggage was interposed, and that it was an easy matter, when the first legion had reached camp and the rest were a great space away, to attack it while it was in heavy marching order; if it were driven back, and the baggage plundered, the rest would not dare to withstand. The plan proposed by those who brought the information was further assisted by an ancient practice of the Nervii. Having no strength in cavalry (for even to this day they care naught for that service, but all their power lies in the strength of their infantry), the easier to hamper the cavalry of their neighbours, whenever these made a raid on them, they cut into young saplings and bent them over, and thus by the thick horizontal growth of boughs, and by intertwining with them brambles and thorns, they contrived that these wall-like hedges

should serve them as fortifications which not only could not be penetrated, but not even seen through. As the route of our column was hampered by these abatis, the Nervii considered that the proposed plan could be tried.

[18] 1 Loci natura erat haec, quem locum nostri castris delegerant. Collis ab summo aequaliter declivis ad flumen Sabim, quod supra nominavimus, vergebat. 2 Ab eo flumine pari acclivitate collis nascebatur adversus huic et contrarius, passus circiter CC infimus apertus, ab superiore parte silvestris, ut non facile introrsus perspici posset. 3 Intra eas silvas hostes in occulto sese continebant; in aperto loco secundum flumen paucae stationes equitum videbantur. Fluminis erat altitudo pedum circiter trium.

[18] The character of the ground selected by our officers for the camp was as follows. There was a hill, inclining with uniform slope from its top to the river Sambre above mentioned. From the river-side there rose another hill of like slope, over against and confronting the other, open for about two hundred paces at its base, wooded in its upper half, so that it could not easily be seen through from without. Within those woods the enemy kept themselves in hiding. On open ground along the river a few cavalry posts were to be seen. The depth of the river was about three feet.

[19] 1 Caesar equitatu praemisso subsequebatur omnibus copiis; sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant. 2 Nam quod hostibus adpropinquabat, consuetudine sua Caesar VI legiones expeditas ducebat; 3 post eas totius exercitus impedimenta conlocarat; inde duae legiones quae proxime conscriptae erant totum agmen claudebant praesidioque impedimentis erant. 4 Equites nostri cum funditoribus sagittariisque

flumen transgressi cum hostium equitatu proelium commiserunt. 5 Cum se illi identidem in silvis ad suos reciperent ac rursus ex silva in nostros impetum facerent, neque nostri longius quam quem ad finem porrecta [ac] loca aperta pertinebant cedentes insequi auderent, interim legiones VI quae primae venerant, opere dimenso, castra munire coeperunt. 6 Ubi prima impedimenta nostri exercitus ab iis qui in silvis abditi latebant visa sunt, quod tempus inter eos committendi proelii convenerat, ut intra silvas aciem ordinesque constituerant atque ipsi sese confirmaverant, subito omnibus copiis provolaverunt impetumque in nostros equites fecerunt. 7 His facile pulsus ac proturbatis, incredibili celeritate ad flumen decucurrerunt, ut paene uno tempore et ad silvas et in flumine [et iam in manibus nostris] hostes viderentur. 8 Eadem autem celeritate adverso colle ad nostra castra atque eos qui in opere occupati erant contenderunt.

[19] Caesar had sent on the cavalry, and was following up with all his forces; but the arrangement and order of the column was different from the report given by the Belgae to the Nervii. For, as he was approaching an enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, was moving with six legions in light field order; after them he had placed the baggage of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last enrolled brought up the rear of the whole column and formed the baggage-guard. Our cavalry crossed the river along with the slingers and archers, and engaged the enemy's horsemen. The latter retired repeatedly upon their comrades in the woods, and, issuing hence, again charged our men; nor did our men dare to follow in pursuit farther than the extent of level open ground. Meanwhile the six legions first to arrive measured out the work, and began to entrench camp. The moment that the first baggage-detachments of our army were seen by the enemy, who were lurking hidden in the woods —

the moment agreed upon among them for joining battle — they suddenly dashed forth in full force, having already in the woods ordered their line in regular ranks and encouraged one another for the conflict; and so charged down upon our cavalry. These were easily beaten and thrown into disorder, and with incredible speed the enemy rushed down to the river, so that almost at the same moment they were seen at the edge of the woods, in the river, and then at close quarters. Then with the same speed they hastened up-hill against our camp and the troops engaged in entrenching it.

[20] 1 Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda: vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne, cum ad arma concurri oporteret; signum tuba dandum; ab opere revocandi milites; qui paulo longius aggeris petendi causa processerant arcessendi; acies instruenda; milites cohortandi; signum dandum. Quarum rerum magnam partem temporis brevitatis et incursus hostium impendebat. 2 His difficultatibus duae res erant subsidio, scientia atque usus militum, quod superioribus proeliis exercitati quid fieri oporteret non minus commode ipsi sibi praescribere quam ab aliis doceri poterant, et quod ab opere singulisque legionibus singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat. 3 Hi propter propinquitatem et celeritatem hostium nihil iam Caesaris imperium expectabant, sed per se quae videbantur administrabant.

[20] Caesar had everything to do at one moment — the flag to raise, as signal of a general call to arms; the trumpet-call to sound; the troops to recall from entrenching; the men to bring in who had gone somewhat farther afield in search of stuff for the ramp; the line to form; the troops to harangue; the signal to give. A great part of these duties was prevented by the shortness of the time and the advance of

the enemy. The stress of the moment was relieved by two things: the knowledge and experience of the troops — for their training in previous battles enabled them to appoint for themselves what was proper to be done as readily as others could have shown them — and the fact that Caesar had forbidden the several lieutenant-generals to leave the entrenching and their proper legions until the camp was fortified. These generals, seeing the nearness and the speed of the enemy, waited no more for a command from Caesar, but took on their own account what steps seemed to them proper.

[21] 1 Caesar, necessariis rebus imperatis, ad cohortandos milites, quam [in] partem fors obtulit, decucurrit et ad legionem decimam devenit. 2 Milites non longiore oratione cohortatus quam uti suae pristinae virtutis memoriam retinerent neu perturbarentur animo hostiumque impetum fortiter sustinerent, 3 quod non longius hostes aberant quam quo telum adigi posset, proelii committendi signum dedit. 4 Atque in alteram item cohortandi causa profectus pugnantibus occurrit. 5 Temporis tanta fuit exiguitas hostiumque tam paratus ad dimicandum animus ut non modo ad insignia accommodanda sed etiam ad galeas induendas scutisque tegimenta detrahenda tempus defuerit. 6 Quam quisque ab opere in partem casu devenit quaeque prima signa conspexit, ad haec constitit, ne in quaerendis suis pugnandi tempus dimitteret.

[21] Caesar gave the necessary commands, and then ran down in a chance direction to harangue the troops, and came to the Tenth Legion. His harangue to the troops was no more than a charge to bear in mind their ancient valour, to be free from alarm, and bravely to withstand the onslaught of the enemy; then, as the enemy were no farther off than the range of a missile, he gave the signal to engage.

He started off among other things in the other direction to give like harangue, and found them fighting. The time was so short, the temper of the enemy so ready for conflict, that there was no space not only to fit badges in their places, but even to put on helmets and draw covers from shields. In whichever direction each man chanced to come in from the entrenching, whatever standard each first caught sight of, by that he stood, to lose no fighting time in seeking out his proper company.

[22] 1 Instructo exercitu magis ut loci natura [deiectusque collis] et necessitas temporis quam ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat, cum diversae legiones aliae alia in parte hostibus resisterent saepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, interiectis prospectus impediretur, neque certa subsidia conlocari neque quid in quaque parte opus esset provideri neque ab uno omnia imperia administrari poterant. 2 Itaque in tanta rerum iniquitate fortunae quoque eventus varii sequebantur.

[22] The army was drawn up rather as the character of the ground, the slope of the hill, and the exigency of the moment required than according to regular tactical formation. The legions were separated, and each was resisting the enemy in a different quarter; while the view to the front was interrupted, as above shown, by a barrier of very thick fences. Supports, therefore, could not be posted with certainty, nor could it be foreseen what would be needed anywhere, nor could all the commands be controlled by one man. Thus, with affairs in so grievous a difficulty, the issues of the day came likewise in varying sequence.

[23] 1 Legionis VIII. et X. milites, ut in sinistra parte aciei constiterant, pilis emissis cursu ac lassitudine exanimatos

vulneribusque confectos Atrebates (nam his ea pars obvenerat) celeriter ex loco superiore in flumen compulerunt et transire conantes insecuti gladiis magnam partem eorum impeditam interfecerunt. 2 Ipsi transire flumen non dubitaverunt et in locum iniquum progressi rursus resistentes hostes redintegrato proelio in fugam coniecerunt. 3 Item alia in parte diversae duae legiones, XI. et VIII., profligatis Viromanduis, quibuscum erant congressae, ex loco superiore in ipsis fluminis ripis proeliabantur. 4 At totis fere castris a fronte et a sinistra parte nudatis, cum in dextro cornu legio XII. et non magno ab ea intervallo VII. constitisset, omnes Nervii confertissimo agmine duce Boduognato, qui summam imperii tenebat, ad eum locum contenderunt; quorum pars ab aperto latere legiones circumvenire, pars summum castrorum locum petere coepit.

[23] The troops of the Ninth and the Tenth Legion, who had formed up on the left flank, discharged their pikes, and, as they possessed the higher ground, speedily drove the Atrebates (the section which happened to face them) into the river, breathless as they were with running and weakened with wounds; and, pursuing them with the sword as they endeavoured to cross, they slew a great part of them while in difficulties. They did not hesitate to cross the river themselves, and, advancing with the ground against them, when the enemy turned to resist, renewed the fight and put them to rout. Likewise in another quarter two detached legions, the Eleventh and the Eighth, having broken the Viromandui with whom they had engaged, left the higher ground, and continued the fight on the very banks of the river. But thereby — though on the right wing the Twelfth were stationed, and at no great distance from them the Seventh — almost all the front and the left face of the camp were laid bare; and to this point all the Nervii, led by Boduognatus, their

commander-in- chief, pressed forward in a dense column, part of which began to envelop the legions on their exposed flank, part to attack the highest ground, where was the camp.

[24] 1 Eodem tempore equites nostri levisque armaturae pedites, qui cum iis una fuerant, quos primo hostium impetu pulsos dixeram, cum se in castra reciperent, adversis hostibus occurrebant ac rursus aliam in partem fugam petebant; 2 et calones, qui ab decumana porta ac summo iugo collis nostros victores flumen transire conspexerant, praedandi causa egressi, cum respexissent et hostes in nostris castris versari vidissent, praecipites fugae sese mandabant. 3 Simul eorum qui cum impedimentis veniebant clamor fremitusque oriebatur, aliique aliam in partem perterriti ferebantur. 4 Quibus omnibus rebus permoti equites Treveri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis, qui auxilii causa a civitate missi ad Caesarem venerant, cum multitudo hostium castra [nostra] compleri, legiones premi et paene circumventas teneri, calones, equites, funditores, Numidas diversos dissipatosque in omnes partes fugere vidissent, desperatis nostris rebus domum contenderunt: 5 Romanos pulsos superatosque, castris impedimentisque eorum hostes potitos civitati renuntiaverunt.

[24] At the same moment our cavalry and the light-armed infantry who had accompanied them, having been beaten back, as I related, by the first onslaught of the enemy, were retiring on to the camp, when they met the enemy face to face and again tried to flee in another direction. The sutlers too, who from the rear gate on the crest of the hill had remarked the passage of the river by our victorious troops, and had gone out to plunder, when they looked back and beheld the enemy moving about in our camp, betook themselves headlong to flight. At the same time there arose a confusion of

shouting among the detachments coming up with the baggage-train, and they began to rush terror-stricken in all directions. All these events alarmed certain horsemen of the Treveri, whose reputation for valour among the Gauls is unique. Their state had sent them to Caesar as auxiliaries; but when they saw our camp filled with the host of the enemy, our legions hard pressed and almost surrounded in their grip, the sutlers, horsemen, slingers, Numidians, sundered, scattered, and fleeing in all directions, in despair of our fortunes they made haste for home, and reported to their state that the Romans were repulsed and overcome, and that the enemy had taken possession of their camp and baggage-train.

[25] 1 Caesar ab X. legionis cohortatione ad dextrum cornu profectus, ubi suos urgeri signisque in unum locum conlatis XII. legionis confertos milites sibi ipsos ad pugnam esse impedimento vidit, quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus occisis signiferoque interfecto, signo amisso, reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis, in his primipilo P. Sextio Baculo, fortissimo viro, multis gravibusque vulneribus confecto, ut iam se sustinere non posset, reliquos esse tardiores et non nullos ab novissimis deserto loco proelio excedere ac tela vitare, hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere instare et rem esse in angusto vidit, neque ullum esse subsidium quod submitti posset, 2 scuto ab novissimis [uni] militi detracto, quod ipse eo sine scuto venerat, in primam aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus milites signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti possent. 3 Cuius adventu spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu imperatoris etiam in extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet, paulum hostium impetus tardatus est.

[25] After haranguing the Tenth Legion Caesar started for the right wing. There he beheld his troops hard driven, and the men of the Twelfth Legion, with their standards collected in one place, so closely packed that they hampered each other for fighting. All the centurions of the fourth cohort had been slain, and the standard-bearer likewise, and the standard was lost; almost all the centurions of the other cohorts were either wounded or killed, among them the chief centurion, Publius Sextius Baculus, bravest of the brave, who was overcome by many grievous wounds, so that he could no longer hold himself upright. The rest of the men were tiring, and some of the rearmost ranks, abandoning the fight, were retiring to avoid the missiles; the enemy were not ceasing to move upwards in front from the lower ground, and were pressing hard on either flank. The condition of affairs, as he saw, was critical indeed, and there was no support that could be sent up. Taking therefore a shield from a soldier of the rearmost ranks, as he himself was come thither without a shield, he went forward into the first line, and, calling on the centurions by name, and cheering on the rank and file, he bade them advance and extend the companies, that they might ply swords more easily. His coming brought hope to the troops and renewed their spirit; each man of his own accord, in sight of the commander-in-chief, desperate as his own case might be, was fain to do his utmost. So the onslaught of the enemy was checked a little.

[26] 1 Caesar, cum VII. legionem, quae iuxta constiterat, item urgeri ab hoste vidisset, tribunos militum monuit ut paulatim sese legiones coniungerent et conversa signa in hostes inferrent. 2 Quo facto cum aliis alii subsidium ferrent neque timerent ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare coeperunt. 3 Interim milites legionum duarum quae in novissimo agmine

praesidio impedimentis fuerant, proelio nuntiato, cursu incitato in summo colle ab hostibus conspiciebantur, 4 et T. Labienus castris hostium potitus et ex loco superiore quae res in nostris castris gererentur conspicatus X. legionem subsidio nostris misit. 5 Qui cum ex equitum et calonum fuga quo in loco res esset quantoque in periculo et castra et legiones et imperator versaretur cognovissent, nihil ad celeritatem sibi reliqui fecerunt.

[26] Perceiving that the Seventh Legion, which had formed up near at hand, was also harassed by the enemy, Caesar instructed the tribunes to close the legions gradually together, and then, wheeling, to advance against the enemy. This was done; and as one soldier supported another, and they did not fear that their rear would be surrounded by the enemy, they began to resist more boldly and to fight more bravely. Meanwhile the soldiers of the two legions which had acted as baggage-guard at the rear of the column heard news of the action. Pressing on with all speed, they became visible to the enemy on the crest of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having taken possession of the enemy's camp, and observed from the higher ground what was going forward in our own camp, sent the Tenth Legion to support our troops. When these learnt from the flight of cavalry and sutlers the state of affairs, and the grave danger in which the camp, the legions, and the commander-in-chief were placed, they spared not a tittle of their speed.

[27] 1 Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui vulneribus confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent, 2 equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnae se legionariis militibus praeferrent.

3 At hostes, etiam in extrema spe salutis, tantam virtutem praestiterunt ut, cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent, 4 his deiectis et coacervatis cadaveribus qui superessent ut ex tumultu tela in nostros conicerent et pila intercepta remitterent: 5 ut non nequiquam tantae virtutis homines iudicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas ripas, subire iniquissimum locum; quae facilia ex difficillimis animi magnitudo redegerat.

[27] Their arrival wrought a great change in the situation. Even such of our troops as had fallen under stress of wounds propped themselves against their shields and renewed the fight; then the sutlers, seeing the panic of the enemy, met their armed assault even without arms; finally, the cavalry, to obliterate by valour the disgrace of their flight, fought at every point in the effort to surpass the legionaries. The enemy, however, even when their hope of safety was at an end, displayed a prodigious courage. When their front ranks had fallen, the next stood on the prostrate forms and fought from them; when these were cast down, and the corpses were piled up in heaps, the survivors, standing as it were upon a mound, hurled darts on our troops, or caught and returned our pikes. Not without reason, therefore, was it to be concluded that these were men of a great courage, who had dared to cross a very broad river, to climb very high banks, and to press up over most unfavourable ground. These were tasks of the utmost difficulty, but greatness of courage had made them easy.

[28] 1 Hoc proelio facto et prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto, maiores natu, quos una cum pueris mulieribusque in aestuaria ac paludes coniectos dixeramus, hac

pugna nuntiata, cum victoribus nihil impeditum, victis nihil tutum arbitrantur, 2 omnium qui supererant consensu legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dediderunt; et in commemoranda civitatis calamitate ex DC ad tres senatores, ex hominum milibus LX vix ad D, qui arma ferre possent, sese redactos esse dixerunt. 3 Quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus atque oppidis uti iussit et finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque prohiberent.

[28] This engagement brought the name and nation of the Nervii almost to utter destruction. Upon report of the battle, the older men, who, as above mentioned, had been gathered with the women and children in the creeks and marshes, supposed that there was nothing to hinder the victors, nothing to save the vanquished; and so, with the consent of all the survivors, they sent deputies to Caesar and surrendered to him. In relating the disaster which had come upon their state, they declared that from six hundred senators they had been reduced to three, and from sixty thousand to barely five hundred that could bear arms. To show himself merciful towards their pitiful suppliance, Caesar was most careful for their preservation; he bade them keep their own territory and towns, and commanded their neighbours to restrain themselves and their dependents from outrage and injury.

[29] 1 Atuatuca, de quibus supra diximus, cum omnibus copiis auxilio Nervii venirent, hac pugna nuntiata ex itinere domum reverterunt; 2 cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis sua omnia in unum oppidum egregie natura munitum contulerunt. 3 Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes deiectusque haberet, una ex parte leniter acclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius pedum CC

relinquebatur; quem locum duplici altissimo muro munierant; tum magni ponderis saxa et praeacutas trabes in muro conlocabant. 4 Ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui, cum iter in provinciam nostram atque Italiam facerent, iis impedimentis quae secum agere ac portare non poterant citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodiam [ex suis] ac praesidium VI milia hominum una reliquerant. 5 Hi post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, cum alias bellum inferrent, alias inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum delegerant.

[29] The Aduatuci, of whom I have written above, were coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, but upon report of this battle they left their march and returned home; and, abandoning all their towns and forts, they gathered all their stuff in one stronghold, which was admirably fortified by Nature. On every side of its circumference it looked down over the steepest rocks, and on one side only was left a gently sloping approach, not more than two hundred feet in breadth. This place they had fortified with a double wall of great height, and at this time they were setting stones of great weight and sharpened beams upon the wall. The tribe was descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who, upon their march into our Province and Italy, set down such of their stock and stuff as they could not drive or carry with them on the near (*i.e.* west) side of the Rhine, and left six thousand men of their company therewith as guard and garrison. This party, after the destruction of the others, were harassed for many years by their neighbours, and fought sometimes on the offensive, sometimes on the defensive; then by general agreement among them peace was made, and they chose this place to be their habitation.

[30] 1 Ac primo adventu exercitus nostri crebras ex oppido excursiones faciebant parvulisque proeliis cum nostris contendebant; 2 postea vallo pedum XII in circuitu quindecim milium crebrisque castellis circummuniti oppido sese continebant. 3 Ubi vineis actis aggere extructo turrim procul constitui viderunt, primum inridere ex muro atque increpitare vocibus, quod tanta machinatio a tanto spatio institueretur: 4 quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae (nam plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum quorum brevitudo nostra contemptui est) tanti oneris turrim in muro sese posse conlocare confiderent?

[30] And now, upon the first arrival of our army, they made frequent sallies from the stronghold, and engaged in petty encounters with our troops. Afterwards, when they had round them a fortified rampart of fifteen thousand feet in circumference, with forts at close interval, they kept within the town. When our mantlets had been pushed up and a ramp constructed, and they saw a tower set up in the distance, they first of all laughed at us from the wall, and loudly railed upon us for erecting so great an engine at so great a distance. By what handiwork, said they, by what strength could men, especially of so puny a stature (for, as a rule, our stature, short by comparison with their own huge physique, is despised of the Gauls), hope to set so heavy a tower on the wall?

[31] 1 Ubi vero moveri et adpropinquare muris viderunt, nova atque inusitata specie commoti legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt, qui ad hunc modum locuti; 2 non se existimare Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere possent; 3 se suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt. 4 Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia ac

mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuaticos esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret. 5 Sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos ac suae virtuti invidere; a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent. 6 Sibi praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati quam ab his per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consuessent.

[31] But when they saw that it was moving and approaching the walls, they were alarmed at the novel and extraordinary sight, and sent deputies to Caesar to treat of peace, who spake after this fashion: They supposed that the Romans did not wage war without divine aid, inasmuch as they could move forward at so great a speed engines of so great a height; they therefore submitted themselves and all they had to the power of Rome. In one matter only did they seek indulgence: that if haply of his mercy and kindness, whereof they heard from others, Caesar decided to save the Aduatuci alive, he would not despoil them of their arms. Almost all their neighbours were at enmity with them and envied their courage; and from such, if they delivered up their arms, they could not defend themselves. If they were to be brought into such case, it were better for them to suffer any fortune at the hand of Rome than to be tortured and slain by men among whom they were accustomed to hold mastery.

[32] 1 Ad haec Caesar respondit: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent; 2 sed deditiois nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis. Se id quod in Nervii fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam inferrent. 3 Re renunciata ad suos illi se quae imperarentur facere dixerunt. 4 Armorum magna multitudine de muro in fossam, quae

erat ante oppidum, iacta, sic ut prope summam muri aggerisque altitudinem acervi armorum adaequarent, et tamen circiter parte tertia, ut postea perspectum est, celata atque in oppido retenta, portis patefactis eo die pace sunt usi.

[32] To this Caesar replied that he would save their state alive rather because it was his custom than for any desert on their part, if they surrendered before the battering-ram touched the wall; but there could be no terms of surrender save upon delivery of arms. He would do, he said, what he had done in the case of the Nervii, and command the neighbours to do no outrage to the surrendered subjects of Rome. They reported this to their tribesmen, and agreed to perform his commands. A great quantity of arms was cast from the wall into the trench which was before the town, so that the heaps of weapons were well-nigh level with the top of the wall and the height of the ramp; and for all this about a third part, as was afterwards seen, was concealed and kept back in the town. So they threw open their gates, and on that day enjoyed the benefit of peace.

[33] 1 Sub vesperum Caesar portas claudi militesque ex oppido exire iussit, ne quam noctu oppidani a militibus iniuriam acciperent. 2 Illi ante inito, ut intellectum est, consilio, quod deditione facta nostros praesidia deducturos aut denique indiligentius servaturos crediderant, partim cum iis quae retinuerant et celaverant armis, partim scutis ex cortice factis aut viminibus intextis, quae subito, ut temporis exiguitas postulabat, pellibus induxerant, tertia vigilia, qua minime arduus ad nostras munitiones ascensus videbatur, omnibus copiis repente ex oppido eruptionem fecerunt. 3 Celeriter, ut ante Caesar imperaverat, ignibus significatione facta, ex proximis castellis eo concursus est, 4 pugnatumque ab hostibus ita acriter est ut a viris

fortibus in extrema spe salutis iniquo loco contra eos qui ex vallo turribusque tela iacerent pugnari debuit, cum in una virtute omnis spes consisteret. 5 Occisis ad hominum milibus IIII reliqui in oppidum reiecti sunt. 6 Postridie eius diei refractis portis, cum iam defenderet nemo, atque intromissis militibus nostris, sectionem eius oppidi universam Caesar vendidit. 7 Ab iis qui emerant capitem numerus ad eum relatus est milium LIII.

[33] At eventide Caesar ordered the gates to be closed and the troops to leave the town, in order that the townsfolk might suffer no outrage at their hands in the night. In the belief that after the surrender our troops would withdraw their posts or would at least look after them less carefully, the townsfolk, it appeared, had previously formed a plan. Part of them had the weapons which they had kept back and concealed, part had shields made of bark or plaited osiers and hastily (as the shortness of time necessitated) spread over with hides. In the third watch they made a sudden sally from the town in full force, on the side where the ascent to our field-works seemed least steep. Speedily, as Caesar had ordered beforehand, the signal was given by flares, and the detachments from the nearest forts doubled in to the point. The enemy fought fiercely, as was to be expected of brave men in desperate case, where all hope of safety lay in valour alone, contending on unfavourable ground against troops who could hurl missiles at them from rampart and towers. Some four thousand men were slain, and the rest were flung back into the town. On the morrow the gates were broken open, for there was no more defence, and our troops were sent in; then Caesar sold as one lot the booty of the town. The purchasers furnished a return to him of three-and-fifty thousand persons.

[34] 1 Eodem tempore a P. Crasso, quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Venellos, Osismos, Coriosolitas, Esumios, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt, certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani esse redactas.

[34] At the same season Publius Crassus, whom he had despatched with one legion against the Veneti, Venelli, Osismi, Curiosolitae, Esubii, Aulerci, and Redones, the maritime states which border upon the Ocean, reported that all those states had been brought into subjection to the power of Rome.

[35] 1 His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata, tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est uti ab iis nationibus quae trans Rhenum incoherent legationes ad Caesarem mitterentur, quae se obsides daturas, imperata facturas pollicerentur. 2 Quas legationes Caesar, quod in Italiam Illyricumque properabat, inita proxima aestate ad se reverti iussit. 3 Ipse in Carnutes, Andes, Turonos quaeque civitates propinquae iis locis erant ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hiberna deductis, in Italiam profectus est. 4 Ob easque res ex litteris Caesaris dierum XV supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli.

[35] These achievements brought peace throughout Gaul, and so mighty a report of this campaign was carried to the natives that deputies were sent to Caesar from the tribes dwelling across the Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and do his commands. As Caesar was for hastening to Italy and Illyricum, he bade these deputations return to him at the beginning of the next summer. As soon as the legions had been withdrawn to winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, the Turones, and such states as were near the scenes of the recent campaign, he himself set out for

Italy. And for those achievements, upon receipt of Caesar's despatches, a fifteen days' thanksgiving was decreed, an honour that had previously fallen to no man.

BOOK III

[1] 1 Cum in Italiam proficisceretur Caesar, Ser. Galbam cum legione XII et parte equitatus in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque misit, qui a finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano ad summas Alpes pertinent. 2 Causa mittendi fuit quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis mercatores ire consueverant, patefieri volebat. 3 Huic permisit, si opus esse arbitrareretur, uti in his locis legionem hiemandi causa conlocaret. 4 Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta, constituit cohortes duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis eius legionis cohortibus in vico Veragrorum, qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare; 5 qui vicus positus in valle non magna adiecta planitie altissimis montibus undique continetur. 6 Cum hic in duas partes flumine divideretur, alteram partem eius vici Gallis [ad hiemandum] concessit, alteram vacuum ab his relictam cohortibus attribuit. Eum locum vallo fossaque munivit.

[1] When he was starting for Italy, Caesar sent Servius Galba with the Twelfth Legion and a detachment of cavalry to the district of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, which reaches from the borders of the Allobroges, from the Lake of Geneva, and from the river Rhone to the summits of the Alps. The reason for sending him was that he wished to open up a route through the Alps by which traders had been accustomed to travel, but at great risk and on payment of great tolls; and Caesar gave him permission to station his legion in this locality for the winter, if he thought it necessary. A certain number of successful engagements were fought; several of the enemy's forts were taken by storm; then deputies were sent to Galba from all sides,

hostages given, and peace made. So Galba decided to station two cohorts in the district of the Nantuates, and to winter himself with the remaining cohorts of the legion in a hamlet of the Veragri called Octodurus. It is set in a valley, with no great space of level about it, and shut in all round by very lofty mountains. As the hamlet was divided in two by a river, Galba granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which the Gauls evacuated, to his cohorts to winter in. He fortified the place with rampart and trench.

[2] 1 Cum dies hibernorum complures transissent frumentumque eo comportari iussisset, subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri. 2 Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent: 3 primum, quod legionem neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant; 4 tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant. 5 Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.

[2] Several days had passed in winter quarters, and Galba had given orders for corn^o to be brought in from the neighbourhood when on a sudden his scouts informed him that in the night every soul had withdrawn from that part of the hamlet which he had granted to the

Gauls, and that the heights overhanging were occupied by an enormous host of Seduni and Veragri. Several causes had contributed to make the Gauls suddenly adopt the plan of renewing the war and crushing the legion. In the first place, they despised the small numbers of a legion, from which, never at full establishment, two cohorts had been withdrawn, and a considerable number of private soldiers sent off to seek supplies. In the second place, they supposed that, because of the disadvantage of position, since they themselves would charge down from the heights into the valley and hurl their missiles, not even their first onset could be withstood. Moreover, they were indignant that their children had been taken away from them under the title of hostages; and they were convinced that the Romans were endeavouring to seize the peaks of the Alps and to add those districts to their neighbouring Province, not only for the sake of the routes, but to secure a permanent occupation.

[3] 1 His nuntiis acceptis Galba, cum neque opus hibernorum munitionesque plene essent perfectae neque de frumento reliquoque commeatu satis esset provisum quod deditione facta obsidibusque acceptis nihil de bello timendum existimaverat, consilio celeriter convocato sententias exquirere coepit. 2 Quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent, 3 prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad salutem contenderent. 4 Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere.

[3] This was the information received by Galba. Now he knew that the construction and entrenchment of the winter quarters were not fully completed, and that no adequate provision had been made for corn and supplies in general, because he had come to the conclusion that, as surrender had been made and hostages received, no warlike development was to be apprehended. He therefore summoned with speed a council of war, and proceeded to ask for expressions of opinion. The danger that had arisen was as serious as it was sudden and unexpected, and indeed by this time almost all higher ground was seen to be packed with a host of armed men, while, with the communications interrupted, reinforcements could not be attempted nor supplies brought up. In the council, therefore, the chance of safety was almost despaired of, and not a few opinions were expressed in favour of abandoning the baggage, making a sortie, and striving to win safety by the same routes which had brought them thither. None the less, the majority decided to reserve this expedient to the final emergency, and meanwhile to await the issue and defend the camp.

[4] 1 Brevi spatio interiecto, vix ut iis rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque administrandis tempus daretur, hostes ex omnibus partibus signo dato decurrere, lapides gaesaeque in vallum coicere. 2 Nostri primo integris viribus fortiter propugnare neque ullum frustra telum ex loco superiore mittere, et quaecumque pars castrorum nudata defensoribus premi videbatur, eo occurrere et auxilium ferre, 3 sed hoc superari quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi proelio excedebant, alii integris viribus succedebant; 4 quarum rerum a nostris propter paucitatem fieri nihil poterat, ac non modo defesso ex pugna excedendi, sed ne saucio quidem eius loci ubi constiterat relinquendi ac sui recipiendi facultas dabatur.

[4] After a short interval — so short that it scarcely allowed time to complete the dispositions and arrangements determined upon — the enemy, upon a signal given, charged down from all sides, and hurled volleys of stones and javelins against the rampart. At first the Roman troops repelled them gallantly with strength unimpaired, and discharged not a missile in vain from their higher station; and if any part of the camp was stripped of defenders and seemed to be hard pressed, they sped thither to render assistance. But they were at a disadvantage, because when any of the enemy, wearied by the long continuance of the battle, retired from the fighting line, others with strength unimpaired would step into their places; but nothing of the kind could be done by the Romans on account of their scantiness of numbers, and not only had a wearied man no chance of retiring from the battle, but not even a wounded man could leave the spot where he had been posted and look after himself.

[5] 1 Cum iam amplius horis sex continenter pugnaretur, ac non solum vires sed etiam tela nostros deficerent, atque hostes acrius instarent languidioribusque nostris vallum scindere et fossas complere coepissent, resque esset iam ad extremum perducta casum, 2 P. Sextius Baculus, primi pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus, et item C. Volusenus, tribunus militum, vir et consilii magni et virtutis, ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur. 3 Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.

[5] The fighting actually went on for more than six hours on end, and not only the strength but the missiles of the Romans were failing; the enemy were pressing on more fiercely, and beginning, as our energies slackened, to break down the rampart and fill in the trench. At this juncture Publius Sextius Baculus, the senior centurion (whom we have mentioned as disabled by several wounds in the battle with the Nervii), and with him Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune, a man of great sagacity and courage, hastened to Galba, and informed him that the only hope of safety was to try the last expedient in making a sortie. Galba accordingly summoned the centurions, and speedily instructed the troops to make a short pause in the fighting, and merely to intercept the missiles discharged against them, and to refresh themselves after their effort; then, upon a given signal, to burst from the camp and place all hope of safety in courage.

[6] 1 Quod iussi sunt faciunt, ac subito omnibus portis eruptione facta neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt. 2 Ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum venerant undique circumventos intercipiunt, et ex hominum milibus amplius XXX, quem numerum barbarorum ad castra venisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coiciunt ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur. 3 Sic omnibus hostium copiis fuis armisque exutis se intra munitiones suas recipiunt. 4 Quo proelio facto, quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba nolebat atque alio se in hiberna consilio venisse meminerat, aliis occurrisset rebus videbat, maxime frumenti [commeatusque] inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici aedificiis incensis in provinciam reverti contendit, 5 ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter demorante incolumem legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique hiemavit.

[6] They did as they were bid; and suddenly from all the gates a sortie was made, leaving the enemy no chance of learning what was afoot, nor of rallying. So there was a complete change of fortune; the Romans surrounded on every side and slew the multitude which had come in hope of capturing the camp, and of more than thirty thousand men (for that was known to be the number of the natives who came against the camp) more than a third were slain, while the rest were driven in headlong flight, and not suffered to stand fast even on the higher ground. Thus all the forces of the enemy were routed, and the Romans, stripping off the arms of the slain, retired to their own entrenched camp. This battle over, Galba declined to try fortune too often: he remembered that there was a great difference between the purpose of his coming into winter quarters and the state of things which he had found, and he was very greatly concerned by the lack of corn and supplies. Accordingly, on the next day he caused all the buildings of that hamlet to be burnt, and made haste to return to the Province; and, as there was no enemy to hinder him or delay his march, he brought the legion safely into the territory of the Nantuates, and then into that of the Allobroges, and there wintered.

[7] 1 His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, [superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus Sedunis,] atque ita inita hieme in Illyricum profectus esset, quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere volebat, subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est. 2 Eius belli haec fuit causa. P. Crassus adulescens cum legione VII. proximus mare Oceanum in Andibus hiemabat. 3 Is, quod in his locis inopia frumenti erat, praefectos tribunosque militum complures in finitimas civitates frumenti causa dimisit; 4 quo in numero est T. Terrasidius missus in Esuvios, M. Trebius Gallus in Coriosolites, Q. Velanius cum T. Silio in Venetos.

[7] After these events Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was at peace again, for the Belgae were defeated, the Germans driven out, and the Seduni in the Alpine region conquered; therefore after the beginning of winter he had set out for Illyricum, desiring to visit the tribes there also and to become acquainted with the country. But at this point war broke out suddenly in Gaul, of which the cause was as follows. Publius Crassus the younger with the Seventh Legion had been wintering by the Ocean in the country of the Andes. As there was a lack of corn in those parts, he despatched several commandants and tribunes into the neighbouring states to seek it. Of these officers Titus Terrasidius was sent among the Esubii, Marcus Trebius Gallus among the Curiosolites, Quintus Velanius with Titus Silius among the Veneti.

[8] 1 Huius est civitatis longe amplissima auctoritas omnis orae maritimae regionum earum, quod et naves habent Veneti plurimas, quibus in Britanniam navigare consuerunt, et scientia atque usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt et in magno impetu maris atque aperto paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent vectigales. 2 Ab his fit initium retinendi Silii atque Velanii, quod per eos suos se obsides, quos Crasso dedissent, recuperaturos existimabant. 3 Horum auctoritate finitimi adducti, ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia, eadem de causa Trebium Terrasidiumque retinent et celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos, 4 reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint. 5 Omni ora maritima celeriter ad suam sententiam perducta communem legationem ad P. Crassum mittunt, si velit suos recuperare, obsides

sibi remittat.

[8] These Veneti exercise by far the most extensive authority over all the sea-coast in those districts, for they have numerous ships, in which it is their custom to sail to Britain, and they excel the rest in the theory and practice of navigation. As the sea is very boisterous, and open, with but a few harbours here and there which they hold themselves, they have as tributaries almost all those whose custom is to sail that sea. It was the Veneti who took the first step, by detaining Silius and Velanius, supposing that through them they should recover their own hostages whom they had given to Crassus. Their authority induced their neighbours — for the Gauls are sudden and spasmodic in their designs — to detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same reason, and, rapidly despatching deputies among their chiefs, they bound themselves by mutual oath to do nothing save by common consent, and to abide together the single issue of their destiny. Moreover, they urged the remaining states to choose rather to abide in the liberty received from their ancestors than to endure Roman slavery. The whole sea-coast was rapidly won to their opinion, and they despatched a deputation in common to Publius Crassus, bidding him restore their hostages if he would receive back his own officers.

[9] 1 Quibus de rebus Caesar a Crasso certior factus, quod ipse aberat longius, naves interim longas aedificari in flumine Ligeri, quod influit in Oceanum, remiges ex provincia institui, nautas gubernatoresque comparari iubet. 2 His rebus celeriter administratis ipse, cum primum per anni tempus potuit, ad exercitum contendit. 3 Veneti reliquaeque item civitates cognito Caesaris adventu [certiores facti], simul quod quantum in se facinus admisissent intellegebant, [legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque

semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos,] pro magnitudine periculi bellum parare et maxime ea quae ad usum navium pertinent providere instituunt, hoc maiore spe quod multum natura loci confidebant. 4 Pedestria esse itinera concisa aestuariis, navigationem impeditam propter inscientiam locorum paucitatemque portuum sciebant, 5 neque nostros exercitus propter inopiam frumenti diutius apud se morari posse confidebant; 6 ac iam ut omnia contra opinionem acciderent, tamen se plurimum navibus posse, [quam] Romanos neque ullam facultatem habere navium, neque eorum locorum ubi bellum gesturi essent vada, portus, insulas novisse; 7 ac longe aliam esse navigationem in concluso mari atque in vastissimo atque apertissimo Oceano perspiciebant. 8 His initis consiliis oppida muniunt, 9 frumenta ex agris in oppida comportant, naves in Venetiam, ubi Caesarem primum bellum gesturum 10 constabat, quam plurimas possunt cogunt. Socios sibi ad id bellum Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt.

[9] Caesar was informed by Crassus concerning these matters, and, as he himself was at some distance, he ordered men-of-war to be built meanwhile on the river Loire, which flows into the Ocean, rowers to be drafted from the Province, seamen and steersmen to be got together. These requirements were rapidly executed, and so soon as the season allowed he himself hastened to join the army. The Veneti and likewise the rest of the states were informed of Caesar's coming, and at the same time they perceived the magnitude of their offence — they had detained and cast into prison deputies, men whose title had ever been sacred and inviolable among all nations. Therefore, as the danger was great, they began to prepare for war on a

corresponding scale, and especially to provide naval equipment, and the more hopefully because they relied much on the nature of the country. They knew that on land the roads were intersected by estuaries, that our navigation was hampered by ignorance of the locality and by the scarcity of harbours, and they trusted that the Roman armies would be unable to remain long in their neighbourhood by reason of the lack of corn. Moreover, they felt that, even though everything should turn out contrary to expectation, they were predominant in sea-power, while the Romans had no supply of ships, no knowledge of the shoals, harbours, or islands in the region where they were about to wage war; and they could see that navigation on a land-locked sea was quite different from navigation on an Ocean very vast and open. Therefore, having adopted this plan, they fortified their towns, gathered corn thither from the fields, and assembled as many ships as possible in Venetia, where it was known that Caesar would begin the campaign. As allies for the war they took to themselves the Osismi, the Lexovii, the Namnetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and they sent to fetch auxiliaries from Britain, which lies opposite those regions.

[10] 1 Erant hae difficultates belli gerendi quas supra ostendimus, sed tamen multa Caesarem ad id bellum incitabant: 2 iniuria retentorum equitum Romanorum, rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio, in primis ne hac parte neglecta reliquae nationes sibi idem licere arbitrentur. 3 Itaque cum intellegeret omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari, omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse, prius quam plures civitates conspirarent, partiendum sibi ac latius distribuendum exercitum

putavit.

[10] The difficulties of the campaign were such as we have shown above; but, nevertheless, many considerations moved Caesar to undertake it. Such were the outrageous detention of Roman knights, the renewal of war after surrender, the revolt after hostages given, the conspiracy of so many states — and, above all, the fear that if this district were not dealt with the other nations might suppose they had the same liberty. He knew well enough that almost all the Gauls were bent on revolution, and could be recklessly and rapidly aroused to war; he knew also that all men are naturally bent on liberty, and hate the state of slavery. And therefore he deemed it proper to divide his army and disperse it at wider intervals before more states could join the conspiracy.

[11] 1 Itaque T. Labienum legatum in Treveros, qui proximi flumini Rheno sunt, cum equitatu mittit. 2 Huic mandat, Remos reliquosque Belgas adeat atque in officio contineat Germanosque, qui auxilio a Belgis arcessiti dicebantur, si per vim navibus flumen transire conentur, prohibeat. 3 P. Crassum cum cohortibus legionariis XII et magno numero equitatus in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet, ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur. 4 Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum legionibus tribus in Venellos, Coriosolites Lexoviosque mittit, qui eam manum distinendam curet. 5 D. Brutum adolescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat, praeficit et, cum primum possit, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit.

[11] Accordingly he despatched Titus Labienus, lieutenant-general, with the cavalry to the territory of the Treveri, who live next the river

Rhine. His instructions were to visit the Remi and the rest of the Belgae, and to keep them loyal, and to hold back the Germans, who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae to their assistance, in case they should endeavour to force the passage of the river by boats. Publius Crassus, with twelve cohorts from the legions and a large detachment of cavalry, was ordered to start for Aquitania, to prevent the despatch of auxiliaries from the tribes there into Gaul, and the junction of the two great nations. Quintus Titurius Sabinus, lieutenant-general, was despatched with three legions to the territory of the Venelli, the Curiosolites, and the Lexovii, to keep that force away from the rest. Decimus Brutus the younger was put in command of the fleet, and of the Gallic ships already ordered to assemble from the territory of the Pictones, the Santoni, and the others now pacified, and was ordered to start as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti, whither Caesar himself hastened with the land force.

[12] 1 Erant eius modi fere situs oppidorum ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent, cum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod [bis] accidit semper horarum XII spatio, neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis adfluctarentur. 2 Ita utraque re oppidorum oppugnatio impediabatur. 3 Ac si quando magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis, suis fortunis desperare coeperant, magno numero navium adpulso, cuius rei summam facultatem habebant, omnia sua deportabant seque in proxima oppida recipiebant: 4 ibi se rursus isdem oportunitatibus loci defendebant. 5 Haec eo facilius magnam partem aestatis faciebant quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, raris ac prope nullis portibus

difficultas navigandi.

[12] The positions of the strongholds were generally of one kind. They were set at the end of tongues and promontories, so as to allow no approach on foot, when the tide had rushed in from the sea — which regularly happens every twelve hours — nor in ships, because when the tide ebbed again the ships would be damaged in shoal water. Both circumstances, therefore, hindered the assault of the strongholds; and, whenever the natives were in fact overcome by huge siege-works — that is to say, when the sea had been set back by a massive mole built up level to the town-walls — and so began to despair of their fortunes, they would bring close inshore a large number of ships, of which they possessed an unlimited supply, and take off all their stuff and retire to the nearest strongholds, there to defend themselves again with the same advantages of position. They pursued these tactics for a great part of the summer the more easily because our own ships were detained by foul weather, and because the difficulty of navigation on a vast and open sea, with strong tides and few — nay, scarcely any — harbours, was extreme.

[13] 1 Namque ipsorum naves ad hunc modum factae armataeque erant: carinae aliquanto planiores quam nostrarum navium, quo facilius vada ac decessum aestus excipere possent; 2 prorae admodum erectae atque item puppes, ad magnitudinem fluctuum tempestatumque accommodatae; 3 naves totae factae ex robore ad quamvis vim et contumeliam perferendam; 4 transtra ex pedibus in altitudinem trabibus, confixa clavis ferreis digiti pollicis crassitudine; 5 ancorae pro funibus ferreis catenis revinctae; 6 pelles pro velis alutaeque tenuiter confectae, [hae] sive propter inopiam lini atque eius usus inscientiam, sive eo, quod est magis veri simile, quod

tantas tempestates Oceani tantosque impetus ventorum sustineri ac tanta onera navium regi velis non satis commode posse arbitrabantur. 7 Cum his navibus nostrae classi eius modi congressus erat ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret, reliqua pro loci natura, pro vi tempestatum illis essent aptiora et accommodatiora. 8 Neque enim iis nostrae rostro nocere poterant (tanta in iis erat firmitudo), neque propter altitudinem facile telum adigebatur, et eadem de causa minus commode copulis continebantur. 9 Accedebat ut, cum [saevire ventus coepisset et] se vento dedissent, et tempestatem ferrent facilius et in vadis consisterent tutius et ab aestu relictæ nihil saxa et cautes timerent; quarum rerum omnium nostris navibus casus erat extimescendus.

[13] Not so the ships of the Gauls, for they were built and equipped in the following fashion. Their keels were considerably more flat than those of our own ships, that they might more easily weather shoals and ebb-tide. Their prows were very lofty, and their sterns were similarly adapted to meet the force of waves and storms. The ships were made entirely of oak, to endure any violence and buffeting. The cross-pieces were beams a foot thick, fastened with iron nails as thick as a thumb. The anchors were attached by iron chains instead of cables. Skins and pieces of leather finely finished were used instead of sails, either because the natives had no supply of flax and no knowledge of its use, or, more probably, because they thought that the mighty ocean-storms and hurricanes could not be ridden out, nor the mighty burden of their ships conveniently controlled, by means of sails. When our own fleet encountered these ships it proved its superiority only in speed and oarsmanship; in all other respects, having regard to the locality and the force of the tempests, the others were more suitable and adaptable. For our ships could not damage

them with the ram (they were so stoutly built), nor, by reason of their height, was it easy to hurl a pike, and for the same reason they were less readily gripped by grapnels. Moreover, when the wind began to rage and they ran before it, they endured the storm more easily, and rested in shoals more safely, with no fear of rocks or crags if left by the tide; whereas our own vessels could not but dread the possibility of all these chances.

[14] 1 Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar, ubi intellexit frustra tantum laborem sumi neque hostium fugam captis oppidis reprimi neque iis noceri posse, statuit expectandam classem. 2 Quae ubi convenit ac primum ab hostibus visa est, circiter CCXX naves eorum paratissimae atque omni genere armorum ornatissimae profectae ex portu nostris adversae constiterunt; 3 neque satis Bruto, qui classi praeerat, vel tribunis militum centurionibusque, quibus singulae naves erant attributae, constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem pugnae insisterent. 4 Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant; turribus autem excitatis tamen has altitudo puppium ex barbaris navibus superabat, ut neque ex inferiore loco satis commode tela adigi possent et missa a Gallis gravius acciderent. 5 Una erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium. 6 His cum funes qui antemnas ad malos destinabant comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato prae rumpebantur. 7 Quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant, ut, cum omnis Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis omnis usus navium uno tempore eriperetur. 8 Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur, ut nullum paulo fortius factum latere posset; 9 omnes enim colles ac loca superiora, unde

erat propinquus despectus in mare, ab exercitu tenebantur.

[14] Caesar had taken several towns by assault, when he perceived that all his labour availed nothing, since the flight of the enemy could not be checked by the capture of towns, nor damage done to them; accordingly he determined to await the fleet. It assembled in due course, and so soon as it was sighted by the enemy about two hundred and twenty of their ships, fully prepared and provided with every kind of equipment, sailed out of harbour and took station opposite ours. Brutus, who commanded the fleet, and his tribunes and centurions in charge of single ships, were by no means certain what to do or what plan of battle they were to pursue. For our commanders knew the enemy could not be damaged by the ram; while, even when turrets were set up on board, the lofty sterns of the native ships commanded even these, so that from the lower level missiles could not be hurled properly, while those discharged by the Gauls gained a heavier impact. One device our men had prepared to great advantage — sharp-pointed hooks let in and fastened to long poles, in shape not unlike siege-hooks. When by these contrivances the halyards which fastened the yards to the masts were caught and drawn taut, the ship was rowed hard ahead and they were snapped short. With the halyards cut, the yards of necessity fell down; and as all the hope of the Gallic ships lay in their sails and tackle, when those were torn away all chance of using their ships was taken away also. The rest of the conflict was a question of courage, in which our own troops easily had the advantage — the more so because the engagement took place in sight of Caesar and of the whole army, so that no exploit a little more gallant than the rest could escape notice. The army, in fact, was occupying all the hills and higher ground from which there was a near view down upon the sea.

[15] 1 Deiectis, ut diximus, antennis, cum singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant, milites summa vi transcendere in hostium naves contendebant. 2 Quod postquam barbari fieri animadverterunt, expugnatis compluribus navibus, cum ei rei nullum reperiretur auxilium, fuga salutem petere contenderunt. 3 Ac iam conversis in eam partem navibus quo ventus ferebat, tanta subito malacia ac tranquillitas exstitit ut se ex loco movere non possent. 4 Quae quidem res ad negotium conficiendum maximae fuit opportunitati: 5 nam singulas nostri consecrati expugnaverunt, ut perpaucae ex omni numero noctis interventu ad terram pervenirent, cum ab hora fere IIII usque ad solis occasum pugnaretur.

[15] When the yards had been torn down as described, and each ship was surrounded by two or three, the troops strove with the utmost force to climb on to the enemy's ships. When several of them had been boarded, the natives saw what was toward; and, as they could think of no device to meet it, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And they had headed all their vessels down the wind, when suddenly a calm so complete and absolute came on that they could not stir from the spot. This circumstance was in the highest degree fortunate for the settlement of the business, for our troops pursued and boarded the vessels one by one, with the result that of all the number very few, when night came on, reached the land. The battle, indeed, lasted from about the fourth hour to sunset.

[16] 1 Quo proelio bellum Venetorum totiusque orae maritimae confectum est. 2 Nam cum omnis iuventus, omnes etiam gravioris aetatis in quibus aliquid consilii aut dignitatis fuit eo convenerant, tum navium quod ubique fuerat in unum locum coegerant; 3 quibus amissis reliqui neque quo se reciperent neque quem ad modum

oppida defenderent habebant. 4 Itaque se suaque omnia Caesari dediderunt. In quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.

[16] This engagement finished the campaign against the Veneti and the whole sea-coast. For, on the one hand, all the fighting men, nay, all the older men who had any sagacity or distinction, had there assembled; on the other, they had collected in one place every single ship they had anywhere; and after such losses the rest of their men had no point to retire to, no means of defending the towns. Accordingly they surrendered themselves and all they had to Caesar. He decided that their punishment must be the more severe in order that the privilege of deputies might be more carefully preserved by the natives for the future. He therefore put the whole of their senate to the sword, and sold the rest of the men as slaves.

[17] 1 Dum haec in Venetis geruntur, Q. Titurius Sabinus cum iis copiis quas a Caesare acceperat in fines Venellorum pervenit. 2 His praeerat Viridovix ac summam imperii tenebat earum omnium civitatum quae defecerant, ex quibus exercitum [magnasque copias] coegerat; 3 atque his paucis diebus Aulerci Eburovices Lexoviique, senatu suo interfecto quod auctores belli esse nolebant, portas clauserunt seque cum Viridovice coniunxerunt; 4 magnaue praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat, quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat. 5 Sabinus idoneo omnibus rebus loco castris sese tenebat, cum Viridovix contra eum duorum milium spatio consedisset cotidieque productis copiis pugnandi

potestatem faceret, ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus non nihil carperetur; 6 tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent. 7 Id ea de causa faciebat quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data legato dimicandum non existimabat.

[17] During these events in the land of the Veneti Quintus Titurius Sabinus, with the force received from Caesar, reached the borders of the Venelli. Their chief, Viridovix, held the supreme command of all the revolted states, from which he had raised an army, and large levies besides. Further, in the last few days the Aulerci, Eburovices, and the Lexovii, after putting their senate to death because they refused to approve the war, closed their gates and joined Viridovix. Moreover, from every corner of Gaul a great host of desperadoes and brigands had gathered, whom the hope of plunder and the passion for war seduced from the daily toil of agriculture. Sabinus confined himself to camp, in a spot suited for any emergency. Viridovix had encamped against him two miles away, and daily led out his forces to give him a chance of fighting, so that at last Sabinus not only incurred the contempt of the enemy, but was assailed by occasional reproaches even of the Roman troops; indeed, he created so strong an impression of cowardice that at length the enemy ventured to come up to the rampart of the camp. He pursued these tactics because he deemed it improper for a lieutenant-general to fight an engagement with so large a host of the enemy, especially in the absence of his commander-in-chief, unless on favourable ground or on some opportunity offered.

[18] 1 Hac confirmata opinione timoris idoneum quendam hominem et callidum deligit, Gallum, ex iis quos auxilii causa secum habebat. 2 Huic magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque persuadet uti ad hostes transeat, et quid fieri velit edocet. 3 Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet, 4 neque longius abesse quin proxima nocte Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa proficiscatur. 5 Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene gerendi amittendam non esse: 6 ad castra iri oportere. Multae res ad hoc consilium Gallos hortabantur: superiorum dierum Sabini cunctatio, perfugae confirmatio, inopia cibariorum, cui rei parum diligenter ab iis erat provisum, spes Venetici belli, et quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. 7 His rebus adducti non prius Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt quam ab iis sit concessum arma uti capiant et ad castra contendant. 8 Qua re concessa laeti, ut explorata victoria, sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant, ad castra pergunt.

[18] When this impression of timidity had been confirmed, he chose out a fit man and a cunning, one of the Gauls whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He induced him by great rewards and promises to go over to the enemy, and instructed him in what he would have done. When the pretended deserter had reached the enemy, he set before them the timidity of the Romans, explained to them how Caesar himself was in straits and hard pressed by the Veneti, and told them that no later than next night Sabinus was to lead his army secretly out of his camp and to set out to the assistance of Caesar. Upon hearing this, they all cried with one consent that the chance of successful achievement should not be lost — that they should march upon the

camp. Many considerations encouraged the Gauls to this course: the hesitation of Sabinus during the previous days, the confirmation given by the deserter, the lack of victuals (for which they had made too careless a provision), the hope inspired by the Venetian war, and the general readiness of men to believe what they wish. With these thoughts to spur them on, they would not suffer Viridovix and the rest of the leaders to leave the council until they had their permission to take up arms and press on to the camp. Rejoicing at the permission given as though at victory assured, they collected faggots and brushwood to fill up the trenches of the Romans and marched on the camp.

[19] 1 Locus erat castrorum editus et paulatim ab imo acclivis circiter passus mille. Huc magno cursu contenderunt, ut quam minimum spatii ad se colligendos armandosque Romanis daretur, exanimatique pervenerunt. 2 Sabinus suos hortatus cupientibus signum dat. Impeditis hostibus propter ea quae ferebant onera subito duabus portis eruptionem fieri iubet. 3 Factum est oportunitate loci, hostium inscientia ac defatigatione, virtute militum et superiorum pugnarum exercitatione, ut ne unum quidem nostrorum impetum ferrent ac statim terga verterent. 4 Quos impeditos integris viribus milites nostri consecuti magnum numerum eorum occiderunt; reliquos equites consecrati paucos, qui ex fuga evaserant, reliquerunt. 5 Sic uno tempore et de navali pugna Sabinus et de Sabini victoria Caesar est certior factus, civitatesque omnes se statim Titurio dediderunt. 6 Nam ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minime resistens ad calamitates ferendas mens eorum est.

[19] The position of the camp was on high ground, with a gradual

slope from the bottom of about a mile. Hither the Gauls hastened at great speed to give the Romans the least possible time to assemble and to arm; and they arrived out of breath. Sabinus exhorted his troops, and gave the signal which they longed for. The enemy were hampered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, and he ordered a sudden sortie to be made from two gates. The order was executed with the advantage of ground; the enemy were inexperienced and fatigued, the Romans courageous and schooled by previous engagements. The result was that without standing even one of our attacks the Gauls immediately turned and ran. Hampered as they were, our troops pursued them with strength unimpaired and slew a great number of them; the rest our cavalry chased and caught, and left but a few, who had got away from the rout. So it chanced that in the same hour Sabinus learnt of the naval battle, and Caesar of Sabinus' victory; and all the states at once surrendered to Sabinus. For while the temper of the Gauls is eager and ready to undertake a campaign, their purpose is feeble and in no way steadfast to endure disasters.

[20] 1 Eodem fere tempore P. Crassus, cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset, quae [pars], ut ante dictum est, [et regionum latitudine et multitudine hominum] tertia pars Galliae est [aestimanda], cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum ubi paucis ante annis L. Valerius Praeconinus legatus exercitu pulso interfectus esset atque unde L. Manlius proconsul impedimentis amissis profugisset, non mediocrem sibi diligentiam adhibendam intellegebat. 2 Itaque re frumentaria provisa, auxiliis equitatuque comparato, multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae, ex his regionibus nominatim evocatis, in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit. 3 Cuius adventu cognito

Sotiates magnis copiis coactis, equitatuque, quo plurimum valebant, in itinere agmen nostrum adorti primum equestre proelium commiserunt, 4 deinde equitatu suo pulso atque insequentibus nostris subito pedestres copias, quas in convalle in insidiis conlocaverant, ostenderunt. Hi nostros disiectos adorti proelium renovarunt.

[20] About this time Publius Crassus had reached Aquitania, a district which, as has been said before, for extent of territory and number of inhabitants is to be reckoned as a third part of Gaul. He understood that he was to conduct a campaign in the localities where a few years before Lucius Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant-general, had been defeated and slain, and from which the proconsul Lucius Mallius had escaped with the loss of his baggage; he understood, therefore, that he must exercise no common care. Accordingly he provided a supply of corn, he collected auxiliaries and cavalry, and he further called up singly many brave men from Toulouse and Narbonne, communities of the Province of Gaul adjacent to the regions concerned; he then marched his army into the borders of the Sotiates. Hearing of his approach, the Sotiates collected a large force, with cavalry, in which lay their chief strength, and attacked our column on the march. First of all they engaged in a cavalry combat; then, when their cavalry were beaten, and ours pursued, they suddenly unmasked their infantry force, which they had posted in ambush in a valley. The infantry attacked our scattered horsemen and renewed the fight.

[21] 1 Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem quid sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent perspicere cuperent; tandem confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt. 2 Quorum magno numero

interfecto Crassus ex itinere oppidum Sotiatium oppugnare coepit. Quibus fortiter resistentibus vineas turresque egit. 3 Illi alias eruptione temptata, alias cuniculis ad aggerem vineasque actis (cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt), ubi diligentia nostrorum nihil his rebus profici posse intellexerunt, legatos ad Crassum mittunt seque in deditionem ut recipiat petunt. Qua re impetrata arma tradere iussi faciunt.

[21] The battle was long and fierce. The Sotiates, with the confidence of previous victories, felt that upon their own courage depended the safety of all Aquitania: the Romans were eager to have it seen what they could accomplish under a young leader without the commander-in-chief and the rest of the legions. At last, however, after heavy casualties the enemy fled from the field. A large number of them were slain; and then Crassus turned direct from his march and began to attack the stronghold of the Sotiates. When they offered a brave resistance he brought up mantlets and towers. The enemy at one time attempted a sortie, at another pushed mines as far as the ramp and the mantlets — and in mining the Aquitani are by far the most experienced of men, because in many localities among them there are copper-mines and diggings. When they perceived that by reason of the efficiency of our troops no advantage was to be gained by these expedients, they sent deputies to Crassus and besought him to accept their surrender.

[22] 1 Atque in eam rem omnium nostrorum intentis animis alia ex parte oppidi Adiatunnus, qui summam imperii tenebat, cum DC devotis, quos illi soldurios appellant, quorum haec est condicio, ut omnibus in vita commodis una cum iis fruantur quorum se amicitiae

dediderint, si quid his per vim accidat, aut eundem casum una ferant aut sibi mortem consciscant; 2 neque adhuc hominum memoria repertus est quisquam qui, eo interfecto cuius se amicitiae devovisset, mortem recusaret – 4 cum his Adiatunnus eruptionem facere conatus clamore ab ea parte munitionis sublato cum ad arma milites concurrissent vehementerque ibi pugnatum esset, repulsus in oppidum tamen uti eadem deditionis condicione uteretur a Crasso impetravit.

[22] Their request was granted, and they proceeded to deliver up their arms as ordered. Then, while the attention of all our troops was engaged upon that business, Adiatunnus, the commander-in-chief, took action from another quarter of the town with six hundred devotees, whom they call vassals. The rule of these men is that in life they enjoy all benefits with the comrades to whose friendship they have committed themselves, while if any violent fate befalls their fellows, they either endure the same misfortune along with them or take their own lives; and no one yet in the memory of man has been found to refuse death, after the slaughter of the comrade to whose friendship he had devoted himself. With these men Adiatunnus tried to make a sortie; but a shout was raised on that side of the entrenchment, the troops ran to arms, and a sharp engagement was fought there. Adiatunnus was driven back into the town; but, for all that, he begged and obtained from Crassus the same terms of surrender as at first.

[23] 1 Armis obsidibusque acceptis, Crassus in fines Vocationum et Tarusatum profectus est. 2 Tum vero barbari commoti, quod oppidum et natura loci et manu munitum paucis diebus quibus eo ventum erat expugnatum cognoverant, legatos quoque versum

dimittere, coniurare, obsides inter se dare, copias parare coeperunt. 3 Mittuntur etiam ad eas civitates legati quae sunt citerioris Hispaniae finitimae Aquitaniae: inde auxilia ducesque arcessuntur. 4 Quorum adventu magna cum auctoritate et magna [cum] hominum multitudine bellum gerere conantur. 5 Duces vero ii deliguntur qui una cum Q. Sertorio omnes annos fuerant summamque scientiam rei militaris habere existimabantur. 6 Hi consuetudine populi Romani loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instituunt. 7 Quod ubi Crassus animadvertit, suas copias propter exiguitatem non facile diduci, hostem et vagari et vias obsidere et castris satis praesidii relinquere, ob eam causam minus commode frumentum commeatumque sibi supportari, in dies hostium numerum augeri, non cunctandum existimavit quin pugna decertaret. 8 Hac re ad consilium delata, ubi omnes idem sentire intellexit, posterum diem pugnae constituit.

[23] After receiving arms and hostages Crassus set his march for the borders of the Vocates and the Tarusates. At this juncture the natives, alarmed by the information that a town fortified alike by natural position and by the hand of man had been carried within a few days of his arrival, began to send deputies about in every direction, to conspire together, to deliver hostages to each other, and to make ready a force. They even sent deputies to those states of Nearer Spain which border on Aquitania, inviting succours and leaders from thence. Upon their arrival they attempted the campaign with great prestige and a great host of men. And as their leaders for the same they selected men who had served for the whole period with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to be past masters of war. These leaders, in Roman fashion, set to work to take up positions, to entrench a camp, and to cut off our supplies. Crassus remarked that his own

force by reason of its slender numbers could not easily be split up, while the enemy could range at will, beset the roads, and yet leave sufficient garrison for their camp; and that for this reason his corn and supplies were less conveniently brought up, while the numbers of the enemy daily increased: he therefore considered that he must not delay to fight a decisive battle. He referred the question to a council of war; and, perceiving that all were agreed, he appointed the following day for the battle.

[24] 1 Prima luce productis omnibus copiis duplici acie instituta, auxiliis in mediam aciem coniectis, quid hostes consilii caperent expectabat. 2 Illi, etsi propter multitudinem et veterem belli gloriam paucitatemque nostrorum se tuto dimicaturos existimabant, tamen tutius esse arbitrabantur obsessis viis commeatu intercluso sine vulnere victoria potiri, 3 et si propter inopiam rei frumentariae Romani se recipere coepissent, impeditos in agmine et sub sarcinis infirmiore animo adoriri cogitabant. 4 Hoc consilio probato ab ducibus, productis Romanorum copiis, sese castris tenebant. 5 Hac re perspecta Crassus, cum sua cunctatione atque opinione timoris hostes nostros milites alacriores ad pugnandum effecissent atque omnium voces audirentur expectari diutius non oportere quin ad castra iretur, cohortatus suos omnibus cupientibus ad hostium castra contendit.

[24] At dawn he brought out all his force and formed double line, with the auxiliaries massed in the centre; then he waited to see what plan the enemy would adopt. Although they considered that they could fight an action safely by reason of their numbers and their past glory in war and the smallness of the Roman force, they still thought it safer to close the roads and cut off supplies, and so to secure victory without bloodshed. And further, if through lack of corn the Romans

began to retire, they had it in mind to attack them when they were encumbered in column by the weight of their packs, so that their spirit would be weaker. This plan was approved by their leaders; therefore, when the Roman force was brought out, they kept in camp. Crassus perceived this; and, inasmuch as the enemy by their hesitation had created an impression of timidity and increased the eagerness of our soldiers for action, and a general protest was heard against longer delay before an advance on the camp, he harangued his troops, and then amid general enthusiasm he pressed on to the enemy's camp.

[25] 1 Ibi cum alii fossas complerent, alii multis telis coniectis defensores vallo munitionibusque depellerent, auxiliaresque, quibus ad pugnam non multum Crassus confidebat, lapidibus telisque subministrandis et ad aggerem caespitibus comportandis speciem atque opinionem pugnantium praeberent, cum item ab hostibus constanter ac non timide pugnaretur telaque ex loco superiore missa non frustra acciderent, 2 equites circumitis hostium castris Crasso renuntiaverunt non eadem esse diligentia ab decumana porta castra munita facilemque aditum habere.

[25] Arrived there, some proceeded to fill up the trenches, others by many volleys of missiles to clear the defenders from the rampart and fortifications, while the auxiliaries, in whom Crassus had no great confidence for actual fighting, by handing up stones and missiles and carrying sods to make a ramp, gave the appearance and impression of fighting troops. Meanwhile the enemy, for their part, fought in no irresolute or cowardly fashion, and their missiles discharged from a higher level fell to some purpose. A party of cavalry, however, having moved round the enemy's camp, reported to Crassus that it

was not fortified with the same care on the rear side, and might easily be approached there.

[26] 1 Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus, ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri vellet ostendit. 2 Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus quae praesidio castris relictæ intritæ ab labore erant, et longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad pugnam intentis celeriter ad eas quas diximus munitiones pervenerunt 3 atque his prorutis prius in hostium castris constiterunt quam plane ab his videri aut quid rei gereretur cognosci posset. 4 Tum vero clamore ab ea parte audito nostri redintegratis viribus, quod plerumque in spe victoriae accidere consuevit, acrius impugnare coeperunt. 5 Hostes undique circumventi desperatis omnibus rebus se per munitiones deicere et fuga salutem petere contenderunt. 6 Quos equitatus apertissimis campis consecutus ex milium L numero, quae ex Aquitania Cantabrisque convenisse constabat, vix quarta parte relictæ, multa nocte se in castra recepit.

[26] Crassus exhorted the cavalry commanders to incite their men by great rewards and promises, and showed what he would have done. In accordance with his orders they led out the cohorts which had been left to guard the camp and were unwearied by exertion; and, having led them a long way round, so as not to be seen from the enemy's camp, they rapidly reached the fortifications above mentioned while the eyes and attention of all were set on the actual fight. They threw down the fortifications, and established themselves in the enemy's camp before they could be clearly seen by them or their action perceived. But when shouting was heard in that quarter the Romans, with strength renewed, began, as is frequent and usual

where there is hope of victory, to assault the more vigorously. The enemy, surrounded on all sides and in utter despair, hastened to lower themselves over the fortifications and to seek safety in flight. The cavalry chased them over plains wholly without shelter; and of fifty thousand, the number known to have assembled from Aquitania and the Cantabrian country, they had left scarce a quarter when they returned to camp late at night.

[27] 1 Hac audita pugna maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso deditit obsidesque ultro misit; quo in numero fuerunt Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, Cocosates: 2 paucae ultimae nationes anni tempore confisae, quod hiems suberat, id facere neglexerunt.

[27] Upon hearing of this battle the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus, and of its own motion sent hostages, among whom were representatives of the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibuzates, Cocosates. A few of the most distant tribes, trusting in the season, as winter was at hand, omitted to do this.

[28] 1 Eodem fere tempore Caesar, etsi prope exacta iam aestas erat, tamen, quod omni Gallia pacata Morini Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent, arbitratus id bellum celeriter confici posse eo exercitum duxit; qui longe alia ratione ac reliqui Galli bellum gerere coeperunt. 2 Nam quod intellegebant maximas nationes, quae proelio contendissent, pulsas superatasque esse, continentesque silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque omnia contulerunt. 3 Ad quarum initium silvarum cum Caesar pervenisset castraque munire instituisset neque hostis interim visus esset, dispersis in opere nostris subito ex omnibus partibus

silvae evolaverunt et in nostros impetum fecerunt. 4 Nostri celeriter arma ceperunt eosque in silvas repulerunt et compluribus interfectis longius impeditioribus locis secuti paucos ex suis deperdiderunt.

[28] In the general pacification of Gaul the Morini and Menapii remained under arms, and had never sent deputies to Caesar to treat for peace. About this same time, although the summer was almost over, he led his army against them, believing that the campaign could be speedily completed. These tribes, however, started upon the campaign with tactics quite different from the rest of the Gauls. For, perceiving that the most powerful tribes which had fought an action had been beaten and vanquished, and possessing continuous forests and marshes, they conveyed themselves and all their stuff thither. Caesar reached the outskirts of these forests, and determined to entrench a camp, having in the meanwhile seen nothing of the enemy. When, however, our men were scattered at work, the enemy suddenly dashed out of all parts of the forest and charged our troops. These speedily took up arms, and drove the enemy back into the forests: a considerable number of them were slain, but as the Romans pursued too far in almost impassable places they lost a few of their own side.

[29] 1 Reliquis deinceps diebus Caesar silvas caedere instituit, et ne quis inermibus imprudentibusque militibus ab latere impetus fieri posset, omnem eam materiam quae erat caesa conversam ad hostem conlocabat et pro vallo ad utrumque latus extruebat. 2 Incredibili celeritate magno spatio paucis diebus confecto, cum iam pecus atque extrema impedimenta a nostris tenerentur, ipsi densiores silvas peterent, eius modi sunt tempestates consecutae uti opus necessario intermitteretur et continuatione imbrium diutius sub pellibus milites

contineri non possent. 3 Itaque vastatis omnibus eorum agris, vicis aedificiisque incensis, Caesar exercitum reduxit et in Aulercis Lexoviisque, reliquis item civitatibus quae proxime bellum fecerant, in hibernis conlocavit.

[29] In the days then remaining Caesar set to work to cut down the forests, and, to prevent any flank attack on troops unarmed and unprepared, he placed all the timber felled on the side toward the enemy, and also piled it as a rampart on both flanks. With incredible rapidity a great space was cleared in a few days, until the enemy's cattle and the rearward of their baggage were in our keeping, while they themselves sought the denser forests. But then such storms ensued that the work was of necessity interrupted, and the continual rains made it impossible to keep the troops longer under canvas. Accordingly, after laying waste all the fields of the enemy, and burning villages and farm-buildings, Caesar brought back his army, and placed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the rest of the states which had recently waged war.

BOOK IV

[1] 1 Ea quae secuta est hieme, qui fuit annus Cn. Pompeio, M. Crasso consulibus, Usipetes Germani et item Tencteri magna [cum] multitudine hominum flumen Rhenum transierunt, non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit. 2 Causa transeundi fuit quod ab Suebis complures annos exagitati bello premebantur et agri cultura prohibebantur. 3 Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium. 4 Hi centum pagos habere dicuntur, ex quibus quotannis singula milia armatorum bellandi causa ex finibus educunt. Reliqui, qui domi manserunt, se atque illos alunt; 5 hi rursus in vicem anno post in armis sunt, illi domi remanent. 6 Sic neque agri cultura nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur. 7 Sed privati ac separati agri apud eos nihil est, neque longius anno remanere uno in loco colendi causa licet. 8 Neque multum frumento, sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt multum sunt in venationibus; 9 quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitatione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina adsuefacti nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciunt, et vires alit et immani corporum magnitudine homines efficit. 10 Atque in eam se consuetudinem adduxerunt ut locis frigidissimis neque vestitus praeter pelles habeant quicquam, quarum propter exiguitatem magna est corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

[1] In the following winter — the year in which Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Crassus were consuls — the Usipetes from Germany, and likewise the Tencteri, crossed the Rhine with a large host of men, not far from the sea into which it flows. The reason for their crossing was that for several years they had been much harassed by the Suebi, who pressed on them by force of arms and prevented them

from husbandry. The Suebi are by far the largest and the most warlike nation among the Germans. It is said that they have a hundred cantons, from each of which they draw one thousand armed men yearly for the purpose of war outside their borders. The remainder, who have stayed at home, support themselves and the absent warriors; and again, in turn, are under arms the following year, while the others remain at home. By this means neither husbandry nor the theory and practice of war is interrupted. They have no private or separate holding of land, nor are they allowed to abide longer than a year in one place for their habitation. They make not much use of corn^o for food, but chiefly of milk and of cattle, and are much engaged in hunting; and this, owing to the nature of the food, the regular exercise, and the freedom of life — for from boyhood up they are not schooled in a sense of duty or discipline, and do nothing whatever against their wish — nurses their strength and makes men of immense bodily stature. Moreover, they have regularly trained themselves to wear nothing, even in the coldest localities, except skins, the scantiness of which leaves a great part of the body bare, and they bathe in the rivers.

[2] 1 Mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus vendant habeant, quam quo ullam rem ad se importari desiderent. 2 Quin etiam iumentis, quibus maxime Galli delectantur quaeque impenso parant pretio, Germani importatis non utuntur, sed quae sunt apud eos nata, parva atque deformia, haec cotidiana exercitatione summi ut sint laboris efficiunt. 3 Equestribus proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equos eodem remanere vestigio adsuefecerunt, ad quos se celeriter, cum usus est, recipiunt: 4 neque eorum moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti. 5 Itaque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis

pauci adire audent. 6 Vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur.

[2] They give access to traders rather to secure purchasers for what they have captured in war than to satisfy any craving for imports. And, in fact, the Germans do not import for their use draught-horses, in which the Gauls take the keenest delight, procuring them at great expense; but they take their home-bred animals, inferior and ill-favoured, and by regular exercising they render them capable of the utmost exertion. In cavalry combats they often leap from their horses and fight on foot, having trained their horses to remain in the same spot, and retiring rapidly upon them at need; and their tradition regards nothing as more disgraceful or more indolent than the use of saddles. And so, however few in number, they dare approach any party, however large, of saddle-horsemen. They suffer no importation of wine whatever, believing that men are thereby rendered soft and womanish for the endurance of hardship.

[3] 1 Publice maximam putant esse laudem quam latissime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari magnum numerum civitatum suam vim sustinere non posse. 2 Itaque una ex parte a Suebis circiter milia passuum C agri vacare dicuntur. 3 Ad alteram partem succedunt Ubii, quorum fuit civitas ampla atque florens, ut est captus Germanorum; ii paulo, quamquam sunt eiusdem generis, sunt ceteris humaniores, propterea quod Rhenum attingunt multum ad eos mercatores ventitant et ipsi propter propinquitatem [quod] Gallicis sunt moribus adsuefacti. 4 Hos cum Suebi multis saepe bellis experti propter amplitudinem gravitatem civitatis finibus expellere non potuissent, tamen vectigales sibi fecerunt ac multo humiliores

infirmiores redegerunt.

[3] As a nation, they count it the highest praise to have the land on their borders untenanted over as wide a tract as may be, for this signifies, they think, that a great number of states cannot withstand their force. Thus it is said that on one side for about six hundred miles from the territory of the Suebi the land is untenanted. On the other side the Ubii come nearest, a state which was once extensive and prosperous, according to German standards. Its inhabitants are somewhat more civilised than the other folk of the same race, because their borders touch the Rhine and traders visit them frequently, and, further, because the Ubii themselves by close neighbourhood have grown accustomed to Gallic fashions. Upon this people the Suebi had made frequent attempts in many wars, but had proved unable to drive them from their territory because the state was populous and powerful; however, they made the Ubii tributary to themselves, and greatly diminished their strength and importance.

[4] 1 In eadem causa fuerunt Usipetes et Tencteri, quos supra diximus; qui complures annos Sueborum vim sustinuerunt, 2 ad extremum tamen agris expulsi et multis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt, quas regiones Menapii incolebant. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant; 3 sed tantae multitudinis adventu perterriti ex iis aedificiis quae trans flumen habuerant demigraverant, et cis Rhenum dispositis praesidiis Germanos transire prohibebant. 4 Illi omnia experti, cum neque vi contendere propter inopiam navium neque clam transire propter custodias Menapiorum possent, 5 reverti se in suas sedes regionesque simulaverunt et tridui viam progressi rursus reverterunt atque omni hoc itinere una nocte equitatu confecto inscios inopinantes Menapios

oppresserunt, 6 qui de Germanorum discessu per exploratores certiores facti sine metu trans Rhenum in suos vicos remigraverant. 7 His interfectis navibus eorum occupatis, prius quam ea pars Menapiorum quae citra Rhenum erat certior fieret, flumen transierunt atque omnibus eorum aedificiis occupatis reliquam partem hiemis se eorum copiis aluerunt.

[4] The Usipetes and the Tencteri, mentioned above, were in the same case. For several years they withstood the force of the Suebi, but at last they were driven out of their lands, and after wandering for three years in many districts of Germany they reached the Rhine. The localities thereabout were inhabited by the Menapii, who possessed lands, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river; but, being alarmed by the approach of so great a host, they removed from the buildings which they had possessed beyond the river, and, setting garrisons at intervals on the near side of the Rhine, sought to prevent the Germans from crossing. The Germans tried every expedient, but when they found that they could neither force their way because of their lack of vessels nor cross privily because of the Menapian piquets, they pretended to retire to their own homes and districts. They proceeded for a three days' journey, and then returned; and their cavalry, having completed the whole of this distance in a single night, caught the Menapii uninformed and unawares, for, having learnt through their scouts of the departure of the Germans, they had moved back without fear over the Rhine into their own villages. So they were put to the sword and their vessels seized; then the Germans crossed the river before the section of the Menapii on the near side of the Rhine could learn of it, seized all their buildings, and for the remainder of the winter sustained themselves on the supplies of the Menapii.

[5] 1 His de rebus Caesar certior factus et infirmitatem Gallorum veritus, quod sunt in consiliis capiendis mobiles et novis plerumque rebus student, nihil his committendum existimavit. 2 Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et viatores etiam invitos consistere cogant et quid quisque eorum de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit quaerant et mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibus ex regionibus veniant quas ibi res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat. 3 His rebus atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio paenitere necesse est, cum incertis rumoribus serviant et pleri ad voluntatem eorum ficta respondeant.

[5] Caesar was informed of these events; and fearing the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are capricious in forming designs and intent for the most part on change, he considered that no trust should be reposed in them. It is indeed a regular habit of the Gauls to compel travellers to halt, even against their will, and to ascertain what each of them may have heard or learnt upon every subject; and in the towns the common folk surround traders, compelling them to declare from what districts they come and what they have learnt there. Such stories and hearsay often induce them to form plans upon vital questions of which they must forthwith repent; for they are the slaves of uncertain rumours, and most men reply to them in fictions made to their taste.

[6] 1 Qua consuetudine cognita Caesar, ne graviori bello, occurreret, maturius quam consuevit ad exercitum proficiscitur. 2 Eo cum venisset, ea quae fore suspicatus erat facta cognovit: 3 missas legationes ab nonnullis civitatibus ad Germanos invitatosque eos uti ab Rheno discederent: omnia quae postulassent ab se fore parata. 4 Qua spe adducti Germani latius iam vagabantur et in fines Eburorum

et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant. 5 Principibus Gallice evocatis Caesar ea quae cognoverat dissimulanda sibi existimavit, eorumque animis permulsis et confirmatis equitatu imperato bellum cum Germanis gerere constituit.

[6] Caesar was aware of this their habit, and, for fear that otherwise he might have to face a more serious campaign, set out for the army earlier than was his wont. When he reached headquarters he learnt that his suspicions had been realised; deputations had been sent by some states to the Germans, inviting them to leave the Rhine, and promising to furnish all things demanded of them. The hope thus inspired encouraged the Germans to range more widely, and they had already reached the borders of the Eburones and the Condrusi, dependents of the Treveri. Thereupon Caesar summoned the chiefs of Gaul from their homes; but, thinking it best to conceal the information in his possession, he comforted and encouraged them, and, having made requisition of cavalry, determined to make war on the Germans.

[7] 1 Re frumentaria comparata equitibusque delectis iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat. 2 A quibus cum paucorum dierum iter abesset, legati ab iis venerunt, quorum haec fuit oratio: 3 Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre neque tamen recusare, si lacesantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum consuetudo [haec] sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invitos, eiectos domo; 4 si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur eos tenere quos armis possederint: 5 sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales pares esse possint;

reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint.

[7] Having secured his corn-supply and selected his cavalry, he began to march into the localities in which the Germans were reported to be. When he was a few days' march away deputies arrived from them, whose address was to the following effect: The Germans did not take the first step in making war on the Roman people, nor yet, if provoked, did they refuse the conflict of arms, for it was the ancestral custom of the Germans to resist anyone who made war upon them, and not to beg off. They declared, however, that they had come against their will, being driven out of their homes: if the Romans would have their goodwill, they might find their friendship useful. Let the Romans either grant them lands, or suffer them to hold the lands their arms had acquired. They yielded to the Suebi alone, to whom even the immortal gods could not be equal; on earth at any rate there was no one else whom they could not conquer.

[8] 1 Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent; 2 neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint; 3 sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considerare, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturus.

[8] To this Caesar replied as seemed good; but the conclusion of his speech was as follows: He could have no friendship with them, if they remained in Gaul. On the one hand, it was not just that men who had not been able to defend their own territories should seize those of others; on the other hand, there was no land in Gaul which could be

granted without injustice, especially to so numerous a host. However, they had permission, if they pleased, to settle in the territories of the Ubii, whose deputies were in his camp, complaining of the outrages of the Suebi and seeking his assistance: he would give orders to the Ubii to this effect.

[9] 1 Legati haec se ad suos relatueros dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt. 2 Ne id quidem Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit. 3 Cognoverat enim magnam partem equitatus ab iis aliquot diebus ante praedandi frumentandi causa ad Ambivaritos trans Mosam missam: hos expectari equites atque eius rei causa moram interponi arbitrabatur.

[9] The envoys said that they would report this to their people and, after deliberation upon the matter, return to Caesar in three days: they asked him not to move his camp nearer in the meanwhile. Caesar replied that he could not even grant that request. He knew, in fact, that they had sent a large detachment of cavalry some days before to the country of the Ambivariti across the Meuse, to get booty and corn: he supposed that they were waiting for this cavalry, and for that reason sought to interpose delay.

[10] 1 [Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulam efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit 2 neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit. 3 Rhenus autem oritur ex Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur et, 4 ubi Oceano adpropinquavit, in plures diffluit partes multis ingentibus insulis effectis, quarum pars magna a

feris barbaris nationibus incolitur, 5 ex quibus sunt qui piscibus atque ovis avium vivere existimantur, multis capitibus in Oceanum influit.]

[10] The Meuse flows from the range of the Vosges, in the territory of the Lingones, and, receiving from the Rhine a certain tributary called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi; then, no more than eighty miles from the Ocean, it flows into the Rhine. The Rhine rises in the land of the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps; in a long, swift course it runs through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrices, Triboci, and Treveri, and on its approach to the Ocean divides into several streams, forming many large islands (a great number of which are inhabited by fierce barbaric tribes, believed in some instances to live on fish and birds' eggs); then by many mouths it flows into the Ocean.

[11] 1 Caesar cum ab hoste non amplius passuum XII milibus abesset, ut erat constitutum, ad eum legati revertuntur; qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progredieretur orabant. 2 Cum id non impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos [equites] qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos pugna prohiberet, sibi ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi; 3 quorum si principes ac senatus sibi iure iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret. 4 Haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur ut tridui mora interposita equites eorum qui abessent reverterentur; tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit: 5 huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret. 6 Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacesserent, et si ipsi lacesserentur, sustinerent quoad ipse cum

exercitu propius accessisset.

[11] When Caesar was no more than twelve miles away from the enemy, the deputies returned to him as agreed: they met him on the march, and besought him earnestly not to advance further. When their request was not granted, they asked him to send forward to the cavalry in advance of his column and to prevent them from engaging, and to grant themselves an opportunity of sending deputies into the land of the Ubii. They put forward the hope that, if the chiefs and the senate of the Ubii pledged their faith on oath, they (the Germans) would accept the terms which Caesar offered; and they asked him to give them an interval of three days to settle these affairs. Caesar supposed that all these pleas had the same object as before, to secure by a three days' interval the return of their absent cavalry; however, he said that on that day he would advance no further than four miles, in order to get water. He instructed them to meet him there next day with as large a number as they could, in order that he might take cognisance of their demands. Meanwhile he sent instructions to the commanders who had gone forward with all the cavalry not to provoke the enemy to an engagement, and, if provoked themselves, to hold their ground until he himself with the army had come up nearer.

[12] 1 At hostes, ubi primum nostros equites conspexerunt, quorum erat V milium numerus, cum ipsi non amplius DCCC equites haberent, quod ii qui frumentandi causa erant trans Mosam profecti nondum redierant, nihil timentibus nostris, quod legati eorum paulo ante a Caesare discesserant atque is dies indutiis erat ab his petitus, impetu facto celeriter nostros perturbaverunt; 2 rursus his resistentibus consuetudine sua ad pedes desiluerunt subfossis equis

compluribus nostris deiectis reliquos in fugam coniecerunt atque ita perterritos egerunt ut non prius fuga desisterent quam in conspectum agminis nostri venissent. 3 In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur IIII et LXX, 4 in his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat amicus a senatu nostro appellatus. 5 Hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus, quoad potuit, fortissime restitit; 6 cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis cecidisset atque id frater, qui iam proelio excesserat, procul animadvertisset, incitato equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfectus est.

[12] The enemy had no more than eight hundred cavalry, for the party which was gone across the Meuse to get corn was not yet returned. Our own men, five thousand strong, had nothing to fear, for the deputies of the Germans had left Caesar but a short while before, having asked for a truce that day. However, directly they saw our cavalry, the enemy charged, and speedily threw our men into confusion. When our men turned to resist, the enemy, according to their custom, dismounted, and, by stabbing our horses and bringing down many of our troopers to the ground, they put the rest to rout, and indeed drove them in such panic that they did not desist from flight until they were come in sight of our column. In that engagement were slain seventy-four of our cavalry, and among them the gallant Piso of Aquitania, the scion of a most distinguished line, whose grandfather had held the sovereignty in his own state, and had been saluted as Friend by the Roman Senate. Piso went to the assistance of his brother, who had been cut off by the enemy, and rescued him from danger, but was thrown himself, his horse having been wounded. He resisted most gallantly as long as he could; then

he was surrounded, and fell after receiving many wounds. His brother, who had escaped from the fight, saw him fall from a distance; then spurred his horse, flung himself upon the enemy, and was slain.

[13] 1 Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent; 2 expectare vero dum hostium copiae augerentur equitatus reverteretur summae dementiae esse iudicabat, 3 et cognita Gallorum infirmitate quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat. 4 His constitutis rebus et consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato, ne quem diem pugnae praetermitteret, oportunissima res accidit, quod postridie eius diei mane eadem et perfidia et simulatione usi Germani frequentes, omnibus principibus maioribusque natu adhibitis, ad eum in castra venerunt, 5 simul, ut dicebatur, sui purgandi causa, quod contra atque esset dictum et ipsi petissent, proelium pridie commisissent, simul ut, si quid possent, de indutiis fallendo impetrarent. 6 Quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus illos retineri iussit; ipse omnes copias castris D eduxit equitatumque, quod recenti proelio perterritum esse existimabat, agmen subsequi iussit.

[13] After this engagement was over, Caesar felt that he ought no longer to receive deputies nor to accept conditions from tribes which had sought for peace by guile and treachery, and then had actually begun war. Further, he judged it the height of madness to wait till the enemy's forces should be increased and their cavalry returned. Knowing as he did the fickleness of the Gauls, he apprehended how much influence the enemy had already acquired over them by a

single engagement; and he considered that no time to form plans should be given them. Thus determined, he communicated to the lieutenant-generals and the quartermaster-general his purpose not to lose a day in giving battle. Then, most fortunately, a certain thing occurred. The next morning, as treacherous and hypocritical as ever, a large company of Germans, which included all the principal and senior men, came to his quarters, with a double object — to clear themselves (so they alleged) for engaging in a battle the day before, contrary to the agreement and to their own request therein, and also by deceit to get what they could in respect of the truce. Caesar rejoiced that they were delivered into his hand, and ordered them to be detained; then in person he led all his troops out of camp, commanding the cavalry, which he judged to be shaken by the recent engagement, to follow in the rear.

[14] 1 Acie triplici instituta et celeriter VIII milium itinere confecto, prius ad hostium castra pervenit quam quid ageretur Germani sentire possent. 2 Qui omnibus rebus subito perterriti et celeritate adventus nostri et discessu suorum, neque consilii habendi neque arma capiendi spatio dato perturbantur, copiasne adversus hostem ducere an castra defendere an fuga salutem petere praestaret. 3 Quorum timor cum fremitu et concursu significaretur, milites nostri pristini diei perfidia incitati in castra inruperunt. 4 Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter carros impedimentaue proelium commiserunt; 5 at reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenum transierant) passim fugere coepit, ad quos consecrandos Caesar equitatum misit.

[14] Triple line of columns was formed, and the eight-mile march was

so speedily accomplished that Caesar reached the enemy's camp before the Germans could have any inkling of what was toward. They were struck with sudden panic by everything — by the rapidity of our approach, the absence of their own chiefs; and, as no time was given them to think, or to take up arms, they were too much taken aback to decide which was best — to lead their forces against the enemy, to defend the camp, or to seek safety by flight. When their alarm was betrayed by the uproar and bustle, our troops, stung by the treachery of the day before, burst into the camp. In the camp those who were able speedily to take up arms resisted the Romans for a while, and fought among the carts and baggage-wagons; the remainder, a crowd of women and children (for the Germans had left home and crossed the Rhine with all their belongings), began to flee in all directions, and Caesar despatched the cavalry in pursuit.

[15] 1 Germani post tergum clamore audito, cum suos interfici viderent, armis abiectis signis militaribus relictis se ex castris eiecerunt, 2 et cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, reliqua fuga desperata, magno numero interfecto, reliqui se in flumen praecipitaverunt atque ibi timore, lassitudine, vi fluminis oppressi perierunt. 3 Nostri ad unum omnes incolumes, perpaucis vulneratis, ex tanti belli timore, cum hostium numerus capitum CCCCXXX milium fuisset, se in castra receperunt. 4 Caesar iis quos in castris retinuerat discedendi potestatem fecit. 5 Illi supplicia cruciatusque Gallorum veriti, quorum agros vexaverant, remanere se apud eum velle dixerunt. His Caesar libertatem concessit.

[15] Hearing the noise in rear, and seeing their own folk slain, the Germans threw away their arms, abandoned their war-standards, and burst out of the camp. When they reached the junction of the Meuse

and the Rhine, they gave up hope of escaping further; a large number were already slain, and the rest hurled themselves into the river, there to perish, overcome by terror, by exhaustion, by the force of the stream. The Romans, with not a man lost and but few wounded, freed from the fear of a stupendous war — with an enemy whose numbers had been 430,000 souls — returned to camp. Caesar gave to the Germans detained in camp permission to depart; but they, fearing punishments and tortures at the hand of the Gauls whose lands they had harassed, said that they would stay in his company, and he gave them liberty to do so.

[16] 1 Germanico bello confecto multis de causis Caesar statuit sibi Rhenum esse transeundum; quarum illa fuit iustissima quod, cum videret Germanos tam facile impelli ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire. 2 Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam supra commemoravi praedandi frumentandi causa Mosam transisse neque proelio interfuisse, post fugam suorum se trans Rhenum in fines Sugambrorum receperat seque cum his coniunxerat. 3 Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliaeque bellum intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt: 4 populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet? 5 Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur; 6 vel, si id facere occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id sibi ad auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum. 7 Tantum esse

nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint. 8 Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur.

[16] The German campaign thus finished, Caesar decided for many reasons that he must cross the Rhine. The most cogent reason was that, as he saw the Germans so easily induced to enter Gaul, he wished to make them fearful in turn for their own fortunes, by showing them that a Roman army could and durst cross the Rhine. Moreover, that section of the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri which, as I have mentioned before, had crossed the Meuse to get booty and corn, and had taken no part in the battle, had now, after the rout of their countrymen, withdrawn across the Rhine into the territory of the Sugambri, and joined them. To them Caesar sent envoys to demand the surrender of the men who had made war upon himself and Gaul. They replied that the Rhine marked the limit of the Roman empire: if he thought it unfair that the Germans should cross into Gaul against his will, why did he claim any imperial power across the Rhine?

The Ubii, on the other hand, the only tribe beyond the Rhine which had sent deputies to Caesar, made friendly terms, and given hostages, earnestly besought him to assist them, as they were grievously hard pressed by the Suebi; or, if the urgent concerns of state prevented that, only to transport his army across the Rhine: that would suffice for their present help and future hope. So great, they said, even among the farthest tribes of Germany was the renown and reputation of his army, after the defeat of Ariovistus and the success of this last action, that their own safety was secure in the prestige and the

friendship of Rome. They promised a large supply of boats for the transport of his army.

[17] 1 Caesar his de causis quas commemoravi Rhenum transire decreverat; sed navibus transire neque satis tutum esse arbitrabatur neque suae neque populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat. 2 Itaque, etsi summa difficultas faciendi pontis proponebatur propter latitudinem, rapiditatem altitudinemque fluminis, tamen id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat. 3 Rationem pontis hanc instituit. Tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat. 4 Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo directe ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent, 5 iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetu fluminis conversa statuebat. 6 Haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur; 7 quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut, quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur. 8 Haec directa materia iniecta contexebantur ac longuriis cratibusque consternebantur; 9 ac nihilo setius sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent, 10 et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut, si arborum trunci sive naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent.

[17] For the reasons above mentioned Caesar had decided to cross the Rhine; but he deemed it scarcely safe, and ruled it unworthy of his own and the Romans' dignity, to cross in boats. And so, although he was confronted with the greatest difficulty in making a bridge, by reason of the breadth, the rapidity, and the depth of the river, he still thought that he must make that effort, or else not take his army across. He proceeded to construct a bridge on the following plan. He caused pairs of barks eighteen inches thick, sharpened a little way from the base and measured to suit the depth of the river, to be coupled together at an interval of two feet. These he lowered into the river by means of rafts, and set fast, and drove home by rammers; not, like piles, straight up and down, but leaning forward at a uniform slope, so that they inclined in the direction of the stream. Opposite to these, again, were planted two barks coupled in the same fashion, at a distance of forty feet from base to base of each pair, slanted against the force and onrush of the stream. These pairs of barks had two-foot transoms let into them atop, filling the interval at which they were coupled, and were kept apart by a pair of braces on the outer side at each end. So, as they were held apart and contrariwise clamped together, the stability of the structure was so great and its character such that, the greater the force and thrust of the water, the tighter were the barks held in lock. These trestles were interconnected by timber laid over at right angles, and floored with long poles and wattlework. And further, piles were driven in aslant on the side facing down stream, thrust out below like a buttress and close joined with the whole structure, so as to take the force of the stream; and others likewise at a little distance above the bridge, so that if trunks of trees, or vessels, were launched by the natives to break down the structure, these fenders might lessen the force of

such shocks, and prevent them from damaging the bridge.

[18] 1 Diebus X, quibus materia coepta erat comportari, omni opere effecto exercitus traducitur. 2 Caesar ad utramque partem pontis firmo praesidio relicto in fines Sugambrorum contendit. 3 Interim a compluribus civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt; quibus pacem atque amicitiam petentibus liberaliter respondet obsidesque ad se adduci iubet. 4 At Sugambri, ex eo tempore quo pons institui coeptus est fuga comparata, hortantibus iis quos ex Tencteris atque Usipetibus apud se habebant, finibus suis excesserant suaque omnia exportaverant seque in solitudinem ac silvas abdiderant.

[18] The whole work was completed in ten days from that on which the collecting of timber began, and the army was taken across. Leaving a strong post at either end of the bridge, Caesar pressed on into the territory of Sugambri. Meanwhile from several states deputies came to him, to whose request for peace and friendship he replied in generous fashion, and ordered hostages to be brought to him. But from the moment when the bridge began to be constructed the Sugambri, at the instigation of the Tencteri and Usipetes among them, had been preparing for flight; and now they had evacuated their territory, carried off all their stuff, and hidden themselves in the remote part of the forests.

[19] 1 Caesar paucos dies in eorum finibus moratus, omnibus vicis aedificiisque incensis frumentisque succisis, se in fines Ubiorum recepit atque his auxilium suum pollicitus, si a Suebis premerentur, haec ab iis cognovit: 2 Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes qui arma ferre possent unum in

locum convenirent. 3 Hunc esse delectum medium fere regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi decertare constituisse. 4 Quod ubi Caesar comperit, omnibus iis rebus confectis, quarum rerum causa exercitum traducere constituerat, ut Germanis metum iniceret, ut Sugambros ulcisceretur, ut Ubios obsidione liberaret, diebus omnino XVIII trans Rhenum consumptis, satis et ad laudem et ad utilitatem profectum arbitratus se in Galliam recepit pontemque rescidit.

[19] Caesar tarried for a few days in their territory, until he had burnt all the villages and buildings, and cut down the corn-crops. Then he withdrew into the territory of the Ubii; and, after a promise of his help to them, if they were hard pressed by the Suebi, he received the following information from them. The Suebi, when they had discovered by means of their scouts that a bridge was being built, held a convention according to their custom, and despatched messengers to all quarters, ordering the people to remove from their towns, to lodge their children and all their stuff in the woods, and to assemble in one place all men capable of bearing arms. The place chosen was about the middle of the districts occupied by the Suebi; here they were awaiting the approach of the Romans, having determined to fight the decisive battle on this spot. By the time when Caesar learnt this he had accomplished all the objects for which he had determined to lead his army across the Rhine — to strike terror into the Germans, to take vengeance on the Sugambri, to deliver the Ubii from a state of blockade. So, having spent in all eighteen days across the Rhine, and advanced far enough, as he thought, to satisfy both honour and expediency, he withdrew into Gaul and broke up the bridge.

[20] 1 Exigua parte aestatis reliqua Caesar, etsi in his locis, quod omnis Gallia ad septentriones vergit, maturae sunt hiemes, tamen in Britanniam proficisci contendit, quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat, 2 et si tempus anni ad bellum gerendum deficeret, tamen magno sibi usui fore arbitrabatur, si modo insulam adiisset, genus hominum perspexisset, loca, portus, aditus cognovisset; quae omnia fere Gallis erant incognita. 3 Neque enim temere praeter mercatores illo adit quisquam, neque his ipsis quicquam praeter oram maritimam atque eas regiones quae sunt contra Galliam notum est. 4 Itaque vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus, neque quanta esset insulae magnitudo neque quae aut quanta nationes incolerent, neque quem usum belli haberent aut quibus institutis uterentur, neque qui essent ad maiorem navium multitudinem idonei portus reperire poterat.

[20] Only a small part of the summer was left, and in these regions, as all Gaul has a northerly aspect, the winters are early; but for all this Caesar was intent upon starting for Britain. He understood that in almost all the Gallic campaigns succours had been furnished for our enemy from that quarter; and he supposed that, if the season left no time for actual campaigning, it would still be of great advantage to him merely to have entered the island, observed the character of the natives, and obtained some knowledge of the localities, the harbours, and the landing-places; for almost all these matters were unknown to the Gauls. In fact, nobody except traders journeys thither without good guard; and even traders know nothing except the sea-coast and the districts opposite Gaul. Therefore, although he summoned to his quarters traders from all parts, he could discover neither the size of the island, nor the number or the strength of the tribes inhabiting it, nor their manner of warfare, nor the ordinances they observed, nor

the harbours suitable for a number of large ships.

[21] 1 Ad haec cognoscenda, prius quam periculum faceret, idoneum esse arbitratus C. Volusenum cum navi longa praemittit. 2 Huic mandat ut exploratis omnibus rebus ad se quam primum revertatur. 3 Ipse cum omnibus copiis in Morinos proficiscitur, quod inde erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus. 4 Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire. 5 Interim, consilio eius cognito et per mercatores perlato ad Britannos, a compluribus insulae civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt, qui polliceantur obsides dare atque imperio populi Romani obtemperare. 6 Quibus auditis, liberaliter pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent, 7 eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat, cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit. 8 Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet. 9 Volusenus perspectis regionibus omnibus quantum ei facultatis dari potuit, qui navi egredi ac se barbaris committere non auderet, V. die ad Caesarem revertitur quaeque ibi perspexisset renuntiat.

[21] To gain such knowledge before he made the venture, Caesar thought Gaius Volusenus a proper person to send on in advance with a ship of war. His orders were to spy out everything and to return to him at once. He himself with all his forces started for the territory of the Morini, from which was the shortest passage across to Britain. He commanded the general concentration here of ships from the neighbouring districts, and of the fleet which he had built in the

previous summer for the Venetian campaign. Meanwhile his purpose had become known and had been reported through traders to the Britons, and deputies came to him from several states in the island with promises to give hostages and to accept the empire of Rome. He heard them, and made them a generous promise, encouraging them to keep their word; then he sent them back home, and along with them he sent Commius, whom he himself, after subduing the Atrebates, had made king over them. Caesar approved his courage and discretion, and believed him loyal to himself; and his influence was reckoned to be of great account in those parts. Him he commanded to visit what states he could, to exhort them to seek the protection of Rome, and to announce his own speedy advent thither. Volusenus observed all the country so far as was possible for an officer who did not dare to disembark and entrust himself to the rough natives, and on the fifth day returned to Caesar, and reported his observations in Britain.

[22] 1 Dum in his locis Caesar navium parandarum causa moratur, ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur. 2 Hoc sibi Caesar satis oportune accidisse arbitratus, quod neque post tergum hostem relinquere volebat neque belli gerendi propter anni tempus facultatem habebat neque has tantularum rerum occupationes Britanniae anteponendas iudicabat, magnum iis numerum obsidum imperat. 3 Quibus adductis eos in fidem recipit. Navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis contractisque, quot satis esse ad duas transportandas legiones existimabat, quod praeterea navium longarum habebat quaestori, legatis praefectisque distribuit. 4 Huc

accedebant XVIII onerariae naves, quae ex eo loco a milibus passuum VIII vento tenebantur quo minus in eundem portum venire possent: has equitibus tribuit. 5 Reliquum exercitum Q. Titurio Sabino et L. Aurunculeio Cottae legatis in Menapios atque in eos pagos Morinorum a quibus ad eum legati non venerant ducendum dedit. 6 P. Sulpicium Rufum legatum cum eo praesidio quod satis esse arbitrabatur portum tenere iussit.

[22] While Caesar tarried where he was to fit out his ships, deputies came to him from a great part of the Morini to make excuse for their policy of the previous season, when in their barbarism and ignorance of our usage they had made war against Rome, and to promise that they would carry out his commands. Caesar thought this overture exceedingly opportune. He did not wish to leave an enemy in his rear, nor had he a chance of carrying out a campaign because of the lateness of the season; nor did he think the settlement of such trivialities should take precedence of Britain. He therefore ordered them to furnish a large number of hostages; and when they brought these he received them under his protection. When about eighty transports — enough, in his opinion, to carry two legions across — had been collected and concentrated, he distributed all the ships of war he had over between his quartermaster-general, lieutenant-generals, and commandants. To the total stated eighteen transports should be added, which were detained eight miles off by the wind, and prevented from entering the port of concentration; these he allotted to the cavalry. The rest of the army he handed over to Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, lieutenant-generals, to be led against the Menapii and against those cantons of the Morini from which no deputies had come to him. He commanded Publius Sulpicius Rufus, lieutenant-general, with a garrison he

considered sufficient, to hold the port.

[23] 1 His constitutis rebus, nactus idoneam ad navigandum tempestatem III. fere vigilia solvit equitesque in ulteriorem portum progredi et naves conscendere et se sequi iussit. 2 A quibus cum paulo tardius esset administratum, ipse hora diei circiter IIII. cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit atque ibi in omnibus collibus expositas hostium copias armatas conspexit. 3 Cuius loci haec erat natura atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in litus telum adigi posset. 4 Hunc ad egrediendum nequaquam idoneum locum arbitratus, dum reliquae naves eo convenirent ad horam nonam in ancoris expectavit. 5 Interim legatis tribunisque militum convocatis et quae ex Voluseno cognovisset et quae fieri vellet ostendit monuitque, ut rei militaris ratio, maximeque ut maritimae res postularent, ut, cum celerem atque instabilem motum haberent, ad nutum et ad tempus omnes res ab iis administrarentur. 6 His dimissis et ventum et aestum uno tempore nactus secundum dato signo et sublatis ancoris circiter milia passuum septem ab eo loco progressus, aperto ac plano litore naves constituit.

[23] These arrangements made, he caught a spell of fair weather for sailing, and weighed anchor about the third watch; he ordered the cavalry to proceed to the further harbour, embark, and follow him. They took somewhat too long to despatch the business; he himself reached Britain about the fourth hour of the day, and there beheld the armed forces of the enemy displayed on all the cliffs. Such was the nature of the ground, so steep the heights which banked the sea, that a missile could be hurled from the higher levels on to the shore. Thinking this place to be by no means suitable for disembarkation, he waited at anchor till the ninth hour for the rest of the flotilla to

assemble there. Meanwhile he summoned together the lieutenant-generals and tribunes, to inform them what he had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wished to be done; and he warned them that, to meet the requirements of tactics and particularly of navigation — with its liability to movements as rapid as they were irregular — they must do everything in the nick of time at a hint from him. He then dismissed them; and catching at one and the same moment a favourable wind and tide, he gave the signal, and weighed anchor, and, moving on about seven miles from that spot, he grounded his ships where the shore was even and open.

[24] 1 At barbari, consilio Romanorum cognito praemisso equitatu et essedariis, quo plerumque genere in proeliis uti consuerunt, reliquis copiis subsecuti nostros navibus egredi prohibebant. 2 Erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem nisi in alto constitui non poterant, militibus autem, ignotis locis, impeditis manibus, magno et gravi onere armorum oppressis simul et de navibus desiliendum et in fluctibus consistendum et cum hostibus erat pugnandum, 3 cum illi aut ex arido aut paulum in aquam progressi omnibus membris expeditis, notissimis locis, audacter tela coicerent et equos insuefactos incitarent. 4 Quibus rebus nostri perterriti atque huius omnino generis pugnae imperiti, non eadem alacritate ac studio quo in pedestribus uti proeliis consueverant utebantur.

[24] The natives, however, perceived the design of the Romans. So they sent forward their cavalry and charioteers — an arm which it is their regular custom to employ in fights — and, following up with the rest of their forces, they sought to prevent our troops from disembarking. Disembarkation was a matter of extreme difficulty, for

the following reasons. The ships, on account of their size, could not be run ashore, except in deep water; the troops — though they did not know the ground, had not their hands free, and were loaded with the great and grievous weight of their arms — had nevertheless at one and the same time to leap down from the vessels, to stand firm in the waves, and to fight the enemy. The enemy, on the other hand, had all their limbs free, and knew the ground exceeding well; and either standing on dry land or advancing a little way into the water, they boldly hurled their missiles, or spurred on their horses, which were trained to it. Frightened by all this, and wholly inexperienced in this sort of fighting, our troops did not press on with the same fire and force as they were accustomed to show in land engagements.

[25] 1 Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris inusitator et motus ad usum expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et remis incitari et ad latus apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, tormentis hostes propelli ac submoveri iussit; quae res magno usui nostris fuit. 2 Nam et navium figura et remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt ac paulum modo pedem rettulerunt. 3 Atque nostris militibus cunctantibus, maxime propter altitudinem maris, qui X legionis aquilam gerebat, obtestatus deos, ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, ‘desilite’, inquit, ‘milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.’ 4 Hoc cum voce magna dixisset, se ex navi proiecit atque in hostes aquilam ferre coepit. 5 Tum nostri cohortati inter se, ne tantum dedecus admitteretur, universi ex navi desiluerunt. 6 Hos item ex proximis primi navibus cum conspexissent, subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.

[25] When Caesar remarked this, he commanded the ships of war (which were less familiar in appearance to the natives, and could move more freely at need) to remove a little from the transports, to row at speed, and to bring up on the exposed flank of the enemy; and thence to drive and clear them off with slings, arrows, and artillery. This movement proved of great service to our troops; for the natives, frightened by the shape of the ships, the motion of the oars, and the unfamiliar type of the artillery, came to a halt, and retired, but only for a little space. And then, while our troops still hung back, chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, the eagle-bearer of the Tenth Legion, after a prayer to heaven to bless the legion by his act, cried: "Leap down, soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy; it shall be told that I at any rate did my duty to my country and my general." When he had said this with a loud voice, he cast himself forth from the ship, and began to bear the eagle against the enemy. Then our troops exhorted one another not to allow so dire a disgrace, and leapt down from the ship with one accord. And when the troops on the nearest ships saw them, they likewise followed on, and drew near to the enemy.

[26] 1 Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. Nostri tamen, quod neque ordines servare neque firmiter insistere neque signa subsequi poterant atque alius alia ex navi quibuscumque signis occurrerat se adgregabat, magnopere perturbabantur; 2 hostes vero, notis omnibus vadii, ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur, 3 plures paucos circumsistebant, alii ab latere aperto in universos tela coiciebant. 4 Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, scaphas longarum navium, item speculatoria navigia militibus compleri iussit, et quos laborantes conspexerat, his subsidia submittebat. 5 Nostri, simul in arido

constiterunt, suis omnibus consecutis, in hostes impetum fecerunt atque eos in fugam dederunt; neque longius prosequi potuerunt, quod equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non potuerant. Hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit.

[26] The fighting was fierce on both sides. Our troops, however, because they could not keep rank, nor stand firm, nor follow their proper standards — for any man from any ship attached himself to whatever standard he chanced upon — were in considerable disorder. But the enemy knew all the shallows, and as soon as they had observed from the shore a party of soldiers disembarking one by one from a ship, they spurred on their horses and attacked them while they were in difficulties, many surrounding few, while others hurled missiles into a whole party from the exposed flank. Caesar noticed this; and causing the boats of the warships, and likewise the scout-vessels, to be manned with soldiers, he sent them to support any parties whom he had observed to be in distress. The moment our men stood firm on dry land, they charged with all their comrades close behind, and put the enemy to rout; but they could not pursue very far, because the cavalry had not been able to hold on their course and make the island. This one thing was lacking to complete the wonted success of Caesar.

[27] 1 Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt; obsides sese daturos quaeque imperasset facturos polliciti sunt. 2 Una cum his legatis Commius Atrebas venit, quem supra demonstraveram a Caesare in Britanniam praemisum. 3 Hunc illi e navi egressum, cum ad eos oratoris modo Caesaris mandata deferret, comprehenderant atque in vincula coniecerant; 4 tum proelio facto remiserunt et in petenda

pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt. 5 Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit; 6 quorum illi partem statim dederunt, partem ex longinquiore locis arcessitam paucis diebus sese daturus dixerunt. 7 Interea suos in agros remigrare iusserunt, principesque undique convenire et se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt.

[27] So the enemy were overcome in the fight; and as soon as they had recovered from the rout they at once sent deputies to Caesar to treat for peace, promising that they would give hostages and do what he commanded. Together with these deputies came Commius the Atrebatian, who, as shown above, had been sent forward by Caesar into Britain. When Commius disembarked and delivered Caesar's messages to the Britons, they had seized him and thrown him into chains; but now, after the fight, they sent him back. In their entreaty for peace they cast the blame of the misdeed upon the multitude, and sought pardon in consideration of their ignorance. Caesar complained that, though of their own motion they had sent deputies on to the Continent to seek peace from him, they had now begun war on him without cause; but he agreed to pardon their ignorance, and required hostages. Part of these they gave at once, part they said they would summon from the more distant parts and give in a few days. Meanwhile they ordered their own folk to get back to their fields; and the chiefs began to assemble from every quarter, and to deliver themselves and their states to Caesar.

[28] 1 His rebus pace confirmata, post diem quartum quam est in Britanniam ventum naves XVIII, de quibus supra demonstratum est,

quae equites sustulerant, ex superiore portu leni vento solverunt. 2 Quae cum adpropinquarent Britanniae et ex castris viderentur, tanta tempestas subito coorta est ut nulla earum cursum tenere posset, sed aliae eodem unde erant profectae referrentur, aliae ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum, magno suo cum periculo deicerentur; 3 quae tamen ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur, necessario adversa nocte in altum provectae continentem petierunt.

[28] Peace was thus established. Four days after the arrival in Britain the eighteen ships above mentioned, which had embarked the cavalry, weighed anchor, in a gentle breeze, from the upper port. When they were nearing Britain, and in view of the camp, so fierce a storm suddenly arose that none of them could hold on its course; some were carried back to the selfsame port whence they had started, others were driven away, with great peril to themselves, to the lower, that is, to the more westerly, part of the island. None the less, they cast anchor; but when they began to fill with the waves they were obliged to stand out to sea in a night of foul weather, and made for the Continent.

[29] 1 Eadem nocte accidit ut esset luna plena, qui dies a maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit, nostrisque id erat incognitum. 2 Ita uno tempore et longas naves, [quibus Caesar exercitum transportandum curaverat,] quas Caesar in aridum subduxerat, aestus complebat, et onerarias, quae ad ancoras erant deligatae, tempestas adflictabat, neque ulla nostris facultas aut administrandi aut auxiliandi dabatur. 3 Compluribus navibus fractis, reliquae cum essent funibus, ancoris reliquisque armamentis amissis ad navigandum inutiles, magna, id quod necesse erat accidere, totius

exercitus perturbatio facta est. 4 Neque enim naves erant aliae quibus reportari possent, et omnia deerant quae ad reficiendas naves erant usui, et, quod omnibus constabat hiemari in Gallia oportere, frumentum in his locis in hiemem provisum non erat.

[29] That same night, as it chanced, the moon was full, the day of the month which usually makes the highest tides in the Ocean, a fact unknown to our men. Therefore the tide was found to have filled the warships, in which Caesar had caused his army to be conveyed across, and which he had drawn up on dry land; and at the same time the storm was buffeting the transports, which were made fast to anchors. Nor had our troops any chance of handling them or helping. Several ships went to pieces; and the others, by loss of cordage, anchors, and the rest of their tackle, were rendered useless for sailing. This, as was inevitable, caused great dismay throughout the army. For there were no other ships to carry them back; everything needful for the repair of ships was lacking; and, as it was generally understood that the army was to winter in Gaul, no corn had been provided in these parts against the winter.

[30] 1 Quibus rebus cognitis, principes Britanniae, qui post proelium ad Caesarem convenerant, inter se conlocuti, cum et equites et naves et frumentum Romanis deesse intellegerent et paucitatem militum ex castrorum exiguitate cognoscerent, quae hoc erant etiam angustior quod sine impedimentis Caesar legiones transportaverat, 2 optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellione facta frumento commeatuque nostros prohibere et rem in hiemem producere, quod his superatis aut reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum confidebant. 3 Itaque rursus coniuratione facta paulatim ex castris discedere et suos clam ex agris deducere coeperunt.

[30] When they became aware of this, the British chiefs who had assembled at Caesar's headquarters after the fight took counsel together. As they knew that the Romans lacked cavalry, ships, and corn, and perceived the scantiness of the army from the smallness of the camp (it was straitened even more by the fact that Caesar had brought the legions over without baggage), they thought that the best thing to do was to renew the war, cut off our corn and other supplies, and prolong the business into the winter; for they were confident that when the present force was overcome or cut off from return no one thereafter would cross over into Britain to make war upon them. Therefore they conspired together anew, and, departing a few at a time from the camp, they began secretly to draw in their followers from the fields.

[31] 1 At Caesar, etsi nondum eorum consilia cognoverat, tamen et ex eventu navium suarum et ex eo quod obsides dare intermiserant fore id quod accidit suspicabatur. 2 Itaque ad omnes casus subsidia comparabat. Nam et frumentum ex agris cotidie in castra conferebat et, quae gravissime adflictae erant naves, earum materia atque aere ad reliquas reficiendas utebatur et quae ad eas res erant usui ex continenti comportari iubebat. 3 Itaque, cum summo studio a militibus administraretur, XII navibus amissis, reliquis ut navigari satis commode posset effecit.

[31] Although Caesar had not yet learnt their designs, yet the misfortune of his ships and the fact that the chiefs had broken off the surrender of hostages led him to suspect that events would turn out as they did; and therefore he prepared means to meet any emergency. He collected corn daily from the fields into the camp, and he utilised the timber and bronze of the ships which had been most severely

damaged to repair the rest, and ordered the necessary gear for that purpose to be brought from the Continent. The work was most zealously carried out by the troops; and thus, though twelve ships had been lost, he was able to render the rest tolerably seaworthy.

[32] 1 Dum ea geruntur, legione ex consuetudine una frumentatum missa, quae appellabatur VII, neque ulla ad id tempus belli suspicione interposita, cum pars hominum in agris remaneret, pars etiam in castra ventitaret, ii qui pro portis castrorum in statione erant Caesari nuntiaverunt pulverem maiorem quam consuetudo ferret in ea parte videri quam in partem legio iter fecisset. 2 Caesar id quod erat suspicatus aliquid novi a barbaris initum consilii, cohortes quae in statione erant secum in eam partem proficisci, ex reliquis duas in stationem succedere, reliquas armari et confestim sese subsequi iussit. 3 Cum paulo longius a castris processisset, suos ab hostibus premi atque aegre sustinere et conferta legione ex omnibus partibus tela coici animadvertit. 4 Nam quod omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento pars una erat reliqua, suspicati hostes huc nostros esse venturos noctu in silvis delituerant; 5 tum dispersos depositis armis in metendo occupatos subito adorti paucis interfectis reliquos incertis ordinibus perturbaverant, simul equitatu atque essedis circumdederant.

[32] Meanwhile one legion, called the Seventh, had been sent as usual to collect corn; nor as yet had any suspicion of hostilities intervened, since part of the people remained in the fields, and part were actually frequent visitors to the camp. Then the outposts on duty before the gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than usual was to be seen in that quarter to which the legion had marched. Caesar suspected the truth — that some fresh design had been started

by the natives — and ordered the cohorts which were on outpost to proceed with him to the quarter in question, two of the others to relieve them on outpost, and the rest to arm and follow him immediately. When he had advanced some little way from the camp, he found that his troops were being hard pressed by the enemy and were holding their ground with difficulty: the legion was crowded together, while missiles were being hurled from all sides. The fact was that when the corn had been cut from the rest of the neighbourhood one part remained, and the enemy, supposing that our troops would come hither, had hidden by night in the woods; then, when the men were scattered and, having grounded arms, were engaged in cutting corn, they had suddenly attacked them. They had killed a few, throwing the rest into confusion before they could form up, and at the same time surrounding them with horsemen and chariots.

[33] 1 Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae. Primo per omnes partes perequitant et tela coiciunt atque ipso terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque perturbant, et cum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverunt, ex essedis desiliunt et pedibus proeliantur. 2 Aurigae interim paulatim ex proelio excedunt atque ita currus conlocant ut, si illi a multitudine hostium premantur, expeditum ad quos receptum habeant. 3 Ita mobilitatem equitum, stabilitatem peditum in proeliis praestant, ac tantum usu cotidiano et exercitatione efficiunt uti in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos sustinere et brevi moderari ac flectere et per temonem percurrere et in iugo insistere et se inde in currus citissime recipere consuerint.

[33] Their manner of fighting from chariots is as follows. First of all they drive in all directions and hurl missiles, and so by the mere

terror that the teams inspire and by the noise of the wheels they generally throw ranks into confusion. When they have worked their way in between the troops of cavalry, they leap down from the chariots and fight on foot. Meanwhile the charioteers retire gradually from the combat, and dispose the chariots in such fashion that, if the warriors are hard pressed by the host of the enemy, they may have a ready means of retirement to their own side. Thus they show in action the mobile of cavalry and the stability of infantry; and by daily use and practice they become so accomplished that they are ready to gallop their teams down the steepest of slopes without loss of control, to check and turn them in a moment, to run along the pole, stand on the yoke, and then, quick as lightning, to dart back into the chariot.

[34] 1 Quibus rebus perturbatis nostris [novitate pugnae] tempore opportunissimo Caesar auxilium tulit: namque eius adventu hostes constiterunt, nostri se ex timore receperunt. 2 Quo facto, ad lacesendum hostem et committendum proelium alienum esse tempus arbitratus suo se loco continuit et brevi tempore intermisso in castra legiones reduxit. 3 Dum haec geruntur, nostris omnibus occupatis qui erant in agris reliqui discesserunt. 4 Secutae sunt continuos complures dies tempestates, quae et nostros in castris continerent et hostem a pugna prohiberent. 5 Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt. His rebus celeriter magna multitudo peditatus equitatusque coacta ad castra venerunt.

[34] When our troops were thrown into confusion in this fashion by

the novel character of the fighting, Caesar brought assistance in the very nick of time; for his arrival caused the enemy to halt, and enabled our men to recover from their fear. This done, he deemed the moment unsuitable for provoking and engaging in a combat; he therefore stood to his own ground and, after a brief interval, led the legions back to camp. In the course of these events all our troops were busily occupied, and the natives who remained in the fields withdrew. Then for several days on end storms ensued, severe enough to keep our men in camp and to prevent the enemy from fighting. Meanwhile the natives despatched messengers in every direction, to tell of the scanty numbers of our troops and to show how great a chance was given of getting booty and of liberating themselves for ever by driving the Romans out of their camp. By this means they speedily collected a great host of footmen and horsemen, and came on towards the camp.

[35] 1 Caesar, etsi idem quod superioribus diebus acciderat fore videbat, ut, si essent hostes pulsi, celeritate periculum effugerent, tamen nactus equites circiter XXX, quos Commius Atrebas, de quo ante dictum est, secum transportaverat, legiones in acie pro castris constituit. 2 Commisso proelio diutius nostrorum militum impetum hostes ferre non potuerunt ac terga verterunt. 3 Quos tanto spatio secuti quantum cursu et viribus efficere potuerunt, complures ex iis occiderunt, deinde omnibus longe lateque aedificiis incensis se in castra receperunt.

[35] Caesar saw that the result would be the same as on the previous days — that the enemy, if repulsed, would use their speed to escape from danger; nevertheless, as he had got about thirty horsemen, whom Commius, the Atrebatian before mentioned, had brought over

with him, he formed the legions in line before the camp. When battle was joined the enemy, unable to endure for long the attack of our troops, turned and fled. The Romans followed after, as far as their speed and strength enabled, and slew not a few of them; then, after setting on fire all buildings far and wide, they retired to camp.

[36] 1 Eodem die legati ab hostibus missi ad Caesarem de pace venerunt. 2 His Caesar numerum obsidum quem ante imperaverat duplicavit eosque in continentem adduci iussit, quod propinqua die aequinoctii infirmis navibus hiemi navigationem subiciendam non existimabat. 3 Ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus paulo post mediam noctem naves solvit, 4 quae omnes incolumes ad continentem pervenerunt; sed ex iis onerariae duae eosdem portus quos reliquae capere non potuerunt et paulo infra delatae sunt.

[36] On the same day deputies sent by the enemy came to Caesar to treat of peace. For them Caesar doubled the number of hostages previously commanded, and ordered them to be brought to the Continent, because the equinox was close at hand, and with a damaged flotilla he did not think it right to subject his crossing to the hazard of winter storms. He himself, taking advantage of a spell of fair weather, weighed anchor a little after midnight, and all the ships came safe to the Continent; but two of the transports were unable to make the same port as the rest, and were carried a little lower down the coast.

[37] 1 Quibus ex navibus cum essent expositi milites circiter CCC atque in castra contenderent, Morini, quos Caesar in Britanniam proficiscens pacatos reliquerat, spe praedae adducti primo non ita magno suorum numero circumsteterunt ac, si sese interfici nollent, arma ponere iusserunt. 2 Cum illi orbe facto sese defenderent,

celeriter ad clamorem hominum circiter milia VI convenerunt; qua re nuntiata, Caesar omnem ex castris equitatum suis auxilio misit. 3 Interim nostri milites impetum hostium sustinuerunt atque amplius horis IIII fortissime pugnaverunt et paucis vulneribus acceptis complures ex iis occiderunt. 4 Postea vero quam equitatus noster in conspectum venit, hostes abiectis armis terga verterunt magnusque eorum numerus est occisus.

[37] When about three hundred men had been landed from these vessels and were marching rapidly to camp, the Morini, who had been left by Caesar in a state of peace when he set out for Britain, were fired by the hope of booty, and surrounded the troops, at first with no very large number of their own folk, bidding them lay down their arms if they did not wish to be killed. The Romans formed square and defended themselves, and at the noise of shouting some six thousand men speedily came about them. Upon report of this Caesar sent the whole of the cavalry from the camp to assist his men. Meanwhile our troops withstood the enemy's assault, and fought with the greatest gallantry for more than four hours: they received but a few wounds, and slew a good many of the enemy. Howbeit, as soon as our cavalry came in sight, the enemy threw down their arms and fled, and a great number of them were slain.

[38] 1 Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum iis legionibus quas ex Britannia reducerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit. 2 Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se reciperent non haberent, quo perflugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni venerunt. 3 At Q. Titurius et L. Cotta legati, qui in Menapiorum fines legiones duxerant, omnibus eorum agris vastatis, frumentis succisis, aedificiis incensis, quod Menapii se

omnes in densissimas silvas abdiderant, se ad Caesarem receperunt. 4 Caesar in Belgis omnium legionum hiberna constituit. Eo duae omnino civitates ex Britannia obsides miserunt, reliquae neglexerunt. 5 His rebus gestis ex litteris Caesaris dierum XX supplicatio a senatu decreta est.

[38] The next day Caesar sent Titus Labienus, the lieutenant-general, with the legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had renewed hostilities. The enemy had no place of retreat, by reason of the dryness of the marshes, their refuge in the previous year; almost all of them, therefore, came and surrendered to Labienus. As for Quintus Titurius and Lucius Cotta, the lieutenant-generals who had led legions into the territory of the Menapii, they did not return to Caesar until they had laid waste all the fields of the natives, cut down the corn-crops, and burnt the buildings, because the Menapii had all hidden in their densest forests. Then Caesar established the winter quarters of all the legions in Belgic territory. Thither no more than two of the British states sent hostages; the remainder omitted to do so. And for these achievements, upon receipt of Caesar's despatches, the senate decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.

BOOK V

[1] 1 L. Domitio Ap. Claudio consulibus, discedens ab hibernis Caesar in Italiam, ut quotannis facere consuerat, legatis imperat quos legionibus praefecerat uti quam plurimas possent hieme naves aedificandas veteresque reficiendas curarent. Earum modum formamque demonstrat. 2 Ad celeritatem onerandi subductionesque paulo facit humiliores quam quibus in nostro mari uti consuevimus, atque id eo magis, quod propter crebras commutationes aestuum minus magnos ibi fluctus fieri cognoverat; ad onera, ad multitudinem iumentorum transportandam paulo latiores quam quibus in reliquis utimur maribus. 3 Has omnes actuarias imperat fieri, quam ad rem multum humilitas adiuvat. 4 Ea quae sunt usui ad armandas naves ex Hispania apportari iubet. 5 Ipse conventibus Galliae citerioris peractis in Illyricum proficiscitur, quod a Pirustis finitimam partem provinciae incursionibus vastari audiebat. 6 Eo cum venisset, civitatibus milites imperat certumque in locum convenire iubet. 7 Qua re nuntiata Pirustae legatos ad eum mittunt qui doceant nihil earum rerum publico factum consilio, seseque paratos esse demonstrant omnibus rationibus de iniuriis satisfacere. 8 Accepta oratione eorum Caesar obsides imperat eosque ad certam diem adduci iubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat. 9 Eis ad diem adductis, ut imperaverat, arbitros inter civitates dat qui litem aestiment poenamque constituent.

[1] Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius were still consuls when Caesar, on the eve of his departure from winter quarters to go to Italy, as it was his practice every year to do, ordered the lieutenant-generals in charge of the legions to have as many ships as possible built during the winter, and the old fleet repaired. He set forth the

plan and pattern of the new ships. For speed of loading and for purposes of beaching he would build them somewhat lower than those which we are accustomed to use on our own sea — and the more so because he had learnt that by reason of the frequent turns of the tides the waves off Gaul were generally smaller. For the transport of cargo, and of the numerous draught-animals, he would have the ships somewhere broader than those we use on the other seas. All of them he ordered to be fitted for oars as well as sails, to which end their lowness of build helped much. The necessary tackle for the equipment of the ships he commanded to be brought out of Spain. When he had concluded the assizes of Hither Gaul he himself set out for Illyricum, for he learnt that the Pirustae were devastating by raids the portion of the Province nearest them. When he was come thither he made a levy of troops upon the states, and commanded them to assemble at a certain point. Upon report of this the Pirustae sent deputies to him to declare that none of these raids had been the result of any public decision, and they affirmed that they were ready by every means to give satisfaction for the outrages. Accepting their statement, Caesar made requisition of hostages and commanded them to be brought in by a certain day; failing this, he affirmed that he would visit the state with war. The hostages were brought in by the day, as ordered; and Caesar appointed arbitrators as between state and state to assess the damages and determine the penalty.

[2] 1 His confectis rebus conventibusque peractis, in citeriorem Galliam revertitur atque inde ad exercitum proficiscitur. 2 Eo cum venisset, circuitis omnibus hibernis, singulari militum studio in summa omnium rerum inopia circiter sescentas eius generis cuius supra demonstravimus naves et longas XXVIII invenit instructas neque multum abesse ab eo quin paucis diebus deduci possint. 3

Collaudatis militibus atque eis qui negotio praefuerant, quid fieri velit ostendit atque omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet, quo ex portu commodissimum in Britanniam traiectionem esse cognoverat, circiter milium passuum XXX transmissum a continenti: huic rei quod satis esse visum est militum reliquit. 4 Ipse cum legionibus expeditis IIII et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur, quod hi neque ad concilia veniebant neque imperio parebant Germanosque Transrhenanos sollicitare dicebantur.

[2] When these matters were settled and the assizes concluded he returned to Hither Gaul, and thence set out for the army. When he was come thither he went round all the winter quarters, and learnt that by the exemplary energy of the soldiers, and in spite of the utmost lack of all necessaries, about six hundred ships of the type set forth above and twenty-eight men-of-war had been built, and lacked but little to make them ready for launching in a few days. Caesar warmly commended the troops and the officers who had been in charge of the work; he gave his instructions, and commanded all the ships to assemble at the Itian port, from which, as he was informed, was the most convenient passage to Britain, a transit of about thirty miles from the Continent. He left such troops as he thought sufficient for the business; and himself, with four legions marching light and eight hundred horse, set out for the borders of the Treveri, because this tribe came not to the councils nor obeyed his command, and, according to report, was stirring up the Germans beyond the Rhine.

[3] 1 Haec civitas longe plurimum totius Galliae equitatu valet magnasque habet copias peditum Rhenumque, ut supra demonstravimus, tangit. 2 In ea civitate duo de principatu inter se contendebant, Indutiomarus et Cingetorix; 3 e quibus alter, simul

atque de Caesaris legionumque adventu cognitum est, ad eum venit, se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit. 4 At Indutiomarus equitatum peditatumque cogere, eisque qui per aetatem in armis esse non poterant in silvam Arduennam abditis, quae ingenti magnitudine per medios fines Treverorum a flumine Rheno ad initium Remorum pertinet, bellum parare instituit. 5 Sed posteaquam nonnulli principes ex ea civitate et familiaritate Cingetorigis adducti et adventu nostri exercitus perterriti ad Caesarem venerunt et de suis privatim rebus ab eo petere coeperunt, quoniam civitati consulere non possent, veritus ne ab omnibus desereretur Indutiomarus legatos ad Caesarem mittit: 6 sese idcirco ab suis discedere atque ad eum venire noluisse, quo facilius civitatem in officio contineret, ne omnis nobilitatis discessu plebs propter imprudentiam laberetur: 7 itaque esse civitatem in sua potestate, seseque, si Caesar permetteret, ad eum in castra venturum, suas civitatisque fortunas eius fidei permissurum.

[3] Their state is by far the most powerful in cavalry of all the Gauls, and possesses great forces of infantry; and, as above set forth, it touches the Rhine. Two men in the state were striving together for the chieftaincy, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix. The latter of these, directly he was informed of the coming of Caesar and his legions, came to him, affirming that he and all his followers would abide in loyalty and not forsake their friendship with Rome; moreover, he showed what was afoot among the Treveri. Indutiomarus, on the other hand, began to raise horse and foot, and to prepare for war, as soon as he had hidden away those whose age made them unfit for service, in the Forest of Ardennes, which is of great size, stretching right through the territory of the Treveri, from the river Rhine to the border of the Remi. But some of the chiefs of the Treveri, actuated

by their friendship for Cingetorix, and at the same time alarmed at the coming of our army, came to Caesar and began to make requests of him as touching their own private interests, since it was not in their power, they said, to take measures in the interests of the state. Then Indutiomarus feared that he might be deserted by one and all, and sent deputies to Caesar. He urged that in his reluctance to leave his own folk and to come to Caesar his object was to keep the state the more easily to its allegiance, lest, if the whole of the nobility left them, the common people might go astray through ignorance. As a result, he said, the state was in his power, and, if Caesar allowed, he would come to his headquarters and commit the fortunes of himself and of the state to his protection.

[4] 1 Caesar, etsi intellegebat qua de causa ea dicerentur quaeque eum res ab instituto consilio deterreret, tamen, ne aestatem in Treveris consumere cogeretur omnibus ad Britannicum bellum rebus comparatis, Indutiomarum ad se cum CC obsidibus venire iussit. 2 His adductis, in eis filio propinquisque eius omnibus, quos nominatim evocaverat, consolatus Indutiomarum hortatusque est uti in officio maneret; 3 nihilo tamen setius principibus Treverorum ad se convocatis hos singillatim Cingetorigi conciliavit, quod cum merito eius a se fieri intellegebat, tum magni interesse arbitrabatur eius auctoritatem inter suos quam plurimum valere, cuius tam egregiam in se voluntatem perspexisset. 4 Id tulit factum graviter Indutiomarus, suam gratiam inter suos minui, et, qui iam ante inimico in nos animo fuisset, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.

[4] Caesar knew very well the purpose of these remarks, and the circumstance which was discouraging Indutiomarus from his deliberate design; nevertheless, that he might not be obliged to waste

the summer among the Treveri, when everything was prepared for the campaign in Britain, he commanded Indutiomarus to come to him with two hundred hostages. When these were brought in, among them his son and all his relatives, whom Caesar had summoned by name, he comforted Indutiomarus and exhorted him to abide in loyalty. Nevertheless he assembled at his headquarters the chiefs of the Treveri, and won them over severally for Cingetorix. He was aware that Cingetorix deserved this of him, but he deemed it also of great importance that the authority of one whose signal goodwill towards himself he had fully proved should be as strong as possible among his own folk. This action Indutiomarus took grievously to heart, for he saw that his own influence among his people was being diminished; and though he had previously felt hostility towards us, his indignation now burst far more vehemently into flame.

[5] 1 His rebus constitutis Caesar ad portum Itium cum legionibus pervenit. 2 Ibi cognoscit LX naves, quae in Meldis factae erant, tempestate reiectas cursum tenere non potuisse atque eodem unde erant profectae revertisse; reliquas paratas ad navigandum atque omnibus rebus instructas invenit. 3 Eodem equitatus totius Galliae convenit, numero milium quattuor, principesque ex omnibus civitatibus; 4 ex quibus perpauca, quorum in se fidem perspexerat, relinquere in Gallia, reliquos obsidum loco secum ducere decreverat, quod, cum ipse abesset, motum Galliae verebatur.

[5] When these matters had been settled Caesar proceeded with the legions to the Itian port. There he was informed that sixty ships, which had been built in the country of the Meldi, had been driven back by the weather so that they could not hold on their course, and had therefore returned to their starting-point. The rest he found ready

for sailing and equipped in all respects. A body of cavalry from all Gaul, four thousand strong, assembled at the same spot, together with chiefs from every state. A very few of the latter, whose loyalty towards himself he had proved, he had decided to leave in Gaul, taking the rest with him by way of hostages, because he feared a rising in Gaul during his own absence.

[6] 1 Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix Aeduus, de quo ante ab nobis dictum est. Hunc secum habere in primis constituerat, quod eum cupidum rerum novarum, cupidum imperi, magni animi, magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis cognoverat. 2 Accedebat huc quod in concilio Aeduorum Dumnorix dixerat sibi a Caesare regnum civitatis deferri; quod dictum Aedui graviter ferebant, neque recusandi aut deprecandi causa legatos ad Caesarem mittere audebant. 3 Id factum ex suis hospitibus Caesar cognoverat. Ille omnibus primo precibus petere contendit ut in Gallia relinqueretur, partim quod insuetus navigandi mare timeret, partim quod religionibus impediri sese diceret. 4 Posteaquam id obstinate sibi negari vidit, omni spe impetrandi adempta principes Galliae sollicitare, sevocare singulos hortarique coepit uti in continenti remanerent: 5 metu territare: non sine causa fieri, ut Gallia omni nobilitate spoliaretur; id esse consilium Caesaris, ut quos in conspectu Galliae interficere vereretur, hos omnes in Britanniam traductos necaret; 6 fidem reliquis interponere, iusiurandum poscere, ut quod esse ex usu Galliae intellexissent communi consilio administrarent. Haec a compluribus ad Caesarem deferebantur.

[6] Among the others there was Dumnorix of the Aedui, of whom we have spoken before. Caesar had determined to keep Dumnorix in particular with him, because he knew him to be bent on revolution,

bent on sovereignty, a man of great courage and of great weight among the Gauls. Moreover, in the council of the Aedui Dumnorix had said that Caesar meant to offer him the kingship of the state; and while the Aedui took the saying grievously to heart, they did not dare to send envoys to Caesar either to repudiate or deprecate his purpose. Caesar had learnt this fact from his own partisans. Dumnorix at first by every kind of entreaty pressed his petition to be left in Gaul, affirming now that he was unused to a voyage and feared the sea, now that he was hindered on religious grounds. Then, when he saw that leave was inexorably refused, and all hope of it taken away, he began to stir up the Gallic chieftains, drawing them aside severally and exhorting them to stay on the Continent. And he sought to frighten them by expressing apprehension that there was some reason for stripping Gaul of all her nobility: that it was Caesar's design to transport to Britain and there slaughter all whom he feared to put to death in the sight of Gaul. To the rest he pledged his word, and demanded of them an oath that they would execute by common consent whatever they judged to be for the advantage of Gaul. These plots were reported to Caesar by several persons.

[7] 1 Qua re cognita Caesar, quod tantum civitati Aeduae dignitatis tribuebat, coercendum atque deterrendum quibuscumque rebus posset Dumnorigem statuebat; 2 quod longius eius amentiam progredi videbat, prospiciendum, ne quid sibi ac rei publicae nocere posset. Itaque dies circiter XXV in eo loco commoratus, 3 quod Corus ventus navigationem impediabat, qui magnam partem omnis temporis in his locis flare consuevit, dabat operam ut in officio Dumnorigem contineret, nihilo tamen setius omnia eius consilia cognosceret: 4 tandem idoneam nactus tempestatem milites equitesque conscendere in naves iubet. 5 At omnium impeditis

animis Dumnorix cum equitibus Aeduorum a castris insciente Caesare domum discedere coepit. 6 Qua re nuntiata Caesar intermissa profectione atque omnibus rebus postpositis magnam partem equitatus ad eum insequendum mittit retrahique imperat; 7 si vim faciat neque pareat, interfici iubet, nihil hunc se absente pro sano facturum arbitratus, qui praesentis imperium neglexisset. 8 Ille enim revocatus resistere ac se manu defendere suorumque fidem implorare coepit, saepe clamitans liberum se liberaeque esse civitatis. 9 Illi, ut erat imperatum, circumsistunt hominem atque interficiunt: at equites Aedui ad Caesarem omnes revertuntur.

[7] Upon this information Caesar was disposed to think, in view of the great importance he attached to the Aedui, that Dumnorix should be repressed and discouraged by all possible means, and at the same time, as his infatuation was obviously going too far, that precaution should be taken against his being able to do any damage to himself and the Roman state. And therefore, as he was delayed at that spot for some five-and-twenty days, because a north-west wind (prevalent for a great part of every season in these localities) prevented his sailing, he endeavoured to keep Dumnorix to his allegiance, but none the less to learn all his designs. At length fair weather came, and he ordered foot and horse to embark. But when all were thus preoccupied, Dumnorix, along with certain troopers of the Aedui, was minded to leave camp and depart for home. Caesar knew not of this; but upon report thereof he countermanded the sailing and put off everything, and then despatched a large detachment of cavalry to follow him up, with orders to hale him back, and, if he offered force or refused to obey, to put him to death; for he supposed that a man who had disregarded the command before his face would do nothing right-minded behind his back. And indeed when Dumnorix was

summoned to return he sought to resist and to defend himself by force, entreating the help of his followers and crying repeatedly that he was a free man and of a free state. The pursuers, as they were ordered, surrounded the man and despatched him; but the troopers of the Aedui all returned to Caesar.

[8] 1 His rebus gestis, Labieno in continente cum tribus legionibus et equitum milibus duobus relicto ut portus tueretur et rem frumentariam provideret quaeque in Gallia gererentur cognosceret consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet, 2 ipse cum quinque legionibus et pari numero equitum, quem in continenti reliquerat, ad solis occasum naves solvit et leni Africo provectus media circiter nocte vento intermisso cursum non tenuit, et longius delatus aestu orta luce sub sinistra Britanniam relictam conspexit. 3 Tum rursus aestus commutationem secutus remis contendit ut eam partem insulae caperet, qua optimum esse egressum superiore aestate cognoverat. 4 Qua in re admodum fuit militum virtus laudanda, qui vectoriis gravibusque navigiis non intermisso remigandi labore longarum navium cursum adaequarunt. 5 Accessum est ad Britanniam omnibus navibus meridiano fere tempore, neque in eo loco hostis est visus; 6 sed, ut postea Caesar ex captivis cognovit, cum magnae manus eo convenissent, multitudo navium perterritae, quae cum annotinis privatisque quas sui quisque commodi fecerat amplius octingentae uno erant visae tempore, a litore discesserant ac se in superiora loca abdiderant.

[8] When this was done Labienus was left on the Continent with three legions and two thousand horse, and with instructions to guard the ports, to ensure the corn^o-supply, to keep himself informed of events in Gaul, and to make plans as occasion and circumstance should

require. The commander-in-chief, with five legions and a contingent of horse equal to that left on the Continent, weighed anchor about sunset, and proceeded under a gentle south-west wind. But about midnight the wind failed, and he did not make the course: he was carried on too far by the tide, and at sunrise he sighted Britain left afar on the port side. Then once more he followed the turn of the tide, and strove by rowing to make that part of the island where (as he had learnt in the previous summer) was the best place of disembarkation. And herein was the spirit of the troops much to be commended, who, in the heavily built transports, by uninterrupted effort of rowing kept level with the men-of-war. The whole fleet reached the shore of Britain about midday, but no enemy was to be seen there. They had, indeed, as Caesar learnt afterward from prisoners, assembled there in large companies; but, alarmed at the host of ships, of which, counting those of the previous year and the private vessels which individuals had built for their own convenience, over eight hundred had been seen at once, they had withdrawn from the shore and concealed themselves on the high ground.

[9] 1 Caesar exposito exercitu et loco castris idoneo capto, ubi ex captivis cognovit quo in loco hostium copiae consedissent, cohortibus decem ad mare relictis et equitibus trecentis, qui praesidio navibus essent, de tertia vigilia ad hostes contendit, eo minus veritus navibus, quod in litore molli atque aperto deligatas ad ancoram relinquebat, 2 et praesidio navibus Q. Atrium praefecit. Ipse noctu progressus milia passuum circiter XII hostium copias conspicatus est. 3 Illi equitatu atque essedis ad flumen progressi ex loco superiore nostros prohibere et proelium committere coeperunt. 4 Repulsi ab equitatu se in silvas abdiderunt, locum nacti egregie et natura et

opere munitum, quem domestici belli, ut videbantur, causa iam ante praeparaverant: 5 nam crebris arboribus succisis omnes introitus erant praeclusi. 6 Ipsi ex silvis rari propugnabant nostrosque intra munitiones ingredi prohibebant. 7 At milites legionis septimae, testudine facta et aggere ad munitiones adiecto, locum ceperunt eosque ex silvis expulerunt paucis vulneribus acceptis. 8 Sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat.

[9] The army was landed and a place suitable for the camp was chosen. When Caesar had learnt from prisoners where the enemy's forces had taken post, he left ten cohorts and three hundred horse by the seashore to guard the fleet; then, starting in the third watch, he pressed on to meet the enemy, having the less fear for the fleet because he was leaving it at anchor on a sandy, open shore; and he appointed Quintus Atrius to command the troops guarding the ships. He himself, advancing about twelve miles in the night, came in sight of the enemy's forces. They advanced their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground to a river, and sought to check our troops and to engage. Driven back by our horse, they concealed themselves in the woods: there they had got a position excellently fortified by nature as well as by handiwork, which, as it would seem, had been prepared before for a war among themselves; for all the entries had been barred by a great number of felled trees. The enemy came out of the woods to fight in small groups, and sought to prevent our troops from entering the fortifications. But the men of the Seventh Legion formed a "tortoise," and threw up a ramp against the fortifications, and so took the position, driving the enemy out of the woods at the cost of a few men wounded. Caesar forbade them to pursue the fugitives very

far, because he did not know the character of the country, and also because a great part of the day was spent, and he wished to leave time for the entrenchment of the camp.

[10] 1 Postridie eius diei mane tripartito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit, ut eos qui fugerant persequerentur. 2 His aliquantum itineris progressis, cum iam extremi essent in prospectu, equites a Quinto Atrio ad Caesarem venerunt, qui nuntiarent superiore nocte maxima coorta tempestate prope omnes naves adflictas atque in litore eiectas esse, quod neque ancorae funesque subsisterent, neque nautae gubernatoresque vim tempestatis pati possent; 3 itaque ex eo concursu navium magnum esse incommodum acceptum.

[10] In the morning of the next day he divided the foot and the horse in three detachments, and sent them as flying columns to pursue the fugitives. When these had advanced a good long march and the rearguards were just in sight, troopers came from Quintus Atrius to Caesar to report that a violent storm had arisen in the previous night, and that nearly all the ships had been damaged and cast up on shore, as the anchors and cables would not hold, and the seamen and steersmen could not face the force of the storm: and so the collision of ships had caused serious damage.

[11] 1 His rebus cognitis Caesar legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet, ipse ad naves revertitur; 2 eadem fere quae ex nuntiis litterisque cognoverat coram perspicit, sic ut amissis circiter XL navibus reliquae tamen refici posse magno negotio viderentur. 3 Itaque ex legionibus fabros deligit et ex continenti alios arcessi iubet; 4 Labieno scribit, ut quam plurimas posset eis legionibus, quae sunt apud eum, naves instituat. 5 Ipse, etsi res erat

multae operae ac laboris, tamen commodissimum esse statuit omnes naves subduci et cum castris una munitione coniungi. 6 In his rebus circiter dies X consumit ne nocturnis quidem temporibus ad laborem militum intermissis. 7 Subductis navibus castrisque egregie munitis easdem copias, quas ante, praesidio navibus reliquit: ipse eodem unde redierat proficiscitur. 8 Eo cum venisset, maiores iam undique in eum locum copiae Britannorum convenerant summa imperi bellicae administrandi communi consilio permissa Cassivellauno, cuius fines a maritimis civitatibus flumen dividit, quod appellatur Tamesis, a mari circiter milia passuum LXXX. 9 Huic superiore tempore cum reliquis civitatibus continentia bella intercesserant; sed nostro adventu permoti Britanni hunc toti bello imperioque praefecerant.

[11] Upon receipt of this intelligence Caesar commanded the legions and the cavalry to be recalled, and to keep off attacks on the line of march, while he himself returned to the fleet. With his own eyes he saw almost exactly what he had learnt from the messengers and despatches: some forty vessels indeed were lost, but it appeared that the rest could be repaired with great trouble. He therefore picked out artificers from the legions, and ordered others to be fetched from the Continent; and wrote to Labienus to construct as many ships as possible by the help of the legions he had with him. For himself he determined that, although the task involved much labour and effort, it was still the best plan to have all the ships beached and connected with the camp by a single entrenchment. Upon this business he spent about ten days, allowing no interruption even at night-time in the work of the troops. When the ships had been beached and the camp thoroughly well entrenched, he left the same forces as before to guard the ships: he himself then set out for the point whence he had

returned. When he was come thither he found that still greater forces of the Britons had assembled there from every direction, and that by common consent they had entrusted the supreme command and conduct of the campaign to Cassivellaunus, whose territories are divided from the maritime states by the river called Thames, about eighty miles from the sea. Hitherto there had been continuous wars between this chief and the other states; but our arrival had moved the Britons to appoint him commander-in-chief for the conduct of the whole campaign.

[12] 1 Britanniae pars interior ab eis incolitur quos natos in insula ipsi memoria proditum dicunt, 2 maritima ab eis, qui praedae ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierunt (qui omnes fere eis nominibus civitatum appellantur, quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerunt) et bello illato ibi permanserunt atque agros colere coeperunt. 3 Hominum est infinita multitudo creberrimaque aedificia fere Gallicis consimilia, pecorum magnus numerus. 4 Utuntur aut aere aut nummo aureo aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo. 5 Nascitur ibi plumbum album in mediterraneis regionibus, in maritimis ferrum, sed eius exigua est copia; aere utuntur importato. Materia cuiusque generis ut in Gallia est, praeter fagum atque abietem. 6 Leporem et gallinam et anserem gustare fas non putant; haec tamen alunt animi voluptatisque causa. Loca sunt temperatiora quam in Gallia, remissioribus frigoribus.

[12] The inland part of Britain is inhabited by tribes declared in their own tradition to be indigenous to the island, the maritime part by tribes that migrated at an earlier time from Belgium to seek booty by invasion. Nearly all of these latter are called after the names of the states from which they sprang when they went to Britain; and after

the invasion they abode there and began to till the fields. The population is innumerable; the farm-buildings are found very close together, being very like those of the Gauls; and there is great store of cattle. They use either bronze, or gold coins, or instead of coined money tallies of iron, of a certain standard of weight. In the midland districts of Britain tin is produced, in the maritime iron, but of that there is only a small supply; the bronze they use is imported. There is timber of every kind, as in Gaul, save beech and pine. They account it wrong to eat of hare, fowl, and goose; but these they keep for pastime or pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, the cold seasons more moderate.

[13] 1 Insula natura triquetra, cuius unum latus est contra Galliam. Huius lateris alter angulus, qui est ad Cantium, quo fere omnes ex Gallia naves appellantur, ad orientem solem, inferior ad meridiem spectat. Hoc pertinet circiter mila passuum quingenta. 2 Alterum vergit ad Hispaniam atque occidentem solem; qua ex parte est Hibernia, dimidio minor, ut aestimatur, quam Britannia, sed pari spatio transmissus atque ex Gallia est in Britanniam. 3 In hoc medio cursu est insula, quae appellatur Mona: complures praeterea minores subiectae insulae existimantur, de quibus insulis nonnulli scripserunt dies continuos triginta sub bruma esse noctem. 4 Nos nihil de eo percontationibus reperiebamus, nisi certis ex aqua mensuris breviores esse quam in continenti noctes videbamus. 5 Huius est longitudo lateris, ut fert illorum opinio, septingentorum milium. 6 Tertium est contra septentriones; cui parti nulla est obiecta terra, sed eius angulus lateris maxime ad Germaniam spectat. Hoc milia passuum octingenta in longitudinem esse existimatur. 7 Ita omnis insula est in circuitu vicies centum milium passuum.

[13] The natural shape of the island is triangular, and one side lies opposite to Gaul. Of this side one angle, which is in Kent (where almost all the ships from Gaul come in to land), faces the east, the lower angle faces south. This side stretches about five hundred miles. The second side bears towards Spain and the west, in which direction lies Ireland, smaller by one half, as it is thought, than Britain; the sea-passage is of equal length to that from Gaul to Britain. Here in mid-channel is an island called Man; in addition, several smaller islands are supposed to lie close to land, as touching which some have written that in midwinter night there lasts for thirty whole days. We could discover nothing about this by inquiries; but, by exact water measurements, we observed that the nights were shorter than on the Continent. The length of this side, according to the belief of the natives, is seven hundred miles. The third side bears northwards, and has no land confronting it; the angle, however, of that side faces on the way towards Germany. The side is supposed to be eight hundred miles long. Thus the whole island is two thousand miles in circumference.

[14] 1 Ex his omnibus longe sunt humanissimi qui Cantium incolunt, quae regio est maritima omnis, neque multum a Gallica differunt consuetudine. 2 Interiores plerique frumenta non serunt, sed lacte et carne vivunt pellibusque sunt vestiti. Omnes vero se Britanni vitro inficiunt, quod caeruleum efficit colorem, atque hoc horridiores sunt in pugna aspectu; 3 capilloque sunt promisso atque omni parte corporis rasa praeter caput et labrum superius. 4 Uxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes et maxime fratres cum fratribus parentesque cum liberis; sed qui sunt ex his nati, eorum habentur liberi, quo primum virgo quaeque deducta est.

[14] Of all the Britons the inhabitants of Kent, an entirely maritime district, are by far the most civilised, differing but little from the Gallic manner of life. Of the inlanders most do not sow corn, but live on milk and flesh and clothe themselves in skins. All the Britons, indeed, dye themselves with woad, which produces a blue colour, and makes their appearance in battle more terrible. They wear long hair, and shave every part of the body save the head and the upper lip. Groups of ten or twelve men have wives together in common, and particularly brothers along with brothers, and fathers with sons; but the children born of the unions are reckoned to belong to the particular house to which the maiden was first conducted.

[15] 1 Equites hostium essedariique acriter proelio cum equitatu nostro in itinere conflixerunt, tamen ut nostri omnibus partibus superiores fuerint atque eos in silvas collesque compulerint; 2 sed compluribus interfectis cupidius insecuti nonnullos ex suis amiserunt. 3 At illi intermisso spatio imprudentibus nostris atque occupatis in munitione castrorum subito se ex statione pro castris collocati, 4 acriter pugnaverunt, duabusque missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare atque eis primis legionum duarum, cum hae perexiguo intermisso loci spatio inter se constitissent, novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris per medios audacissime perruperunt seque inde incolumes receperunt. 5 Eo die Quintus Laberius Durus, tribunus militum, interficitur. Illi pluribus submissis cohortibus repelluntur.

[15] The horsemen and charioteers of the enemy engaged in fierce conflict with our cavalry on the march, with the result, however, that our troops proved their superiority in all respects, and drove them into the woods and highlands; but, pursuing too eagerly after slaying

several of the enemy, they lost some of their own number. After an interval, however, when our troops were off their guard and engaged in entrenching the camp, the enemy suddenly dashed out from the woods, and charging the detachments on outpost duty in advance of the camp, they fought fiercely. And though Caesar sent up two cohorts in support — and those the first cohorts of two legions — and two detachments had taken post with a very slight interval between them, the enemy most gallantly broke through in the middle (as our troops were disconcerted by the novel kind of fighting), and retired safely from the field. On that day a tribune, Quintus Laberius Durus, was killed. The enemy were driven back when more cohorts had been sent up.

[16] 1 Toto hoc in genere pugnae, cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem, 2 equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent. 3 Equestris autem proeli ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat. 4 Accedebat huc ut numquam conferti sed rari magnisque intervallis proeliarentur stationesque dispositas haberent, atque alios alii deinceps exciperent, integrique et recentes defetigatis succederent.

[16] The action took place in front of the camp and under the eyes of all; and it was clear that in all such fighting our infantry, by reason of their heavy armament, since they could neither pursue a retiring enemy nor venture far from the standards, were but poorly fitted for

an enemy of this kind. It was clear, again, that our cavalry fought with great risk, because the enemy often retired of deliberate purpose, and, when they had separated our horse a little from the legions, leapt down from their chariots and fought on foot to our disadvantage. Their cavalry tactics, however, threatened us with exactly the same danger in retirement or pursuit. Add to this that the enemy never fought in close array, but in small parties with wide intervals; and had detachments posted at regular stations, so that one party covered another in turn, and fresh, unspent warriors took the place of the battle-weary.

[17] 1 Postero die procul a castris hostes in collibus constiterunt rarique se ostendere et lenius quam pridie nostros equites proelio lacerare coeperunt. 2 Sed meridie, cum Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum Gaio Trebonio legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab signis legionibusque non absisterent. 3 Nostri acriter in eos impetu facto repellerunt neque finem sequendi fecerunt, quoad subsidio confisi equites, cum post se legiones viderent, 4 praecipites hostes egerunt magnoque eorum numero interfecto neque sui colligendi neque consistendi aut ex essedis desiliendi facultatem dederunt. 5 Ex hac fuga protinus, quae undique convenerant, auxilia discesserunt, neque post id tempus umquam summis nobiscum copiis hostes contenderunt.

[17] Next day the enemy took post on the hills, at a distance from the camp, and began to show themselves in small parties and to assail our horsemen, though more feebly than on the day before. But at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions and all the cavalry with Gaius Trebonius, the lieutenant-general, to get forage, the enemy

swooped suddenly from all directions upon the foraging parties, with such vigour that they did not stop short of the legions drawn up for battle. Our troops charged them fiercely and drove them back, and did not bring the pursuit to an end until the cavalry, relying on the support of the legions they saw behind them, drove the enemy headlong and slew a great number of them, giving them no chance to rally or stand fast, nor to leap down from their chariots. After this rout the succours which had assembled from all quarters took their departure; and never afterwards did the enemy engage us at their full strength.

[18] 1 Caesar cognito consilio eorum ad flumen Tamesim in fines Cassivellauni exercitum duxit; quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest. 2 Eo cum venisset, animum advertit ad alteram fluminis ripam magnas esse copias hostium instructas. 3 Ripa autem erat acutis sudibus praefixis munita, eiusdemque generis sub aqua defixae sudes flumine tegebantur. 4 His rebus cognitis a captivis perfugisque Caesar praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit. 5 Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua exstarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent.

[18] Having obtained knowledge of their plans, Caesar led his army into the borders of Cassivellaunus as far as the river Thames, which can be crossed at one place only on foot, and that with difficulty. When he was come thither he remarked that on the other bank of the river a great force of the enemy was drawn up. The bank was fortified with a fringe of sharp projecting stakes, and stakes of the same kind fixed under water were concealed by the stream. When he

had learnt these details from prisoners and deserters, Caesar sent the cavalry in advance and ordered the legions to follow up instantly. But the troops moved with such speed and such spirit, although they had only their heads above water, that the enemy could not withstand the assault of legions and cavalry, but abandoned the banks and betook themselves to flight.

[19] 1 Cassivellaunus, ut supra demonstravimus, omni deposita spe contentionis dimissis amplioribus copiis milibus circiter quattuor essedariorum relictis itinera nostra servabat paulumque ex via excedebat locisque impeditis ac silvestribus sese occultabat, atque eis regionibus quibus nos iter facturos cognoverat pecora atque homines ex agris in silvas compellebat et, 2 cum equitatus noster liberius praedandi vastandique causa se in agros eiecerat, omnibus viis semitisque essedarios ex silvis emittebat et magno cum periculo nostrorum equitum cum eis confligebat atque hoc metu latius vagari prohibebat. 3 Relinquebatur ut neque longius ab agmine legionum discedi Caesar pateretur, et tantum in agris vastandis incendiisque faciendis hostibus noceretur, quantum labore atque itinere legionarii milites efficere poterant.

[19] When Cassivellaunus, as above set forth, had relinquished all hope of a struggle, and disbanded the greater part of his force, with the remainder — about four thousand charioteers — he kept our marches under observation, and, withdrawing a little from the route, concealed himself in entangled positions among the woods. In whatever districts he had learnt that we intended to march he drove all cattle and human beings from the fields into the woods; then, whenever our cavalry dashed out over the fields to plunder and devastate more freely, he sent out charioteers from the woods by

every road and path, engaging our cavalry to their great danger, and preventing them by the fear thus caused from ranging farther afield. The only course left to Caesar was to allow no party to remove very far from the main column of the legions, and to do as much harm to the enemy in laying waste the fields and in conflagrations as the marching powers of the legionaries could accomplish.

[20] 1 Interim Trinobantes, prope firmissima earum regionum civitas, ex qua Mandubracius adulescens Caesaris fidem secutus ad eum in continentem Galliam venerat, cuius pater in ea civitate regnum obtinuerat interfectusque erat a Cassivellauno, ipse fuga mortem vitaverat, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata facturos; 2 petunt, ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in civitatem mittat, qui praesit imperiumque obtineat. 3 His Caesar imperat obsides quadraginta frumentumque exercitui Mandubraciumque ad eos mittit. 4 Illi imperata celeriter fecerunt, obsides ad numerum frumentumque miserunt.

[20] In the meantime the Trinobantes, the strongest state, perhaps, in those parts — the state from which young Mandubracius, in quest of the protection of Caesar, had come to him on the mainland of Gaul: his own father had held the kingship in the state, but had been slain by Cassivellaunus, when he himself had escaped death by flight — sent deputies to Caesar, promising to surrender to him and to do his commands, and beseeching him to protect Mandubracius from outrage at the hands of Cassivellaunus, and to send him to their state as ruler and sovereign lord. Caesar required of them forty hostages, and corn for the army, and sent Mandubracius to them. They speedily did his commands, and sent hostages to the number required, and

corn.

[21] 1 Trinobantibus defensis atque ab omni militum inuria prohibitis Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, Cassi legationibus missis sese Caesari dedunt. 2 Ab his cognoscit non longe ex eo loco oppidum Cassivellauni abesse silvis paludibusque munitum, quo satis magnus hominum pecorisque numerus invenerit. 3 Oppidum autem Britanni vocant, cum silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, quo incursionis hostium vitandae causa convenire consuerunt. 4 Eo proficiscitur cum legionibus: locum reperit egregie natura atque opere munitum; tamen hunc duabus ex partibus oppugnare contendit. 5 Hostes paulisper morati militum nostrorum impetum non tulerunt seseque alia ex parte oppidi eiecerunt. 6 Magnus ibi numerus pecoris repertus, multique in fuga sunt comprehensi atque interfecti.

[21] When the Trinobantes had been placed under protection and secured from all outrage at the hands of the troops, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi sent deputations and surrendered to Caesar. From them he learnt that the stronghold of Cassivellaunus was not far from thence, fenced by woods and marshes; and that he had assembled there a considerable quantity of men and cattle. Now the Britons call it a stronghold when they have fortified a thick-set woodland with rampart and trench, and thither it is their custom to collect, to avoid a hostile inroad. For this spot Caesar now started with the legions: he found it thoroughly fortified by nature and by handiwork, but none the less he made a vigorous assault from two sides. The enemy tarried for a space, but did not stand the assault of our troops, and broke away from another side of the stronghold. A great quantity of cattle was found there; and

many of the enemy were caught in the act of fleeing and put to death.

[22] 1 Dum haec in his locis geruntur, Cassivellaunus ad Cantium, quod esse ad mare supra demonstravimus, quibus regionibus quattuor reges praeerant, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, Segovax, nuntios mittit atque eis imperat uti coactis omnibus copiis castra navalia de improvviso adorianentur atque oppugnent. 2 Ei cum ad castra venissent, nostri eruptione facta multis eorum interfectis, capto etiam nobili duce Lugotorige suos incolumes reduxerunt. 3 Cassivellaunus hoc proelio nuntiato tot detrimentis acceptis, vastatis finibus, maxime etiam permotus defectione civitatum legatos per Atrebatem Commium de deditioe ad Caesarem mittit. 4 Caesar, cum constituisset hiemare in continenti propter repentinos Galliae motus, neque multum aestatis superesset, atque id facile extrahi posse intellexeret, obsides imperat et quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet constituit; 5 interdicat atque imperat Cassivellauno, ne Mandubracio neu Trinobantibus noceat.

[22] While these events were proceeding thereabout, Cassivellaunus sent messages to Kent, a country by the sea, as above set forth, over whose four districts Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax ruled as kings, and commanded them to collect all their forces for a sudden attempt and assault upon the naval camp. But when they were come to the camp the Romans made a sortie and slew many of them, capturing also Lugotorix, a commander of noble station; and then withdrew the detachment without loss. Upon report of this engagement Cassivellaunus was constrained, by the numerous defeats he had suffered, by the devastation of his borders, and chiefly by his alarm at the revolt of the states, to send deputies to Caesar and

treat for peace, by the help of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar had determined to winter on the Continent, in view of sudden commotions in Gaul; and as he had little of the summer left, and was aware that it might easily be spun out to no purpose, he made requisition of hostages, and determined what tribute Britain should pay yearly to Rome. He straitly charged Cassivellaunus to do no hurt to Mandubracius or the Trinobantes.

[23] 1 Obsidibus acceptis exercitum reducit ad mare, naves invenit refectas. 2 His deductis, quod et captivorum magnum numerum habebat, et nonnullae tempestate deperierant naves, duobus com meatibus exercitum reportare instituit. 3 Ac sic accidit, uti ex tanto navium numero tot navigationibus neque hoc neque superiore anno ulla omnino navis, quae milites portaret, desideraretur; at ex eis, 4 quae inanes ex continenti ad eum remitterentur et prioris com meatus expositis militibus et quas postea Labienus faciendas curaverat numero LX, perpaucae locum caperent, reliquae fere omnes reicerentur. 5 Quas cum aliquamdiu Caesar frustra exspectasset, ne anni tempore a navigatione excluderetur, 6 quod aequinoctium suberat, necessario angustius milites collocavit ac summa tranquillitate consecuta, secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia, prima luce terram attigit omnesque incolumes naves perduxit.

[23] As soon as the hostages were received he led the army back to the sea, and found the ships repaired. When they had been launched he decided, as he had a great number of prisoners, and some ships had perished in the storm, to convey the army back by two journeys. And eventually, of all that number of ships and in all those voyages, not a single ship carrying troops in this or the previous year was missing. But of the ships sent back empty to him from the Continent — both

those which had disembarked troops on the first journey, and the second fleet which Labienus had caused to be built, to the number of sixty — very few made the rendezvous; almost all the rest were driven back. Caesar waited some time for these in vain; then, fearing he might be precluded from sailing by the season, as the equinox was nigh at hand, he packed the troops of necessity more closely together; a complete calm ensued, and he weighed anchor at the beginning of the second watch, and at dawn touched land and brought all the ships safely to port.

[24] 1 Subductis navibus concilioque Gallorum Samarobrivae peracto, quod eo anno frumentum in Gallia propter siccitates angustius provenerat, coactus est aliter ac superioribus annis exercitum in hibernis collocare legionesque in plures civitates distribuere. 2 Ex quibus unam in Morinos ducendam Gaio Fabio legato dedit, alteram in Nervios Quinto Ciceroni, tertiam in Esubios Lucio Roscio; quartam in Remis cum Tito Labieno in confinio Treverorum hiemare iussit. Tres in Belgis collocavit: 3 eis Marcum Crassum quaestorem et Lucium Munatium Plancum et Gaium Trebonium legatos praefecit. 4 Unam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat, et cohortes V in Eburones, quorum pars maxima est inter Mosam ac Rhenum, qui sub imperio Ambiorigis et Catuvolci erant, misit. 5 Eis militibus Quintum Titurium Sabinum et Lucium Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praeesse iussit. 6 Ad hunc modum distributis legionibus facillime inopiae frumentariae sese mederi posse existimavit. 7 Atque harum tamen omnium legionum hiberna praeter eam, quam Lucio Roscio in pacatissimam et quietissimam partem ducendam dederat, milibus passuum centum continebantur. 8 Ipse interea, quoad legiones collocatas munitaque hiberna cognovisset, in Gallia morari constituit.

[24] The ships were beached, and a council of the Gauls was held at Samarobriva (Amiens). Then, as the corn-crop had been scantier that year in Gaul on account of droughts, Caesar was forced to dispose the army in winter quarters in a different fashion from that of previous years, distributing the legions over a larger number of states. One of the legions he gave to Gaius Fabius, the lieutenant-general, to be led into the country of the Morini, a second to Quintus Cicero for the Nervii, a third to Lucius Roscius for the Eburones; a fourth, with Titus Labienus in command, he ordered to winter among the Remi on the border of the Treveri. There he stationed among the Belgae: in command of them he set Marcus Crassus, the quartermaster-general, and Lucius Munatius Plancus and Gaius Trebonius, lieutenant-generals. One legion, the most recently enrolled north of the Po, with five cohorts, he sent into the country of the Eburones, of which the chief part lies between the Meuse and the Rhine; the tribe was under the rule of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. He ordered Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, lieutenant-generals, to command those detachments. With the legions distributed after this fashion, he supposed that he could easiest remedy any shortage of corn-supply. And yet the winter quarters of all the legions, save that which he had assigned to Lucius Roscius to be led into the most quiet and peaceful district, were within a range of one hundred miles. He himself meanwhile determined to wait in Gaul until he should have information that the legions were at their stations and the cantonments entrenched.

[25] 1 Erat in Carnutibus summo loco natus Tasgetius, cuius maiores in sua civitate regnum obtinuerant. 2 Huic Caesar pro eius virtute atque in se benevolentia, quod in omnibus bellis singulari eius opera fuerat usus, maiorum locum restituerat. 3 Tertium iam hunc annum

regnantem inimici, multis palam ex civitate eius auctoribus, eum interfecerunt. 4 Defertur ea res ad Caesarem. Ille veritus, quod ad plures pertinebat, ne civitas eorum impulsu deficeret, Lucium Plancum cum legione ex Belgio celeriter in Carnutes proficisci iubet ibique hiemare quorumque opera cognoverat Tasgetium interfectum, hos comprehensos ad se mittere. 5 Interim ab omnibus legatis quaestoreque, quibus legiones tradiderat, certior factus est in hiberna perventum locumque hibernis esse munitum.

[25] There was among the Carnutes one Tasgetius, a man of the highest lineage, whose ancestors had held the kingship in their state. To him, in consideration for his character and his goodwill towards himself — for in all the campaigns he had profited by his remarkable energy — Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors. He had now reigned for two years and more, when his enemies, with the open approval of many persons in the state, put him to death. The matter was reported to Caesar, who, apprehending — as a considerable number of persons were concerned — that the state might revolt at the prompting of the regicides, ordered Lucius Plancus to move speedily with his legion from Belgium far into the country of the Carnutes and there to winter, and to seize and send to him the person by whose instrumentality he knew that Tasgetius had been put to death. Meanwhile he received information from all the lieutenant-generals and the quartermaster-general, to whom he had assigned the legions, that winter quarters had been reached and each station duly entrenched for the same.

[26] 1 Diebus circiter XV, quibus in hiberna ventum est, initium repentini tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco; 2 qui, cum ad fines regni sui Sabino Cottaeque praesto

fuissent frumentumque in hiberna comportavissent, Indutiomari Treveri nuntiis impulsos suos concitaverunt subitoque oppressis lignatoribus magna manu ad castra oppugnatum venerunt. 3 Cum celeriter nostri arma cepissent vallumque adscendissent atque una ex parte Hispanis equitibus emissis equestri proelio superiores fuissent, desperata re hostes suos ab oppugnatione reduxerunt. 4 Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui posse sperarent.

[26] In about a fortnight after the troops had moved into winter quarters, disorder and revolt suddenly began. It originated with Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, who, after attending Sabinus and Cotta upon the borders of their kingdom, and bringing in corn^o to the cantonments, were induced by messages from Indutiomarus of the Treveri to stir up their own folk. They overwhelmed of a sudden the detachments gathering wood, and with a large force came to assault the camp. Our troops speedily took up arms and mounted the rampart; and a party of Spanish horse sent out on one flank secured us the advantage in a cavalry engagement, upon which the enemy, despairing of success, withdrew their men from the assault. Then, according to their national usage, they called loudly for some one of our number to go forth for a parley, affirming that they had something to say for the interest of both parties, whereby they trusted to be able to reduce the matters in dispute.

[27] 1 Mittitur ad eos colloquendi causa Gaius Arpineius, eques Romanus, familiaris Quinti Tituri, et Quintus Iunius ex Hispania quidam, qui iam ante missu Caesaris ad Ambiorigem ventitare consuerat; apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est: 2 Sese

pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuesset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius ab Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud se in servitute et catenis tenuissent; 3 neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem. 4 Civitati porro hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat. 5 Sed esse Galliae commune consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset. 6 Non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur. 7 Quibus quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem officii pro beneficiis Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. 8 Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo. 9 Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab eis absit. 10 Illud se polliceri et iureiurando confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum. 11 Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre. Hac oratione habita discedit Ambiorix.

[27] Gaius Arpineius, a Roman knight, a friend of Quintus Titurius, and Quintus Junius, a Spaniard, who had previously been

accustomed to go to and fro upon Caesar's errands to Ambiorix, were sent to them for the purpose of a parley. Before them Ambiorix spake as follows. He admitted that he was very greatly indebted to Caesar for his good offices towards himself; for it was by Caesar's instrumentality that he had been set free from the tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to his neighbours the Aduatuci, and by Caesar's action that a son and a nephew, sent to the Aduatuci as hostages, and kept in their country in slavery and bondage, had been sent back to him. He declared that his action in assaulting the camp had been the result, not of judgment or intention on his part, but of compulsion on the part of his state; and that the conditions of his own sovereignty were such that the people had as much authority over him as he himself over the people. The state, moreover, had gone to war because it had not been able to resist the sudden conspiracy of the Gauls. He could easily prove that by the insignificance of his own position; for he was not so ignorant of affairs as to believe that by his own forces the Roman people could be overcome. No, there was common consent among the Gauls: this was the day appointed for assaulting all the cantonments of Caesar, so that one legion might not be able to come to the support of another. It would not have been easy for Gauls to refuse Gauls, especially when they considered that the design they had entered on was for the recovery of their common freedom. And now, having satisfied the Gauls as far as the claim of his country required, he had regard to his duty in response to the good offices of Caesar; and he warned, he prayed Titurius, as in private duty bound, to take measures for his own and his soldiers' safety. A great company of Germans had been hired, and had crossed the Rhine; in two days it would be at hand. It was for the Romans themselves to consider

whether they would choose to bring the troops out of cantonments before neighbours could know of it, and to march them either to Cicero or to Labienus, one of whom was about fifty miles from them, the other a little farther. He promised them, and confirmed it with an oath, that he would grant them safe passage through his borders. In so doing, he said, he was consulting the interests of his state, by relieving it of the burden of cantonments, and was making a return to Caesar according to his merits. After delivering this address Ambiorix departed.

[28] 1 Arpineius et Iunius, quae audierunt, ad legatos deferunt. Illi repentina re perturbati, etsi ab hoste ea dicebantur, tamen non neglegenda existimabant maximeque hac re permovebantur, quod civitatem ignobilem atque humilem Eburonum sua sponte populo Romano bellum facere ausam vix erat credendum. 2 Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magnaue inter eos exsistit controversia. 3 Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: quantasvis [magnas] copias etiam Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?

[28] Arpineius and Junius reported what they heard to the lieutenant-generals. The latter were alarmed by the sudden news, and, though the statement was made by an enemy, they nevertheless considered that it must not be disregarded. One thing especially stirred their

anxiety — it was scarcely credible that the Eburones, an undistinguished and insignificant state, had dared of their own motion to make war on Rome. They accordingly submitted the question to a council of war, and a great dispute arose among them. Lucius Aurunculeius, with several tribunes and centurions of the first grade, thought that nothing should be done rashly, and no departure from winter quarters made without Caesar's order. They sought to show that even German forces, no matter how numerous, could be withstood by entrenched cantonments; there was proof of it in the fact that they had most gallantly withstood the first charge of the enemy, and had actually dealt them many wounds. They were not hard pressed for corn; meanwhile reinforcements would reach them alike from the nearest cantonments and from Caesar. In fine, what was more senseless or more discreditable than to take the advice of an enemy in deciding supreme issues?

[29] 1 Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium adiunctis Germanis convenissent aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam; 2 neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. 3 Non hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum; magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias; 4 ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris exstincta. 5 Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa re Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse? 6 Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis

consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem. 7 Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda.

[29] Against this Titurius vociferated that it would be too late to act when larger bodies of the enemy, with Germans in addition, had come up, or when some disaster had been experienced in the cantonments next their own. There was short time, he said, for deliberation. He believed that Caesar had started for Italy; otherwise the Carnutes would not have conceived the design of murdering Tasgetius, nor, with Caesar present, would the Eburones now have come against the camp with so profound a contempt for us. He had regard, not to the suggestion of the enemy, but to fact. The Rhine was close at hand; the Germans were highly indignant at the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories; Gaul was incensed at all the insults experienced since it was brought in subjection to the authority of Rome, and at the extinction of its earlier renown in war. In fine, who could persuade himself that Ambiorix had engaged in such a design without sure cause? His own view made for safety in either event: if nothing very serious occurred, they would reach the next legion without danger; if the whole of Gaul were at one with the Germans, the sole chance of safety lay in speedy action. And to what was the plan of Cotta, and those who disagreed with himself, to lead? There might be no present danger in it, but there was certainly famine to fear from a prolonged siege.

[30] 1 Hac in utramque partem disputatione habita, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus acriter resisteretur, "Vincite," inquit, "si ita vultis," Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret;

2 “neque is sum,” inquit, “qui gravissime ex vobis mortis periculo terrear: hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, 3 qui, si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe ab ceteris aut ferro aut fame intereant.”

[30] After this discussion of the alternatives Cotta and the senior centurions vehemently opposed Sabinus, who exclaimed — and with a louder voice than usual, so that a great number of the soldiers might hear— “Have your way, if you please. I am not the man to feel the most serious alarm of any of you at the danger of death. The troops will understand. If anything very serious comes to pass, they will require an account from yourself; for, if you allowed them, they would by the day after to-morrow have joined forces with the nearest cantonments, and would abide the event of war along with the rest, instead of perishing by sword or famine, far removed and isolated from their comrades.”

[31] 1 Consurgitur ex consilio; comprehendunt utrumque et orant, ne sua dissensione et pertinacia rem in summum periculum deducant: 2 facilem esse rem, seu maneant, seu proficiscantur, si modo unum omnes sentiant ac probent; contra in dissensione nullam se salutem perspicere. Res disputatione ad mediam noctem perducitur. 3 Tandem dat Cotta permotus manus: superat sententia Sabini. Pronuntiatur prima luce ituros. 4 Consumitur vigiliis reliqua pars noctis, cum sua quisque miles circumspiceret, quid secum portare posset, quid ex instrumento hibernorum relinquere cogeretur. 5 Omnia excogitantur, quare nec sine periculo maneatur, et languore militum et vigiliis periculum augeatur. 6 Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed ab

homine amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum, longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis.

[31] The council rose, and the officers laid hold on the two generals and prayed them not utterly to endanger the issue by their own obstinacy in disagreement. There was no difficulty, whether they stayed or marched, if only all shared and approved one plan; in disagreement, on the contrary, they saw no safety. The matter continued in dispute till midnight. At last Cotta was induced to yield, and the view of Sabinus prevailed. It was announced that the troops would march at dawn. The rest of the night was spent without sleep, for each soldier was looking over his effects, to see what he could carry with him, and what part of the winter equipment he must needs leave. They thought of any and every plea to prove that it must be dangerous to remain, and that the danger would be increased by the exhaustion of the troops in long watches. At dawn they marched forth from camp, as men persuaded that counsel had been given them not by an enemy, but by Ambiorix, a devoted friend; the column was very lengthy, and the baggage very heavy.

[32] 1 At hostes, posteaquam ex nocturno fremitu vigiliisque de profectione eorum senserunt, collocatis insidiis bipertito in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus Romanorum adventum exspectabant, 2 et cum se maior pars agminis in magnam convallem demisisset, ex utraque parte eius vallis subito se ostenderunt novissimosque premere et primos prohibere ascensu atque iniquissimo nostris loco proelium committere coeperunt.

[32] When the enemy felt sure, by the noise and watchfulness of the night, that the Romans meant to march out, they posted a double ambush in the woods, in a convenient and covert spot about two

miles away; and there they awaited the coming of the Romans. When the greater part of the column had descended into a big ravine, they showed themselves suddenly on either flank of the same, and sought to harass the rearguard, to prevent the vanguard from climbing the ascent, and to engage on ground the most unfavourable for our troops.

[33] 1 Tum demum Titurius, qui nihil ante providisset, trepidare et concursare cohortesque disponere, haec tamen ipsa timide atque ut eum omnia deficere viderentur; quod plerumque eis accidere consuevit, qui in ipso negotio consilium capere coguntur. 2 At Cotta, qui cogitasset haec posse in itinere accidere atque ob eam causam profectionis auctor non fuisset, nulla in re communi saluti deerat et in appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat. 3 Cum propter longitudinem agminis minus facile omnia per se obire et, quid quoque loco faciendum esset, providere possent, iusserunt pronuntiare, ut impedimenta relinquerent atque in orbem consisterent. 4 Quod consilium etsi in eiusmodi casu reprehendendum non est, tamen incommode accidit: 5 nam et nostris militibus spem minuit et hostes ad pugnam alacriores effecit, quod non sine summo timore et desperatione id factum videbatur. Praeterea accidit, quod fieri necesse erat, ut vulgo milites ab signis discederent, quae quisque eorum carissima haberet, ab impedimentis petere atque arripere properaret, clamore et fletu omnia complerentur.

[33] Then indeed, as he had anticipated nothing, Titurius was alarmed: he ran hither and thither posting cohorts, yet even this he did in timid fashion and with all judgment evidently gone, as generally happens when men are forced to decide in the moment of action. Cotta,

however, as he had thought this might happen on the march, and for that reason had opposed departure, neglected nothing for the safety of the force: in addressing and encouraging the troops he did his duty as a commander, in action his duty as a soldier. When by reason of the length of the column the generals found it too hard to control everything in their own person, and to provide for the action necessary at each point, they ordered to pass the word along the line to abandon the baggage and form square. This plan, though not reprehensible in an emergency, had an unfortunate result; for it diminished the hope of our own troops and made the enemy keener for the fight, since the movement could not but betray the greatest apprehension and despair. Moreover, it was an inevitable consequence that on all sides soldiers were deserting their standards, while each of them hastened to seek and to seize from the baggage-train all that he accounted dearest. So everything was a confusion of shouting and weeping.

[34] 1 At barbaris consilium non defuit. Nam duces eorum tota acie pronuntiare iusserunt, ne quis ab loco discederet: illorum esse praedam atque illis reservari quaecumque Romani reliquissent: proinde omnia in victoria posita existimarent. 2 Erant et virtute et studio pugnandi pares; nostri, tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant, et quotiens quaeque cohors procurrerat, ab ea parte magnus numerus hostium cadebat. 3 Qua re animadversa Ambiorix pronuntiare iubet, ut procul tela coniciant neu propius accedant et, quam in partem Romani impetum fecerint, cedant (levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil eis noceri posse), 4 rursus se ad signa recipientes insequantur.

[34] But the natives were not lacking in resource. Their leaders ordered the command to be given along the line that no one was to leave his rank, that the booty was theirs, and whatsoever the Romans abandoned was to be reserved for them; wherefore they must think that all depended on victory. The enemy were our equals in valour and in fighting zeal. Our troops, though deserted by their commander and by fortune, still set all hope of safety in valour; and as often as each cohort dashed forward a great number of the enemy would fall in that quarter. Noticing this, Ambiorix ordered the command to be given that his men should discharge their missiles at long range and not approach too near, and give way where the Romans made a charge, for that by reason of the lightness of their armament and their daily training no harm could be done to them, and when the enemy retired upon their standards they were to pursue in their turn.

[35] 1 Quo praecepto ab eis diligentissime observato, cum quaequam cohors ex orbe excesserat atque impetum fecerat, hostes velocissime refugiebant. 2 Interim eam partem nudari necesse erat et ab latere aperto tela recipi. 3 Rursus cum in eum locum unde erant egressi reverti coeperant, et ab eis qui cesserant et ab eis qui proximi steterant circumveniebantur; 4 sin autem locum tenere vellent, nec virtuti locus relinquebatur, neque ab tanta multitudine coniecta tela conferti vitare poterant. 5 Tamen tot incommodis conflictati, multis vulneribus acceptis resistebant et magna parte diei consumpta, cum a prima luce ad horam octavam pugnaretur, nihil quod ipsis esset indignum committebant. 6 Tum Tito Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat, viro forti et magnae auctoritatis, utrumque femur tragula traicitur; 7 Quintus Lucanius, eiusdem ordinis, fortissime pugnans, dum circumvento filio subvenit, interficitur; Lucius Cotta legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque adhortans in

adversum os funda vulneratur.

[35] This instruction they most carefully observed. When any cohort left the square and made a charge the enemy would run back with great rapidity. Meanwhile that detachment was of necessity uncovered, and a discharge of missiles was received upon its exposed flank. And when they sought to return back to the position from which they had started, they were like to be surrounded both by those who had given way and by those who had the nearest station. If, on the other hand, they were fain to hold their ground, there was no room left for valour, and in close array they could not avoid the missiles discharged by so great a host. Yet, handicapped by all these disadvantages, and with many men wounded, they stood firm; and though a great part of the day was so spent, for the battle lasted from dawn till the eighth hour, they did nothing unworthy of themselves. At this point Titus Balventius, a gallant man of great influence, who in the previous year had commanded the first century, had both thighs pierced by a dart; Quintus Lucanius, of the same rank, was killed fighting most bravely to succour a son who had been surrounded; Lucius Cotta, the lieutenant-general, as he cheered on all the cohorts and centuries, was hit full in the face by a sling-bullet.

[36] 1 His rebus permotus Quintus Titurius, cum procul Ambiorigem suos cohortantem conspexisset, interpretem suum Gnaeum Pompeium ad eum mittit rogatum ut sibi militibusque parcat. 2 Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; sperare a multitudine impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri, inque eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta saucio communicat, 3 si videatur, pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una colloquantur: sperare ab eo de sua ac militum

salute impetrari posse. Cotta se ad armatum hostem iturum negat atque in eo perseverat.

[36] Alarmed by these events, Quintus Titurius, who had remarked Ambiorix at a distance encouraging his men, sent his interpreter, Gnaeus Pompeius, to him to ask him to spare himself and his troops. Ambiorix replied to the appeal that, if Titurius wished to parley with him, he was at liberty so to do; he hoped that he could prevail on his host to save the soldiers alive; to Titurius himself certainly no harm would be done, and thereto he pledged his own word. Titurius communicated with the wounded Cotta to see if he agreed to withdraw with him from the fight and parley with Ambiorix, stating that he hoped he might prevail on him to save themselves and the troops. Cotta refused to go to an armed enemy, and persisted in the refusal.

[37] 1 Sabinus quos in praesentia tribunos militum circum se habebat et primorum ordinum centuriones se sequi iubet et, cum propius Ambiorigem accessisset, iussus arma abicere imperatum facit suisque ut idem faciant imperat. 2 Interim, dum de condicionibus inter se agunt longiorque consulto ab Ambiorige instituitur sermo, paulatim circumventus interficitur. 3 Tum vero suo more victoriam conclamant atque ululatum tollunt impetuque in nostros facto ordines perturbant. 4 Ibi Lucius Cotta pugnans interficitur cum maxima parte militum. Reliqui se in castra recipiunt unde erant egressi. 5 Ex quibus Lucius Petrosidius aquilifer, cum magna multitudine hostium premeretur, aquilam intra vallum proiecit; ipse pro castris fortissime pugnans occiditur. Illi aegre ad noctem oppugnationem sustinent; 6 noctu ad unum omnes desperata salute se ipsi interficiunt. 7 Pauci ex proelio lapsi incertis itineribus per silvas ad Titum Labienum

legatum in hiberna perveniunt atque eum de rebus gestis certiore faciant.

[37] Sabinus ordered all the tribunes and the senior centurions he had about him at the time to follow him; and when he was come quite near to Ambiorix, and was ordered to cast away his arms, he obeyed the command and commanded his party to do the same. While they two were discussing the terms together, and Ambiorix was purposely making a longer speech than necessary, Titurius was gradually surrounded and slain. Then at once they shouted victory after their own fashion, and, with a loud yell, charged our troops and threw the ranks into confusion. There Lucius Cotta was killed fighting, with the greatest part of the troops. The remainder retired to the camp from which they had marched out. One of them, the standard-bearer Lucius Petrosidius, hard pressed by a great host of the enemy, flung his eagle within the rampart, and was himself cut down, fighting most gallantly, before the camp. The others scarcely kept off the assault till nightfall; in the night, despairing of deliverance, they slew one another to a man. A few who had slipped away from the battle made their way by uncertain paths through the woods to the cantonments of Titus Labienus, the lieutenant-general, and informed him of what had happened.

[38] 1 Hac victoria sublatu Ambiorix statim cum equitatu in Aduatucos, qui erant eius regno finitimi, proficiscitur; neque noctem neque diem intermittit peditatumque subsequi iubet. 2 Re demonstrata Aduatucisque concitatis postero die in Nervios pervenit hortaturque, ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque ulciscendi Romanos pro eis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant: 3 interfectos esse legatos duos magnamque partem exercitus interisse demonstrat;

4 nihil esse negoti subito oppressam legionem quae cum Cicerone hiemet interfici; se ad eam rem profitetur adiutorem. Facile hac oratione Nervii persuadet.

[38] Elated by this victory, Ambiorix at once set out with his cavalry for the country of the Aduatuci, which lay next to his kingdom; he marched without a break, for a night and a day, ordering his infantry to follow after him. Having reported the battle and aroused the Aduatuci, he came the next day into the territory of the Nervii, and exhorted them not to let slip the chance of winning freedom for all time and of taking vengeance on the Romans for the outrages they had suffered. He made it clear that two lieutenant-generals had been slain and the great part of an army destroyed; that it was not a difficult business to fall suddenly upon the legion which was wintering with Cicero and cut it to pieces; and he offered his own assistance to that end. With this speech he easily persuaded the Nervii.

[39] 1 Itaque confestim dimissis nuntiis ad Ceutrones, Grudios, Levacos, Pleumoxios, Geidumnos, qui omnes sub eorum imperio sunt, quam maximas manus possunt cogunt et de improvviso ad Ciceronis hiberna advolant nondum ad eum fama de Tituri morte perlata. 2 Huic quoque accidit, quod fuit necesse, ut nonnulli milites, qui lignationis munitionisque causa in silvas discessissent, repentino equitum adventu interciperentur. 3 His circumventis magna manu Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci atque horum omnium socii et clientes legionem oppugnare incipiunt. Nostri celeriter ad arma concurrunt, vallum conscendunt. 4 Aegre is dies sustentatur, quod omnem spem hostes in celeritate ponebant atque hanc adepti victoriam in perpetuum se fore victores confidebant.

[39] Accordingly messengers were at once despatched to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, the Geidumni, all of whom were under the sovereignty of the Nervii; they raised companies as large as they could, and of a sudden swooped upon the winter quarters of Cicero, who had not yet received report of the death of Titurius. In Cicero's case also it happened, as was inevitable, that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods to get timber for entrenching were cut off by the sudden arrival of the enemy's horsemen. They were surrounded; and then in a huge mass the Eburones, the Nervii, the Aduatuci, and the allies and dependents of them all, began the assault upon the legion. Our troops speedily ran to arms and mounted the rampart. Scarcely for that day could they hold out, because the enemy were putting all their hope in despatch, believing that if they won this victory they would be victorious right through.

[40] 1 Mittuntur ad Caesarem confestim ab Cicerone litterae magnis propositis praemiis, si pertulissent: obsessis omnibus viis missi intercipiuntur. 2 Noctu ex materia, quam munitionis causa comportaverant, turres admodum CXX excitantur incredibili celeritate; quae deesse operi videbantur, perficiuntur. 3 Hostes postero die multo maioribus coactis copiis castra oppugnant, fossam complent. Eadem ratione, qua pridie, ab nostris resistitur. 4 Hoc idem reliquis deinceps fit diebus. 5 Nulla pars nocturni temporis ad laborem intermittitur; non aegris, non vulneratis facultas quietis datur. 6 Quaecumque ad proximi diei oppugnationem opus sunt noctu comparantur; multae praeustae sudes, magnus muralium pilorum numerus instituitur; turres contabulantur, pinnae loricae ex cratibus attexuntur. 7 Ipse Cicero, cum tenuissima valetudine esset, ne nocturnum quidem sibi tempus ad quietem relinquebat, ut

ultro militum concursu ac vocibus sibi parcere cogeretur.

[40] Despatches were at once sent by Cicero to Caesar, with promise of great rewards if the bearers carried them safe; but all the roads were blocked, and the messengers were cut off. During the night about one hundred and twenty towers were run up with incredible speed out of the timber which had been collected for the purpose of the entrenchment, and all apparent deficiencies in the earthworks were rectified. On the next day the enemy assaulted the camp with a far larger force which they had assembled, and filled in the trench. Our troops resisted in the same fashion as on the day before. And exactly the same was done on the other days following. For not a moment of the night season was there a break in the work; no chance of rest was given to sick or wounded. All that was needed against the next day's assault was made ready in the night: quantities of stakes fired at the end, a great number of pikes for wall-fighting were got ready; the towers were raised stage by stage, battlements and breastworks of hurdles were attached to them. Cicero himself, though he was in very frail health, left himself not even the night season for rest, until at last he was actually forced to spare himself by the protests of the soldiers, who crowded about him.

[41] 1 Tunc duces principesque Nerviorum qui aliquem sermonis aditum causamque amicitiae cum Cicerone habebant colloqui sese velle dicunt. 2 Facta potestate eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant: omnem esse in armis Galliam; 3 Germanos Rhenum transisse; Caesaris reliquorumque hiberna oppugnari. 4 Addunt etiam de Sabini morte: Ambiorigem ostentant fidei faciendae causa. 5 Errare eos dicunt, si quidquam ab his praesidi sperent, qui suis rebus diffidant; sese tamen hoc esse in Ciceronem populumque

Romanum animo, ut nihil nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere consuetudinem nolint: 6 licere illis incolumibus per se ex hibernis discedere et quascumque in partes velint sine metu proficisci. 7 Cicero ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem: 8 si ab armis discedere velint, se adiutore utantur legatosque ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae petierint, impetraturos.

[41] Then the leaders and chiefs of the Nervii who had some plea of friendship to give them access to conversation with Cicero said that they desired to parley. When the opportunity was given them they recounted the same arguments which Ambiorix had used with Titurius. All Gaul, they said, was in arms; the Germans had crossed the Rhine; the winter stations of Caesar and the rest were being assaulted. They told further of the death of Sabinus; they pointed to Ambiorix in order to inspire credit. "You are wrong," they said, "to hope for any security from others who are themselves in desperate case; our own feeling, however, towards Cicero and Rome is to refuse nothing except winter quartering, for we are unwilling that this practice should become established. So far as we are concerned, you have liberty to depart safe from your winter quarters, and to march off without fear in what soever direction you please." To this Cicero made one remark only in reply: that it was not the practice of Rome to accept terms from an enemy in arms; if they would lay down their arms, they might use his good offices and send deputies to Caesar; he hoped that, having regard to the justice of Caesar, they would obtain their petition.

[42] 1 Ab hac spe repulsi Nervii vallo pedum IX et fossa pedum XV

hiberna cingunt. 2 Haec et superiorum annorum consuetudine ab nobis cognoverant et, quos clam de exercitu habebant captivos, ab eis docebantur; 3 sed nulla ferramentorum copia quae esset ad hunc usum idonea, gladiis caespites circumcidere, manibus sagulisque terram exhaurire nitebantur. 4 Qua quidem ex re hominum multitudo cognosci potuit: nam minus horis tribus milium pedum XV in circuitu munitionem perfecerunt 5 reliquisque diebus turres ad altitudinem valli, falces testudinesque, quas idem captivi docuerant, parare ac facere coeperunt.

[42] Foiled of this hope, the Nervii encompassed the station with a rampart nine feet high and a trench fifteen feet wide. These expedients they had learnt from us in the intercourse of previous years, and they were further instructed by prisoners from the army whom they kept in secret; but, having no supply of the tools suitable for this purpose, they were striving to cut sods round with swords, and lifting out earth with hands and cloaks. And this circumstance made it possible to ascertain the number of their host; for in less than three hours they completed an entrenchment fifteen miles in circumference, and on the days that followed they set about their preparations, making towers to suit the height of the rampart, grappling-hooks, and shelters, under the instruction of the prisoners aforesaid.

[43] 1 Septimo oppugnationis die maximo coorto vento ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes fundis et fervefacta iacula in casas, quae more Gallico stramentis erant tectae, iacere coeperunt. 2 Hae celeriter ignem comprehenderunt et venti magnitudine in omnem locum castrorum distulerunt. 3 Hostes maximo clamore sicuti parta iam atque explorata victoria turres testudinesque agere et scalis

vallum ascendere coeperunt. 4 At tanta militum virtus atque ea praesentia animi fuit, ut, cum undique flamma torrerentur maximaque telorum multitudine premerentur suaque omnia impedimenta atque omnes fortunas conflagrare intellegerent, non modo demigrandi causa de vallo decederet nemo, sed paene ne respiceret quidem quisquam, ac tum omnes acerrime fortissimeque pugnarent. 5 Hic dies nostris longe gravissimus fuit; sed tamen hunc habuit eventum, ut eo die maximus numerus hostium vulneraretur atque interficeretur, ut se sub ipso vallo constipaverant recessumque primis ultimi non dabant. 6 Paulum quidem intermissa flamma et quodam loco turri adacta et contingente vallum tertiae cohortis centuriones ex eo, quo stabant, loco recesserunt suosque omnes removerunt, nutu vocibusque hostes, si introire vellent, vocare coeperunt; quorum progredi ausus est nemo. 7 Tum ex omni parte lapidibus coniectis deturbati, turrisque succensa est.

[43] On the seventh day of the siege-operations a very strong wind arose, and they began to sling red-hot bullets of softened clay and to hurl blazing darts on to the huts, which in Gallic fashion had been thatched with straw. These speedily caught fire, which the strength of the wind carried to every corner of the camp. With a huge shout, as though victory were already won and assured, the enemy began to move up their towers and shelters, and to mount the rampart with scaling-ladders. Yet so great was the valour of the troops, and such their presence of mind, that, although they were everywhere scorched by the flame and harassed by the vast multitude of missiles, and understood that all their own baggage and all their possessions were ablaze, not only did no man leave the rampart to withdraw from the fight, but scarcely a man even looked behind him, and all at that time fought with the greatest zeal and gallantry. This day was by far the

most serious for our troops, with the result, however, that a greater number of the enemy were wounded and slain than on any other day, as they had pressed right up to the very rampart, the rear giving no chance of retirement to the van. When the flames had abated somewhat, in one place a tower was moved up to touch the rampart: whereupon the centurions of the third cohort withdrew from their station and moved back all their men, and then began to invite the enemy by signs and shouts, in case they should desire to come in; but not one of them durst advance. Then they were dislodged by volleys of stones from every side, and the tower was set on fire.

[44] 1 Erant in ea legione fortissimi viri, centuriones, qui primis ordinibus appropinquarent, Titus Pullo et Lucius Vorenius. 2 Hi perpetuas inter se controversias habebant, quoniam anteferebantur, omnibusque annis de locis summis simultatibus contendebant. 3 Ex his Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, “Quid dubitas,” inquit, “Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas? 4 hic dies de nostris controversiis iudicabit.” Haec cum dixisset, procedit extra munitiones quaque pars hostium confertissima est visa irrumpit. 5 Ne Vorenius quidem tum sese vallo continet, sed omnium veritus existimationem subsequitur. 6 Mediocri spatio relicto Pullo pilum in hostes immittit atque unum ex multitudine procurrentem traicit; quo percusso et exanimato hunc scutis protegunt, in hostem tela universi coniciunt neque dant regrediendi facultatem. 7 Transfigitur scutum Pulloni et verutum in balteo defigitur. 8 Avertit hic casus vaginam et gladium educere conanti dextram moratur manum, impeditumque hostes circumsistunt. 9 Succurrit inimicus illi Vorenius et laboranti subvenit. 10 Ad hunc se confestim a Pullone omnis multitudo convertit: 11 illum veruto arbitrantur occisum. Gladio comminus rem gerit Vorenius atque uno interfecto reliquos

paulum propellit; 12 dum cupidius instat, in locum deiectus inferiorem concidit. Huic rursus circumvento fert subsidium Pullo, 13 atque ambo incolumes compluribus interfectis summa cum laude sese intra munitiones recipiunt. 14 Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur.

[44] In that legion there were two most gallant centurions, now not far from the first class of their rank, Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus. They had continual quarrels together which was to stand first, and every year they struggled in fierce rivalry for the chief posts. One of them, Pullo, when the fight was fiercest by the entrenchments, said: "Why hesitate, Vorenus? Or what chance of proving your pluck do you wait for? This day shall decide our quarrels." So saying, he stepped outside the entrenchments, and dashed upon the section of the enemy which seemed to be in closest array. Neither did Vorenus keep within the rampart, but in fear of what all men would think he followed hard. Then, at short range, Pullo sent his pike at the enemy, and pierced one man as he ran forward from the host. When he was struck senseless the enemy sought to cover him with their shields, and discharged their spears in a volley at the foeman, giving him no chance of retirement. Pullo's shield was penetrated, and a dart was lodged in his belt. This accident threw his scabbard out of place, and delayed his right hand as he tried to draw his sword, and while he was in difficulty the enemy surrounded him. His enemy, Vorenus, ran up to him and helped him in his distress. Upon him at once all the host turned, and left Pullo, supposing him to be slain by the dart. Vorenus plied his sword at close quarters, and by slaying one man drove off the rest a little; while he pressed on too eagerly he fell down headlong into a dip in the ground. He was surrounded in his

turn, but Pullo brought assistance; and both, unhurt, though they had slain several men, retired with the utmost glory within the entrenchments. In the eagerness of their rivalry fortune so handled the two that, for all their mutual hostility, the one helped and saved the other, and it was impossible to decide which should be considered the better man in valour.

[45] 1 Quanto erat in dies gravior atque asperior oppugnatio, et maxime quod magna parte militum confecta vulneribus res ad paucitatem defensorum pervenerat, tanto crebriores litterae nuntiique ad Caesarem mittebantur; quorum pars deprehensa in conspectu nostrorum militum cum cruciatu necabatur. 2 Erat unus intus Nervius nomine Vertico, loco natus honesto, qui a prima obsidione ad Ciceronem perfugerat suamque ei fidem praestiterat. 3 Hic servo spe libertatis magnisque persuadet praemiis, ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat. 4 Has ille in iaculo illigatas effert et Gallus inter Gallos sine ulla suspicione versatus ad Caesarem pervenit. 5 Ab eo de periculis Ciceronis legionisque cognoscitur.

[45] The more serious and burdensome the siege-operations each day became — and chiefly because, with a great part of the soldiers overcome by wounds, the burden had fallen on a small number of defenders — the more frequent were the despatches and messengers sent to Caesar. Part of these latter were captured and put to death with torture in sight of our own troops. There was a Nervian in the camp, named Vertico, born to an honourable estate, who at the very beginning of the blockade had fled to Cicero for refuge, and had since proved his loyalty to him. He persuaded a slave by the hope of freedom and by great rewards to deliver a despatch to Caesar. The man carried forth the despatch bound on a javelin, and moving, all

unsuspected, as a Gaul among Gauls, he made his way to Caesar. It was he who brought the information about the dangers of Cicero and the legion.

[46] 1 Caesar acceptis litteris hora circiter XI diei statim nuntium in Bellovacos ad M. Crassum quaestorem mittit, cuius hiberna aberant ab eo milia passuum XXV; 2 iubet media nocte legionem proficisci celeriterque ad se venire. 3 Exit cum nuntio Crassus. Alterum ad Gaium Fabium legatum mittit, ut in Atrebatium fines legionem adducat, qua sibi iter faciendum sciebat. 4 Scribit Labieno, si rei publicae commodo facere posset, cum legione ad fines Nerviorum veniat. Reliquam partem exercitus, quod paulo aberat longius, non putat exspectandam; equites circiter quadringentos ex proximis hibernis colligit.

[46] Caesar received the despatch about the eleventh hour of the day, and at once sent a messenger into the country of the Bellovaci to Marcus Crassus, the quartermaster-general, whose winter quarters were twenty-five miles away from him; he bade the legion start at midnight and come speedily to him. Crassus marched out on receipt of the message. Another envoy was sent to Gaius Fabius, the lieutenant-general, bidding him bring his legion into the borders of the Atrebatians, through which Caesar knew he himself would have to march. He wrote instructions to Labienus to come with his legion as far as the borders of the Nervii, if he could so do without damage to the public service. For the rest of the army he did not think he ought to wait, because it was somewhat too far away; he assembled about four hundred horse from the nearest cantonments.

[47] 1 Hora circiter tertia ab antecursoribus de Crassi adventu certior factus eo die milia passuum XX procedit. 2 Crassum Samarobrivae

praeficit legionemque attribuit, quod ibi impedimenta exercitus, obsides civitatum, litteras publicas frumentumque omne quod eo tolerandae hiemis causa devexerat relinquebat. 3 Fabius, ut imperatum erat, non ita multum moratus in itinere cum legione occurrit. 4 Labienus interitu Sabini et caede cohortium cognita, cum omnes ad eum Treverorum copiae venissent, veritus, si ex hibernis fugae similem profectionem fecisset, ut hostium impetum sustinere posset, praesertim quos recenti victoria efferri sciret, litteras Caesari remittit, quanto cum periculo legionem ex hibernis educturus esset; rem gestam in Eburonibus perscribit; docet omnes equitatus peditatusque copias Treverorum tria milia passuum longe ab suis castris consedissee.

[47] About the third hour the advanced parties informed him of the approach of Crassus, and he moved forward twenty miles that day. He put Crassus in charge of Samarobriva, and assigned him a legion, because he purposed to leave there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, the public documents, and all the corn which he had brought in thither to last through the winter. Fabius and his legion, as ordered, after a brief delay met him on the march. Labienus learnt of the death of Sabinus and the slaughter of the cohorts; but as all the forces of the Treveri were come against him he feared that, if he started to march from his cantonments with the appearance of flight, he would not be able to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, especially as he knew them to be elated by the recent victory. He accordingly sent back a despatch to Caesar explaining the greatness of the danger if he were to bring the legion out of cantonments. He wrote in detail of the operation in the territory of the Eburones, and he informed him that all the horsemen and footmen of the Treveri had stationed themselves three miles from his

own camp.

[48] 1 Caesar consilio eius probato, etsi opinione trium legionum deiectus ad duas redierat, tamen unum communis salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat. Venit magnis itineribus in Nerviorum fines. 2 Ibi ex captivis cognoscit, quae apud Ciceronem gerantur, quantoque in periculo res sit. 3 Tum cuidam ex equitibus Gallis magnis praemiis persuadet uti ad Ciceronem epistolam deferat. 4 Hanc Graecis conscriptam litteris mittit, ne intercepta epistola nostra ab hostibus consilia cognoscantur. 5 Si adire non possit, monet ut tragulam cum epistola ad amentum deligata intra munitionem castrorum abiciat. 6 In litteris scribit se cum legionibus profectum celeriter adfore; hortatur ut pristinam virtutem retineat. 7 Gallus periculum veritus, ut erat praeceptum, tragulam mittit. 8 Haec casu ad turrinam adhaesit neque ab nostris biduo animadversa tertio die a quodam milite conspicitur, dempta ad Ciceronem defertur. 9 Ille perlectam in conventu militum recitat maximaque omnes laetitia adficit. 10 Tum fumi incendiorum procul videbantur; quae res omnem dubitationem adventus legionum expulit.

[48] Caesar approved his conclusion, although he was thereby disappointed in his expectation of obtaining three legions, and reduced to two; none the less, he still regarded speed as the only means to the general safety, and proceeded by forced marches into the borders of the Nervii. There he learnt from prisoners what was taking place at Cicero's station, and how dangerous was his case. Then he persuaded one of the Gallic troopers with great rewards to deliver a letter to Cicero. The letter he sent written in Greek characters, lest by intercepting it the enemy might get to know of our designs. The messenger was instructed, if he could not approach, to

hurl a spear, with the letter fastened to the thong, inside the entrenchment of the camp. In the despatch he wrote that he had started with the legions and would speedily be with him, and he exhorted Cicero to maintain his old courage. Fearing danger, the Gaul discharged the spear, as he had been instructed. By chance it stuck fast in the tower, and for two days was not noticed by our troops; on the third day it was sighted by a soldier, taken down, and delivered to Cicero. He read it through, and then recited it at a parade of the troops, bringing the greatest rejoicing to all. Soon the smoke of the fires was to be seen in the distance, and this banished all doubt about the arrival of the legions.

[49] 1 Galli re cognita per exploratores obsidionem relinquunt, ad Caesarem omnibus copiis contendunt. Hae erant armata circiter milia LX. 2 Cicero data facultate Gallum ab eodem Verticone, quem supra demonstravimus, repetit, qui litteras ad Caesarem deferat; hunc admonet, iter caute diligenterque faciat: 3 perscribit in litteris hostes ab se discessisse omnemque ad eum multitudinem convertisse. 4 Quibus litteris circiter media nocte Caesar adlatis suos facit certiores eosque ad dimicandum animo confirmat. 5 Postero die luce prima movet castra et circiter milia passuum quattuor progressus trans vallem et rivum multitudinem hostium conspicatur. 6 Erat magni periculi res tantulis copiis iniquo loco dimicare; tum, quoniam obsidione liberatum Ciceronem sciebat, aequo animo remittendum de celeritate existimabat: 7 consedit et quam aequissimo loco potest castra communit atque haec, etsi erant exigua per se vix hominum milium septem praesertim nullis cum impedimentis, tamen angustiis viarum quam maxime potest contrahit, eo consilio, ut in summam contemptionem hostibus veniat. 8 Interim speculatoribus in omnes partes dimissis explorat quo commodissime itinere vallem transire

possit.

[49] The Gauls were informed of it by their scouts, and, relinquishing the blockade, they pressed on to meet Caesar with all their forces. These amounted to some sixty thousand men under arms. When a chance offered, Cicero again asked Vertico, whom we mentioned above, for a Gaul to deliver a despatch to Caesar. He warned the man to make his way cautiously and carefully. He wrote explicitly in the despatch that the enemy had departed from him and that the whole host had turned round to meet Caesar. The despatch was brought in about midnight; Caesar informed his troops thereof, and encouraged them for the fight. At dawn next day he struck camp, and, having advanced about four miles, he caught sight of the enemy's host across a valley and a stream. It was a very dangerous thing for so slender a force to fight on unfavourable ground; further, as he knew that Cicero was freed from blockade, he was without anxiety, and thought that he should abate his speed. He halted, therefore, and proceeded to entrench his camp in the most favourable position to be found; and small as was the camp itself, as it was for scarce seven thousand men, and those, too, without baggage, he nevertheless compressed it by narrowing the streets as much as possible, with the object of incurring the utmost contempt on the part of the enemy. Meanwhile, by scouts despatched in all directions, he sought to find the most convenient route by which to cross the valley.

[50] 1 Eo die parvulis equestribus proeliis ad aquam factis utrique sese suo loco continent: 2 Galli, quod ampliores copias, 3 quae nondum convenerant, expectabant; Caesar, si forte timoris simulatione hostes in suum locum elicere posset, 4 ut citra vallem pro castris proelio contenderet, si id efficere non posset, ut exploratis itineribus

minore cum periculo vallem rivumque transiret. Prima luce hostium equitatus ad castra accedit proeliumque cum nostris equitibus committit. 5 Caesar consulto equites cedere seque in castra recipere iubet, simul ex omnibus partibus castra altiore vallo muniri portasque obstrui atque in his administrandis rebus quam maxime concursari et cum simulatione agi timoris iubet.

[50] On that day petty encounters of cavalry took place by the water, but both armies kept to their own ground — the Gauls because they were waiting for larger forces which had not yet joined them; Caesar, to see if by pretending fear he could draw the enemy on to his own ground, and fight on this side of the valley, in front of the camp, or, if he might not do so, that, after reconnaissance of the routes, he might cross valley and stream with less danger. At break of day the enemy's horsemen came up to the camp and engaged our own cavalry. Caesar purposely ordered the cavalry to give way and to retire into camp; at the same time he ordered the camp to be fortified with a higher rampart on all sides, the gates to be barricaded, and as much confusion and pretence of fear as possible to be shown in the execution of these arrangements.

[51] 1 Quibus omnibus rebus hostes invitati copias traducunt aciemque iniquo loco constituunt, 2 nostris vero etiam de vallo deductis propius accedunt et tela intra munitionem ex omnibus partibus coniciunt praeconibusque circummissis pronuntiari iubent, seu quis Gallus seu Romanus velit ante horam tertiam ad se transire, sine periculo licere; post id tempus non fore potestatem: 3 ac sic nostros contempserunt, ut obstructis in speciem portis singulis ordinibus caespitum, quod ea non posse introrumpere videbantur, alii vallum manu scindere, alii fossas complere inciperent. 4 Tum Caesar

omnibus portis eruptione facta equitatuque emissio celeriter hostes in fugam dat, sic uti omnino pugnandi causa resisteret nemo, magnumque ex eis numerum occidit atque omnes armis exuit.

[51] All these proceedings tempted the enemy to lead their forces across and to form line on unfavourable ground; and then, as our troops had been withdrawn even from the rampart, they approached nearer and discharged their missiles from all sides into the entrenchment. Next they sent heralds round about, and ordered proclamation to be made that if anyone, Gaul or Roman, would go over to their side before the third hour, he was at liberty to do so without danger; after that time there would be no chance. And, indeed, they held our troops in such contempt that, thinking they could not break in by the gates, which had been barricaded for show with single rows of sods, some of them set to work to tear down the rampart with their hands, others to fill in the trenches. Then Caesar caused a sally to be made from all the gates, and sending out the cavalry put the enemy speedily to flight, so effectually that never a man stood to fight. He slew a great number of them and stripped all of their arms.

[52] 1 Longius prosequi veritus, quod silvae paludesque intercedebant neque etiam parvulo detrimento illorum locum relinqui videbat, omnibus suis incolumibus copiis eodem die ad Ciceronem pervenit. 2 Institutas turres, testudines munitionesque hostium admiratur; legione producta cognoscit non decimum quemque esse reliquum militem sine vulnere: 3 ex his omnibus iudicat rebus, quanto cum periculo et quanta cum virtute res sint administratae. 4 Ciceronem pro eius merito legionemque collaudat; centuriones singillatim tribunosque militum appellat, quorum egregiam fuisse virtutem

testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat. De casu Sabini et Cottae certius ex captivis cognoscit. 5 Postero die contione habita rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat: 6 quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetatio neque ipsis longior dolor relinquitur.

[52] He feared to pursue very far, because there were woods and marshes in the way, and, as he saw, there was no chance now of doing even slight damage to the enemy; therefore, with his whole force unhurt, he joined Cicero the same day. He marvelled at the towers erected, the shelters, the fortifications of the enemy. He paraded the legion and found that not one-tenth of the soldiers were left unwounded. From all these evidences he could judge with what danger and with what courage the operations had been carried out. He warmly praised Cicero according to his desert, and the legion likewise; he addressed severally the centurions and tribunes, whose valour, on the testimony of Cicero, he knew to have been exceptional. As touching the disaster of Sabinus and Cotta, he learnt more particularly from prisoners. The next day he held a parade and set forth all that had occurred, cheering and encouraging the troops, and admonishing them to bear with the greater equanimity the loss incurred through the fault and foolhardiness of a general, inasmuch as by the goodness of the immortal gods and by their own valour the misfortune had been made good, leaving to the enemy no lasting joy, to themselves no long-enduring grief.

[53] 1 Interim ad Labienum per Remos incredibili celeritate de victoria Caesaris fama perfertur, ut, cum ab hibernis Ciceronis milia

passuum abesset circiter LX, eoque post horam nonam diei Caesar pervenisset, ante mediam noctem ad portas castrorum clamor oreretur, quo clamore significatio victoriae gratulatioque ab Remis Labieno fieret. 2 Hac fama ad Treveros perlata Indutiomarus, qui postero die castra Labieni oppugnare decreverat, noctu profugit copiasque omnes in Treveros reducit. 3 Caesar Fabium cum sua legione remittit in hiberna, ipse cum tribus legionibus circum Samarobrivam trinis hibernis hiemare constituit et, quod tanti motus Galliae exstiterant, totam hiemem ipse ad exercitum manere decrevit. 4 Nam illo incommodo de Sabini morte perlato omnes fere Galliae civitates de bello consultabant, nuntios legationesque in omnes partes dimittebant et quid reliqui consili caperent atque unde initium belli fieret explorabant nocturnaque in locis desertis concilia habebant. 5 Neque ullum fere totius hiemis tempus sine sollicitudine Caesaris intercessit, quin aliquem de consiliis ac motu Gallorum nuntium acciperet. 6 In his ab Lucio Roscio, quem legioni tertiae decimae praefecerat, certior factus est magnas Gallorum copias earum civitatum, quae Armoricae appellantur, oppugnandi sui causa convenisse 7 neque longius milia passuum octo ab hibernis suis afuisse, sed nuntio allato de victoria Caesaris discessisse, adeo ut fugae similis discessus videretur.

[53] Meanwhile report of Caesar's victory was brought to Labienus with incredible speed through the agency of the Remi. In fact, though Labienus was about sixty miles away from Cicero's cantonments, and Caesar had not reached the latter until after the ninth hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of Labienus' camp, to signify the victory and to express the congratulations of the Remi to Labienus. When the same report was brought to the Treveri, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack Labienus' camp next day, fled away in the

night and withdrew all his forces into the country of the Treveri. Caesar sent Fabius with his legion back into cantonments, and determined to winter himself with three legions in three separate stations around Samarobriva; and in view of the great disturbances which had arisen in Gaul, he decided to remain with the army in person throughout the winter. For when news was brought of Sabinus' great disaster almost all the states of Gaul began to think of war, despatching messengers and deputations in all directions to find out what the others purposed and where the war should start, and holding nightly councils in solitary places. And scarcely a moment the whole winter through passed without anxiety for Caesar, without the receipt of some message concerning the projected rising of the Gauls. Among other news he was informed by Lucius Roscius, whom he had put in command of the Thirteenth Legion, that a large force of Gauls, from the states called Armoric, had assembled to attack him and had stationed themselves not farther than eight miles from his cantonments; but that upon receiving report of Caesar's victory they had departed so hastily that their departure seemed like unto flight.

[54] 1 At Caesar principibus cuiusque civitatis ad se evocatis alias territando, cum se scire quae fierent denuntiaret, alias cohortando magnam partem Galliae in officio tenuit. 2 Tamen Senones, quae est civitas in primis firma et magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis, Cavarinum, quem Caesar apud eos regem constituerat, cuius frater Moritasgus adventu in Galliam Caesaris cuiusque maiores regnum obtinuerant, interficere publico consilio conati, cum ille praesensisset ac profugisset, usque ad fines insecuti 3 regno domoque expulerunt et, missis ad Caesarem satisfaciendi causa legatis, cum is omnem ad se senatum venire iussisset, dicto audientes non fuerunt. 4 Tantum

apud homines barbaros valuit esse aliquos repertos principes inferendi belli tantamque omnibus voluntatum commutationem attulit, ut praeter Aeduos et Remos, quos praecipuo semper honore Caesar habuit, alteros pro vetere ac perpetua erga populum Romanum fide, alteros pro recentibus Gallici belli officiis, nulla fere civitas fuerit non suspecta nobis. 5 Idque adeo haud scio mirandumne sit, cum compluribus aliis de causis, tum maxime quod ei, qui virtute belli omnibus gentibus praeferebantur, tantum se eius opinionis deperdidisse ut a populo Romano imperia perferrent gravissime dolebant.

[54] Nevertheless, Caesar summoned to his quarters the chief men of each state; and by frightening some with the announcement that he knew what was afoot, and by encouraging others, he kept a great part of Gaul in submission. The Senones, however, a state of prominent power and great authority among the Gauls, took counsel together and attempted to slay Cavarinus, whom Caesar had appointed king among them, and whose brother Moritasgus had held the kingship at the time of Caesar's arrival in Gaul, and his ancestors before him. Cavarinus got wind of their design and escaped. They pursued him even to the boundaries and drove him out of kingship and home, and then sent deputies to Caesar to make excuse; but they did not obey his command that all their senate should come to him. Indeed, the fact that they had found men to take the lead in a war of offence had so much weight among the natives, and brought about such a universal change of feeling, that, save the Aedui and the Remi, whom Caesar always held in especial honour — the former for their old-established and unbroken loyalty towards Rome, the latter for their recent services in the Gallic war — scarcely a single state was free from suspicion on our part. And I am inclined to think that this

is not so very remarkable, chiefly, among several other reasons, because this nation, which at one time surpassed all others in military courage, was grievously indignant to have lost so much of that estimation as to submit to the sovereignty of the Roman people.

[55] 1 Treveri vero atque Indutiomarus totius hiemis nullum tempus intermiserunt, quin trans Rhenum legatos mitterent, civitates sollicitarent, pecunias pollicerentur, magna parte exercitus nostri interfecta multo minorem superesse dicerent partem. 2 Neque tamen ulli civitati Germanorum persuaderi potuit, ut Rhenum transiret, cum se bis expertos dicerent, Ariovisti bello et Tencterorum transitu: non esse amplius fortunam temptaturos. Hac spe lapsus Indutiomarus nihilo minus copias cogere, 3 exercere, a finitimis equos parare, exules damnatosque tota Gallia magnis praemiis ad se allicere coepit. 4 Ac tantam sibi iam his rebus in Gallia auctoritatem comparaverat ut undique ad eum legationes concurrerent, gratiam atque amicitiam publice privatimque peterent.

[55] So the Treveri and Indutiomarus, without intermission throughout the course of the winter, sent deputies across the Rhine, inviting the states, promising sums of money, and affirming that, as a great part of our army had been slain, a much smaller part was left. But still none of the German states could be persuaded to cross the Rhine: they had tried it twice, they said, in the war of Ariovistus and the passage of the Tencteri, and they would not tempt fortune further. Though disappointed in this hope, Indutiomarus none the less set to work to raise forces, to train them, to procure horses from his neighbours, and to attract to his standard by great rewards exiles and condemned persons throughout Gaul. And, indeed, by such means, he had already secured himself so great an authority in Gaul that

deputations hastened to him from every direction, seeking favour and friendship for their states or for themselves.

[56] 1 Ubi intellexit ultro ad se veniri, altera ex parte Senones Carnutesque conscientia facinoris instigari, altera Nervios Aduatucosque bellum Romanis parare, neque sibi voluntariorum copias defore, si ex finibus suis progredi coepisset, armatum concilium indicit. Hoc more Gallorum est initium belli, 2 quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consuerunt; qui ex eis novissimus convenit, in conspectu multitudinis omnibus cruciatibus affectus necatur. 3 In eo concilio Cingetorigem, alterius principem factionis, generum suum, quem supra demonstravimus Caesaris secutum fidem ab eo non discessisse, hostem iudicat bonaque eius publicat. 4 His rebus confectis, in concilio pronuntiat arcessitum se a Senonibus et Carnutibus aliisque compluribus Galliae civitatibus; 5 huc iturum per fines Remorum eorumque agros populaturum ac, priusquam id faciat, castra Labieni oppugnaturum. Quae fieri velit praecipit.

[56] When he perceived that they were coming to him of their own motion, that on the one hand the Senones and Carnutes were spurred on by the sense of guilt, on the other the Nervii and the Aduatuci were preparing for war against the Romans, and that he would not lack forces of volunteers if he began to advance from out his own borders, he proclaimed an armed convention. This in the practice of the Gauls marks the beginning of a war; and by a general law all grown men are accustomed to assemble at it in arms, while the one who comes last to the assembly is put to death with every kind of torture in sight of the host. At the convention Indutiomarus declared Cingetorix an enemy and confiscated his goods. Cingetorix was his

son-in-law, the chief man of the other party, who, as set forth above, had sought the protection of Caesar and had not deserted him. This business despatched, Indutiomarus declared in the convention that he had been summoned by the Senones, the Carnutes, and several other Gallic states, and that he proposed to march to them through the borders of the Remi, laying waste their lands, and before so doing to attack the camp of Labienus. He gave instructions as to what he would have done.

[57] 1 Labienus, cum et loci natura et manu munitissumis castris sese teneret, de suo ac legionis periculo nihil timebat; ne quam occasionem rei bene gerendae dimitteret, cogitabat. 2 Itaque a Cingetorige atque eius propinquis oratione Indutiomari cognita, quam in concilio habuerat, nuntios mittit ad finitimas civitates equitesque undique evocat: his certum diem conveniendi dicit. 3 Interim prope cotidie cum omni equitatu Indutiomarus sub castris eius vagabatur, alias ut situm castrorum cognosceret, alias colloquendi aut territandi causa: equites plerumque omnes tela intra vallum coniciebant. 4 Labienus suos intra munitionem continebat timorisque opinionem, quibuscumque poterat rebus, augebat.

[57] Labienus, secure as he was in a camp well fortified by natural position and by handiwork, had no apprehension of danger to himself and his legion; his purpose was to lose no chance of a successful operation. And so, having learnt from Cingetorix and his kinsfolk the speech which Indutiomarus had made in the convention, he sent messengers to the neighbouring states and called up cavalry from all quarters, appointing them a certain day for assembly. Meanwhile, almost every day, Indutiomarus, with all his horsemen, would range close to his camp, sometimes to reconnoitre the situation thereof,

sometimes to parley or to intimidate; and generally all the horsemen would discharge missiles within the rampart. Labienus kept his troops within the entrenchment, and sought by all means in his power to enhance the impression that he was afraid.

[58] 1 Cum maiore in dies contemptione Indutiomarus ad castra accederet, nocte una intromissis equitibus omnium finitimarum civitatum quos arcessendos curaverat, tanta diligentia omnes suos custodiis intra castra continuit, ut nulla ratione ea res enuntiari aut ad Treveros perferri posset. 2 Interim ex consuetudine cotidiana Indutiomarus ad castra accedit atque ibi magnam partem diei consumit; equites tela coniciunt et magna cum contumelia verborum nostros ad pugnam evocant. 3 Nullo ab nostris dato responso, ubi visum est, sub vesperum dispersi ac dissipati discedunt. 4 Subito Labienus duabus portis omnem equitatum emittit; praecipit atque interdicat, proterritis hostibus atque in fugam coniectis (quod fore, sicut accidit, videbat) unum omnes peterent Indutiomarus, neu quis quem prius vulneret, quam illum interfectum viderit, quod mora reliquorum spatium nactum illum effugere nolebat; magna proponit eis qui occiderint praemia; 4 mittit cohortes equitibus subsidio. 6 Comprobat hominis consilium fortuna, et cum unum omnes peterent, in ipso fluminis vado deprehensus Indutiomarus interficitur, caputque eius refertur in castra: redeuntes equites quos possunt consecantur atque occidunt. 7 Hac re cognita omnes Eburonum et Nerviorum quae convenerant copiae discedunt, pauloque habuit post id factum Caesar quietiorem Galliam.

[58] Indutiomarus continued to come up to the camp with daily increasing contempt; but in one night Labienus brought inside the cavalry of all the neighbouring states, which he had caused to be

summoned, and by means of guards he kept all his troops so carefully inside camp that the fact could by no means be disclosed or reported to the Treveri. Meanwhile, in accordance with his daily custom, Indutiomarus came up to the camp and spent there a great part of the day; his horsemen discharged missiles, and with great insolence of language called our troops out to fight. No reply was given by our men; and towards evening, when it seemed good, the Gauls began to depart, dispersing in disorder. Suddenly from two gates Labienus launched forth all his cavalry; he straitly charged them that when they had once frightened the enemy and sent them flying (foreseeing exactly what would, and did, happen), they should all make for Indutiomarus alone, and no one was to wound any until he saw the chieftain slain, as Labienus did not wish that delay over the rest might give him time to escape. He offered great rewards to those who should kill him, and sent up cohorts to support the horse. The event approved his plan, and as all the force were making for one man they caught Indutiomarus just in the ford of the river, slew him, and brought his head back to camp; during their return the cavalry chased and killed all they could. On learning of this all the forces of the Eburones and Nervii which had assembled departed, and thereafter Caesar found Gaul somewhat more tranquil.

BOOK VI

[1] 1 Multis de causis Caesar maiorem Galliae motum exspectans per Marcum Silanum, Gaium Antistium Reginum, Titum Sextium legatos dilectum habere instituit; 2 simul ab Gnaeo Pompeio proconsule petit, quoniam ipse ad urbem cum imperio rei publicae causa remaneret, quos ex Cisalpina Gallia consulis sacramento rogavisset, 3 ad signa convenire et ad se proficisci iuberet, magni interesse etiam in reliquum tempus ad opinionem Galliae existimans tantas videri Italiae facultates ut, si quid esset in bello detrimenti acceptum, non modo id brevi tempore sarciri, sed etiam maioribus augeri copiis posset. 4 Quod cum Pompeius et rei publicae et amicitiae tribuisset, celeriter confecto per suos dilectu tribus ante exactam hiemem et constitutis et adductis legionibus duplicatoque earum cohortium numero, quas cum Quinto Titurio amiserat, et celeritate et copiis docuit, quid populi Romani disciplina atque opes possent.

[1] For many reasons Caesar anticipated a more serious rising in Gaul; and he decided to raise a levy through the agency of Marcus Silanus, Gaius Antistius Reginus, and Titus Sextius, lieutenant-generals. At the same time he made request of Gnaeus Pompeius, now proconsul, that as he was remaining near Rome for the service of the state while retaining his military authority, he would order the recruits from Cisalpine Gaul sworn in by him as consul to join the colours and start for Caesar's headquarters. He conceived it to be of great importance, for the future as well as for the present, to create an impression in Gaul that the resources of Italy were extensive enough not only to repair in a short time any damage incurred in the war, but even to increase the establishment. Pompey made the concession to

public service and private friendship, and as Caesar speedily completed the levy through his staff officers, before the winter was over three legions had been formed and brought to headquarters. Having thereby doubled the number of the cohorts lost with Quintus Titurius, he showed the Gauls, at once by his rapidity and by the strength of his reinforcements, what the system and resources of the Roman people could accomplish.

[2] 1 Interfecto Indutiomaro, ut docuimus, ad eius propinquos a Treveris imperium defertur. Illi finitimos Germanos sollicitare et pecuniam polliceri non desistunt. Cum ab proximis impetrare non possent, 2 ulteriores temptant. Inventis nonnullis civitatibus iureiurando inter se confirmant obsidibusque de pecunia cavent: Amborigem sibi societate et foedere adiungunt. 3 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, cum undique bellum parari videret, Nervios, Aduatucos ac Menapios adiunctis Cisirhenanis omnibus Germanis esse in armis, Senones ad imperatum non venire et cum Carnutibus finitimisque civitatibus consilia communicare, a Treveris Germanos crebris legationibus sollicitari, maturius sibi de bello cogitandum putavit.

[2] After Indutiomarus was slain, as we have set forth, the Treveri tendered the chief command to his kindred, who were continuing to tempt the neighbouring Germans and to promise money. As they could not prevail on their immediate neighbours they made trial of the more distant; and, having found some states to their mind, they took an oath to confirm their engagement, and hostages to secure the money; and they associated Ambiorix with themselves by a league and covenant. Caesar had report of this, and saw preparations for war on every hand: the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, and all the

Germans on this side of the Rhine with them, were in arms; the Senones came not at his command, as they were conspiring with the Carnutes and adjacent states; the Germans were being tempted by frequent deputations of the Treveri. He felt, therefore, that he must plan an earlier campaign than usual.

[3] 1 Itaque nondum hieme confecta proximis quattuor coactis legionibus de improvise in fines Nerviorum contendit et, 2 priusquam illi aut convenire aut profugere possent, magno pecoris atque hominum numero capto atque ea praeda militibus concessa vastisque agris in deditionem venire atque obsides sibi dare coegit. 3 Eo celeriter confecto negotio rursus in hiberna legiones reduxit. 4 Concilio Galliae primo vere, ut instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent, initium belli ac defectionis hoc esse arbitratus, ut omnia postponere videretur, concilium Lutetiam Parisiorum transfert. 5 Confines erant hi Senonibus civitatemque patrum memoria coniunxerant, sed ab hoc consilio afuisse existimabantur. 6 Hac re pro suggestu pronuntiata eodem die cum legionibus in Senones proficiscitur magnisque itineribus eo pervenit.

[3] Accordingly, before the winter was ended, he concentrated the four nearest legions; he made a sudden and rapid advance into the borders of the Nervii, and before they could assemble or escape he had captured a great number of cattle and human beings; and giving up such booty to the troops, and laying waste the fields, he compelled the natives to come in and surrender and to give him hostages. That business speedily despatched, he led the legions back into the cantonments. At the beginning of spring a convention of Gaul was proclaimed, according to his practice. The arrival of all except the

Senones, Carnutes, and Treveri made him think this exception the beginning of an armed rebellion; and to give the impression that he counted all else of secondary importance, he removed the convention to Lutetia, a town of the Parisii. (These were next neighbours to the Senones, and in the previous generation had formed one state with them; but it was believed that they had held aloof from the present design.) This decision having been proclaimed from the tribunal, on the same day he set off with the legions against the Senones, and reached their territory by forced marches.

[4] 1 Cognito eius adventu Acco, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, iubet in oppida multitudinem convenire. Conantibus, priusquam id effici posset, adesse Romanos nuntiatur. 2 Necessario sententia desistunt legatosque deprecandi causa ad Caesarem mittunt: adeunt per Aeduos, quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas. 3 Libenter Caesar petentibus Aeduis dat veniam excusationemque accipit, quod aestivum tempus instantis belli, non quaestionis esse arbitrabatur. 4 Obsidibus imperatis centum hos Aeduis custodiendos tradit. 5 Eodem Carnutes legatos obsidesque mittunt usi deprecatoribus Renis, quorum erant in clientela: eadem ferunt responsa. 6 Peragit concilium Caesar equitesque imperat civitatibus.

[4] Upon report of his coming, Acco, who had been the leader in the plot aforesaid, commanded the population to assemble in their strongholds. They tried to do so; but before it could be brought to pass news came that the Romans were at hand. Of necessity they abandoned the project, and sent deputies to Caesar to entreat his clemency, approaching him through the Aedui, the protectors of their state from ancient times. Caesar willingly granted pardon and accepted their plea at the instance of the Aedui; for he held that

summer was the time for the coming war, not for judicial inquiry. He requisitioned one hundred hostages, and delivered the same to the Aedui for custody. The Carnutes also sent deputies and hostages to his camp, employing the Remi, whose vassals they were, to entreat for them, and received the same replies. Caesar closed the convention, and made requisition of cavalry upon the states.

[5] 1 Hac parte Galliae pacata totus et mente et animo in bellum Treverorum et Ambiorigis insistit. 2 Cavarinum cum equitatu Senonum secum proficisci iubet, ne quis aut ex huius iracundia aut ex eo, quod meruerat, odio civitatis motus existat. 3 His rebus constitutis, quod pro explorato habebat Amborigem proelio non esse concertaturum, reliqua eius consilia animo circumspiciebat. 4 Erant Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silisque muniti, qui uni ex Gallia de pace ad Caesarem legatos numquam miserant. Cum his esse hospitium Ambiorigi sciebat; item per Treveros venisse Germanis in amicitiam cognoverat. 5 Haec prius illi detrahenda auxilia existimabat quam ipsum bello lacesseret, ne desperata salute aut se in Menapios abderet aut cum Transrhenanis congredi cogeretur. 6 Hoc inito consilio totius exercitus impedimenta ad Labienum in Treveros mittit duasque legiones ad eum proficisci iubet; ipse cum legionibus expeditis quinque in Menapios profiscitur. 7 Illi nulla coacta manu loci praesidio freti in silvas paludesque confugiunt suaque eodem conferunt.

[5] So this part of Gaul was brought to peace, and he applied himself with all his heart and soul to the war with the Treveri and Ambiorix. He commanded Cavarinus and the horsemen of the Senones to move with him, so as to prevent the occurrence of any commotion in the state as the result of his hot temper or of the enmity which he had

earned. Then, having so arranged these matters, since he was convinced that Ambiorix would not fight a decisive action, he began to examine what other courses were left him. There were the Menapii, near the borders of the Eburones, defended by continuous marshes and forests; and they alone in Gaul had never sent deputies to Caesar to treat of peace. He knew that Ambiorix had a formal friendship with them; he had learnt also that through the Treveri they had made friends with the Germans. He considered that these supports should be withdrawn from Ambiorix before he provoked him to hostilities; otherwise, in despair of deliverance, he might hide among the Menapii, or be obliged to make common cause with the tribes beyond the Rhine. Adopting this plan, then, he despatched the baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the territory of the Treveri, and commanded two legions to begin the march to him, while he himself with five legions in light order began to march against the Menapii. They had raised no force, but, relying only on the protection of the country, fled all into the forests and marshes, and gathered their stuff there also.

[6] 1 Caesar partitis copiis cum Gaio Fabio legato et Marco Crasso quaestore celeriterque effectis pontibus adit tripertito, aedificia vicosque incendit, magno pecoris atque hominum numero potitur. 2 Quibus rebus coacti Menapii legatos ad eum pacis petendae causa mittunt. 3 Ille obsidibus acceptis hostium se habiturum numero confirmat, si aut Amborigem aut eius legatos finibus suis receperissent. His confirmatis rebus Commium Atrebatem cum equitatu custodis loco in Menapiis relinquit; ipse in Treveros proficiscitur.

[6] Caesar divided his forces with Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general,

and Marcus Crassus, quartermaster-general; and after causeways had been speedily constructed he approached in three divisions, setting fire to farm-buildings and hamlets, and seizing a large number of cattle and human beings. This action obliged the Menapii to send deputies to him to seek for peace. He accepted their hostages, and assured them that he would regard them as enemies if they received either Ambiorix or his deputies within their borders. When these matters had been securely settled Caesar left Commius, of the Atrebates, with cavalry in the country of the Menapii by way of guard, and he himself set off against the Treveri.

[7] 1 Dum haec a Caesare geruntur, Treveri magnis coactis peditatus equitatusque copiis Labienum cum una legione, quae in eorum finibus hiemaverat, adoriri parabant, 2 iamque ab eo non longius bidui via aberant, cum duas venisse legiones missu Caesaris cognoscunt. 3 Positis castris a milibus passuum XV auxilia Germanorum exspectare constituunt. 4 Labienus hostium cognito consilio sperans temeritate eorum fore aliquam dimicandi facultatem praesidio quinque cohortium impedimentis relicto cum viginti quinque cohortibus magnoque equitatu contra hostem proficiscitur et mille passuum intermisso spatio castra communit. 5 Erat inter Labienum atque hostem difficili transitu flumen ripisque praeruptis. Hoc neque ipse transire habebat in animo neque hostes transituros existimabat. 6 Augebatur auxiliorum cotidie spes. Loquitur in concilio palam, quoniam Germani appropinquare dicantur, sese suas exercitusque fortunas in dubium non devocaturum et postero die prima luce castra moturum. Celeriter haec ad hostes deferuntur, 7 ut ex magno Gallorum equitum numero nonnullos Gallicis rebus favere natura cogeat. 8 Labienus noctu tribunis militum primisque ordinibus convocatis, quid sui sit consili proponit et, quo facilius

hostibus timoris det suspicionem, maiore strepitu et tumultu, quam populi Romani fert consuetudo castra moveri iubet. His rebus fugae similem profectionem effecit. 9 Haec quoque per exploratores ante lucem in tanta propinquitate castrorum ad hostes deferuntur.

[7] While Caesar was thus engaged, the Treveri collected a large force of infantry and cavalry, and prepared to attack Labienus and the one legion which had wintered within their borders. And by now they were no farther from him than a two days' march, when they learnt that two legions were come, as despatched by Caesar. So they pitched their camp at a distance of fifteen miles, and determined to await their German auxiliaries. Labienus learnt the design of the enemy, and in the hope that their recklessness would afford some chance of engaging them, he left a guard of five cohorts for the baggage, and set off against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large detachment of cavalry. He entrenched a camp at an interval of one mile. Between Labienus and the enemy was a steep-banked river, difficult to cross. He had no intention of crossing this himself, nor did he suppose that the enemy would cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was increasing daily. Labienus declared openly in a council of war that, as the Germans were said to be approaching, he would not risk his own and his army's fortunes, and that he would strike camp at dawn next day. This information was speedily carried to the enemy, for of a large number of Gallic horsemen natural feeling would compel some, as Gauls, to favour the Gallic cause. At nightfall Labienus summoned the military tribunes and the senior centurions, and propounded his plan; and, the more easily to give the enemy a suspicion that he was afraid, he ordered the camp to be struck with greater noise and disorder than was customary among Romans. By this means he made his departure like a rout. The camps

were so close that this, too, was reported to the enemy by scouts before daybreak.

[8] 1 Vix agmen novissimum extra munitiones processerat, cum Galli cohortati inter se, ne speratam praedam ex manibus dimitterent – longum esse per territis Romanis Germanorum auxilium exspectare, neque suam pati dignitatem ut tantis copiis tam exiguam manum praesertim fugientem atque impeditam adoriri non audeant – flumen transire et iniquo loco committere proelium non dubitant. 2 Quae fore suspicatus Labienus, ut omnes citra flumen eliceret, eadem usus simulatione itineris placide progrediebatur. 3 Tum praemissis paulum impedimentis atque in tumulto quodam collocatis “Habetis,” inquit, “milites, quam petistis facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis: 4 praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate.” 5 Simul signa ad hostem converti aciemque dirigi iubet, et paucis turmis praesidio ad impedimenta dimissis reliquos equites ad latera disponit. 6 Celeriter nostri clamore sublato pila in hostes immittunt. Illi, ubi praeter spem quos fugere credebant infestis signis ad se ire viderunt, impetum modo ferre non potuerunt ac primo concursu in fugam coniecti proximas silvas petierunt. 7 Quos Labienus equitatu consecutus, magno numero interfecto, compluribus captis, paucis post diebus civitatem recepit. Nam Germani qui auxilio veniebant percepta Treverorum fuga sese domum receperunt. 8 Cum his propinqui Indutiomari, qui defectionis auctores fuerant, comitati eos ex civitate excesserunt. Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum.

[8] The rear of the column had scarcely moved clear of the

entrenchment when the Gauls with mutual exhortations not to let slip from their grasp the booty for which they hoped — it would be tedious, they said, to wait for German assistance when the Romans were terror-stricken; and it was intolerable to their honour not to venture an attack with so large a force upon so puny a company, especially in the moment of its retreat and embarrassment — proceeded to cross the river without hesitation and to engage on unfavourable ground. Labienus had surmised that this would happen, and to entice them all to his side of the river he pretended to march as before, and calmly continued his advance. He sent the baggage a little forward and packed it on some rising ground. Then said he: “Soldiers, you have the catch you have sought; you hold the enemy on ground that hampers and handicaps them: display under our command the same valour that you have often displayed to the commander-in-chief, and think that he is present and beholds this action with his own eyes.” At the same moment he commanded the troops to wheel towards the enemy and deploy into line, and, detaching a few troops of cavalry to act as baggage-guard, he disposed the rest of the cavalry on the flanks. Speedily our troops raised a shout and hurled their pikes at the enemy. When these unexpectedly saw men whom they believed to be in retreat advancing against them in attack formation, they could not even sustain the assault, and at the first charge they were put to rout and sought the nearest woods. Labienus chased them with the cavalry, slew a great number, took a good many prisoners, and a few days later received the allegiance of the state. Nor was this surprising, for the Germans who were coming to its assistance returned home when they heard of the rout of the Treveri; and the kinsfolk of Indutiomarus, who had initiated the revolt, followed them out of the

state. The prerogative of chieftaincy was delivered to Cingetorix, who, as we have shown, had remained loyal from the beginning.

[9] 1 Caesar, postquam ex Menapiis in Treveros venit, duabus de causis Rhenum transire constituit; quarum una erat, quod auxilia contra se Treveris miserant, 2 altera, ne ad eos Ambiorix receptum haberet. 3 His constitutis rebus paulum supra eum locum quo ante exercitum traduxerat facere pontem instituit. 4 Nota atque instituta ratione magno militum studio paucis diebus opus efficitur. 5 Firmo in Treveris ad pontem praesidio relicto, ne quis ab his subito motus oreretur, reliquas copias equitatumque traducit. 6 Ubii, qui ante obsides dederant atque in deditionem venerant, purgandi sui causa ad eum legatos mittunt, qui doceant neque auxilia ex sua civitate in Treveros missa neque ab se fidem laesam: 7 petunt atque orant ut sibi parcat, ne communi odio Germanorum innocentes pro nocentibus poenas pendant; si amplius obsidum vellet, dare pollicentur. 8 Cognita Caesar causa reperit ab Suebis auxilia missa esse; Ubiorum satisfactionem accipit, aditus viasque in Suebos perquirat.

[9] After he had passed from the territory of the Menapii to that of the Treveri, Caesar decided for two reasons to cross the Rhine. One reason was that the German tribes had sent auxiliaries to the Treveri against them; the other, to prevent Ambiorix from having a chance of retreating to them. This decision made, he set about to build a bridge a little above the place where he had crossed before with his army. The plan of it was known and definite; and, thanks to the great zeal of the troops, the work was accomplished in a few days. He left a strong guard at the bridge-head in the territory of the Treveri, to prevent the outbreak of any sudden commotion on their part, and led the rest of his forces across with the cavalry. The Ubii had given

hostages before and made their surrender, and now, to clear themselves, they sent deputies to him to inform him that no auxiliaries had been despatched from their state to the territory of the Treveri, and that they had not broken faith. They begged and prayed him to spare them, so that in a general hatred of the Germans the innocent might not be punished for the guilty: if he wished for more hostages, they promised to give them. Caesar heard their case, and ascertained that the auxiliaries had been despatched by the Suebi: he accepted the plea of the Ubii, and began to inquire about lines of advance into the country of the Suebi.

[10] 1 Interim paucis post diebus fit ab Ubiis certior Suebos omnes in unum locum copias cogere atque eis nationibus quae sub eorum sint imperio denuntiare, ut auxilia peditatus equitatusque mittant. 2 His cognitis rebus rem frumentariam providet, castris idoneum locum deligit; Ubiis imperat ut pecora deducant suaeque omnia ex agris in oppida conferant, sperans barbaros atque imperitos homines inopia cibarium adductos ad iniquam pugnandi condicionem posse deduci; 3 mandat, ut crebros exploratores in Suebos mittant quaeque apud eos gerantur cognoscant. 4 Illi imperata faciunt et paucis diebus intermissis referunt: Suebos omnes, posteaquam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint, cum omnibus suis sociorumque copiis, quas coegissent, penitus ad extremos fines se recepisse: 5 silvam esse ibi infinita magnitudine, quae appellatur Bacenis; hanc longe introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro obiectam Cheruscos ab Suebis Suebosque ab Cheruscis iniuriis incursionibusque prohibere: ad eius initium silvae Suebos adventum Romanorum exspectare constituisse.

[10] After a few days' interval he was informed by the Ubii that the

Suebi were collecting all their forces into one place and proclaiming to the tribes under their dominion that they must send auxiliaries of foot and horse. Upon report of this, he made provision for the corn^o-supply and selected a suitable spot for the camp. He commanded the Ubii to bring in their cattle and to collect all their stuff from the fields into the strongholds, hoping that lack of provisions might act upon untrained natives and oblige them to fight at a disadvantage. He instructed them to send a number of scouting parties into the country of the Suebi and to ascertain their movements. The Ubii carried out his commands, and reported after a few days' interval. The Suebi, they said, after more definite accounts of the Roman army came to them, had all withdrawn, with all the forces of their own folk and of their allies which they had collected, to the uttermost parts of their territory. There was, they added, a forest there of immense size, called Bacenis: it extended a long way into the country and interposed as a natural wall to keep the Cherusci from raids and outrages on the part of the Suebi, and the Suebi likewise from the Cherusci. At the edge of the forest the Suebi had determined to await the coming of the Romans.

[11] 1 Quoniam ad hunc locum perventum est, non alienum esse videtur de Galliae Germaniaeque moribus et quo differant hae nationes inter sese proponere. 2 In Gallia non solum in omnibus civitatibus atque in omnibus pagis partibusque, sed paene etiam in singulis domibus factiones sunt, earumque factionum principes sunt 3 qui summam auctoritatem eorum iudicio habere existimantur, quorum ad arbitrium iudiciumque summa omnium rerum consiliorumque redeat. 4 Itaque eius rei causa antiquitus institutum videtur, ne quis ex plebe contra potentiores auxili egeret: suos enim quisque opprimi et circumveniri non patitur, neque, aliter si faciat,

ullam inter suos habet auctoritatem. 5 Haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae: namque omnes civitates in partes divisae sunt duas.

[11] Since I have arrived at this point, it would seem to be not inappropriate to set forth the customs of Gaul and of Germany, and the difference between these nations. In Gaul, not only in every state and every canton and district, but almost in each several household, there are parties; and the leaders of the parties are men who in the judgment of their fellows are deemed to have the highest authority, men to whose decision and judgment the supreme issue of all cases and counsels may be referred. And this seems to have been an ordinance from ancient days, to the end that no man of the people should lack assistance against a more powerful neighbour; for each man refuses to allow his own folk to be oppressed and defrauded, since otherwise he has no authority among them. The same principle holds in regard to Gaul as a whole taken together; for the whole body of states is divided into two parties.

[12] 1 Cum Caesar in Galliam venit, alterius factionis principes erant Aedui, alterius Sequani. 2 Hi cum per se minus valerent, quod summa auctoritas antiquitus erat in Aeduis magnaeque eorum erant clientelae, Germanos atque Ariovistum sibi adiunxerant eosque ad se magnis iacturis pollicitationibusque perduxerant. 3 Proeliis vero compluribus factis secundis atque omni nobilitate Aeduorum interfecta tantum potentia antecesserant, 4 ut magnam partem clientium ab Aeduis ad se traducerent obsidesque ab eis principum filios acciperent et publice iurare cogerent nihil se contra Sequanos consili inituros et partem finitimi agri per vim occupatam possiderent Galliaeque totius principatum obtinerent. 5 Qua necessitate adductus Diviciacus auxilii petendi causa Romam ad senatum profectus infecta

re redierat. 6 Adventu Caesaris facta commutatione rerum, obsidibus Aeduis redditis, veteribus clientelis restitutis, novis per Caesarem comparatis, quod hi, qui se ad eorum amicitiam adgregaverant, 7 meliore condicione atque aequiore imperio se uti videbant, reliquis rebus eorum gratia dignitateque amplificata Sequani principatum dimiserant. In eorum locum Remi successerant: quos quod adaequare apud Caesarem gratia intellegebatur, ei, qui propter veteres inimicitias nullo modo cum Aeduis coniungi poterant, se Remis in clientelam dicabant. 8 Hos illi diligenter tuebantur: ita et novam et repente collectam auctoritatem tenebant. 9 Eo tum statu res erat, ut longe principes haberentur Aedui, secundum locum dignitatis Remi obtinerent.

[12] When Caesar arrived in Gaul the leaders of one party were the Aedui, of the other the Sequani. The latter, being by themselves inferior in strength — since the highest authority from ancient times rested with the Aedui, and their dependencies were extensive — had made Ariovistus and the Germans their friends, and with great sacrifices and promises had brought them to their side. Then, by several successful engagements and the slaughter of all the Aeduan nobility, they had so far established their predominance as to transfer a great part of the dependents from the Aedui to themselves, receiving from them as hostages the children of their chief men, compelling them as a state to swear that they would entertain no design against the Sequani, occupying a part of the neighbouring territory which they had seized by force, and securing the chieftaincy of all Gaul. This was the necessity which had compelled Diviciacus to set forth on a journey to the Senate at Rome for the purpose of seeking aid; but he had returned without achieving the object. By the arrival of Caesar a change of affairs was brought about. Their hosts

were restored to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored, and new ones secured through Caesar's efforts (as those who had joined in friendly relations with them found that they enjoyed a better condition and a fairer rule), and their influence and position were increased in all other respects: in result whereof the Sequani had lost the chieftaincy. To their place the Remi had succeeded; and as it was perceived that they had equal influence with Caesar, the tribes which, by reason of ancient animosities, could in no wise join the Aedui were delivering themselves as dependents to the Remi. These tribes the Remi carefully protected, and by this means they sought to maintain their new and suddenly acquired authority. The state of things then at the time in question was that the Aedui were regarded as by far the chief state, while the Remi held the second place in importance.

[13] 1 In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo. Nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco, quae nihil audet per se, nullo adhibetur consilio. 2 Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus: in hos eadem omnia sunt iura, quae dominis in servos. 3 Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum. 4 Illi rebus divinis intersunt, sacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur: ad hos magnus adulescentium numerus disciplinae causa concurrat, magnoque hi sunt apud eos honore. 5 Nam fere de omnibus controversiis publicis privatisque constituunt, et, 6 si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes facta, si de hereditate, de finibus controversia est, idem decernunt, praemia poenasque constituunt; si qui aut privatus aut populus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt. Haec poena apud eos est gravissima. 7 Quibus ita est

interdictum, hi numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur, his omnes decedunt, aditum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant, neque his petentibus ius redditur neque honos ullus communicatur. 8 His autem omnibus druidibus praeest unus, qui summam inter eos habet auctoritatem. 9 Hoc mortuo aut si qui ex reliquis excellit dignitate succedit, aut, si sunt plures pares, suffragio druidum, nonnumquam etiam armis de principatu contendunt. 10 Hi certo anni tempore in finibus Carnutum, quae regio totius Galliae media habetur, considunt in loco consecrato. Huc omnes undique, qui controversias habent, conveniunt eorumque decretis iudiciisque parent. 11 Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur, 12 et nunc, qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur.

[13] Throughout Gaul there are two classes of persons of definite account and dignity. As for the common folk, they are treated almost as slaves, venturing naught of themselves, never taken into counsel. The more part of them, oppressed as they are either by debt, or by the heavy weight of tribute, or by the wrongdoing of the more powerful men, commit themselves in slavery to the nobles, who have, in fact, the same rights over them as masters over slaves. Of the two classes above mentioned one consists of Druids, the other of knights. The former are concerned with divine worship, the due performance of sacrifices, public and private, and the interpretation of ritual questions: a great number of young men gather about them for the sake of instruction and hold them in great honour. In fact, it is they who decide in almost all disputes, public and private; and if any crime has been committed, or murder done, or there is any dispute about succession or boundaries, they also decide it, determining

rewards and penalties: if any person or people does not abide by their decision, they ban such from sacrifice, which is their heaviest penalty. Those that are so banned are reckoned as impious and criminal; all men move out of their path and shun their approach and conversation, for fear they may get some harm from their contact, and no justice is done if they seek it, no distinction falls to their share. Of all these Druids one is chief, who has the highest authority among them. At his death, either any other that is preëminent in position succeeds, or, if there be several of equal standing, they strive for the primacy by the vote of the Druids, or sometimes even with armed force. These Druids, at a certain time of the year, meet within the borders of the Carnutes, whose territory is reckoned as the centre of all Gaul, and sit in conclave in a consecrated spot. Thither assemble from every side all that have disputes, and they obey the decisions and judgments of the Druids. It is believed that their rule of life was discovered in Britain and transferred thence to Gaul; and to-day those who would study the subject more accurately journey, as a rule, to Britain to learn it.

[14] 1 *Druides a bello abesse consuerunt neque tributa una cum reliquis pendunt; militiae vacationem omniumque rerum habent immunitatem.* 2 *Tantis excitati praemiis et sua sponte multi in disciplinam conveniunt et a parentibus propinquisque mittuntur.* 3 *Magnum ibi numerum versuum ediscere dicuntur. Itaque annos nonnulli videnos in disciplina permanent.* 4 *Neque fas esse existimant ea litteris mandare, cum in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus Graecis litteris utantur. Id mihi duabus de causis instituisse videntur, quod neque in vulgum disciplinam efferri velint neque eos, qui discunt, litteris confisos minus memoriae studere: quod fere plerisque accidit, ut praesidio litterarum*

diligentiam in perdiscendo ac memoriam remittant. 5 In primis hoc volunt persuadere, non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios, atque hoc maxime ad virtutem excitari putant metu mortis neglecto. 6 Multa praeterea de sideribus atque eorum motu, de mundi ac terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de deorum immortalium vi ac potestate disputant et iuventuti tradunt.

[14] The Druids usually hold aloof from war, and do not pay war-taxes with the rest; they are excused from military service and exempt from all liabilities. Tempted by these great rewards, many young men assemble of their own motion to receive their training; many are sent by parents and relatives. Report says that in the schools of the Druids they learn by heart a great number of verses, and therefore some persons remain twenty years under training. And they do not think it proper to commit these utterances to writing, although in almost all other matters, and in their public and private accounts, they make use of Greek letters. I believe that they have adopted the practice for two reasons — that they do not wish the rule to become common property, nor those who learn the rule to rely on writing and so neglect the cultivation of the memory; and, in fact, it does usually happen that the assistance of writing tends to relax the diligence of the student and the action of the memory. The cardinal doctrine which they seek to teach is that souls do not die, but after death pass from one to another; and this belief, as the fear of death is thereby cast aside, they hold to be the greatest incentive to valour. Besides this, they have many discussions as touching the stars and their movement, the size of the universe and of the earth, the order of nature, the strength and the powers of the immortal gods, and hand down their lore to the young men.

[15] 1 Alterum genus est equitum. Hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum incidit (quod fere ante Caesaris adventum quotannis accidere solebat, uti aut ipsi iniurias inferrent aut illatas propulsarent), omnes in bello versantur, 2 atque eorum ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque noverunt.

[15] The other class are the knights. These, when there is occasion, upon the incidence of a war — and before Caesar's coming this would happen well-nigh every year, in the sense that they would either be making wanton attacks themselves or repelling such — are all engaged therein; and according to the importance of each of them in birth and resources, so is the number of liegemen and dependents that he has about him. This is the one form of influence and power known to them.

[16] 1 Natio est omnis Gallorum admodum dedita religionibus, 2 atque ob eam causam, qui sunt adfecti gravioribus morbis quique in proeliis periculisque versantur, aut pro victimis homines immolant aut se immolaturos vovent administrisque ad ea sacrificia druidibus utuntur, quod, pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur, 3 non posse deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur, publiceque eiusdem generis habent instituta sacrificia. Alii immani magnitudine simulacra habent, 4 quorum contexta viminibus membra vivis hominibus complent; quibus succensis circumventi flamma exanimantur homines. 5 Supplicia eorum qui in furto aut in latrocinio aut aliqua noxia sint comprehensi gratiora dis immortalibus esse arbitrantur; sed, cum eius generis copia defecit, etiam ad innocentium supplicia descendunt.

[16] The whole nation of the Gauls is greatly devoted to ritual

observances, and for that reason those who are smitten with the more grievous maladies and who are engaged in the perils of battle either sacrifice human victims or vow to do so, employing the Druids as ministers for such sacrifices. They believe, in effect, that, unless for a man's life a man's life be paid, the majesty of the immortal gods may not be appeased; and in public, as in private, life they observe an ordinance of sacrifices of the same kind. Others use figures of immense size, whose limbs, woven out of twigs, they fill with living men and set on fire, and the men perish in a sheet of flame. They believe that the execution of those who have been caught in the act of theft or robbery or some crime is more pleasing to the immortal gods; but when the supply of such fails they resort to the execution even of the innocent.

[17] 1 Deum maxime Mercurium colunt. Huius sunt plurima simulacra: hunc omnium inventorem artium ferunt, hunc viarum atque itinerum ducem, hunc ad quaestus pecuniae mercaturasque habere vim maximam arbitrantur. Post hunc Apollinem et Martem et Iovem et Minervam. 2 De his eandem fere, quam reliquae gentes, habent opinionem: Apollinem morbos depellere, Minervam operum atque artificiorum initia tradere, Iovem imperium caelestium tenere, Martem bella regere. 3 Huic, cum proelio dimicare constituerunt, ea quae bello ceperint plerumque devovent: cum superaverunt, animalia capta immolant reliquasque res in unum locum conferunt. 4 Multis in civitatibus harum rerum exstructos tumulos locis consecratis conspicari licet; 5 neque saepe accidit, ut neglecta quispiam religione aut capta apud se occultare aut posita tollere auderet, gravissimumque ei rei supplicium cum cruciatu constitutum est.

[17] Among the gods, they most worship Mercury. There are

numerous images of him; they declare him the inventor of all arts, the guide for every road and journey, and they deem him to have the greatest influence for all money-making and traffic. After him they set Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva. Of these deities they have almost the same idea as all other nations: Apollo drives away diseases, Minerva supplies the first principles of arts and crafts, Jupiter holds the empire of heaven, Mars controls wars. To Mars, when they have determined on a decisive battle, they dedicate as a rule whatever spoil they may take. After a victory they sacrifice such living things as they have taken, and all the other effects they gather into one place. In many states heaps of such objects are to be seen piled up in hallowed spots, and it has and often happened that a man, in defiance of religious scruple, has dared to conceal such spoils in his house or to remove them from their place, and the most grievous punishment, with torture, is ordained for such an offence.

[18] 1 Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos praedicant idque ab druidibus proditum dicunt. 2 Ob eam causam spatia omnis temporis non numero dierum sed noctium finiunt; dies natales et mensum et annorum initia sic observant ut noctem dies subsequatur. 3 In reliquis vitae institutis hoc fere ab reliquis differunt, quod suos liberos, nisi cum adoleverunt, ut munus militiae sustinere possint, palam ad se adire non patiuntur filiumque puerili aetate in publico in conspectu patris adsistere turpe ducunt.

[18] The Gauls affirm that they are all descended from a common Father, Dis, and say that this is the tradition of the Druids. For that reason they determine all periods of time by the number, not of days, but of nights, and in their observance of birthdays and the beginnings of months and years day follows night. In the other ordinances of life

the main difference between them and the rest of mankind is that they do not allow their own sons to approach them openly until they have grown to an age when they can bear the burden of military service, and they count it a disgrace for a son who is still in his boy to take his place publicly in the presence of his father.

[19] 1 Viri, quantas pecunias ab uxoribus dotis nomine acceperunt, tantas ex suis bonis aestimatione facta cum dotibus communicant. 2 Huius omnis pecuniae coniunctim ratio habetur fructusque servantur: uter eorum vita superarit, ad eum pars utriusque cum fructibus superiorum temporum pervenit. 3 Viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos, vitae necisque habent potestatem; et cum paterfamiliae illustriore loco natus decessit, eius propinqui conveniunt et, de morte si res in suspicionem venit, de uxoribus in servilem modum quaestionem habent et, si compertum est, igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas interficiunt. 4 Funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica et sumptuosa; omniaque quae vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia, ac paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab eis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.

[19] The men, after making due reckoning, take from their own goods a sum of money equal to the dowry they have received from their wives and place it with the dowry. Of each such sum account is kept between them and the profits saved; whichever of the two survives receives the portion of both together with the profits of past years. Men have the power of life and death over their wives, as over their children; and when the father of a house, who is of distinguished birth, has died, his relatives assemble, and if there be anything suspicious about his death they make inquisition of his wives as they

would of slaves, and if discovery is made they put them to death with fire and all manner of excruciating tortures. Their funerals, considering the civilization of Gaul, are magnificent and expensive. They cast into the fire everything, even living creatures, which they believe to have been dear to the departed during life, and but a short time before the present age, only a generation since, slaves and dependents known to have been beloved by their lords used to be burnt with them at the conclusion of the funeral formalities.

[20] 1 Quae civitates commodius suam rem publicam administrare existimantur, habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de re publica a finitimis rumore aut fama acceperit, uti ad magistratum deferat neve cum quo alio communicet, 2 quod saepe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terri et ad facinus impelli et de summis rebus consilium capere cognitum est. 3 Magistratus quae visa sunt occultant quaeque esse ex usu iudicaverunt multitudini produnt. De re publica nisi per concilium loqui non conceditur.

[20] Those states which are supposed to conduct their public administration to greater advantage have it prescribed by law that anyone who has learnt anything of public concern from his neighbours by rumour or report must bring the information to a magistrate and not impart it to anyone else; for it is recognised that oftentimes hasty and inexperienced men are terrified by false rumours, and so are driven to crime or to decide supreme issues. Magistrates conceal what they choose, and make known what they think proper for the public. Speech on state questions, except by means of an assembly, is not allowed.

[21] 1 Germani multum ab hac consuetudine differunt. Nam neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis praesint, neque sacrificiis student. 2

Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus iuvantur, Solem et Vulcanum et Lunam, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt. 3 Vita omnis in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris consistit: ab parvulis labori ac duritiae student. Qui diutissime impuberes permanserunt, 4 maximam inter suos ferunt laudem: hoc ali staturam, ali vires nervosque confirmari putant. 5 Intra annum vero vicesimum feminae notitiam habuisse in turpissimis habent rebus; cuius rei nulla est occultatio, quod et promiscue in fluminibus perluuntur et pellibus aut parvis renonum tegimentis utuntur magna corporis parte nuda.

[21] The Germans differ much from this manner of living. They have no Druids to regulate divine worship, no zeal for sacrifices. They reckon among the gods those only whom they see and by whose offices they are openly assisted — to wit, the Sun, the Fire-god, and the Moon; of the rest they have learnt not even by report. Their whole life is composed of hunting expeditions and military pursuits; from early boyhood they are zealous for toil and hardship. Those who remain longest in chastity win greatest praise among their kindred; some think that stature, some that strength and sinew are fortified thereby. Further, they deem it a most disgraceful thing to have had knowledge of a woman before the twentieth year; and there is no secrecy in the matter, for both sexes bathe in the rivers and wear skins or small cloaks of reindeer hide, leaving great part of the body bare.

[22] 1 Agriculturae non student, maiorque pars eorum victus in lacte, caseo, carne consistit. 2 Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios; sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et

quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt. 3 Eius rei multas adferunt causas: ne adsidua consuetudine capti studium belli gerendi agricultura commutent; ne latos fines parare studeant, potentioresque humiliores possessionibus expellant; ne accuratius ad frigora atque aestus vitandos aedificent; ne qua oriatur pecuniae cupiditas, qua ex re factiones dissensionesque nascuntur; 4 ut animi aequitate plebem contineant, cum suas quisque opes cum potentissimis aequari videat.

[22] For agriculture they have no zeal, and the greater part of their food consists of milk, cheese, and flesh. No man has a definite quantity of land or estate of his own: the magistrates and chiefs every year assign to tribes and clans that have assembled together as much land and in such place as seems good to them, and compel the tenants after a year to pass on elsewhere. They adduce many reasons for that practice — the fear that they may be tempted by continuous association to substitute agriculture for their warrior zeal; that they may become zealous for the acquisition of broad territories, and so the more powerful may drive the lower sort from their holdings; that they may build with greater care to avoid the extremes of cold and heat; that some passion for money may arise to be the parent of parties and of quarrels. It is their aim to keep common people in contentment, when each man sees that his own wealth is equal to that of the most powerful.

[23] 1 Civitatibus maxima laus est quam latissime circum se vastatis finibus solitudines habere. 2 Hoc proprium virtutis existimant, expulsos agris finitimos cedere, neque quemquam prope audere consistere; 3 simul hoc se fore tutiores arbitrantur repentinae incursionis timore sublato. 4 Cum bellum civitas aut illa tum defendit

aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello praesint, ut vitae necisque habeant potestatem, deliguntur. 5 In pace nullus est communis magistratus, sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt. 6 Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidia minuendae causa fieri praedicant. 7 Atque ubi quis ex principibus in concilio dixit se ducem fore, qui sequi velint, profiteantur, consurgunt ei qui et causam et hominem probant suumque auxilium pollicentur atque ab multitudine collaudantur: 8 qui ex his secuti non sunt, in desertorum ac proditorum numero ducuntur, omniumque his rerum postea fides derogatur. 9 Hospitem violare fas non putant; qui quacumque de causa ad eos venerunt, ab iniuria prohibent, sanctos habent, hisque omnium domus patent victusque communicatur.

[23] Their states account it the highest praise by devastating their borders to have areas of wilderness as wide as possible around them. They think it the true sign of valour when the neighbours are driven to retire from their lands and no man dares to settle near, and at the same time they believe they will be safer thereby, having removed all fear of a sudden inroad. When a state makes or resists aggressive war officers are chosen to direct the same, with the power of life and death. In time of peace there is no general officer of state, but the chiefs of districts and cantons do justice among their followers and settle disputes. Acts of brigandage committed outside the borders of their several states involve no disgrace; in fact, they affirm that such are committed in order to practise the young men and to diminish sloth. And when any of the chiefs has said in public assembly that he will be leader, "Let those who will follow declare it," then all who approve the cause and the man rise together to his service and

promise their own assistance, and win the general praise of the people. Any of them who have not followed, after promise, are reckoned as deserters and traitors, and in all things afterwards trust is denied to them. They do not think it right to outrage a guest; men who have come to them for any cause they protect from mischief and regard as sacred; to them the houses of all are open, with them is food shared.

[24] 1 Ac fuit antea tempus, cum Germanos Galli virtute superarent, ultro bella inferrent, propter hominum multitudinem agrique inopiam trans Rhenum colonias mitterent. 2 Itaque ea quae fertilissima Germaniae sunt loca circum Hercyniam silvam, quam Eratostheni et quibusdam Graecis fama notam esse video, quam illi Orcyniam appellant, Volcae Tectosages occupaverunt atque ibi consederunt; 3 quae gens ad hoc tempus his sedibus sese continet summamque habet iustitiae et bellicae laudis opinionem. 4 Nunc quod in eadem inopia, egestate, patientia qua Germani permanent, eodem victu et cultu corporis utuntur; 5 Gallis autem provinciarum propinquitas et transmarinarum rerum notitia multa ad copiam atque usus largitur, 6 paulatim adsuefacti superari multisque victi proeliis ne se quidem ipsi cum illis virtute comparant.

[24] Now there was a time in the past when the Gauls were superior in valour to the Germans and made aggressive war upon them, and because of the number of their people and the lack of land they sent colonies across the Rhine. And thus the most fertile places of Germany round the Hercynian forest (which I see was known by report to Eratosthenes and certain Greeks, who call it the Orcynian forest) were seized by the Volcae Tectosages, who settled there, and the nation maintains itself to this day in these settlements, and enjoys

the highest reputation for justice and for success in war. At the present time, since they abide in the same condition of want, poverty, and hardship as the Germans, they adopt the same kind of food and bodily training. Upon the Gauls, however, the neighbourhood of our provinces and acquaintance with oversea commodities lavishes many articles of use or luxury; little by little they have grown accustomed to defeat, and after being conquered in many battles they do not even compare themselves in point of valour with the Germans.

[25] 1 Huius Hercyniae silvae, quae supra demonstrata est, latitudo novem dierum iter expedito patet: non enim aliter finiri potest, neque mensuras itinerum noverunt. 2 Oritur ab Helvetiorum et Nemetum et Rauracorum finibus rectaque fluminis Danubi regione pertinet ad fines Dacorum et Anartium; 3 hinc se flectit sinistrorsus diversis ab flumine regionibus multarumque gentium fines propter magnitudinem attingit; 4 neque quisquam est huius Germaniae, qui se aut adisse ad initium eius silvae dicat, cum dierum iter LX processerit, aut, quo ex loco oriatur, acceperit: 5 multaque in ea genera ferarum nasci constat, quae reliquis in locis visa non sint; ex quibus quae maxime differant ab ceteris et memoriae prodenda videantur haec sunt.

[25] The breadth of this Hercynian forest, above mentioned, is as much as a nine days' journey for an unencumbered person; for in no other fashion can it be determined, nor have they means to measure journeys. It begins in the borders of the Helvetii, the Nemetes, and the Rauraci, and, following the direct line of the river Danube, it extends to the borders of the Daci and the Anartes; thence it turns leftwards, through districts apart from the river, and by reason of its size touches the borders of many nations. There is no man in the

Germany we know who can say that he has reached the edge of that forest, though he may have gone forward a sixty days' journey, or who has learnt in what place it begins. It is known that many kinds of wild beasts not seen in any other places breed therein, of which the following are those that differ most from the rest of the animal world and appear worthy of record.

[26] 1 Est bos cervi figura, cuius a media fronte inter aures unum cornu existit excelsius magisque directum his, quae nobis nota sunt, cornibus: 2 ab eius summo sicut palmae ramique late diffunduntur. 3 Eadem est feminae marisque natura, eadem forma magnitudoque cornuum.

[26] There is an ox shaped like a stag, from the middle of whose forehead between the ears stands forth a single horn, taller and straighter than the horns we know. From its top branches spread out just like open hands. The main features of female and of male are the same, the same the shape and the size of the horns.

[27] 1 Sunt item, quae appellantur alces. Harum est consimilis capris figura et varietas pellium, sed magnitudine paulo antecedunt mutilaeque sunt cornibus et crura sine nodis articulisque habent 2 neque quietis causa procumbunt neque, si quo adflictae casu conciderunt, erigere sese aut sublevare possunt. 3 His sunt arbores pro cubilibus: ad eas se applicant atque ita paulum modo reclinatae quietem capiunt. 4 Quarum ex vestigiis cum est animadversum a venatoribus, quo se recipere consuerint, omnes eo loco aut ab radicibus subruunt aut accidunt arbores, tantum ut summa species earum stantium relinquatur. Huc cum se consuetudine reclinaverunt, 5 infirmas arbores pondere adfligunt atque una ipsae concidunt.

[27] There are also elks so-called. Their shape and dappled skin are like unto goats, but they are somewhat larger in size and have blunted horns. They have legs without nodes or joints, and they do not lie down to sleep, nor, if any shock has causes them to fall, can they raise or uplift themselves. Trees serve them as couches; they bear against them, and thus, leaning but a little, take their rest. When hunters mark by their tracks the spot to which they are wont to betake themselves, they either undermine all the trees in that spot at the roots or cut them so far through as to leave them just standing to outward appearance. When the elk lean against them after their fashion, their weight bears down the weakened trees and they themselves fall along with them.

[28] 1 Tertium est genus eorum, qui uri appellantur. Hi sunt magnitudine paulo infra elephantos, specie et colore et figura tauri. 2 Magna vis eorum est et magna velocitas, neque homini neque ferae quam conspexerunt parcunt. Hos studiose foveis captos interficiunt. 3 Hoc se labore durant adulescentes atque hoc genere venationis exercent, et qui plurimos ex his interfecerunt, relatis in publicum cornibus, quae sint testimonio, magnam ferunt laudem. 4 Sed adsuescere ad homines et mansuefieri ne parvuli quidem excepti possunt. 5 Amplitudo cornuum et figura et species multum a nostrorum boum cornibus differt. 6 Haec studiose conquisita ab labris argento circumcludunt atque in amplissimis epulis pro poculis utuntur.

[28] A third specie consists of the ure-oxen so-called. In size these are somewhat smaller than elephants; in appearance, colour, and shape they are as bulls. Great is their strength and great their speed, and they spare neither man nor beast once sighted. These the Germans

slay zealously, by taking them in pits; by such work the young men harden themselves and by this kind of hunting train themselves, and those who have slain most of them bring the horns with them to a public place for a testimony thereof, and win great renown. But even if they are caught very young, the animals cannot be tamed or accustomed to human beings. In bulk, shape, and appearance their horns are very different from the horns of our own oxen. The natives collect them zealously and encase the edges with silver, and then at their grandest banquets use them as drinking-cups.

[29] 1 Caesar, postquam per Ubios exploratores comperit Suebos sese in silvas recepisse, inopiam frumenti veritus, quod, ut supra demonstravimus, minime omnes Germani agriculturae student, constituit non progredi longius; sed, 2 ne omnino metum reditus sui barbaris tolleret atque ut eorum auxilia tardaret, reducto exercitu partem ultimam pontis, 3 quae ripas Ubiorum contingebat, in longitudinem pedum ducentorum rescindit atque in extremo ponte turrin tabulatorum quattuor constituit praesidiumque cohortium duodecim pontis tuendi causa ponit magnisque eum locum munitionibus firmat. Ei loco praesidioque Gaium Volcatium Tullum adulescentem praefecit. 4 Ipse, cum maturescere frumenta inciperent, ad bellum Ambiorigis profectus per Arduennam silvam, quae est totius Galliae maxima atque ab ripis Rheni finibusque Treverorum ad Nervios pertinet milibusque amplius quingentis in longitudinem patet, Lucium Minucium Basilum cum omni equitatu praemittit, si quid celeritate itineris atque opportunitate temporis proficere possit; 5 monet, ut ignes in castris fieri prohibeat, ne qua eius adventus procul significatio fiat: sese confestim subsequi dicit.

[29] When Caesar had ascertained through scouts of the Ubii that the

Suebi had retired into the forests, he decided to advance no farther, fearing scarcity of corn,^o because, as above mentioned, all the Germans care naught for agriculture. At the same time, in order not to remove altogether from the natives the fear his return and to delay their reinforcements, after he had withdrawn his army he broke up to the extent of two hundred feet the farthest section of the bridge which touched the banks of the Ubii, and at the end of the bridge he set a tower of four stories, posting a garrison of twelve cohorts to protect the bridge and strengthening the station with considerable fortifications. He set young Gaius Volcatius Tullus in command of the station and garrison, and himself moved on, as soon as the corn-crops began to ripen, through the forest of Ardennes, which is the largest in all Gaul and stretches from the banks of the Rhine and the borders of the Treveri to the country of the Nervii, extending lengthwise for more than five hundred miles, and he sent forward Lucius Minucius Basilus, with all the cavalry, to see if he could gain any advantage by speed of march and chance of opportunity. He instructed him to prevent the making of fires in camp in order to give no intimation from afar of his coming, and said that he himself would follow forthwith.

[30] 1 Basilus, ut imperatum est, facit. Celeriter contraque omnium opinionem confecto itinere multos in agris inopinantes deprehendit: eorum indicio ad ipsum Ambiorigem contendit, quo in loco cum paucis equitibus esse dicebatur. 2 Multum cum in omnibus rebus tum in re militari potest fortuna. Nam <sicut> magno accidit casu ut in ipsum incautum etiam atque imparatum incideret, priusque eius adventus ab omnibus videretur, quam fama ac nuntius adferretur: sic magnae fuit fortunae omni militari instrumento, quod circum se habebat, erepto, raedis equisque comprehensis ipsum effugere

mortem. Sed hoc quoque factum est, 3 quod aedificio circumdato silva, ut sunt fere domicilia Gallorum, qui vitandi aestus causa plerumque silvarum atque fluminum petunt propinquitates, comites familiaresque eius angusto in loco paulisper equitum nostrorum vim sustinuerunt. 4 His pugnantibus illum in equum quidam ex suis intulit: fugientem silvae texerunt. Sic et ad subeundum periculum et ad vitandum multum fortuna valuit.

[30] Basilus did as he was commanded. He accomplished the march speedily, contrary, indeed, to the general expectation, and caught many persons in the fields off their guard. Their information led him to make for Ambiorix himself in the locality where he was reported to be with a few horsemen. In everything, and especially in warfare, great is the power of fortune. For just as it was by great good luck that he fell upon the chief himself actually off his guard and unprepared — in fact, his arrival was seen by everybody before any rumour or message thereof was brought — so likewise it was a great piece of fortune that, when all the military equipment he had about him had been captured, the carriages and horses seized, the chief himself should escape death. But this, too, came to pass because, the building being surrounded by forest, as the dwellings of the Gauls usually are — for to avoid the heat they generally seek the neighbourhood of woods and rivers — his companions and friends in so confined a place held off the attack of our cavalry for a short time. While they fought, one of his followers set him on a horse, and the woods covered his flight. Thus both in his exposure to danger and in his escape therefrom the influence of fortune was great.

[31] 1 Ambiorix copias suas iudicione non conduxerit, quod proelio dimicandum non existimarit, an tempore exclusus et repentino

equitum adventu prohibitus, cum reliquum exercitum subsequi crederet, dubium est. 2 Sed certe dimissis per agros nuntiis sibi quemque consulere iussit. Quorum pars in Arduennam silvam, pars in continentes paludes profugit; 3 qui proximi Oceano fuerunt, his insulis sese occultaverunt, quas aestus efficere consueverunt: 4 multi ex suis finibus egressi se suaque omnia alienissimis crediderunt. 5 Catuvolcus, rex dimidiae partis Eburonum, qui una cum Ambiorige consilium inierat, aetate iam confectus, cum laborem aut belli aut fugae ferre non posset, omnibus precibus detestatus Ambiorigem, qui eius consilii auctor fuisset, taxo, cuius magna in Gallia Germaniaeque copia est, se exanimavit.

[31] It is doubtful whether it was of set purpose that Ambiorix did not assemble his forces, thinking that he ought not to fight a decisive action, or whether he had no chance of so doing because he was prevented by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, believing that the rest of the army was following close behind. But certain it is that he despatched messengers in different directions through the fields with the order that each man should take thought for himself. Part of them escaped into the forest of Ardennes, part into the long stretches of morass; those who were nearest the Ocean hid themselves in the islands which the tides are accustomed to form; many left their own borders and entrusted themselves and all their stuff to utter strangers. Catuvolcus, king of half the Eburones, who had shared the project of Ambiorix, was old and worn, and, finding that he could not endure the effort of war or flight, cursed Ambiorix by all his gods for suggesting such a project, and hanged himself to a yew-tree, of which there is great plenty in Gaul and Germany.

[32] 1 Segni Condrusique, ex gente et numero Germanorum, qui sunt

inter Eburones Treverosque, legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret: nihil se de bello cogitavisse, nulla Ambiorigi auxilia misisse. 2 Caesar explorata re quaestione captivorum, si qui ad eos Eburones ex fuga convenissent, ad se ut reducerentur, imperavit; si ita fecissent, fines eorum se violaturum negavit. 3 Tum copiis in tres partes distributis impedimenta omnium legionum Aduatucam contulit. 4 Id castelli nomen est. Hoc fere est in mediis Eburonum finibus, ubi Titurius atque Aurunculeius hiemandi causa consederant. 5 Hunc cum reliquis rebus locum probabat, tum quod superioris anni munitiones integrae manebant, ut militum laborem sublevaret. Praesidio impedimentis legionem quartamdecimam reliquit, unam ex eis tribus, quas proxime conscriptas ex Italia traduxerat. 6 Ei legioni castrisque Quintum Tullium Ciceronem praeficit ducentosque equites attribuit.

[32] The Segni and Condrusi, who are of the nation and number of the Germans and have their abode betwixt the Eburones and the Treveri, sent envoys to Caesar to beg him not to count them among his enemies, nor to consider that there was common cause among all the Germans on the Roman side of the Rhine. They pleaded that they had had no idea of war, had sent no auxiliaries for Ambiorix. Caesar investigated the matter by examination of prisoners, and commanded that if any of the Eburones should have repaired to them in their flight they should be brought back to him; he said that if they did this he would not do violence to their territories. Then, dividing his forces into three parts, he concentrated the baggage of all the legions at Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort situated almost in the middle of the territory of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had stationed themselves to written; and Caesar approved of the position

on general grounds, and particularly because the fortifications of the previous year remained intact, in order thereby to lighten the labour of the troops. To guard the baggage he left the Fourteenth Legion, one of the three latest enrolled which he had brought over from Italy. He put Quintus Tullius Cicero in command of the legion and camp, and attached two hundred cavalry to his force.

[33] 1 Partito exercitu Titum Labienum cum legionibus tribus ad Oceanum versus in eas partes quae Menapios attingunt proficisci iubet; 2 Gaium Trebonium cum pari legionum numero ad eam regionem quae ad Aduatucos adiacet depopulandam mittit; 3 ipse cum reliquis tribus ad flumen Scaldem, quod influit in Mosam, extremasque Arduennae partis ire constituit, quo cum paucis equitibus profectum Ambiorigem audiebat. 4 Discedens post diem septimum sese reversurum confirmat; quam ad diem ei legioni quae in praesidio relinquebatur deberi frumentum sciebat. 5 Labienum Treboniumque hortatur, si rei publicae commodo facere possint, ad eum diem revertantur, ut rursus communicato consilio exploratisque hostium rationibus aliud initium belli capere possint.

[33] Having divided the army, he ordered Titus Labienus to proceed with three legions towards the districts which touch the Menapii; Gaius Trebonius with an equal number of legions to devastate the region which adjoins the Aduatuci; and he determined to march himself with the remaining three to the river Scheldt, which flows into the Meuse, and to the uttermost parts of the Ardennes, whither he heard Ambiorix had started with a few horsemen. As he departed he guaranteed that he would return, after an interval of seven days, on the day by which he knew that the corn-ration was due for the legion left in garrison. He urged Labienus and Trebonius, if they

could do so without danger to the commonwealth, to return by the same day, in order that they might again take counsel together, examine the tactics of the enemy, and so be able to start the campaign afresh.

[34] 1 Erat, ut supra demonstravimus, manus certa nulla, non oppidum, non praesidium, quod se armis defenderet, sed in omnes partes dispersa multitudo. 2 Ubi cuique aut valles abdita aut locus silvestris aut palus impedita spem praesidi aut salutis aliquam offerebat, consederat. 3 Haec loca vicinitatibus erant nota, magnamque res diligentiam requirebat non in summa exercitus tuenda (nullum enim poterat universis <a> perterritis ac dispersis periculum accidere), sed in singulis militibus conservandis; quae tamen ex parte res ad salutem exercitus pertinebat. 4 Nam et praedae cupiditas multos longius evocabat, et silvae incertis occultisque itineribus confertos adire prohibebant. 5 Si negotium confici stirpemque hominum sceleratorum interfici vellet, dimittendae plures manus diducendique erant milites; 6 si continere ad signa manipulos vellet, ut instituta ratio et consuetudo exercitus Romani postulabat, locus ipse erat praesidio barbaris, neque ex occulto insidiandi et dispersos circumveniendi singulis deerat audacia. 7 Ut in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. 8 Dimittit ad finitimas civitates nuntios Caesar: omnes ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur, simul ut magna multitudine circumfusa pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur. 9 Magnus undique numerus celeriter convenit.

[34] As above mentioned, there was nowhere any definite body of troops, any stronghold, any garrison to defend itself in arms; but the population was scattered in all directions. Each man had settled where a hidden valley or a wooded locality or an entangled morass offered some hope of defence or security. These localities were known to the dwellers round about, and thus the matter required great care, not for the protection of the army as a whole (for no danger could occur to united bodies from individuals scared and scattered), but for the preservation of single soldiers, although this latter consideration affected to some degree the safety of the army. For the passion for plunder was apt to draw many men too far afield, and at the same time the woods forbade the advance of any close-formed body along the hidden and uncertain tracks. If Caesar wished to finish off the business and to make away with a brood of malefactors, he must needs send several bands in different directions and move his troops at wide intervals; if he wished to keep the companies with the standards, as the established rule and custom of the Roman army required, the locality itself gave protection to the natives, and individuals among them lacked not the daring to lay secret ambush and surround scattered detachments. Considering these particular difficulties, all precaution that carefulness could take was taken; and Caesar preferred to forgo some chance of doing harm, although the spirit of every man was burning for vengeance, rather than to do harm with some damage to the troops. He sent messengers round to the neighbouring states and invited them all, in the hope of booty, to join him in pillaging the Eburones, so that he might hazard the lives of the Gauls among the woods rather than the soldiers of the legions, and at the same time, by surrounding it with a large host, destroy the stock and name of the tribe in requital for its horrid

crime. A great number assembled speedily from every side.

[35] 1 Haec in omnibus Eburonum partibus gerebantur, diesque appetebat septimus, quem ad diem Caesar ad impedimenta legionemque reverti constituerat. 2 Hic quantum in bello fortuna possit et quantos adferat casus cognosci potuit. 3 Dissipatis ac perterritis hostibus, ut demonstravimus, manus erat nulla quae parvam modo causam timoris adferret. 4 Trans Rhenum ad Germanos pervenit fama, diripi Eburones atque ultro omnes ad praedam evocari. 5 Cogunt equitum duo milia Sugambri, qui sunt proximi Rheno, a quibus receptos ex fuga Tencteros atque Usipetes supra docuimus. 6 Transeunt Rhenum navibus ratibusque triginta milibus passuum infra eum locum, ubi pons erat perfectus praesidiumque ab Caesare relictum: primos Eburonum fines adeunt; multos ex fuga dispersos excipiunt, magno pecoris numero, cuius sunt cupidissimi barbari, potiuntur. 7 Invitati praeda longius procedunt. Non hos palus in bello latrociniisque natos, non silvae morantur. Quibus in locis sit Caesar ex captivis quaerunt; profectum longius reperiunt omnemque exercitum discessisse cognoscunt. 8 Atque unus ex captivis “Quid vos,” inquit, “hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamini praedam, quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? 9 Tribus horis Aduatucam venire potestis: huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit: praesidi tantum est, ut ne murus quidem cingi possit, neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat.” 10 Oblata spe Germani quam nacti erant praedam in occulto relinquunt; ipsi Aduatucam contendunt usi eodem duce, cuius haec indicio cognoverant.

[35] These operations were being carried out in all parts of the Eburones' country, and the seventh day drew nigh, by which Caesar

had determined to return to the baggage and the legion. Herein it has been possible to note how great is power of fortune in war, and how great the chances she brings in her train. The enemy were scared and scattered, as we have mentioned, and there was no body of troops that could suggest the slightest occasion for alarm. Across the Rhine the report reached the Germans that the Eburones were being pillaged; nay, more — that all were invited to come and plunder. Two thousand horsemen were collected by the Sugambri, who live nearest the Rhine, and, as we set forth above, had received the Tencteri and the Usipetes after their flight. On boats and rafts they crossed the Rhine thirty miles below the spot where the bridge had been built and a garrison left by Caesar; and, coming first to the borders of the Eburones, they caught many persons scattered in flight, and captured a great quantity of cattle, of which barbarians are very covetous. They were tempted by plunder to proceed further. No march, no woods check these children of war and brigandage. From prisoners they inquire in what district Caesar is; they find that he has gone on some distance, they learn that all his army is departed. And then one of their prisoners said: “Why do you pursue this miserable and slender booty, when you now have the chance of the utmost fortune? In three hours you may come to Aduatuca; in that spot the Roman army has concentrated all its stores; the garrison is so small that it cannot even man the wall, and no one dares to step outside the entrenchments.” With this hope offered them, the Germans left in a secret place the plunder they had got and made for Aduatuca, using as a guide the very man by whose information they had learnt the news.

[36] 1 Cicero, qui omnes superiores dies praeceptis Caesaris cum summa diligentia milites in castris continuisset ac ne calonem

quidem quemquam extra munitionem egredi passus esset, septimo die diffidens de numero dierum Caesarem fidem servaturum, quod longius progressum audiebat, neque ulla de reditu eius fama adferebatur, simul eorum permotus vocibus, 2 qui illius patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant, siquidem ex castris egredi non liceret, nullum eiusmodi casum expectans, quo novem oppositis legionibus maximoque equitatu dispersis ac paene deletis hostibus in milibus passuum tribus offendi posset, quinque cohortes frumentatum in proximas segetes mittit, quas inter et castra unus omnino collis intererat. Complures erant ex legionibus aegri relict; 3 ex quibus qui hoc spatio dierum convalescerant, circiter CCC, sub vexillo una mittuntur; magna praeterea multitudo calorum, magna vis iumentorum, quae in castris subsederant, facta potestate sequitur.

[36] For all the previous days Cicero, in obedience to Caesar's instructions, had most carefully confined his troops to camp, allowing not even a single camp-follower to pass beyond the entrenchment. On the seventh day he did not feel sure that Caesar would keep his word as touching the number of days, as he heard that he had advanced further, and no report about his return was brought in. At the same time he was influenced by the remarks of those who called his patience almost a siege, since no leave to pass out of camp was given; and he did not anticipate any turn of fortune such as, with nine legions and a very large force of cavalry to confront a scattered and almost obliterated enemy, could cause disaster within the distance of three miles. He therefore sent five cohorts to get corn in the nearest fields, between which and the camp but a single hill interposed. Several men of the legions had been left behind sick, and those of them who had recovered during the intervening days, to the number of some three hundred, were sent

together under a flag; and, besides, a great host of camp-followers got leave to follow with a great number of pack-animals which had remained in the camp.

[37] 1 Hoc ipso tempore et casu Germani equites interveniunt protinusque eodem illo, quo venerant, cursu ab decumana porta in castra irrumpere conantur, 2 nec prius sunt visi obiectis ab ea parte silvis, quam castris appropinquarent, usque eo ut qui sub vallo tenderent mercatores recipiendi sui facultatem non haberent. 3 Inopinantes nostri re nova perturbantur, ac vix primum impetum cohors in statione sustinet. 4 Circumfunduntur ex reliquis hostes partibus, si quem aditum reperire possent. 5 Aegre portas nostri tuentur, reliquos aditus locus ipse per se munitioque defendit. 6 Totis trepidatur castris, atque alius ex alio causam tumultus quaerit; neque quo signa ferantur neque quam in partem quisque conveniat provident. 7 Alius iam castra capta pronuntiat, alius deleto exercitu atque imperatore victores barbaros venisse contendit; 8 plerique novas sibi ex loco religiones fingunt Cottaque et Tituri calamitatem, qui in eodem occiderint castello, ante oculos ponunt. 9 Tali timore omnibus perterritis confirmatur opinio barbaris, ut ex captivo audierant, nullum esse intus praesidium. 10 Perrumpere nituntur seque ipsi adhortantur, ne tantam fortunam ex manibus dimittant.

[37] Just at this moment, as it chanced, the German horsemen came on the scene, and immediately, at the same speed as had brought them thither, essayed to burst into camp at the main gate. There was a screen of woods on that side, so that they were not seen before they drew near the camp, so much so that the traders encamped close under the rampart had no chance of retreating. Our troops, not expecting them, were thrown into confusion by the surprise, and the

cohort on guard scarcely stood the first attack. The enemy poured round the other faces of the camp to see if they could find an entry. Our troops with difficulty defended the gates; all other chances of entrance were prevented by the nature of the place itself and by the entrenchment. There was confusion throughout the camp, and one sought from another the cause of the uproar; no one had a care to which point the companies were to move or in what quarter each man was to assemble. One declared that the camp was already taken, another insisted that the barbarians were come victorious from the destruction of the army and the commander-in-chief, and the majority pictured to themselves new superstitions because of the place and set before their eyes the disaster of Cotta and Titurius, who (as they remembered) fell in the same fort. Owing to the universal panic caused by such fears, the barbarians were confirmed in the belief that, as they had heard from the prisoner, there was no garrison inside. They strove to break through, exhorting one another not to let so good a chance slip from their hands.

[38] 1 Erat aeger cum praesidio relictus Publius Sextius Baculus, qui primum pilum ad Caesarem duxerat, cuius mentionem superioribus proeliis fecimus, ac diem iam quintum cibo caruerat. 2 Hic diffusus suae atque omnium saluti inermis ex tabernaculo prodit: videt imminere hostes atque in summo esse rem discrimine: capit arma a proximis atque in porta consistit. 3 Consequuntur hunc centuriones eius cohortis quae in statione erat: paulisper una proelium sustinent. 4 Relinquit animus Sextium gravibus acceptis vulneribus: aegre per manus tractus servatur. Hoc spatio interposito reliqui sese confirmant tantum, ut in munitionibus consistere audeant speciemque defensorum praebeant.

[38] With the garrison there had been left behind, sick, a certain Publius Sextius Baculus, who has been mentioned by us in previous battles. He had now been five days without food, and, doubtful of his own and the general safety, he came forth from his tent unarmed. He saw that the enemy were threateningly close and that the issue was in the greatest danger; he took arms from the nearest men and stationed himself in the gate. He was followed by all the centurions of the cohort on guard, and together for a short space they bore the brunt of the battle. Sextius fainted after receiving severe wounds; with difficulty he was dragged from hand to hand into safety. In the respite thus given the rest took courage so far as to venture to their stations in the entrenchments and to afford a semblance of defence.

[39] 1 Interim confecta frumentatione milites nostri clamorem exaudiunt: praecurrunt equites; quanto res sit in periculo cognoscunt. 2 Hic vero nulla munitio est quae perterritos recipiat: modo conscripti atque usus militaris imperiti ad tribunum militum centurionesque ora convertunt; quid ab his praecipiat exspectant. Nemo est tam fortis quin rei novitate perturbetur. 3 Barbari signa procul conspicati oppugnatione desistunt: 4 redisse primo legiones credunt, quas longius discessisse ex captivis cognoverant; postea despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt.

[39] Meanwhile, having finished corn-gathering, our troops heard the shouting; the cavalry sped forward, and learnt the great danger of the moment. But here was no entrenchment to receive the scared soldiers; lately enlisted, and unskilled in the practice of war, they turned their faces with one accord to the tribunes and centurions, waiting to see what these would direct. No one was so brave as not to be confused by so unexpected a situation. The natives, on the other

hand, catching sight of the standards at a distance, desisted from the assault; at first they supposed that the legions had returned, which, according to the information given by the prisoners, had gone farther afield; afterwards, despising the small numbers, they made a charge on every side.

[40] 1 Calones in proximum tumulum procurrunt. Hinc celeriter deiecti se in signa manipulosque coniciunt: eo magis timidos perterrent milites. 2 Alii cuneo facto ut celeriter perrumpant censent, quoniam tam propinqua sint castra, et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt; 3 alii, ut in iugo consistant atque eundem omnes ferant casum. 4 Hoc veteres non probant milites, quos sub vexillo una profectos docuimus. Itaque inter se cohortati duce Gaio Trebonio, equite Romano, qui eis erat praepositus, per medios hostes perrumpunt incolumesque ad unum omnes in castra perveniunt. 5 Hos subsecuti calones equitesque eodem impetu militum virtute servantur. 6 At ei qui in iugo constiterant, nullo etiam nunc usu rei militaris percepto neque in eo quod probaverant consilio permanere, ut se loco superiore defenderent, neque eam quam prodesse aliis vim celeritatemque viderant imitari potuerunt, sed se in castra recipere conati iniquum in locum demiserunt. 7 Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti, ne ante partem rei militaris laudem amitterent, fortissime pugnantes conciderunt. 8 Militum pars horum virtute summotis hostibus praeter spem incolumis in castra pervenit, pars a barbaris circumventa perit.

[40] The camp-followers dashed forward to the nearest rise. They were speedily hurled down from thence, and ran headlong into the

company formations, scaring the soldiers into greater alarm. Some of these proposed to form a wedge and break through speedily, as the camp was so near at hand, feeling confident that if some part were surrounded and slain, yet the remainder could be saved. Others proposed to take post on the ridge and all face the same risk together. This course was not approved by the veterans, who, as we have shown, marched out together under a flag. So they encouraged one another, and, led, by Gaius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been put in command of them, they broke through the midst of the enemy and came into camp all safe to a man. Close behind them in the same onrush came the camp-followers and the cavalry, who were saved by the valour of soldiers. But the party which had taken post on the ridge, still utterly untutored in the practice of war, had proved unable either to abide in the place they had approved and defend themselves on higher ground, or to imitate the vigour and the speed which they had seen to be of assistance to others; indeed, in the attempt to retire into camp they came down to unfavourable ground. Some of their centurions had been transferred, on account of valour, from the lower ranks of the other legion to the higher ranks of this; and these, that they might not lose the renown for military prowess won in the past, fell, fighting most gallantly. Part of the soldiers, when the enemy had been thrust aside by the valour of the centurions, arrived, though they did not expect it, safe in camp; part were surrounded by the natives and perished.

[41] 1 Germani desperata expugnatione castrorum, quod nostros iam constitisse in munitionibus videbant, cum ea praeda quam in silvis deposuerant trans Rhenum sese receperunt. 2 Ac tantus fuit etiam post discessum hostium terror ut ea nocte, cum Gaius Volusenus missus cum equitatu ad castra venisset, fidem non faceret adesse cum

incolumi Caesarem exercitu. 3 Sic omnino animos timor praeoccupaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent neque incolumi exercitu Germanos castra oppugnatos fuisse contenderent. 4 Quem timorem Caesaris adventus sustulit.

[41] The Germans despaired of storming the camp, for they could see that our men had now taken post in the entrenchments; they therefore retired across the Rhine with the booty which they had secreted in the woods. And even after their departure so great was the fear of the enemy that the same night, when Gaius Volusenus, who had been sent on with the cavalry, reached the camp, he could not make the troops believe that Caesar was close at hand with his army unhurt. Terror had so completely seized their minds that they were almost crazy, declaring that after the destruction of all the forces the cavalry had escaped the rout, and insisting that if the army had been safe the Germans would not have attacked the camp. This terror was removed by the arrival of Caesar.

[42] 1 Reversus ille eventus belli non ignorans unum, quod cohortes ex statione et praesidio essent emissae, questus ne minimo quidem casu locum relinqui debuisse, multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse iudicavit, 2 multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum barbaros avertisset. Quarum omnium rerum maxime admirandum videbatur, 3 quod Germani, qui eo consilio Rhenum transierant, ut Ambiorigis fines depopularentur, ad castra Romanorum delati optatissimum Ambiorigi beneficium obtulerunt.

[42] When he returned, knowing well the accidents of war, he had but one complaint to make — that cohorts had been sent afield from

outpost and garrison duty: he held that no room should have been left for even the slightest mischance, and that fortune had proved her power in the sudden arrival of the enemy — ay, and far more so, in that she had turned away the natives almost from the very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all these events the most remarkable seemed to be that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with the definite intention of devastating the territory of Ambiorix, by their descent on the Roman camp rendered Ambiorix the most acceptable service.

[43] 1 Caesar rursus ad vexandos hostes profectus magno coacto numero ex finitimis civitatibus in omnes partes dimittit. 2 Omnes vici atque omnia aedificia quae quisque conspexerat incendebantur; praeda ex omnibus locis agebatur; 3 frumenta non solum tanta multitudine iumentorum atque hominum consumebantur, sed etiam anni tempore atque imbribus procubuerant ut, si qui etiam in praesentia se occultassent, tamen his deducto exercitu rerum omnium inopia pereundum videretur. 4 Ac saepe in eum locum ventum est tanto in omnes partes diviso equitatu, ut modo visum ab se Ambiorigem in fuga circumspicerent captivi nec plane etiam abisse ex conspectu contenderent, ut spe consequendi illata atque infinito labore suscepto, 5 qui se summam ab Caesare gratiam inituros putarent, paene naturam studio vincerent, semperque paulum ad summam felicitatem defuisse videretur, 6 atque ille latebris aut saltibus se eriperet et noctu occultatus alias regiones partesque peteret non maiore equitum praesidio quam quattuor, quibus solis vitam suam committere audebat.

[43] Caesar marched forth again to harass the enemy, and, collecting a great host from the neighbouring states, he sent them off in every

direction. Every hamlet, every homestead that anyone could see was set on fire; captured cattle were driven from every spot; the corn-crops were not only being consumed by the vast host of pack-animals and human beings, but were laid flat in addition because of the rainy season, so that, even if any persons succeeded in hiding themselves for the moment, it seemed that they must perish for want of everything when the army was withdrawn. And with so large a force of cavalry scattered in every direction, it often came to pass that prisoners when taken were gazing about for Ambiorix, whom they had just seen in flight, and even insisting that he had not quite gone out of sight. The hope of catching the fugitive now offered to them inspired immense exertion, and the thought that they would win the highest favour with Caesar made their zeal almost more than human. Yet always it seemed that they had failed by a little to win supreme success, while Ambiorix stole away from covert or glade and, hidden by night, made for other districts or territories, with no more escort of horsemen than four troopers, to whom alone he durst entrust his life.

[44] 1 Tali modo vastatis regionibus exercitum Caesar duarum cohortium damno Durocortorum Remorum reducit concilioque in eum locum Galliae indicto de coniuratione Senonum et Carnutum quaestionem habere instituit et de Accone, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, 2 graviore sententia pronuntiata more maiorum supplicium sumpsit. 3 Nonnulli iudicium veriti profugerunt. Quibus cum aqua atque igni interdixisset, duas legiones ad fines Treverorum, duas in Lingonibus, sex reliquas in Senonum finibus Agedinci in hibernis collocavit frumentoque exercitui proviso, ut instituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

[44] When the districts had been devastated in such fashion, Caesar brought back the army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum, a city of the Remi; and, having summoned a convention of Gaul at that place, he determined to hold an inquisition touching the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes; and on Acco, the arch-conspirator, who had originated the plot, he pronounced a heavier sentence than usual, and executed punishment in our traditional fashion. Some persons feared trial and fled, and these he outlawed. Then he stationed two legions in cantonments on the borders of the Treveri, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agedincum, in the territory of the Senones; and, having provided a corn-supply for the army, set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes.

BOOK VII

[1] 1 Quieta Gallia Caesar, ut constituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos proficiscitur. Ibi cognoscit de Clodii caede [de] senatusque consulto certior factus, ut omnes iuniores Italiae coniurarent, delectum tota provincia habere instituit. 2 Eae res in Galliam Transalpinam celeriter perferuntur. Addunt ipsi et adfingunt rumoribus Galli, quod res poscere videbatur, retineri urbano motu Caesarem neque in tantis dissensionibus ad exercitum venire posse. 3 Hac impulsu occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt. 4 Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis queruntur de Acconis morte; 5 posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant: miserantur communem Galliae fortunam: omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deposcunt qui belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent. 6 In primis rationem esse habendam dicunt, priusquam eorum clandestina consilia efferantur, ut Caesar ab exercitu intercludatur. Id esse facile, 7 quod neque legiones audeant absente imperatore ex hibernis egredi, neque imperator sine praesidio ad legiones pervenire possit. 8 Postremo in acie praestare interfici quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare.

[1] When Gaul was quiet Caesar set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes. There he heard of the murder of Clodius; and having been informed of the Senate's decree that all the younger men of military age in Italy should be sworn in, he decided to hold a levy throughout his province. These events were speedily reported to Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls added to the reports a circumstance of their own invention, which the occasion seemed to

require, that Caesar was detained by the commotion at Rome and, in view of discords so serious, could not come to the army. Such an opportunity served as a stimulus to those who even before were chafing at their subjection to the sovereignty of Rome, and they began with greater freedom and audacity to make plans for a campaign. The chiefs of Gaul summoned conventions by mutual arrangement in remote spots and complained of the death of Acco. They pointed out that his fate might fall next upon themselves; they expressed pity for the common lot of Gaul; by all manner of promises and rewards they called for men to start the campaign and at the risk of their own life to champion the liberty of Gaul. First and foremost, they said, they must devise means, before ever their secret designs got abroad, to shut Caesar off from the army. It was an easy task, because the legions would not dare to march out of cantonments in the absence of the commander-in-chief, nor could the latter without a strong escort reach the legions. Finally, it was better, they urged, to be slain in battle than to fail of recovering their old renown in war and the liberty which they had received from their forefathers.

[2] 1 His rebus agitatis profitentur Carnutes se nullum periculum communis salutis causa recusare principesque ex omnibus bellum facturos pollicentur et, 2 quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint ne res efferatur, ut iureiurando ac fide sanciantur, petunt, collatis militaribus signis, quo more eorum gravissima caerimonia continetur, ne facto initio belli ab reliquis deserantur. 3 Tum collaudatis Carnutibus, dato iureiurando ab omnibus qui aderant, tempore eius rei constituto ab concilio disceditur.

[2] When these subjects had been discussed, the Carnutes declared that there was no hazard they refused for the general welfare, and

promised that they would be the first of all to make war; and, since in the present circumstances they could not give one another security by means of hostages, for fear the matter should get abroad, they asked for the sanction of an oath of honour before the assembled war-standards — the formality which represents their most solemn ritual — to make sure that after beginning the campaign they should not be abandoned by the rest. Thereupon all present praised the Carnutes with one accord and gave their oath, and after appointing a season for the enterprise departed.

[3] 1 Ubi ea dies venit, Carnutes Cotuato et Conconnetodumno ducibus, desperatis hominibus, Cenabum signo dato concurrunt civesque Romanos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant, in his Gaium Fufium Citam, honestum equitem Romanum, qui rei frumentariae iussu Caesaris praeerat, interficiunt bonaque eorum diripiunt. 2 Celeriter ad omnes Galliae civitates fama perfertur. Nam ubicumque maior atque illustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant; hunc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accidit. 3 Nam quae Cenabi oriente sole gesta essent, ante primam confectam vigiliam in finibus Arvernorum audita sunt, quod spatium est milium passuum circiter centum LX.

[3] When the day came, the Carnutes, under the leadership of two desperate men, Cotuatus and Conconnetodumnus, rushed at a given signal on Cenabum, put to the sword the Roman citizens who had established themselves there for trading purposes — among them Gaius Fufius Cita, a Roman knight of distinction, who by Caesar's order was in charge of the corn^o-supply — and plundered their goods. Speedily the report thereof was carried to all the states of Gaul. As a matter of fact, whenever any event of greater note or

importance occurs, the Gauls shout it abroad through fields and districts and then others take it up in turn and pass it on to their next neighbours; as happened on this occasion. For deeds done at Cenabum at sunrise were heard of before the end of the first watch in the borders of the Arverni, a distance of about one hundred and sixty miles.

[4] 1 Simili ratione ibi Vercingetorix, Celtilli filius, Arvernus, summae potentiae adulescens, cuius pater principatum Galliae totius obtinuerat et ob eam causam, quod regnum appetebat, ab civitate erat interfectus, convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit. 2 Cognito eius consilio ad arma concurritur. Prohibetur ab Gobannitione, patruo suo, reliquisque principibus, qui hanc temptandam fortunam non existimabant; expellitur ex oppido Gergovia; 3 non destitit tamen atque in agris habet dilectum egentium ac perditorum. Hac coacta manu, quoscumque adit ex civitate ad suam sententiam perducit; 4 hortatur ut communis libertatis causa arma capiant, magnisque coactis copiis adversarios suos a quibus paulo ante erat eiectus expellit ex civitate. 5 Rex ab suis appellatur. Dimittit quoque versus legationes; obtestatur ut in fide maneant. 6 Celeriter sibi Senones, Parisios, Pictones, Cadurcos, Turonos, Aulercos, Lemovices, Andos reliquosque omnes qui Oceanum attingunt adiungit: omnium consensu ad eum defertur imperium. 7 Qua oblata potestate omnibus his civitatibus obsides imperat, certum numerum militum ad se celeriter adduci iubet, armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi quodque ante tempus efficiat constituit; in primis equitatu studet. 9 Summae diligentiae summam imperi severitatem addit; magnitudine supplicii dubitantes cogit. 10 Nam maiore commisso delicto igni atque omnibus tormentis necat, levio de causa auribus desectis aut singulis effossis oculis domum remittit, ut sint reliquis documento et

magnitudine poenae perterreant alios.

[4] There in like fashion Vercingetorix, son of Celtillus, an Arvernian youth of supreme influence (whose father had held the chieftainship of all Gaul and consequently, because he aimed at the kingship, had been put to death by his state), summoned his own dependents and easily fired their spirit. Directly his design was known there was a general rush to arms. Gobannitio, his uncle, and the rest of the chiefs, who did not think this adventure should be hazarded, sought to prevent him; he was cast out of the town of Gergovia, but he did not give up for all that; and in the fields he held a levy of beggars and outcasts. Then, having got together a body of this sort, he brought over to his own way of thinking all the members of his state whom he approached, urging them to take up arms for the sake of general liberty; and having collected large forces, he cast out of the state his opponents by whom he had been expelled a short time before. He was greeted as “King” by his followers. He sent out deputations in every direction, adjuring the tribesmen to remain loyal to him. He speedily added to his side the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turoni, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andi, and all the other maritime tribes; by consent of all, the command was bestowed upon him. In virtue of the power thus conferred he made requisition of hostages on all these states, and ordered a certain number of soldiers to be brought to him speedily; he determined what amount of arms, and by what date, each state should manufacture at home, and he paid especial attention to the cavalry. To the utmost care he added the utmost strictness of command, compelling waverers by severity of punishment. Indeed for the commission of a greater offence he put to death with fire and all manner of tortures; for a lesser case he sent a man home with his ears cut off or one eye gouged out, to point the moral to the rest and

terrify others by the severity of the penalty.

[5] 1 His suppliciis celeriter coacto exercitu Lucterium Cadurcum, summae hominem audaciae, cum parte copiarum in Rutenos mittit; ipse in Bituriges proficiscitur. Eius adventu Bituriges ad Aeduos, 2 quorum erant in fide, legatos mittunt subsidium rogatum, quo facilius hostium copias sustinere possint. 3 Aedui de consilio legatorum, quos Caesar ad exercitum reliquerat, copias equitatus peditatusque subsidio Biturigibus mittunt. 4 Qui cum ad flumen Ligerim venissent, quod Bituriges ab Aeduis dividit, paucos dies ibi morati neque flumen transire 5 ausi domum revertuntur legatisque nostris renuntiant se Biturigum perfidiam veritos revertisse, quibus id consili fuisse cognoverint, ut, si flumen transissent, una ex parte ipsi, altera Arverni se circumsisterent. 6 Id eane de causa, quam legatis pronuntiarunt, an perfidia adducti fecerint, quod nihil nobis constat, non videtur pro certo esse proponendum. 7 Bituriges eorum discessu statim cum Arvernīs iunguntur.

[5] By enforcing punishments of this sort he speedily raised an army, and he despatched Lucterius, a Cadurcan of the utmost intrepidity, with a part of the forces into the land of the Ruteni, while he himself started forth against the Bituriges. At his coming the Bituriges sent envoys to the Aedui, in whose allegiance they were, to ask for succour, so as to enable them the easier to withstand the enemy's forces. Acting on the advice of the deputies left by Caesar with the army, the Aedui sent a force of horse and foot to the support of the Bituriges. When they were come to the river Loire, which parts the Bituriges from the Aedui, they halted there for a few days; and, not venturing to cross the river, they returned home, and reported to the Roman deputies that their return was due to fear of treachery on the

part of the Bituriges, who, they learnt, had planned that, if the Aedui crossed the river, they themselves should surround them on the one side, and the Arverni on the other. As we have no clear knowledge whether they acted as they did for the reason which they declared to the deputies, or from motives of treachery, it does not seem proper to state it as a certainty. Upon their departure the Bituriges at once joined the Arverni.

[6] 1 His rebus in Italiam Caesari nuntiatis, cum iam ille urbanas res virtute Cn. Pompei commodiorem in statum pervenisse intellexeret, in Transalpinam Galliam profectus est. 2 Eo cum venisset, magna difficultate adficiebatur, qua ratione ad exercitum pervenire posset. 3 Nam si legiones in provinciam arcesseret, se absente in itinere proelio dimicaturas intellegebat; 4 si ipse ad exercitum contenderet, ne eis quidem eo tempore qui quieti viderentur suam salutem recte committi videbat.

[6] When these matters were reported to Caesar in Italy, he had already received intelligence that affairs in Rome had been brought by the energy of Gnaeus Pompeius into a more satisfactory state, and he therefore set out for Transalpine Gaul. Upon arrival there he was confronted with a great difficulty, as to the means whereby he could reach the army. For if he should summon the legions to the Province, he realised that on the march they might have to fight an action without his presence; if, on the other hand, he himself pressed on to the army, he saw that it was a mistake to entrust his personal safety at that time even to the tribes which appeared to be at peace.

[7] 1 Interim Lucterius Cadurcus in Rutenos missus eam civitatem Arvernīs conciliat. 2 Progressus in Nitiobriges et Gabalos ab utrisque obsides accipit et magna coacta manu in provinciam Narbonem

versus eruptionem facere contendit. 3 Qua re nuntiata Caesar omnibus consiliis anteverendum existimavit, ut Narbonem proficisceretur. 4 Eo cum venisset, timentes confirmat, praesidia in Rutenis provincialibus, Volcis Arecomicis, Tolosatibus circumque Narbonem, quae loca hostibus erant finitima, constituit; 5 partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque, quod ex Italia adduxerat, in Helvios, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire iubet.

[7] Meanwhile Lucterius the Cadurcan, who had been sent into the country of the Ruteni, united that state with the Arverni. He then advanced into the land of the Nitiobriges and the Gabali, and received hostages from both tribes; and so, having collected a large force, he made an effort to overrun the Province in the direction of Narbo. On report of this Caesar thought that he should proceed to Narbo in preference to any other plan. When he was come thither he put new strength into timorous hearts by posting garrisons among the Ruteni of the Province, the Volcae Arecomici, the Tolosates, and around Narbo — all localities adjacent to the enemy; and he ordered a part of the forces of the Province, and the supplementary levy which he had brought with him from Italy, to assemble in the territory of the Helvii, which touches the borders of the Arverni.

[8] 1 His rebus comparatis, represso iam Lucterio et remoto, quod intrare intra praesidia periculosum putabat, in Helvios proficiscitur. 2 Etsi mons Cevenna, qui Arvernos ab Helviis discludit, durissimo tempore anni altissima nive iter impendebat, tamen discussa nive sex in altitudinem pedum atque ita viis patefactis summo militum sudore ad fines Arvernorum pervenit. 3 Quibus oppressis inopinantibus, quod se Cevenna ut muro munitos existimabant, ac ne singulari quidem umquam homini eo tempore anni semitae patuerant,

equitibus imperat, ut quam latissime possint vagentur et quam maximum hostibus terrorem inferant. 4 Celeriter haec fama ac nuntiis ad Vercingetorigem perferuntur; quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumsistunt atque obsecrant, ut suis fortunis consulat, neve ab hostibus diripiantur, praesertim cum videat omne ad se bellum translatum. 5 Quorum ille precibus permotus castra ex Biturigibus movet in Arvernos versus.

[8] By these measures of security Lucterius was checked and set back, for he deemed it dangerous to penetrate the line of garrisons; and so Caesar was free to proceed into the district of the Helvii. Now the range of the Cevennes, which parts the Arverni from the Helvii, in this the severest season of the year was likely to hinder the march with great depth of snow; however, he cleared away snow six feet deep and, having thus opened up the roads by a supreme effort of the troops, reached the borders of the Arverni. They were caught off their guard, for they thought themselves fortified by the Cevennes as by a wall, and not even a solitary traveller had ever found the paths open at that season of the year; and Caesar commanded the cavalry to extend on as broad a front and strike as much terror into the enemy as possible. Rumour and reports hereof were speedily brought to Vercingetorix, and all the Arverni gathered about him panic-stricken, beseeching him to have regard to their fortunes and not suffer them to be pillaged by the enemy, especially now that, as he saw, the whole war had been turned against them. He was prevailed upon by their prayers to move his camp from the country of the Bituriges towards that of the Arverni.

[9] 1 At Caesar biduum in his locis moratus, quod haec de Vercingetorige usu ventura opinione praeceperat, per causam

supplementi equitatusque cogendi ab exercitu discedit; Brutum adulescentem his copiis praeficit; 2 hunc monet, ut in omnes partes equites quam latissime pervagentur: daturum se operam, ne longius triduo ab castris absit. 3 His constitutis rebus suis inopinantibus quam maximis potest itineribus Viennam pervenit. 4 Ibi nactus recentem equitatum, quem multis ante diebus eo praemiserat, neque diurno neque nocturno itinere intermisso per fines Aeduorum in Lingones contendit, ubi duae legiones hiemabant, ut, si quid etiam de sua salute ab Aeduis iniretur consili, celeritate praecurreret. 5 Eo cum pervenisset, ad reliquas legiones mittit priusque omnes in unum locum cogit quam de eius adventu Arvernīs nuntiari posset. 6 Hac re cognita Vercingetorix rursus in Bituriges exercitum reducit atque inde profectus Gorgobinam, Boiorum oppidum, quos ibi Helvetico proelio victos Caesar collocaverat Aeduisque attribuerat, oppugnare instituit.

[9] Caesar, however, having anticipated that this would be the natural course of things for Vercingetorix, halted for two days in this locality; then he left the army on the pretext of assembling the supplementary levy and the cavalry. He put young Brutus in command of the force here, instructing him to let his cavalry range the district in every direction on as broad a front as possible, and saying that he would endeavour to be away from the camp no longer than three days. Having set these matters in order, he reached Vienna by forced marches before his own army expected him. There he found the cavalry which he had sent on thither many days beforehand fit for action, and without a break in his march by day or night he pressed on through the country of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, where two legions were wintering — so speedily as to forestall even the possibility of any design of the Aedui on his own

safety. Upon arrival at the station he sent word to the rest of the legions and concentrated them all in one place, or ever report of his coming could reach the Arverni. When he was informed of this, Vercingetorix led his army back again to the country of the Bituriges, and starting thence determined to assault Gorgobina, a stronghold of the Boii, whom, after their defeat in the battle against the Helvetii, Caesar had established there as dependents of the Aedui.

[10] 1 *Magnam haec res Caesari difficultatem ad consilium capiendum adferebat, si reliquam partem hiemis uno loco legiones contineret, ne stipendiariis Aeduorum expugnatis cuncta Gallia deficeret, quod nullum amicis in eo praesidium videretur positum esse; si maturius ex hibernis educeret, ne ab re frumentaria duris subvectionibus laboraret.* 2 *Praestare visum est tamen omnis difficultates perpeti, quam tanta contumelia accepta omnium suorum voluntates alienare.* 3 *Itaque cohortatus Aeduos de supportando commeatu praemittit ad Boios qui de suo adventu doceant hortenturque ut in fide maneant atque hostium impetum magno animo sustineant.* 4 *Duabus Agedinci legionibus atque impedimentis totius exercitus relictis ad Boios proficiscitur.*

[10] This action of Vercingetorix caused Caesar great difficulty in forming his plan of campaign. If he were to keep the legions in one place for the rest of the winter, he was afraid that the reduction of the tributaries of the Aedui would be followed by a revolt of all Gaul, on the ground that Caesar was found to be no safeguard to his friends. If he were to bring the legions out of cantonments too soon, he was afraid that difficulties of transport would cause trouble with the corn^o-supply. However, it seemed preferable to endure any and every difficulty rather than to put up with so dire a disgrace and thus to

alienate the sympathies of all his own adherents. Therefore he urged the Aedui to see to the transport of supplies, and sent men forward to the Boii to apprise them of his own coming and urge them to remain loyal and courageously to withstand the attack of the enemy. Then, leaving two legions at Agedincum with the baggage-train of the whole army, he set off for the Boii.

[11] 1 Altero die cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset, ne quem post se hostem relinqueret, quo expeditiore re frumentaria uteretur, oppugnare instituit idque biduo circumvallavit; 2 tertio die missis ex oppido legatis de deditione arma conferri, iumenta produci, sescentos obsides dari iubet. 3 Ea qui conficeret, Gaium Trebonium legatum relinquit. Ipse, ut quam primum iter faceret, Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur; 4 qui tum primum allato nuntio de oppugnatione Vellaunoduni, cum longius eam rem ductum iri existimarent, praesidium Cenabi tuendi causa, quod eo mitterent, comparabant. Huc biduo pervenit. 5 Castris ante oppidum positis diei tempore exclusus in posterum oppugnationem differt quaeque ad eam rem usui sint militibus imperat 6 et, quod oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat, veritus ne noctu ex oppido profugerent, duas legiones in armis excubare iubet. 7 Cenabenses paulo ante mediam noctem silentio ex oppido egressi flumen transire coeperunt. Qua re per exploratores nuntiata Caesar legiones 9 quas expeditas esse iusserat portis incensis intromittit atque oppido potitur, perpaucis ex hostium numero desideratis quin cuncti caperentur, quod pontis atque iterum angustiae multitudinis fugam intercluserant. 9 Oppidum diripit atque incendit, praedam militibus donat, exercitum Ligerem traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit.

[11] On the next day he came to Vellaunodunum, a stronghold of the

Senones; and in order to leave no enemy in his rear, and so to expedite the corn-supply, he determined to assault the place, and in two days invested it. On the third day deputies were sent out of the town to treat for surrender, and Caesar ordered arms to be collected, pack-animals furnished, and six hundred hostages given. He left Gaius Trebonius, lieutenant-general, to carry out these orders. He himself, in order to end his march as soon as possible, started for Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes. The news of the siege of Vellaunodunum had been brought to them, and thinking that the business would be long drawn out, they were at this moment beginning to raise a garrison to be sent to Cenabum for the protection thereof. Caesar reached it in two days. He pitched his camp before the town, and as the hour of the day forbade further action he deferred the assault until the morrow. He commanded the troops to make ready the appliances required for the operation; and as the bridge over the river Loire was contiguous to the town of Cenabum, he ordered two legions to bivouac under arms, as he feared the inhabitants might escape from the town by night. A little before midnight the men of Cenabum moved out in silence from the town and began to cross the river. This was reported to Caesar by the scouts; and setting the gates on fire, he sent in the legions which he had ordered to be ready for action, and took possession of the town. Exceeding few of the enemy's total strength were lacking to make the capture complete, inasmuch as the narrowness of the bridge and the roads had prevented the escape of the general population. He plundered and burnt the town, bestowed the booty on the troops, crossed the Loire with the army, and reached the borders of the Bituriges.

[12] 1 Vercingetorix, ubi de Caesaris adventu cognovit, oppugnatione

destitit atque obviam Caesari proficiscitur. 2 Ille oppidum Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum oppugnare instituerat. 3 Quo ex oppido cum legati ad eum venissent oratum ut sibi ignosceret suaeque vitae consuleret, ut celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus, arma conferri, equos produci, obsides dari iubet. 4 Partem obsidum tradita, cum reliqua administrarentur, centurionibus et paucis militibus intromissis, qui arma iumentaue conquirent, equitatus hostium procul visus est, qui agmen Vercingetorigis antecesserat. 5 Quem simul atque oppidani conspexerunt atque in spem auxilii venerunt, clamore sublato arma capere, portas claudere, murum complere coeperunt. Centuriones in oppido, 6 cum ex significatione Gallorum novi aliquid ab eis iniri consilii intellexissent, gladiis dstrictis portas occupaverunt suosque omnes incolumes receperunt.

[12] As soon as he heard of Caesar's approach Vercingetorix abandoned the siege and started to meet him. Caesar, for his part, had determined to assault Noviodunum, a stronghold of the Bituriges stationed on his route. And as deputies came out to him from the place to entreat pardon for their faults and pity for their lives, he ordered arms to be collected, horses to be furnished, hostages to be given, with intent to complete the remainder of the business as speedily as he had accomplished the greater part thereof. Part of the hostages had already been handed over, and the other demands were in process of fulfilment, as some centurions and a few soldiers had been sent in to collect arms and animals, when the enemy's horsemen were sighted at a distance, the vanguard of the column of Vercingetorix. The moment the townsfolk caught sight of them and conceived a hope of assistance, they raised a shout and began to take up their arms, to shut the gates, and to man the wall. When the

centurions in the town perceived by the demonstration on the part of the Gauls that some new design was afoot, they drew their swords, seized the gates, and withdrew all their parties in safety.

[13] 1 Caesar ex castris equitatum educi iubet, proelium equestre committit: laborantibus iam suis Germanos equites circiter CCCC summittit, quos ab initio habere secum instituerat. 2 Eorum impetum Galli sustinere non potuerunt atque in fugam coniecti multis amissis se ad agmen receperunt. Quibus profligatis rursus oppidani perterriti comprehensos eos, quorum opera plebem concitatam existimabant, ad Caesarem perduxerunt seseque ei dediderunt. 3 Quibus rebus confectis, Caesar ad oppidum Avaricum, quod erat maximum munitissimumque in finibus Biturigum atque agri fertilissima regione, profectus est, quod eo oppido recepto civitatem Biturigum se in potestatem redacturum confidebat.

[13] Caesar ordered the cavalry to be brought out of camp, and engaged the cavalry of the enemy. When his own troops began to be distressed he sent in support some four hundred German horse, whom he had made a practice of keeping with him from the first. The Gauls could not resist their charge, and were put to flight, retiring to the main body with a loss of many men. At their discomfiture the townsfolk were once more panic-stricken, and seizing the persons by whose efforts they supposed the populace had been roused, they brought them to Caesar and surrendered themselves to him. When this business had been despatched, Caesar moved off to the town of Avaricum, the largest and best fortified in the territory of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile district. He felt confident that by the recovery of that town he would bring the state of the Bituriges again into his power.

[14] 1 Vercingetorix tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat. 2 Docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea gestum sit. Omnibus modis huic rei studendum, ut pabulatione et commeatu Romani prohibeantur. 3 Id esse facile, quod equitatu ipsi abundant et quod anni tempore subleventur. 4 Pabulum secari non posse; necessario dispersos hostes ex aedificiis petere: hos omnes cotidie ab equitibus deleri posse. 5 Praeterea salutis causa rei familiaris commoda neglegenda: vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio ab via quoque versus, quo pabulandi causa adire posse videantur. Harum ipsis rerum copiam suppetere, 6 quod, quorum in finibus bellum geratur, eorum opibus subleventur: 7 Romanos aut inopiam non laturos aut magno periculo longius ab castris processuros; 8 neque interesse, ipsosne interficiant, impedimentisne exuant, quibus amissis bellum geri non possit. 9 Praeterea oppida incendi oportere, quae non munitione et loci natura ab omni sint periculo tuta, neu suis sint ad detractandam militiam receptacula neu Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus praedamque tollendam. 10 Haec si gravia aut acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimare, liberos, coniuges in servitutem abstrahi, ipsos interfici; quae sit necesse accidere victis.

[14] Having experienced three continuous reverses — at Vellaunodunum, Cenabum, and Noviodunum — Vercingetorix summoned his followers to a convention. He pointed out that the campaign must be conducted in far different fashion from hitherto. By every possible means they must endeavour to prevent the Romans from obtaining forage and supplies. The task was easy, because the Gauls had an abundance of horsemen and were assisted by the season of the year. The forage could not be cut; the enemy must of necessity scatter to seek it from the homesteads; and all these detachments

could be picked off daily by the horsemen. Moreover, for the sake of the common weal, the interests of private property must be disregarded; hamlets and homesteads must be burnt in every direction for such a distance from the route as the enemy seemed likely to penetrate in quest of forage. The Gauls had a supply of such necessities, because they were assisted by the resources of the tribes in whose territory the campaign was being carried on. The Romans would not endure scarcity, or else would advance farther from their camp at great risk; and it made no difference whether the Gauls killed them or stripped them of their baggage, the loss of which rendered the campaign impossible. Moreover, any towns which were not secure from all danger by fortification or natural position ought to be burnt, in order that they might not afford the Gauls a refuge for the avoidance of service, nor offer the Romans a chance to carry off plunder and store of supplies. If these measures seemed grievous or cruel, they ought to take into account that it was far more grievous that their children and their wives should be dragged off into slavery, that they themselves should be slaughtered — the inevitable fate of the conquered.

[15] 1 Omnium consensu hac sententia probata uno die amplius XX urbes Biturigum incenduntur. 2 Hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus: in omnibus partibus incendia conspiciuntur; quae etsi magno cum dolore omnes ferebant, tamen hoc sibi solati proponebant, quod se prope explorata victoria celeriter amissa recuperaturos confidebant. 3 Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeret an defendi. 4 Procumbunt omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges, ne pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem, quae praesidio et ornamento sit civitati, suis manibus succendere cogentur: 5 facile se loci natura defensuros dicunt, quod prope ex omnibus partibus

flumine et palude circumdata unum habeat et perangustum aditum. 6 Datur petentibus venia dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi. Defensores oppido idonei deliguntur.

[15] This view was approved by general consent, and in a single day more than twenty cities of the Bituriges were set on fire. The same was done in the other states, and in every direction fires were to be seen. And although it was a bitter pain to all to endure this, yet they set before themselves thus much of comfort, that they were confident of recovering their losses by a well-nigh assured victory. They deliberated in a general convention whether Avaricum should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges flung themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, entreating that they might not be compelled with their own hands to set light to almost the fairest city in all Gaul, the safeguard and the ornament of their state. They declared that they would easily defend themselves by its natural strength, for it was surrounded by river and marsh on almost every side, and had a single and a very narrow approach. Leave was granted to their petition: Vercingetorix at first argued against it, but afterwards yielded to the prayers of the tribesmen and to compassion for the multitude. Suitable defenders for the town were chosen.

[16] 1 Vercingetorix minoribus Caesarem itineribus subsequitur et locum castris deligit paludibus silvisque munitum ab Avarico longe milia passuum XVI. 2 Ibi per certos exploratores in singula diei tempora quae ad Avaricum agerentur cognoscebat et quid fieri vellet imperabat. 3 Omnes nostras pabulationes frumentationesque observabat dispersosque, cum longius necessario procederent, adoriebatur magnoque incommodo adficiebat, etsi, quantum ratione

provideri poterat, ab nostris occurrebatur, ut incertis temporibus diversisque itineribus iretur.

[16] Vercingetorix followed after Caesar by shorter stages, and chose for his camp a place fenced by marshes and woods, about sixteen miles from Avaricum. There, by means of scouting parties appointed for each section of the day, he could keep himself informed of the operations about Avaricum, and give such orders as he desired. He kept all our foraging and corn^o-collecting parties under observation, and when they were scattered, since they had of necessity to advance farther afield, he would attack them and inflict serious loss; at the same time our men took every precaution they could think of to counteract this, by moving at uncertain times and by different routes.

[17] 1 Castris ad eam partem oppidi positis Caesar, quae intermissa [a] flumine et a paludibus aditum, ut supra diximus, angustum habebat, aggerem apparare, vineas agere, turreas duas constituere coepit: nam circumvallare loci natura prohibebat. 2 De re frumentaria Boios atque Aeduos adhortari non destitit; quorum alteri, quod nullo studio agebant, non multum adiuvant, alteri non magnis facultatibus, quod civitas erat exigua et infirma, celeriter quod habuerunt consumpserunt. 3 Summa difficultate rei frumentariae adfecto exercitu tenuitate Boiorum, indiligentia Aeduorum, incendiis aedificiorum, usque eo ut complures dies frumento milites caruerint et pecore ex longinquioribus vicis adacto extremam famem sustentarent, nulla tamen vox est ab eis audita populi Romani maiestate et superioribus victoriis indigna. 4 Quin etiam Caesar cum in opere singulas legiones appellaret et, si acerbius inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret, universi ab eo, ne id faceret, petebant: 5 sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam

ignominiam acciperent, nusquam infecta re discederent: 6 hoc se ignominiae laturos loco, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent: 7 praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis, qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent, parentarent. 8 Haec eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum mandabant, ut per eos ad Caesarem deferrentur.

[17] Caesar pitched his camp on that side of the town which was unenclosed by the river and the marshes, and had, as above mentioned, a narrow approach. He began to prepare a ramp, to move up mantlets, to build two towers; for the nature of the locality precluded an investment. He did not cease to importune the Boii and the Aedui in the matter of the corn-supply; but the latter, with no zeal for the task, did not help much, and the former, having no great resources, because their state was small and feeble, speedily consumed what they had. So the army suffered from the utmost difficulty in its corn-supply, because of the indigence of the Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the homesteads — so much so that for several days the troops were without corn, and staved off the extremity of famine by driving in cattle from the more distant hamlets. Yet never a word was heard from their lips unworthy of the dignity of Rome and of their previous victories. Nay more, when Caesar addressed single legions at work, and declared that if the burden of scarcity were too bitter for them to bear he would raise the siege, one and all would beseech him not to do so. They had served, they said, for many years under his command without once incurring disgrace, without anywhere leaving a task unaccomplished; they would regard it in the nature of a disgrace if they relinquished the siege they had begun; it were better to endure any and every bitterness than to fail of avenging the Roman citizens who had

perished at Cenabum by the treachery of the Gauls. They entrusted messages in the same spirit to the centurions and tribunes, to be tendered to Caesar through them.

[18] 1 Cum iam muro turre appropinquassent, ex captivis Caesar cognovit Vercingetorigem consumpto pabulo castra movisse propius Avaricum atque ipsum cum equitatu expeditisque, qui inter equites proeliari consuessent, insidiarum causa eo profectum, quo nostros postero die pabulatum venturos arbitraretur. 3 Quibus rebus cognitis media nocte silentio profectus ad hostium castra mane pervenit. 3 Illi celeriter per exploratores adventu Caesaris cognito carros impedimenta que sua in artiores silvas abdiderunt, copias omnes in loco edito atque aperto instruxerunt. 4 Qua re nuntiata Caesar celeriter sarcinas conferri, arma expediti iussit.

[18] By the time that the towers had come near to the wall, Caesar learnt from prisoners that Vercingetorix had exhausted his forage and moved his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was gone forward in person, with horsemen and the light troops that were accustomed to do battle among the horse, to set an ambush in the place whither he believed our troops would come next day to get forage. Having learnt this, Caesar marched in silence at midnight, and reached the enemy's camp in the morning. They had speedily learnt through their scouts of Caesar's coming, and having hidden away their wagons and baggage in the denser part of the woods, they drew up all their force on high, open ground. On report of this Caesar ordered packs to be speedily piled and arms got ready.

[19] 1 Collis erat leniter ab infimo acclivis. Hunc ex omnibus fere partibus palus difficilis atque impedita cingebat non latior pedibus quinquaginta. 2 Hoc se colle interruptis pontibus Galli fiducia loci

continebant generatimque distributi in civitates omnia vada ac saltus eius paludis obtinebant, 3 sic animo parati, ut, si eam paludem Romani perrumpere conarentur, haesitantes premerent ex loco superiore; ut qui propinquitatem loci videret paratos prope aequo Marte ad dimicandum existimaret, qui iniquitatem condicionis perspiceret inani simulatione sese ostentare cognosceret. 4 Indignantibus milites Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli exposcentes edocet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam; quos cum sic animo paratos videat, 5 ut nullum pro sua laude periculum recusent, summae se iniquitatis condemnari debere, nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem. 6 Sic milites consolatus eodem die reducit in castra reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinebant oppidi administrare instituit.

[19] There was a hill sloping generally from the base, and surrounded on almost every side by a difficult and troublesome marsh, not more than fifty feet across. On this hill, having broken up the causeways, the Gauls were established, with all confidence in the position; distributed according to their several nationalities, they held every ford and thicket by the marsh. They were resolved, if the Romans tried to burst through the marsh, to overwhelm them from the higher ground as they stuck fast. So anyone who remarked how near they were thought them prepared to fight to a finish in almost equal battle; but anyone who observed the inequality of the conditions recognised that they were displaying themselves in empty bravado. The troops were furious that the enemy were able to endure the sight of themselves at so brief an interval, and demanded the signal for action. But Caesar pointed out what great loss, in the death of so many gallant men, a victory must necessarily cost, and said that,

when he saw them resolved to refuse no risk that might win him renown, he deserved to be condemned for the uttermost injustice if he did not count their life dearer than his own welfare. Having thus pacified the troops, he led them back to camp the same day, and began to set in order everything else required for the siege of the town.

[20] 1 Vercingetorix, cum ad suos redisset, prodicionis insimulatus, quod castra propius Romanos movisset, quod cum omni equitatu discessisset, quod sine imperio tantas copias reliquisset, quod eius discessu Romani tanta opportunitate et celeritate venissent: 2 non haec omnia fortuito aut sine consilio accidere potuisse; regnum illum Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio 3 – tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit: Quod castra movisset, factum inopia pabuli etiam ipsis hortantibus; quod propius Romanos accessisset, persuasum loci opportunitate, qui se ipsum munitione defenderet: 4 equitum vero operam neque in loco palustri desiderari debuisse et illic fuisse utilem, quo sint profecti. 5 Summam imperi se consulto nulli discedentem tradidisse, ne is multitudinis studio ad dimicandum impelleretur; cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non possent. 6 Romani si casu intervenerint, fortunae, si alicuius indicio vocati, huic habendam gratiam, quod et paucitatem eorum ex loco superiore cognoscere et virtutem despicere potuerint, qui dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint. 7 Imperium se ab Caesare per prodicionem nullum desiderare, quod habere victoria posset, quae iam esset sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata: quin etiam ipsis remittere, si sibi magis honorem tribuere, quam ab se salutem accipere videantur. 8 “Haec ut intellegatis,” inquit, “a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites.” Producit servos, 9 quos in pabulatione paucis ante diebus

exceperat et fame vinculisque excrucieverat. Hi iam ante edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent, 10 milites se esse legionarios dicunt; fame et inopia adductos clam ex castris exisse, si quid frumenti aut pecoris in agris reperire possent: 11 simili omnem exercitum inopia premi, nec iam vires sufficere cuiusquam nec ferre operis laborem posse: itaque statuisset imperatorem, si nihil in oppugnatione oppidi profecissent, triduo exercitum deducere. “Haec,” inquit, “a me,” Vercingetorix, “beneficia habetis, 12 quem proditoris insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine tantum exercitum victorem fame consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est.”

[20] When Vercingetorix returned to his followers, he was accused of treachery because he had moved the camp nearer to the Romans, because he had gone off with all the horse and had left so large a force without a commander, and because on his departure the Romans had come with such speed upon their opportunity. All these circumstances, they said, could not have happened by chance or without design; he preferred to possess the kingship of Gaul by the leave of Caesar rather than by favour of themselves. Accused in such sort, he replied to the charges. As for having moved the camp, it had been done, he said, actually at their own instance, through lack of forage; as for having gone nearer the Romans, he had been influenced by the advantage of a person which could protect itself by its own defences; further, the service of the horse should not have been needed on marshy ground, and it had been useful in the place to which they had marched. It was of purpose that he had committed the chief command to no one at his departure, for fear that his deputy might be driven by the zeal of the host to an engagement — an object for which he saw that all were zealous through weakness of spirit,

because they could not longer endure hardship. If the appearance of the Romans on the scene had been due to chance, the Gauls had fortune to thank; if they had been summoned thither by some informer, the Gauls had that man to thank for the satisfaction of having been able to learn from their higher station the scantiness of their numbers, and to despise a courage which had not ventured to fight but had retired disgracefully to camp. He had no need to obtain from Caesar by treachery a title of command which he could enjoy by a victory already assured to himself and all the Gauls. Nay more, he gave the title back to them if they thought that they were bestowing honour on him rather than deriving security from him. "That you may perceive," he continued, "the sincerity of this statement on my part, listen to Roman soldiers." He brought forward slaves whom he had caught foraging a few days before and had tortured with hunger and chains. These had been previously instructed what to state when questioned, and said that they were soldiers of the line; they had been induced by hunger and want to go secretly out of the camp, to see if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; the whole army was suffering from similar want, no man had any strength left, none could endure the strain of work, and therefore the commander-in-chief had decided, if they made no progress in the siege of the town, in three days to withdraw the army. "These," said Vercingetorix, "are the benefits you have from me, whom you accuse of treachery, by whose effort, without shedding of your own blood, you behold this great victorious army wasted with hunger; while it is I who have seen to it that, when it takes shelter in disgraceful flight, no state shall admit within its borders."

[21] 1 Conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo consuerunt cuius orationem approbant: summum esse

Vercingetorigem ducem, nec de eius fide dubitandum, nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse. 2 Statuunt, ut X milia hominum delecta ex omnibus copiis in oppidum mittantur, 3 nec solis Biturigibus communem salutem committendam censent, quod paene in eo, si id oppidum retinuissent, summam victoriae constare intellegebant.

[21] The whole host shouted with one accord, and clashed their arms together in their peculiar fashion, as they always do for a man whose speech they approve. They declared that Vercingetorix was a consummate leader, that there could be no doubt of his loyalty, and that the campaign could not be conducted with greater intelligence. They decided that ten thousand men picked from the whole force should be sent into the town, and resolved that the common safety of all must not be entrusted to the Bituriges alone, for they perceived that in keeping possession of the town rested almost the whole issue of victory.

[22] 1 Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia cuiusque modi Gallorum occurrebant, ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab quoque traduntur, aptissimum. 2 Nam et laqueis falces avertebant, quas, cum destinaverant, tormentis introrsus reducebant, et aggerem cuniculis subtrahebant, eo scientius quod apud eos magnae sunt ferrariae atque omne genus cuniculorum notum atque usitatum est. 3 Totum autem murum ex omni parte turribus contabulaverant atque has coriis intexerant. 4 Tum crebris diurnis nocturnisque eruptionibus aut aggeri ignem inferebant aut milites occupatos in opere adoriebantur, etstrarum turrium altitudinem, quantum has cotidianus agger expresserat, 5 commissis suarum turrium malis adaequabant, et apertos cuniculos

praeusta et praeacuta materia et pice fervefacta et maximi ponderis saxis morabantur moenibusque appropinquare prohibebant.

[22] The matchless courage of our troops was met by all manner of contrivances on the part of the Gauls; for they are a nation possessed of remarkable ingenuity, and extremely apt to copy and carry out anything suggested to them. So now they sought to drag aside the grappling-hooks with nooses, and, when they had caught them, to pull them back inwards with windlasses; and they tried to under-cut the ramp by mines, the more scientifically because they have large iron-workings in their country, and every kind of mine is known and employed. Further, they had furnished the whole wall on every side with a superstructure of wooden turrets, and covered these over with hides. Then in frequent sallies by day and night they tried to set fire to the ramp or to attack the troops engaged in the works; and whatever increase was made in the height of our turrets by daily additions to the ramp, they equalised by joining fresh scaffolding to their own turrets, and tried to check the progress of our own mines where they opened up, and to prevent their approach to the walls by means of timbers hardened in the fire and sharpened, boiling pitch, and stones of a very great weight.

[23] 1 Muri autem omnes Gallici hac fere forma sunt. Trabes directae perpetuae in longitudinem paribus intervallis, distantes inter se binos pedes, in solo collocantur. 2 Hae revinciuntur introrsus et multo aggere vestiuntur: ea autem, quae diximus, inter valla grandibus in fronte saxis effarciuntur. 3 His collocatis et coagmentatis alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, sed paribus intermissae spatiis singulae singulis saxis interiectis arte contineantur. 4 Sic deinceps omne opus

contextitur, dum iusta muri altitudo expleatur. 5 Hoc cum in speciem varietatemque opus deforme non est alternis trabibus ac saxis, quae rectis lineis suos ordines servant, tum ad utilitatem et defensionem urbium summam habet opportunitatem, quod et ab incendio lapis et ab ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedes quadragenos plerumque introrsus revincta neque perrumpi neque distrahi potest.

[23] All Gallic walls are, as a rule, of the following pattern. Balks are laid on the ground at equal intervals of two feet throughout the length of the wall and at right angles thereto. These are made fast on the inside and banked up with a quantity of earth, while the intervals above mentioned are stopped up on the front side with big stones. When these balks have been laid and clamped together a second course is added above, in such fashion that the same interval as before is kept, and the balks do not touch each other, but each is tightly held at a like space apart by the interposition of single stones. So the whole structure is knit together stage by stage until the proper height of wall is completed. This work is not unsightly in appearance and variety, with alternate balks and stones which keep their proper courses in straight lines; and it is eminently suitable for the practical defence of cities, since the stone protects from fire and the timber from battery, for with continuous balks, generally forty feet long, made fast on the inside it can neither be breached nor pulled to pieces.

[24] 1 His tot rebus impedita oppugnatione milites, cum toto tempore frigore et assiduis imbribus tardarentur, tamen continenti labore omnia haec superaverunt et diebus XXV aggerem latum pedes CCCXXX, altum pedes LXXX extruxerunt. 2 Cum is murum hostium paene contingeret, et Caesar ad opus consuetudine excubaret

militesque hortaretur, ne quod omnino tempus ab opere intermitteretur, paulo ante tertiam vigiliam est animadversum fumare aggerem, quem cuniculo hostes succenderant, 3 eodemque tempore toto muro clamore sublato duabus portis ab utroque latere turrium eruptio fiebat, 4 alii faces atque aridam materiem de muro in aggerem eminus iaciebant, picem reliquasque res, quibus ignis excitari potest, fundebant, ut quo primum curreretur aut cui rei ferretur auxilium vix ratio iniri posset. 5 Tamen, quod instituto Caesaris semper duae legiones pro castris excubabant pluresque partitis temporibus erant in opere, celeriter factum est, ut alii eruptionibus resisterent, alii turrez reducerent aggeremque inter scinderent, omnis vero ex castris multitudo ad restinguendum concurreret.

[24] All these circumstances impeded the siege; but though the troops were delayed throughout by cold and constant showers, still by continuous effort they overcame all these obstacles, and in twenty-five days they built a ramp three hundred and thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. This was almost touching the enemy's wall, and Caesar, according to his custom, bivouacked by the work, urging the troops not to leave off working even for a moment: when shortly before the third watch the ramp was observed to be smoking, for the enemy had set fire to it from a counter-mine. At the same moment a shout was raised all along the wall, and a sortie was made from two gates on either side of the Roman turrets. Others began at long range to hurl torches and dry wood from the wall on to the ramp, and to pour down pitch and everything else that can kindle a fire, so that it was scarcely possible to form an idea in which direction the troops should hasten first or to what point bring assistance. However, as by Caesar's standing order two legions were always in bivouac before

the camp, and more, by a succession of reliefs, were engaged on the earthwork, it was speedily arranged that some troops should resist the sorties, while others dragged back the turrets and cut a gap in the ramp, and the whole host from the camp rushed up to extinguish the fire.

[25] 1 Cum in omnibus locis consumpta iam reliqua parte noctis pugnaretur, semperque hostibus spes victoriae redintegretur, eo magis, quod deustos pluteos turrium videbant nec facile adire apertos ad auxiliandum animadvertabant, semperque ipsi recentes defessis succederent omnemque Galliae salutem in illo vestigio temporis positam arbitrarentur, accidit inspectantibus nobis quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non existimavimus. 2 Quidam ante portam oppidi Gallus per manus sebi ac picis traditas glebas in ignem e regione turris proiciebat: scorpione ab latere dextro traiectus exanimatusque concidit. 3 Hunc ex proximis unus iacentem transgressus eodem illo munere fungebatur; 4 eadem ratione ictu scorpionis exanimato alteri successit tertius et tertio quartus, nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus quam restincto aggere atque omni ex parte summotis hostibus finis est pugnandi factus.

[25] Even when the rest of the night was spent, there was fighting at every point, and ever the enemy's hope of victory was renewed — the more so because they saw that the breastworks of the turrets were burnt up, and observed that without cover it was not easy for the troops to advance in support; and ever, on their side, fresh men replaced the weary, and they believed that the deliverance of Gaul depended on that moment of time. Then there occurred before our eyes a thing which, as it seemed worthy of record, we have not

thought it right to omit. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town was hurling into the fire over against a turret lumps of grease and pitch that were handed to him. He was pierced by a dart from a “scorpion” in the right side and fell dead. One of the party next him stepped over his prostrate body and went on with the same work; and when this second man had been killed in the same fashion by a scorpion-shot, a third succeeded, and to the third a fourth; and that spot was not left bare of defenders until the ramp had been extinguished, the enemy cleared away on every side, and a stop put to the fighting.

[26] 1 Omnia experti Galli, quod res nulla successerat, postero die consilium ceperunt ex oppido profugere hortante et iubente Vercingetorige. 2 Id silentio noctis conati non magna iactura suorum sese effecturos sperabant, propterea quod neque longe ab oppido castra Vercingetorigis aberant, et palus, quae perpetua intercedebat, Romanos ad insequendum tardabat. 3 Iamque hoc facere noctu apparabant, cum matres familiae repente in publicum procurrerunt flentesque proiectae ad pedes suorum omnibus precibus petierunt, ne se et communes liberos hostibus ad supplicium dederent, quos ad capiendam fugam naturae et virium infirmitas impediret. 4 Ubi eos in sententia perstare viderunt, quod plerumque in summo periculo timor misericordiam non recipit, conclamare et significare de fuga Romanis coeperunt. 5 Quo timore perterriti Galli, ne ab equitatu Romanorum viae praeoccuparentur, consilio destiterunt.

[26] The Gauls had tried every expedient, and as nothing had succeeded they resolved next day to escape from the town, as Vercingetorix urged and ordered. They hoped that by attempting it in the silence of night they would accomplish it with no great loss of

their men, because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far from the town, and the marsh, which filled without break all the space between, must hinder the Romans in pursuit. And it was now night and they were already preparing to do this, when the matrons suddenly rushed out of doors, and, flinging themselves with tears at the feet of their men, with prayers and supplications besought them not to surrender, to the tender mercies of the enemy, themselves and their common children, whom natural weakness hampered from taking flight. When they saw that the men were firm in their purpose, for as a rule in extreme peril fear admits no sense of pity, they began to cry out in a body and to make signs to the Romans as touching the flight. So the Gauls were terror-struck by the fear that the Roman cavalry might seize the roads before them, and they abandoned their design.

[27] 1 Postero die Caesar promota turri perfectisque operibus quae facere instituerat, magno coorto imbri non inutilem hanc ad capiendum consilium tempestatem arbitratus est, quod paulo incautius custodias in muro dispositas videbat, suosque languidius in opere versari iussit et quid fieri vellet ostendit. 2 Legionibusque intra vineas in occulto expeditis, cohortatus ut aliquando pro tantis laboribus fructum victoriae perciperent, eis qui primi murum ascendissent praemia proposuit militibusque signum dedit. 3 Illi subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt.

[27] On the morrow, when a turret had been advanced and the works which Caesar had begun to construct were finished, a heavy shower of rain came on. He thought the moment suitable for the execution of his plan, as he observed that the guards on the wall were less

carefully posted than usual; so he ordered his men to move more leisurely about the work, and showed them what he wanted to be done. The legions made ready for action secretly under cover of the mantlets; and having urged them to reap at length the fruit of victory in return for their great labours, he offered prizes to those who should first mount the wall, and gave the signal to the troops. They dashed out suddenly from all sides and speedily lined the wall.

[28] 1 Hostes re nova perterriti muro turribusque deiecti in foro ac locis patentioribus cuneatim constiterunt, hoc animo ut si qua ex parte obviam contra veniretur acie instructa depugnarent. 2 Ubi neminem in aequum locum sese demittere, sed toto undique muro circumfundi viderunt, veriti ne omnino spes fugae tolleretur, abiectis armis ultimas oppidi partes continenti impetu petiverunt 3, parsque ibi, cum angusto exitu portarum se ipsi premerent, a militibus, pars iam egressa portis ab equitibus est interfecta; 4 nec fuit quisquam, qui praedae studeret. Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt. 5 Denique ex omni numero, qui fuit circiter milium XL, vix DCCC, qui primo clamore audito se ex oppido eiecerunt, incolumes ad Vercingetorigem pervenerunt. 6 Quos ille multa iam nocte silentio ex fuga excepit, veritus ne qua in castris ex eorum concursu et misericordia vulgi seditio oreretur, ut procul in via dispositis familiaribus suis principibusque civitatum disparandos deducendosque ad suos curaret, quae cuique civitati pars castrorum ab initio obvenerat.

[28] The enemy were panic-stricken by the surprise, and when they were hurled down from the wall and the turrets they stood fast in wedge-formations in the market-place and the more open places,

with intent, if a movement were made from any side upon them, to deploy into line and fight to a finish. When they saw no one coming down on to the level ground, but that the troops were pouring round everywhere all along the wall, they feared that the hope of escape might be cut off altogether, and, casting away their arms, they made in a continuous rush for the farthest parts of the town; and part, as they crowded one another at the narrow passage of the gates, were slain there by the troops, part after they had got out of the gates by the cavalry, and no one had any thought for plunder. In such fashion the troops, maddened by the massacre at Cenabum and the toil of the siege-work, spared not aged men, nor women, nor children. Eventually of all the number, which was about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who had flung themselves out of the town when they heard the first shout, reached Vercingetorix in safety. He intercepted the refugees late at night in silence, fearing that a mutiny might arise if they were met and pitied by the common sort: therefore, by stationing his own friends and the chiefs of states at some distance along the roads, he took steps to separate them and conduct them to their friends in the part of the camp allotted to each state from the beginning.

[29] 1 Postero die concilio convocato consolatus cohortatusque est ne se admodum animo demitterent, ne perturbarentur incommodo. 2 Non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis, cuius rei fuerint ipsi imperiti. 3 Errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus exspectent. 4 Sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum acciperetur. 5 Id tamen se celeriter maioribus commodis sanaturum. 6 Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates

dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere. 7 Interea aequum esse ab eis communis salutis causa impetrari ut castra munire instituerent, quo facilius repentinos hostium impetus sustinerent.

[29] On the next day, summoning a conference, he comforted them, and exhorted them not greatly to lose heart, nor to be disturbed by the disaster. The Romans had not conquered by courage nor in pitched battle, but by stratagem and by knowledge of siege operations, in which the Gauls had had no experience. It was a mistake to expect in war that all events would have a favourable issue. He himself had never agreed with the defence of Avaricum, and of that he had themselves as witnesses; but this experience of disaster had been brought about by the unwisdom of the Bituriges and the undue complaisance of the rest. However, he would speedily remedy it by greater advantages. He would by his own efforts bring to their side the states which disagreed with the rest of Gaul, and establish one policy for the whole of Gaul, whose unanimity not even the world could resist; and already he had almost brought that to pass. Meanwhile it was reasonable that for the sake of the common weal they should do as he asked and set to work to fortify the camp, in order more easily to resist sudden attacks of the enemy.

[30] 1 Fuit haec oratio non ingrata Gallis, et maxime, quod ipse animo non defecerat tanto accepto incommodo neque se in occultum abdiderat et conspectum multitudinis fugerat; 2 plusque animo providere et praesentire existimabatur, quod re integra primo incendendum Avaricum, post deserendum censuerat. 3 Itaque ut

reliquorum imperatorum res adversae auctoritatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in dies augebatur. 4 Simul in spem veniebant eius adfirmatione de reliquis adiungendis civitatibus; primumque eo tempore Galli castra munire instituerunt et sic sunt animo confirmati, homines insueti laboris, ut omnia quae imperarentur sibi patienda existimarent.

[30] This speech was not unpleasing to the Gauls, chiefly because the commander himself had not failed them after the great disaster they had suffered, nor hidden out of their sight and avoided the gaze of the host; and they considered his foresight and forethought the greater because, while the matter was still open, he had first advocated the burning, and afterwards the abandonment, of Avaricum. And thus, whereas the authority of commanders in general is diminished by reverses, so his position, on the contrary, was daily enhanced by the disaster they had suffered. At the same time they were inclined to be hopeful, by reason of his assurance, about bringing in the remaining states; and on this occasion for the first time the Gauls set to work to fortify the camp, and they were so strengthened in spirit that, although unaccustomed to toil, they thought that they must submit to any commands.

[31] 1 Nec minus quam est pollicitus Vercingetorix animo laborabat ut reliquas civitates adiungeret, atque eas donis pollicitationibusque alliciebat. Huic rei idoneos homines deligebat, 2 quorum quisque aut oratione subdola aut amicitia facillime capere posset. Qui Avarico expugnato refugerant, 3 armandos vestiendosque curat; 4 simul, ut deminutae copiae redintegrarentur, imperat certum numerum militum civitatibus, quem et quam ante diem in castra adduci velit, sagittariosque omnes, quorum erat permagnus numerus in Gallia,

conquiri et ad se mitti iubet. His rebus celeriter id quod Avarici deperierat expletur. 5 Interim Teutomatus, Olloviconis filius, rex Nitiobrigum, cuius pater ab senatu nostro amicus erat appellatus, cum magno equitum suorum numero et quos ex Aquitania conduxerat ad eum pervenit.

[31] As good as his promise, Vercingetorix worked with a will to bring in the remaining states, and tried to attract them by presents and promises. He selected for the purpose suitable persons, each of whom, by guileful speech or by friendly demeanour, should be able most easily to captivate. The men who had escaped at the storming of Avaricum he caused to be armed and clothed; at the same time, to recruit his diminished force, he made requisition of a certain number of soldiers from the states, saying what number he wished for and by what day they should be brought into camp; and he ordered all archers, of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, to be sought out and sent to him. By this means the loss at Avaricum was speedily made up. Meanwhile Teutomatus, the son of Ollovico and king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had been saluted as Friend by the Roman Senate, came to him with a large number of horsemen: some were his own, and others he had hired from Aquitania.

[32] 1 Caesar Avarici complures dies commoratus summamque ibi copiam frumenti et reliqui commeatus nactus exercitum ex labore atque inopia refecit. 2 Iam prope hieme confecta cum ipso anni tempore ad gerendum bellum vocaretur et ad hostem proficisci constituisset, sive eum ex paludibus silvisque elicere sive obsidione premere posset, legati ad eum principes Aeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario tempore civitati subveniat: 3 summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque

regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat. 4 Horum esse alterum Convictolitavem, florentem et illustrem adolescentem, alterum Cotum, antiquissima familia natum atque ipsum hominem summae potentiae et magnae cognationis, cuius frater Valetiacus proximo anno eundem magistratum gesserit. 5 Civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas. Quod si diutius alatur controversia, fore uti pars cum parte civitatis confligat. Id ne accadat, positum in eius diligentia atque auctoritate.

[32] Caesar halted at Avaricum for several days, and by the immense quantity of corn and all other supplies which he found there recuperated the army after toil and want. The winter was now almost spent; the very season was inviting him to continue the war, and he had decided to march against the enemy to see whether he could entice them out of the marshes and woods or reduce them by blockade, when at this juncture chiefs of the Aedui came on a mission to him to beseech his succour for the state in a crisis of absolute urgency. The administration, they said, was in the utmost peril, because, in spite of their ancient custom of electing single magistrates to hold kingly power for a year, two persons were exercising office, and each of them declared himself legally elected. One of the two was Convictolitavis, a successful and distinguished young man; the other Cotus, the scion of a most ancient house, and himself a man of dominant power and noble connection, whose brother Valetiacus had exercised the same office in the previous year. The whole state was in arms, the senate was divided, and each claimant had his own following. If the quarrel were any longer fomented, one part of the state must inevitably come to blows with

the other. The prevention of that depended upon Caesar's energy and authority.

[33] 1 Caesar, etsi a bello atque hoste discedere detrimentosum esse existimabat, tamen non ignorans quanta ex dissensionibus incommoda oriri consuessent, ne tanta et tam coniuncta populo Romano civitas, quam ipse semper aluisset omnibusque rebus ornasset, ad vim atque arma descenderet, atque ea pars quae minus sibi confideret auxilia a Vercingetorige arcesseret, 2 huic rei praevertendum existimavit et, quod legibus Aeduorum eis, qui summum magistratum obtinerent, excedere ex finibus non liceret, ne quid de iure aut de legibus eorum deminuisse videretur, ipse in Aeduos proficisci statuit senatumque omnem et quos inter controversia esset ad se Decetiam evocavit. 3 Cum prope omnis civitas eo convenisset, docereturque paucis clam convocatis alio loco, alio tempore atque oportuerit fratrem a fratre renuntiatum, cum leges duo ex una familia vivo utroque non solum magistratus creari vetarent, sed etiam in senatu esse prohiberent, Catum imperium deponere coegit, Convictolitavem, 4 qui per sacerdotes more civitatis intermissis magistratibus esset creatus, potestatem obtinere iussit.

[33] Caesar thought it disastrous to move away from the war and the enemy, but at the same time he knew full well what great troubles generally arose from such dissensions; and therefore, to prevent this large state, so closely connected with Rome — a state which he himself had always cherished and by every means distinguished — from resorting to armed violence, wherein the party which had less confidence in itself would seek succours from Vercingetorix, he thought the matter should receive his first attention. And, inasmuch as the laws of the Aedui did not suffer those who exercised the

highest office to leave the country, he determined, in order that he might not appear in any way to disparage their rights or laws, to proceed in person into the territory of the Aedui, and summoned all their senate, together with the parties to the quarrel, to join him at Decetia. Almost the whole state assembled there, and he was informed that in a small and secret assembly, held in a place and at a time which were irregular, one brother had declared the other elected, although the law not only forbade two of one house, in the lifetime of both, to be elected as officers of state, but even precluded them from membership of the senate. He therefore compelled Cotus to lay down the supreme authority, and ordered Convictolitavis, who had been elected by the priests, according to the tradition of the state when the succession of civil officers had been interrupted, to hold the power.

[34] 1 Hoc decreto interposito cohortatus Aeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque omnibus omissis his rebus huic bello servirent eaque quae meruissent praemia ab se devicta Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter mitterent, quae in praesidiis rei frumentariae causa disponeret, exercitum in duas partes divisit: 2 quattuor legiones in Senones Parisiosque Labieno ducendas dedit, sex ipse in Arvernos ad oppidum Gergoviam secundum flumen Elaver duxit; equitatus partem illi attribuit, partem sibi reliquit. 3 Qua re cognita Vercingetorix omnibus interruptis eius fluminis pontibus ab altera fluminis parte iter facere coepit.

[34] Having made this decision between them, he urged the Aedui to forget disputes and discord and, leaving all such matters alone, to devote themselves to the present campaign, in anticipation of the

rewards they deserved from himself so soon as the conquest of Gaul was complete. He bade them send him speedily all their horsemen and ten thousand infantry, that he might put them in various garrisons to protect the corn^o-supply. He then divided the army into two parts. Four legions he gave to Labienus to be led against the Senones and Parisii, six he led in person along the river Allier towards the town of Gergovia, in the country of the Arverni; he assigned part of the cavalry to Labienus, part he left for himself. As soon as Vercingetorix heard of it he broke up all the bridges over that river and began to march along the other side thereof.

[35] 1 Cum uterque utrimque exisset exercitus, in conspectu fereque e regione castris castra ponebant dispositis exploratoribus, necubi effecto ponte Romani copias traducerent. Erat in magnis Caesaris difficultatibus res, ne maiorem aetatis partem flumine impediretur, quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet. 2 Itaque, ne id accideret, silvestri loco castris positus e regione unius eorum pontium, quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat, postero die cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit; 3 reliquas copias cum omnibus impedimentis, ut consueverat, misit, apertis quibusdam cohortibus, uti numerus legionum constare videretur. 4 His quam longissime possent egredi iussis, cum iam ex diei tempore coniecturam ceperat in castra perventum, isdem sublicis, quarum pars inferior integra remanebat, pontem reficere coepit. 5 Celeriter effecto opere legionibusque traductis et loco castris idoneo delecto reliquas copias revocavit. 6 Vercingetorix re cognita, ne contra suam voluntatem dimicare cogeretur, magnis itineribus antecessit.

[35] When the two armies had drawn apart, they proceeded to pitch camp in sight of each other and almost opposite, with the enemy's

scouts posted about to prevent the Romans from constructing a bridge and effecting a passage. Caesar's position was thus beset by great difficulties; for there was danger that the river would block him for the greater part of the summer, as the Allier is not usually fordable in the autumn. To prevent this, therefore, he pitched camp in a wooded spot opposite one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be cut away, and on the morrow he kept two legions hidden, sending on the rest of the force with all the baggage, according to his custom, and opening out some of the cohorts to make the number of the legions appear the same as usual. This force was ordered to march out as far as possible, and when by the time of day he conjectured that they were safe in camp, he began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles as before, the lower part of which was still intact. The work was speedily completed and the legions put across; and when a suitable camping-ground had been chosen, he recalled the rest of the force. On report of this, Vercingetorix moved ahead by forced marches, in order that he might not be forced to fight against his own wish.

[36] 1 Caesar ex eo loco quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit equestrique eo die proelio levi facto perspecto urbis situ, quae posita in altissimo monte omnes aditus difficiles habebat, de expugnatione desperavit, de obsessione non prius agendum constituit, quam rem frumentariam expedisset. 2 At Vercingetorix castris, prope oppidum positis, mediocribus circum se intervallis separatim singularum civitatum copias collocaverat atque omnibus eius iugi collibus occupatis, qua despici poterat, 3 horribilem speciem praebebat; principesque earum civitatum, quos sibi ad consilium capiendum delegerat, prima luce cotidie ad se convenire iubebat, seu quid communicandum, seu quid administrandum videretur; 4 neque ullum

fere diem intermittebat quin equestri proelio interiectis sagittariis, quid in quoque esset animi ac virtutis suorum perspiceret. 5 Erat e regione oppidi collis sub ipsis radicibus montis, egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisis; quem si tenerent nostri, et aquae magna parte et pabulatione libera prohibitori hostes videbantur. 6 Sed is locus praesidio ab his non nimis firmo tenebatur. 7 Tamen silentio noctis Caesar ex castris egressus, priusquam subsidio ex oppido veniri posset, deiecto praesidio potitus loco duas ibi legiones collocavit fossamque duplicem duodenum pedum a maioribus castris ad minora perduxit, ut tuto ab repentino hostium incursu etiam singuli commeare possent.

[36] From that position Caesar reached Gergovia in five days' march. On the fifth day a slight cavalry skirmish took place; and having reconnoitred the position of the city, which was set upon a very lofty height, with difficult approaches on every side, he despaired of taking it by storm, and he determined not to attempt a blockade until he had secured his corn-supply. Vercingetorix, for his part, had pitched camp near the town, and posted the contingent of each state separately at short intervals around himself. Every eminence on the ridge from which a bird's-eye view was possible had been seized, and the appearance was formidable. He would order the chiefs of the states, whom he had chosen to assist him in council, to assemble at dawn daily at his quarters in case there should seem to be anything to communicate or to arrange. And scarcely a day passed that he did not put to the test, by an encounter of horsemen with archers placed among them, the spirit and the courage of each of his followers. Opposite the town there was a hill at the very foot of the mountain, an exceedingly strong position, precipitous on every side. If our troops secured this they thought they could cut off the enemy at once

from great part of their water-supply and from freedom of foraging. The post was held, however, by the enemy with a garrison, albeit not a very strong one. None the less, Caesar marched out of camp in the silence of night, dislodged the garrison before it could be reinforced from the town, and made himself master of the position. He posted two legions there, and ran a double ditch, twelve feet broad in each case, from the greater to the lesser camp, so that even single soldiers could pass to and fro safe from a sudden onset of the enemy.

[37] 1 Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Convictolitavis Aeduus, cui magistratum adiudicatum a Caesare demonstravimus, sollicitatus ab Arvernīs pecunia cum quibusdam adolescentibus colloquitur; quorum erat princeps Litaviccus atque eius fratres, amplissima familia nati adolescentes. 2 Cum his praemium communicat hortaturque, ut se liberos et imperio natos meminerint. 3 Unam esse Aeduorum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam detineat; eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis in Gallia non fore. 4 Esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum, sic tamen, ut iustissimam apud eum causam obtinuerit; sed plus communi libertati tribuere. 5 Cur enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam Romani ad Aeduos veniant? 6 Celeriter adolescentibus et oratione magistratus et praemio deductis, cum se vel principes eius consili fore profiterentur, ratio perficiendi quaerebatur, quod civitatem temere ad suscipiendum bellum adduci posse non confidebant. 7 Placuit ut Litaviccus decem illis milibus, quae Caesari ad bellum mitterentur, praeficeretur atque ea ducenda curaret, fratresque eius ad Caesarem praecurrerent. Reliqua qua ratione agi placeat constituunt.

[37] During these operations about Gergovia Convictolitavis the

Aeduan, to whom, as above mentioned, the magistracy had been adjudged by Caesar, was tempted by a bribe on the part of the Arverni, and held converse with certain young men, among whom the leaders were Litaviccus and his brethren, young scions of a most distinguished house. The Aeduan shared his bribe with them, and urged them to remember that they were born to freedom and command. The state of the Aedui was the only bar to the absolutely certain victory of Gaul; by its influence the rest were held in check; if it were brought over, the Romans would have no foothold in Gaul. It was true that he himself had received some benefit at Caesar's hands, but simply in the sense that he had won an entirely just cause before him, and he had a greater duty to the general liberty. Why should the Aedui come to Caesar to decide a question of their own right and law, rather than the Romans to the Aedui? The young men were speedily won over by the speech of the magistrate and by the bribe, and avowed that they would be the very first to support his design. Then they began to seek a means of executing it, because they were not sure that the state could be induced off-hand to undertake a war. It was resolved that Litaviccus should be put in command of the ten thousand soldiers who were to be sent to Caesar for the war, and should be responsible for their leading, while his brethren hastened forward to Caesar. They determined the plan to be adopted for carrying out the rest of the scheme.

[38] 1 Litaviccus accepto exercitu, cum milia passuum circiter XXX ab Gergovia abesset, convocatis subito militibus lacrimans, "Quo proficiscimur," inquit, "milites? 2 Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit; principes civitatis, Eporedorix et Viridomarus, insimulati prodicionis ab Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt. 3 Haec ab ipsis cognoscite, qui ex ipsa caede fugerunt: nam ego

fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore prohibeor, 4 quae gesta sunt, pronuntiare.” Producuntur hi quos ille edocuerat quae dici vellet, atque eadem, quae Litaviccus pronuntiaverat, multitudini exponunt: multos equites Aeduorum interfectos, 5 quod collocti cum Arvernīs dicerentur; ipsos se inter multitudinem militum occultasse atque ex media caede fugisse. 6 Conclamant Aedui et Litaviccum obsecrant ut sibi consulat. “Quasi vero,” inquit ille, “consili sit res, ac non necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernīs nosmet coniungere. 7 An dubitamus quin nefario facinore admissō Romani iam ad nos interficiendos concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est, 8 persequamur eorum mortem qui indignissime interierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus.” Ostendit cives Romanos, qui eius praesidi fiducia una erant: 9 magnum numerum frumenti commeatusque diripit, ipsos crudeliter excruciatos interficit. 10 Nuntios tota civitate Aeduorum dimittit, eodem mendacio de caede equitum et principum permovet; hortatur ut simili ratione atque ipse fecerit suas iniurias persequantur.

[38] Litaviccus took over the army, and when he was about thirty miles from Gergovia he suddenly called together the troops, and with tears addressed them: “Whither, soldiers, are we proceeding? All our horsemen, all our chivalry is perished; Eporedorix and Viridomarus, chief men of our state, have been accused of treachery by the Romans, and put to death with their cause unheard. This you shall learn from men who actually escaped from that same massacre; for all my own brethren and all my kindred have been put to death, and grief prevents me from declaring what was brought to pass.” The persons whom he had instructed what they were to say were brought forward, and set forth to the host the same tale which Litaviccus had declared — that many horsemen of the Aedui had been put to death

because it was alleged that they had held converse with the Arverni; that they themselves had hidden in the general throng of soldiers, and so had escaped from the midst of the massacre. The Aedui shouted with one accord and entreated Litaviccus to take counsel for their safety. "As if," quoth he, "this were a matter of counsel, and it were not necessary for us to make speed to Gergovia and join ourselves to the Arverni! Or can we doubt that after committing an abominable crime the Romans are already hastening hither to slay us? Wherefore, if we have any spirit in us, let us avenge the death of those who have perished most shamefully, and let us slay these brigands." He pointed to Roman citizens, who were accompanying his force in reliance on his safeguard; he plundered a large quantity of corn and supplies, and put the Romans to death with cruel tortures. He sent messages throughout the state of the Aedui and sought to arouse them by the same falsehood concerning the massacre of horsemen and chiefs, urging them to avenge their own wrongs in the same fashion as he himself had done.

[39] 1 Eporedorix Aeduus, summo loco natus adulescens et summae domi potentiae, et una Viridomarus, pari aetate et gratia, sed genere dispari, quem Caesar ab Diviciaco sibi traditum ex humili loco ad summam dignitatem perduxerat, in equitum numero convenerant nominatim ab eo evocati. 2 His erat inter se de principatu contentio, et in illa magistratum controversia alter pro Convictolitavi, alter pro Coto summis opibus pugnaverant. 3 Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavicci consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem defert; orat ne patiatur civitatem pravis adolescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi Romani deficere; quod futurum provideat, si se tot hominum milia cum hostibus coniunxerint, quorum salutem neque propinqui neglegere, neque civitas levi momento aestimare posset.

[39] Eporedorix the Aeduan, a young man of the highest rank and of supreme influence in his own country, and with him Viridomarus, his peer in age and popularity, but not in birth — he had been commended by Diviciacus to Caesar, who had advanced him from a humble station to a pre-eminent position — had come along with the horsemen in response to a personal summons from Caesar. These two had a struggle between them for chieftaincy, and in the late dispute between the magistrates the one had fought with might and main for Convictolitavis, the other for Cotus. Of these two, Eporedorix, when he learnt the design of Litaviccus, reported the matter about midnight to Caesar. He besought him not to allow the state to fall away from the friendship of Rome through the mischievous designs of the young men; yet this, as he foresaw, would happen if those thousands of troops joined forces with the enemy, for their kindred could not ignore their safety, nor could the state account it of slight importance.

[40] 1 Magna adfectus sollicitudine hoc nuntio Caesar, quod semper Aeduorum civitati praecipue indulserat, nulla interposita dubitatione legiones expeditas quattuor equitatumque omnem ex castris educit; 2 nec fuit spatium tali tempore ad contrahenda castra, quod res posita in celeritate videbatur; Gaium Fabium legatum cum legionibus duabus castris praesidio relinquit. 3 Fratres Litavicci cum comprehendi iussisset, paulo ante reperit ad hostes fugisse. 4 Adhortatus milites, ne necessario tempore itineris labore permoveantur, cupidissimis omnibus progressus milia passuum XXV agmen Aeduorum conspicatus immisso equitatu iter eorum moratur atque impedit interdicitque omnibus ne quemquam interficiant. Eporedorigem et Viridomarum, 5 quos illi interfectos existimabant, inter equites versari suosque appellare iubet. 6 His cognitis et

Litavicci fraude perspecta Aedui manus tendere, deditionem significare et proiectis armis mortem deprecari incipiunt. 7 Litaviccus cum suis clientibus, quibus more Gallorum nefas est etiam in extrema fortuna deserere patronos, Gergoviam profugit.

[40] This report caused Caesar great anxiety, because he had always shown especial indulgence to the state of the Aedui; and without a moment's hesitation he marched four legions in light order, and all the cavalry, out of camp. There was no time at such a crisis to reduce the camp-area, as the issue seemed to depend on speed; he left Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, with two legions as camp-garrison. He ordered the brethren of Litaviccus to be arrested, but found that they had fled to the enemy shortly before. He urged the troops not to be disturbed by the fatigue of a march which the emergency rendered necessary, and then, amid the greatest eagerness of all ranks, he advanced for five-and-twenty miles, when he caught sight of the column of the Aedui. By sending on the cavalry he checked and hampered the enemy's march, and he forbade all to put any man to the sword. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whom the other side supposed to be slain, he ordered to move among the horsemen and address their own people. When they were recognized, and the deceit of Litaviccus was discovered, the Aedui began to stretch out their hands in token of surrender and, casting away their arms, to beg for mercy. Litaviccus escaped to Gergovia with his dependents; for, according to the custom of Gaul, it is a crime in dependents to desert their patrons, even in desperate case.

[41] 1 Caesar nuntiis ad civitatem Aeduorum missis, qui suo beneficio conservatos docerent quos iure belli interficere potuisset, tribusque horis noctis exercitui ad quietem datis castra ad Gergoviam movit. 2

Medio fere itinere equites a Fabio missi, quanto res in periculo fuerit, exponunt. Summis copiis castra oppugnata demonstrant, cum crebro integri defessis succederent nostrosque assiduo labore defatigarent, quibus propter magnitudinem castrorum perpetuo esset isdem in vallo permanendum. 3 Multitudine sagittarum atque omnis generis telorum multos vulneratos; ad haec sustinenda magno usui fuisse tormenta. 4 Fabium discessu eorum duabus relictis portis obstruere ceteras pluteosque vallo addere et se in posterum diem similemque casum apparare. 5 His rebus cognitis Caesar summo studio militum ante ortum solis in castra pervenit.

[41] Caesar sent messengers to the state of the Aedui to report that the men, whom by right of war he might have put to death, had by his own favour been saved; and then, having given the army three hours of the night for rest, struck camp for Gergovia. About halfway thither some troopers sent by Fabius related how perilous had been their case. They reported that the camp had been attacked in full force, fresh men frequently taking the place of the fatigued and wearing down our troops by incessant toil, inasmuch as the size of the camp obliged the same men to continue throughout on the rampart. Many men, they said, had been wounded by the swarms of arrows and of every kind of missile; the artillery, however, had proved of great use in resisting these assaults; and, on the withdrawal of the enemy, Fabius was barricading all the gates except two, setting screens to the rampart, and preparing for a like event on the morrow. On report of this, Caesar reached the camp before sunrise, by a supreme effort of the troops.

[42] 1 Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Aedui primis nuntiis ab Litavico acceptis nullum sibi ad cognoscendum spatium relinquunt.

2 Impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas, quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata, ut levem auditionem habeant pro re comperta. 3 Bona civium Romanorum diripiunt, caedes faciunt, in servitutem abstrahunt. 4 Adiuvat rem proclinatam Convictolitavis plebemque ad furorem impellit, ut facinore admissio ad sanitatem reverti pudeat. 5 Marcum Aristium, tribunum militum, iter ad legionem facientem fide data ex oppido Cabillono educunt: idem facere cogunt eos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant. 6 Hos continuo (in) itinere adorti omnibus impedimentis exuunt; repugnantes diem noctemque obsident; multis utrimque interfectis maiorem multitudinem armatorum concitant.

[42] During these operations about Gergovia the Aedui received the first messages sent by Litaviccus. They left themselves no time to investigate: some were influenced by avarice, others by anger and the recklessness which is specially characteristic of their race, treating frivolous hearsay as assured fact. They plunder the goods of Roman citizens, massacred some, dragged off others into slavery. Convictolitavis encouraged the general tendency, and urged the common folk to fury, that by committing crime they might be ashamed to return to a right mind. By giving him a pledge of safety they then induced Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was travelling to his legion, to quit the town of Cabillonum; those who had settled there for the sake of trade they compelled to do the same. Then they attacked them the moment they started on their journey, stripped them of all their baggage, and, when they defended themselves, blockaded them for a day and a night. After many persons had been slain on both sides, they brought up a still greater multitude of armed men.

[43] 1 Interim nuntio allato omnes eorum milites in potestate Caesaris teneri, concurrunt ad Aristium, nihil publico factum consilio demonstrant; quaestionem de bonis direptis decernunt, 2 Litavici fatrumque bona publicant, legatos ad Caesarem sui purgandi gratia mittunt. 3 Haec faciunt recipiendorum suorum causa; sed contaminati facinore et capti compendio ex direptis bonis, quod ea res ad multos pertinebat, timore poenae exterriti consilia clam de bello inire incipiunt civitatesque reliquas legationibus sollicitant. 4 Quae tametsi Caesar intellegebat, tamen quam mitissime potest legatos appellat: nihil se propter inscientiam levitatemque vulgi gravius de civitate iudicare neque de sua in Aeduos benevolentia deminuere. 5 Ipse maiorem Galliae motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumsisteretur, consilia inibat quemadmodum ab Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret, 6 ne profectio nata ab timore defectionis similis fugae videretur.

[43] In the midst of this a message was brought that all their soldiers were prisoners in the power of Caesar. At once they ran with one consent to Aristius, declaring that the state had had no share in their design or deed. They ordered an inquiry as touching the plundered goods, they confiscated the goods of Litavicus and his brethren, and sent deputies to Caesar to clear themselves. This they did to recover their kith and kin; but they were stained with crime, they were tempted by the profit to be made of plundered goods, as the business concerned a large number of persons; so, as they were alarmed by the fear of penalty, they began to entertain secret designs of war and to sound the other states by means of deputations. Caesar was fully aware of this; nevertheless he accosted their deputies as gently as possible, assuring them that the ignorance and inconsequence of the common people did not make him judge more severely of the state,

nor diminish aught of his personal goodwill towards the Aedui. He himself was anticipating a greater rising in Gaul; and that he might not be surrounded by all the states, he began to plan how he might withdraw from Gergovia and once more concentrate the whole army without allowing a departure occasioned by fear of the revolt to resemble flight.

[44] 1 Haec cogitanti accidere visa est facultas bene rei gerendae. Nam cum in minora castra operis perspiciendi causa venisset, animadvertit collem, qui ab hostibus tenebatur, nudatum hominibus, qui superioribus diebus vix prae multitudine cerni poterat. 2 Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam, quorum magnus ad eum cotidie numerus confluebat. 3 Constat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed hunc silvestrem et angustum, qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; huic loco vehementer illos timere nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur: ad hunc muniendum omnes a Vercingetorige evocatos.

[44] While he reflected on these matters, a chance of successful action seemed to offer itself. He had come to the lesser camp to inspect the works, when he noticed that a hill held by the enemy, and on the previous days scarcely visible for the crowd upon it, was undefended. Surprised thereat, he asked deserters, a large number of whom were flocking to him daily, for the reason. All agreed in stating, what Caesar himself had already learnt through scouts, that the crest of the ridge there was almost level, but that this hill was wooded and narrow where it gave access to the other side of the town. For this spot the Gauls, they said, were grievously alarmed,

and had now no alternative but to believe that if, after the seizure of one hill by the Romans, they lost the other, they would find themselves to be almost invested, and cut off from all egress and from foraging. Vercingetorix had accordingly called out every man to fortify this hill.

[45] 1 Hac re cognita Caesar mittit complures equitum turmas; eis de media nocte imperat, ut paulo tumultuosius omnibus locis vagarentur. 2 Prima luce magnum numerum impedimentorum ex castris mulorumque produci deque his stramenta detrahi mulionesque cum cassidibus equitum specie ac simulatione collibus circumvehi iubet. 3 His paucos addit equites qui latius ostentationis causa vagarentur. Longo circuitu easdem omnes iubet petere regiones. 4 Haec procul ex oppido videbantur, ut erat a Gergovia despectus in castra, neque tanto spatio certi quid esset explorari poterat. 5 Legionem unam eodem iugo mittit et paulum progressam inferiore constituit loco silvisque occultat. 6 Augetur Gallis suspicio, atque omnes illo ad munitionem copiae traducuntur. 7 Vacua castra hostium Caesar conspicatus tectis insignibus suorum occultatisque signis militaribus raros milites, ne ex oppido animadverterentur, ex maioribus castris in minora traducit legatisque, quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit ostendit: 8 in primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur; 9 quid iniquitas loci habeat incommodi proponit: hoc una celeritate posse mutari; occasionis esse rem, non proeli. 10 His rebus expositis signum dat et ab dextra parte alio ascensu eodem tempore Aeduos mittit.

[45] On this information Caesar sent several troops of cavalry thither just after midnight, with orders to range in every direction in rather

more noisy fashion than usual. At daybreak he commanded a large quantity of baggage-mules to be brought forth from camp, and the muleteers to take off the packs, and with helmets on their heads to ride round the hills, like cavalry to all seeming. With them he put a few cavalry, to range more widely by way of demonstration, and ordered them all to make for the same general destination by a long circuit. The proceeding was noticed afar from the town, as there was a bird's-eye view from Gergovia into the camp; but at so great a distance the real meaning thereof could not be discovered. He despatched one legion in the same direction, and when it had advanced a little way he halted it on the lower ground and concealed it in the woods. The suspicion of the Gauls was increased, and all their force was brought to the spot to fortify it. When Caesar saw that the enemy's camp was empty, covering the badges of his men and concealing the war-standards, he moved soldiers from the greater to the lesser camp in small parties so as not to attract attention from the town. He showed the lieutenant-generals whom he had put in command of each legion what he wished to be done: first and foremost he instructed them to keep the troops in hand, lest in the zeal for battle or the hope of booty they might advance too far. He explained the disadvantage caused by the inequality of the ground, and said that this could be remedied by speed alone: it was a question of surprise, not of battle. After these explanations he gave the signal, and started the Aedui at the same moment by another ascent, on the right side.

[46] 1 Oppidi murus ab planitie atque initio ascensus recta regione, si nullus anfractus intercederet, MCC passus aberat: 2 quidquid huc circuitus ad molliendum clivum accesserat, id spatium itineris augebat. 3 A medio fere colle in longitudinem, ut natura montis

ferebat, ex grandibus saxis sex pedum murum qui nostrorum impetum tardaret praeduxerant Galli, atque inferiore omni spatio vacuo relicto superiorem partem collis usque ad murum oppidi densissimis castris compleverant. 4 Milites dato signo celeriter ad munitionem perveniunt eamque transgressi trinis castris potiuntur; 5 ac tanta fuit in castris capiendis celeritas, ut Teutomatus, rex Nitiobrigum, subito in tabernaculo oppressus, ut meridie conquieverat, superiore corporis parte nudata vulnerato equo vix se ex manibus praedantium militum eriperet.

[46] From the level where the ascent began the wall of the town was twelve hundred paces distant in a straight line, if there were no curve to consider. Any deviation added to ease the slope of necessity increased the distance to be marched. About halfway up the hill, the Gauls had put up a six-foot covering-wall of large stones, running lengthways so as to follow the contour of the height, to check our attack; and leaving all the lower area unoccupied, they had filled all the upper part of the hill, right up to the wall of the town, with their camps, closely crowded together. When the signal was given, the troops speedily reached the fortification, crossed it, and took possession of three camps, and so great was their speed in capturing the camps that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, caught suddenly in his tent in a noonday sleep, barely escaped from the hands of the plundering troops, with the upper part of his body bare, and his horse wounded.

[47] 1 Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat, Caesar receptui cani iussit legionique decimae, quacum erat, continuo signa constituit. 2 Ac reliquarum legionum milites non exaudito sono tubae, quod satis magna valles intercedebat, tamen ab tribunis militum legatisque, ut

erat a Caesare praeceptum, retinebantur. 3 Sed elati spe celeris victoriae et hostium fuga et superiorum temporum secundis proeliis nihil adeo arduum sibi esse existimaverunt quod non virtute consequi possent, neque finem prius sequendi fecerunt quam muro oppidi portisque appropinquare. Tum vero ex omnibus urbis partibus orto clamore, 4 qui longius aberant repentino tumultu perterriti, cum hostem intra portas esse existimarent, sese ex oppido eiecerunt. 5 Matres familiae de muro vestem argentumque iactabant et pectore nudo prominentes passis manibus obtestabantur Romanos, ut sibi parcerent neu, sicut Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus quidem atque infantibus abstinerent: 6 nonnullae de muris per manus demissae sese militibus tradebant. 7 Lucius Fabius, centurio legionis VIII, quem inter suos eo die dixisse constabat excitari se Avaricensibus praemiis neque commissurum, ut prius quisquam murum ascenderet, tres suos nactus manipulares atque ab eis sublevatus murum ascendit: hos ipse rursus singulos exceptans in murum extulit.

[47] Having thus secured his particular purpose, Caesar ordered the retreat to be sounded, and at once halted the Tenth Legion, which he had accompanied. But the rank and file of the other legions did not hear the trumpet-call, as a considerable valley lay in between; none the less, efforts were made by the tribunes and lieutenant-generals to hold them back, according to Caesar's instructions. Elated, however, and by the hope of a speedy victory, by the flight of the enemy, and their successful engagements on previous occasions, they thought that nothing was so difficult as to be unattainable by their valour, and they did not make an end of pursuing until they neared the wall and the gates of the town. Then, indeed, shouting arose from all parts of the city, and those who were farther away were terror-struck at the sudden uproar, and, believing that the enemy was within the gates,

flung out of the town. Matrons cast clothing and silver from the wall, and with bare breast and outstretched hands implored the Romans to spare them, and then to do as they had done at Avaricum, holding their hand not even from women and children. Some of the women were lowered by hand from the wall, and were fain to deliver themselves to the troops. Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the Eighth Legion, who was known to have said that day among his company that he was spurred on by the rewards at Avaricum, and would allow no one to mount the wall before him, got three men of his company, was lifted up by them, and mounted the wall. Then he in turn took hold of them one by one and pulled them up on to the wall.

[48] 1 Interim ei qui ad alteram partem oppidi, ut supra demonstravimus, munitionis causa convenerant, primo exaudito clamore, inde etiam crebris nuntiis incitati, oppidum a Romanis teneri, praemissis equitibus magno concursu eo contenderunt. 2 Eorum ut quisque primus venerat, sub muro consistebat suorumque pugnantium numerum augebat. 3 Quorum cum magna multitudo convenisset, matres familiae, quae paulo ante Romanis de muro manus tendebant, suos obtestari et more Gallico passum capillum ostentare liberosque in conspectum proferre coeperunt. 4 Erat Romanis nec loco nec numero aequa contentio; simul et cursu et spatio pugnae defatigati non facile recentes atque integros sustinebant.

[48] Meanwhile the Gauls who had assembled, as above mentioned, at the other side of the town to make a fortification first of all heard the shouting, and then came frequent messages that the town was held by the Romans to arouse them further; so they sent the horsemen in advance and hastened thither in a mighty stream. Each as he arrived

took his stand under the wall and swelled the number of their fighting men. When a great host of them had assembled, the matrons who a moment before were stretching out their hands to the Romans from the wall began to adjure their own men and, in Gallic fashion, to show dishevelled hair and to bring their children forward into view. The Romans had no fair contest in ground or numbers; they were tired out by the speedy march and the duration of the battle, and could not easily resist men that were fresh and unhurt.

[49] 1 Caesar, cum iniquo loco pugnari hostiumque augeri copias videret, praemetuens suis ad Titum Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit, ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret, 2 ut, si nostros loco depulsos vidisset, quo minus libere hostes insequerentur terreret. Ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus, ubi constiterat, eventum pugnae expectabat.

[49] Caesar saw that the battle was being fought on unfavourable ground and that the strength of the enemy was increasing. Anxious, therefore, for his troops, he sent a message to Titus Sextius, the lieutenant-general, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, bidding him bring the cohorts speedily out of the camp and post them at the foot of the hill on the right flank of the enemy, so that, if he saw our troops driven down from the position, he might deter the enemy from an indiscriminate pursuit. He himself advanced a little with the legion from the place where he had halted, and awaited the issue of the battle.

[50] 1 Cum acerrime comminus pugnaretur, hostes loco et numero, nostri virtute confiderent, subito sunt Aedui visi ab latere nostris aperto, quos Caesar ab dextra parte alio ascensu manus distinendae

causa miserat. 2 Hi similitudine armorum vehementer nostros perterruerunt, ac tametsi dextris humeris exsertis animadvertabantur, quod insigne pactum esse consuerat, tamen id ipsum sui fallendi causa milites ab hostibus factum existimabant. 3 Eodem tempore Lucius Fabius centurio quique una murum ascenderant circumventi atque interfecti muro praecipitabantur. 4 Marcus Petronius, eiusdem legionis centurio, cum portam excidere conatus esset, a multitudine oppressus ac sibi desperans multis iam vulneribus acceptis manipularibus suis, qui illum secuti erant, “Quoniam,” inquit, “me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. 5 Vos data facultate vobis consulite.” Simul in medios hostes irrupit duobusque interfectis reliquos a porta paulum summovit. 6 Conantibus auxiliari suis “Frustra,” inquit, “meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem recipite.” Ita pugnans post paulum concidit ac suis saluti fuit.

[50] The battle was continued most fiercely at close quarters: the enemy trusted to position and numbers, our troops to courage. Suddenly the Aedui, whom Caesar had sent on the right by another line of ascent to divert the enemy's forces, were seen on the exposed flank of our troops. The similarity of their armament to that of the Gauls grievously alarmed the Romans; and although it was noticed that they had their right shoulders uncovered — the distinction agreed upon by custom — still the troops were disposed to think that even this had been done by the enemy to deceive them. At the same moment the centurion Lucius Fabius and those who had mounted the wall along with him were surrounded, slain, and hurled from the wall. Marcus Petronius, a centurion of the same legion, had tried to

cut down a gate, but was overpowered by superior numbers and in desperate case. Already he had received many wounds, and he cried to the men of his company who had followed him: “As I cannot save myself with you, I will at any rate provide for *your* life, whom in the eager desire for glory I have brought into danger. When the chance is given do you look after yourselves.” With this he burst into the midst of the enemy, and by slaying two shifted the rest a little from the gate. When his men tried to assist him he said: “In vain do you try to rescue *my* life, for blood and strength are already failing me. Wherefore depart while you have a chance and get you back to the legion.” So, a moment later, he fell fighting and saved his men.

[51] 1 Nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deiecti sunt loco. Sed intolerantius Gallos insequentes legio decima tardavit, quae pro subsidio paulo aequiore loco constiterat. 2 Hanc rursus XIII legionis cohortes exceperunt, quae ex castris minoribus eductae cum Tito Sextio legato ceperant locum superiorem. 3 Legiones, ubi primum planitiem attigerunt, infestis contra hostes signis constiterunt. 4 Vercingetorix ab radicibus collis suos intra munitiones reduxit. Eo die milites sunt paulo minus septingenti desiderati.

[51] Our troops were hard pressed on every side, and were dislodged from the position with a loss of six-and-forty centurions. But any immoderate pursuit on the part of the Gauls was checked by the Tenth Legion, which had taken post in support on rather more even ground. This legion was covered in turn by cohorts of the Thirteenth, which had marched out of the lesser camp with Titus Sextius, the lieutenant-general, and had occupied higher ground. As soon as the legions touched the plain they turned the standards against the enemy

and halted. Vercingetorix led his men back from the base of the hill within the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred soldiers were missing.

[52] 1 Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque ab tribunis militum legisque retineri potuissent. 2 Exposuit quid iniquitas loci posset, quid ipse ad Avaricum sensisset, cum sine duce et sine equitatu deprehensis hostibus exploratam victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione propter iniquitatem loci accideret. 3 Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; 4 nec minus se ab milite modestiam et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare.

[52] On the morrow Caesar called a parade and reprimanded the troops for their recklessness and headstrong passion: they had decided for themselves whither they should advance or what they should do, they had not halted when the signal for retirement was given, and had not been amenable to the restraint of tribunes and lieutenant-generals. He showed what might be the effect of unfavourable ground, what he himself had borne in mind at Avaricum, when, though he had caught the enemy without general and without cavalry, he had given up an assured victory in order that even slight loss in action might not be caused by unfavourable ground. Greatly as he admired the high courage of men whom no

camp fortifications, no mountain-height, no town-wall had been able to check, he blamed as greatly their indiscipline and presumption in supposing that they had a truer instinct than the commander-in-chief for victory and the final result. He required from his soldiers, he said, discipline and self-restraint no less than valour and high courage.

[53] 1 Hac habita contione et ad extremam orationem confirmatis militibus, ne ob hanc causam animo permoverentur neu quod iniquitas loci attulisset id virtuti hostium tribuerent, eadem de profectione cogitans quae ante senserat legiones ex castris eduxit aciemque idoneo loco constituit. 2 Cum Vercingetorix nihil magis in aequum locum descenderet, levi facto equestri proelio atque secundo in castra exercitum reduxit. 3 Cum hoc idem postero die fecisset, satis ad Gallicam ostentationem minuendam militumque animos confirmandos factum existimans in Aeduos movit castra. 4 Ne tum quidem insecutis hostibus tertio die ad flumen Elaver venit; pontem refecit exercitumque traduxit.

[53] After delivering this harangue, and at the end thereof encouraging the troops not to be cast down on this account, nor to attribute to the courage of the enemy a result caused by unfavourable ground, though he was still minded, as he had been before, to march off, he led the legions out of camp and formed line-of-battle on suitable ground. When Vercingetorix, notwithstanding, refused to come down to level ground, a cavalry skirmish ensued, favourable to the Romans, after which Caesar led the army back to camp. After a repetition of the same action on the morrow he thought enough had been done to reduce the bravado of the Gauls and to establish the spirit of the troops, and he moved camp accordingly into the territory of the Aedui. Even then the enemy did not pursue; and on the third

day he reached the river Allier, rebuilt the bridge, and brought the army across to the other side.

[54] 1 Ibi a Viridomaro atque Eporedorige Aeduis appellatus discit cum omni equitatu Litavicum ad sollicitandos Aeduos profectum: opus esse ipsos antecedere ad confirmandam civitatem. 2 Etsi multas iam rebus perfidiam Aeduorum perspectam habebat atque horum discessu admaturari defectionem civitatis existimabat, tamen eos retinendos non constituit, ne aut inferre iniuriam videretur aut dare timoris aliquam suspicionem. Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita exposuit, 3 quos et quam humiles accepisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio, obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis, 4 et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset, ut non solum in pristinum statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse viderentur. His datis mandatis eos ab se dimisit.

[54] There he was greeted by Viridomarus and Eporedorix, the Aeduans, from whom he learnt that Litavicus with all his horse was gone to rouse the Aedui, and that they themselves must be before him in order to keep the state loyal. Caesar already had abundant evidence to prove the treachery of the Aedui, and he believed that the departure of these two served but to hasten a revolt of the state; however, he determined not to detain them, lest he might seem to be inflicting an injury or affording some suspicion of fear. As they departed he set forth briefly his own services to the Aedui: their position, their humiliations at the time when he had received them — crowded into towns, deprived of fields, all their resources plundered, a tribute imposed, hostages wrung from them with the utmost insolence — the success and the distinction to which he had brought

them, with the result that they had not only returned to their ancient position, but, to all appearance, had surpassed the dignity and influence of all previous ages. With these monitions he dismissed them from his presence.

[55] 1 Noviodunum erat oppidum Aeduorum ad ripas Ligeris opportuno loco positum. 2 Huc Caesar omnes obsides Galliae, frumentum, pecuniam publicam, suorum atque exercitus impedimentorum magnam partem contulerat; 3 huc magnum numerum equorum huius belli causa in Italia atque Hispania coemptum miserat. 4 Eo cum Eporedorix Viridomarusque venissent et de statu civitatis cognovissent, Litavicum Bibracti ab Aeduis receptum, quod est oppidum apud eos maximae auctoritatis, Convictolitavim magistratum magnamque partem senatus ad eum convenisse, legatos ad Vercingetorigem de pace et amicitia concilianda publice missos, non praetermittendum tantum commodum existimaverunt. 5 Itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant pecuniam atque equos inter se partiti sunt; 6 obsides civitatum Bibracte ad magistratum deducendos curaverunt; oppidum, 7 quod a se teneri non posse iudicabant, ne cui esset usui Romanis, incenderunt; 8 frumenti quod subito potuerunt navibus avexerunt, reliquum flumine atque incendio corruperunt. 9 Ipsi ex finitimis regionibus copias cogere, praesidia custodiasque ad ripas Ligeris disponere equitatumque omnibus locis iniciendi timoris causa ostentare coeperunt, si ab re frumentaria Romanos excludere aut adductos inopia in provinciam expellere possent. 10 Quam ad spem multum eos adiuwabatur, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur.

[55] Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui situated in an advantageous position by the banks of the Loire. Here Caesar had concentrated all the hostages of Gaul, the corn,^o the state chest, and great part of his own and the army's baggage; hither he had sent a great number of horses purchased for this war in Italy and Spain. When Eporedorix and Viridomarus were come to the town they learnt how it was with the state. Litaviccus had been received by the Aedui at Bibracte, the town of supreme influence among them; the magistrate, Convictolitavis, and a great part of the senate had gone to join him; deputies had been despatched officially to Vercingetorix to secure peace and friendship. So signal an advantage ought not, the two men thought, be forgone. So they put to the sword the troops on guard at Noviodunum and the traders who had gathered there, and divided the money and the horses between them; they caused the hostages of the states to be conducted to the magistrate at Bibracte. As they judged that they could not hold the town they set it on fire, that it might be of no service to the Romans; all the corn that they could handle at once they removed in boats, the rest they spoilt with fire and river-water. They began themselves to collect forces from the neighbouring districts, to post garrisons and piquets on the banks of the Loire, and to display horsemen everywhere in order to strike terror, in the hope that they might be able to cut the Romans off from their corn-supply, or to reduce them by scarcity and drive them out into the Province. In this hope they were much assisted by the fact that the Loire was so swollen after the snows that it appeared to be altogether unfordable.

[56] 1 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar maturandum sibi censuit, si esset in perficiendis pontibus periclitandum, ut prius quam essent maiores eo coactae copiae dimicaret. 2 Nam ut commutato consilio iter in

provinciam converteret, id ne metu quidem necessario faciendum existimabat; cum infamia atque indignitas rei et oppositus mons Cevenna viarumque difficultas impediēbat, tum maxime quod abiuncto Labieno atque eis legionibus quas una miserat vehementer timebat. 3 Itaque admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis contra omnium opinionem ad Ligerem venit 4 vadoque per equites invento pro rei necessitate opportuno, ut brachia modo atque humeri ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu qui vim fluminis refringeret, atque hostibus primo aspectu perturbatis, 5 incolumem exercitum traduxit frumentumque in agris et pecoris copiam nactus repleto his rebus exercitu iter in Senones facere instituit.

[56] On learning this Caesar decided that he must make speed, if the completion of the bridges was to be adventured, in order to fight a decisive battle before larger forces had been collected at the river. As for changing his plan and turning his march into the Province, even apprehension did not seem to necessitate it: there was the shame and disgrace of the thing, as well as the barrier of the Cevennes and the difficulty of the roads, to prevent it, and more especially there was his pressing anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had sent with him on a separate mission. Therefore he executed very long marches by day and night, and came, altogether unexpected, to the Loire; found by means of the cavalry a ford to suit the need of the case, where the troops could just keep arms and shoulders clear of the water, to hold up their weapons; posted the cavalry at intervals to break the force of the stream, and brought the army safe across, as the enemy were put to confusion by the first sight of him. In the country he found corn and store of cattle, and as soon as these requirements of the army had been duly supplied he decided to

march into the country of the Senones.

[57] 1 Dum haec apud Caesarem geruntur, Labienus eo supplemento, quod nuper ex Italia venerat, relicto Agedinci, ut esset impedimentis praesidio, cum quattuor legionibus Lutetiam proficiscitur. Id est oppidum Parisiorum, quod positum est in insula fluminis Sequanae. 2 Cuius adventu ab hostibus cognito magnae ex finitimis civitatibus copiae convenerunt. 3 Summa imperi traditur Camulogeno Aulenco, qui prope confectus aetate tamen propter singularem scientiam rei militaris ad eum est honorem evocatus. 4 Is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem, quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit.

[57] While this was happening with Caesar, Labienus had left the draft of recruits newly arrived from Italy at Agedincum to guard the baggage, and with four legions started for Lutetia (Paris), a town of the Parisii, situated on an island in the river Seine. When the enemy had news of his coming a large force assembled from the neighbouring states. The chief command was entrusted to Camulogenus the Aulencan, who, though old and well-nigh worn out, was nevertheless singled out for the distinction because of his exceptional knowledge of warfare. He, noticing a continuous marsh which flowed into the Seine and greatly increased the difficulties of the whole locality, halted there and decided to prevent our troops from crossing.

[58] 1 Labienus primo vineas agere, cratibus atque aggere paludem explere atque iter munire conabatur. 2 Postquam id difficiliter confieri animadvertit, silentio e castris tertia vigilia egressus eodem quo venerat itinere Metiosedum pervenit. 3 Id est oppidum Senonum in

insula Sequanae positum, ut paulo ante de Lutetia diximus. 4 Deprensus navibus circiter quinquaginta celeriterque coniunctis atque eo militibus iniectis et rei novitate perterritis oppidanis, quorum magna pars erat ad bellum evocata, sine contentione oppido potitur. 5 Refecto ponte, quem superioribus diebus hostes resciderant, exercitum traducit et secundo flumine ad Lutetiam iter facere coepit. 6 Hostes re cognita ab eis, qui Metiosedo fugerant, Lutetiam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi profecti a palude ad ripas Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni castra considunt.

[58] Labienus at first tried to move up mantlets, fill in the marsh with hurdles and earth, and build a roadway. When he found that task too difficult he silently marched out of camp in the third watch, and reached Metiosedum by the same route by which he had come. This is a town of the Senones, situated, as was said just now of Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. Seizing some fifty vessels and fastening them speedily together, he hurried his troops on board, and by the suddenness of the operation struck such terror into the townsfolk, of whom a great proportion had been called out for the war, that he gained possession of the town without a struggle. Repairing the bridge, he led the army across, and began to march down stream towards Lutetia. The enemy were told of it by refugees from Metiosedum. They ordered Lutetia to be set on fire and the bridges belonging to the town to be cut down, and advancing from the marsh to the banks of the Seine, they halted opposite Lutetia over against the camp of Labienus.

[59] 1 Iam Caesar a Gergovia discessisse audiebatur, iam de Aeduorum defectione et secundo Galliae motu rumores adferebantur, Gallique in colloquiis interclusum itinere et Ligeri Caesarem inopia

frumenti coactum in provinciam contendisse confirmabant. 2 Bellovaci autem defectione Aeduorum cognita, qui ante erant per se infideles, manus cogere atque aperte bellum parare coeperunt. 3 Tum Labienus tanta rerum commutatione longe aliud sibi capiendum consilium atque antea senserat intellegebat, 4 neque iam, ut aliquid acquireret proelioque hostes lacesseret, sed ut incolumem exercitum Agedincum reduceret, cogitabat. 5 Namque altera ex parte Bellovaci, quae civitas in Gallia maximam habet opinionem virtutis, instabant, alteram Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat; tum legiones a praesidio atque impedimentis interclusas maximum flumen distinebat. 6 Tantis subito difficultatibus obiectis ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat.

[59] By this time it came to be known that Caesar had withdrawn from Gergovia, and rumours began to be brought in touching the revolt of the Aedui and the successful rising in Gaul; and in conversation the Gauls affirmed that Caesar's march and passage of the Loire had been blocked, and that scarcity of corn had compelled him to make for the Province with speed. The Bellovaci were disloyal in themselves before the revolt of the Aedui, and when they heard thereof they began to collect companies and openly to prepare for war. With the case so completely altered, Labienus perceived that he must adopt a course quite different from his previous design, and he began now to consider the means, not of further acquisition or of provoking the enemy to fight, but of bringing the army safely back to Agedincum. For the Bellovaci, the state which has the greatest reputation for courage in Gaul, were pressing upon him from one side, while the ground on the other was held by Camulogenus with an army regularly equipped and organized; and further, the legions were cut off from their baggage and its guard with a mighty river

between. Confronted suddenly with these supreme difficulties, he saw that he must have recourse to personal courage.

[60] 1 Sub vesperum consilio convocato cohortatus ut ea quae imperasset diligenter industrieque administrarent, naves, quas Metiosedo deduxerat, singulas equitibus Romanis attribuit, et prima confecta vigilia quattuor milia passuum secundo flumine silentio progredi ibique se exspectari iubet. 2 Quinque cohortes, quas minime firmas ad dimicandum esse existimabat, castris praesidio relinquit; 3 quinque eiusdem legionis reliquas de media nocte cum omnibus impedimentis adverso flumine magno tumultu proficisci imperat. 4 Conquirat etiam lintres: has magno sonitu remorum incitatus in eandem partem mittit. Ipse post paulo silentio egressus cum tribus legionibus eum locum petit quo naves appellere iusserat.

[60] Towards evening he called together a council of war. Urging them to carry out his commands with care and energy, he assigned each of the vessels which he had brought down from Metiosedum to a Roman knight, and ordered them at the end of the first watch to proceed silently four miles down stream and there to await him. He left as garrison for the camp the five cohorts which he regarded as least steady for action; he commanded the remaining five of the same legion to start up stream at midnight with all the baggage, with great uproar. He got together small boats also, and despatched these in the same direction with great noise of oars in the rowing. A short time afterwards he himself marched out silently with three legions, and made for the spot where he had ordered the vessels to put in.

[61] 1 Eo cum esset ventum, exploratores hostium, ut omni fluminis parte erant dispositi, inopinantes, quod magna subito erat coorta tempestas, ab nostris opprimuntur; 2 exercitus equitatusque equitibus

Romanis administrantibus, quos ei negotio praefecerat, celeriter transmittitur. 3 Uno fere tempore sub lucem hostibus nuntiatur in castris Romanorum praeter consuetudinem tumultuari et magnum ire agmen adverso flumine sonitumque remorum in eadem parte exaudiri et paulo infra milites navibus transportari. 4 Quibus rebus auditis, quod existimabant tribus locis transire legiones atque omnes perturbatos defectione Aeduorum fugam parare, suas quoque copias in tres partes distribuerunt. 5 Nam praesidio e regione castrorum relicto et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa, quae tantum progrediatur, quantum naves processissent, reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt.

[61] Upon his arrival there the enemy's scouts, posted all along the river, were caught unawares by our men and overcome, owing to a great storm which had suddenly got up. The legions and the cavalry were speedily sent across under the direction of the Roman knights in charge of the business. At almost the same moment, just before daylight, it was reported to the enemy that in the Roman camp there was unusual uproar, that a large column was moving up stream, that the sound of oars was audible in the same quarter, and that a little way down stream troops were being carried across in boats. When they heard this they supposed that the legions were crossing at three places and that all were preparing for flight in the disorder caused by the revolt of the Aedui; so they, too, distributed their force in three divisions. A guard was left opposite the camp; a small company was sent towards Metiosedum, to advance as far as the vessels should have proceeded; the rest of the force they led against Labienus.

[62] 1 Prima luce et nostri omnes erant transportati, et hostium acies cernebatur. 2 Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et

secundissimorum proeliorum retinerent memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent, dat signum proeli. 3 Primo concursu ab dextro cornu, ubi septima legio constiterat, hostes pelluntur atque in fugam coniciuntur; 4 ab sinistro, quem locum duodecima legio tenebat, cum primi ordines hostium transfixi telis concidissent, tamen acerrime reliqui resistebant, nec dabat suspicionem fugae quisquam. 5 Ipse dux hostium Camulogenus suis aderat atque eos cohortabatur. 6 Incerto nunc etiam exitu victoriae, cum septimae legionis tribunis esset nuntiatum quae in sinistro cornu gererentur, post tergum hostium legionem ostenderunt signaque intulerunt. 7 Ne eo quidem tempore quisquam loco cessit, sed circumventi omnes interfectique sunt. 8 Eandem fortunam tulit Camulogenus. At ei qui praesidio contra castra Labieni erant relict, cum proelium commissum audissent, subsidio suis ierunt collemque ceperunt, neque nostrorum militum victorum impetum sustinere potuerunt. 9 Sic cum suis fugientibus permixti, quos non silvae montesque texerunt, ab equitatu sunt interfecti. 10 Hoc negotio confecto Labienus revertitur Agedincum, ubi impedimenta totius exercitus relict, erant: inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit.

[62] By daybreak our own troops had all been carried across, and the enemy's line began to be seen. Labienus urged the troops to remember well their own courage in the past and the brilliant success of their battles, and to think that Caesar himself, under whose leadership they had often overcome the enemy, was present to see them; then he gave the signal for action. At the first encounter on the right wing, where the Seventh Legion was posted, the enemy were driven back and put to rout; on the left, which was held by the Twelfth Legion, although the first ranks of the enemy had fallen

pierced by the missiles, the remainder nevertheless resisted most stoutly, and not a man gave an inkling of flight. The leader of the enemy, Camulogenus, was present in person to urge on his men. The ultimate victory, however, was still uncertain; but when the tribunes of the Seventh Legion were told what was afoot on the left wing, they brought out their legion in rear of the enemy and attacked. Not even then did any man yield his ground, but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus met with the same fate. As for the detachment which had been left on guard over against the camp of Labienus, when they heard that the fight had begun they marched to the support of their comrades, and occupied a hill. But they could not withstand the attack of our victorious troops; and thus, as they became intermingled with their fugitive comrades, all who did not win the shelter of woods or heights were slain by the cavalry. Having finished this business, Labienus returned to Agedincum, where the baggage of the whole army had been left. Marching thence with all his force, he reached Caesar on the third day.

[63] 1 Defectione Aeduorum cognita bellum augetur. Legationes in omnes partes circummittuntur: 2 quantum gratia, auctoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas civitates nituntur; 3 nacti obsides, quos Caesar apud eos deposuerat, horum supplicio dubitantes territant. 4 Petunt a Vercingetorige Aedui ut ad se veniat rationesque belli gerendi communicet. 5 Re impetrata contendunt ut ipsis summa imperi tradatur, et re in controversiam deducta totius Galliae concilium Bibracte indicitur. Eodem conveniunt undique frequentes. 6 Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur: ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant imperatorem. 7 Ab hoc concilio Remi, Lingones, Treveri afuerunt: illi, quod amicitiam Romanorum sequebantur; Treveri, quod aberant longius et ab Germanis

premebantur, quae fuit causa quare toto abessent bello et neutris auxilia mitterent. 8 Magno dolore Aedui ferunt se deiectos principatu, queruntur fortunae commutationem et Caesaris indulgentiam in se requirunt, neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent. 9 Inviti summae spei adulescentes Eporedorix et Viridomarus Vercingetorigi parent.

[63] When the revolt of the Aedui became known the war increased in extent. Deputations were sent round in all directions: with all the power of influence, authority, money, they strove to stir up the states, and having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar had lodged among them, they sought by the execution of these to terrify waverers. The Aedui requested Vercingetorix to come to them and concert plans for the conduct of the war. When their request was granted, they insisted that the supreme command should be assigned to them. The matter was disputed, and a convention of all Gaul was summoned at Bibracte. Thither assembled many persons from all quarters. The question was put to the vote of the host, and all to a man approved Vercingetorix as commander-in-chief. From this convention the Remi, Lingones, and Treveri were absent: the former two out of consideration for the friendship of Rome, the Treveri because they were too far distant and were hard pressed by the Germans, which was the reason why they took no part throughout the war and sent no succours to either side. The Aedui were greatly distressed at their rejection from the leadership, complaining of the change in their fortune and feeling the loss of Caesar's kindness towards them; but nevertheless, having undertaken the campaign, they durst not part counsel from the rest. Unwillingly, for they were young and very ambitious, Eporedorix and Viridomarus obeyed Vercingetorix.

[64] 1 Ipse imperat reliquis civitatibus obsides diemque ei rei constituit. Omnes equites, quindecim milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet; 2 peditatu quem antea habuerit se fore contentum dicit, neque fortunam temptaturum aut in acie dimicaturum, sed, quoniam abundet equitatu, perfacile esse factu frumentationibus pabulationibusque Romanos prohibere, 3 aequo modo animo sua ipsi frumenta corrumpant aedificiaque incendant, qua rei familiaris iactura perpetuum imperium libertatemque se consequi videant. 4 His constitutis rebus Aeduis Segusiavisque, qui sunt finitimi provinciae, decem milia peditum imperat; huc addit equites octingentos. 5 His praeficit fratrem Eporedorigis bellumque inferri Allobrogibus iubet. 6 Altera ex parte Gabalos proximosque pagos Arvernorum in Helvios, item Rutenos Cadurcosque ad fines Volcarum Arecomicorum depopulandos mittit. 7 Nihilo minus clandestinis nuntiis legationibusque Allobrogas sollicitat, quorum mentes nondum ab superiore bello resedissee sperabat. 8 Horum principibus pecunias, civitati autem imperium totius provinciae pollicetur.

[64] He for his part made requisition of hostages from the other states, and appointed a day for the same, ordering all the horsemen, to the number of fifteen thousand, to assemble with speed. He said that he would be content with the footmen that he had beforehand, as he did not purpose to try his fortune or fight a pitched battle; but, as he had abundance of horsemen, it was easy enough to prevent the Romans from getting corn^o and forage. Only, the Gauls must consent to destroy with their own hands their corn-supplies and burn their buildings, seeing that by such loss of property they were acquiring dominion and liberty for all time. When he had made these arrangements he required of the Aedui and the Segusiavi, who are

neighbours of the Province, ten thousand foot-soldiers; to this total he added eight hundred horsemen. He set the brother of Eporedorix in command of them, and ordered them to make war on the Allobroges. On the other side he sent the Gabali and the cantons of the Arverni next them against the Helvii, and likewise the Ruteni and Cadurci to devastate the borders of the Volcae Arecomici. At the same time, by secret messages and deputations, he sought to rouse the Allobroges, hoping that their temper had not yet settled down after the late war. To their chiefs he promised sums of money, to their state the dominion over the whole Province.

[65] 1 Ad hos omnes casus provisa erant praesidia cohortium duarum et viginti, quae ex ipsa provincia ab Lucio Caesare legato ad omnes partes opponebantur. 2 Helvii sua sponte cum finitimis proelio congressi pelluntur et Gaio Valerio Donnotauro, Caburi filio, principe civitatis, compluribusque aliis interfectis intra oppida ac muros compelluntur. 3 Allobroges crebris ad Rhodanum dispositis praesidiis magna cum cura et diligentia suos fines tuentur. 4 Caesar, quod hostes equitatu superiores esse intellegebat et interclusis omnibus itineribus nulla re ex provincia atque Italia sublevari poterat, trans Rhenum in Germaniam mittit ad eas civitates quas superioribus annis pacaverat, equitesque ab his arcessit et levis armaturae pedites, qui inter eos proeliari consuerant. 5 Eorum adventu, quod minus idoneis equis utebantur, a tribunis militum reliquisque equitibus Romanis atque evocatis equos sumit Germanisque distribuit.

[65] To meet all these emergencies there had been provided contingents to the number of two-and-twenty cohorts, drafted from the whole Province by Lucius Caesar, lieutenant-general, and now

set to oppose the enemy at all points. The Helvii of their own motion joined battle with their neighbours, and were repulsed; the chief of their state, Gaius Valerius Donnotaurus, son of Caburus, and several others were slain, and they were shut up within the walls of their towns. The Allobroges posted numerous detachments at intervals along the Rhone and protected their borders with great care and efficiency. Caesar was aware that the enemy were superior in mounted troops and that, as all the lines of communication were interrupted, he could in no wise be assisted from the Province and from Italy; accordingly, he sent across the Rhine into Germany to the states which he had reduced to peace in previous years, and fetched horsemen from them and infantry trained to fight along with the horsemen. On their arrival he found that the horses they were using were unsuitable, and therefore he took the horses from the military tribunes and the rest of the Roman knights and the re-enlisted veterans, and distributed them among the Germans.

[66] 1 Interea, dum haec geruntur, hostium copiae ex Arvernīs equitesque qui totī Galliae erant imperatī conveniunt. 2 Magno horum coacto numero, cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret, quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferri posset, circiter milia passuum decem ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit 3 convocatisque ad concilium praefectis equitum venisse tempus victoriae demonstrat. Fugere in provinciam Romanos Galliaeque excedere. 4 Id sibi ad praesentem obtinendam libertatem satis esse; ad reliqui temporis pacem atque otium parum profici: maioribus enim coactis copiis reversuros neque finem bellandi facturos. Proinde agmine impeditos adorirantur. 5 Si pedites suis auxilium ferant atque in eo morentur, iter facere non posse; si, id quod magis futurum confidat, relictis impedimentis suae salutis

consulant, et usu rerum necessariorum et dignitate spoliatum iri. 6 Nam de equitibus hostium, quin nemo eorum progredi modo extra agmen audeat, et ipsos quidem non debere dubitare, et quo maiore faciant animo, copias se omnes pro castris habiturum et terrori hostibus futurum. 7 Conclamant equites sanctissimo iureiurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos, ne ad parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium perequitasset.

[66] In the meanwhile the enemy's contingent from the Arverni and the horsemen requisitioned from the whole of Gaul were assembling. While Caesar was marching to the country of the Sequani across the outermost borders of the Lingones, so as to be able to lend support more easily to the Province, Vercingetorix got together a great number of these contingents and established himself in three camps about ten miles from the Romans. He called the cavalry commanders together to a council of war, and stated that the hour of victory was come. The Romans were fleeing to the Province and leaving Gaul. In his opinion that was enough to secure a temporary liberty, but it was too small a gain to give peace and quiet for the future; for they would return when they had collected a large force and would make no end of the war. Therefore, the Gauls must attack them while encumbered with baggage in column of route; then, if the legionaries hung back to give support to their comrades, they could not pursue the march; if, as he felt sure was more likely to happen, they left the baggage and looked to their own safety, they would be stripped at once of necessities and of reputation. For, as touching the enemy's cavalry, they themselves, at any rate, ought to have no doubt that not a man of them would dare even to advance beyond the column; and further, to make the commanders act with more spirit, he would have all his

force paraded in front of the camp and strike terror into the enemy. The horsemen shouted with one accord that they should be bound by a most solemn oath — that no man should be received beneath a roof, nor have access to children, or to parents, or to wife, who had not twice ridden through the enemy's column.

[67] 1 Probata re atque omnibus iureiurando adactis postero die in tres partes distributo equitatu duae se acies ab duobus lateribus ostendunt, una primo agmine iter impedire coepit. 2 Qua re nuntiata Caesar suum quoque equitatum tripertito divisum contra hostem ire iubet. Pugnatur una omnibus in partibus. 3 Consistit agmen; impedimenta intra legiones recipiuntur. 4 Si qua in parte nostri laborare aut gravius premi videbantur, eo signa inferri Caesar aciemque constitui iubebat; quae res et hostes ad insequendum tardabat et nostros spe auxili confirmabat. 5 Tandem Germani ab dextro latere summum iugum nacti hostes loco depellunt; fugientes usque ad flumen, ubi Vercingetorix cum pedestribus copiis consederat, persequuntur compluresque interficiunt. 6 Qua re animadversa reliqui ne circumirentur veriti se fugae mandant. Omnibus locis fit caedes. 7 Tres nobilissimi Aedui capti ad Caesarem perducuntur: Cotus, praefectus equitum, qui controversiam cum Convictolitavi proximis comitiis habuerat, et Cavarillus, qui post defectionem Litavici pedestribus copiis praefuerat, et Eporedorix, quo duce ante adventum Caesaris Aedui cum Sequanis bello contenderant.

[67] This was approved, and all were sworn, and on the morrow the horsemen were divided into three detachments. Two, in battle array, made a demonstration on the two flanks, and one began to hinder the march at the head of the column. On report of this Caesar divided his own cavalry likewise into three, and ordered it to advance against the

enemy. The battle began simultaneously in every quarter. The column halted, and the baggage was drawn back inside the legions. At any point where our troops seemed to be distressed or too hard pressed Caesar would order the standards to advance and line of battle to be formed. This served to check the enemy in pursuit and to encourage our troops by hope of succour. At length the Germans on the right flank gained the top of a ridge and dislodged the enemy, drove them headlong as far as the river, where Vercingetorix had halted with the footmen of his force, and slew not a few. The rest remarked this and, fearing they might be surrounded, betook themselves to flight. Everywhere slaughter ensued. Three Aeduians of distinguished rank were captured and brought to Caesar. They were Cotus, a commander of horse, who had had the quarrel with Convictolitavis at the last election; Cavarillus, who after the revolt of Litavicus had commanded the footmen of the force; and Eporedorix, under whose leadership before the coming of Caesar the Aedui had fought a campaign with the Sequani.

[68] 1 Fugato omni equitatu Vercingetorix copias, ut pro castris collocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam, quod est oppidum Mandubiorum, iter facere coepit celeriterque impedimenta ex castris educi et se subsequi iussit. 2 Caesar impedimentis in proximum collem deductis, duabus legionibus praesidio relictis, secutus quantum diei tempus est passum, circiter tribus milibus hostium ex novissimo agmine interfectis altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit. 3 Perspecto urbis situ perterritisque hostibus, quod equitatu, qua maxime parte exercitus confidebant, erant pulsus, adhortatus ad laborem milites circumvallare instituit.

[68] When all the horsemen had been put to flight Vercingetorix drew

his forces back from their position in front of the camps and at once began the march to Alesia, a town of the Mandubii, ordering the baggage to be brought speedily out of camp and to follow close after him. Caesar withdrew his baggage to the nearest hill and, leaving two legions to guard it, pursued as long as daylight allowed. Some three thousand of the enemy's rearguard were slain, and on the next day he pitched camp near Alesia. He reconnoitred the situation of the city, and as the enemy were terror-struck by the rout of their horsemen, the branch of their army on which they most relied, he urged his soldiers to the task and began the investment.

[69] 1 Ipsum erat oppidum Alesia in colle summo admodum edito loco, ut nisi obsidione expugnari non posse videretur; 2 cuius collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina sublebant. 3 Ante id oppidum planities circiter milia passuum tria in longitudinem patebat: 4 reliquis ex omnibus partibus colles mediocri interiecto spatio pari altitudinis fastigio oppidum cingebant. 5 Sub muro, quae pars collis ad orientem solem spectabat, hunc omnem locum copiae Gallorum compleverant fossamque et maceriam sex in altitudinem pedum praeduxerant. 6 Eius munitionis quae ab Romanis instituebatur circuitus XI milia passuum tenebat. 7 Castra opportunis locis erant posita ibique castella viginti tria facta, quibus in castellis interdiu stationes ponebantur, ne qua subito eruptio fieret: haec eadem noctu excubitoribus ac firmis praesidiis tenebantur.

[69] The actual stronghold of Alesia was set atop of a hill, in a very lofty situation, apparently impregnable save by blockade. The bases of the hill were washed on two separate sides by rivers. Before the town a plain extended for a length of about three miles; on all the other sides there were hills surrounding the town at a short distance,

and equal to it in height. Under the wall, on the side which looked eastward, the forces of the Gauls had entirely occupied all this intervening space, and had made in front a ditch and a rough wall six feet high. The perimeter of the siege-works which the Romans were beginning had a length of eleven miles. Camps had been pitched at convenient spots, and three-and-twenty forts had been constructed on the line. In these piquets would be posted by day to prevent any sudden sortie; by night the same stations were held by sentries and strong garrisons.

[70] 1 Opere instituto fit equestre proelium in ea planitie, quam intermissam collibus tria milia passuum in longitudinem patere supra demonstravimus. Summa vi ab utrisque contenditur. 2 Laborantibus nostris Caesar Germanos summittit legionesque pro castris constituit, ne qua subito irruptio ab hostium peditatu fiat. 3 Praesidio legionum addito nostris animus augetur: hostes in fugam coniecti se ipsi multitudine impediunt atque angustioribus portis relictis coacervantur. 4 Germani acrius usque ad munitiones sequuntur. 5 Fit magna caedes: nonnulli relictis equis fossam transire et maceriam transcendere conantur. Paulum legiones Caesar quas pro vallo constituerat promoveri iubet. 6 Non minus qui intra munitiones erant perturbantur Galli: veniri ad se confestim existimantes ad arma conclamant; nonnulli perterriti in oppidum irrumpunt. 7 Vercingetorix iubet portas claudi, ne castra nudentur. Multis interfectis, compluribus equis captis Germani sese recipiunt.

[70] When the siege-work had been started, a cavalry encounter took place in the plain which we have described above as set between hills and extending to a length of three miles. Both sides strove with the utmost vigour. When our men were distressed Caesar sent up the

Germans, and posted the legions in front of the camp to prevent any sudden inrush on the part of the enemy's footmen. With the reinforcement of the legions behind them our men's spirit was increased; the enemy were put to flight, and, hampering one another by sheer numbers, as the gates were left too narrow, were crowded together in a press. The Germans pursued most vigorously right up to the fortifications. A great slaughter ensued; some of the enemy abandoned their horses, and tried to cross the ditch and scale the wall. Caesar ordered the legions posted in front of the rampart to advance a short distance. The Gauls inside the fortifications were in just as great a confusion as the rest; believing that the enemy were coming on them at once, they shouted the call to arms, and some in panic burst into the town. Vercingetorix ordered the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be deserted. After much slaughter and the capture of many horses the Germans retired.

[71] 1 Vercingetorix, priusquam munitiones ab Romanis perficiantur, consilium capit omnem ab se equitatum noctu dimittere. 2 Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant. 3 Sua in illos merita proponit obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem habeant neu se optime de communi libertate meritum in cruciatum hostibus dedant. Quod si indiligentiores fuerint, milia hominum delecta octoginta una secum interitura demonstrat. 4 Ratione inita se exigue dierum triginta habere frumentum, sed paulo etiam longius tolerari posse parcendo. His datis mandatis, 5 qua opus erat intermissum, secunda vigilia silentio equitatum mittit. 6 Frumentum omne ad se referri iubet; capitis poenam eis qui non paruerint constituit: 7 pecus, cuius magna erat copia ab Mandubiis compulsa, viritim distribuit; frumentum parce et paulatim metiri instituit; 8

copias omnes quas pro oppido collocaverat in oppidum recepit. 9 His rationibus auxilia Galliae expectare et bellum parat administrare.

[71] Vercingetorix now made up his mind to send away all his horsemen by night, before the Romans could complete their entrenchments. His parting instructions were that each of them should proceed to his own state and impress for the campaign all men whose age allowed them to bear arms. He set forth his own claims upon them, and adjured them to have regard for his personal safety, and not to surrender to the torture of the enemy one who had done sterling service for the general liberty. He showed them that if they proved indifferent eighty thousand chosen men were doomed to perish with him. He had calculated that he had corn in short rations for thirty days, but that by economy he could hold out just a little longer. After giving these instructions he sent the horsemen silently away in the second watch, at a point where a gap was left in our works. He ordered all the corn to be brought in to his headquarters; he appointed death as the penalty for any disobedience of the order; the cattle, of which great store had been driven together by the Mandubii, he distributed man by man; he arranged that the corn should be measured out sparingly and gradually; he withdrew into the town all the force which he had posted in front of it. By such measures did he prepare for the conduct of the campaign, in anticipation of the succours from Gaul.

[72] 1 Quibus rebus cognitis ex perfugis et captivis, Caesar haec genera munitionis instituit. Fossam pedum viginti directis lateribus duxit, ut eius fossae solum tantundem pateret quantum summae fossae labra distarent. 2 Reliquas omnes munitiones ab ea fossa pedes quadringentos reduxit, [id] hoc consilio, quoniam tantum esset

necessario spatium complexus, nec facile totum corpus corona militum cingeretur, ne de improvviso aut noctu ad munitiones hostium multitudo advolaret aut interdiu tela in nostros operi destinatos conicere possent. 3 Hoc intermisso spatio duas fossas quindecim pedes latas, eadem altitudine perduxit, quarum anteriorem campestribus ac demissis locis aqua ex flumine derivata complevit. 4 Post eas aggerem ac vallum duodecim pedum extruxit. Huic loricam pinnaeque adiecit grandibus cervis eminentibus ad commissuras pluteorum atque aggeris, qui ascensum hostium tardarent, et turres toto opere circumdedit, quae pedes LXXX inter se distarent.

[72] Caesar had report of this from deserters and prisoners, and determined on the following types of entrenchments. He dug a trench twenty feet wide with perpendicular sides, in such fashion that the bottom thereof was just as broad as the distance from edge to edge at the surface. He set back the rest of the siege-works four hundred paces from the trench; for as he had of necessity included so large an area, and the whole of the works could not easily be manned by a ring-fence of troops, his intention was to provide against any sudden rush of the enemy's host by night upon the entrenchments, or any chance of directing their missiles by day upon our troops engaged on the works. Behind this interval he dug all round two trenches, fifteen feet broad and of equal depth; and the inner one, where the ground was level with the plain or sank below it, he filled with water diverted from the river. Behind the trenches he constructed a ramp and palisade twelve feet high; to this he added a breastwork and battlements, with large fraises projecting at the junctions of screens and ramp, to check the upward advance of the enemy; and all round the works he set turrets at intervals of eighty feet.

[73] 1 Erat eodem tempore et materiari et frumentari et tantas munitiones fieri necesse deminutis nostris copiis quae longius ab castris progrediebantur: ac non numquam opera nostra Galli temptare atque eruptionem ex oppido pluribus portis summa vi facere conabantur. 2 Quare ad haec rursus opera addendum Caesar putavit, quo minore numero militum munitiones defendi possent. Itaque truncis arborum aut admodum firmis ramis abscisis atque horum delibratis ac praeacutis cacuminibus perpetuae fossae quinos pedes altae ducebantur. 3 Huc illi stipites demissi et ab infimo revincti, ne revelli possent, ab ramis eminebant. 4 Quini erant ordines coniuncti inter se atque implicati; quo qui intraverant, se ipsi acutissimis vallis induebant. 5 Hos cippos appellabant. Ante quos obliquis ordinibus in quincuncem dispositis scrobes tres in altitudinem pedes fodiebantur paulatim angustiore ad infimum fastigio. 6 Huc teretes stipites feminis crassitudine ab summo praeacuti et praeusti demittebantur, ita ut non amplius digitis quattuor ex terra emerent; 7 simul confirmandi et stabiliendi causa singuli ab infimo solo pedes terra exculcabantur, reliqua pars scrobis ad occultandas insidias viminibus ac virgultis tegebatur. 8 Huius generis octoni ordines ducti ternos inter se pedes distabant. 9 Id ex similitudine floris lilium appellabant. Ante haec taleae pedem longae ferreis hamis infixis totae in terram infodiebantur mediocribusque intermissis spatiis omnibus locis disserebantur; quos stimulos nominabant.

[73] As it was necessary that at one and the same time timber and corn should be procured, and lines of such extent constructed, our forces, having to proceed to a considerable distance from camp, were reduced in number; and sometimes the Gauls would try to make an attempt upon our works by a sortie in force from several gates of the town. Caesar, therefore, thought proper to make a further addition to

these works, in order that the lines might be defensible by a smaller number of troops. Accordingly, trunks or very stout branches of trees were cut, and the tops thereof barked and sharpened, and continuous trenches five feet deep were dug. Into these the stumps were sunk and fastened at the bottom so that they could not be torn up, while the bough-ends were left projecting. They were in rows of five fastened and entangled together, and anyone who pushed into them must impale himself on the sharpest of stakes. These they called “markers.” In front of these, in diagonal rows arranged like a figure of five, pits three feet deep were dug, sloping inwards slightly to the bottom. In these, tapering stakes as thick as a man’s thigh, sharpened at the top and fire-hardened, were sunk so as to project no more than four fingers’ breadth from the ground; at the same time, to make all strong and firm, the earth was trodden down hard for one foot from the bottom, and the remainder of the pit was covered over with twigs and brushwood to conceal the trap. Eight rows of this kind were dug, three feet apart. From its resemblance to the flower the device was called a “lily.” In front of all these, logs a foot long, with iron hooks firmly attached, were buried altogether in the ground and scattered at brief intervals all over the field, and these they called “spurs.”

[74] 1 His rebus perfectis regiones secutus quam potuit aequissimas pro loci natura quattuordecim milia passuum complexus pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit, ut ne magna quidem multitudine, si ita accidat, munitionum praesidia circumfundi possent; 2 ac ne cum periculo ex castris egredi cogatur, dierum triginta pabulum frumentumque habere omnes convectum iubet.

[74] When all these arrangements had been completed Caesar

constructed parallel entrenchments of the same kind facing the other way, against the enemy outside, following the most favourable ground that the locality afforded, with a circuit of fourteen miles. This he did to secure the garrisons of the entrenchments from being surrounded by a host, however large it might chance to be. And in order that he might not be constrained to dangerous excursions from camp, he ordered all his men to have thirty days' corn and forage collected.

[75] 1 Dum haec apud Alesiam geruntur, Galli concilio principum indicto non omnes eos qui arma ferre possent, ut censuit Vercingetorix, convocandos statuunt, sed certum numerum cuique ex civitate imperandum, ne tanta multitudo confusa nec moderari nec discernere suos nec frumentandi rationem habere possent. 2 Imperant Aeduis atque eorum clientibus, Segusiavis, Ambivaretis, Aulercis Brannovicibus, Blannoviis, milia XXXV; parem numerum Arvernīs adiunctis Eleutetis, Cadurcis, Gabalis, Vellaviis, qui sub imperio Arvernorum esse consuerunt; Sequanis, 3 Senonibus, Biturigibus, Santonis, Rutenis, Carnutibus duodena milia; Bellovacis X; totidem Lemovicibus; octona Pictonibus et Turonis et Parisiis et Helvetiis; [Suessionibus,] Ambianis, Mediomatricis, Petrocoriis, Nerviis, Morinis, Nitiobrigibus quina milia; Aulercis Cenomanis totidem; Atrebatibus [IIII milibus]; Vellocassis, Lexoviis et Aulercis Eburovicibus terna; Rauracis et Boiis bina; 4 [XXX milia] universis civitatibus, quae Oceanum attingunt quaeque eorum consuetudine Armoricae appellantur, quo sunt in numero Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, Venelli. 5 Ex his Bellovaci suum numerum non compleverunt, quod se suo nomine atque arbitrio cum Romanis bellum gesturos dicebant neque cuiusquam imperio obtemperaturos; rogati tamen ab Commio pro

eius hospitio duo milia una miserunt.

[75] While this was proceeding about Alesia, the Gauls summoned a council of chiefs and determined not to call up (according to the proposal of Vercingetorix) all who could bear arms, but to require of each chief a certain quota from his state; for they feared that with so large a host herded together they might not be able to preserve discipline, to distinguish their several contingents, or to secure a supply of corn.^o Of the Aedui and their dependents, Segusiavi, Ambivareti, Aulerci Brannovices, and Blannovii, they required five-and-thirty thousand; an equal number from the Arverni, together with the Eleuteti, Cadurci, Gabali, and Vellavii, who are regularly under the sovereignty of the Arverni; from the Sequani, Senones, Bituriges, Santoni, Ruteni, and Carnutes, twelve thousand each; from the Bellovaci ten thousand, and as many from the Lemovices; eight thousand each from the Pictones, Turoni, Parisii, and Helvetii; five thousand each from the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges; a like number from the Aulerci Cenomani; four thousand from the Atrebates; three each from the Veliocasses, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices; two each from the Rauraci and the Boii; thirty thousand in all from the states touching the Ocean, commonly called by them Armoric, among whom are the Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, and Venelli. Of these the Bellovaci did not make up their quota, because they declared that they would wage war with the Romans on their own account and at their own discretion, and would obey no man's command; however, when Commius made request they sent two thousand men with the rest, out of regard to their private relations with him.

[76] 1 Huius opera Commi, ut antea demonstravimus, fideli atque utili superioribus annis erat usus in Britannia Caesar; quibus ille pro meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat. 2 Tamen tanta universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent. 3 Coactis equitum VIII milibus et peditum circiter CCL haec in Aeduum finibus recensebantur, numerusque inibatur, praefecti constituebantur. 4 Commio Atrebati, Viridomaro et Eporedorigi Aeduis, Vercassivellauno Arverno, consobрино Vercingetorigis, summa imperi traditur. His delecti ex civitatibus attribuuntur, quorum consilio bellum administraretur. 5 Omnes alacres et fiduciae pleni ad Alesiam proficiscuntur, 6 neque erat omnium quisquam qui aspectum modo tantae multitudinis sustineri posse arbitraretur, praesertim ancipiti proelio, cum ex oppido eruptione pugnaretur, foris tantae copiae equitatus peditatusque cernerentur.

[76] This Commius, as we have before mentioned, had rendered faithful and efficient service to Caesar in previous years in the expedition to Britain. For these good offices Caesar had ordered his state to be exempt from taxation, had restored its rights and laws, and had made the Morini tributary to him. Yet so strong was the unanimity of Gaul as a whole for the maintenance of their liberty and the recovery of their ancient renown in war that no benefits, no memory of friendship could influence them, and all devoted themselves with heart and strength to the campaign before them. When eight thousand horsemen and about two hundred and fifty thousand footmen had been collected, the force was reviewed and a muster was taken in the country of the Aedui. Officers were

appointed, and the chief command was entrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix the Aeduans, and Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, a cousin of Vercingetorix. To them were attached a staff selected from the states, by whose counsel the campaign was to be conducted. Full of spirit and confidence, all started for Alesia; there was not a man of them all who thought the mere sight of so vast a host could be withstood, especially in a two-sided engagement, when there would be fighting with those who made a sortie from within the town, and outside the display of so vast an army of horse and foot.

[77] 1 At ei, qui Alesiae obsidebantur praeterita die, qua auxilia suorum exspectaverant, consumpto omni frumento, inscii quid in Aeduis gereretur, concilio coacto 2 de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Ac variis dictis sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppeterent, eruptionem censebat, non praetereunda oratio Critognati videtur propter eius singularem et nefariam crudelitatem. 3 Hic summo in Arvernīs ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis, “Nihil,” inquit, “de eorum sententia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam servitutem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad concilium adhibendos censeo. 4 Cum his mihi res sit, qui eruptionem probant; quorum in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinae residere virtutis memoria videtur. Animi est ista mollitia, 5 non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. 6 Atque ego hanc sententiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae nostrae iacturam fieri viderem: 7 sed in consilio capiēdo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus. 8 Quid hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis

consanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur? 9 Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetuae servituti subicere. 10 An, quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis? 11 Si illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepo, his utimini testibus appropinquare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere versantur. 12 Quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari bello Cimbrorum Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt neque se hostibus tradiderunt. 13 Cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen libertatis causa institui et posteris prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem. 14 Nam quid illi simile bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaue illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reliquerunt. 15 Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considerare atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt. 16 Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute.”

[77] However, when the day on which they had expected reinforcements of their own folk was past, and they had exhausted all their corn, and knew not what was going on in the land of the Aedui,

the Gauls besieged in Alesia called a council of war to consider what would be the issue of their own fortunes. Various opinions were expressed, one party voting for surrender, another for a sortie while their strength sufficed; but the speech of Critognatus should not, I think, be omitted, because of its remarkable and abominable cruelty. He was of high lineage among the Arverni, and considered to have great influence. "Of their opinion," he said, "who call a most disgraceful slavery by the name of surrender I purpose to say nothing; I hold that they should not be treated as citizens nor invited to the council. Let *my* business be with those who approve a sortie; and in their design, by your general agreement, there seems to remain a memory of ancient courage. This is faint-heartedness of yours, not courage, to be unable to endure want for a short space. It is easier to find men to fling themselves recklessly on death than men to endure pain patiently. And yet I might now have approved this view (so much weight with me has the authority of those who hold it) if I saw therein the loss of nothing but our life; but in making our decision we should have regard to the whole of Gaul, which we have aroused to our assistance. What, think ye, will be the spirit of our friends and kindred, when eighty thousand men have been slain in one spot, if they are forced to fight out the issue almost over their very bodies? Refuse to rob of your support the men who for your deliverance have disregarded their own peril; forbear by folly, recklessness, or weak-mindedness of yours to lay prostrate, and subject to everlasting slavery, the whole of Gaul. Or do you doubt their faithfulness, their resolution, because they are not arrived to the day? What then? Do ye think that the Romans are daily engaged in those outer trenches for mere amusement? If it may not be that your resolve should be strengthened by messages from your friends, since every approach is

blocked, yet take the Romans here to your witnesses that their coming draws nigh; and it is in fear thereof that they are busy in their works day and night. What, then, is my counsel? To do what our forefathers did in the war, in no wise equal to this, with the Cimbri and the Teutones. They shut themselves into the towns, and under stress of a like scarcity sustained life on the bodies of those whose age showed them useless for war, and delivered not themselves to the enemy. And if we had not a precedent for this, I should still have judged it a most glorious thing for the sake of liberty to set such a one and to hand it down to posterity. For wherein was that war like this? The Cimbri devastated Gaul, they brought great disaster upon us, yet they departed at length from our borders and sought other countries, leaving us our rights, laws, lands, liberty. But the Romans — what else do they seek or desire than to follow where envy leads, to settle in the lands and states of men whose noble report and martial strength they have learnt, and to bind upon them a perpetual slavery? 'Tis in no other fashion they have waged wars. And if ye know not what is afoot among distant nations, look now on Gaul close at hand, which has been reduced to a province, with utter change of rights and laws, and crushed beneath the axes in everlasting slavery.”

[78] 1 Sententiis dictis constituunt ut ei qui valetudine aut aetate inutiles sunt bello oppido excedant, atque omnia prius experiantur, quam ad Critognati sententiam descendant: 2 illo tamen potius utendum consilio, si res cogat atque auxilia morentur, quam aut deditionis aut pacis subeundam condicionem. 3 Mandubii, qui eos oppido receperant, cum liberis atque uxoribus exire coguntur. Hi, cum ad munitiones Romanorum accessissent, flentes omnibus precibus orabant, ut se in servitutem receptos cibo iuvarent. 4 At

Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recipi prohibebat.

[78] When opinions had been expressed they determined that those who by reason of health or age were useless for war should leave the town, and that every expedient should be tried before they had recourse to the counsel of Critognatus, resolving, however, to adopt that plan, if compelled by circumstances — that is to say, the delay of the reinforcements — rather than to submit to terms of surrender or of peace. The Mandubii, whose town had received them, were compelled to leave it with wives and children. When they reached the Roman lines they begged with tears and abject prayers to be received as slaves and helped with food. But Caesar posted sentries on the rampart and prevented their admission.

[79] 1 Interea Commius reliquique duces quibus summa imperi permissa erat cum omnibus copiis ad Alesiam perveniunt et colle exteriore occupato non longius mille passibus ab nostris munitionibus considunt. 2 Postero die equitatu ex castris educto omnem eam planitiem, quam in longitudinem tria milia passuum patere demonstravimus, complent pedestresque copias paulum ab eo loco abditas in locis superioribus constituunt. 3 Erat ex oppido Alesia despectus in campum. Concurrunt his auxiliis visis; fit gratulatio inter eos, atque omnium animi ad laetitiam excitantur. 4 Itaque productis copiis ante oppidum considunt et proximam fossam cratibus integunt atque aggere explent seque ad eruptionem atque omnes casus comparant.

[79] Meanwhile Commius and the other leaders entrusted with the supreme command reached the neighbourhood of Alesia with all their force, and, seizing a hill outside, halted not more than a mile from our entrenchments. The day after they brought their horsemen

out of camp and filled the whole of that plain which we have described as extending for a length of three miles; their force of footmen they posted a little way back from the spot, on the higher ground. There was a bird's-eye view from the town of Alesia over the plain. At sight of these reinforcements the others hastened together with mutual congratulation, and all minds were stirred to joy. So they brought out their force and halted in front of the town; they covered over the nearest trench with hurdles and filled it in with earth, and prepared for a sally and for every emergency.

[80] 1 Caesar omni exercitu ad utramque partem munitionum disposito, ut, si usus veniat, suum quisque locum teneat et noverit, equitatum ex castris educi et proelium committi iubet. 2 Erat ex omnibus castris, quae summum undique iugum tenebant, despectus, atque omnes milites intenti pugnae proventum exspectabant. 3 Galli inter equites raros sagittarios expeditosque levis armaturae interiecerant, qui suis cedentibus auxilio succurrerent et nostrorum equitum impetus sustinerent. Ab his complures de improvviso vulnerati proelio excedebant. 4 Cum suos pugna superiores esse Galli confiderent et nostros multitudine premi viderent, ex omnibus partibus et ei qui munitionibus continebantur et hi qui ad auxilium convenerant clamore et ululatu suorum animos confirmabant. 5 Quod in conspectu omnium res gerebatur neque recte ac turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabant. 6 Cum a meridie prope ad solis occasum dubia victoria pugnaretur, Germani una in parte confertis turmis in hostes impetum fecerunt eosque propulerunt; 7 quibus in fugam coniectis sagittarii circumventi interfectique sunt. 8 Item ex reliquis partibus nostri cedentes usque ad castra insecuti sui colligendi facultatem non dederunt. 9 At ei qui ab Alesia processerant maesti prope victoria

desperata se in oppidum receperunt.

[80] Caesar disposed the whole army on both faces of the entrenchments in such fashion that, if occasion should arise, each man could know and keep his proper station; then he ordered the cavalry to be brought out of camp and to engage. There was a view down from all the camps, which occupied the top of the surrounding ridge, and all the troops were intently awaiting the issue of the fight. The Gauls had placed archers and light-armed skirmishers here and there among the horsemen to give immediate support to their comrades if driven back and to resist the charge of the cavalry. A number of men, wounded unexpectedly by these troops, began to withdraw from the fight. When the Gauls were confident that their own men were getting the better of the battle, and saw ours hard pressed by numbers, with shouts and yells on every side — those who were confined by the entrenchments as well as the others who had come up to their assistance — they sought to inspirit their countrymen. As the action was proceeding in sight of all, and no deed, of honour or dishonour, could escape notice, both sides were stirred to courage by desire of praise and fear of disgrace. The fight lasted, and the victory was doubtful, from noon almost to sunset; then the Germans in one part of the field massed their troops of horse, charged the enemy and routed them, and when they had been put to flight the archers were surrounded and slain. Likewise, from the other parts of the field, our troops pursued the retreating enemy right up to their camp, giving them no chance of rallying. But the Gauls who had come forth from Alesia, almost despairing of victory, sadly withdrew again into the town.

[81] 1 Uno die intermisso Galli atque hoc spatio magno cratium,

scalarum, harpagonum numero effecto media nocte silentio ex castris egressi ad campestris munitiones accedunt. 2 Subito clamore sublato, qua significatione qui in oppido obsidebantur de suo adventu cognoscere possent, crates proicere, fundis, sagittis, lapidibus nostros de vallo proturbare reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinent parant administrare. 3 Eodem tempore clamore exaudito dat tuba signum suis Vercingetorix atque ex oppido educit. 4 Nostri, ut superioribus diebus, ut cuique erat locus attributus, ad munitiones accedunt; fundis librilibus sudibusque quas in opere disposuerant ac glandibus Gallos proterrent. 5 Prospectu tenebris adempto multa utrimque vulnera accipiuntur. Complura tormentis tela coniciuntur. 6 At Marcus Antonius et Gaius Trebonius legati, quibus hae partes ad defendendum obvenerant, qua ex parte nostros premi intellexerant, his auxilio ex ulterioribus castellis deductos submittebant.

[81] After one day's interval, in the course of which they made a great number of hurdles, ladders, and grappling-hooks, the Gauls left camp silently at midnight and approached the entrenchments in the plain. Raising a sudden shout, to signify their coming to the besieged inside the town, they began to fling down the hurdles, to dislodge our men from the rampart with slings, arrows and stones, and to carry out everything else proper to an assault. At the same moment, hearing the shout, Vercingetorix gave his troops the signal by trumpet, and led them out of the town. Our troops, as on previous days, moved each to his appointed station in the entrenchments; with slings, one-pounders, stakes set ready inside the works, and bullets, they beat off the Gauls. As the darkness made it impossible to see far, many wounds were received on both sides. A number of missiles were discharged by the artillery. Then Marcus Antonius and Gaius Trebonius, the lieutenant-generals to whom the defence of these

sections had been allotted, withdrew troops from forts farther away, and sent them up to bring assistance wherever they remarked that our men were hard pressed.

[82] 1 Dum longius ab munitione aberant Galli, plus multitudine telorum proficiebant; posteaquam propius successerunt, aut se stimulis inopinantes induebant aut in scrobes delati transfodiebantur aut ex vallo ac turribus traieci pilis muralibus interibant. 2 Multis undique vulneribus acceptis nulla munitione perrupta, cum lux appeteret, veriti ne ab latere aperto ex superioribus castris eruptione circumvenirentur, se ad suos receperunt. 3 At interiores, dum ea quae a Vercingetorige ad eruptionem praeparata erant proferunt, priores fossas explent, diutius in his rebus administrandis morati prius suos discessisse cognoverunt, quam munitionibus appropinquarent. Ita re infecta in oppidum reverterunt.

[82] While the Gauls were some distance from the entrenchment they had more advantage from the quantity of their missiles; then, when they came up closer, they were soon caught unawares on the “spurs,” or they sank into the pits and were impaled, or they were shot by artillery pikes from the rampart and the turrets, and so perished on every side. Many a man was wounded, but the entrenchment was nowhere penetrated; and when daybreak drew nigh, fearing that they might be surrounded on their exposed flank by a sortie from the camps above them, they retired to their comrades. Meanwhile the inner force brought out the appliances which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for a sortie, and filled in the nearer trenches; but they lingered too long in the execution of the business, and, or ever they could get near the entrenchments, they learnt that their countrymen had withdrawn. So without success they returned to the town.

[83] 1 Bis magno cum detrimento repulsi Galli quid agant consulunt; locorum peritos adhibent: ex his superiorum castrorum situs munitionesque cognoscunt. 2 Erat a septentrionibus collis, quem propter magnitudinem circuitus opere circumplecti non potuerant nostri: necessario paene iniquo loco et leniter declivi castra fecerunt. 3 Haec Gaius Antistius Reginus et Gaius Caninius Rebilus legati cum duabus legionibus obtinebant. 4 Cognitis per exploratores regionibus duces hostium LX milia ex omni numero deligunt earum civitatum quae maximam virtutis opinionem habebant; 5 quid quoque pacto agi placeat occulte inter se constituunt; adeundi tempus definiunt, cum meridies esse videatur. 6 His copiis Vercassivellaunum Arvernum, unum ex quattuor ducibus, propinquum Vercingetorigis, praeficiunt. 7 Ille ex castris prima vigilia egressus prope confecto sub lucem itinere post montem se occultavit militesque ex nocturno labore sese reficere iussit. 8 Cum iam meridies appropinquare videretur, ad ea castra quae supra demonstravimus contendit; eodemque tempore equitatus ad campestris munitiones accedere et reliquae copiae pro castris sese ostendere coeperunt.

[83] Twice beaten back with great loss, the Gauls took counsel what to do. They called in men who knew the locality well, and from them they learnt the positions and the defences of the upper camps. On the north side there was a hill, which by reason of its huge circumference our troops had been unable to include within the works; they had been obliged to lay out the camp on ground generally sloping, which put them almost at a disadvantage. This camp was held by Gaius Antistius Reginus and Gaius Caninius Rebilus, lieutenant-generals, with two legions. Having reconnoitred the locality by means of scouts, the commanders of the enemy chose out of the whole host

sixty thousand men belonging to the states which had the greatest reputation for courage: they determined secretly together what should be done and in what fashion, and decided that the advance should take place at the moment when it was seen to be midday. In charge of this force they put Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, one of the four commanders, a kinsman of Vercingetorix. He left camp in the first watch, and having almost completed his march just before dawn, he concealed himself behind the height and ordered his soldiers to rest after their night's work. When at last it was seen to be near midday he moved with speed on the camp above mentioned and at the same moment the horsemen began to advance towards the entrenchments in the plain, and the rest of the force to make a demonstration before the camp.

[84] 1 Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur; crates, longurios, musculos, falces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat profert. 2 Pugnatur uno tempore omnibus locis, atque omnia temptantur: quae minime visa pars firma est, huc concurritur. 3 Romanorum manus tantis munitionibus distinctetur nec facile pluribus locis occurrit. 4 Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui post tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident salute constare: 5 omnia enim plerumque quae absunt vehementius hominum mentes perturbant.

[84] When from the citadel of Alesia Vercingetorix observed his countrymen, he moved out of the town, taking with him the hurdles, poles, mantlets, grappling-hooks, and all the other appliances prepared for the sally. The fight went on simultaneously in all places, and all expedients were attempted, with a rapid concentration on that section which was seen to be least strong. With lines so extensive the

Roman army was strung out, and at several points defence proved difficult. The shouting which arose in rear of the fighting line did much to scare our troops, as they saw that the risk to themselves depended on the success of others; for, as a rule, what is out of sight disturbs men's minds more seriously than what they see.

[85] 1 Caesar idoneum locum nactus quid quaque ex parte geratur cognoscit; laborantibus summittit. 2 Utrisque ad animum occurrit unum esse illud tempus, quo maxime contendere conveniat: 3 Galli, nisi perfregerint munitiones, de omni salute desperant; Romani, si rem obtinuerint, finem laborum omnium exspectant. 4 Maxime ad superiores munitiones laboratur, quo Vercassivellaunum missum demonstravimus. Iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium magnum habet momentum. 5 Alii tela coniciunt, alii testudine facta subeunt; defatigatis in vicem integri succedunt. 6 Agger ab universis in munitionem coniectus et ascensum dat Gallis et ea quae in terra occultaverant Romani contegit; nec iam arma nostris nec vires suppetunt.

[85] Caesar found a suitable spot from which he could see what was proceeding in each quarter. To parties distressed he sent up supports. Both sides felt that this was the hour of all others in which it was proper to make their greatest effort. The Gauls utterly despaired of safety unless they could break through the lines; the Romans anticipated an end of all toils if they could hold their own. The hardest struggle occurred by the entrenchments on the hill, whither, as we have mentioned, Vercassivellaunus had been sent. The unfavourable downward slope of the ground had great effect. Some of the enemy discharged missiles, others moved up in close formation under their shields; fresh men quickly replaced the

exhausted. Earth cast by the whole body together over the entrenchments gave the Gauls a means of ascent and at the same time covered over the appliances which the Romans had concealed in the ground; and our troops had now neither arms nor strength enough.

[86] 1 His rebus cognitis Caesar Labienum cum cohortibus sex subsidio laborantibus mittit: 2 imperat, si sustinere non posset, deductis cohortibus eruptione pugnaret; id nisi necessario ne faciat. 3 Ipse adit reliquos, cohortatur ne labori succumbant; omnium superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere. 4 Interiores desperatis campestribus locis propter magnitudinem munitionum loca praecepta ex ascensu temptant: huc ea quae paraverant conferunt. 5 Multitudine telorum ex turribus propugnantes deturbant, aggere et cratibus fossas explent, falcibus vallum ac loricam rescindunt.

[86] When Caesar learnt this, he sent Labienus with six cohorts to support them in their distress. He commanded him, if he could not hold his ground, to draw in the cohorts and fight his way out, but not to do so unless of necessity. He himself went up to the rest of the troops, and urged them not to give in to the strain, telling them that the fruit of all previous engagements depended upon that day and hour. The enemy on the inner side, despairing of success on the level ground, because of the size of the entrenchments, made an attempt to scale the precipitous parts, conveying thither the appliances they had prepared. They dislodged the defenders of the turrets by a swarm of missiles, filled in the trenches with earth and hurdles, tore down rampart and breastwork with grappling-hooks.

[87] 1 Mittit primo Brutum adolescentem cum cohortibus Caesar, post cum aliis Gaium Fabium legatum; postremo ipse, cum vehementius

pugnaretur, integros subsidio adducit. 2 Restituto proelio ac repulsis hostibus eo quo Labienum miserat contendit; cohortes quattuor ex proximo castello deducit, equitum partem sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et ab tergo hostes adoriri iubet. 3 Labienus, postquam neque aggeres neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidis deductas fors obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios facit certiore quid faciendum existimet. Accelerat Caesar, ut proelio intersit.

[87] Caesar first sent young Brutus with some cohorts, and then Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, with others; last of all, as the fight raged more fiercely, he himself brought up fresh troops to reinforce. The battle restored, and the enemy repulsed, he hastened to the quarter whither he had sent Labienus. He withdrew four cohorts from the nearest fort, and ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, part to go round the outer entrenchments and attack the enemy in rear. Labienus, finding that neither ramps nor trenches could resist the rush of the enemy, collected together forty cohorts, which had been withdrawn from the nearest post and by chance presented themselves, and sent messengers to inform Caesar what he thought it proper to do. Caesar hurried on to take part in the action.

[88] 1 Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuevit, turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt. 2 Utrunque clamore sublato excipit rursus ex vallo atque omnibus munitionibus clamor. Nostri omissis pilis gladiis rem gerunt. 3 Repente post tergum equitatus cernitur; cohortes aliae appropinquant. Hostes terga vertunt; fugientibus equites occurrunt. Fit magna caedes. Sedulius, dux et princeps

Lemovicum, occiditur; 4 Vercassivellaunus Arvernus vivus in fuga comprehenditur; signa militaria septuaginta quattuor ad Caesarem referuntur: pauci ex tanto numero se incolumes in castra recipiunt. 5 Conspicati ex oppido caedem et fugam suorum desperata salute copias a munitionibus reducunt. 6 Fit protinus hac re audita ex castris Gallorum fuga. Quod nisi crebris subsidiis ac totius diei labore milites essent defessi, omnes hostium copiae deleri potuissent. 7 De media nocte missus equitatus novissimum agmen consequitur: magnus numerus capitur atque interficitur; reliqui ex fuga in civitates discedunt.

[88] His coming was known by the colour of his cloak, which it was his habit to wear in action as a distinguishing mark; and the troops of cavalry and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him were noticed, because from the upper levels these downward slopes and depressions were visible. Thereupon the enemy joined battle: a shout was raised on both sides, and taken up by an answering shout from the rampart and the whole of the entrenchments. Our troops discarded their pikes and got to work with their swords. Suddenly the cavalry was noticed in the rear; other cohorts drew near. The enemy turned to flee; the cavalry met them in flight, and a great slaughter ensued. Sedulius, commander and chief of the Lemovices, was killed; Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian was captured alive in the rout; seventy-four war-standards were brought in to Caesar; of the vast host few returned safe to camp. The others beheld from the town the slaughter and rout of their countrymen, and, in despair of safety, recalled their force from the entrenchments. Directly they heard what had happened the Gauls fled from their camp. And if the troops had not been worn out by frequent reinforcing and the whole day's effort, the entire force of the enemy could have been destroyed. The cavalry

were sent off just after midnight and caught up with the rearguard; a great number were taken and slain, the rest fled away into the different states.

[89] 1 Postero die Vercingetorix concilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatum, 2 sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat, et quoniam sit fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint. Mittuntur de his rebus ad Caesarem legati. 3 Iubet arma tradi, principes produci. 4 Ipse in munitione pro castris consedit: eo duces producuntur; Vercingetorix deditur, arma proiciuntur. 5 Reservatis Aeduis atque Arvernīs, si per eos civitates recipere posset, ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singula praedae nomine distribuit.

[89] On the morrow Vercingetorix summoned a council, at which he stated that he had undertaken that campaign, not for his own occasions, but for the general liberty; and as they must yield to fortune he offered himself to them for whichever course they pleased — to give satisfaction to the Romans by his death, or to deliver him alive. Deputies were despatched to Caesar to treat of this matter. He ordered the arms to be delivered up, the chiefs to be brought out. He himself took his seat in the entrenchments in front of the camp: the leaders were brought out to him there. Vercingetorix was surrendered, arms were thrown down. Keeping back the Aedui and the Arverni, to see if through them he could recover their states, he distributed the rest of the prisoners, one apiece to each man throughout the army, by way of plunder.

[90] 1 His rebus confectis in Aeduos proficiscitur; civitatem recipit. 2 Eo legati ab Arvernīs missi quae imperaret se facturos pollicentur.

Imperat magnum numerum obsidum. 3 Legiones in hiberna mittit. Captivorum circiter viginti milia Aeduis Arvernisque reddit. 4 Titum Labienum duabus cum legionibus et equitatu in Sequanos proficisci iubet: huic Marcum Sempronium Rutilum attribuit. 5 Gaium Fabium legatum et Lucium Minucium Basilum cum legionibus duabus in Remis collocat, ne quam ab finitimis Bellovacis calamitatem accipiant. 6 Gaium Antistium Reginum in Ambivaretos, Titum Sextium in Bituriges, Gaium Caninium Rebilum in Rutenos cum singulis legionibus mittit. 7 Quintum Tullium Ciceronem et Publium Sulpicium Cabilloni et Matiscone in Aeduis ad Ararim rei frumentariae causa collocat. Ipse Bibracte hiemare constituit. His litteris cognitis Romae dierum viginti supplicatio redditur.

[90] When these affairs were settled he started for the country of the Aedui and recovered the state. The Arverni sent deputies to him there who promised to carry out his commands: he required of them a great number of hostages. He sent the legions into cantonments. He restored some twenty thousand prisoners to the Aedui and the Arverni. He ordered Titus Labienus with two legions and cavalry to march off into the country of the Sequani, attaching Marcus Sempronius Rutilus to him. Gaius Fabius, the lieutenant-general, and Lucius Minucius Basilus he stationed with two legions in the country of the Remi, in order that they might suffer no damage from the neighbouring Bellovaci. Gaius Antistius Reginus he sent into the territory of the Ambivareti, Titus Sextius to the Bituriges, Gaius Caninius Rebilus to the Ruteni, with a legion apiece. Quintus Tullius Cicero and Publius Sulpicius he stationed at Cabillonum and Matisco, Aeduan towns near the Arar, to secure the corn-supply. He himself decided to winter at Bibracte. When the despatches of the campaign were published at Rome a public thanksgiving of twenty

days was granted.

BOOK VIII

1 Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum cotidiana mea recusatio non difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur deprecationem habere, rem difficillimam suscepi. 2 Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius scriptis, contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris. 3 Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis. 4 Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur: 5 qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur. 6 Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecere scimus. 7 Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum. 8 Mihi ne illud quidem accidit, ut Alexandrino atque Africano bello interesssem; quae bella quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro testimonio sumus dicturi. 9 Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis causas colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo, quod me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare comparari. Vale.

By your continual reproaches, Balbus, which seemed to regard my

daily refusal not as a plea caused by difficulty, but as an evasion due to indolence, I have been constrained to undertake a most difficult task. I have tacked a supplement to the Commentaries of our great Caesar on the operations in Gaul, as his previous and his subsequent writings did not otherwise fit together; and his last work, which was left unfinished from the operations at Alexandria onwards, I have completed as far as the conclusion, not indeed of civil discord, of which we see no end, but of Caesar's life. And I trust that those who will read it may understand how unwillingly I have undertaken the task of writing this Commentary; for so shall I the easier free myself from the charge of folly and presumption for having intruded myself in the middle of Caesar's writings. For it is universally agreed that nothing was ever so elaborately finished by others that is not surpassed by the refinement of these Commentaries. They have been published that historians may not lack knowledge of those great achievements; and so strong is the unanimous verdict of approval as to make it appear that historians have been robbed of an opportunity rather than enriched with one. Yet herein is our own admiration greater than all other men's; the world knows how excellently, how faultlessly, but we know also how easily, how speedily he completed his Commentaries. Caesar possessed not only the greatest facility and refinement of style, but also the surest skill in explaining his own plans. For myself, I had not the fortune ever to take part in the Alexandrian and the African campaign. It is true that those campaigns are partially known to me from the conversation of Caesar; but we listen in different fashion to events which fascinate us by their wonderful novelty, and to events which we are to state in evidence. Yet I doubt not that, in collecting every plea to excuse myself from comparison with Caesar, I incur a charge of

presumption for imagining that there is anyone in whose judgment I can be set beside Caesar. Farewell.

[1] 1 Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore aestate nullum bellandi tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete reficere a tantis laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere. 2 Cuius rei verisimilis causa adferebatur, quod Gallis omnibus cognitum esset neque ulla multitudo in unum locum coacta resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa bella complures eodem tempore intulissent civitates, satis auxilii aut spatii aut copiarum habiturum exercitum populi Romani ad omnia persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem incommodi recusandam, si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in libertatem.

[1] The whole of Gaul was now subdued, and Caesar, having been continuously engaged in war since the previous summer, desired to refresh his troops with a rest in cantonments after their great exertions. Reports came, however, that several states at once were considering fresh plans of campaign and forming conspiracies. The reason suggested for this movement was probable. All the Gauls, it was said, were aware that, on the one hand, it was impossible to make a stand against the Romans by the concentration of any number of men in one place, and that, on the other, if a number of states attacked them in separate places at the same time, the army of Rome was not likely to have strength or time or troops enough to deal with everything. Wherefore it was not proper for a particular state to refuse any trouble that might befall, if by such a respite the remainder could reclaim their liberty.

[2] 1 Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur, Caesar Marcum

Antonium quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum praesidio pridie Kal. Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem XIII, quam non longe a finibus Aeduorum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum, eique adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat. 2 Binis cohortibus ad impedimenta tuenda relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros Biturigum inducit, qui, cum latos fines et complura oppida haberent, unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent.

[2] Caesar did not wish to encourage the Gauls in this opinion: he therefore put Marcus Antonius, his quartermaster-general, in command of his own cantonments, and on the last day of December marched off himself, with an escort of cavalry, from the town of Bibracte to the quarters of the Thirteenth Legion, stationed in the country of the Bituriges not far from that of the Aedui, and he brigaded with it the Eleventh Legion, its next neighbour. Leaving two cohorts of each to guard the baggage, he led the rest of the army into the most fertile districts of the Bituriges, since, being the possessors of broad territories and numerous strongholds, they had proved more than a single legion in cantonments could restrain from warlike preparations and conspiracies.

[3] 1 Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod imparatis disiectisque accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes prius ab equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent. 2 Namque etiam illud vulgare incursionis hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes incendiis terrentur. 3 Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere

Romanorum, in finitimas civitates aut privatis hospitiiis confisi aut societate consiliorum confugerant. 4 Frustra: nam Caesar magnis itineribus omnibus locis occurrit nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de domestica salute cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et dubitantes terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat. 5 Tali condicione proposita Bituriges, cum sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius amicitiam finitimasque civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in fidem receptas esse, idem fecerunt.

[3] The sudden coming of Caesar brought the inevitable consequence on a folk dispersed and unprepared. They were tilling their farms without the least fear, and they were caught by the cavalry before they could flee for refuge into the strongholds. For even the ordinary sign of a hostile inroad (which is usually perceived by the wholesale burning of farm-buildings) had been omitted by Caesar's command, in order that his supply of forage and corn^o might not run short if he should wish to advance further, nor the enemy be frightened by the conflagrations. The capture of many thousand persons struck terror into the Bituriges; and those who had been able in the first instance to escape from the coming of the Romans had fled for refuge into neighbouring states, trusting either to private relations or to political sympathy. In vain; for by means of forced marches Caesar appeared in every corner, giving no state a chance of thought for another's safety rather than for its own; and by this rapidity of action he contrived at once to keep friends loyal and to bring doubters by intimidation to terms of peace. The Bituriges saw that the clemency of Caesar opened the way for a return to his friendship, and that neighbouring states, without punishment of any kind, had given hostages and had been readmitted to protection; and the chance of

such terms induced them to do likewise.

[4] 1 Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac patientia, qui brumalibus diebus itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus intolerandis studiosissime permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios, centurionibus tot milia nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur legionibusque in hiberna remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte. 2 Ibi cum ius diceret, Bituriges ad eum legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos intulisse bellum sibi querebantur. 3 Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius decem et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIII et VI ex hibernis ab Arare educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa superiore commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad persequendos Carnutes proficiscitur.

[4] In spite of winter days, the most difficult of marches, and cold weather beyond endurance, the troops had stuck most zealously to their work, and in reward for their effort and hardship Caesar promised them two hundred sesterces apiece, and as many thousand to each centurion, as a free gift in lieu of booty. Then he sent the legions back to cantonments, and himself returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. While he was administering justice there the Bituriges sent deputies to him to seek help against the Carnutes who, as they complained, had made war upon them. On report of this, after a halt of no more than eighteen days in cantonments, he marched the Fourteenth and Sixth Legions from their cantonments on the Saône (these legions, as mentioned in the previous book of the Commentaries, he had stationed there to keep the corn-supply clear); then, with the two legions, he started to punish the Carnutes.

[5] 1 Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata, calamitate

ceterorum ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae hiemis causa constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant (nuper enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiunt. 2 Caesar erumpentes eo maxime tempore acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites nolle, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo castra ponit atque in tecta partim Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter stramentis tentoriorum integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites compegit. 3 Equites tamen et auxiliosos pedites in omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse dicebantur hostes; nec frustra: 4 nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri revertuntur. Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum praesidio tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte amissa suorum dissipantur in finitimas civitates.

[5] When report of the army reached the enemy, the influence of the disaster which had befallen the rest made itself felt. The Carnutes forsook the villages and the strongholds — in which they were living for protection against the winter, in mean buildings erected hastily to meet their need, for after their recent defeat they had abandoned many of their strongholds — and fled in all directions. Caesar was unwilling that his troops should be subjected to the storms which break out in especial vehemence just at that time; so he pitched camp at Cenabum, the town of the Carnutes, and crowded the men partly into the dwellings of the Gauls, partly into huts built on to them with the thatch hastily collected for roofing the tents in winter. The cavalry, however, and auxiliary infantry were sent in all directions which the enemy were said to have taken, and not in vain, for as a rule our men returned with great store of booty. The Carnutes were overcome by the distress of winter and the fear of danger; they were

driven out of their homes and durst make no long stay in any place; nor when the storms were most severe could they get shelter in the protection of the woods. So they scattered abroad and dispersed among the neighbouring states, with the loss of a great part of their own folk.

[6] 1 Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis haberet convenientes manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur, quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum summum bellum posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit; 2 ipse, cum crebris legationibus Remorum certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque praestabant, finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco et Commio Atrebate exercitus comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut omni multitudine in fines Suessionum, qui Remis erant attributi, facerent impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad dignitatem sed etiam ad salutem suam iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime de re publica meritos accipere, 3 legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus undecimam; litteras autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum legiones duas quas habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit. Ita, quantum hibernorum opportunitas bellicae ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo labore in vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat.

[6] It was now the most troublesome season of the year, and Caesar, deeming it sufficient to scatter bands that were assembling so as to prevent any new outbreak of war, and feeling sure, so far as could reasonably be reckoned, that no war of first-rate importance could be stirred up until the summer season, stationed Gaius Trebonius, with

the two legions of his own command, in cantonments at Cenabum. By frequent deputations from the Remi he was receiving information that the Bellovaci (who surpassed all the Gauls and Belgae in renown of war) and the neighbouring states were preparing armies under the leadership of Correus of the Bellovaci and Commius of the Atrebates, and concentrating the same. Their object was to make an incursion with all their host into the country of the Suessiones, who were tributaries of the Remi; and as Caesar deemed it important not only to his honour, but even to his security, that no disaster should come upon allies who had deserved exceeding well of the Republic, he again called out the Eleventh Legion from cantonments. Further, he sent a despatch to Gaius Fabius bidding him bring his two legions into the country of the Suessiones, and summoned one of the two legions with Titus Labienus. Thus, so far as the situation of the cantonments allowed, and the tactics of the campaign required, he contrived, by continuous work on his own part, to lay the burden of expeditions on the legions in turn.

[7] 1 His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos proficiscitur castrisque in eorum finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in omnes partes ad aliquos excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia cognosceret. 2 Equites officio functi renuntiant paucos in aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui agrorum colendorum causa remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter demigratum), sed qui speculandi causa essent remissi. 3 A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse, 4 itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses, Atrebates; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in ultiores silvas contulisse. 5 Complures esse principes belli

auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent. 6 Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita. 7 Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebis cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur; 8 si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos.

[7] When this force was collected, he marched for the country of the Bellovaci, and having pitched camp therein, he despatched troops of cavalry in all directions to catch any prisoners they could from whom they might learn the enemy's plans. The cavalry performed their duty, and reported that in the buildings a few persons had been found; and even these had not stayed behind to till the fields (for the emigration had been thorough everywhere), but had been sent back to act as spies. By inquiring of these as to where the main body of the Bellovaci was and what was their intention, he found out that all the Bellovaci able to bear arms had assembled in one place, and likewise the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caleti, Veliocasses, and Atrebates; that they had chosen for their camp high ground in a wood surrounded by a marsh, and had collected all the baggage in the more distant woods; that several chiefs were responsible for the war, but the rank and file were mostly under the orders of Correus, because they had perceived that he was the one to whom the name of the Roman people was most hateful. He further learnt that a few days before Commius the

Atrebatian had left their camp to bring up succours from the Germans, whose proximity was as imminent as their numbers were infinite. The Bellovaci, however, had determined, with the consent of all the chiefs and the utmost enthusiasm of the common folk, if Caesar, as was said, came with three legions, to offer battle, lest they might be compelled afterwards to fight it out with his whole army under conditions more miserable and severe. If Caesar brought up a larger force, they had determined to stand fast in the position they had chosen, while they tried, from ambushades, to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which by reason of the time of year was both scanty and scattered), corn, and all other supplies.

[8] 1 Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum cognosset atque ea quae proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a temeritate barbarorum remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum statuit, quo celerius hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem. 2 Singularis enim virtutis veterrimas legiones VII, VIII, VIII habebat, summae spei delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo iam stipendio tamen in collatione reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac virtutis ceperat opinionem. 3 Itaque consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad se essent delatae omnibus expositis animos multitudinis confirmat. 4 Si forte hostes trium legionum numero posset elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio septima, octava, nona ante omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium impedimentorum agmen, quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse consuevit, cogeret undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere hostibus posset quam ipsi depoposcissent. 5 Hac ratione paene quadrato agmine instructo in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum adducit.

[8] Upon this information, in regard to which most of the prisoners were in agreement, Caesar considered that the plans proposed were full of a prudence far removed from the recklessness of barbarians, and decided accordingly to make all possible efforts to induce the enemy, by contempt for the scanty number of the Romans, to come forth the more speedily to battle. For the truth was that he had the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions, real veterans of incomparable courage, and the Eleventh, a most promising corps of picked younger men: it was now on its eighth campaign, but in comparison with the rest had not yet won the same reputation for length of service and for courage. Accordingly, he summoned a council of war and set forth everything that had been reported to him; then he spoke encouragingly to the rank and file. To see if he could entice the enemy to a decisive battle by the appearance of only three legions, he arranged the order of the column as follows. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth were to march in front of all the baggage, and the Eleventh was to bring up the rear of the whole baggage-train (which, however, was but moderate, according to the custom on expeditions), to prevent the enemy from catching a sight of greater numbers than they themselves had challenged. By this arrangement he formed the army almost in battle column, and brought it within sight of the enemy before they expected it.

[9] 1 Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo gradu legiones accedere Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiducia consilia perlata, sive certaminis periculo sive subito adventu sive exspectatione nostri consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore decedunt. Caesar, etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium valle intermissa magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente castra castris hostium confert. 3 Haec

imperat vallo pedum XII muniri, loriculam pro [haec] ratione eius altitudinis inaedicari; fossam duplicem pedum denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in altitudinem trium tabulorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi, quorum frontes viminea lorica munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa, duplici propugnatorum ordine defenderentur, 4 quorum alter ex pontibus, quo tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque permetteret tela, alter, qui propior hostem in ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus telis tegeretur. Portis fores altioresque turres imposuit.

[9] When the Gauls (whose plans in all their self-confidence had been reported to Caesar) suddenly saw the legions in their formation advancing upon them in regular step as in line of battle, they drew up their force in front of their camp, but — either because they felt the risk of a struggle, or because of the suddenness of our arrival, or because they waited to see our plan — did not move from the higher ground. Anxious as he had been to fight, Caesar was surprised at the greater number of the enemy, and set his camp over against that of the enemy, with a valley in between, deep rather than extensive. He commanded the camp to be fortified with a twelve-foot rampart, a breastwork to be built on in proportion to the height of the same, a double trench fifteen feet wide in each case to be dug with perpendicular sides, turrets three stories high to be set up at frequent intervals and connected by covered cross-bridges, having their front faces protected by a breastwork of wattles. His object was to hold the camp against the enemy by the double ditch and a double rank of defenders: one rank, posted on the bridges, from the greater safety afforded by height, could hurl its missiles with greater range and confidence; the other, posted on the actual rampart nearer the enemy,

would be covered by the bridge from the showers of missiles. At the gateways he set doors and higher turrets.

[10] 1 Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium. Namque et operum magnitudinem et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris allaturum, et cum pabulatum frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis copiis castra munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi. 2 Interim crebro paucis utrimque procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam tamen paludem nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque transibant acriusque hostes insequabantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem transgressi nostros longius summovebant. 3 Accidebat autem cotidianis pabulationibus (id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex aedificiis pabulum conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi pabulatores circumvenirentur; 4 quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes incitabat barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad auxilia Germanorum arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi numero non amplius erant quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari nitebantur.

[10] The object of this fortification was twofold. He hoped that the size of the works and the evidence of fear on his part would bring confidence into the minds of the natives, and he saw that whenever it was necessary to march farther afield for forage and corn the fortification of itself would make it possible to defend the camp with a small force. Meanwhile there were frequent encounters across the marsh that lay between the two camps, for a few men would dash forward from either side; but sometimes our own Gallic or German auxiliaries would cross the marsh to pursue the enemy the more

fiercely, or in turn the enemy would push across it and force our troops to give ground. Moreover, in the daily expeditions for forage it happened — as was inevitable, when forage had to be collected from homesteads few and far apart — that scattered foraging parties were surrounded in troublesome places; and this occurrence, though causing our troops an insignificant loss in draught-animals and slaves, served nevertheless to arouse foolish fancies in the mind of the natives, the more so as Commius, who, as I have shown, had departed to fetch German auxiliaries, was now come with some horsemen. It is true they were no more in number than five hundred; nevertheless, the arrival of these Germans gave the natives something to rely on.

[11] 1 Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures dies castris palude et loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra eorum sine dimicatione perniciose nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset legionem XIII, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat, arcesseret atque ita cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se veniret; 2 ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum reliquarumque civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio pabulationibus mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent.

[11] Caesar remarked that for several days the enemy kept within their camp, which was fortified by the marsh and by its natural position, and that it could not be assaulted without an expensive action, nor the position enclosed by siege-works without a larger army than he had. Wherefore he sent a despatch to Trebonius to summon with all speed the Thirteenth Legion (which was wintering in the country of

the Bituriges with Titus Sextius, lieutenant-general), and so with three legions to come to him by forced marches. He himself had called out a large number of horsemen belonging to the Remi, the Lingones, and other states; and he now sent these by turns to act as escort for the foraging parties and to resist sudden raids of the enemy.

[12] 1 Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine diligentia minueretur, quod plerumque accidit diuturnitate, Bellovaci delecta manu peditum cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum 2 silvestribus locis insidias disponunt eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum elicerent nostros, deinde circumventos aggrederentur. 3 Cuius mali sors incidit Remis, quibus ille dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi, cum repente hostium equites animadvertissent ac numero superiores paucitatem contempsissent, cupidius insecuti peditibus undique sunt circumdati. 4 Quo facto perturbati celerius quam consuetudo fert equestris proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe civitatis, praefecto equitum; 5 qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti, tamen consuetudine Gallorum neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda praefectura usus erat neque dimicari sine se voluerat. 6 Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto, 7 nostrique detrimento admonentur diligentius exploratis locis stationes disponere ac moderatius cedentem insequi hostem.

[12] This happened daily, and at length the sameness of the duty began to diminish carefulness — the usual result of long continuance in one thing. Then the Bellovaci chose out a detachment of footmen, and, as they knew the daily stations of our cavalry piquets, set ambuscades about in wooded spots, and on the morrow sent thither

horsemen also, first to lure on our men, and then, when they were surrounded, to attack them. As it chanced, the blow fell upon the Remi, to whom the performance of duty for that day had been allotted. When they suddenly remarked the enemy's horsemen, and in their superiority of numbers despised the scanty force, they pursued too eagerly and were surrounded by footmen on every side. They were more speedily thrown into confusion by this occurrence than is usually the case in a cavalry combat, and retired with the loss of Vertiscus, a chief of their state and commander of the horse. Though he could scarcely sit a horse by reason of age, yet, according to the custom of the Gauls, he had made no excuse of age in undertaking the command, and he had desired that no battle should take place without him. The spirit of the enemy was fired and excited by the success of the combat and the slaughter of a chief and commander of the Remi, and our own troops were taught by the disaster to search localities more carefully before they posted their piquets and to pursue a retiring enemy with more restraint.

[13] 1 Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia in conspectu utrorumque castrorum, quae ad vada transitusque fiebant paludis. 2 Qua contentione Germani, quos propterea Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi proeliarentur, cum constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque resistentibus interfectis pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui aut cominus opprimebantur aut eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius subsidiari consuerant, turpiter refugerunt, 3 nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli pudore coacti longius profugerent. 4 Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus insolentiores an adverso

mediocri casu timidiores essent.

[13] There was no interruption meanwhile of the daily combats in sight of both camps, which usually took place at the fords and passages over the marsh. In this sort of contest the Germans (whom Caesar had brought over the Rhine on purpose that they might fight intermingled with cavalry) on one occasion crossed the marsh in a body with much resolution, cut down such few men as stood their ground, and stubbornly pursued the rest of the host. The result was a panic, not only of those whom they caught at close quarters or wounded at long range, but even of those who formed the regular reserve at a distance. It was a disgraceful rout, which did not end until, after several times losing the advantage of position, the enemy reached once more their own camp, or in some cases were shamed into yet further flight. Their danger threw the whole force into such confusion that it was scarce possible to judge which was the greater — their arrogance after a trifling success, or their terror after a slight reverse.^a

[14] 1 Compluribus diebus isdem in castris consumptis, cum propius accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum cognossent, duces Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu dimittunt eos quos aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant, unaque reliqua impedimenta. 2 Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant agmen (magna enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit), oppressi luce copias armatorum pro suis instruunt castris, ne prius Romani persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum processisset. 3 At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos tanto collis ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut discedere ex eo loco

sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non possent. 4 Ita, cum palude impedita a castris castra dividi videret, quae transeundi difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare posset, atque id iugum quod trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri valle a castris eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata legiones traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi fastigio duobus ab lateribus muniebatur. 5 Ibi legionibus instructis ad ultimum iugum pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa tela in hostium cuneos conici possent.

[14] After several days spent in the same camp, the chiefs of the Bellovaci learnt that the legions with Gaius Trebonius, lieutenant-general, were come nearer; and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, they thought to send away at night all persons failing in years or strength, or unarmed, and the rest of the baggage along with them. While they were marshalling the crowded and disorderly column (for a great quantity of carts usually accompanies the Gauls, even when they are moving light), daybreak came upon them, and they drew up their force of armed men in front of their own camp, for fear that the Romans might essay to pursue them before their baggage-train had advanced to any distance. Caesar, however, considered that if they stood their ground they should not be attacked, owing to the steepness of the ascent, and yet that the legions should certainly be moved up close enough to make it impossible for the natives to withdraw from the spot without risk of an attack. Seeing, therefore, that camp was divided from camp by a troublesome marsh so difficult to cross that it could check the speed of a pursuit, and remarking that beyond the marsh the ridge, stretching almost to the enemy's camp, was cut off from the same by but a slight valley, he had gangways laid over the marsh, led the legions across, and

speedily reached the highest plateau on the ridge, which was protected on its two sides by a downward slope. There he reformed the legions, and then reached the end of the ridge, where he posted his line of battle in a spot from which the missiles of the artillery could be discharged into the masses of the enemy.

[15] 1 Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare non recusarent, si forte Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias distributas dimittere non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie permanserunt. 2 Quorum pertinacia cognita Caesar XX cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco mutatis muniri iubet castra. 3 Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit. 4 Bellovaci, cum Romanos ad insequendum paratos viderent neque pernoctare aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem loco possent, tale consilium sui recipiendi ceperunt. 5 Fasces, ut consueverant (namque in acie sedere Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia, inter se traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo pronuntiato uno tempore incenderunt. 6 Ita continens flamma copias omnes repente a conspectu textit Romanorum. Quod ubi accidit, barbari vehementissimo cursu refugerunt.

[15] The natives relied on the natural strength of the position; and while they did not intend to decline battle, if perchance the Romans should try to mount the hill, they could not send their forces away gradually in detachments, for fear that, if so dispersed, they would be put to confusion. So they stood fast in line. Caesar noted their stubbornness, and forming up twenty cohorts, he measured out a camp on the spot and ordered it to be entrenched. The works

finished, he set the legions in battle array before the rampart, and placed the cavalry, with chargers bridled, on outpost. The Bellovaci saw that the Romans were ready for pursuit, and feeling that they could not spend the night where they were, nor, indeed, remain longer without danger, they determined on the following plan of retirement. They had a very large quantity of straw bales and faggots in their camp; and passing these from hand to hand between them where they sat (for, as stated in former books of Caesar's Commentaries, it is the custom of the Gauls to sit in line of battle), they piled them in front of their line, and at the end of the day they fired them simultaneously at a given signal. So a continuous flame suddenly covered the whole force from the sight of the Romans. When this occurred, the natives fled away at a most furious speed.

[16] 1 Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit. 2 Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt. 4 Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt. 5 Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites peditesque disponent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus inferebant.

[16] Caesar could not observe the withdrawal of the enemy through the screen of fires, but, nevertheless, suspecting that the stratagem

had been adopted with flight in view, he advanced the legions and despatched troops of cavalry in pursuit. He himself moved forward more slowly, fearing an ambushade — in other words, that the enemy might perhaps try to hold their ground and to entice our troops onto unfavourable ground. The cavalry feared to enter the smoke and the thick belt of flame, and even if any more eager spirits entered therein, they scarce could make out the front part of their own horses; wherefore, in fear of an ambushade, they gave the Bellovaci a free chance of retirement. So they fled, with as much of cunning as of fear, and with no loss; and proceeding no more than ten miles, they pitched camp in a strongly fenced place. Thence, often setting horsemen and foot in ambushades, they wrought great havoc upon the Roman foraging parties.

[17] 1 Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo quodam comperit Caesar Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex peditum delegisse equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco collocaret, quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros suspicaretur. 2 Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam solebat educit equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio consuerat, praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum legionibus quam potest maxime appropinquat.

[17] This happened somewhat frequently, and from a prisoner Caesar discovered that Correus, the chief of the Bellovaci, had chosen six thousand footmen and a thousand horse from the total number, to put them in ambushade at a spot to which he suspected the Romans would be sending because of the store and corn and forage there. Upon information of this design Caesar brought out more legions

than usual, and pushed forward cavalry, according to his practice of sending such as an escort for foraging parties, and among them he put light-armed auxiliaries. He himself approached as near as possible with the legions.

[18] 1 Hostes in insidiis dispositi, cum sibi delegissent campum ad rem gerendam non amplius patentem in omnes partes passibus mille, silvis undique aut impeditissimo flumine munitum, velut indagine hunc insidiis circumdederunt. 2 Explorato hostium consilio nostri ad proeliandum animo atque armis parati, cum subsequentibus legionibus nullam dimicationem recusarent, turmatim in eum locum devenerunt. 3 Quorum adventu cum sibi Correus oblatam occasionem rei gerendae existimaret, primum cum paucis se ostendit atque in proximas turmas impetum fecit. 4 Nostri constanter incursum sustinent insidiatorum neque plures in unum locum conveniunt; quod plerumque equestribus proeliis cum propter aliquem timorem accidit, tum multitudine ipsorum detrimentum accipitur.

[18] The enemy were set about in ambuscades. They had chosen for the despatch of the business a plain extending nor more than a mile in every direction, fenced every way by woods or by a most troublesome river: this plain they surrounded with a network of ambuscades. The enemy's design was found out, and our men, with hearts and hands all ready for fight — for with the legions supporting they had no idea of declining battle — reached the spot troop by troop. Their arrival led Correus to suppose that a chance of despatching the business was offered him; and showing himself first with a few men, he charged the nearest troops of cavalry. Our men stoutly withstood the onrush of the ambuscaders without crowding

together — and when such crowding occurs, as it generally does in cavalry combats, through a sense of fear, the mere numbers of the men engaged cause loss.

[19] 1 Cum dispositis turmis in vicem rari proeliarentur neque ab lateribus circumveniri suos paterentur, erumpunt ceteri Correo proeliante ex silvis. 2 Fit magna contentione diversum proelium. Quod cum diutius pari Marte iniretur, paulatim ex silvis instructa multitudo procedit peditum, quae nostros coegit cedere equites. Quibus celeriter subveniunt levis armaturae pedites, quos ante legiones missos docui, turmisque nostrorum interpositi constanter proeliantur. 3 Pugnatur aliquamdiu pari contentione; deinde, ut ratio postulabat proeli, qui sustinuerant primos impetus insidiarum hoc ipso fiunt superiores, quod nullum ab insidiantibus imprudentes acceperant detrimentum. 4 Accedunt propius interim legiones, crebrique eodem tempore et nostris et hostibus nuntii adferuntur, imperatorem instructis copiis adesse. 5 Qua re cognita praesidio cohortium confisi nostri acerrime proeliantur, ne, si tardius rem gessissent, victoriae gloriam communicasse cum legionibus viderentur; 6 hostes concidunt animis atque itineribus diversis fugam quaerunt. Nequiquam: nam quibus difficultatibus locorum Romanos claudere voluerant, eis ipsi tenebantur. 7 Victi tamen percussique maiore parte amissa consternati profugiunt partim silvis petitis, partim flumine (qui tamen in fuga a nostris acriter insequentibus conficiuntur), 8 cum interim nulla calamitate victus Correo excedere proelio silvasque petere aut invitantibus nostris ad deditionem potuit adduci, quin fortissime proeliando compluresque vulnerando cogeret elatos iracundia victores in se tela conicere.

[19] Our troops of cavalry were thus posted in different places, and

when scattered parties began one after another to engage, to prevent their comrades being outflanked, the rest of the enemy, while Correus was fighting, burst out of the woods. In different parts of the field a fierce struggle began; and as it tended to drag on indecisively, little by little there issued from the woods a formed body of footmen, which forced our cavalry to give way. But they were speedily supported by the light-armed infantry, which, as I have mentioned, had been sent on in front of the legions, and these, taking post between the troops of our cavalry, fought stoutly. For some time the battle was evenly contested; then, as was inevitable from the nature of the engagement, the troops which had withstood the first attack from the ambuscades began to get the better of it just because they had not suffered any damage from the ambuscaders through want of judgment. Meanwhile the legions were drawing nearer, and frequent reports were being brought alike to our own side and to the enemy to the effect that the commander-in-chief was come with troops in order of battle. When they learnt this our men, relying on the support of the cohorts, fought most fiercely, for they feared that if they were too slow of execution they would be thought to have shared the glory of victory with the legions. The enemy's spirits fell, and by different roads they sought to flee. In vain; for they themselves were held fast by those difficulties of the locality, by which they had hoped to cut off the Romans. Still, beaten and broken as they were, and panic-stricken by the loss of more than half their number, they fled on, part by way of the woods, part by the river-side; yet even these fugitives were slain by the eager pursuit of our men. Meanwhile Correus, in no wise conquered by disaster, could not be induced to withdraw from the engagement and seek the woods, nor to surrender at our summons; nay, fighting most gallantly and wounding many men, he

compelled the victors, in a frenzy of rage, to hurl their missiles against him.

[20] 1 Tali modo re gesta recentibus proeli vestigiis ingressus Caesar, cum victos tanta calamitate existimaret hostes nuntio accepto locum castrorum relicturos, quae non longius ab ea caede abesse plus minus octo milibus dicebantur, tametsi flumine impeditum transitum videbat, tamen exercitu traducto progreditur. 2 At Bellovaci reliquaeque civitates repente ex fuga paucis atque his vulneratis receptis, qui silvarum beneficio casum evitaverant, omnibus adversis, cognita calamitate, interfecto Correo, amisso equitatu et fortissimis peditibus, cum adventare Romanos existimarent, concilio repente cantu tubarum convocato conclamant, legati obsidesque ad Caesarem mittantur.

[20] The business had been despatched after this fashion, and the traces of the combat were still fresh, when Caesar came on the scene. He supposed that the enemy were crushed by so dire a disaster, and that upon report thereof they would abandon their camping-ground, said to be not farther than eight miles, more or less, from the field of slaughter. He saw that his passage was impeded by the river, but, none the less, he led the army across and advanced. But when the Bellovaci and the rest of the states received suddenly among them the few fugitives, and those wounded, who by the help of the woods had escaped destruction, they recognized their disaster, seeing that all was against them, that Correo was slain, that their horsemen and the most gallant of their footmen were lost. And as they thought the Romans were coming upon them they suddenly summoned a conference by trumpet-call, and clamoured that deputies and hostages should be sent to Caesar.

[21] 1 Hoc omnibus probato consilio Commius Atrebas ad eos confugit Germanos, a quibus ad id bellum auxilia mutuatus erat. 2 Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. 3 Adflctas opes equestri proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios caedis. 4 Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse.

[21] When this counsel was approved by all, Commius the Atrebatian escaped to the Germans from whom he had borrowed succours for that campaign. The rest at once sent deputies to Caesar, and besought him to be satisfied with a punishment of his enemy which, had he been able to inflict it without a battle while their strength was unimpaired, in his mercy and kindness he would assuredly never have inflicted. The power of the Bellovaci was crushed, they said, by the cavalry combat; many thousand chosen footmen had perished, scarcely had men escaped to tell of the slaughter. Nevertheless, for all the greatness of the disaster, the Bellovaci had gained one advantage by the combat, in the slaughter of Correus, who had originated the campaign and stirred up the people. For never during his lifetime had the council possessed so much power in the state as the untutored populace.

[22] 1 Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse

neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditione esse perductos. 2 Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent.

[22] To this petition of the deputies Caesar remarked that in the previous year the Bellovaci and the rest of the Gallic states had simultaneously engaged in war: the Bellovaci had stuck to their intention the most obstinately of all, and had not been brought to a right mind by the surrender of the rest. He was very well aware that it was easy enough to shift the blame of the offence on to the dead. But no one was so powerful that, if chiefs were reluctant, the council in opposition, and all good citizens adverse, he could excite and conduct a war by means of a feeble band of common folk. Nevertheless, he would be satisfied with the punishment which they had brought upon themselves.

[23] 1 Nocte insequenti legati responsa ad suos referunt, obsides conficiunt. Concurrunt reliquarum civitatum legati, quae Bellovacorum speculabantur eventum; 2 obsides dant, imperata faciunt excepto Commio, quem timor prohibebat cuiusquam fidei suam committere salutem. 3 Nam superiore anno Titus Labienus, Caesare in Gallia citeriore ius dicente, cum Commium comperisset sollicitare civitates et coniurationem contra Caesarem facere, infidelitatem eius sine ulla perfidia iudicavit comprimi posse. 4 Quem quia non arbitrabatur vocatum in castra venturum, ne temptando cautiorem faceret, Gaium Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum per simulationem colloqui curaret interficiendum. Ad eam

rem delectos idoneos ei tradit centuriones. 5 Cum in colloquium ventum esset, et, ut convenerat, manum Commi Volusenus arripuisset, centurio vel insueta re permotus vel celeriter a familiaribus prohibitus Commi conficere hominem non potuit; graviter tamen primo ictu gladio caput percussit. 6 Cum utrimque gladii dstricti essent, non tam pugnandi quam diffugiendi fuit utrorumque consilium: nostrorum, quod mortifero vulnere Commium credebant adfectum; Gallorum, quod insidiis cognitis plura quam videbant extimescebant. Quo facto statuisset Commius dicebatur numquam in conspectum cuiusquam Romani venire.

[23] In the ensuing night the deputies reported his replies to the people, and the tale of hostages was made up. Deputies met hastily together from the rest of the states, which were watching to see how the Bellovaci fared. They gave hostages and did as commanded, with the exception of Commius, whom fear prevented from entrusting his personal safety to the honour of any man. The truth was that in the previous year, while Caesar was in Nearer Gaul administering justice, Titus Labienus, having discovered Commius to be tampering with the states and forming a conspiracy against Caesar, determined that his faithlessness might be suppressed without any breach of faith. And as he did not suppose that Commius would come to the camp on a summons, he did not wish to make him more cautious by any such attempt; he therefore sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to compass his execution on pretence of parley. He gave him a party of centurions, chosen as fit for the purpose. When they were come to the parley, and, as agreed, Volusenus seized the hand of Commius, a centurion — unsteadied, it may be, by the strangeness of the task, or speedily prevented by the friends of Commius — could not despatch the man; however, with the first stroke he dealt him a severe blow on

the head. Swords were drawn on both sides, but both thought not so much of fight as of flight, our own men because they believed that Commius had got a mortal wound, the Gauls because they knew it was an ambush, and feared more trouble than they saw. After this deed Commius, it was said, had resolved never to come within sight of any Roman.

[24] 1 Bellicosissimis gentibus devictis Caesar, cum videret nullam iam esse civitatem quae bellum pararet quo sibi resisteret, sed nonnullos ex oppidis demigrare, ex agris diffugere ad praesens imperium evitandum, plures in partes exercitum dimittere constituit. 2 M. Antonium quaestorem cum legione duodecima sibi coniungit. C. Fabium legatum cum cohortibus XXV mittit in diversissimam partem Galliae, quod ibi quasdam civitates in armis esse audiebat neque C. Caninium Rebilum legatum, qui in illis regionibus erat, satis firmas duas legiones habere existimabat. 3 Titum Labienum ad se evocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis, in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias civium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentino latrocinio atque impetu illorum erant oppressi. 4 Ipse ad vastandos depopulandosque fines Ambiorigis proficiscitur; quem perterritum ac fugientem cum redigi posse in suam potestatem desperasset, proximum suae dignitatis esse ducebat, adeo fines eius vastare civibus, aedificiis, pecore, ut odio suorum Ambiorix, si quos fortuna reliquos fecisset, nullum reditum propter tantas calamitates haberet in civitatem.

[24] So the most warlike nations were subdued; and as he saw that there was no longer any state able to compass a war of resistance to himself — that not a few persons were moving out of the towns and

fleeing away from the fields to avoid the dominion at their gates — Caesar determined to divide the army into several parts. Marcus Antonius, the quartermaster-general, with the Twelfth Legion he attached to his own force. Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, with five-and-twenty cohorts he sent to an entirely different part of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were in arms, and believed that the two legions with Gaius Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant-general in those parts, were not strong enough. Titus Labienus he summoned to join him, sending the Fifteenth Legion, however, which had been with Labienus in cantonments, to Italian Gaul to protect the colonies of Roman citizens and to prevent the occurrence of a disaster, through a raid of barbarians, similar to that which had occurred the summer before to the men of Tergeste, who had been overwhelmed by a sudden assault of Illyrian brigands. He himself moved off to devastate and plunder the country of Ambiorix; and, in despair of being able to bring the frightened fugitive into his power, he deemed it the best thing, out of regard for his own prestige, so completely to strip his territory of citizens, buildings, and cattle as to make Ambiorix hated by any of his subjects who might chance to survive, and to leave him no return to the state by reason of disasters so grievous.

[25] 1 Cum in omnes partes finium Ambiorigis aut legiones aut auxilia dimisisset atque omnia caedibus, incendiis, rapinis vastasset, magno numero hominum interfecto aut capto Labienum cum duabus legionibus in Treveros mittit, 2 quorum civitas propter Germaniae vicinitatem cotidianis exercitata bellis cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebat neque imperata umquam nisi exercitu coacta faciebat.

[25] He despatched legions or auxiliaries into every part of the country of Ambiorix, wrought general devastation by slaughter, fire, and pillage, killed or captured a large number of persons. He then sent Labienus with two legions against the Treveri. This state, by reason of its proximity to Germany and its training in daily wars, differed little from the Germans in its habits of barbarity, and never submitted to commands except under compulsion of an army.

[26] 1 Interim Gaius Caninius legatus, cum magnam multitudinem convenisse hostium in fines Pictonum litteris nuntiisque Durati cognosceret, qui perpetuo in amicitia manserat Romanorum, cum pars quaedam civitatis eius defecisset, ad oppidum Lemonum contendit. 2 Quo cum adventaret atque ex captivis certius cognosceret multis hominum milibus a Dumnaco, duce Andium, Duratium clausum Lemoni oppugnari neque infirmas legiones hostibus committere auderet, castra posuit loco munito. 3 Dumnacus, cum appropinquare Caninium cognosset, copiis omnibus ad legiones conversis castra Romanorum oppugnare instituit. 4 Cum complures dies in oppugnatione consumpsisset et magno suorum detrimento nullam partem munitionum convellere potuisset, rursus ad obsidendum Lemonum redit.

[26] Meanwhile Gaius Caninius, lieutenant-general, had learnt by despatches and messages from Duratius that a great host of the enemy had assembled in the country of the Pictones. Duratius had remained throughout in amity with the Romans, though a certain part of his state had revolted. Caninius therefore pushed forward towards the town of Lemonum (Poitiers), and as he came near it he received more definite information from prisoners that Duratius was shut up in Lemonum and attacked by Dumnacus, chief of the Andes, with many

thousand men. Not venturing to pit weak legions against the enemy, the Roman commander pitched camp in a fenced position. When Dumnacus learnt the approach of Caninius, he turned the whole of his force against the legions and prepared to assault the Roman camp. After spending several days on the assault, and failing, though with great loss of his men, to break down any part of the entrenchments, he returned again to the siege of Lemonum.

[27] 1 Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem recipit, obsidibus firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in Pictonibus gerantur. 2 Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus adventu Fabi cognito desperata salute, si tempore eodem coactus esset et Romanum externum sustinere hostem et respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine Ligeri, quod erat ponte propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset. 3 Fabius, etsi nondum in conspectum venerat hostibus neque se Caninio coniunxerat, tamen doctus ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum credidit hostes perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros. 4 Itaque cum copiis ad eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum procedere ante agmen imperat legionum, quantum cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in eadem se reciperet castra. 5 Consecuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum, invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in itinere adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur. Ita re bene gesta se recipiunt in castra.

[27] Gaius Fabius, lieutenant-general, was readmitting several states to protection, with hostages to confirm the same, just at the moment when by a despatch from Gaius Caninius Rebilus he learnt what was

happening in the country of the Pictones. Upon the information he started to render assistance to Duratius. But when Dumnacus learnt of the arrival of Fabius he despaired of safety, if he were to be compelled at one and the same time to withstand a Roman enemy outside and to keep an anxious watch upon the townsfolk; so he suddenly retired with his force from the place, thinking that he would not be really safe unless he marched his force across the river Loire, which by reason of its size had to be crossed by a bridge. Fabius was not yet come within sight of the enemy and had not joined forces with Caninius; nevertheless, on information derived from those who knew the character of the country, he believed that the enemy in panic would make for the spot for which they were actually making. So he pressed on with his force to the same bridge, and commanded the cavalry to advance to such a distance in front of the column as should make it possible, after such advance, to retire without fatiguing the horses to the same camp as himself. The Roman cavalry went in chase, according to their instructions, and attacked the column of Dumnacus, and as their assault was delivered upon panic-stricken fugitives in heavy marching order they slew many and got great spoil. So, their business well done, they retired to camp.

[28] 1 Insequenti nocte Fabius equites praemittit sic paratos ut confligerent atque omne agmen morarentur, dum consequeretur ipse. 2 Cuius praeceptis ut res gereretur, Quintus Atius Varus, praefectus equitum, singularis et animi et prudentiae vir, suos hortatur agmenque hostium consecutus turmas partim idoneis locis disponit, parte equitum proelium committit. 3 Confligit audacius equitatus hostium succedentibus sibi peditibus, qui toto agmine subsistentes equitibus suis contra nostros ferunt auxilium. Fit proelium acri certamine. 4 Namque nostri contemptis pridie superatis hostibus,

cum subsequi legiones meminissent, et pudore cedendi et cupiditate per se conficiendi proeli fortissime contra pedites proeliantur, 5 hostesque nihil amplius copiarum accessurum credentes, ut pridie cognoverant, delendi equitatus nostri nacti occasionem videbantur.

[28] The following night Fabius sent on the cavalry with instructions to fight and to delay the whole column till he himself should come up. And in order to carry out the operation in accordance with these instructions Quintus Atius Varus, commander of the cavalry, a soldier of uncommon spirit and sagacity, after haranguing his men, caught up the enemy's column and, placing part of his troops of cavalry in suitable positions, with part engaged in combat. The enemy's cavalry fought with the greater boldness because their footmen were coming up in support, and the latter, halting their whole column, rendered assistance to their cavalry against ours. A fiercely contested combat ensued. Our cavalry despised an enemy they had beaten the day before, and, remembering that the legions were following up, were ashamed to yield and eager to finish the combat by themselves, so that they fought most gallantly against the footmen; while the enemy, believing, according to their information of the day before, that there were no more troops to come up, thought they had got a chance of exterminating our cavalry.

[29] 1 Cum aliquamdiu summa contentione dimicaretur, Dumnacus instruit aciem quae suis esset equitibus in vicem praesidio, cum repente confertae legiones in conspectum hostium veniunt. 2 Quibus visis percussae barbarorum turmae ac perterritae acies hostium, perturbato impedimentorum agmine, magno clamore discursuque passim fugae se mandant. 3 At nostri equites, qui paulo ante cum resistentibus fortissime conflixerant, laetitia victoriae elati magno

undique clamore sublato cedentibus circumfusi, quantum equorum vires ad persequendum dextraeque ad caedendum valent, tantum eo proelio interficiunt. 4 Itaque amplius milibus XII aut armatorum aut eorum qui eo timore arma proiecerant interfectis omnis multitudo capitur impedimentorum.

[29] As the fight went on for some time with the utmost keenness, Dumnacus was drawing up his line to furnish in due turn a support for his horsemen, when suddenly the legions in close order came into view of the enemy. At sight of them the troops of native horse were paralyzed, the enemy's line was terror-struck; and throwing their baggage-column into confusion, with a great shout they scattered in every direction and betook themselves to flight. Then our own cavalry, who a moment before had been struggling most gallantly with a resisting foe, set up a great shout on every hand in the joyful excitement of victory and surrounded them as they retreated, and in that encounter they slew as long as their horses had strength to pursue and their hands to strike. So more than twelve thousand, armed men or men who had flung away their arms in the panic I have described, were slain, and the whole train of the baggage was captured.

[30] 1 Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, servis ad libertatem vocatis, exulibus omnium civitatum adscitis, receptis latronibus impedimenta et commeatus Romanorum interceperat, non amplius hominum duobus milibus ex fuga collectis provinciam petere unaque consilium cum eo Lucterium Cadurcum cepisse, quem superiore commentario prima defectione Galliae facere in provinciam voluisse impetum cognitum est, 2 Caninius legatus cum

legionibus duabus ad eos persequendos contendit, ne detrimento aut timore provinciae magna infamia perditorum hominum latrociniis caperetur.

[30] After the rout it became known that Drappes, a Senonian — who at the first outbreak of the revolt in Gaul had collected desperadoes from anywhere and everywhere, calling slaves to liberty, summoning exiles from every state, and harbouring brigands, and with these forces had cut off the baggage-trains and supplies of the Romans — with no more than two thousand men, collected from the rout, was making for the Province; and that Lucterius the Cadurcan, who (as we know from the preceding book of the Commentaries) had desired to make an attack on the Province at the beginning of the Gallic revolt, had made common cause with him. Wherefore Caninius, the lieutenant-general, pressed on with two legions in pursuit of them to prevent the dire disgrace that must result, by loss of panic in the Province, from the acts of these desperate brigands.

[31] 1 Gaius Fabius cum reliquo exercitu in Carnutes ceterasque proficiscitur civitates, quarum eo proelio, quod cum Dumnaco fecerat, copias esse accisas sciebat. 2 Non enim dubitabat quin recenti calamitate summissiores essent futurae, dato vero spatio ac tempore eodem instigante Dumnaco possent concitari. 3 Qua in re summa felicitas celeritasque in recipiendis civitatibus Fabium consequitur. 4 Nam Carnutes, qui saepe vexati numquam pacis fecerant mentionem, datis obsidibus veniunt in deditionem, ceteraeque civitates positae in ultimis Galliae finibus Oceano coniunctae, quae Aremoricae appellantur, auctoritate adductae Carnutum adventu Fabi legionumque imperata sine mora faciunt. 5 Dumnacus suis finibus expulsus errans latitansque solus extremas

Galliae regiones petere est coactus.

[31] Gaius Fabius, with the rest of the army, marched off against the Carnutes and the other states whose forces, as he knew, had been worsted in the battle which he had fought with Dumnaeus. He had, indeed, no doubt that they would prove more submissive in view of the recent disaster, but felt that, if time and space were granted, they might be stirred up again on the provocation of Dumnaeus. And on this occasion Fabius was attended by the most signal and speedy success in his recovery of the states. The Carnutes, who, though often harassed, had never made mention of peace, gave hostages and surrendered; and the other states aid in the most distant borders of Gaul, next the Ocean, the Armoric states so-called, were constrained by the example of the Carnutes to submit at once to orders when Fabius and the legions arrived. Dumnaeus was driven out of his own country and compelled, in secret, solitary wanderings, to seek the uttermost parts of Gaul.

[32] 1 At Drappes unaque Lucterius, cum legiones Caniniumque adesse cognoscerent nec se sine certa pernicie persequente exercitu putarent provinciae fines intrare posse nec iam libere vagandi latrociniorumque faciendorum facultatem haberent, in finibus consistunt Cadurcorum. 2 Ibi cum Lucterius apud suos cives quondam integris rebus multum potuisset, semperque auctor novorum consiliorum magnam apud barbaros auctoritatem haberet, oppidum Uxellodunum, quod in clientela fuerat eius, egregie natura loci munitum, occupat suis et Drappetis copiis oppidanosque sibi coniungit.

[32] But Drappes and his partner Lucterius, when they learnt that Caninius and the legions were at hand, conceived that with an army

at their heels they could not enter the confines of the Province without certain destruction; and as they had no chance of ranging freely and committing acts of brigandage, they halted in the country of the Cadurci. Lucterius had wielded great power there among his own countrymen in earlier days when their fortunes were unimpaired, and a champion of revolution always exercised great influence among the natives. With his own and Drappes' forces he occupied Uxellodunum, formerly a dependency of his, a town exceedingly well protected by its natural position, and he added the townsfolk to his force.

[33] 1 Quo cum confestim Gaius Caninius venisset animadverteretque omnes oppidi partes praeruptissimis saxis esse munitas, quo defendente nullo tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile, magna autem impedimenta oppidanorum videret, quae si clandestina fuga subtrahere conarentur, effugere non modo equitatum, sed ne legiones quidem possent, tripertito cohortibus divisus trina excelsissimo loco castra fecit; 2 a quibus paulatim, quantum copiae patiebantur, vallum in oppidi circuitum ducere instituit.

[33] Thither with all speed came Gaius Caninius. He noticed that every part of the town was protected by the most precipitous rocks, which, even if undefended, it was difficult for armed men to climb; but at the same time he saw that the townsfolk had great quantities of baggage, and that, if they tried to remove it in secret flight, they would be unable to escape not only the cavalry but even the legions. Accordingly he divided his cohorts into three detachments, and formed three camps on very high ground, from which he proceeded by degrees, according to the capacity of his troops, to run a rampart all round the town.

[34] 1 Quod cum animadverterent oppidani miserrimaeque Alesiae memoria solliciti similem casum obsessionis vererentur, maximeque ex omnibus Lucterius, qui fortunae illius periculum fecerat, moneret frumenti rationem esse habendam, constituunt omnium consensu parte ibi relictā copiarum ipsi cum expeditis ad importandum frumentum proficisci. 2 Eo consilio probato proxima nocte duobus milibus armatorum relictis reliquos ex oppido Drappes et Lucterius educunt. 3 Hi paucos dies morati ex finibus Cadurcorum, qui partim re frumentaria sublevare eos cupiebant, partim prohibere quo minus sumerent non poterant, magnum numerum frumenti comparant, nonnumquam autem expeditionibus nocturnis castella nostrorum adoriuntur. 4 Quam ob causam Gaius Caninius toto oppido munitiones circumdare moratur, ne aut opus effectum tueri non possit aut plurimis in locis infirma disponat praesidia.

[34] When the townsfolk remarked this they were filled with anxiety, remembering the utter distress at Alesia, and fearing that a blockade might have similar result; and Lucterius most of all, having experienced that fate, admonished them to have a care for the corn-supply. By general consent, therefore, the two leaders determined to leave a part of their force there, and to set forth with a body of light-armed troops to get corn into the town. This plan being approved, Drappes and Lucterius the following night left behind two thousand armed men and led the rest out of the town. In the space of a few days this party collected a great quantity of corn from the country of the Cadurci, some of whom were eager to assist them with a supply, while others were unable to prevent them from taking it; and several times they moved by night to attack our forts. Therefore Gaius Caninius delayed to make a ring of entrenchments all round the town, for fear he might not be able to defend the works when

finished or might have to post weak detachments in a number of separate positions.

[35] 1 Magna copia frumenti comparata considunt Drappes et Lucterius non longius ab oppido X milibus, unde paulatim frumentum in oppidum supportarent. 2 Ipsi inter se provincias partiuntur: Drappes castris praesidio cum parte copiarum restitit; Lucterius agmen iumentorum ad oppidum ducit. 3 Dispositis ibi praesidiis hora noctis circiter decima silvestribus angustisque itineribus frumentum importare in oppidum instituit. 4 Quorum strepitum vigiles castrorum cum sensissent, exploratoresque missi quae gererentur renuntiassent, Caninius celeriter cum cohortibus armatis ex proximis castellis in frumentarios sub ipsam lucem impetum fecit. 5 Ei repentino malo perterriti diffugiunt ad sua praesidia; quae nostri ut viderunt, acrius contra armatos incitati neminem ex eo numero vivum capi patiuntur. Profugit inde cum paucis Lucterius nec se recipit in castra.

[35] Having collected great store of corn, Drappes and Lucterius established themselves not more than ten miles from the town, intending from this point to convey the corn into the town by degrees. The commanders divided the duties between them: Drappes stood fast with part of the force to guard the camp, Lucterius escorted the train of animals to the town. Having posted several detachments thereabout, he began about the tenth hour of the night to carry the corn into the town by narrow paths through the woods. The camp sentries noticed the noise thereof, and scouts, being sent out, reported what was afoot; so Caninius moved speedily with cohorts (which had stood to arms) from the nearest forts and attacked the corn-carriers just before dawn. They were panic-struck by the sudden blow, and

fled helter-skelter to their own detachments. When our men saw it they dashed the more fiercely against the armed men, and suffered not one of the number to be taken alive. Lucterius fled away from the spot with a few followers, and did not return to the camp.

[36] 1 Re bene gesta Caninius ex captivis comperit partem copiarum cum Drappete esse in castris a milibus longe non amplius XII. 2 Quare ex compluribus cognita, cum intellexeret fugato duce altero perterritos reliquos facile opprimi posse, magnae felicitatis esse arbitrabatur neminem ex caede refugisse in castra qui de accepta calamitate nuntium Drappeti perferret. 3 Sed in experiendo cum periculum nullum videret, equitatum omnem Germanosque pedites, summae velocitatis homines, ad castra hostium praemittit; ipse legionem unam in trina castra distribuit, alteram secum expeditam ducit. 4 Cum propius hostes accessisset, ab exploratoribus quos praemiserat cognoscit castra eorum, ut barbarorum fere consuetudo est, relictis locis superioribus ad ripas fluminis esse demissa; at Germanos equitesque imprudentibus omnibus de improvise advolasse proeliumque commisisse. 5 Qua re cognita legionem armatam instructamque adducit. Ita repente omnibus ex partibus signo dato loca superiora capiuntur. 6 Quod ubi accidit, Germani equitesque signis legionis visis vehementissime proeliantur. Confestim cohortes undique impetum faciunt omnibusque aut interfectis aut captis magna praeda potiuntur. Capitur ipse eo proelio Drappes.

[36] After his success Caninius discovered from the prisoners that a part of the force was with Drappes in camp not much more than twelve miles away. He ascertained this from several persons, and perceiving that if they were panic-stricken by the rout of one chief,

the rest could easily be overwhelmed, he thought it a great piece of fortune that no one had escaped from the slaughter to the camp to bring news to Drappes of the disaster they had suffered. But, though he saw no danger in the attempt, he sent forward to the enemy's camp all the cavalry and the German infantry, the swiftest of troops, and, distributing one legion between the three camps, himself led off the other in light order. When he was come nearer the enemy, he learnt from the scouts he had sent forward that, according to the general rule of the natives, the higher ground had been abandoned and the camp brought down to the banks of the river; also that the Germans and cavalry had caught them altogether unawares when they swooped suddenly upon them, and had engaged. On this report he brought up the legion, armed and formed for action, and then suddenly, at a given signal, the upper ground was surrounded and captured. When this happened, the Germans and the cavalry, at sight of the standards of the line, fought with the utmost fury. The cohorts charged at once from all sides, and as every man was killed or captured much booty fell into their hands. Drappes himself was captured in that engagement.

[37] 1 Caninius felicissime re gesta sine ullo paene militis vulnere ad obsidendos oppidanos revertitur 2 externoque hoste deleto, cuius timore antea dividere praesidia et munitione oppidanos circumdare prohibitus erat, opera undique imperat administrari. Venit eodem cum suis copiis postero die Gaius Fabius partemque oppidi sumit ad obsidendum.

[37] After this brilliant success, with scarce a soldier wounded, Caninius returned to the blockade of the townsfolk; and now that he had exterminated the enemy outside, in fear of whom he had hitherto

been prevented from breaking up his force into detachments and surrounding the townsfolk with an entrenchment, he commanded siege-works to be carried out on every side. Next day Gaius Fabius joined him there with his own force and took a part of the town to blockade.

[38] 1 Caesar interim M. Antonium quaestorem cum cohortibus XV in Bellovacis relinquit, ne qua rursus novorum consiliorum capiendorum Belgis facultas daretur. 2 Ipse reliquas civitates adit, obsides plures imperat, timentes omnium animos consolatione sanat. 3 Cum in Carnutes venisset, quorum in civitate superiore commentario Caesar exposuit initium belli esse ortum, quod praecipue eos propter conscientiam facti timere animadvertibat, quo celerius civitatem timore liberaret, principem sceleris illius et concitatore belli, Gutruatum, ad supplicium depoposcit. 4 Qui etsi ne civibus quidem suis se committebat, tamen celeriter omnium cura quaesitus in castra perducitur. 5 Cogitur in eius supplicium Caesar contra suam naturam concursu maximo militum, qui ei omnia pericula et detrimenta belli accepta referebant, adeo ut verberibus exanimatum corpus securi feriretur.

[38] Meanwhile Caesar left Marcus Antonius, quartermaster-general, with fifteen cohorts in the country of the Bellovaci, in order to give the Belgae no further chance of framing rebellious designs. He himself visited the rest of the states, making requisition of more hostages and quieting the general apprehension by words of encouragement. When he was come to the Carnutes, the state in which (as Caesar explained in the preceding book of his Commentaries) the war had originated, he remarked that they were especially alarmed owing to their consciousness of guilt; and the

more speedily to free the state from apprehension he demanded for punishment Gutruatus, the ringleader in that crime and the instigator of the rebellion. And although the man would not trust himself even to his fellow-countrymen, all bestirred themselves speedily to seek him out and bring him to the camp. In opposition to his own natural inclination, Caesar was compelled to execute him by the troops who gathered in a mighty crowd, for they attributed to him all the dangers and losses of the war. He was therefore scourged to death and then decapitated.

[39] 1 Ibi crebris litteris Canini fit certior quae de Drappete et Lucterio gesta essent, quoque in consilio permanerent oppidani. 2 Quorum etsi paucitatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficiendam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad resistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in libertatem, 3 cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur. 4 Itaque Q. Calenum legatum cum legionibus reliquit qui iustis itineribus subsequeretur; ipse cum omni equitatu quam potest celerrime ad Caninium contendit.

[39] At this point Caesar learned by frequent despatches from Caninius what had been done with Drappes and Lucterius and what was the steadfast purpose of the townsfolk. And though he disregarded their small numbers, he judged nevertheless that their obstinacy must be visited with a severe punishment, for he feared that the Gauls as a whole might suppose that what had been lacking in them for resisting the Romans was not strength, but resolution; and that the rest of the state might follow this example and rely on

any advantage offered by strong positions to reassert their liberty. All the Gauls were aware, as he knew, that there was one more summer season in his term of office, and that, if they could hold out for that, they had no further danger to fear. And so, leaving Quintus Calenus, lieutenant-general, with the legions to follow after him by regular marches, he himself with the whole of the cavalry pressed on with all speed to join Caninius.

[40] 1 Cum contra expectationem omnium Caesar Uxellodunum venisset oppidumque operibus clausum animadverteret neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla condicione posse, magna autem copia frumenti abundare oppidanos ex perfugis cognosset, aqua prohibere hostem temptare coepit. 2 Flumen infimam vallem dividebat, quae totum paene montem cingebat, in quo positum erat praeruptum undique oppidum Uxellodunum. 3 Hoc avertere loci natura prohibebat: in infimis enim sic radicibus montis ferebatur, ut nullam in partem depressis fossis derivari posset. 4 Erat autem oppidanis difficilis et praeruptus eo descensus, ut prohibentibus nostris sine vulneribus ac periculo vitae neque adire flumen neque arduo se recipere possent ascensu. 5 Qua difficultate eorum cognita Caesar sagittariis funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra facillimos descensus collocatis aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos.

[40] He reached Uxellodunum altogether unexpected. He perceived that the town was surrounded by siege-works and that the enemy had no chance of retreat from an assault, and he had learnt from deserters that the townsfolk were well supplied with a large quantity of corn; he began, therefore, to try to cut off their water. A river ran through the bottom of the valley which almost entirely surrounded the hill,

and on the hill was built the town of Uxellodunum, with a precipice on every side. The lie of the ground prevented a diversion of the river, for its course at the very base of the hill was such that it could nowhere be drawn off by sinking trenches. But the townsfolk had a difficult and precipitous descent to the river, so that our troops, without danger to life or limb, could prevent them from either approaching the river or retiring up the steep ascent. Caesar remarked this difficulty of theirs, and by posting archers and slingers thereabout, and, further, by placing artillery at certain points opposite the easiest lines of descent, he sought to cut off the townsfolk from the river-water.

[41] 1 Quorum omnis postea multitudo aquatorum unum in locum conveniebat sub ipsius oppidi murum, ubi magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat. 2 Hoc fonte prohiberi posse oppidanos cum optarent reliqui, Caesar unus videret, e regione eius vineas agere adversus montem et aggerem instruere coepit magno cum labore et continua dimicatione. 3 Oppidani enim loco superiore decurrunt et eminus sine periculo proeliantur multosque pertinaciter succedentes vulnerant; non deterrentur tamen milites nostri vineas proferre et labore atque operibus locorum vincere difficultates. 4 Eodem tempore cuniculos tectos ab vineis agunt ad caput fontis; quod genus operis sine ullo periculo, sine suspicione hostium facere licebat. 5 Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris decem tabulorum, non quidem quae moenibus aequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae superare fontis fastigium posset. 6 Ex ea cum tela tormentis iacerentur ad fontis aditum, nec sine periculo possent aquari oppidani, non tantum pecora atque iumenta, sed etiam magna hostium multitudo siti

consumebatur.

[41] Subsequently the whole host of water-carriers assembled at one spot, immediately under the town wall. A great spring of water gushed out there, on the side where for an interval of about three hundred feet there was a break in the circuit of the river. All the Romans wished that the townsfolk could be cut off from this spring, but Caesar alone saw how it could be done. He began, just opposite the place, to push up mantlets against the hill and to build a ramp with great effort and continual fighting; for the townsfolk ran down from the higher ground and engaged without risk at long range, wounding many men as they doggedly worked upwards. However, our troops were not to be deterred from thrusting the mantlets forward and from defeating the local difficulties by sheer labour of engineering. At the same time they were pushing forward covered mines from the mantlets to the head of the spring; and this kind of work involved no risk, and could be done without suspicion on the part of the enemy. The ramp was built up to a height of sixty feet, and upon it was set a turret of ten stories, not, indeed, to reach the level of the walls, for no siege-works could effect that, but to overtop the level of the spring. When the artillery from the turret began to discharge missiles upon the line of approach to the spring, and the townsfolk could not get water without danger, not only cattle and beasts of burden, but even the great host of the enemy, were like to die of thirst.

[42] 1 Quo malo perterriti oppidani cupas sebo, pice, scandulis complent; eas ardentes in opera provolvunt eodemque tempore acerrime proeliantur, ut ab incendio restinguendo dimicationis periculo deterreant Romanos. 3 Magna repente in ipsis operibus

flamma exstitit. Quaecumque enim per locum praecipitem missa erant, ea vineis et aggere suppressa comprehendebant id ipsum quod morabatur. 3 Milites contra nostri, quamquam periculoso genere proeli locoque iniquo premebantur, tamen omnia fortissimo sustinebant animo. 4 Res enim gerebatur et excelso loco et in conspectu exercitus nostri, magnusque utrimque clamor oriebatur. Ita quam quisque poterat maxime insignis, quo notior testatiorque virtus esset eius, telis hostium flammaeque se offerebat.

[42] Terror-struck by this trouble, the townsfolk filled tubs with grease, pitch, and shingles, and rolled them burning on to the works, at the same time engaging with the utmost ferocity in order that the danger of the fight might prevent the Romans from extinguishing the fire. A mighty flame suddenly shot forth in the midst of the works; for everything that was discharged over the escarpment was held up by the mantlets and the ramp, and set fire to the particular object which checked its course. On the other hand, our soldiers, though handicapped by the dangerous position, none the less endured every difficulty in the most gallant spirit. For the action went on at a considerable height and in sight of our army, and great shouting arose on both sides. So each man, in as conspicuous a fashion as he could — the better to make his valour known and approved — faced alike the missiles of the enemy and the flames.

[43] 1 Caesar cum complures suos vulnerari videret, ex omnibus oppidi partibus cohortes montem ascendere et simulatione moenium occupandorum clamorem undique iubet tollere. 2 Quo facto perterriti oppidani, cum quid ageretur in locis reliquis essent suspensi, revocant ab impugnandis operibus armatos murisque disponunt. 3 Ita nostri fine proeli facto celeriter opera flamma comprehensa partim

restinguunt, partim interscindunt. 4 Cum pertinaciter resisterent oppidani, magna etiam parte amissa siti suorum in sententia permanerent, ad postremum cuniculis venae fontis intercisae sunt atque aversae. 5 Quo facto repente perennis exaruit fons tantumque attulit oppidanis salutis desperationem, ut id non hominum consilio, sed deorum voluntate factum putarent. Itaque se necessitate coacti tradiderunt.

[43] Seeing not a few of his men wounded, Caesar ordered cohorts to climb the height from every side of the town and under pretence of attacking the walls to raise a shout all round. This action terrified the townsfolk, and in their uncertainty as to what was going on in the other quarters they replaced their men-at-arms from the attempt on the works and set them along the walls. So our men, when the fighting ceased, speedily extinguished or cut away the parts of the works which had caught fire. Although the townsfolk continued to resist stoutly, and stuck to their resolve, even when they had lost a great part of their number through thirst, at last by means of the mines the feeders of the spring were cut off and diverted. This caused the perpetual spring suddenly to dry up, and wrought such despair of deliverance in the townsfolk that they thought it due, not to the device of man, but to the act of God. And so necessity forced them to surrender.

[44] 1 Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur ne quid crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse, neque exitum consiliorum suorum animadverteret, si tali ratione diversis in locis plures consilia inissent, exemplo supplicii deterrendos reliquos existimavit. 2 Itaque omnibus qui arma tulerant manus praecidit vitamque concessit, quo testatior esset poena improborum. 3

Drappes, quem captum esse a Caninio docui, sive indignitate et dolore vinculorum sive timore gravioris supplicii paucis diebus cibo se abstinuit atque ita interiit. 4 Eodem tempore Lacterius, quem profugisse ex proelio scripsi, cum in potestatem venisset Epasnacti Arverni 5 (crebro enim mutandis locis multorum fidei se committebat, quod nusquam diutius sine periculo commoraturus videbatur, cum sibi conscius esset, quam inimicum deberet Caesarem habere), 6 hunc Epasnactus Arvernus, amicissimus populi Romani, sine dubitatione ulla vinctum ad Caesarem deduxit.

[44] Caesar's clemency, as he knew, was familiar to all, and he did not fear that severer action on his part might seem due to natural cruelty; at the same time he could not see any successful issue to his plans if more of the enemy in different districts engaged in designs of this sort. He therefore considered that the rest must be deterred by an exemplary punishment; and so, while granting them their lives, he cut off the hands of all who had borne arms, to terrify the more openly the penalty of evildoers. Drappes, taken prisoner by Caninius, as I have related, was so mortified at the indignity of bondage, or so fearful of yet more grievous punishment, that he abstained from food for a few days and so met his death. At the same time Lucterius, who escaped from the fight, as I described, came into the hands of Epasnactus, an Arvernian; for he had to change his quarters frequently and to entrust himself to the honour of many persons, as he felt that he could make no long stay anywhere without danger, conscious as he was how bitter an enemy he must have in Caesar. And now Epasnactus the Arvernian, a devoted friend of the Roman people, put him in bonds without hesitation and brought him in to Caesar.

[45] 1 Labienus interim in Treveris equestre proelium facit secundum compluribusque Treveris interfectis et Germanis, qui nullis adversus Romanos auxilia denegabant, principes eorum vivos redigit in suam potestatem 2 atque in his Surum Aeduum, qui et virtutis et generis summam nobilitatem habebat solusque ex Aeduis ad id tempus permanserat in armis.

[45] Meanwhile, in the country of the Treveri, Labienus fought a cavalry combat with success, killing not a few of the Treveri and of the Germans, who never refused succours to any state against the Romans. Their chiefs he got into his power alive, among them Surus the Aeduan, a man of the highest distinction in courage as well as lineage, and the only Aeduan who had remained in arms up to that time.

[46] 1 Ea re cognita Caesar, cum in omnibus partibus Galliae bene res geri videret iudicaretque superioribus aestivis Galliam devictam subactamque esse, Aquitaniam numquam adisset, per Publium Crassum quadam ex parte devicisset, cum duabus legionibus in eam partem Galliae est profectus, ut ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum. 2 Quam rem sicuti cetera celeriter feliciterque confecit. Namque omnes Aquitaniae civitates legatos ad Caesarem miserunt obsidesque ei dederunt. 3 Quibus rebus gestis ipse equitum praesidio Narbonem profecto est, exercitum per legatos in hiberna deduxit: 4 quattuor legiones in Belgio collocavit cum M. Antonio et C. Trebonio et P. Vatinio legatis, duas legiones in Aeduos deduxit, quorum in omni Gallia summam esse auctoritatem sciebat, duas in Turonis ad fines Carnutum posuit, quae omnem illam regionem coniunctam Oceano continerent, duas reliquas in Lemovicum finibus non longe ab Arvernibus, ne qua pars Galliae vacua ab exercitu esset. 5

Paucos dies ipse in provincia moratus, cum celeriter omnes conventus percucurrisset, publicas controversias cognosset, 6 bene meritis praemia tribuisset (cognoscendi enim maximam facultatem habebat, quali quisque fuisset animo in totius Galliae defectione, quam sustinuerat fidelitate atque auxiliis provinciae illius), his confectis rebus ad legiones in Belgium se recipit hibernatque Nemetocennae.

[46] On report of this, Caesar saw that matters were going well in every part of Gaul, and he judged that in the campaigns of the previous summers Gaul had been conquered and subdued. But as he himself had never visited Aquitaine, though he had partially conquered it by the campaign of Publius Crassus, he started with two legions for that part of Gaul, to spend there the campaign season of his last summer. And he carried out this work, like all others, with speed and success, for all the states of Aquitaine sent deputies to him and gave hostages. These affairs settled, he started for Narbonne with an escort of cavalry, despatching the army to winter quarters under command of the lieutenant-generals. Four legions he stationed in Belgium, with the generals Marcus Antonius, Gaius Trebonius, and Publius Vatinius; two he despatched into the country of the Aedui, whose influence he knew to be supreme in the whole of Gaul; two he stationed among the Turoni, on the borders of the Carnutes, to hold all that district next to the Ocean; the remaining two in the country of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, in order that no part of Gaul might be without an army. He himself stayed for a few days in the Province, and speedily passed through all the assize towns, investigated matters of public dispute, and assigned rewards to the meritorious; for he had the best possible chance of learning what had been the temper of each person in that revolt of all Gaul which he

had withstood by the loyalty and the succours of that Province. This business despatched, he retired to the legions in Belgium and wintered at Nemetocenna.

[47] 1 Ibi cognoscit Commium Atrebatem proelio cum equitatu suo contendisse. 2 Nam cum Antonius in hiberna venisset, civitasque Atrebatum in officio esset, Commius, qui post illam vulnerationem, quam supra commemoravi, semper ad omnes motus paratus suis civibus esse consuesset, ne consilia belli quaerentibus auctor armorum duxque deesset, 3 parente Romanis civitate cum suis equitibus latrociniiis se suosque alebat infestisque itineribus commeatus complures, qui comportabantur in hiberna Romanorum, intercipiebat.

[47] There he learnt that Commius the Atrebatian had had an encounter with the Roman cavalry. The truth was that Antonius had gone into cantonments, and the state of the Atrebates was loyal; but Commius, after the wound which I have related above, had kept himself always in readiness for any rising in the interest of his fellow-countrymen, that when they sought a plan of campaign they might not lack a man to inspire and to lead their arms. And now, when the state was in obedience to the Romans, with his own horsemen he supported himself and his followers by acts of brigandage, and by infesting the roads he cut off several trains of supplies which were being conveyed to the cantonments of the Romans.

[48] 1 Erat attributus Antonio praefectus equitum C. Volusenus Quadratus qui cum eo hibernaret. Hunc Antonius ad persequendum equitatum hostium mittit. 2 Volusenus ad eam virtutem, quae singularis erat in eo, magnum odium Commi adiungebat, quo

libentius id faceret quod imperabatur. Itaque dispositis insidiis saepius equites eius adgressus secunda proelia faciebat. 3 Novissime, cum vehementius contenderetur, ac Volusenus ipsius intercipiendi Commi cupiditate pertinacius eum cum paucis insecutus esset, ille autem fuga vehementi Volusenum produxisset longius, inimicus homini suorum invocat fidem atque auxilium, ne sua vulnera per fidem imposita paterentur impunita, conversoque equo se a ceteris incautius permittit in praefectum. 4 Faciunt hoc idem omnes eius equites paucosque nostros convertunt atque insequuntur. 5 Commius incensum calcaribus equum coniungit equo Quadrati lanceaque infesta magnis viribus medium femur traicit Voluseni. 6 Praefecto vulnerato non dubitant nostri resistere et conversis equis hostem pellere. 7 Quod ubi accidit, complures hostium magno nostrorum impetu perculsi vulnerantur ac partim in fuga proteruntur, partim intercipiuntur; quod ubi malum dux equi velocitate evitavit, +ac si+ proelio secundo graviter ab eo vulneratus praefectus, ut vitae periculum aditurus videretur, refertur in castra. 8 Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus firmat; 9 unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani. Cuius postulationem Antonius cum iudicaret ab iusto nasci timore, veniam petenti dedit, obsides accepit. 10 Scio Caesarem singulorum annorum singulos commentarios confecisse; quod ego non existimavi mihi esse faciendum, propterea quod insequens annus, L. Paulo C. Marcello consulibus, nullas habet magnopere Galliae res gestas. 11 Ne quis tamen ignoraret, quibus in locis Caesar exercitusque eo tempore fuissent, pauca esse scribenda coniungendaque huic commentario statui.

[48] Gaius Volusenus Quadratus had been attached as cavalry commander to Antonius, to winter with him, and Antonius despatched him to pursue the enemy's horse. With the unique courage which he possessed Volusenus combined great hatred of Commius, so that he was the more willing to carry out his order. So he set ambuscades about, attacked the other's horsemen frequently, and won his actions. At last, in a fiercer struggle than unusual, wherein Volusenus, in his desire to cut off Commius in person, had pursued him too persistently with a few followers, while Commius in furious flight had led Volusenus on too far, in his hatred of the Roman he suddenly called on the loyal assistance of his men not to leave unpunished the wounds inflicted on himself under pledge of faith, then turned his horse, and leaving the rest, recklessly galloped at the Roman commander. All his horsemen did likewise, turning and pursuing our small party. Commius spurred on his horse and brought it abreast of the horse of Quadratus, pointed his lance, and with a mighty thrust pierced him in the middle of the thigh. When their commander was wounded our men at once stood fast, then turned their horses about and drove back the enemy. Upon this a number of the enemy were crushed and wounded by the strength of our onset, and some were ridden down in flight, some cut off. Their leader escaped this fate by the speed of his horse; but the Roman commander, so grievously wounded that he seemed likely to come within peril of his life, was carried back to camp. Commius, however, either because his wrath was appraised or because he had lost a great part of his following, sent deputies to Antonius and gave hostages to guarantee that he would report himself where Antonius should prescribe and submit to his commands. One concession he prayed might be granted to his fears — that he would not come into

the sight of any Roman. Judging that this demand proceeded from a legitimate fear, Antonius indulged his petition and accepted his hostages. I am aware that Caesar has compiled a separate Commentary for each year; but I have deemed it unnecessary for me to do this, because the ensuing year, when Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus were consuls, contains no operations on a large scale in Gaul. However, to leave no one in ignorance as to the positions of Caesar and his army at that time, I have decided to write a few remarks and add them to this Commentary.

[49] 1 Caesar in Belgio cum hiemaret, unum illud propositum habebat, continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum. 2 Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo susciperet. 3 Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace continuit.

[49] During his winter in Belgium Caesar had one definite purpose in view — to keep the states friendly, and to give hope or occasion of armed action to none. There was nothing, in fact, which he desired less than to have the definite necessity of a campaign imposed upon him on the eve of his quitting his province, for fear that, when he was about to lead his army south, he might leave behind a war which all Gaul could readily take up without immediate danger. Accordingly, by addressing the states in terms of honour, by bestowing ample presents upon the chief, by imposing no new burdens, he easily kept Gaul at peace after the exhaustion of so many defeats, under

improved conditions of obedience.

[50] 1 Ipse hibernis peractis contra consuetudinem in Italiam quam maximis itineribus est profectus, ut municipia et colonias appellaret, quibus M. Antoni quaestoris sui, commendaverat sacerdoti petitionem. 2 Contendebat enim gratia cum libenter pro homine sibi coniunctissimo, quem paulo ante praemiserat ad petitionem, tum acriter contra factionem et potentiam paucorum, qui M. Antoni repulsa Caesaris decedentis gratiam convellere cupiebant. 3 Hunc etsi augurem prius factum quam Italiam attingeret in itinere audierat, tamen non minus iustam sibi causam municipia et colonias adeundi existimavit, ut eis gratias ageret, quod frequentiam atque officium suum Antonio praestitissent, 4 simulque se et honorem suum sequentis anni commendaret, propterea quod insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragiisque valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset.

[50] The winter season over, he varied his usual practice, travelling to Italy with all possible speed in order to address the boroughs and colonies to which he had already commended the candidature of his quartermaster-general, Marcus Antonius, for the priesthood. He was glad to use his personal influence in the contest for an intimate friend of his own, whom he had sent on a little before to pursue his candidature; he was no less eager to do so in opposition to the powerful partisanship of the few who desired, by the defeat of Marcus Antonius, to upset the influence of Caesar when he should retire from his province. And although he had heard on the way that, before he could reach Italy, Antonius had been elected augur, he felt

that he had no less legitimate reason for visiting the boroughs and colonies to thank them for affording Antonius their support in so large numbers, and at the same time to commend himself as a candidate for the office he sought for the following year. For his opponents were insolently boasting that Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus had been elected consuls to despoil Caesar of every office and distinction, and that the consulship had been wrested from Servius Galba, though he had been far stronger in influence and votes alike, because he was intimately connected with Caesar by personal friendship and by service as his lieutenant-general.

[51] 1 Exceptus est Caesaris adventus ab omnibus municipiis et coloniis incredibili honore atque amore. 2 Tum primum enim veniebat ab illo universae Galliae bello. Nihil relinquebatur quod ad ornatum portarum, itinerum, locorum omnium qua Caesar iturus erat excogitari poterat. 3 Cum liberis omnis multitudo obviam procedebat, hostiae omnibus locis immolabantur, tricliniis stratis fora templaque occupabantur, ut vel exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset. Tanta erat magnificentia apud opulentiores, cupiditas apud humiliores.

[51] The arrival of Caesar was welcomed by all the boroughs and colonies with honour and affection beyond belief; for it was his first coming since the glorious campaign against a united Gaul. Nothing was omitted that wit could devise for the decoration of gates, roads, and every place where Caesar was to pass. The whole population, with the children, went forth to meet him, victims were sacrificed everywhere, festal couches, duly spread, occupied market-places and temples, so as to anticipate, if possible, the joy of the triumph so long, so very long expected. Such was the magnificence shown by

the richer folk, such the eagerness of the humbler sort.

[52] 1 Cum omnes regiones Galliae togatae Caesar percucurrisset, summa celeritate ad exercitum Nemetocennam rediit legionibusque ex omnibus hibernis ad fines Treverorum evocatis eo profectus est ibique exercitum lustravit. 2 T. Labienum Galliae togatae praefecit, quo maiore commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. Ipse tantum itinerum faciebat, quantum satis esse ad mutationem locorum propter salubritatem existimabat. 3 Ibi quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab inimicis suis sollicitari certiorque fiebat id agi paucorum consiliis, ut interposita senatus auctoritate aliqua parte exercitus spoliaretur, tamen neque de Labieno credidit quicquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem ut aliquid faceret potuit adduci. Iudicabat enim liberis sententiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri. 4 Nam C. Curio, tribunus plebis, cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris laederet, et quoniam Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrorem foro inferrent, discederet uterque ab armis exercitusque dimitteret: fore eo facto liberam et sui iuris civitatem. 5 Neque hoc tantum pollicitus est, sed etiam per se discessionem facere coepit; quod ne fieret consules amicieque Pompei iusserunt atque ita rem morando discusserunt.

[52] Having passed rapidly through all the districts of Italian Gaul, Caesar returned with all speed to the army at Nemetocenna; he summoned the legions out of all the cantonments to the country of the Treveri, proceeded thither himself, and there reviewed the army. He put Titus Labienus in charge of Italian Gaul, that it might be won over to give stronger support to his candidature for the consulship. He himself marched as far as he deemed sufficient for change of

stations, to keep the troops in health. In the course of his marches he frequently heard that Labienus was being tampered with by his enemies, and he was informed that it was the aim of a few plotters to interpose a resolution of the Senate and deprive him of some part of the army; nevertheless he believed nothing in regard to Labienus, nor could he be induced to take any action against the resolution of the Senate. For he judged that his cause was like to be easily gained if the votes of the conscript fathers were unrestrained. Indeed, Gaius Curio, tribune of the people, had undertaken to defend the cause and the position of Caesar; and he had often promised the Senate that, if any person suffered from apprehension of Caesar's arms, and as the armed tyranny of Pompeius was creating considerable alarm in the Forum, he would move that both leaders should give up arms and disband their armies. He held that by this means the state would be free and independent. And this was no mere promise, but he even tried to secure a decree by a division; however, the consuls and the friends of Pompeius interposed to prevent it, and thus frustrated the attempt by delaying action.

[53] 1 Magnum hoc testimonium senatus erat universi conveniensque superiori facto. Nam Marcellus proximo anno, cum impugnaret Caesaris dignitatem, contra legem Pompei et Crassi rettulerat ante tempus ad senatum de Caesaris provinciis, sententiisque dictis discessionem faciente Marcello, qui sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat, senatus frequens in alia omnia transiit. 2 Quibus non frangebantur animi inimicorum Caesaris, sed admonebantur quo maiores pararent necessitates, quibus cogi posset senatus id probare, quod ipsi constituissent.

[53] The testimony of the Senate as a whole was important, and

consistent with their previous action. The year before, in the course of an attack on the position of Caesar, Marcellus had brought before the Senate prematurely, and in violation of a law of Pompeius and Crassus, a motion touching the provinces of Caesar. Opinions were expressed, and when Marcellus, who coveted for himself any position to be secured from the feeling against Caesar, tried to divide the House, a crowded Senate passed over in support of the general negative. These set-backs did not break the spirit of Caesar's enemies, but they prompted them to find more forcible arguments whereby the Senate would be compelled to approve what they themselves had resolved.

[54] 1 Fit deinde senatus consultum, ut ad bellum Parthicum legio una a Cn. Pompeio, altera a C. Caesare mitteretur; neque obscure duae legiones uni detrahuntur. 2 Nam Cn. Pompeius legionem primam, quam ad Caesarem miserat, confectam ex delectu provinciae Caesaris, eam tamquam ex suo numero dedit. 3 Caesar tamen, cum de voluntate minime dubium esset adversariorum suorum, Pompeio legionem remisit et suo nomine quintam decimam, quam in Gallia citeriore habuerat, ex senatus consulto iubet tradi. In eius locum tertiam decimam legionem in Italiam mittit quae praesidia tueretur, ex quibus praesidiis quinta decima deducebatur. 4 Ipse exercitui distribuit hiberna: C. Trebonium cum legionibus quattuor in Belgio collocat, C. Fabium cum totidem in Aeduos deducit. 5 Sic enim existimabat tutissimam fore Galliam, si Belgae, quorum maxima virtus, Aedui, quorum auctoritas summa esset, exercitibus continerentur. Ipse in Italiam profectus est.

[54] Then a decree of the Senate was made that for the Parthian campaign one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompeius, a second

by Gaius Caesar, and it was clear enough that the two legions were to be withdrawn from one man. For the First Legion, which he had sent to Caesar, as it had been raised from a levy in Caesar's province, Pompeius gave as one of his own. Caesar, though there was not the least doubt about the intention of his opponents, nevertheless sent the legion back to Pompeius, and on his own account ordered the Fifteenth, which he had kept in Nearer Gaul, to be handed over in accordance with the Senate's decree. In its stead he sent the Thirteenth Legion to Italy, to maintain the garrisons from which the Fifteenth was to be withdrawn. He himself arranged the cantonments for the army: he stationed Gaius Trebonius with three legions in Belgium, Gaius Fabius with the same number he moved into the country of the Aedui; for he thought that the safety of Gaul would best be assured if the Belgae, whose valour was greatest, and the Aedui, whose influence was strongest, were held in check by armies. He himself proceeded to Italy.

[55] 1 Quo cum venisset, cognoscit per C. Marcellum consulem legiones duas ab se remissas, quae ex senatus consulto deberent ad Parthicum bellum duci, Cn. Pompeio traditas atque in Italia retentas esse. 2 Hoc facto quamquam nulli erat dubium, quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belli gerendi. Contendit . . .

[55] When he was come thither he learnt that through the action of the consul Gaius Marcellus the two legions sent back by himself, which in accordance with the Senate's decree ought to have been marched off for the Parthian campaign, had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompeius and kept in Italy. This action left no doubt in any man's

mind what was afoot against Caesar; still, Caesar determined to submit to anything so long as some hope was left to him of a constitutional settlement rather than an appeal to arms. He pressed . .

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**THE GALLIC WARS, W. A. MACDEVITT
TRANSLATION**

BOOK I (58 BC)

Table of Contents for Dual and Latin and English Texts

1:1. All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are called Celts, in our Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are furthest from the civilization and refinement of [our] Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them, and import those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war; for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in valor, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said that the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone; it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae; it borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches toward the north. The Belgae rises from the extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and look toward the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun, and the north star.

Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt.

Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen, a Belgis Matrona et Sequana dividit. Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important, proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt. Eorum una, pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano, continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum, attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum, vergit ad septentriones. Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur, pertinent ad inferiorem partem fluminis Rheni, spectant in septentrionem et orientem solem. Aquitania a Garumna flumine ad Pyrenaeos montes et eam partem Oceani quae est ad Hispaniam pertinet; spectat inter occasum solis et septentriones.

1:2. Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incited by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and persuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all their possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled all in valor, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii, are confined on every side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain, which is [situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake of

Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the Helvetii. From these circumstances it resulted, that they could range less widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbors; for which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with great regret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.

Apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus fuit et ditissimus Orgetorix. Is M. Messala, [et P.] M. Pisone consulibus regni cupiditate inductus coniurationem nobilitatis fecit et civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent: perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri. Id hoc facilius iis persuasit, quod undique loci natura Helvetii continentur: una ex parte flumine Rheno latissimo atque altissimo, qui agrum Helvetium a Germanis dividit; altera ex parte monte Iura altissimo, qui est inter Sequanos et Helvetios; tertia lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit. His rebus fiebat ut et minus late vagarentur et minus facile finitimis bellum inferre possent; qua ex parte homines bellandi cupidi magno dolore adficiebantur. Pro multitudine autem hominum et pro gloria belli atque fortitudinis angustos se fines habere arbitrabantur, qui in longitudinem milia passuum CCXL, in latitudinem CLXXX patebant.

1:3. Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authority of Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary for their expedition-to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts of burden and wagons-to make their sowings as large as possible, so that on their march plenty of corn might be in

store-and to establish peace and friendship with the neighboring states. They reckoned that a term of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs; they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office of ambassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the son of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed the sovereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled “friend” by the senate of the Roman people), to seize upon the sovereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, and he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and was exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives him his daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish their attempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself would obtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that the Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them that he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the sovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.

His rebus adducti et auctoritate Orgetorigis permoti constituerunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinerent comparare, iumentorum et carrorum quam maximum numerum coemere, sementes quam maximas facere, ut in itinere copia frumenti suppeteret, cum proximis civitatibus pacem et amicitiam confirmare. Ad eas res conficiendas biennium sibi satis esse duxerunt; in tertium annum profectionem lege confirmant. Ad eas res conficiendas Orgetorix

deligitur. Is sibi legationem ad civitates suscipit. In eo itinere persuadet Castico, Catamantaloedis filio, Sequano, cuius pater regnum in Sequanis multos annos obtinuerat et a senatu populi Romani amicus appellatus erat, ut regnum in civitate sua occuparet, quod pater ante habuerit; itemque Dumnorigi Haeduo, fratri Diviciaci, qui eo tempore principatum in civitate obtinebat ac maxime plebi acceptus erat, ut idem conaretur persuadet eique filiam suam in matrimonium dat. Perfacile factu esse illis probat conata perficere, propterea quod ipse suae civitatis imperium obtenturus esset: non esse dubium quin totius Galliae plurimum Helvetii possent; se suis copiis suoque exercitu illis regna conciliaturum confirmat. Hac oratione adducti inter se fidem et ius iurandum dant et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant.

1:4. When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they, according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should await him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his cause, Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the court, all his vassals to the number of ten thousand persons; and led together to the same place all his dependents and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a great number; by means of those he rescued himself from [the necessity of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was endeavoring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were mustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; and there is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having committed suicide.

Ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata. Moribus suis

Orgetoricem ex vinculis causam dicere coegerunt; damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni cremaretur. Die constituta causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit; per eos ne causam diceret se eripuit. Cum civitas ob eam rem incitata armis ius suum exequi conaretur multitudinemque hominum ex agris magistratus cogerent, Orgetorix mortuus est; neque abest suspicio, ut Helvetii arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem consciverit.

1:5. After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories. When they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve-to their villages about four hundred-and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. They persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their neighbors, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their towns and villages, to set out with them: and they admit to their party and unite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the other side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, and assaulted Noreia.

Post eius mortem nihilo minus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur, ut e finibus suis exeant. Ubi iam se ad eam rem paratos esse arbitrati sunt, oppida sua omnia, numero ad duodecim, vicos ad quadringentos, reliqua privata aedificia incendunt; frumentum omne,

praeter quod secum portaturi erant, comburunt, ut domum reditionis spe sublata paratiores ad omnia pericula subeunda essent; trium mensum molita cibaria sibi quemque domo efferre iubent. Persuadent Rauracis et Tulingis et Latobrigis finitimis, uti eodem usu consilio oppidis suis vicisque exustis una cum iis proficiscantur, Boiosque, qui trans Rhenum incoluerant et in agrum Noricum transierant Noreiamque oppugnabant, receptos ad se socios sibi adsciscunt.

1:6. There were in all two routes, by which they could go forth from their country one through the Sequani narrow and difficult, between Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one wagon at a time could be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so that a very few might easily intercept them; the other, through our Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of the Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the Helvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges, because they did not seem as yet well-affected toward the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories. Having provided every thing for the expedition, they appoint a day, on which they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was the fifth before the kalends of April [i.e. the 28th of March], in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B.C. 58.]

Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent: unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, inter montem Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur, mons autem

altissimus impendebat, ut facile perpauci prohibere possent; alterum per provinciam nostram, multo facilius atque expeditius, propterea quod inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum, qui nuper pacati erant, Rhodanus fluit isque non nullis locis vado transitur. Extremum oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque Helvetiorum finibus Genava. Ex eo oppido pons ad Helvetios pertinet. Allobrogibus sese vel persuasuros, quod nondum bono animo in populum Romanum viderentur, existimabant vel vi coacturos ut per suos fines eos ire paterentur. Omnibus rebus ad profectionem comparatis diem dicunt, qua die ad ripam Rhodani omnes conveniant. Is dies erat a. d. V. Kal. Apr. L. Pisone, A. Gabinio consulibus.

1:7. When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make their route through our Province he hastens to set out from the city, and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a number of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one legion in Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii are apprized of his arrival they send to him, as ambassadors, the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius and Verudoctius held the chief place), to say “that it was their intention to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had” [according to their own representations,] “no other route: that they requested, they might be allowed to do so with his consent.” Caesar, inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted: nor was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from outrage and

mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, he replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; if they wanted any thing, they might return on the day before the ides of April [on April 12th].

Caesari cum id nuntiatum esset, eos per provinciam nostram iter facere conari, maturat ab urbe proficisci et quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem contendit et ad Genavam pervenit. Provinciae toti quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat (erat omnino in Gallia ulteriore legio una), pontem, qui erat ad Genavam, iubet rescindi. Ubi de eius adventu Helvetii certiores facti sunt, legatos ad eum mittunt nobilissimos civitatis, cuius legationis Nammæius et Verucloetius principem locum obtinebant, qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per provinciam facere, propterea quod aliud iter haberent nullum: rogare ut eius voluntate id sibi facere liceat. Caesar, quod memoria tenebat L. Cassium consulem occisum exercitumque eius ab Helvetiis pulsum et sub iugum missum, concedendum non putabat; neque homines inimico animo, data facultate per provinciam itineris faciendi, temperaturos ab iniuria et maleficio existimabat. Tamen, ut spatium intercedere posset dum milites quos imperaverat convenirent, legatis respondit diem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: si quid vellent, ad Id. April. reverterentur.

1:8. Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldiers which had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen [Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of sixteen feet, and a trench, from the Lake of Geneva, which flows into the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the

territories of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the ambassadors came, and they returned to him; he says, that he can not, consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant any one a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understand, that, if they should attempt to use violence he would oppose them. The Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage (some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed for the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the river was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night), but being kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse of the soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.

Interea ea legione quam secum habebat militibusque, qui ex provincia convenerant, a lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, milia passuum XVIII murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit. Eo opere perfecto praesidia disponit, castella communit, quo facilius, si se invito transire conentur, prohibere possit. Ubi ea dies quam constituerat cum legatis venit et legati ad eum reverterunt, negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et, si vim facere conentur, prohibitorium ostendit. Helvetii ea spe deiecti navibus iunctis ratibusque compluribus factis, alii vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, non numquam interdium, saepius noctu si perrumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum concursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu destiterunt.

1:9. There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of the Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they send ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession, they might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached to him by his kindness toward them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair, and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each other-the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march-the Helvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage.

Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invitis propter angustias ire non poterant. His cum sua sponte persuadere non possent, legatos ad Dumnorigem Haeduum mittunt, ut eo deprecatore a Sequanis impetrarent. Dumnorix gratia et largitione apud Sequanos plurimum poterat et Helvetiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in matrimonium duxerat, et cupiditate regni adductus novis rebus studebat et quam plurimas civitates suo beneficio habere obstrictas volebat. Itaque rem suscipit et a Sequanis impetrat ut per fines suos Helvetios ire patiantur, obsidesque uti inter sese dent perficit: Sequani, ne itinere Helvetios prohibeant, Helvetii, ut sine maleficio et iniuria transeant.

1:10. It is again told Caesar, that the Helvetii intended to march through the country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories

of the Santones, which are not far distant from those boundaries of the Tolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If this took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these reasons he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of the fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the army in their march. After having routed these in several battles, he arrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province on the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither Province; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the first beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone.

Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. Id si fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet. Ob eas causas ei munitioni quam fecerat T. Labienum legatum praeficit; ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit duasque ibi legiones conscribit et tres, quae circum Aquileiam hiemabant, ex hibernis educit et, qua proximum iter in ulteriorem Galliam per Alpes erat, cum his quinque legionibus

ire contendit. Ibi Ceutrones et Graioceli et Caturiges locis superioribus occupatis itinere exercitum prohibere conantur. Compluribus his proeliis pulsus ab Ocelo, quod est oppidum citerioris provinciae extremum, in fines Vocontiorum ulterioris provinciae die septimo pervenit; inde in Allobrogum fines, ab Allobrogibus in Segusiavos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.

1:11. The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as they could not defend themselves and their possessions against them, send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had at all times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fields ought not to have been laid waste-their children carried off into slavery-their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the same time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, apprize Caesar, that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had been devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other side of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar, and assure him that they had nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar, induced by these circumstances, decides, that he ought not to wait until the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, should arrive among the Santones.

Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias traduxerant et in Haeduorum fines pervenerant eorumque agros populabantur. Haedui, cum se suaque ab iis defendere non possent, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium: ita se omni tempore

de populo Romano meritos esse ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi [eorum] in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint. Eodem tempore quo Haedui Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Haeduorum, Caesarem certiores faciunt sese depopulatis agris non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere. Item Allobroges, qui trans Rhodanum vicos possessionesque habebant, fuga se ad Caesarem recipiunt et demonstrant sibi praeter agri solum nihil esse reliqui. Quibus rebus adductus Caesar non expectandum sibi statuit dum, omnibus, fortunis sociorum consumptis, in Santonos Helvetii pervenirent.

1:12. There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible slowness, that it can not be determined by the eye in which direction it flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined together. When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii had already conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but that the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set out from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed themselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was called the Tigurine; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four cantons. This single canton having left their country, within the recollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius the consul, and had made his army pass under the yoke. Thus, whether by chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman people, was the first to pay the penalty. In

this Caesar avenged not only the public but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as Cassius himself.

Flumen est Arar, quod per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit, incredibili lenitate, ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iudicari non possit. Id Helvetii ratibus ac lintribus iunctis transibant. Ubi per exploratores Caesar certior factus est tres iam partes copiarum Helvetios id flumen traduxisse, quartam vero partem citra flumen Ararim reliquam esse, de tertia vigilia cum legionibus tribus e castris profectus ad eam partem pervenit quae nondum flumen transierat. Eos impeditos et inopinantes adgressus magnam partem eorum concidit; reliqui sese fugae mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdiderunt. Is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus; nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est. Hic pagus unus, cum domo exisset, patrum nostrorum memoria L. Cassium consulem interfecerat et eius exercitum sub iugum miserat. Ita sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenam persolvit. Qua in re Caesar non solum publicas, sed etiam privatas iniurias ultus est, quod eius soceri L. Pisonis avum, L. Pisonem legatum, Tigurini eodem proelio quo Cassium interfecerant.

1:13. This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across the Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his sudden arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day, what they, themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty namely, the crossing of the river, send

embassadors to him; at the head of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii, in the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar: — that, “if the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be; but if he should persist in persecuting them with war that he ought to remember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the characteristic valor of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that account to ascribe very much to his own valor, or despise them; that they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more on valor than on artifice and stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it to pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name, from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their army or transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity].”

Hoc proelio facto, reliquas copias Helvetiorum ut consequi posset, pontem in Arari faciendum curat atque ita exercitum traducit. Helvetii repentino eius adventu commoti cum id quod ipsi diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellegerent, legatos ad eum mittunt; cuius legationis Divico princeps fuit, qui bello Cassiano dux Helvetiorum fuerat. Is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque esse voluisset; sin bello persequi perseveraret, reminisceretur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. Quod improvise unum pagum adortus esset, cum ii qui flumen transissent suis auxilium ferre non possent, ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere virtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret. Se

ita a patribus maioribusque suis didicisse, ut magis virtute contenderent quam dolo aut insidiis niterentur. Quare ne committeret ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi Romani et internecione exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet.

1:14. To these words Caesar thus replied: — that “on that very account he felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done any wrong, it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for that very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they aware that any offense had been given by them, on account of which they should be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid without cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in that they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their being astonished that they had so long committed their outrages with impunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him by them in order that he may be assured these will do what they promise, and provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages which they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges, he

[Caesar] will make peace with them.” Divico replied, that “the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors, that they were accustomed to receive, not to give hostages; of that fact the Roman people were witness.” Having given this reply, he withdrew.

His Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii commemorassent memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent; qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellegeret quare timeret neque sine causa timendum putaret. Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, memoriam deponere posse? Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere. Consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundoiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. Cum ea ita sint, tamen, si obsides ab iis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur facturos intellegat, et si Haeduis de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allobrogibus satis faciunt, sese cum iis pacem esse facturum. Divico respondit: ita Helvetios a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare, consuerint; eius rem populum Romanum esse testem. Hoc responso dato discessit.

1:15. On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesar does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and from the Aedui and their allies), to observe

toward what parts the enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated with this battle, because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six miles between the enemy's rear and our van.

Postero die castra ex eo loco movent. Idem facit Caesar equitatumque omnem, ad numerum quattuor milium, quem ex omni provincia et Haeduis atque eorum sociis coactum habebat, praemittit, qui videant quas in partes hostes iter faciant. Qui cupidius novissimum agmen insecuti alieno loco cum equitatu Helvetiorum proelium committunt; et pauci de nostris cadunt. Quo proelio sublati Helvetii, quod quingentis equitibus tantam multitudinem equitum propulerant, audacius subsistere non numquam et novissimo agmine proelio nostros lacescere coeperunt. Caesar suos a proelio continebat, ac satis habebat in praesentia hostem rapinis, pabulationibus populationibusque prohibere. Ita dies circiter XV iter fecerunt uti inter novissimum hostium agmen et nostrum primum non amplius quinque aut sex milibus passuum interesset.

1:16. Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn which they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequence of the coldness (Gaul, being as before said, situated toward the north), not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but

there was not in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he was unable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the river Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire had diverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day to day, and saying that it was being collected-brought in-on the road.” When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers;-having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Divitiacus and Liscus who was invested with the chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the Vergobretus, and who is elected annually and has power of life or death over his countrymen), he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by them on so urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when [corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularly as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the war; much more bitterly, therefore does he complain of his being forsaken.

Interim cotidie Caesar Haeduos frumentum, quod essent publice polliciti, flagitare. Nam propter frigora [quod Gallia sub septentrionibus, ut ante dictum est, posita est,] non modo frumenta in agris matura non erant, sed ne pabuli quidem satis magna copia suppetebat; eo autem frumento quod flumine Arari navibus subvexerat propterea uti minus poterat quod iter ab Arari Helvetii averterant, a quibus discedere nolebat. Diem ex die ducere Haedui: conferri, comportari, adesse dicere. Ubi se diutius duci intellexit et diem instare quo die frumentum militibus metiri oporteret, convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Diviciaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerat, quem ‘vergobretum’ appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae

necisque in suos habet potestatem, graviter eos accusat, quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit, tam necessario tempore, tam propinquis hostibus ab iis non sublevetur, praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum susceperit; multo etiam gravius quod sit destitutus queritur.

1:17. Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what he had hitherto kept secret: — that there are some whose influences with the people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than the magistrates themselves: that these by seditions and violent language are deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought to supply; [by telling them] that, if they can not any longer retain the supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gauls than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men, [said he], are our plans and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that they could not be restrained by him: nay more, he was well aware, that though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent as long as he could."

Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: esse non nullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus possint quam ipsi magistratus. Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem deterrere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant: praestare, si iam principatum Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre, neque dubitare [debeant] quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una

cum reliqua Gallia Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi. Ab isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse. Quin etiam, quod necessariam rem coactus Caesari enuntiarit, intellegere sese quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam causam quam diu potuerit tacuisse.

1:18. Caesar perceived that by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that these matters should be discussed while so many were present, he speedily dismisses: the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him when alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He [Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makes inquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovered that it is all true; that “Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring, in great favor with the people on account of his liberality, a man eager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the habit of contracting for the customs and all the other taxes of the Aedui at a small cost, because when he bids, no one dares to bid against him. By these means he has both increased his own private property, and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains constantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among the neighboring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he has himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his sister by the mother’s side and his female relations in marriage into other states; that he favors and wishes well to the Helvetii on account of this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own account, because by their arrival

his power was weakened, and his brother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of influence and dignity: that, if any thing should happen to the Romans, he entertains the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii, but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not only of royalty, but even of that influence which he already has.” Caesar discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagement which had taken place a few days before, that the commencement of that flight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in command of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); that by their flight the rest of the cavalry were dismayed.

Caesar hac oratione Lisci Dumnorigem, Diviciaci fratrem, designari sentiebat, sed, quod pluribus praesentibus eas res iactari nolebat, celeriter concilium dimittit, Liscum retinet. Quaerit ex solo ea quae in conventu dixerat. Dicit liberius atque audacius. Eadem secreto ab aliis quaerit; reperit esse vera: ipsum esse Dumnorigem, summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum. Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Haeduorum vectigalia parvo pretio redempta habere, propterea quod illo licente contra liceri audeat nemo. His rebus et suam rem familiarem auxisse et facultates ad largiendum magnas comparasse; magnum numerum equitatus suo sumptu semper alere et circum se habere, neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates largiter posse, atque huius potentiae causa matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo conlocasse; ipsum ex Helvetiis uxorem habere, sororum ex matre et propinquas suas nuptum in alias civitates conlocasse. Favere et cupere Helvetiis propter eam adfinitatem, odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos, quod eorum adventu potentia eius deminuta et Diviciacus frater in

antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris sit restitutus. Si quid accidat Romanis, summam in spem per Helvetios regni obtinendi venire; imperio populi Romani non modo de regno, sed etiam de ea quam habeat gratia desperare. Reperiebat etiam in quaerendo Caesar, quod proelium equestre adversum paucis ante diebus esset factum, initium eius fugae factum a Dumnorige atque eius equitibus (nam equitatui, quem auxilio Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix praeerat): eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum.

1:19. After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions the most unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that hostages should be mutually given; that he had done all these things, not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's, but even without their [the Aedui] knowing any thing of it themselves; that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded: by the [chief] magistrate of the Aedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason, why he should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing [however] stood in the way of all this—that he had learned by experience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman people, his great affection toward him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment of this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before he attempted any thing, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and, when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with him through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in every thing; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and shows

what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own presence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offense to his feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so.

Quibus rebus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciones certissimae res accederent, quod per fines Sequanorum Helvetios traduxisset, quod obsides inter eos dandos curasset, quod ea omnia non modo iniussu suo et civitatis sed etiam inscientibus ipsis fecisset, quod a magistratu Haeduorum accusaretur, satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitatem animadvertere iuberet. His omnibus rebus unum repugnabat, quod Diviciaci fratris summum in populum Romanum studium, summum in se voluntatem, egregiam fidem, iustitiam, temperantiam cognoverat; nam ne eius supplicio Diviciaci animum offenderet verebatur. Itaque prius quam quicquam conaretur, Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet et, cotidianis interpretibus remotis, per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo conloquitur; simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio [Gallorum] de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit. Petit atque hortatur ut sine eius offensione animi vel ipse de eo causa cognita statuatur vel civitatem statuere iubeat.

1:20. Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many tears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his brother; saying, that he knows that those charges are true, and that nobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did; for when he himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home and in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on

account of his youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power and strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus] popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced both by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if any thing very severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think that it had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a place in Caesar's friendship: from which circumstance it would arise, that the affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great, that he forgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in his brother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him what he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he pardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he communicates.

Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset; quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri. Quod si quid ei a Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, neminem existimaturum non

sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se averterentur. Haec cum pluribus verbis flens a Caesare peteret, Caesar eius dextram prendit; consolatus rogat finem orandi faciat; tanti eius apud se gratiam esse ostendit uti et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius voluntati ac precibus condonet. Dumnorigem ad se vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse intellegat, quae civitas queratur proponit; monet ut in reliquum tempus omnes suspiciones vitet; praeterita se Diviciaco fratri condonare dicit. Dumnorigi custodes ponit, ut quae agat, quibuscum loquatur scire possit.

1:21. Being on the same day informed by his scouts, that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp; he sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back, that it was easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; he explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterward in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts.

Eodem die ab exploratoribus certior factus hostes sub monte consedissee milia passuum ab ipsius castris octo, qualis esset natura montis et qualis in circuitu ascensus qui cognoscerent misit. Renuntiatum est facilem esse. De tertia vigilia T. Labienum, legatum pro praetore, cum duabus legionibus et iis ducibus qui iter

cognoverant summum iugum montis ascendere iubet; quid sui consilii sit ostendit. Ipse de quarta vigilia eodem itinere quo hostes ierant ad eos contendit equitatumque omnem ante se mittit. P. Considius, qui rei militaris peritissimus habebatur et in exercitu L. Sullae et postea in M. Crassi fuerat, cum exploratoribus praemittitur.

1:22. At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterward ascertained from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned through spies, that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp three miles from theirs.

Prima luce, cum summus mons a [Lucio] Labieno teneretur, ipse ab hostium castris non longius mille et quingentis passibus abesset neque, ut postea ex captivis comperit, aut ipsius adventus aut Labieni

cognitus esset, Considius equo admisso ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse. Caesar suas copias in proximum collem subducit, aciem instruit. Labienus, ut erat ei praeceptum a Caesare ne proelium committeret, nisi ipsius copiae prope hostium castra visae essent, ut undique uno tempore in hostes impetus fieret, monte occupato nostros expectabat proelioque abstinebat. Multo denique die per exploratores Caesar cognovit et montem a suis teneri et Helvetios castra, movisse et Considium timore perterritum quod non vidisset pro viso sibi renuntiavisse. Eo die quo consuerat intervallo hostes sequitur et milia passuum tria ab eorum castris castra ponit.

1:23. The next day (as there remained in all only two day's space [to the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-stored town of the Aedui), he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain, of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined battle or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut off from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began to pursue, and to annoy our men in the rear.

Postridie eius diei, quod omnino biduum supererat, cum exercitui frumentum metiri oporteret, et quod a Bibracte, oppido Haeduorum longe maximo et copiosissimo, non amplius milibus passuum XVIII

ab erat, rei frumentariae prospiciendum existimavit; itaque iter ab Helvetiis avertit ac Bibracte ire contendit. Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemilii, decurionis equitum Gallorum, hostibus nuntiatur. Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacessere coeperunt.

1:24. Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of his four veteran legions in such a manner, that he placed above him on the very summit the two legions, which he had lately levied in Hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii having followed with all their wagons, collected their baggage into one place: they themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx, advanced up to our front line in very close order.

Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subduxit equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium petum, misit. Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas legiones quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat et omnia auxilia conlocavit, ita ut supra se totum montem hominibus compleret; impedimenta sarcinasque in unum locum conferri et eum ab iis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit. Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris

secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie, reiecto nostro equitatu, phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt.

1:25. Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. His soldiers hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on them with drawn swords. It was a great hinderance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the (Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the buckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. At length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and, as there was in the neighborhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii who had betaken themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the first and second line, to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off the field; the third to receive those who were just arriving.

Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut

aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium commisit. Milites loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Ea disiecta gladiis dextris in eos impetum fecerunt. Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et conligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant, multi ut diu iactato brachio praeoptarent scutum manu emittere et nudo corpore pugnare. Tandem vulneribus defessi et pedem referre et, quod mons suberit circiter mille passuum spatio, eo se recipere coeperunt. Capto monte et succedentibus nostris, Boi et Tulingi, qui hominum milibus circiter XV agmen hostium claudebant et novissimis praesidio erant, ex itinere nostros ab latere aperto adgressi circumvenire, et id conspicati Helvetii, qui in montem sese receperant, rursus instare et proelium redintegrare coeperunt. Romani conversa signa bipertito intulerunt: prima et secunda acies, ut victis ac submotis resisteret, tertia, ut venientes sustineret.

1:26. Thus, was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and wagons. For during the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [i.e. 12 (noon) 1 P. M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night, for they had set wagons in the way as a rampart, and from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some from between the wagons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight had lasted some

time, our men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix was taken. After the battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, while our men, having stopped for three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist them with corn or with any thing else; for that if they should assist them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After the three days' interval he began to follow them himself with all his forces.

Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt. Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit. Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pugnatum est, propterea quod pro vallo carros obiecerunt et e loco superiore in nostros venientes tela coiciebant et non nulli inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque vulnerabant. Diu cum esset pugnatum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti sunt. Ibi Orgetorigis filia atque unus e filiis captus est. Ex eo proelio circiter hominum milia CXXX superfuerunt eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt [nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso]; in fines Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt, cum et propter vulnera militum et propter sepulturam occisorum nostri [triduum morati] eos sequi non potuissent. Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re iuvarent: qui si

iuuissent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum. Ipse triduo intermisso cum omnibus copiis eos sequi coepit.

1:27. The Helvetii, compelled by the want of every thing, sent ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him on the way and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone had with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await his arrival, in the place, where they then were, they obeyed his commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. While those things are being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000 men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by fear, lest after delivering up their arms, they should suffer punishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed that, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves, their flight might either be concealed or entirely overlooked, having at night-fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

Helvetii omnium rerum inopia adducti legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt. Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, paruerunt. Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent, poposcit. Dum ea conquiruntur et conferuntur, [nocte intermissa] circiter hominum milia VI eius pagi qui Verbigenus appellatur, sive timore perterriti, ne armis traditis supplicio adficerentur, sive spe salutis inducti, quod in tanta multitudine dediticiorum suam fugam aut occultari aut omnino

ignorari posse existimarent, prima nocte e castris Helvetiorum egressi ad Rhenum finesque Germanorum contenderunt.

1:28. But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those through whose territory they had gone, to seek them out and to bring them back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and considered them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all the rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, and deserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, to return to their territories from which they had come, and as there was at home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the productions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burned. This he did, chiefly, on this account, because he was unwilling that the country, from which the Helvetii had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on account of the excellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories into those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gaul and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that they might settle the Boii, in their own (i. e. in the Aeduan) territories, as these were known to be of distinguished valor, to whom they gave lands, and whom they afterward admitted to the same state of rights and freedom as themselves.

Quod ubi Caesar resciiit, quorum per fines ierant his uti conquirerent et reducerent, si sibi purgati esse vellent, imperavit; reductos in hostium numero habuit; reliquos omnes obsidibus, armis, perfugis traditis in deditionem accepit. Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, et, quod omnibus

frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, restituere iussit. Id ea maxime ratione fecit, quod noluit eum locum unde Helvetii discesserant vacare, ne propter bonitatem agrorum Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, ex suis finibus in Helvetiorum fines transirent et finitimi Galliae provinciae Allobrogibusque essent. Boios petentibus Haeduis, quod egregia virtute erant cogniti, ut in finibus suis conlocarent, concessit; quibus illi agros dederunt quosque postea in parem iuris libertatisque condicionem atque ipsi erant receperunt.

1:29. In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was: Of the Helvetii [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000; Of the Tulingi 36,000; Of the Latobrigi 14,000; Of the Rauraci 23,000; Of the Boii 32,000. The sum of all amounted to 368,000. Out of these, such as could bear arms, [amounted] to about 92,000. When the census of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.

In castris Helvetiorum tabulae repertae sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim, quot pueri, senes mulieresque. [Quarum omnium rerum] summa erat capitum Helvetiorum milium CCLXIII, Tulingorum milium XXXVI, Latobrigorum XIII, Rauracorum XXIII, Boiorum XXXII; ex his qui arma ferre possent ad milia nonaginta duo.

Summa omnium fuerunt ad milia CCCLXVIII. Eorum qui domum redierunt censu habito, ut Caesar imperaverat, repertus est numerus milium C et X.

1:30. When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrong done by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the Helvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance, that spot for an abode, which they should judge to be the most convenient and most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states as tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having been granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath with each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations] except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the general assembly.

Bello Helvetiorum confecto totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt: intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu [terrae] Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse, propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii reliquissent uti toti Galliae

bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent. Petierunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent. Ea re permissa diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt.

1:31. When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged and earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed, than that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch as they saw, that, if a disclosure was made, they should be put to the greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him: "That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [i.e. of the Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and savage men had become enamored of the lands and the refinement and the abundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their dependents had repeatedly struggled in arms — that they had been routed, and had sustained a great calamity — had lost all their

nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, both from their own valor and from the Roman people's hospitality and friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state, as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath, that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid from the Roman people, nor refuse to be forever under their sway and empire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui, who could not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as hostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to the senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath nor hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than the vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus the king of the Germans, had settled in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be provided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would all be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the land of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on a level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle which took place at Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demand as hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on them every kind of cruelty, if every thing was not done at his nod or pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there

was some aid in Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that the Helvetii have done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek another dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be disclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he would inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his own influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name of the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from the outrages of Ariovistus.

Eo concilio dimisso, idem princeps civitatum qui ante fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret. Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: non minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent. Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduus: Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab Arvernīs Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur. Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad C et XX milium numerum. Cum his Haeduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum armis contendisse; magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse. Quibus proeliis calamitatibusque fractos, qui et sua virtute et populi Romani hospitio

atque amicitia plurimum ante in Gallia potuissent, coactos esse Sequanis obsides dare nobilissimos civitatis et iure iurando civitatem obstringere sese neque obsides repetituros neque auxilium a populo Romano imploratorios neque recusatorios quo minus perpetuo sub illorum ditione atque imperio essent. Unum se esse ex omni civitate Haeduorum qui adduci non potuerit ut iuraret aut liberos suos obsides daret. Ob eam rem se ex civitate profugisse et Romam ad senatum venisse auxilium postulatum, quod solus neque iure iurando neque obsidibus teneretur. Sed peius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis accidisse, propterea quod Ariovistus, rex Germanorum, in eorum finibus consedisset tertiamque partem agri Sequani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupavisset et nunc de altera parte tertia Sequanos decedere iuberet, propterea quod paucis mensibus ante Harudum milia hominum XXIII ad eum venissent, quibus locus ac sedes pararentur. Futurum esse paucis annis uti omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent; neque enim conferendum esse Gallicum cum Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem victus cum illa comparandam. Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque liberos poscere et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad voluntatem eius facta sit. Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium: non posse eius imperia, diutius sustineri. Nisi quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit auxilii, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a Germanis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accadat, experiantur. Haec si enuntiata Ariovisto sint, non dubitare quin de omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint

gravissimum supplicium sumat. Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Romani deterrere posse ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere.

1:32. When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down, gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this conduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but silently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that— “the lot of the Sequani was more wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he were present; for, to the rest, despite of every thing there was an opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and whose towns were all in his power.”

Hac oratione ab Diviciaco habita omnes qui aderant magno fletu auxilium a Caesare petere coeperunt. Animadvertit Caesar unos ex omnibus Sequanos nihil earum rerum facere quas ceteri facerent sed tristes capite demisso terram intueri. Eius rei quae causa esset miratus ex ipsis quaesiit. Nihil Sequani respondere, sed in eadem tristitia taciti permanere. Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque ullam omnino vocem exprimere posset, idem Diviacus Haeduus respondit: hoc esse miseriorem et graviolem fortunam Sequanorum quam

reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem, velut si cora adesset, horrerent, propterea quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas daretur, Sequanis vero, qui intra fines suos Ariovistum recepissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestate eius essent, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi.

1:33. Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds of the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus, induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly; and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think that this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the senate “brethren” and “kinsmen,” were held in the thralldom and dominion of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That, moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw [would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged, that wild and savage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they had possessed themselves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separated the Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he ought to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to himself such pride and

arrogance, that he was felt to be quite insufferable.

His rebus cognitis Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum. Hac oratione habita, concilium dimisit. Et secundum ea multae res eum hortabantur quare sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, in primis quod Haeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepe numero a senatu appellatos, in servitute atque in ditione videbat Germanorum teneri eorumque obsides esse apud Ariovistum ac Sequanos intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur. Paulatim autem Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire et in Galliam magnam eorum multitudinem venire populo Romano periculosum videbat, neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros temperaturos existimabat quin, cum omnem Galliam occupavissent, ut ante Cimbri Teutonique fecissent, in provinciam exirent atque inde in Italiam contenderent [, praesertim cum Sequanos a provincia nostra Rhodanus divideret]; quibus rebus quam maturime occurrendum putabat. Ipse autem Ariovistus tantos sibi spiritus, tantam arrogantiam sumpserat, ut ferendus non videretur.

1:34. He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between the two, [saying] that he wished to treat him on state-business and matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of any thing from Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted any thing from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go without an army into those parts of Gaul which

Caesar had possession of, nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together to one place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange, what business either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he had conquered in war.

Quam ob rem placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis utriusque rebus cum eo agere. Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se venire oportere. Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno commeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse. Sibi autem mirum videri quid in sua Gallia, quam bello vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Romano negotii esset.

1:35. When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors to him a second time with this message. "Since, after having been treated with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in his consulship been styled 'king and friend' by the senate), he makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz.] that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that it concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutual interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul; in the next place, that he restore the hostages, which he has from the Aedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would accordingly do this,"

[Caesar says] that “he himself and the Roman people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favor and friendship toward him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires] that he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so consistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people), will not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui.”

His responsis ad Caesarem relatis, iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit: quoniam tanto suo populiue Romani beneficio adtectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eo postulare: primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis redderet Sequanisque permetteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret. Si id ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae lacere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum.

1:36. To this Ariovistus replied, that “the right of war was, that they who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in what manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to govern the nations which they had conquered, not

according to the dictation of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he for his part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which they were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the Roman people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had tried the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, had become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him; that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not make war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by that which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they did not continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers' would avail them naught. As to Caesar's threatening him, that he would not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one had ever entered into a contest with him [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feel what the invincible Germans, well- trained [as they were] beyond all others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could achieve by their valor."

Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. Si ipse populo Romano non praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in suo iure impediri. Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortunam temptassent et armis congressi ac superati essent, stipendiarios esse factos. Magnam Caesarem iniuriam facere, qui suo adventu vectigalia sibi deteriora faceret. Haeduis se obsides redditurum non esse neque his neque eorum sociis iniuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo manerent quod

convenisset stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id non fecissent, longe iis fraternum nomen populi Romani afuturum. Quod sibi Caesar denuntiaret se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse. Cum vellet, congredieretur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatisimi in armis, qui inter annos XIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent.

1:37. At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar, ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul, were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things, Caesar thought that he ought to use all dispatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus] might be less easily withstood. Having therefore, as quickly as he could, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced marches.

Haec eodem tempore Caesari mandata referebantur et legati ab Haeduis et a Treveris veniebant: Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse; Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedissee, qui Rhenum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres. Quibus rebus Caesar vehementer commotus maturandum sibi existimavit, ne, si nova manus Sueborum cum veteribus copiis Ariovisti sese coniunxisset, minus facile resisti posset. Itaque re

frumentaria quam celerrime potuit comparata magnis itineribus ad Ariovistum contendit.

1:38. When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey from its territories. Caesar thought that he ought to take the greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town a most ample supply of every thing which was serviceable for war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground, as to afford a great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with a pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town, stations a garrison there.

Cum tridui viam processisset, nuntiatum est ei Ariovistum cum suis omnibus copiis ad occupandum Vesontionem, quod est oppidum maximum Sequanorum, contendere [triduique viam a suis finibus processisse]. Id ne accideret, magnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimabat. Namque omnium rerum quae ad bellum usui erant summa erat in eo oppido facultas, idque natura loci sic muniebatur ut magnam ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propterea quod flumen [alduas] Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit, reliquum spatium, quod est non amplius pedum MDC, qua flumen intermittit, mons continet magna altitudine, ita ut

radices eius montis ex utraque parte ripae fluminis contingant, hunc murus circumdatus arcem efficit et cum oppido coniungit. Huc Caesar magnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus contendit occupatoque oppido ibi praesidium conlocat.

1:39. While he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice in arms-that oftentimes they, on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the fierceness of their eyes)-so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up readily

enough. Some even declared to Caesar, that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in consequence of their fear.

Dum paucos dies ad Vesontionem rei frumentariae commeatusque causa moratur, ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse praedicabant (saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse), tantus subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit ut non mediocriter omnium mentes animosque perturbaret. Hic primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis, reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant: quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret; non nulli pudore adducti, ut timoris suspicionem vitarent, remanebant. Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant: abditi in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis commune periculum miserabantur. Vulgo totis castris testamenta obsignabantur. Horum vocibus ac timore paulatim etiam ii qui magnum in castris usum habebant, milites centurionesque quique equitatu praerant, perturbabantur. Qui se ex his minus timidos existimari volebant, non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam, ut satis commode supportari posset, timere dicebant. Non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientes milites neque propter timorem signa laturos.

1:40. When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely reprimanded them, “particularly, for supposing that it belonged to them to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar’s] consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was persuaded, that, when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people’s favor. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of?-or why should they despair either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers’ recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy, during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it inasmuch as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterward vanquished, when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet can not have been a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept

himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a pretense about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew, that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort." This legion Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor, placed the greatest confidence.

Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent. Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret? Sibi quidem persuaderi cognitis suis poslulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi Romani gratiam repudiaturum. Quod si furore atque amentia impulsum bellum intulisset, quid tandem vererentur? Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent? Factum eius hostis periculum patrum nostrorum memoria Cimbris et Teutonis a C. Mario pulsus [cum non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritis videbatur]; factum etiam nuper in Italia servili tumultu, quos tamen aliquid usus ac disciplina, quam a nobis acceperant, sublevarint. Ex quo iudicari posse quantum haberet in se boni constantia, propterea quod quos aliquam diu inermes sine causa timuissent hos postea armatos ac victores superassent. Denique hos esse eosdem Germanos quibuscum saepe numero Helvetii congressi non solum in suis sed etiam in illorum finibus plerumque superarint, qui tamen pares esse nostro exercitui non potuerint. Si quos adversum proelium et fuga Gallorum commoveret, hos, si quaerent, reperire posse diuturnitate belli defatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset neque sui potestatem fecisset, desperantes iam de pugna et dispersos subito adortum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros atque imperitos locus fuisset, hac ne ipsum quidem sperare nostros exercitus capi posse. Qui suum timorem in rei frumentariae simulationem angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum aut de officio

imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur. Haec sibi esse curae; frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura; de itinere ipsos brevi tempore iudicatuos. Quod non fore dicto audientes neque signa latu dicantur, nihil se ea re commoveri: scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. Itaque se quod in longiorem diem conlaturus fuisset repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta, vigilia castra moturum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an timor plus valeret. Quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua non dubitet, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem futuram. Huic legioni Caesar et indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime.

1:41. Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavored, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitered by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith [he found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his army through open parts;

he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four and twenty miles distant from ours.

Hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi innata est, princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit. Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satis facerent: se neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed imperatoris esse existimavisse. Eorum satisfactione accepta et itinere exquisito per Diviciacum, quod ex Gallis ei maximam fidem habebat, ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret, de quarta vigilia, ut dixerat, profectus est. Septimo die, cum iter non intermitteret, ab exploratoribus certior factus est Ariovisti copias a nostris milia passuum IIII et XX abesse.

1:42. Upon being apprized of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to think that he was now returning to a rational state of mind as he spontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him when requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own and the Roman people's great favors toward him, the issue would be that he would desist from his obstinacy upon

his demands being made known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference, [saying] that “he was afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would not come on any other condition.” Caesar, as he neither wished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided that it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence, in order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth legion said, not without a touch of humor, “that Caesar did more for them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion in place of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse.”

Cognito Caesaris adventu Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse existimaret. Non respuit condicionem Caesar iamque eum ad sanitatem reverti arbitrabatur, cum id quod antea petenti denegasset ultro polliceretur, magnamque in spem veniebat pro suis tantis populique Romani in eum beneficiis cognitis suis postulatis fore uti pertinacia desisteret. Dies conloquio dictus est ex eo die quintus. Interim saepe cum legati ultro citroque inter eos mitterentur, Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar adduceret: vereri se ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu veniret: alia ratione sese

non esse venturum. Caesar, quod neque conloquium interposita causa tolli volebat neque salutem suam Gallorum equitatu committere audebat, commodissimum esse statuit omnibus equis Gallis equitibus detractis eo legionarios milites legionis X., cui quam maxime confidebat, imponere, ut praesidium quam amicissimum, si quid opus facto esset, haberet. Quod cum fieret, non inridicule quidam ex militibus X. legionis dixit: plus quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum se in cohortis praetoriae loco X. legionem habiturum ad equum rescribere.

1:43. There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference. Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that they should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they were come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the senate's favors toward him [Ariovistus], in that he had been styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate-in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been bestowed in consideration of important personal services; that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the request, had obtained these honors through the kindness and munificence of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how just were the grounds of connection that existed between themselves [the Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate

had been passed in their favor, and how frequent and how honorable; how from time immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even [said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and friends should lose none of their property, but be advanced in influence, dignity, and honor: who then could endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people should be torn from them?" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the ambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon the Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that if he could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, he should at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine.

Planities erat magna et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis. Hic locus aequum fere spatium a castris Ariovisti et Caesaris aberat. Eo, ut erat dictum, ad conloquium venerunt. Legionem Caesar, quam equis devexerat, passibus CC ab eo tumulo constituit. Item equites Ariovisti pari intervallo constiterunt. Ariovistus ex equis ut conloquerentur et praeter se denos ad conloquium adducerent postulavit. Ubi eo ventum est, Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex appellatus esset a senatu, quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat; illum, cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iustam haberet, beneficio ac liberalitate sua ac senatus ea praemia consecutum. Docebat etiam quam veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercederent, quae senatus consulta quotiens quamque honorifica in eos facta essent, ut omni tempore totius Galliae principatum Haedui tenuissent, prius etiam quam nostram

amicitiam adpetissent. Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse; quod vero ad amicitiam populi Romani attulissent, id iis eripi quis pati posset? Postulavit deinde eadem quae legatis in mandatis dederat: ne aut Haeduis aut eorum sociis bellum inferret, obsides redderet, si nullam partem Germanorum domum remittere posset, at ne quos amplius Rhenum transire pateretur.

1:44. Ariovistus briefly replied to the demands of Caesar; but expatiated largely on his own virtues, “that he had crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations and great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been given by their good-will; that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and had encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman people the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing himself, not of

assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not make war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?- why come into his [Ariovistus] domains?-that this was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if he were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we were unjust, to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to the Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles which the Aedui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious, that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in Gaul, was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that unless he depart and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would please many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance of that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase the favor and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him."

Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit: transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed

rogatum et arcessitum a Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint. Non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas esse. Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerit. Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, atque se hac spe petisse. Si per populum Romanum stipendium remittatur et dediticii subtrahantur, non minus libenter sese recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam quam adpetierit. Quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam traducat, id se sui muniendi, non Galliae oppugnandae causa facere; eius rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogatus non venerit et quod bellum non intulerit sed defenderit. Se prius in Galliam venisse quam populum Romanum. Numquam ante hoc tempus exercitum populi Romani Galliae provinciae finibus egressum. Quid sibi vellet? Cur in suas possessiones veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut illam nostram. Ut ipsi concedi non oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos, quod in suo iure se interpellaremus. Quod fratres a senatu Haeduos appellatos diceret, non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos in iis contentionibus quas Haedui secum et cum Sequanis habuissent auxilio populi Romani usos esse. Debere se suspicari simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi causa habere. Qui nisi decedat atque

exercitum deducat ex his regionibus, sese illum non pro amico sed pro hoste habiturum. Quod si eum interfecerit, multis sese nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum (id se ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere), quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset. Quod si decessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi tradidisset, magno se illum praemio remuneraturum et quaecumque bella geri vellet sine ullo eius labore et periculo confecturum.

1:45. Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]; “why he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman people’s practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded-then was the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the Senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws.”

Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium posuisset. Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari

oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset.

1:46. While these things are being transacted in the conference it was announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said that they had been insnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.

Dum haec in conloquio geruntur, Caesari nuntiatum est equites Ariovisti propius tumultum accedere et ad nostros adequitare, lapides telaque in nostros coicere. Caesar loquendi finem fecit seque ad suos recepit suisque imperavit ne quod omnino telum in hostes reicerent. Nam etsi sine ullo periculo legionis delectae cum equitatu proelium fore videbat, tamen committendum non putabat ut, pulsus hostibus, dici posset eos ab se per fidem in conloquio circumventos. Postea quam in vulgus militum elatum est qua arrogantia in conloquio Ariovistus usus omni Gallia Romanis interdixisset, impetumque in nostros eius equites fecissent, eaque res conloquium ut diremisset, multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum

est.

1:47. Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state “that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded;” [and to beg] that “he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or, if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his [officers] as an ambassador to him.” There did not appear to Caesar any good reason for holding a conference; and the more so as the day before the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He thought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one of his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed [therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germans would have no motive for committing violence; and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his army, “Why were they come to him? Was it for the purpose of acting as spies?” He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast them into chains.

Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter eos egi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex

suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret. Conloquendi Caesari causa visa non est, et eo magis quod pridie eius diei Germani retineri non potuerant quin tela in nostros coicerent. Legatum ex suis sese magno cum periculo ad eum missurum et hominibus feris obiecturum existimabat. Commodissimum visum est C. Valerium Procillum, C. Valerii Caburi filium, summa virtute et humanitate adolescentem, cuius pater a C. Valerio Flacco civitate donatus erat, et propter fidem et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam, qua multa iam Ariovistus longinqua consuetudine utebatur, et quod in eo peccandi Germanis causa non esset, ad eum mittere, et una M. Metium, qui hospitio Ariovisti utebatur. His mandavit quae diceret Ariovistus cognoscerent et ad se referrent. Quos cum apud se in castris Ariovistus conspexisset, exercitu suo praesente conclamavit: quid ad se venirent? an speculandi causa? Conantes dicere prohibuit et in catenas coniecit.

1:48. The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design that he might cut off Caesar from the corn and provisions, which might be conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of battle in which the Germans had practiced themselves was this. There were 6,000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their

engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance further than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with their speed.

Eodem die castra promovit et milibus passuum VI a Caesaris castris sub monte consedit. Postridie eius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copias traduxit et milibus passuum duobus ultra eum castra fecit eo consilio uti frumento commeatuque qui ex Sequanis et Haeduis supportaretur Caesarem intercluderet. Ex eo die dies continuos V Caesar pro castris suas copias produxit et aciem instructam habuit, ut, si vellet Ariovistus proelio contendere, ei potestas non deesset. Ariovistus his omnibus diebus exercitum castris continuit, equestri proelio cotidie contendit. Genus hoc erat pugnae, quo se Germani exercuerant: equitum milia erant VI, totidem numero pedites velocissimi ac fortissimi, quos ex omni copia singuli singulos suae salutis causa delegerant: cum his in proeliis versabantur, ad eos se equites recipiebant; hi, si quid erat durius, concurrebant, si qui graviore vulnere accepto equo deciderat, circumsistebant; si quo erat longius prodeundum aut celerius recipiendum, tanta erat horum exercitatione celeritas ut iubis sublevati equorum cursum adaequarent.

1:49. Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped, at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and

second lines to be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry; which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.

Ubi eum castris se tenere Caesar intellexit, ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur, ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant, circiter passus DC ab his, castris idoneum locum delegit acieque triplici instructa ad eum locum venit. Primam et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit. Hic locus ab hoste circiter passus DC, uti dictum est, aberat. Eo circiter hominum XVI milia expedita cum omni equitatu Ariovistus misit, quae copiae nostros terrent et munitione prohiberent. Nihilo setius Caesar, ut ante constituerat, duas acies hostem propulsare, tertiam opus perficere iussit. Munitis castris duas ibi legiones reliquit et partem auxiliorum, quattuor reliquas legiones in castra maiora reduxit.

1:50. The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even then come out [from their intrenchments,] he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after many wounds had been inflicted and

received, Ariovistus led back his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the reason—that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and divination, whether it were expedient that the battle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, “that it was not the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new moon.”

Proximo die instituto suo Caesar ex castris utrisque copias suas eduxit paulumque a maioribus castris progressus aciem instruxit hostibusque pugnandi potestatem fecit. Ubi ne tum quidem eos prodire intellexit, circiter meridiem exercitum in castra reduxit. Tum demum Ariovistus partem suarum copiarum, quae castra minora oppugnaret, misit. Acriter utrimque usque ad vesperum pugnatum est. Solis occasu suas copias Ariovistus multis et inlatis et acceptis vulneribus in castra reduxit. Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, hanc reperiebat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset ut matres familiae eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent utrum proelium committi ex usu esset necne; eas ita dicere: non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam lunam proelio contendissent.

1:51. The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that [thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the

Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with disheveled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

Postridie eius diei Caesar praesidio utrisque castris quod satis esse visum est reliquit, alios omnes in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quod minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur; ipse triplici instructa acie usque ad castra hostium accessit. Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Tribocos, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur. Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes milites passis manibus flentes implorabant ne se in servitutem Romanis traderent.

1:52. Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor. He himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were

found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry-as he was more disengaged than those who were employed in the fight-sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

Caesar singulis legionibus singulos legatos et quaestorem praefecit, uti eos testes suae quisque virtutis haberet; ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit. Ita nostri acriter in hostes signo dato impetum fecerunt itaque hostes repente celeriterque procurrerunt, ut spatium pila in hostes coiciendi non daretur. Relictis pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est. At Germani celeriter ex consuetudine sua phalange facta impetus gladiatorum exceperunt. Reperti sunt complures nostri qui in phalanga insilirent et scuta manibus revellerent et desuper vulnerarent. Cum hostium acies a sinistro cornu pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, a dextro cornu vehementer multitudine suorum nostram aciem premebant. Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus adulescens, qui equitatu praerat, quod expeditior erat quam ii qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem laborantibus nostris subsidio misit.

1:53. Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying on their strength, endeavored to swim over, or, finding boats, procured their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting

with a small vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it; our horse pursued and slew all the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom he brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of king Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was being dragged by his guards in the fight, bound with a triple chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had not diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by his destruction. He [Procillus] said that, in his own presence, the lots had been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time: that by the favor of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and brought back to him [Caesar.]

Ita proelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga verterunt nec prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter L pervenerunt. Ibi perpauci aut viribus confisi tranare contenderunt aut lintribus inventis sibi salutem reppererunt. In his fuit Ariovistus, qui naviculam deligatam ad ripam nactus ea profugit; reliquos omnes consecuti equites nostri interfecerunt. Duae fuerunt Ariovisti uxores, una Sueba natione, quam domo secum eduxerat, altera Norica, regis Voccionis soror, quam in Gallia duxerat a fratre missam: utraque in ea fuga periit; duae filiae: harum altera occisa, altera capta est. C. Valerius Procillus, cum a custodibus in fuga trinis

catenis vinctus traheretur, in ipsum Caesarem hostes equitatu insequentem incidit. Quae quidem res Caesari non minorem quam ipsa victoria voluptatem attulit, quod hominem honestissimum provinciae Galliae, suum familiarem et hospitem, ereptum ex manibus hostium sibi restitutum videbat neque eius calamitate de tanta voluptate et gratulatione quicquam fortuna deminuerat. Is se praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur an in aliud tempus reservaretur: sortium beneficio se esse incolumem. Item M. Metius repertus et ad eum reductus est.

1:54. This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. He appointed Labienus over the winter-quarters, and set out in person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.

Hoc proelio trans Rhenum nuntiato, Suebi, qui ad ripas Rheni venerant, domum reverti coeperunt; quos ubi qui proximi Rhenum incolunt perterritos senserunt, insecuti magnum ex iis numerum occiderunt. Caesar una aestate duobus maximis bellis confectis maturius paulo quam tempus anni postulabat in hiberna in Sequanos exercitum deduxit; hibernis Labienum praeposuit; ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

BOOK II (57 BC)

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2:1. While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a third part of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people, and giving hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacy were these—first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul was subdued, our army would be led against them; secondly, because they were instigated by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the one hand] they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer in Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the Roman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and others of them, from a natural instability and fickleness of disposition, were anxious for a revolution; [the Belgae were instigated] by several, also, because the government in Gaul was generally seized upon by the more powerful persons and by those who had the means of hiring troops, and they could less easily effect this object under our dominion.

Cum esset Caesar in citeriore Gallia [in hibernis], ita uti supra demonstravimus, crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat omnes Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra populum Romanum coniurare obsidesque inter se dare. Coniurandi has esse causas: primum quod vererentur ne, omni pacata Gallia, ad eos exercitus noster adduceretur; deinde quod ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui, ut Germanos diutius in Gallia versari noluerant, ita populi Romani exercitum hiemare atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant, partim qui

mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant; ab non nullis etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro consequi poterant.

2:2. Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions in Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul. He, himself, as soon as there began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. He gives a commission to the Senones and the other Gauls who were neighbors of the Belgae, to learn what is going on among them [i.e. the Belgae], and inform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that troops were being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place. Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding toward them, and having provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about fifteen days arrives at the territories of the Belgae.

His nuntiis litterisque commotus Caesar duas legiones in citeriore Gallia novas conscripsit et in ita aestate in ulteriorem Galliam qui deduceret Q. Pedium legatum misit. Ipse, cum primum pabuli copia esse inciperet, ad exercitum venit. Dat negotium Senonibus reliquisque Gallis qui finitimi Belgis erant uti ea quae apud eos gerantur cognoscant seque de his rebus certiores faciant. Hi constanter omnes nuntiaverunt manus cogi, exercitum in unum locum conduci. Tum vero dubitandum non existimavit quin ad eos proficisceretur. Re frumentaria provisa castra movet diebusque circiter XV ad fines Belgarum pervenit.

2:3. As he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than any one anticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic]

Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of] the principal persons of the state, as their ambassadors: to tell him that they surrendered themselves and all their possessions to the protection and disposal of the Roman people: and that they had neither combined with the rest of the Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman people: and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him into their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things; that all the rest of the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on this side of the Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and that so great was the infatuation of them all, that they could not restrain even the Suessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights, and the, same laws, and who have one government and one magistracy [in common] with themselves, from uniting with them.

Eo cum de improvise celeriusque omnium opinione venisset, Remi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum legatos Iccium et Andebrogium, primos civitatis, miserunt, qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra populum Romanum coniurasse, paratosque esse et obsides dare et imperata facere et oppidis recipere et frumento ceterisque rebus iuvare; reliquos omnes Belgas in armis esse, Germanosque qui cis Rhenum incolant sese cum his coniunxisse, tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem ut ne Suessiones quidem, fratres consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, detertere potuerint quin cum iis consentirent.

2:4. When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what they could do, in war, he received the

following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung, from the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their territories; the effect of which was, that, from the recollection of those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters. The Remi said, that they had known accurately every thing respecting their number, because being united to them by neighborhood and by alliances, they had learned what number each state had in the general council of the Belgae promised for that war. That the Bellovaci were the most powerful among them in valor, influence, and the number of men; that these could muster 100,000 armed men, [and had] promised 60,000 picked men out of that number, and demanded for themselves the command of the whole war. That the Suessiones were their nearest neighbors and possessed a very extensive and fertile country; that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus, the most powerful man of all Gaul, had been king; who had held the government of a great part of these regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at present was Galba; that the direction of the whole war was conferred by the consent of all, upon him, on account of his integrity and prudence; that they had twelve towns; that they had promised 50,000 armed men; and that the Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them, and are situated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; the Atrebatas 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii, 9,000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many; the Aduatuci

19,000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans [had promised], they thought, to the number of 40,000.

Cum ab iis quaereret quae civitates quantaque in armis essent et quid in bello possent, sic reperiebat: plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter loci fertilitatem ibi consedis Gallosque qui ea loca incolerent expulisse, solosque esse qui, patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata, Teutonos Cimbrosque intra suos fines ingredi prohibuerint; qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent. De numero eorum omnia se habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus adfinitatibus quo coniuncti quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint. Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia centum, pollicitos ex eo numero electa milia LX totiusque belli imperium sibi postulare. Suessiones suos esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere. Apud eos fuisse regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae potentissimum, qui cum magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse regem Galbam: ad hunc propter iustitiam prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium voluntate deferri; oppida habere numero XII, polliceri milia armata L; totidem Nervios, qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint; XV milia Atrebatas, Ambianos X milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios VII milia, Caletos X milia, Veliocasses et Viromandos totidem, Atuaticos XVIII milia; Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur, arbitrari ad XL milia.

2:5. Caesar, having encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children of their chief men to be brought to him as hostages; all which commands they punctually performed by the day [appointed]. He, addressing himself to Divitiacus, the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points out how much it concerns the republic and their common security, that the forces of the enemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to engage with so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might be affected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the territories of the Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these instructions he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived that all the forces of the Belgae, which had been collected in one place, were approaching toward him, and learned from the scouts whom he had sent out, and [also] from the Remi, that they were then not far distant, he hastened to lead his army over the Aisne, which is on the borders of the Remi, and there pitched his camp. This position fortified one side of his camp by the banks of the river, rendered the country which lay in his rear secure from the enemy, and furthermore insured that provisions might without danger be brought to him by the Remi and the rest of the states. Over that river was a bridge: there he places a guard; and on the other side of the river he leaves Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with a rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth.

Caesar Remos cohortatus liberaliterque oratione prosecutus omnem senatum ad se convenire principumque liberos obsides ad se adduci iussit. Quae omnia ab his diligenter ad diem facta sunt. Ipse Divitiacum Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet quanto opere rei publicae communisque salutis intersit manus hostium distineri, ne

cum tanta multitudine uno tempore conflagrandum sit. Id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum agros populari coeperint. His datis mandatis eum a se dimittit. Postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se venire vidit neque iam longe abesse ab iis quos miserat exploratoribus et ab Remis cognovit, flumen Axonam, quod est in extremis Remorum finibus, exercitum traducere maturavit atque ibi castra posuit. Quae res et latus unum castrorum ripis fluminis muniebat et post eum quae erant tuta ab hostibus reddebat et commeatus ab Remis reliquisque civitatibus ut sine periculo ad eum portari possent efficiebat. In eo flumine pons erat. Ibi praesidium ponit et in altera parte fluminis Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum sex cohortibus relinquit; castra in altitudinem pedum XII vallo fossaque duodeviginti pedum muniri iubet.

2:6. There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant from this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack with great vigor. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the wall has been stripped of its defenders, [then], forming a testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were casting stones and darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon the wall. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, who was then in command of the town, one of the Remi, a man of the highest rank and influence among his people, and one of those who had come to Caesar as ambassador [to sue] for peace, sends messengers to him, [to report] "That, unless assistance

were sent to him he could not hold out any longer.”

Ab his castris oppidum Remorum nomine Bibrax aberat milia passuum VIII. Id ex itinere magno impetu Belgae oppugnare coeperunt. Aegre eo die sustentatum est. Gallorum eadem atque Belgarum oppugnatio est haec: ubi circumiecta multitudine hominum totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt murusque defensoribus nudatus est, testudine facta portas succedunt murumque subruunt. Quod tum facile fiebat. Nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela coicerent, in muro consistendi potestas erat nulli. Cum finem oppugnandi nox fecisset, Iccius Remus, summa nobilitate et gratia inter suos, qui tum oppido praeerat, unus ex iis qui legati de pace ad Caesarem venerant, nuntium ad eum mittit, nisi subsidium sibi submittatur, sese diutius sustinere non posse.

2:7. Thither, immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian slingers as a relief to the towns-people, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with the hope of [making good their] defense, was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town, abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste the country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they could approach had been burned, they hastened with all their forces to the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of it]; and their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than eight miles in breadth.

Eo de media nocte Caesar isdem ducibus usus qui nuntii ab Iccio venerant, Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Baleares

subsidio oppidanis mittit; quorum adventu et Remis cum spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit et hostibus eadem de causa spes potiundi oppidi discessit. Itaque paulisper apud oppidum morati agrosque Remorum depopulati, omnibus vicis aedificiisque quo adire potuerant incensis, ad castra Caesaris omnibus copiis contenderunt et a milibus passuum minus duobus castra posuerunt; quae castra, ut fumo atque ignibus significabatur, amplius milibus passuum VIII latitudinem patebant.

2:8. Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on account of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished reputation for valor: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain by frequent trials, what the enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and suitable for marshaling an army (since the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the space which the marshaled army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in front gradually sank to the plain); on either side of that hill he drew a cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of that trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after he had marshaled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which they had brought out of the camp.

Caesar primo et propter multitudinem hostium et propter eximiam opinionem virtutis proelio supersedere statuit; cotidie tamen equestribus proeliis quid hostis virtute posset et quid nostri auderent periclitabatur. Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura oportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis ubi castra posita erant paululum ex planitie editus tantum adversus in latitudinem patebat quantum loci acies instructa occupare poterat, atque ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat et in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit circiter passuum CCCC et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta conlocavit, ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes, quod tantum multitudine poterant, ab lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent. Hoc facto, duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis ut, si quo opus esset, subsidio duci possent, reliquas VI legiones pro castris in acie constituit. Hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerunt.

2.9. There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this; our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the mean time battle was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse [proving] favorable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has been; stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavored to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded,

and might cut off the bridge; but, if they could not do that, they should lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great use to us in carrying on the war, and might hinder our men from foraging.

Palus erat non magna inter nostrum atque hostium exercitum. Hanc si nostri transirent hostes expectabant; nostri autem, si ab illis initium transeundi fieret, ut impeditos adgrederentur, parati in armis erant. Interim proelio equestri inter duas acies contendebatur. Ubi neutri transeundi initium faciunt, secundiore equitum proelio nostris Caesar suos in castra reduxit. Hostes protinus ex eo loco ad flumen Axonam contenderunt, quod esse post nostra castra demonstratum est. Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt eo consilio ut, si possent, castellum, cui praeerat Q. Titurius legatus, expugnarent pontemque interscinderent; si minus potuissent, agros Remorum popularentur, qui magno nobis usui ad bellum gerendum erant, commeatuque nostros prohiberent.

2:10. Caesar, being apprized of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens toward them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who, in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over their bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for each to return to his

country, and resolved to assemble from all quarters to defend those into whose territories the Romans should first march an army; that they might contend in their own rather than in a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provision which they possessed at home. Together with other causes, this consideration also led them to that resolution, viz: that they had learned that Divitiacus and the Aedui were approaching the territories of the Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay any longer, or to deter them from conveying succor to their own people.

[Caesar] certior factus ab Titurio omnem equitatum et levis armaturae Numidas, funditores sagittariosque pontem traducit atque ad eos contendit. Acriter in eo loco pugnatum est. Hostes impeditos nostri in flumine adgressi magnum eorum numerum occiderunt; per eorum corpora reliquos audacissime transire conantes multitudine telorum reppulerunt primosque, qui transierant, equitatu circumventos interfecerunt. Hostes, ubi et de expugnando oppido et de flumine transeundo spem se fefellisse intellexerunt neque nostros in locum iniquiorum progredi pugnandi causa viderunt atque ipsos res frumentaria deficere coepit, concilio convocato constituerunt optimum esse domum suam quemque reverti, et quorum in fines primum Romani exercitum introduxissent, ad eos defendendos undique convenirent, ut potius in suis quam in alienis finibus decertarent et domesticis copiis rei frumentariae uterentur. Ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod Diviciacum atque Haeduos finibus Bellovacorum adpropinquare cognoverant. His persuaderi ut diutius morarentur neque suis auxilium ferrent non poterat.

2:11. That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at

the second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambushade, because he had not yet discovered for what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they were fleeing; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded.

Ea re constituta, secunda vigilia magno cum, strepitu ac tumultu castris egressi nullo certo ordine neque imperio, cum sibi quisque primum itineris locum peteret et domum pervenire properaret, fecerunt ut consimilis fugae profectio videretur. Hac re statim Caesar per speculatores cognita insidias veritus, quod qua de causa discederent nondum perspexerat, exercitum equitatumque castris continuit. Prima luce, confirmata re ab exploratoribus, omnem equitatum, qui novissimum agmen moraretur, praemisit. His Q.

Pedium et L. Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praefecit; T. Labienum legatum cum legionibus tribus subsequi iussit. Hi novissimos adorti et multa milia passuum prosecuti magnam multitudinem eorum fugientium conciderunt, cum ab extremo agmine, ad quos ventum erat, consisterent fortiterque impetum nostrorum militum sustinerent, priores, quod abesse a periculo viderentur neque ulla necessitate neque imperio continerentur, exaudito clamore perturbatis ordinibus omnes in fuga sibi praesidium ponerent. Ita sine ullo periculo tantam eorum multitudinem nostri interfecerunt quantum fuit diei spatium; sub occasum solis sequi destiterunt seque in castra, ut erat imperatum, receperunt.

2:12. On the day following, before the enemy could recover from their terror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of the Suessiones, which are next to the Remi, and having accomplished a long march, hastens to the town named Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it by storm on his march, because he heard that it was destitute of [sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry it by assault, on account of the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall, though few were defending it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began to bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever things were necessary for the storm. In the mean time the whole body of the Suessiones, after their flight, came the next night into the town. The vineae having been quickly brought up against the town, a mound thrown up, and towers built, the Gauls, amazed by the greatness of the works, such as they had neither seen nor heard of before, and struck also by the dispatch of the Romans, send ambassadors to Caesar respecting a surrender, and succeed in consequence of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones] might be spared.

Postridie eius diei Caesar, prius quam se hostes ex terrore ac fuga reciperent, in fines Suessionum, qui proximi Remis erant, exercitum duxit et magno itinere [confecto] ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit. Id ex itinere oppugnare conatus, quod vacuum ab defensoribus esse audiebat, propter latitudinem fossae murique altitudinem paucis defendentibus expugnare non potuit. Castris munitis vineas agere quaeque ad oppugnandum usui erant comparare coepit. Interim omnis ex fuga Suessionum multitudo in oppidum proxima nocte convenit. Celeriter vineis ad oppidum actis, aggere iacto turribusque constitutis, magnitudine operum, quae neque viderant ante Galli neque audierant, et celeritate Romanorum permoti legatos ad Caesarem de deditione mittunt et petentibus Remis ut conservarentur impetrant.

2:13. Caesar, having received as hostages the first men of the state, and even the two sons of king Galba himself; and all the arms in the town having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who, when they had conveyed themselves and all their possessions into the town Galled Bratuspantium, and Caesar with his army was about five miles distant from that town, all the old men, going out of the town, began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and to intimate by their voice that they would throw themselves on his protection and power, nor would contend in arms against the Roman people. In like manner, when he had come up to the town, and there pitched his camp, the boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched hands, after their custom, begged peace from the Romans.

Caesar, obsidibus acceptis primis civitatis atque ipsius Galbae regis duobus filiis armisque omnibus ex oppido traditis, in deditionem

Suessiones accipit exercitumque in Bellovacos ducit. Qui cum se suaque omnia in oppidum Bratuspantium contulissent atque ab eo oppido Caesar cum exercitu circiter milia passuum V abesset, omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum Romanum armis contendere. Item, cum ad oppidum accessisset castraque ibi poneret, pueri mulieresque ex muro passis manibus suo more pacem ab Romanis petierunt.

2:14. For these Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of the Belgae, having dismissed the troops of the Aedui, he had returned to Caesar). "The Bellovaci had at all times been in the alliance and friendship of the Aeduan state; that they had revolted from the Aedui and made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto by their nobles, who said that the Aedui, reduced to slavery by Caesar, were suffering every indignity and insult. That they who had been the leaders of that plot, because they perceived how great a calamity they had brought upon the state, had fled into Britain. That not only the Bellovaci, but also the Aedui, entreated him to use his [accustomed] clemency and lenity toward them [the Bellovaci]: which if he did, he would increase the influence of the Aedui among all the Belgae, by whose succor and resources they had been accustomed to support themselves whenever any wars occurred."

Pro his Diviciacus (nam post discessum Belgarum dimissis Haeduum copiis ad eum reverterat) facit verba: Bellovacos omni tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse; impulsos ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitutem redacto. Omnes indignitates contumeliasque perferre, et ab Haeduis defecisse et populo Romano bellum intulisse. Qui eius consilii

principes fuissent, quod intellegerent quantam calamitatem civitati intulissent, in Britanniam profugisse. Petere non solum Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Haeduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur. Quod si fecerit, Haeduum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare consuerint.

2:15. Caesar said that on account of his respect for Divitiacus and the Aeduians, he would receive them into his protection, and would spare them; but, because the state was of great influence among the Belgae, and pre-eminent in the number of its population, he demanded 600 hostages. When these were delivered, and all the arms in the town collected, he went from that place into the territories of the Ambiani, who, without delay, surrendered themselves and all their possessions. Upon their territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character and customs when Caesar inquired he received the following information: — That there was no access for merchants to them; that they suffered no wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported; because, they thought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courage impaired: that they were a savage people and of great bravery: that they upbraided and condemned the rest of the Belgae who had surrendered themselves to the Roman people and thrown aside their national courage: that they openly declared they would neither send ambassadors, nor accept any condition of peace.”

Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduum causa sese eos in fidem recepturum et conservaturum dixit, et quod erat civitas magna inter Belgas auctoritate atque hominum multitudine praestabat, DC obsides poposcit. His traditis omnibusque armis ex oppido conlatis, ab eo loco in fines Ambianorum pervenit; qui se suaque omnia sine

mora dediderunt. Eorum fines Nervii attingebant. Quorum de natura moribusque Caesar cum quaereret, sic reperiebat: nullum esse aditum ad eos mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarumque rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium inferri, quod his rebus relanguescere animos eorum et remitti virtutem existimarent; esse homines feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent; confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem pacis accepturos.

2:16. After he had made three days march through their territories, he discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp; that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbors, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

Cum per eorum fines triduum iter fecisset, inveniebat ex captivis Sabim flumen a castris suis non amplius milibus passuum X abesse; trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedisse adventumque ibi Romanorum expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis (nam his utrisque persuaserant uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur); expectari etiam ab iis Aduatucorum copias atque esse in itinere; mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam inutiles viderentur in eum locum coniecisse quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non esset.

2:17. Having learned these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learned from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage- trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them.

His rebus cognitis, exploratores centurionesque praemittit qui locum castris idoneum deligant. Cum ex dediticiis Belgis reliquisque Gallis complures Caesarem secuti una iter facerent, quidam ex his, ut postea ex captivis cognitum est, eorum dierum consuetudine itineris

nostri exercitus perspecta, nocte ad Nervios pervenerunt atque his demonstrarunt inter singulas legiones impedimentorum magnum numerum intercedere, neque esse quicquam negotii, cum prima legio in castra venisset reliquaeque legiones magnum spatium abessent, hanc sub sarcinis adoriri; qua pulsa impedimentisque direptis, futurum ut reliquae contra consistere non auderent. Adiuwabatur etiam eorum consilium qui rem deferebant quod Nervii antiquitus, cum equitatu nihil possent (neque enim ad hoc tempus ei rei student, sed quicquid possunt, pedestribus valent copiis), quo facilius finitimorum equitatum, si praedandi causa ad eos venissent, impedirent, teneris arboribus incisus atque inflexis crebrisque in latitudinem ramis enatis [et] rubis sentibusque interiectis effecerant ut instar muri hae saepe munimentum praeberent, quo non modo non intrari sed ne perspicere quidem posset. His rebus cum iter agminis nostri impediretur, non omittendum sibi consilium Nervii existimaverunt.

2:18. The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extending to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within these woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet.

Loci natura erat haec, quem locum nostri castris delegerant. Collis ab summo aequaliter declivis ad flumen Sabim, quod supra nominavimus, vergebat. Ab eo flumine pari acclivitate collis nascebatur adversus huic et contrarius, passus circiter CC infimus

apertus, ab superiore parte silvestris, ut non facile introrsus perspici posset. Intra eas silvas hostes in occulto sese continebant; in aperto loco secundum flumen paucae stationes equitum videbantur. Fluminis erat altitudo pedum circiter trium.

2:19. Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the

works.

Caesar equitatu praemisso subsequebatur omnibus copiis; sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant. Nam quod hostibus adpropinquabat, consuetudine sua Caesar VI legiones expeditas ducebat; post eas totius exercitus impedimenta conlocarat; inde duae legiones quae proxime conscriptae erant totum agmen claudebant praesidioque impedimentis erant. Equites nostri cum funditoribus sagittariisque flumen transgressi cum hostium equitatu proelium commiserunt. Cum se illi identidem in silvis ad suos reciperent ac rursus ex silva in nostros impetum facerent, neque nostri longius quam quem ad finem porrecta [ac] loca aperta pertinebant cedentes insequi auderent, interim legiones VI quae primae venerant, opere dimenso, castra munire coeperunt. Ubi prima impedimenta nostri exercitus ab iis qui in silvis abditi latebant visa sunt, quod tempus inter eos committendi proelii convenerat, ut intra silvas aciem ordinesque constituerant atque ipsi sese confirmaverant, subito omnibus copiis provolaverunt impetumque in nostros equites fecerunt. His facile pulsus ac proturbatis, incredibili celeritate ad flumen decucurrerunt, ut paene uno tempore et ad silvas et in flumine [et iam in manibus nostris] hostes viderentur. Eadem autem celeritate adverso colle ad nostra castra atque eos qui in opere occupati erant contenderunt.

2:20. Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the

watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill and experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive information from others; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever appeared proper.

Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda: vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne, cum ad arma concurri oporteret; signum tuba dandum; ab opere revocandi milites; qui paulo longius aggeris petendi causa processerant arcessendi; acies instruenda; milites cohortandi; signum dandum. Quarum rerum magnam partem temporis brevitatis et incursus hostium impendebat. His difficultatibus duae res erant subsidio, scientia atque usus militum, quod superioribus proeliis exercitati quid fieri oporteret non minus commode ipsi sibi praescribere quam ab aliis doceri poterant, et quod ab opere singulisque legionibus singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat. Hi propter propinquitatem et celeritatem hostium nihil iam Caesaris imperium expectabant, sed per se quae videbantur administrabant.

2:21. Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever quarter fortune carried him, to animate the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no

further speech than that “they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valor, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy ;” as the latter were not further from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing battle. And having gone to another quarter for the purpose of encouraging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was the shortness of the time, and so determined was the mind of the enemy on fighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing the military insignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off the covers from the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from the works (in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the time for fighting.

Caesar, necessariis rebus imperatis, ad cohortandos milites, quam [in] partem fors obtulit, decucurrit et ad legionem decimam devenit. Milites non longiore oratione cohortatus quam uti suae pristinae virtutis memoriam retinerent neu perturbarentur animo hostiumque impetum fortiter sustinerent, quod non longius hostes aberant quam quo telum adigi posset, proelii committendi signum dedit. Atque in alteram item cohortandi causa profectus pugnantibus occurrit. Temporis tanta fuit exiguitas hostiumque tam paratus ad dimicandum animus ut non modo ad insignia accommodanda sed etiam ad galeas induendas scutisque tegimenta detrahenda tempus defuerit. Quam quisque ab opere in partem casu devenit quaeque prima signa conspexit, ad haec constitit, ne in quaerendis suis pugnandi tempus dimitteret.

2:22. The army having been marshaled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than

as the method and order of military matters required; while the legions in the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavorable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed.

Instructo exercitu magis ut loci natura [deiectusque collis] et necessitas temporis quam ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat, cum diversae legiones aliae alia in parte hostibus resisterent saepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, interiectis prospectus impediretur, neque certa subsidia conlocari neque quid in quaque parte opus esset provideri neque ab uno omnia imperia administrari poterant. Itaque in tanta rerum iniquitate fortunae quoque eventus varii sequebantur.

2:23. The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui, with whom they had engaged,

were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river. But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened toward that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment.

Legionis VIII. et X. milites, ut in sinistra parte aciei constiterant, pilis emissis cursu ac lassitudine exanimatos vulneribusque confectos Atrebates (nam his ea pars obvenerat) celeriter ex loco superiore in flumen compulerunt et transire conantes insecuti gladiis magnam partem eorum impeditam interfecerunt. Ipsi transire flumen non dubitaverunt et in locum iniquum progressi rursus resistentes hostes redintegrato proelio in fugam coniecerunt. Item alia in parte diversae duae legiones, XI. et VIII., profligatis Viromanduis, quibuscum erant congressae, ex loco superiore in ipsis fluminis ripis proeliabantur. At totis fere castris a fronte et a sinistra parte nudatis, cum in dextro cornu legio XII. et non magno ab ea intervallo VII. constitisset, omnes Nervii confertissimo agmine duce Boduognato, qui summam imperii tenebat, ad eum locum contenderunt; quorum pars ab aperto latere legiones circumvenire, pars summum castrorum locum petere coepit.

2:24. At the same time our horsemen, and light- armed infantry, who had been with those, who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; and the camp-followers who from the Decuman

Gate, and from the highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to flight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the baggage-train: and they (affrighted), were carried some one way, some another. By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri were much alarmed, (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, the camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train.

Eodem tempore equites nostri levisque armaturae pedites, qui cum iis una fuerant, quos primo hostium impetu pulsos dixeram, cum se in castra reciperent, adversis hostibus occurrebant ac rursus aliam in partem fugam petebant; et calones, qui ab decumana porta ac summo iugo collis nostros victores flumen transire conspexerant, praedandi causa egressi, cum respexissent et hostes in nostris castris versari vidissent, praecipites fugae sese mandabant. Simul eorum qui cum impedimentis veniebant clamor fremitusque oriebatur, aliique aliam in partem perterriti ferebantur. Quibus omnibus rebus permoti equites Treveri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis, qui auxilii causa a civitate missi ad Caesarem venerant, cum multitudine hostium castra [nostra] compleri, legiones premi et paene circumventas teneri, calones, equites, funditores, Numidas diversos dissipatosque in omnes partes fugere vidissent, desperatis nostris

rebus domum contenderunt: Romanos pulsos superatosque, castris impedimentisque eorum hostes potitos civitati renuntiaverunt.

2:25. Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hinderance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand] though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up, having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, while every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked.

Caesar ab X. legionis cohortatione ad dextrum cornu profectus, ubi suos urgeri signisque in unum locum conlatis XII. legionis confertos milites sibi ipsos ad pugnam esse impedimento vidit, quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus occisis signiferoque interfecto, signo amisso, reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis, in his primipilo P. Sextio Baculo, fortissimo viro, multis gravibusque vulneribus confecto, ut iam se sustinere non posset, reliquos esse tardiores et non nullos ab novissimis deserto loco proelio excedere ac tela vitare, hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere instare et rem esse in angusto vidit, neque ullum esse subsidium quod submitti posset, scuto ab novissimis [uni] militi detracto, quod ipse eo sine scuto venerat, in primam aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus milites signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti possent. Cuius adventu spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu imperatoris etiam in extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet, paulum hostium impetus tardatus est.

2:26. Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make their charge upon the enemy with a double front; which having been done, since they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lest their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. In the mean time, the soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and Titus Labienus,

having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learned from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the commander were involved, left undone nothing [which tended] to dispatch.

Caesar, cum VII. legionem, quae iuxta constiterat, item urgeri ab hoste vidisset, tribunos militum monuit ut paulatim sese legiones coniungerent et conversa signa in hostes inferrent. Quo facto cum aliis alii subsidium ferrent neque timerent ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare coeperunt. Interim milites legionum duarum quae in novissimo agmine praesidio impedimentis fuerant, proelio nuntiato, cursu incitato in summo colle ab hostibus conspiciebantur, et T.Labienus castris hostium potitus et ex loco superiore quae res in nostris castris gererentur conspicatus X.legionem subsidio nostris misit. Qui cum ex equitum et calonum fuga quo in loco res esset quantoque in periculo et castra et legiones et imperator versaretur cognovissent, nihil ad celeritatem sibi reliqui fecerunt.

2:27. By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valor blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and

fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies]; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult.

Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui vulneribus confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent, equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnae se legionariis militibus praeferrent. At hostes, etiam in extrema spe salutis, tantam virtutem praestiterunt ut, cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent, his deiectis et coacervatis cadaveribus qui superessent ut ex tumultu tela in nostros conicerent et pila intercepta remitterent: ut non nequiquam tantae virtutis homines iudicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas ripas, subire iniquissimum locum; quae facilia ex difficillimis animi magnitudo redegerat.

2:28. This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii being almost reduced to annihilation, their old men, whom together with the boys and women we have stated to have been collected together in the fenny places and marshes, on this battle having been reported to them, since they were convinced that nothing was an obstacle to the conquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, sent ambassadors to Caesar by the consent of all who remained, and

surrendered themselves to him; and in recounting the calamity of their state, said that their senators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60,000 men they [were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that he might appear to use compassion toward the wretched and the suppliant, most carefully spared; and ordered them to enjoy their own territories and towns, and commanded their neighbors that they should restrain themselves and their dependents from offering injury or outrage [to them].

Hoc proelio facto et prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto, maiores natu, quos una cum pueris mulieribusque in aestuaria ac paludes coniectos dixeramus, hac pugna nuntiata, cum victoribus nihil impeditum, victis nihil tutum arbitrarentur, omnium qui supererant consensu legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dederunt; et in commemoranda civitatis calamitate ex DC ad tres senatores, ex hominum milibus LX vix ad D, qui arma ferre possent, sese redactos esse dixerunt. Quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus atque oppidis uti iussit et finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque prohiberent.

2:29. When the Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were coming up with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battle being reported to them, they returned home after they were on the march; deserting all their towns and forts, they conveyed together all their possessions into one town, eminently fortified by nature. While this town had on all sides around it very high rocks and precipices, there was left on one side a gently ascending approach, of not more than 200 feet in width; which place they had fortified with a very lofty double wall: besides, they had placed stones of great

weight and sharpened stakes upon the walls. They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, when they were marching into our province and Italy, having deposited on this side the river Rhine such of their baggage-trains as they could not drive or convey with them, left 6,000 of their men as a guard and defense for them. These having, after the destruction of their countrymen, been harassed for many years by their neighbors, while one time they waged war offensively, and at another resisted it when waged against them, concluded a peace with the consent of all, and chose this place as their settlement.

Atuatuci, de quibus supra diximus, cum omnibus copiis auxilio Nervii venirent, hac pugna nuntiata ex itinere domum reverterunt; cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis sua omnia in unum oppidum egregie natura munitum contulerunt. Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes deiectusque haberet, una ex parte leniter acclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius pedum CC relinquebatur; quem locum duplici altissimo muro munierant; tum magni ponderis saxa et praeacutas trabes in muro conlocabant. Ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui, cum iter in provinciam nostram atque Italiam facerent, iis impedimentis quae secum agere ac portare non poterant citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodiam [ex suis] ac praesidium VI milia hominum una reliquerant. Hi post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, cum alias bellum inferrent, alias inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum delegerant.

2:30. And on the first arrival of our army they made frequent sallies from the town, and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes; afterward, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet [in height],

and fifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves within the town. When, vineae having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed that a tower also was being built at a distance, they at first began to mock the Romans from their wall, and to taunt them with the following speeches. “For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed at so great a distance? With what hands,” or “with what strength did they, especially [as they were] men of such very small stature” (for our shortness of stature, in comparison to the great size of their bodies, is generally a subject of much contempt to the men of Gaul) “trust to place against their walls a tower of such great weight.”

Ac primo adventu exercitus nostri crebras ex oppido excursiones faciebant parvulisque proeliis cum nostris contendebant; postea vallo pedum XII in circuitu quindecim milium crebrisque castellis circummuniti oppido sese continebant. Ubi vineis actis aggere extracto turrim procul constitui viderunt, primum inridere ex muro atque increpitare vocibus, quod tanta machinatio a tanto spatio institueretur: quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae (nam plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum quorum brevitudo nostra contemptui est) tanti oneris turrim in muro sese posse conlocare confiderent?

2:31. But when they saw that it was being moved, and was approaching their walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed sight, they sent ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace; who spoke in the following manner: “That they did not believe the Romans waged war without divine aid, since they were able to move forward machines of such a height with so great speed, and thus fight from close quarters; that they resigned themselves and all their possessions

to [Caesar's] disposal: that they begged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if perchance, agreeable to his clemency and humanity, which they had heard of from others, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he would not deprive them of their arms; that all their neighbors were enemies to them and envied their courage, from whom they could not defend themselves if their arms were delivered up: that it was better for them, if they should be reduced to that state, to suffer any fate from the Roman people, than to be tortured to death by those among whom they had been accustomed to rule."

Ubi vero moveri et adpropinquare muris viderunt, nova atque inusitata specie commoti legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt, qui ad hunc modum locuti; non se existimare Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere possent; se suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt. Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuaticos esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret. Sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos ac suae virtuti invidere; a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent. Sibi praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati quam ab his per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consuessent.

2:32. To these things Caesar replied, "That he, in accordance with his custom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if they should surrender themselves before the battering-ram should touch the wall; but that there was no condition of surrender, except upon their arms being delivered up; that he should do to them that which he had done in the case of the Nervii, and would command

their neighbors not to offer any injury to those who had surrendered to the Roman people.” The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said that they would execute his commands. Having cast a very large quantity of their arms from the wall into the trench that was before the town, so that the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and the rampart, and nevertheless having retained and concealed, as we afterward discovered, about a third part in the town, the gates were opened, and they enjoyed peace for that day.

Ad haec Caesar respondit: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent; sed deditionis nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis. Se id quod in Nerviis fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam inferrent. Re renuntiata ad suos illi se quae imperarentur facere dixerunt. Armorum magna multitudine de muro in fossam, quae erat ante oppidum, iacta, sic ut prope summam muri aggerisque altitudinem acervi armorum adaequarent, et tamen circiter parte tertia, ut postea perspectum est, celata atque in oppido retenta, portis patefactis eo die pace sunt usi.

2:33. Toward evening Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to go out of the town, lest the towns-people should receive any injury from them by night. They [the Aduatuci], by a design before entered into, as we afterwards understood, because they believed that, as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss their guards, or at least would keep watch less carefully, partly with those arms which they had retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark or interwoven wickers, which they had hastily

covered over with skins, (as the shortness of time required) in the third watch, suddenly made a sally from the town with all their forces [in that direction] in which the ascent to our fortifications seemed the least difficult. The signal having been immediately given by fires, as Caesar had previously commended, a rush was made thither [i. e. by the Roman soldiers] from the nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the enemy as vigorously as it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope of safety, in a disadvantageous place, and against those who were throwing their weapons from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety depended on their courage alone. About 4,000 of the men having been slain, the rest were forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breaking open the gates, which there was no one then to defend, and sending in our soldiers, sold the whole spoil of that town. The number of 53,000 persons was reported to him by those who had bought them.

Sub vesperum Caesar portas claudi militesque ex oppido exire iussit, ne quam noctu oppidani a militibus iniuriam acciperent. Illi ante inito, ut intellectum est, consilio, quod deditione facta nostros praesidia deducturos aut denique indiligentius servaturos crediderant, partim cum iis quae retinuerant et celaverant armis, partim scutis ex cortice factis aut viminibus intextis, quae subito, ut temporis exiguitas postulabat, pellibus induxerant, tertia vigilia, qua minime arduus ad nostras munitiones accensus videbatur, omnibus copiis repente ex oppido eruptionem fecerunt. Celeriter, ut ante Caesar imperaverat, ignibus significatione facta, ex proximis castellis eo concursus est, pugnatumque ab hostibus ita acriter est ut a viris fortibus in extrema spe salutis iniquo loco contra eos qui ex vallo turribusque tela iacerent pugnari debuit, cum in una virtute omnis spes consisteret. Occisis ad hominum milibus IIII reliqui in oppidum

reiecti sunt. Postridie eius diei refractis portis, cum iam defenderet nemo, atque intromissis militibus nostris, sectionem eius oppidi universam Caesar vendidit. Ab iis qui emerant capitum numerus ad eum relatus est milium LIII.

2:34. At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are maritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic] ocean, that all these nations were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.

Eodem tempore a P. Crasso, quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Venellos, Osismos, Curiosolitas, Esuvios, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt, certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani esse redactas.

2:35. These things being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so high an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians, that ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations who dwelt beyond the Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and execute his commands. Which embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italy and Illyricum, ordered to return to him at the beginning of the following summer. He himself, having led his legions into winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, which states were close to those regions in which he had waged war, set out for Italy; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was decreed for those achievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an honor] which before that time had been conferred on none.

His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata, tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est uti ab iis nationibus quae trans Rhenum incolerent legationes ad Caesarem mitterentur, quae se obsides daturas, imperata facturas pollicerentur. Quas legationes Caesar, quod in Italiam Illyricumque properabat, inita proxima aestate ad se reverti iussit. Ipse in Carnutes, Andes, Turonos quaeque civitates propinquae iis locis erant ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hiberna deductis, in Italiam profectus est. Ob easque res ex litteris Caesaris dierum XV supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli.

BOOK III (56 BC)

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3:1. When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry, against the Nantuates, the Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges, and the lake of Geneva, and the River Rhone to the top of the Alps. The reason for sending him was, that he desired that the pass along the Alps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel with great danger, and under great imposts, should be opened. He permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba having fought some successful battles and stormed several of their forts, upon ambassadors being sent to him from all parts and hostages given and a peace concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to winter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by a river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.

Cum in Italiam proficisceretur Caesar, Ser. Galbam cum legione XII et parte equitatus in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque misit, qui a finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano ad summas Alpes pertinent. Causa mittendi fuit quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis mercatores ire consueant, patefieri volebat. Huic permisit, si opus esse arbitraretur, uti in his

locis legionem hiemandi causa conlocaret. Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta, constituit cohortes duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis eius legionis cohortibus in vico Veragrorum, qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare; qui vicus positus in valle non magna adiecta planitie altissimis montibus undique continetur. Cum hic in duas partes flumine divideretur, alteram partem eius vici Gallis [ad hiemandum] concessit, alteram vacuum ab his relictam cohortibus attribuit. Eum locum vallo fossaque munivit.

3:2. When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had ordered corn to be brought in he was suddenly informed by his scouts that all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town which he had given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hung over it were occupied by a very large force of the Seduni and Veragri. It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the design of renewing the war and cutting off that legion. First, because they despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and that not quite full (two cohorts having been detached, and several individuals being absent, who had been dispatched for the purpose of seeking provision); then, likewise, because they thought that on account of the disadvantageous character of the situation, even their first attack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To this was added, that they were indignant that their children were torn from them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite those parts to the neighboring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the passes, but

also a constant possession.

Cum dies hibernorum complures transissent frumentumque eo comportari iussisset, subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri. Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent: primum, quod legionem neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant; tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant. Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.

3:3. Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of the winter-quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was sufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions (since, as a surrender had been made, and hostages received, he had thought he need entertain no apprehension of war), speedily summoning a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council, since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the general expectation, and almost all the higher places were seen already covered with a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops come to their relief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [by the enemy]; safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this sort were

delivered: that, “leaving their baggage, and making a sally, they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had come thither.” To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving that measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and to defend the camp.

His nuntiis acceptis Galba, cum neque opus hibernorum munitionesque plene essent perfectae neque de frumento reliquoque commeatu satis esset provisum quod deditione facta obsidibusque acceptis nihil de bello timendum existimaverat, consilio celeriter convocato sententias exquirere coepit. Quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent, prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad salutem contenderent. Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere.

3:4. A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from all parts, and discharged stones and darts, upon our rampart. Our men at first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were over-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went out of the action, and others

with fresh strength came in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing to the smallness of their number; and not only was permission not given to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been stationed, and recover.

Brevi spatio interiecto, vix ut iis rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque administrandis tempus daretur, hostes ex omnibus partibus signo dato decurrere, lapides gaesaque in vallum coicere. Nostri primo integris viribus fortiter propugnare neque ullum frustra telum ex loco superiore mittere, et quaecumque pars castrorum nudata defensoribus premi videbatur, eo occurrere et auxilium ferre, sed hoc superari quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi proelio excedebant, alii integris viribus succedebant; quarum rerum a nostris propter paucitatem fieri nihil poterat, ac non modo defesso ex pugna excedendi, sed ne saucio quidem eius loci ubi constiterat relinquiendi ac sui recipiendi facultas dabatur.

3:5. When they had now been fighting for more than six hours, without cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men, and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last extremity, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we have related to have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagement with the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man of great skill and valor, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only hope of safety lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders to the soldiers to discontinue the

fight a short time, and only collect the weapons flung [at them], and recruit themselves after their fatigue, and afterward, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, and place in their valor all their hope of safety.

Cum iam amplius horis sex continenter pugnaretur, ac non solum vires sed etiam tela nostros deficerent, atque hostes acrius instarent languidioribusque nostris vallum scindere et fossas complere coepissent, resque esset iam ad extremum perducta casum, P. Sextius Baculus, primi pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus, et item C. Volusenus, tribunus militum, vir et consilii magni et virtutis, ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur. Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.

3:6. They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from all the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowing what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking a turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had entertained the hope of gaining the camp and having killed more than the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men (which number of the barbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flight the rest when panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even upon the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp and fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was unwilling to tempt

fortune again, and remembered that he had come into winter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with a different state of affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of corn and provision, having the next day burned all the buildings of that village, he hastens to return into the province; and as no enemy opposed or hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the [country of the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there wintered.

Quod iussi sunt faciunt, ac subito omnibus portis eruptione facta neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt. Ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum venerant undique circumventos intercipiunt, et ex hominum milibus amplius XXX, quem numerum barbarorum ad castra venisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coniciunt ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur. Sic omnibus hostium copiis fuis armisque exutis se intra munitiones suas recipiunt. Quo proelio facto, quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba nolebat atque alio se in hiberna consilio venisse meminerat, aliis occurrisset rebus videbat, maxime frumenti [commeatusque] inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici aedificiis incensis in provinciam reverti contendit, ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter demorante incolumem legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique hiemavit.

3:7. These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae being overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a

knowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border upon the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in those parts, sent out some officers of cavalry, and several military tribunes among the neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn and provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent among the Esubii; M. Trebius Gallus among the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, T. Silius, amongst the Veneti.

His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, [superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus Sedunis,] atque ita inita hieme in Illyricum profectus esset, quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere volebat, subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est. Eius belli haec fuit causa. P. Crassus adulescens eum legione VII. proximus mare Oceanum in Andibus hiemabat. Is, quod in his locis inopia frumenti erat, praefectos tribunosque militum complures in finitimas civitates frumenti causa dimisit; quo in numero est T. Terrasidius missus in Esuvios, M. Trebius Gallus in Coriosolites, Q. Velanius cum T. Silio in Venetos.

3:8. The influence of this state is by far the most considerable of any of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti both have a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed to sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and experience of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in possession, they hold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their detaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that they should

recover by their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus. The neighboring people led on by their influence (as the measures of the Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same motive; and quickly sending ambassadors, by means of their leading men, they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by general consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the other states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they had received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. All the sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send a common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to receive back his officers, let him send back to them their hostages."

Huius est civitatis longe amplissima auctoritas omnis orae maritimae regionum earum, quod et naves habent Veneti plurimas, quibus in Britanniam navigare consuerunt, et scientia atque usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt et in magno impetu maris atque aperto paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent vectigales. Ab his fit initium retinendi Silii atque Velanii, quod per eos suos se obsides, quos Crasso dedissent, recuperaturos existimabant. Horum auctoritate finitimi adducti, ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia, eadem de causa Trebium Terrasidiumque retinent et celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos, reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint. Omni ora maritima celeriter ad suam sententiam perducta communem legationem ad P. Crassum mittunt, si velit suos recuperare, obsides sibi remittat.

3:9. Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the mean time on the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from the province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being quickly executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits, hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other states also, being informed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great a crime they had committed, in that, the ambassadors (a character which had among all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been detained and thrown into prison, resolve to prepare for a war in proportion to the greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those things which appertain to the service of a navy, with the greater confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situation. They knew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that the approach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of the localities, [and] the small number of the harbors, and they trusted that our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on account of the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all these things should turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in their navy. They well understood that the Romans neither had any number of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbors, or the islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; and the navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in the vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify their towns, convey corn into them from the country parts, bring together as many ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on the war. They unite to themselves as allies for that war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and

the Menapii; and send for auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated over against those regions.

Quibus de rebus Caesar a Crasso certior factus, quod ipse aberat longius, naves interim longas aedificari in flumine Ligeri, quod influit in Oceanum, remiges ex provincia institui, nautas gubernatoresque comparari iubet. His rebus celeriter administratis ipse, cum primum per anni tempus potuit, ad exercitum contendit. Veneti reliquaeque item civitates cognito Caesaris adventu [certiores facti], simul quod quantum in se facinus admisissent intellegebant, [legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos,] pro magnitudine periculi bellum parare et maxime ea quae ad usum navium pertinent providere instituunt, hoc maiore spe quod multum natura loci confidebant. Pedestria esse itinera concisa aestuariis, navigationem impeditam propter inscientiam locorum paucitatemque portuum sciebant, neque nostros exercitus propter inopiam frumenti diutius apud se morari posse confidebant; ac iam ut omnia contra opinionem acciderent, tamen se plurimum navibus posse, [quam] Romanos neque ullam facultatem habere navium, neque eorum locorum ubi bellum gesturi essent vada, portus, insulas novisse; ac longe aliam esse navigationem in concluso mari atque in vastissimo atque apertissimo Oceano perspiciebant. His initis consiliis oppida muniunt, frumenta ex agris in oppida comportant, naves in Venetiam, ubi Caesarem primum bellum gesturum constabat, quam plurimas possunt cogunt. Socios sibi ad id bellum Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt.

3:10. There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, in

carrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that war;—the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Roman knights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt after hostages were given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally, lest if, [the conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nations should think that the same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since he reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by nature, love liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to divide and more widely distribute his army, before more states should join the confederation.

Erant hae difficultates belli gerendi quas supra ostendimus, sed tamen multa Caesarem ad id bellum incitabant: iniuria retentorum equitum Romanorum, rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio, in primis ne hac parte neglecta reliquae nationes sibi idem licere arbitrarentur. Itaque cum intellegeret omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari, omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse, prius quam plures civitates conspirarent, partiendum sibi ac latius distribuendum exercitum putavit.

3:11. He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to the Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit the Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance and repel the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae to their aid,) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a great number of the

cavalry, lest auxiliaries should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations be united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus his lieutenant, with three legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to take care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest. He appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vessels which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni, and the other provinces which remained at peace; and commands him to proceed toward the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens thither with the land forces.

Itaque T. Labienum legatum in Treveros, qui proximi flumini Rheno sunt, cum equitatu mittit. Huic mandat, Remos reliquosque Belgas adeat atque in officio contineat Germanosque, qui auxilio a Belgis arcessiti dicebantur, si per vim navibus flumen transire conentur, prohibeat. P. Crassum cum cohortibus legionariis XII et magno numero equitatus in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet, ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur. Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum legionibus tribus in Venellos, Curiosolites Lexoviosque mittit, qui eam manum destinendam curet. D. Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat, praeficit et, cum primum possit, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit.

3:12. The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed on extreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had an approach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which always happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed upon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance, was the

storming of their towns rendered difficult; and if at any time perchance the Veneti overpowered by the greatness of our works, (the sea having been excluded by a mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal in height to the walls of the town) had begun to despair of their fortunes; bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a very great quantity, they carried off all their property and betook themselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended themselves by the same advantages of situation. They did this the more easily during a great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms, and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea, with its strong tides and its harbors far apart and exceedingly few in number.

Erant eius modi fere situs oppidorum ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent, cum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod [bis] accidit semper horarum XII spatio, neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis adflctarentur. Ita utraque re oppidorum oppugnatio impediabatur. Ac si quando magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis, suis fortunis desperare coeperant, magno numero navium adpulso, cuius rei summam facultatem habebant, omnia sua deportabant seque in proxima oppida recipiebant: ibi se rursus isdem opportunitatibus loci defendebant. Haec eo facilius magnam partem aestatis faciebant quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, raris ac prope nullis portibus difficultas navigandi.

3:13. For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. The keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they

could more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows were raised very high, and, in like manner the sterns were adapted to the force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence whatever; the benches which were made of planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb; the anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for sails they used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either through their want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, or for this reason, which is more probable, that they thought that such storms of the ocean, and such violent gales of wind could not be resisted by sails, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enough managed by them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships' was of such a nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of the oars; other things, considering the nature of the place [and] the violence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted on their side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their beaks (so great was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weapon easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readily locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began to rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the storm more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the tide feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things was much to be dreaded by our ships.

Namque ipsorum naves ad hunc modum factae armataeque erant: carinae aliquanto planiores quam nostrarum navium, quo facilius vada ac decessum aestus excipere possent; prorae admodum erectae atque item puppes, ad magnitudinem fluctuum tempestatumque

accommodatae; naves totae factae ex robore ad quamvis vim et contumeliam perferendam; transtra ex pedalibus in altitudinem trabibus, confixa clavis ferreis digiti pollicis crassitudine; ancorae pro funibus ferreis catenis revinctae; pelles pro velis alutaeque tenuiter confectae, [hae] sive propter inopiam lini atque eius usus inscientiam, sive eo, quod est magis veri simile, quod tantas tempestates Oceani tantosque impetus ventorum sustineri ac tanta onera navium regi velis non satis commode posse arbitrabantur. Cum his navibus nostrae classi eius modi congressus erat ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret, reliqua pro loci natura, pro vi tempestatum illis essent aptiora et accommodatiora. Neque enim iis nostrae rostro nocere poterant (tanta in iis erat firmitudo), neque propter altitudinem facile telum adigebatur, et eadem de causa minus commode copulis continebatur. Accedebat ut, cum [saevire ventus coepisset et] se vento dedissent, et tempestatem ferrent facilius et in vadis consisterent tutius et ab aestu relictas nihil saxa et cautes timerent; quarum rerum omnium nostris navibus casus erat extimescendus.

3:14. Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much labor was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not be prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be done them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully equipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailed forth from the harbor, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that damage could not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets

were built [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our] lower position with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When the ropes which fastened the sail- yards to the masts were caught by them and pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarily fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire management of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest of the contest depended on courage; in which our men decidedly had the advantage; and the more so, because the whole action was carried on in the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little more valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and higher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea were occupied by our army.

Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar, ubi intellexit frustra tantum laborem sumi neque hostium fugam captis oppidis reprimi neque iis noceri posse, statuit expectandam classem. Quae ubi convenit ac primum ab hostibus visa est, circiter CCXX naves eorum paratissimae atque omni genere armorum ornatissimae profectae ex portu nostris adversae constiterunt; neque satis Bruto, qui classi praeerat, vel tribunis militum centurionibusque, quibus singulae naves erant attributae, constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem pugnae insisterent. Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant; turribus autem excitatis tamen has altitudo puppium ex barbaris navibus superabat, ut neque ex inferiore loco satis commode tela

adigi possent et missa a Gallis gravius acciderent. Una erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium. His cum funes qui antemnas ad malos destinabant comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato praerumpebantur. Quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant, ut, cum omnis Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis omnis usus navium uno tempore eriperetur. Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur, ut nullum paulo fortius factum latere posset; omnes enim colles ac loca superiora, unde erat propinquus despectus in mare, ab exercitu tenebantur.

3:15. The sail yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being brought down, although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded each one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board the ships of the enemy; and, after the barbarians observed this taking place, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for that evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the wind blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could not move out of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune for finishing the business; for our men gave chase and took them one by one, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by the intervention of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lasted almost from the fourth hour till sun-set.

Deiectis, ut diximus, antemnis, cum singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant, milites summa vi transcendere in hostium naves

contendebant. Quod postquam barbari fieri animadverterunt, expugnatis compluribus navibus, cum ei rei nullum reperiretur auxilium, fuga salutem petere contenderunt. Ac iam conversis in eam partem navibus quo ventus ferebat, tanta subito malacia ac tranquillitas exstitit ut se ex loco movere non possent. Quae quidem res ad negotium conficiendum maximae fuit oportunitati: nam singulas nostri consecrati expugnaverunt, ut perpaucae ex omni numero noctis interventu ad terram pervenirent, cum ab hora fere IIII usque ad solis occasum pugnaretur.

3:16. By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more advanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in that battle; and they had collected in that one place whatever naval forces they had anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had no place to retreat to, nor means of defending their towns. They accordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the more severely, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors might be more carefully respected by barbarians; having, therefore, put to death all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves.

Quo proelio bellum Venetorum totiusque orae maritimae confectum est. Nam cum omnis iuventus, omnes etiam gravioris aetatis in quibus aliquid consilii aut dignitatis fuit eo convenerant, tum navium quod ubique fuerat in unum locum coegerant; quibus amissis reliqui neque quo se reciperent neque quem ad modum oppida defenderent habebant. Itaque se suaque omnia Caesari dediderunt. In quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum

tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.

3:17. While these things are going on among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in the territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and held the chief command of all those states which had revolted; from which he had collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and the Sexovii, having slain their senate because they would not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [against us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude besides of desperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from husbandry and their daily labor. Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even to the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the following reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with so great a force, especially while he who held the chief command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favorable circumstance presented itself.

Dum haec in Venetis geruntur, Q. Titurius Sabinus cum iis copiis quas a Caesare acceperat in fines Venellorum pervenit. His praeerat Viridovix ac summam imperii tenebat earum omnium civitatum quae

defecerant, ex quibus exercitum [magnasque copias] coegerat; atque his paucis diebus Aulerci Eburovices Lexoviiique, senatu suo interfecto quod auctores belli esse nolebant, portas clausurunt seque cum Viridovice coniunxerunt; magnaue praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat, quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat. Sabinus idoneo omnibus rebus loco castris sese tenebat, cum Viridovix contra eum duorum milium spatio consedisset cotidieque productis copiis pugnandi potestatem faceret, ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus non nihil carperetur; tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent. Id ea de causa faciebat quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data legato dimicandum non existimabat.

3:18. After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and promises to go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished to be done. Who, when he arrives among them as a deserter, lays before them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed from this- that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar for the purpose of carrying [him] assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together that an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise, ought not to be thrown away: that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things persuaded the Gauls to this

measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want of provisions, for a supply of which they had not taken the requisite precautions; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and [also] because in most cases men willingly believe what they wish. Influenced by these things they do not discharge Viridovix and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission from them to take up arms and hasten to [our] camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.

Hac confirmata opinione timoris idoneum quendam hominem et callidum deligit, Gallum, ex iis quos auxilii causa secum habebat. Huic magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque persuadet uti ad hostes transeat, et quid fieri velit edocet. Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet, neque longius abesse quin proxima nocte Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa proficiscatur. Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene gerendi amittendam non esse: ad castra iri oportere. Multae res ad hoc consilium Gallos hortabantur: superiorum dierum Sabini cunctatio, perfugae confirmatio, inopia cibariorum, cui rei parum diligenter ab iis erat provisum, spes Venetici belli, et quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. His rebus adducti non prius Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt quam ab iis sit concessum arma uti capiant et ad castra contendant. Qua re concessa laeti, ut explorata victoria, sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant, ad castra pergunt.

3:19. The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed (in order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, he orders a sally to be made suddenly from two gates [of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by the unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valor of our soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could not stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs; and our men with full vigor followed them while disordered, and slew a great number of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.

Locus erat castrorum editus et paulatim ab imo acclivis circiter passus mille. Huc magno cursu contenderunt, ut quam minimum spatii ad se colligendos armandosque Romanis daretur, exanimatique pervenerunt. Sabinus suos hortatus cupientibus signum dat. Impeditis hostibus propter ea quae ferebant onera subito duabus portis eruptionem fieri iubet. Factum est oportunitate loci, hostium inscientia ac defatigatione, virtute militum et superiorum pugnarum exercitatione, ut ne unum quidem nostrorum impetum ferrent ac statim terga verterent. Quos impeditos integris viribus milites nostri consecuti magnum numerum eorum occiderunt; reliquos equites

consectati paucos, qui ex fuga evaserant, reliquerunt. Sic uno tempore et de navali pugna Sabinus et de Sabini victoria Caesar est certior factus, civitatesque omnes se statim Titurio dediderunt. Nam ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minime resistens ad calamitates ferendas mens eorum est.

3:20. About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania (which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul,) understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few years before, L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant had been killed, and his army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used by him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that border on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their strength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly display their infantry forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men [while] disordered, and renewed the fight.

Eodem fere tempore P. Crassus, cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset, quae [pars], ut ante dictum est, [et regionum latitudine et multitudine hominum] tertia pars Galliae est [aestimanda], cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum ubi paucis ante annis L. Valerius

Praeconinus legatus exercitu pulso interfectus esset atque unde L. Manlius proconsul impedimentis amissis profugisset, non mediocrem sibi diligentiam adhibendam intellegebat. Itaque re frumentaria provisa, auxiliis equitatuque comparato, multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae, ex his regionibus nominatim evocatis, in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit. Cuius adventu cognito Sotiates magnis copiis coactis, equitatuque, quo plurimum valebant, in itinere agmen nostrum adorti primum equestre proelium commiserunt, deinde equitatu suo pulso atque insequentibus nostris subito pedestres copias, quas in convalle in insidiis conlocaverant, ostenderunt. Hi nostros disiectos adorti proelium renovarunt.

3:21. The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates, relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valor; [and] our men, on the other hand, desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without their general and without the other legions, under a very young commander; at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the [principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a sally, at another forming mines, to our rampart and vineae (at which the Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places among them there are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could be gained by these operations through the perseverance of our men, they send ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up their arms, comply.

Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem quid sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent perspicere cuperent; tandem confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt. Quorum magno numero interfecto Crassus ex itinere oppidum Sotiatium oppugnare coepit. Quibus fortiter resistentibus vineas turresque egit. Illi alias eruptione temptata, alias cuniculis ad aggerem vineasque actis (cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt), ubi diligentia nostrorum nihil his rebus profici posse intellexerunt, legatos ad Crassum mittunt seque in deditionem ut recipiat petunt.

3:22. And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devoted followers whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association are these, — that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted themselves: if any thing calamitous happen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them, or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been found any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavoring to make a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of the fortification, and a fierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into the town, yet he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the same terms of surrender [as the other inhabitants].

Qua re impetrata arma tradere iussi faciunt. Atque in eam rem

omnium nostrorum intentis animis alia ex parte oppidi Adiatunnus, qui summam imperii tenebat, cum DC devotis, quos illi soldurios appellant, quorum haec est condicio, ut omnibus in vita commodis una cum iis fruantur quorum se amicitiae dediderint, si quid his per vim accadat, aut eundem casum una ferant aut sibi mortem consciscant; neque adhuc hominum memoria repertus est quisquam qui, eo interfecto cuius se amicitiae devovisset, mortem recusaret — cum his Adiatunnus eruptionem facere conatus clamore ab ea parte munitionis sublato cum ad arma milites concurrissent vehementerque ibi pugnatum esset, repulsus in oppidum tamen uti eadem deditionis condicione uteretur a Crasso impetravit.

3:23. Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the barbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified by the nature of the place and by art, had been taken by us in a few days after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on whose arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole period [of his war in Spain] and were supposed to have very great skill in military matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice of the Roman people, begin to select [advantageous] places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on account of their small number could not safely be separated; that the enemy both made excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard for their camp; that on that account,

corn and provision could not very conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.

Armis obsidibusque acceptis, Crassus in fines Vocationum et Tarusatum profectus est. Tum vero barbari commoti, quod oppidum et natura loci et manu munitum paucis diebus quibus eo ventum erat expugnatum cognoverant, legatos quoque versum dimittere, coniurare, obsides inter se dare, copias parare coeperunt. Mittuntur etiam ad eas civitates legati quae sunt citerioris Hispaniae finitimae Aquitaniae: inde auxilia ducesque arcessuntur. Quorum adventu magna cum auctoritate et magna [cum] hominum multitudine bellum gerere conantur. Duces vero ii deliguntur qui una cum Q. Sertorio omnes annos fuerant summamque scientiam rei militaris habere existimabantur. Hi consuetudine populi Romani loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instituunt. Quod ubi Crassus animadvertit, suas copias propter exiguitatem non facile diduci, hostem et vagari et vias obsidere et castris satis praesidii relinquere, ob eam causam minus commode frumentum commeatumque sibi supportari, in dies hostium numerum augeri, non cunctandum existimavit quin pugna decertaret. Hac re ad consilium delata, ubi omnes idem sentire intellexit, posterum diem pugnae constituit.

3:24. Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and marshaled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the center, and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They, although on account of their great number and their ancient

renown in war, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safely fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any wound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. This measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and by the reputation [i.e. for cowardice arising thence] had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks of all were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made in going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of the enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.)

Prima luce productis omnibus copiis duplici acie instituta, auxiliis in mediam aciem coniectis, quid hostes consilii caperent expectabat. Illi, etsi propter multitudinem et veterem belli gloriam paucitatemque nostrorum se tuto dimicatuuros existimabant, tamen tutius esse arbitrabantur obsessis viis commeatu intercluso sine vulnere victoria potiri, et si propter inopiam rei frumentariae Romani se recipere coepissent, impeditos in agmine et sub sarcinis infirmiore animo adoriri cogitabant. Hoc consilio probato ab ducibus, productis Romanorum copiis, sese castris tenebant. Hac re perspecta Crassus, cum sua cunctatione atque opinione timoris hostes nostros milites alacriores ad pugnandum effecissent atque omnium voces audirentur expectari diutius non oportere quin ad castra iretur, cohortatus suos omnibus cupientibus ad hostium castra contendit.

3:25. There, while some were filling up the ditch, and others, by throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from the rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not much rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the soldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance and character of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were fighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from their higher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone round the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had an easy approach.

Ibi cum alii fossas complerent, alii multis telis coniectis defensores vallo munitionibusque depellerent, auxiliaresque, quibus ad pugnam non multum Crassus confidebat, lapidibus telisque subministrandis et ad aggerem caespitibus comportandis speciem atque opinionem pugnantium praeberent, cum item ab hostibus constanter ac non timide pugnaretur telaque ex loco superiore missa non frustra acciderent, equites circumitis hostium castris Crasso renuntiaverunt non eadem esse diligentia ab decumana porta castra munita facilemque aditum habere.

3:26. Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to animate their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what he wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having brought out the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a some what longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy, when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly arrived at those fortifications which we have

spoken of, and, having demolished these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen by them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a shout being heard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited, (which usually occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight more vigorously. The enemy surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs being despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over the ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued over the very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of the number of 50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp.

Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus, ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri vellet ostendit. Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus quae praesidio castris relictæ intritæ ab labore erant, et longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad pugnam intentis celeriter ad eas quas diximus munitiones pervenerunt atque his prorutis prius in hostium castris constiterunt quam plane ab his videri aut quid rei gereretur cognosci posset. Tum vero clamore ab ea parte audito nostri redintegratis viribus, quod plerumque in spe victoriae accidere consuevit, acrius impugnare coeperunt. Hostes undique circumventi desperatis omnibus rebus se per munitiones deicere et fuga salutem petere contenderunt. Quos equitatus apertissimis campis consecutus ex milium L numero, quæ ex Aquitania Cantabrisque convenisse constabat, vix quarta parte relicta, multa nocte se in castra recepit.

3:27. Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in

which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was at hand, neglected to do this.

Hac audita pugna maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso deditit obsidesque ultro misit; quo in numero fuerunt Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, Cocosates: paucae ultimae nationes anni tempore confisae, quod hiems suberat, id facere neglexerunt.

3:28. About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly past, yet, since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make a treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. When Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begun to fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the mean time seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuing them too far through those intricate places.

Eodem fere tempore Caesar, etsi prope exacta iam aestas erat, tamen,

quod omni Gallia pacata Morini Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent, arbitratus id bellum celeriter confici posse eo exercitum duxit; qui longe alia ratione ac reliqui Galli bellum gerere coeperunt. Nam quod intellegebant maximas nationes, quae proelio contendissent, pulsas superatasque esse, continentesque silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque omnia contulerunt. Ad quarum initium silvarum cum Caesar pervenisset castraque munire instituisset neque hostis interim visus esset, dispersis in opere nostris subito ex omnibus partibus silvae evolaverunt et in nostros impetum fecerunt. Nostri celeriter arma ceperunt eosque in silvas repulerunt et compluribus interfectis longius impeditioribus locis secuti paucos ex suis deperdiderunt.

3:29. During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage train were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all their country, [and] having burned their villages and houses, Caesar led back his army and stationed them in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.

Reliquis deinceps diebus Caesar silvas caedere instituit, et ne quis

inermibus imprudentibusque militibus ab latere impetus fieri posset, omnem eam materiam quae erat caesa conversam ad hostem conlocabat et pro vallo ad utrumque latus extruebat. Incredibili celeritate magno spatio paucis diebus confecto, cum iam pecus atque extrema impedimenta a nostris tenerentur, ipsi densiores silvas peterent, eius modi sunt tempestates consecutae uti opus necessario intermitteretur et continuatione imbrium diutius sub pellibus milites contineri non possent. Itaque vastatis omnibus eorum agris, vicis aedificiisque incensis, Caesar exercitum reduxit et in Aulercis Lexoviisque, reliquis item civitatibus quae proxime bellum fecerant, in hibernis conlocavit.

BOOK IV (55 BC)

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4:1. The following winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls), those Germans [called] the Usipetes, and likewise the Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Rhine, not far from the place at which that river discharges itself into the sea. The motive for crossing [that river] was, that having been for several years harassed by the Suevi, they were constantly engaged in war, and hindered from the pursuits of agriculture. The nation of the Suevi is by far the largest and the most warlike nation of all the Germans. They are said to possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they yearly send from their territories for the purpose of war a thousand armed men: the others who remain at home, maintain [both] themselves and those-engaged in the expedition. The latter again, in their turn, are in arms the year after: the former remain at home. Thus neither husbandry, nor the art and practice of war are neglected. But among them there exists no private and separate land; nor are they permitted to remain more than one year in one place for the purpose of residence. They do not live much on corn, but subsist for the most part on milk and flesh, and are much [engaged] in hunting; which circumstance must, by the nature of their food, and by their daily exercise and the freedom of their life (for having from boyhood been accustomed to no employment, or discipline, they do nothing at all contrary to their inclination), both promote their strength and render them men of vast stature of body. And to such a habit have they brought themselves, that even in the coldest parts they wear no clothing whatever except skins, by reason of the scantiness of which, a great portion of their body is bare, and besides

they bathe in open rivers.

Ea quae secuta est hieme, qui fuit annus Cn. Pompeio, M. Crasso consulibus, Usipetes Germani et item Tencteri magna [cum] multitudine hominum flumen Rhenum transierunt, non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit. Causa transeundi fuit quod ab Suebis complures annos exagitati bello premebantur et agri cultura prohibebantur. Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium. Hi centum pagos habere dicuntur, ex quibus quotannis singula milia armatorum bellandi causa ex finibus educunt. Reliqui, qui domi manserunt, se atque illos alunt; hi rursus in vicem anno post in armis sunt, illi domi remanent. Sic neque agri cultura nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur. Sed privati ac separati agri apud eos nihil est, neque longius anno remanere uno in loco colendi causa licet. Neque multum frumento, sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt multum sunt in venationibus; quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitatione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina adsueta nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciunt, et vires alit et immani corporum magnitudine homines efficit. Atque in eam se consuetudinem adduxerunt ut locis frigidissimis neque vestitus praeter pelles habeant quicquam, quarum propter exiguitatem magna est corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

4:2. Merchants have access to them rather than that they may have persons to whom they may sell those things which they have taken in war, than because they need any commodity to be imported to them. Moreover, even as to laboring cattle, in which the Gauls take the greatest pleasure, and which they procure at a great price, the Germans do not employ such as are imported, but those poor and ill-shaped animals, which belong to their country; these, however, they

render capable of the greatest labor by daily exercise. In cavalry actions they frequently leap from their horses and fight on foot; and train their horses to stand still in the very spot on which they leave them, to which they retreat with great activity when there is occasion; nor, according to their practice, is any thing regarded as more unseemly, or more unmanly, than to use housings. Accordingly, they have the courage, though they be themselves but few, to advance against any number whatever of horse mounted with housings. They on no account permit wine to be imported to them, because they consider that men degenerate in their powers of enduring fatigue, and are rendered effeminate by that commodity.

Mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus vendant habeant, quam quo ullam rem ad se importari desiderent. Quin etiam iumentis, quibus maxime Galli delectantur quaeque impenso parant pretio, Germani importatis non utuntur, sed quae sunt apud eos nata, parva atque deformia, haec cotidiana exercitatione summi ut sint laboris efficiunt. Equestribus proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equos eodem remanere vestigio adsuefecerunt, ad quos se celeriter, cum usus est, recipiunt: neque eorum moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti. Itaque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire audent. Vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur.

4:3. They esteem it their greatest praise as a nation, that the lands about their territories lie unoccupied to a very great extent, inasmuch as [they think] that by this circumstance is indicated, that a great number of nations can not withstand their power; and thus on one

side of the Suevi the lands are said to lie desolate for about six hundred miles. On the other side they border on the Ubii, whose state was large and flourishing, considering the condition of the Germans, and who are somewhat more refined than those of the same race and the rest [of the Germans], and that because they border on the Rhine, and are much resorted to by merchants, and are accustomed to the manners of the Gauls, by reason of their proximity to them. Though the Suevi, after making the attempt frequently and in several wars, could not expel this nation from their territories, on account of the extent and population of their state, yet they made them tributaries, and rendered them less distinguished and powerful [than they had ever been].

Publice maximam putant esse laudem quam latissime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari magnum numerum civitatum suam vim sustinere non posse. Itaque una ex parte a Suebis circiter milia passuum C agri vacare dicuntur. Ad alteram partem succedunt Ubii, quorum fuit civitas ampla atque florens, ut est captus Germanorum; ii paulo, quamquam sunt eiusdem generis, sunt ceteris humaniores, propterea quod Rhenum attingunt multum ad eos mercatores ventitant et ipsi propter propinquitatem [quod] Gallicis sunt moribus adsuefacti. Hos cum Suebi multis saepe bellis experti propter amplitudinem gravitatem civitatis finibus expellere non potuissent, tamen vectigales sibi fecerunt ac multo humiliores infirmiores redegerunt.

4:4. In the same condition were the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri (whom we have mentioned above), who, for many years, resisted the power of the Suevi, but being at last driven from their possessions, and having wandered through many parts of Germany, came to the

Rhine, to districts which the Menapii inhabited, and where they had lands, houses, and villages on either side of the river. The latter people, alarmed by the arrival of so great a multitude, removed from those houses which they had on the other side of the river, and having placed guards on this side the Rhine, proceeded to hinder the Germans from crossing. They, finding themselves, after they had tried all means, unable either to force a passage on account of their deficiency in shipping, or cross by stealth on account of the guards of the Menapii, pretended to return to their own settlements and districts; and, after having proceeded three days' march, returned; and their cavalry having performed the whole of this journey in one night, cut off the Menapii, who were ignorant of, and did not expect [their approach, and] who, having moreover been informed of the departure of the Germans by their scouts, had, without apprehension, returned to their villages beyond the Rhine. Having slain these, and seized their ships, they crossed the river before that part of the Menapii, who were at peace in their settlements over the Rhine, were apprized of [their intention]; and seizing all their houses, maintained themselves upon their provisions during the rest of the winter.

In eadem causa fuerunt Usipetes et Tencteri, quos supra diximus; qui complures annos Sueborum vim sustinuerunt, ad extremum tamen agris expulsi et multis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt, quas regiones Menapii incolebant. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant; sed tantae multitudinis adventu perterriti ex iis aedificiis quae trans flumen habuerant demigraverant, et cis Rhenum dispositis praesidiis Germanos transire prohibebant. Illi omnia experti, cum neque vi contendere propter inopiam navium neque clam transire propter custodias Menapiorum possent, reverti se in suas sedes regionesque

simulaverunt et tridui viam progressi rursus reverterunt atque omni hoc itinere una nocte equitatu confecto inscios inopinantes Menapios oppresserunt, qui de Germanorum discessu per exploratores certiores facti sine metu trans Rhenum in suos vicos remigraverant. His interfectis navibus eorum occupatis, prius quam ea pars Menapiorum quae citra Rhenum erat certior fieret, flumen transierunt atque omnibus eorum aedificiis occupatis reliquam partem hiemis se eorum copiis aluerunt.

4:5. Caesar, when informed of these matters, fearing the fickle disposition of the Gauls, who are easily prompted to take up resolutions, and much addicted to change, considered that nothing was to be intrusted to them; for it is the custom of that people to compel travelers to stop, even against their inclination, and inquire what they may have heard, or may know, respecting any matter; and in towns the common people throng around merchants and force them to state from what countries they come, and what affairs they know of there. They often engage in resolutions concerning the most important matters, induced by these reports and stories alone; of which they must necessarily instantly repent, since they yield to mere unauthorized reports; and since most people give to their questions answers framed agreeably to their wishes.

His de rebus Caesar certior factus et infirmitatem Gallorum veritus, quod sunt in consiliis capiendis mobiles et novis plerumque rebus student, nihil his committendum existimavit. Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et viatores etiam invitos consistere cogant et quid quisque eorum de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit quaerant et mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumstet quibus ex regionibus veniant quas ibi res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat. His rebus atque

auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio paenitere necesse est, cum incertis rumoribus serviant et pleri ad voluntatem eorum ficta respondeant.

4:6. Caesar, being aware of their custom, in order that he might not encounter a more formidable war, sets forward to the army earlier in the year than he was accustomed to do. When he had arrived there, he discovered that those things, which he had suspected would occur, had taken place; that embassies had been sent to the Germans by some of the states, and that they had been entreated to leave the Rhine, and had been promised that all things which they desired should be provided by the Gauls. Allured by this hope, the Germans were then making excursions to greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri. After summoning the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretend ignorance of the things which he had discovered; and having conciliated and confirmed their minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised, resolved to make war against the Germans.

Qua consuetudine cognita Caesar, ne graviori bello, occurreret, maturius quam consuerat ad exercitum proficiscitur. Eo cum venisset, ea quas fore suspicatus erat facta cognovit: missas legationes ab non nullis civitatibus ad Germanos invitatos eos uti ab Rheno discederent: omnia quae[que] postulassent ab se fore parata. Qua spe adducti Germani latius iam vagabantur et in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant. Principibus Gallice evocatis Caesar ea quae cognoverat dissimulanda sibi existimavit, eorumque animis permulsis et confirmatis equitatu imperato bellum cum Germanis gerere constituit.

4:7. Having provided corn and selected his cavalry, he began to direct his march toward those parts in which he heard the Germans were. When he was distant from them only a few days' march, ambassadors came to him from their state, whose speech was as follows: "That the Germans neither make war upon the Roman people first, nor do they decline, if they are provoked, to engage with them in arms; for that this was the custom of the Germans handed down to them from their forefathers, -to resist whatsoever people make war upon them and not to avert it by entreaty; this, however, they confessed, — that they had come hither reluctantly, having been expelled from their country. If the Romans were disposed to accept their friendship, they might be serviceable allies to them; and let them either assign them lands, or permit them to retain those which they had acquired by their arms; that they are inferior to the Suevi alone, to whom not even the immortal gods can show themselves equal; that there was none at all besides on earth whom they could not conquer."

Re frumentaria comparata equitibusque delectis iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat. A quibus cum paucorum dierum iter abesset, legati ab iis venerunt, quorum haec fuit oratio: Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre neque tamen recusare, si lacessantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum consuetudo [haec] sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invitos, eiectos domo; si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur eos tenere quos armis possederint: sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales pares esse possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint.

4:8. To these remarks Caesar replied in such terms as he thought proper; but the conclusion of his speech was, "That he could make no alliance with them, if they continued in Gaul; that it was not probable that they who were not able to defend their own territories, should get possession of those of others, nor were there any lands lying waste in Gaul, which could be given away, especially to so great a number of men, without doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if they were desirous, settle in the territories of the Ubii; whose ambassadors were then with him, and were complaining of the aggressions of the Suevi, and requesting assistance from him; and that he would obtain this request from them."

Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent; neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint; sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considerare, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturus.

4:9. The ambassadors said that they would report these things to their country men; and, after having deliberated on the matter, would return to Caesar after the third day, they begged that he would not in the mean time advance his camp nearer to them. Caesar said that he could not grant them even that; for he had learned that they had sent a great part of their cavalry over the Meuse to the Ambivariti, some days before, for the purpose of plundering and procuring forage. He supposed that they were then waiting for these horse, and that the delay was caused on this account.

Legati haec se ad suos relatores dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt. Ne id quidem Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit. Cognoverat enim magnam partem equitatus ab iis aliquot diebus ante praedandi frumentandi causa ad Ambivaritos trans Mosam missam: hos expectari equites atque eius rei causa moram interponi arbitrabatur.

4:10. The Meuse rises from mount Le Vosge, which is in the territories of the Lingones; and, having received a branch of the Rhine, which is called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi, and not more than eighty miles from it it falls into the ocean. But the Rhine takes its source among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and is carried with a rapid current for a long distance through the territories of the Sarunates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, and when it approaches the ocean, divides into several branches; and, having formed many and extensive islands, a great part of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous nations (of whom there are some who are supposed to live on fish and the eggs of sea-fowl), flows into the ocean by several mouths.

[Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulam efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit. Rhenus autem oritur ex Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur et, ubi Oceano adpropinquavit, in plures diffluit partes multis ingentibus insulis effectis, quarum pars magna a feris barbaris nationibus incolitur, ex quibus sunt qui piscibus atque

ovis avium vivere existimantur, multis capitibus in Oceanum influit.]

4:11. When Caesar was not more than twelve miles distant from the enemy, the ambassadors return to him, as had been arranged; who meeting him on the march, earnestly entreated him not to advance any further. When they could not obtain this, they begged him to send on a dispatch to those who had marched in advance of the main army, and forbid them to engage; and grant them permission to send ambassadors to the Ubii, and if the princes and senate of the latter would give them security by oath, they assured Caesar that they would accept such conditions as might be proposed by him; and requested that he would give them the space of three days for negotiating these affairs. Caesar thought that these things tended to the self- same point [as their other proposal]; [namely] that, in consequence of a delay of three days intervening, their horse, which were at a distance, might return; however, he said, that he would not that day advance further than four miles for the purpose of procuring water; he ordered that they should assemble at that place in as large a number as possible, the following day, that he might inquire into their demands. In the mean time he sends messengers to the officers who had marched in advance with all the cavalry, to order them not to provoke the enemy to an engagement, and if they themselves were assailed, to sustain the attack until he came up with the army.

Caesar cum ab hoste non amplius passuum XII milibus abesset, ut erat constitutum, ad eum legati revertuntur; qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progredieretur orabant. Cum id non impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos [equites] qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos pugna prohiberet, sibi ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi; quorum si principes ac senatus sibi iure

iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret. Haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur ut tridui mora interposita equites eorum qui abessent reverterentur; tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit: huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret. Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacesserent, et si ipsi lacesserentur, sustinerent quoad ipse cum exercitu propius accessisset.

4:12. But the enemy, as soon as they saw our horse, the number of which was 5000, whereas they themselves had not more than 800 horse, because those which had gone over the Meuse for the purpose of foraging had not returned, while our men had no apprehensions, because their ambassadors had gone away from Caesar a little before, and that day had been requested by them as a period of truce, made an onset on our men, and soon threw them into disorder. When our men, in their turn, made a stand, they, according to their practice, leaped from their horses to their feet, and stabbing our horses in the belly and overthrowing a great many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove them forward so much alarmed that they did not desist from their retreat till they had come in sight of our army. In that encounter seventy-four of our horse were slain; among them, Piso, an Aquitanian, a most valiant man, and descended from a very illustrious family; whose grandfather had held the sovereignty of his state, and had been styled friend by our senate. He, while he was endeavoring to render assistance to his brother who was surrounded by the enemy, and whom he rescued from danger, was himself thrown from his horse, which was wounded under him, but still

opposed [his antagonists] with the greatest intrepidity, as long as he was able to maintain the conflict. When at length he fell, surrounded on all sides and after receiving many wounds, and his brother, who had then retired from the fight, observed it from a distance, he spurred on his horse, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed.

At hostes, ubi primum nostros equites conspexerunt, quorum erat V milium numerus, cum ipsi non amplius DCCC equites haberent, quod ii qui frumentandi causa erant trans Mosam profecti nondum redierant, nihil timentibus nostris, quod legati eorum paulo ante a Caesare discesserant atque is dies indutiis erat ab his petitus, impetu facto celeriter nostros perturbaverunt; rursus his resistentibus consuetudine sua ad pedes desiluerunt subfossis equis compluribus nostris deiectis reliquos in fugam coniecerunt atque ita perterritos egerunt ut non prius fuga desisterent quam in conspectum agminis nostri venissent. In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur IIII et LXX, in his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat amicus a senatu nostro appellatus. Hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus, quoad potuit, fortissime restitit; cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis cecidisset atque id frater, qui iam proelio excesserat, procul animadvertisset, incitato equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfectus est.

4:13. After this engagement, Caesar considered that neither ought ambassadors to be received to audience, nor conditions be accepted by him from those who, after having sued for peace by way of stratagem and treachery, had made war without provocation. And to wait until the enemy's forces were augmented and their cavalry had

returned, he concluded, would be the greatest madness; and knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he felt how much influence the enemy had already acquired among them by this one skirmish. He [therefore] deemed that no time for concerting measures ought to be afforded them. After having resolved on those things and communicated his plans to his lieutenants and quaestor in order that he might not suffer any opportunity for engaging to escape him, a very seasonable event occurred, namely, that on the morning of the next day, a large body of Germans, consisting of their princes and old men, came to the camp to him to practice the same treachery and dissimulation; but, as they asserted, for the purpose of acquitting themselves for having engaged in a skirmish the day before, contrary to what had been agreed and to what indeed, they themselves had requested; and also if they could by any means obtain a truce by deceiving him. Caesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into his power, ordered them to be detained. He then drew all his forces out of the camp, and commanded the cavalry, because he thought they were intimidated by the late skirmish, to follow in the rear.

Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent; expectare vero dum hostium copiae augerentur equitatus reverteretur summae dementiae esse iudicabat, et cognita Gallorum infirmitate quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat. His constitutis rebus et consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato, ne quem diem pugnae praetermitteret, oportunissima res accidit, quod postridie eius diei mane eadem et perfidia et simulatione usi Germani frequentes, omnibus principibus maioribusque natu adhibitis, ad eum

in castra venerunt, simul, ut dicebatur, sui purgandi causa, quod contra atque esset dictum et ipsi petissent, proelium pridie commisissent, simul ut, si quid possent, de indutiis fallendo impetrarent. Quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus illos retineri iussit; ipse omnes copias castris D eduxit equitatumque, quod recenti proelio perterritum esse existimabat, agmen subsequi iussit.

4:14. Having marshalled his army in three lines, and in a short time performed a march of eight miles, he arrived at the camp of the enemy before the Germans could perceive what was going on; who being suddenly alarmed by all the circumstances, both by the speediness of our arrival and the absence of their own officers, as time was afforded neither for concerting measures nor for seizing their arms, are perplexed as to whether it would be better to lead out their forces against the enemy, or to defend their camp, or seek their safety by flight. Their consternation being made apparent by their noise and tumult, our soldiers, excited by the treachery of the preceding day, rushed into the camp: such of them as could readily get their arms, for a short time withstood our men, and gave battle among their carts and baggage wagons; but the rest of the people, [consisting] of boys and women (for they had left their country and crossed the Rhine with all their families) began to fly in all directions; in pursuit of whom Caesar sent the cavalry.

Acie triplici instituta et celeriter VIII milium itinere confecto, prius ad hostium castra pervenit quam quid ageretur Germani sentire possent. Qui omnibus rebus subito perterriti et celeritate adventus nostri et discessu suorum, neque consilii habendi neque arma capiendi spatio dato perturbantur, copiasne adversus hostem ducere an castra defendere an fuga salutem petere praestaret. Quorum timor

cum fremitu et concursu significaretur, milites nostri pristini diei perfidia incitati in castra inruperunt. Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter carros impedimentaue proelium commiserunt; at reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenum transierant) passim fugere coepit, ad quos consecandos Caesar equitatum misit.

4:15. The Germans when, upon hearing a noise behind them, [they looked and] saw that their families were being slain, throwing away their arms and abandoning their standards, fled out of the camp, and when they had arrived at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, the survivors despairing of further escape, as a great number of their countrymen had been killed, threw themselves into the river and there perished, overcome by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the stream. Our soldiers, after the alarm of so great a war, for the number of the enemy amounted to 430,000, returned to their camp, all safe to a man, very few being even wounded. Caesar granted those whom he had detained in the camp liberty of departing. They however, dreading revenge and torture from the Gauls, whose lands they had harassed, said that they desired to remain with him. Caesar granted them permission.

Germani post tergum clamore audito, cum suos interfiei viderent, armis abiectis signis militaribus relictis se ex castris eiecerunt, et cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, reliqua fuga desperata, magno numero interfecto, reliqui se in flumen praecipitaverunt atque ibi timore, lassitudine, vi fluminis oppressi perierunt. Nostri ad unum omnes incolumes, perpaucis vulneratis, ex tanti belli timore, cum hostium numerus capitum CCCCXXX milium

fuisset, se in castra receperunt. Caesar iis quos in castris retinuerat discedendi potestatem fecit. Illi supplicia cruciatusque Gallorum veriti, quorum agros vexaverant, remanere se apud eum velle dixerunt. His Caesar libertatem concessit.

4:16. The German war being finished, Caesar thought it expedient for him to cross the Rhine, for many reasons; of which this was the most weighty, that, since he saw the Germans were so easily urged to go into Gaul, he desired they should have their fears for their own territories, when they discovered that the army of the Roman people both could and dared pass the Rhine. There was added also, that portion of the cavalry of the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri, which I have above related to have crossed the Meuse for the purpose of plundering and procuring forage, and was not present at the engagement, had betaken themselves, after the retreat of their countrymen, across the Rhine into the territories of the Sigambri, and united themselves to them. When Caesar sent ambassadors to them, to demand that they should give up to him those who had made war against him and against Gaul, they replied, "That the Rhine bounded the empire of the Roman people; if he did not think it just for the Germans to pass over into Gaul against his consent, why did he claim that any thing beyond the Rhine should be subject to his dominion or power?" The Ubii, also, who alone, out of all the nations lying beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to Caesar, and formed an alliance and given hostages, earnestly entreated "that he would bring them assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by the Suevi; or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of the commonwealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; that that would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope for the future; that so great was the name

and the reputation of his army, even among the most remote nations of the Germans, arising from the defeat of Ariovistus and this last battle which was fought, that they might be safe under the fame and friendship of the Roman people.” They promised a large number of ships for transporting the army.

Germanico bello confecto multis de causis Caesar statuit sibi Rhenum esse transeundum; quarum illa fuit iustissima quod, cum videret Germanos tam facile impelli ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire. Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam supra commemoravi praedandi frumentandi causa Mosam transisse neque proelio interfuisse, post fugam suorum se trans Rhenum in fines Sugambrorum receperat seque cum his coniunxerat. Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliae bellum intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt: populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet? Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur; vel, si id facere occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id sibi ad auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum. Tantum esse nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint. Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur.

4:17. Caesar, for those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved to cross the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither deemed to be sufficiently safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people. Therefore, although the greatest difficulty in forming a bridge was presented to him, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river, he nevertheless considered that it ought to be attempted by him, or that his army ought not otherwise to be led over. He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined together at the distance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little at the lower end, and proportioned in length, to the depth of the river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the river, and fixed them at the bottom, and then driven them in with rammers, not quite perpendicularly, like a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so as to incline in the direction of the current of the river; he also placed two [other piles] opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down, fastened together in the same manner, but directed against the force and current of the river. Both these, moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams two feet thick (the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at their extremities between two braces on each side, and in consequence of these being in different directions and fastened on sides the one opposite to the other, so great was the strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials, that in proportion as the greater body of water dashed against the bridge, so much the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams were bound together by timber laid over them, in the direction of the length of the bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and hurdles; and in addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at the lower side of the bridge, and these, serving as buttresses, and being connected with

every portion of the work, sustained the force of the stream: and there were others also above the bridge, at a moderate distance; that if trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river by the barbarians for the purpose of destroying the work, the violence of such things might be diminished by these defenses, and might not injure the bridge.

Caesar his de causis quas commemoravi Rhenum transire decrevat; sed navibus transire neque satis tutum esse arbitrabatur neque suae neque populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat. Itaque, etsi summa difficultas faciendi pontis proponebatur propter latitudinem, rapiditatem altitudinemque fluminis, tamen id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat. Rationem pontis hanc instituit. Tigna bina sesquipedalia. paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat. Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo directe ad perpendicularum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent, iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetu fluminis conversa statuebat. Haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur; quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut, quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur. Haec directa materia iniecta contexebantur ac longuriis cratibusque consternebantur; ac nihilo setius sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent, et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut, si arborum trunci sive

naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent.

4:18. Within ten days after the timber began to be collected, the whole work was completed, and the whole army led over. Caesar, leaving a strong guard at each end of the bridge, hastens into the territories of the Sigambri. In the mean time, ambassadors from several nations come to him, whom, on their suing for peace and alliance, he answers in a courteous manner, and orders hostages to be brought to him. But the Sigambri, at the very time the bridge was begun to be built, made preparations for a flight (by the advice of such of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes as they had among them), and quitted their territories, and conveyed away all their possessions, and concealed themselves in deserts and woods.

Diebus X, quibus materia coepta erat comportari, omni opere effecto exercitus traducitur. Caesar ad utramque partem pontis firmo praesidio relicto in fines Sugambrorum contendit. Interim a compluribus civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt; quibus pacem atque amicitiam petentibus liberaliter respondet obsidesque ad se adduci iubet. At Sugambri, ex eo tempore quo pons institui coeptus est fuga comparata, hortantibus iis quos ex Tencteris atque Usipetibus apud se habebant, finibus suis excesserant suaque omnia exportaverant seque in solitudinem ac silvas abdiderant.

4:19. Caesar, having remained in their territories a few days, and burned all their villages and houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded into the territories of the Ubii; and having promised them his assistance, if they were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned from them these particulars: that the Suevi, after they had by means of their scouts found that the bridge was being built, had called a

council, according to their custom, and sent orders to all parts of their state to remove from the towns and convey their children, wives, and all their possessions into the woods, and that all who could bear arms should assemble in one place; that the place thus chosen was nearly the centre of those regions which the Suevi possessed; that in this spot they had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle there. When Caesar discovered this, having already accomplished all these things on account of which he had resolved to lead his army over, namely, to strike fear into the Germans, take vengeance on the Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spent altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had advanced far enough to serve both honor and interest, he returned into Gaul, and cut down the bridge.

Caesar paucos dies in eorum finibus moratus, omnibus vicis aedificiisque incensis frumentisque succisis, se in fines Ubiorum recepit atque his auxilium suum pollicitus, si a Suebis premerentur, haec ab iis cognovit: Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaeque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes qui arma ferre possent unum in locum convenirent. Hunc esse delectum medium fere regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi decertare constituisse. Quod ubi Caesar comperit, omnibus iis rebus confectis, quarum rerum causa exercitum traducere constituerat, ut Germanis metum iniceret, ut Sugambros ulcisceretur, ut Ubios obsidione liberaret, diebus omnino XVIII trans Rhenum consumptis, satis et ad laudem et ad utilitatem profectum arbitratus se in Galliam recepit pontemque rescidit.

4:20. During the short part of summer which remained, Caesar, although in these countries, as all Gaul lies toward the north, the winters are early, nevertheless resolved to proceed into Britain, because he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls succors had been furnished to our enemy from that country; and even if the time of year should be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it would be of great service to him if he only entered the island, and saw into the character of the people, and got knowledge of their localities, harbors, and landing- places, all which were for the most part unknown to the Gauls. For neither does any one except merchants generally go thither, nor even to them was any portion of it known, except the sea-coast and those parts which are opposite to Gaul. Therefore, after having called up to him the merchants from all parts, he could learn neither what was the size of the island, nor what or how numerous were the nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they followed, nor what customs they used, nor what harbors were convenient for a great number of large ships.

Exigua parte aestatis reliqua Caesar, etsi in his locis, quod omnis Gallia ad septentriones vergit, maturae sunt hiemes, tamen in Britanniam proficisci contendit, quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat, et si tempus anni ad bellum gerendum deficeret, tamen magno sibi usui fore arbitrabatur, si modo insulam adiisset, genus hominum perspexisset, loca, portus, aditus cognovisset; quae omnia fere Gallis erant incognita. Neque enim temere praeter mercatores illo adit quisquam, neque his ipsis quicquam praeter oram maritimam atque eas regiones quae sunt contra Galliam notum est. Itaque vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus, neque quanta esset insulae magnitudo neque quae aut quantae nationes incolerent, neque quem usum belli haberent aut

quibus institutis uterentur, neque qui essent ad maiorem navium multitudinem idonei portus reperire poterat.

4:21. He sends before him Caius Volusenus with a ship of war, to acquire a knowledge of these particulars before he in person should make a descent into the island, as he was convinced that this was a judicious measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly examine into all matters, and then return to him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds to the Morini with all his forces. He orders ships from all parts of the neighboring countries, and the fleet which the preceding summer he had built for the war with the Veneti, to assemble in this place. In the mean time, his purpose having been discovered, and reported to the Britons by merchants, ambassadors come to him from several states of the island, to promise that they will give hostages, and submit to the government of the Roman people. Having given them an audience, he after promising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country, and [dispatches] with them Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he had created king there, a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who he thought would be faithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those countries. He orders him to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to embrace the protection of the Roman people, and apprise them that he would shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed the localities as far as means could be afforded one who dared not leave his ship and trust himself to barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, and reports what he had there observed.

Ad haec cognoscenda, prius quam periculum faceret, idoneum esse arbitratus C. Volusenum cum navi longa praemittit. Huic mandat ut

exploratis omnibus rebus ad se quam primum revertatur. Ipse cum omnibus copiis in Morinos proficiscitur, quod inde erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus. Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire. Interim, consilio eius cognito et per mercatores perlato ad Britannos, a compluribus insulae civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt, qui polliceantur obsides dare atque imperio populi Romani obtemperare. Quibus auditis, liberaliter pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent, eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat, cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit. Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet. Volusenus perspectis regionibus omnibus quantum ei facultatis dari potuit, qui navi egredi ac se barbaris committere non auderet, V. die ad Caesarem revertitur quaeque ibi perspexisset renuntiat.

4:22. While Caesar remains in these parts for the purpose of procuring ships, ambassadors come to him from a great portion of the Morini, to plead their excuse respecting their conduct on the late occasion; alleging that it was as men uncivilized, and as those who were unacquainted with our custom, that they had made war upon the Roman people, and promising to perform what he should command. Caesar, thinking that this had happened fortunately enough for him, because he neither wished to leave an enemy behind him, nor had an opportunity for carrying on a war, by reason of the time of year, nor considered that employment in such trifling matters was to be preferred to his enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number of hostages; and when these were brought, he received them to his

protection. Having collected together, and provided about eighty transport ships, as many as he thought necessary for conveying over two legions, he assigned such [ships] of war as he had besides to the quaestor, his lieutenants, and officers of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships of burden which were prevented, eight miles from that place, by winds, from being able to reach the same port. These he distributed among the horse; the rest of the army, he delivered to Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to lead into the territories of the Menapii and those cantons of the Morini from which ambassadors had not come to him. He ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to hold possession of the harbor, with such a garrison as he thought sufficient.

Dum in his locis Caesar navium parandarum causa moratur, ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur. Hoc sibi Caesar satis oportune accidisse arbitratus, quod neque post tergum hostem relinquere volebat neque belli gerendi propter anni tempus facultatem habebat neque has tantularum rerum occupationes Britanniae anteponendas iudicabat, magnum iis numerum obsidum imperat. Quibus adductis eos in fidem recipit. Navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis contractisque, quot satis esse ad duas transportandas legiones existimabat, quod praeterea navium longarum habebat quaestori, legatis praefectisque distribuit. Huc accedebant XVIII onerariae naves, quae ex eo loco a milibus passuum VIII vento tenebantur quo minus in eundem portum venire possent: has equitibus tribuit. Reliquum exercitum Q. Titurio Sabino et L. Aurunculeio Cottae legatis in Menapios atque in eos pagos

Morinorum a quibus ad eum legati non venerant ducendum dedit. P. Sulpicium Rufum legatum cum eo praesidio quod satis esse arbitrabatur portum tenere iussit.

4:23. These matters being arranged, finding the weather favorable for his voyage, he set sail about the third watch, and ordered the horse to march forward to the further port, and there embark and follow him. As this was performed rather tardily by them, he himself reached Britain with the first squadron of ships, about the fourth hour of the day, and there saw the forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all the hills. The nature of the place was this: the sea was confined by mountains so close to it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore. Considering this by no means a fit place for disembarking, he remained at anchor till the ninth hour, for the other ships to arrive there. Having in the mean time assembled the lieutenants and military tribunes, he told them both what he had learned from Volusenus, and what he wished to be done; and enjoined them (as the principle of military matters, and especially as maritime affairs, which have a precipitate and uncertain action, required) that all things should be performed by them at a nod and at the instant. Having dismissed them, meeting both with wind and tide favorable at the same time, the signal being given and the anchor weighed, he advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationed his fleet over against an open and level shore.

His constitutis rebus, nactus idoneam ad navigandum tempestatem III. fere vigilia solvit equitesque in ulteriorem portum progredi et naves conscendere et se sequi iussit. A quibus cum paulo tardius esset administratum, ipse hora diei circiter IIII. cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit atque ibi in omnibus collibus eitas hostium copias

armatas conspexit. Cuius loci haec erat natura atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in litus telum adigi posset. Hunc ad egrediendum nequaquam idoneum locum arbitratus, dum reliquae naves eo convenirent ad horam nonam in ancoris expectavit. Interim legatis tribunisque militum convocatis et quae ex Voluseno cognovisset et quae fieri vellet ostendit monuitque, ut rei militaris ratio, maximeque ut maritimae res postularent, ut, cum celerem atque instabilem motum haberent, ad nutum et ad tempus D omnes res ab iis administrarentur. His dimissis, et VII ab eo loco progressus aperto ac plano litore naves constituit.

4:24. But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom it is their practice to make great use in their battles, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavored to prevent our men landing. In this was the greatest difficulty, for the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on account of their great size, could be stationed only in deep water; and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, with their hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy weight of armor, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amid the waves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, or advancing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs in places thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weapons and spur on their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not all exert the same vigor and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground.

At barbari, consilio Romanorum cognito praemisso equitatu et

essedariis, quo plerumque genere in proeliis uti consuerunt, reliquis copiis subsecuti nostros navibus egredi prohibebant. Erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem nisi in alto constitui non poterant, militibus autem, ignotis locis, impeditis manibus, magno et gravi onere armorum oppressis simul et de navibus desiliendum et in auctibus consistendum et cum hostibus erat pugnandum, cum illi aut ex arido aut paulum in aquam progressi omnibus membris expeditis, notissimis locis, audacter tela coicerent et equos insuefactos incitarent. Quibus rebus nostri perterriti atque huius omnino generis pugnae imperiti, non eadem alacritate ac studio quo in pedestribus uti proeliis consueverant utebantur.

4:25. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the appearance of which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and the motion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from the transport vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be stationed toward the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be beaten off and driven away, with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great service to our men; for the barbarians being startled by the form of our ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which was strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. And while our men were hesitating [whether they should advance to the shore], chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, he who carried the eagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the gods that the matter might turn out favorably to the legion, exclaimed, "Leap, fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." When he had said this with a loud voice, he leaped from the ship and proceeded to bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one another that so great

a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from the ship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followed and approached the enemy.

Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris inusitator et motus ad usum expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et remis incitari et ad latus apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, tormentis hostes propelli ac submoveri iussit; quae res magno usui nostris fuit. Nam et navium figura et remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt ac paulum modo pedem rettulerunt. Atque nostris militibus cunctantibus, maxime propter altitudinem maris, qui X legionis aquilam gerebat, obtestatus deos, ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, ‘desilite’, inquit, ‘milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.’ Hoc cum voce magna dixisset, se ex navi proiecit atque in hostes aquilam ferre coepit. Tum nostri cohortati inter se, ne tantum dedecus admitteretur, universi ex navi desiluerunt. Hos item ex proximis primi navibus cum conspexissent, subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.

4:26. The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men, however, as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from another assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown into great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by one, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; many surrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed flank. When

Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of the ships of war and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and sent them up to the succor of those whom he had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as they made good their footing on dry ground, and all their comrades had joined them, made an attack upon the enemy, and put them to flight, but could not pursue them very far, because the horse had not been able to maintain their course at sea and reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success.

Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. Nostri tamen, quod neque ordines servare neque firmiter insistere neque signa subsequi poterant atque alius alia ex navi quibuscumque signis occurrerat se adgregabat, magnopere perturbabantur; hostes vero, notis omnibus vadii, ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur, plures paucos circumsistebant, alii ab latere aperto in universos tela coiciebant. Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, scaphas longarum navium, item speculatoria navigia militibus compleri iussit, et quos laborantes conspexerat, his subsidia submittebat. Nostri, simul in arido constiterunt, suis omnibus consecutis, in hostes impetum fecerunt atque eos in fugam dederunt; neque longius prosequi potuerunt, quod equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non potuerant. Hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit.

4:27. The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, as soon as they recovered after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors to Caesar to negotiate about peace. They promised to give hostages and perform what he should command. Together with these ambassadors came Commius the Altrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been sent by Caesar into Britain. Him they had seized upon when leaving his

ship, although in the character of ambassador he bore the general's commission to them, and thrown into chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent him back, and in suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon the common people, and entreated that it might be pardoned on account of their indiscretion. Caesar, complaining, that after they had sued for peace, and had voluntarily sent ambassadors into the continent for that purpose, they had made war without a reason, said that he would pardon their indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a part of whom they gave immediately; the rest they said they would give in a few days, since they were sent for from remote places. In the mean time they ordered their people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembled from all quarter, and proceeded to surrender themselves and their states to Caesar.

Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt; obsides sese daturos quaeque imperasset facturos polliciti sunt. Una cum his legatis Commius Atrebas venit, quem supra demonstraveram a Caesare in Britanniam praemisum. Hunc illi e navi egressum, cum ad eos oratoris modo Caesaris mandata deferret, comprehenderant atque in vincula coniecerant; tum proelio facto remiserunt et in petenda pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt. Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit; quorum illi partem statim dederunt, partem ex longinquiore locis arcessitam paucis diebus sese daturos dixerunt. Interea suos in agros remigrare iusserunt, principesque undique convenire et se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt.

4:28. A peace being established by these proceedings four days after we had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to which reference has been made above, and which conveyed the cavalry, set sail from the upper port with a gentle gale, when, however, they were approaching Britain and were seen from the camp, so great a storm suddenly arose that none of them could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken back to the same port from which they had started;-others, to their great danger, were driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west; which, however, after having cast anchor, as they were getting filled with water, put out to sea through necessity in a stormy night, and made for the continent.

His rebus pace confirmata, post diem quartum quam est in Britanniam ventum naves XVIII, de quibus supra demonstratum est, quae equites sustulerant, ex superiore portu leni vento solverunt. Quae cum adpropinquarent Britanniae et ex castris viderentur, tanta tempestas subito coorta est ut nulla earum cursum tenere posset, sed aliae eodem unde erant profectae referrentur, aliae ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum, magno suo cum periculo deicerentur; quae tamen ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur, necessario adversa nocte in altum provectae continentem petierunt.

4:29. It happened that night to be full moon, which usually occasions very high tides in that ocean; and that circumstance was unknown to our men. Thus, at the same time, the tide began to fill the ships of war which Caesar had provided to convey over his army, and which he had drawn up on the strand; and the storm began to dash the ships of burden which were riding at anchor against each other; nor was any means afforded our men of either managing them or of rendering

any service. A great many ships having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having lost their cables, anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, a great confusion, as would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army; for there were no other ships in which they could be conveyed back, and all things which are of service in repairing vessels were wanting, and, corn for the winter had not been provided in those places, because it was understood by all that they would certainly winter in Gaul.

Eadem nocte accidit ut esset luna plena, qui dies a maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit, nostrisque id erat incognitum. Ita uno tempore et longas naves, [quibus Caesar exercitum transportandum curaverat,] quas Caesar in aridum subduxerat, aestus complebat, et onerarias, quae ad ancoras erant deligatae, tempestas adflictabat, neque ulla nostris facultas aut administrandi aut auxiliandi dabatur. Compluribus navibus fractis, reliquae cum essent funibus, ancoris reliquisque armamentis amissis ad navigandum inutiles, magna, id quod necesse erat accidere, totius exercitus perturbatio facta est. Neque enim naves erant aliae quibus reportari possent, et omnia deerant quae ad reficiendas naves erant usui, et, quod omnibus constabat hiemari in Gallia oportere, frumentum in his locis in hiemem provisum non erat.

4:30. On discovering these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come up after the battle was fought to perform those conditions which Caesar had imposed, held a conference, when they perceived that cavalry, and ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans, and discovered the small number of our soldiers from the small extent of the camp (which, too, was on this account more limited than ordinary, because Caesar had conveyed over his legions without

baggage), and thought that the best plan was to renew the war, and cut off our men from corn and provisions and protract the affair till winter; because they felt confident, that, if they were vanquished or cut off from a return, no one would afterward pass over into Britain for the purpose of making war. Therefore, again entering into a conspiracy, they began to depart from the camp by degrees and secretly bring up their people from the country parts.

Quibus rebus cognitis, principes Britanniae, qui post proelium ad Caesarem convenerant, inter se conlocuti, cum et equites et naves et frumentum Romanis deesse intellegerent et paucitatem militum ex castrorum exiguitate cognoscerent, quae hoc erant etiam angustior quod sine impedimentis Caesar legiones transportaverat, optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellione facta frumento commeatuque nostros prohibere et rem in hiemem producere, quod his superatis aut reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum confidebant. Itaque rursus coniuratione facta paulatim ex castris discedere et suos clam ex agris deducere coeperunt.

4:31. But Caesar, although he had not as yet discovered their measures, yet, both from what had occurred to his ships, and from the circumstance that they had neglected to give the promised hostages, suspected that the thing would come to pass which really did happen. He therefore provided remedies against all contingencies; for he daily conveyed corn from the country parts into the camp, used the timber and brass of such ships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the rest, and ordered whatever things besides were necessary for this object to be brought to him from the continent. And thus, since that business was executed by the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the loss of twelve

ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest.

At Caesar, etsi nondum eorum consilia cognoverat, tamen et ex eventu navium suarum et ex eo quod obsides dare intermiserant fore id quod accidit suspicabatur. Itaque ad omnes casus subsidia comparabat. Nam et frumentum ex agris cotidie in castra conferebat et, quae gravissime adflictae erant naves, earum materia atque aere ad reliquas reficiendas utebatur et quae ad eas res erant usui ex continenti comportari iubebat. Itaque, cum summo studio a militibus administraretur, XII navibus amissis, reliquis ut navigari satis commode posset effecit.

4:32. While these things are being transacted, one legion had been sent to forage, according to custom, and no suspicion of war had arisen as yet, and some of the people remained in the country parts, others went backward and forward to the camp, they who were on duty at the gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than was usual was seen in that direction in which the legion had marched. Caesar, suspecting that which was [really the case], — that some new enterprise was undertaken by the barbarians, ordered the two cohorts which were on duty, to march into that quarter with him, and two other cohorts to relieve them on duty; the rest to be armed and follow him immediately. When he had advanced some little way from the camp, he saw that his men were overpowered by the enemy and scarcely able to stand their ground, and that, the legion being crowded together, weapons were being cast on them from all sides. For as all the corn was reaped in every part with the exception of one, the enemy, suspecting that our men would repair to that, had concealed themselves in the woods during the night. Then attacking them suddenly, scattered as they were, and when they had laid aside

their arms, and were engaged in reaping, they killed a small number, threw the rest into confusion, and surrounded them with their cavalry and chariots.

Dum ea geruntur, legione ex consuetudine una frumentatum missa, quae appellabatur VII, neque ulla ad id tempus belli suspicione interposita, cum pars hominum in agris remaneret, pars etiam in castra ventitaret, ii qui pro portis castrorum in statione erant Caesari nuntiaverunt pulverem maiorem quam consuetudo ferret in ea parte videri quam in partem legio iter fecisset. Caesar id quod erat suspicatus aliquid novi a barbaris initum consilii, cohortes quae in statione erant secum in eam partem proficisci, ex reliquis duas in stationem succedere, reliquas armari et confestim sese subsequi iussit. Cum paulo longius a castris processisset, suos ab hostibus premi atque aegre sustinere et conferta legione ex omnibus partibus tela coici animadvertit. Nam quod omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento pars una erat reliqua, suspicati hostes huc nostros esse venturos noctu in silvis delituerant; tum dispersos depositis armis in metendo occupatos Subito adorti paucis interfectis reliquos incertis ordinibus perturbaverant, simul equitatu atque essedis circumdederant.

4:33. Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers in the mean time withdraw some little distance from the battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may

have a ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of horse, [together with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily practice and exercise attain to such expertness that they are accustomed, even on a declining and steep place, to check their horses at full speed, and manage and turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand on the yoke, and thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity to their chariots again.

Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae. Primo per omnes partes perequitant et tela coiciunt atque ipso terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque perturbant, et cum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverunt, ex essedis desiliunt et pedibus proeliantur. Aurigae interim paulatim ex proelio excedunt atque ita currus conlocant ut, si illi a multitudine hostium premantur, expeditum ad quos receptum habeant. Ita mobilitatem equitum, stabilitatem peditum in proeliis praestant, ac tantum usu cotidiano et exercitatione efficiunt uti in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos sustinere et brevi moderari ac flectere et per temonem percurrere et in iugo insistere et se inde in currus citissime recipere consuerint.

4:34. Under these circumstances, our men being dismayed by the novelty of this mode of battle, Caesar most seasonably brought assistance; for upon his arrival the enemy paused, and our men recovered from their fear; upon which thinking the time unfavorable for provoking the enemy and coming to an action, he kept himself in his own quarter, and, a short time having intervened, drew back the legions into the camp. While these things are going on, and all our men engaged, the rest of the Britons, who were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in for several successive days, which both confined our men to the camp and hindered the enemy from attacking

us. In the mean time the barbarians dispatched messengers to all parts, and reported to their people the small number of our soldiers, and how good an opportunity was given for obtaining spoil and for liberating themselves forever, if they should only drive the Romans from their camp. Having by these means speedily got together a large force of infantry and of cavalry they came up to the camp.

Quibus rebus perturbatis nostris [novitate pugnae] tempore oportunissimo Caesar auxilium tulit: namque eius adventu hostes constiterunt, nostri se ex timore receperunt. Quo facto, ad lacesendum hostem et committendum proelium alienum esse tempus arbitratus suo se loco continuit et brevi tempore intermisso in castra legiones reduxit. Dum haec geruntur, nostris omnibus occupatis qui erant in agris reliqui discesserunt. Secutae sunt continuos complures dies tempestates, quae et nostros in castris continerent et hostem a pugna prohiberent. Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt. His rebus celeriter magna multitudo peditatus equitatusque coacta ad castra venerunt.

4:35. Although Caesar anticipated that the same thing which had happened on former occasions would then occur—that, if the enemy were routed, they would escape from danger by their speed; still, having got about thirty horse, which Commius the Atrebatian, of whom mention has been made, had brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp. When the action commenced, the enemy were unable to sustain the attack of our men long, and turned their backs; our men pursued

them as far as their speed and strength permitted, and slew a great number of them; then, having destroyed and burned every thing far and wide, they retreated to their camp.

Caesar, etsi idem quod superioribus diebus acciderat fore videbat, ut, si essent hostes pulsi, celeritate periculum effugerent, tamen nactus equites circiter XXX, quos Commius Atrebas, de quo ante dictum est, secum transportaverat, legiones in acie pro castris constituit. Commisso proelio diutius nostrorum militum impetum hostes ferre non potuerunt ac terga verterunt. Quos tanto spatio secuti quantum cursu et viribus efficere potuerunt, complures ex iis occiderunt, deinde omnibus longe lateque aedificiis incensis se in castra receperunt.

4:36. The same day, ambassadors sent by the enemy came to Caesar to negotiate a peace. Caesar doubled the number of hostages which he had before demanded; and ordered that they should be brought over to the continent, because, since the time of the equinox was near, he did not consider that, with his ships out of repair, the voyage ought to be deferred till winter. Having met with favorable weather, he set sail a little after midnight, and all his fleet arrived safe at the continent, except two of the ships of burden which could not make the same port which the other ships did, and were carried a little lower down.

Eodem die legati ab hostibus missi ad Caesarem de pace venerunt. His Caesar numerum obsidum quem ante imperaverat duplicavit eosque in continentem adduci iussit, quod propinqua die aequinoctii infirmis navibus hiemi navigationem subiciendam non existimabat. Ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus paulo post mediam noctem naves solvit, quae omnes incolumes ad continentem pervenerunt; sed ex iis onerariae duae eosdem portus quos reliquae capere non potuerunt et

paulo infra delatae sunt.

4:37. When our soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out of these two ships, and were marching to the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar, when setting forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, excited by the hope of spoil, at first surrounded them with a small number of men, and ordered them to lay down their arms, if they did not wish to be slain; afterward however, when they, forming a circle, stood on their defense, a shout was raised and about 6000 of the enemy soon assembled; which being reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as a relief to his men. In the mean time our soldiers sustained the attack of the enemy, and fought most valiantly for more than four hours, and, receiving but few wounds themselves, slew several of them. But after our cavalry came in sight, the enemy, throwing away their arms, turned their backs, and a great number of them were killed.

Quibus ex navibus cum essent eiti milites circiter CCC atque in castra contenderent, Morini, quos Caesar in Britanniam proficiscens pacatos reliquerat, spe praedae adducti primo non ita magno suorum numero circumsteterunt ac, si sese interfici nollent, arma ponere iusserunt. Cum illi orbe facto sese defenderent, celeriter ad clamorem hominum circiter milia VI convenerunt; qua re nuntiata, Caesar omnem ex castris equitatum suis auxilio misit. Interim nostri milites impetum hostium sustinuerunt atque amplius horis IIII fortissime pugnauerunt et paucis vulneribus acceptis complures ex iis occiderunt. Postea vero quam equitatus noster in conspectum venit, hostes abiectis armis terga verterunt magnusque eorum numerus est occisus.

4:38. The day following Caesar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with

those legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini, who had revolted; who, as they had no place to which they might retreat, on account of the drying up of their marshes (which they had availed themselves of as a place of refuge the preceding year), almost all fell into the power of Labienus. In the mean time Caesar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into the territories of the Menapii, having laid waste all their lands, cut down their corn and burned their houses, returned to Caesar because the Menapii had all concealed themselves in their thickest woods. Caesar fixed the winter quarters of all the legions among the Belgae. Thither only two British states sent hostages; the rest omitted to do so. For these successes, a thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by the senate upon receiving Caesar's letter.

Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum iis legionibus quas ex Britannia reduxerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit. Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se reciperent non haberent, quo perfugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni venerunt. At Q. Titurius et L. Cotta legati, qui in Menapiorum fines legiones duxerant, omnibus eorum agris vastatis, frumentis succisis, aedificiis incensis, quod Menapii se omnes in densissimas silvas abdiderant, se ad Caesarem receperunt. Caesar in Belgis omnium legionum hiberna constituit. Eo duae omnino civitates ex Britannia obsides miserunt, reliquae neglexerunt. His rebus gestis ex litteris Caesaris dierum XX supplicatio a senatu decreta est.

BOOK V (54 BC)

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5:1. Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar, when departing from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomed to do yearly, commands the lieutenants whom he appointed over the legions to take care that during the winter as many ships as possible should be built, and the old repaired. He plans the size and shape of them. For dispatch of lading, and for drawing them on shore, he makes them a little lower than those which we have been accustomed to use in our sea; and that so much the more, because he knew that, on account of the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the purpose of transporting burdens and a great number of horses, [he makes them] a little broader than those which we use in other seas. All these he orders to be constructed for lightness and expedition, to which object their lowness contributes greatly. He orders those things which are necessary for equipping ships to be brought thither from Spain. He himself, on the assizes of Hither Gaul being concluded, proceeds into Illyricum, because he heard that the part of the province nearest them was being laid waste by the incursions of the Pirustae. When he had arrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and orders them to assemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been reported [to them], the Pirustae send ambassadors to him to inform him that no part of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assert that they were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries [inflicted]. Caesar, accepting their defense, demands hostages, and orders them to be brought to him on a specified day, and assures them that unless they did so he would

visit their state with war. These being brought to him on the day which he had ordered, he appoints arbitrators between the states, who should estimate the damages and determine the reparation.

L. Domitio Ap. Claudio consulibus, discedens ab hibernis Caesar in Italiam, ut quotannis facere consuerat, legatis imperat quos legionibus praefecerat uti quam plurimas possent hieme naves aedificandas veteresque reficiendas curarent. Earum modum formamque demonstrat. Ad celeritatem onerandi subductionesque paulo facit humiliores quam quibus in nostro mari uti consuevimus, atque id eo magis, quod propter crebras commutationes aestuum minus magnos ibi fluctus fieri cognoverat; ad onera, ad multitudinem iumentorum transportandam paulo latiores quam quibus in reliquis utimur maribus. Has omnes actuarias imperat fieri, quam ad rem multum humilitas adiuvat. Ea quae sunt usui ad armandas naves ex Hispania apportari iubet. Ipse conventibus Galliae citeribris peractis in Illyricum proficiscitur, quod a Pirustis finitimam partem provinciae incursionibus vastari audiebat. Eo cum venisset, civitatibus milites imperat certumque in locum convenire iubet. Quare nuntiata Pirustae legatos ad eum mittunt qui doceant nihil earum rerum publico factum consilio, seseque paratos esse demonstrant omnibus rationibus de iniuriis satisfacere. Accepta oratione eorum Caesar obsides imperat eosque ad certam diem adduci iubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat. Eis ad diem adductis, ut imperaverat, arbitros inter civitates dat qui litem aestiment poenamque constituent.

5:2. These things being finished, and the assizes being concluded, he returns into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the army. When he had arrived there, having made a survey of the winter quarter, he

finds that, by the extraordinary ardor of the soldiers, amid the utmost scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described above and twenty-eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from that state, that they might be launched in a few days. Having commended the soldiers and those who had presided over the work, he informs them what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships to assemble at port Itius, from which port he had learned that the passage into Britain was shortest, [being only] about thirty miles from the continent. He left what seemed a sufficient number of soldiers for that design; he himself proceeds into the territories of the Treviri with four legions without baggage, and 800 horse, because they neither came to the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his commands, and were moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans beyond the Rhine.

His confectis rebus conventibusque peractis, in citeriorem Galliam revertitur atque inde ad exercitum proficiscitur. Eo cum venisset, circuitis omnibus hibernis, singulari militum studio in summa omnium rerum inopia circiter sescentas eius generis cuius supra demonstravimus naves et longas XXVIII invenit instructas neque multum abesse ab eo quin paucis diebus deduci possint. Collaudatis militibus atque eis qui negotio praefuerant, quid fieri velit ostendit atque omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet, quo ex portu commodissimum in Britanniam traiectum esse cognoverat, circiter milium passuum XXX transmissum a continenti: huic rei quod satis esse visum est militum reliquit. Ipse cum legionibus expeditis IIII et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur, quod hi neque ad concilia veniebant neque imperio parebant Germanosque Transrhenanos sollicitare dicebantur.

5:3. This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and has great forces of infantry, and as we have remarked above, borders on the Rhine. In that state, two persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were then contending with each other for the supreme power; one of whom, as soon as the arrival of Caesar and his legions was known, came to him; assures him that he and all his party would continue in their allegiance, and not revolt from the alliance of the Roman people, and informs him of the things which were going on among the Treviri. But Indutiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, and make preparations for war, having concealed those who by reason of their age could not be under arms, in the forest Arduenna, which is of immense size, [and] extends from the Rhine across the country of the Treviri to the frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some of the chief persons of the state, both influenced by their friendship for Cingetorix, and alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began to solicit him privately about their own interests, since they could not provide for the safety of the state; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should be abandoned by all, sends ambassadors to Caesar, to declare that he absented himself from his countrymen, and refrained from coming to him on this account, that he might the more easily keep the state in its allegiance, lest on the departure of all the nobility the commonalty should, in their indiscretion, revolt. And thus the whole state was at his control; and that he, if Caesar would permit, would come to the camp to him, and would commit his own fortunes and those of the state to his good faith.

Haec civitas longe plurimum totius Galliae equitatu valet magnasque habet copias peditum Rhenumque, ut supra demonstravimus, tangit. In ea civitate duo de principatu inter se contendebant, Indutiomarus

et Cingetorix; e quibus alter, simul atque de Caesaris legionumque adventu cognitum est, ad eum venit, se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit. At Indutiomarus equitatum peditatumque cogere, eisque qui per aetatem in armis esse non poterant in silvam Arduennam abditis, quae ingenti magnitudine per medios fines Treverorum a flumine Rheno ad initium Remorum pertinet, bellum parare instituit. Sed posteaquam nonnulli principes ex ea civitate et familiaritate Cingetorigis adducti et adventu nostri exercitus perterriti ad Caesarem venerunt et de suis privatim rebus ab eo petere coeperunt, quoniam civitati consulere non possent, veritus ne ab omnibus desereretur Indutiomarus legatos ad Caesarem mittit: sese idcirco ab suis discedere atque ad eum venire noluisse, quo facilius civitatem in officio contineret, ne omnis nobilitatis discessu plebs propter imprudentiam laberetur: itaque esse civitatem in sua potestate, seseque, si Caesar permetteret, ad eum in castra venturum, suas civitatisque fortunas eius fidei permissurum.

5:4. Caesar, though he discerned from what motive these things were said, and what circumstances deterred him from his meditated plan, still, in order that he might not be compelled to waste the summer among the Treviri, while all things were prepared for the war with Britain, ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When they were brought, [and] among them his son and near relations, whom he had demanded by name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continue in his allegiance; yet, nevertheless, summoning to him the chief men of the Treviri, he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix: this he both thought should be done by him in justice to the merits of the latter, and also judged that it was of great importance that the influence of one

whose singular attachment toward him he had fully seen, should prevail as much as possible among his people. Indutiomarus was very much offended at this act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished among his countrymen; and he, who already before had borne a hostile mind toward us, was much more violently inflamed against us through resentment at this.

Caesar, etsi intellegebat qua de causa ea dicerentur quaeque eum res ab instituto consilio deterreret, tamen, ne aestatem in Treveris consumere cogeretur omnibus ad Britannicum bellum rebus comparatis, Indutiomarum ad se cum CC obsidibus venire iussit. His adductis, in eis filio propinquisque eius omnibus, quos nominatim evocaverat, consolatus Indutiomarum hortatusque est uti in officio maneret; nihilo tamen setius principibus Treverorum ad se convocatis hos singillatim Cingetorigi conciliavit, quod cum merito eius a se fieri intellegebat, tum magni interesse arbitrabatur eius auctoritatem inter suos quam plurimum valere, cuius tam egregiam in se voluntatem perspexisset. Id tulit factum graviter Indutiomarus, suam gratiam inter suos minui, et, qui iam ante inimico in nos animo fuisset, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.

5:5. These matters being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with the legions. There he discovers that forty ships, which had been built in the country of the Meldi, having been driven back by a storm, had been unable to maintain their course, and had returned to the same port from which they had set out; he finds the rest ready for sailing, and furnished with every thing. In the same place, the cavalry of the whole of Gaul, in number 4,000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of all the states; he had determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whose fidelity toward him he had clearly discerned, and

take the rest with him as hostages; because he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should be absent.

His rebus constitutis Caesar ad portum Itium cum legionibus pervenit. Ibi cognoscit LX naves, quae in Meldis factae erant, tempestate reiectas cursum tenere non potuisse atque eodem unde erant profectae revertisse; reliquas paratas ad navigandum atque omnibus rebus instructas invenit. Eodem equitatus totius Galliae convenit, numero milium quattuor, principesque ex omnibus civitatibus; ex quibus perpaucos, quorum in se fidem perspexerat, relinquere in Gallia, reliquos obsidum loco secum ducere decreverat, quod, cum ipse abesset, motum Galliae verebatur.

5:6. There was together with the others, Dumnorix, the Aeduan, of whom we have made previous mention. Him, in particular, he had resolved to have with him, because he had discovered him to be fond of change, fond of power, possessing great resolution, and great influence among the Gauls. To this was added, that Dumnorix had before said in an assembly of Aeduans, that the sovereignty of the state had been made over to him by Caesar; which speech the Aedui bore with impatience and yet dared not send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either rejecting or deprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from his own personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreaty that he should be left in Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed to sailing, he feared the sea; partly because he said he was prevented by divine admonitions. After he saw that this request was firmly refused him, all hope of success being lost, he began to tamper with the chief persons of the Gauls, to call them apart singly and exhort them to remain on the continent; to agitate them with the fear that it was not without reason that Gaul

should be stripped of all her nobility; that it was Caesar's design, to bring over to Britain and put to death all those whom he feared to slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his honor to the rest, to ask for their oath that they would by common deliberation execute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul. These things were reported to Caesar by several persons.

Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix Aeduus, de quo ante ab nobis dictum est. Hunc secum habere in primis constituerat, quod eum cupidum rerum novarum, cupidum imperi, magni animi, magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis cognoverat. Accedebat huc quod in concilio Aeduorum Dumnorix dixerat sibi a Caesare regnum civitatis deferri; quod dictum Aedui graviter ferebant, neque recusandi aut deprecandi causa legatos ad Caesarem mittere audebant. Id factum ex suis hospitibus Caesar cognoverat. Ille omnibus primo precibus petere contendit ut in Gallia relinqueretur, partim quod insuetus navigandi mare timeret, partim quod religionibus impediri sese diceret. Posteaquam id obstinate sibi negari vidit, omni spe impetrandi adempta principes Galliae sollicitare, sevocare singulos hortarique coepit uti in continenti remanerent: metu territare: non sine causa fieri, ut Gallia omni nobilitate spoliaretur; id esse consilium Caesaris, ut quos in conspectu Galliae interficere vereretur, hos omnes in Britanniam traductos necaret; fidem reliquis interponere, iusiurandum poscere, ut quod esse ex usu Galliae intellexissent communi consilio administrarent. Haec a compluribus ad Caesarem deferebantur.

5:7. Having learned this fact, Caesar, because he had conferred so much honor upon the Aeduan state, determined that Dumnorix should be restrained and deterred by whatever means he could; and

that, because he perceived his insane designs to be proceeding further and further, care should be taken lest he might be able to injure him and the commonwealth. Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five days in that place, because the north wind, which usually blows a great part of every season, prevented the voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his allegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his measures: having at length met with favorable weather, he orders the foot soldiers and the horse to embark in the ships. But, while the minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to take his departure from the camp homeward with the cavalry of the Aedui, Caesar being ignorant of it. Caesar, on this matter being reported to him, ceasing from his expedition and deferring all other affairs, sends a great part of the cavalry to pursue him, and commands that he be brought back; he orders that if he use violence and do not submit, that he be slain; considering that Dumnorix would do nothing as a rational man while he himself was absent, since he had disregarded his command even when present. He, however, when recalled, began to resist and defend himself with his hand, and implore the support of his people, often exclaiming that “he was free and the subject of a free state.” They surround and kill the man as they had been commanded; but the Aeduan horsemen all return to Caesar.

Qua re cognita Caesar, quod tantum civitati Aeduae dignitatis tribuebat, coercendum atque deterrendum quibuscumque rebus posset Dumnorigem statuebat; quod longius eius amentiam progredi videbat, prospiciendum, ne quid sibi ac rei publicae nocere posset. Itaque dies circiter XXV in eo loco commoratus, quod Corus ventus navigationem impediabat, qui magnam partem omnis temporis in his locis flare consuevit, dabat operam ut in officio Dumnorigem contineret, nihilo tamen setius omnia eius consilia cognosceret:

tandem idoneam nactus tempestatem milites equitesque conscendere in naves iubet. At omnium impeditis animis Dumnorix cum equitibus Aeduorum a castris insciente Caesare domum discedere coepit. Quare nuntiata Caesar intermissa profectio atque omnibus rebus postpositis magnam partem equitatus ad eum insequendum mittit retrahique imperat; si vim faciat neque pareat, interfici iubet, nihil hunc se absente pro sano facturum arbitratus, qui praesentis imperium neglexisset. Ille enim revocatus resistere ac se manu defendere suorumque fidem implorare coepit, saepe clamitans liberum se liberaeque esse civitatis. Illi, ut erat imperatum, circumstant hominem atque interficiunt: at equites Aedui ad Caesarem omnes revertuntur.

5:8. When these things were done [and] Labienus, left on the continent with three legions and 2,000 horse, to defend the harbors and provide corn, and discover what was going on in Gaul, and take measures according to the occasion and according to the circumstance; he himself, with five legions and a number of horse, equal to that which he was leaving on the continent, set sail at sunset, and [though for a time] borne forward by a gentle south-west wind, he did not maintain his course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried on too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left. Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged on with the oars that he might make that part of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer, that there was the best landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of our soldiers was very much to be extolled; for they with the transports and heavy ships, the labor of rowing not being [for a moment] discontinued, equaled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day; nor was there seen a [single]

enemy in that place, but, as Caesar afterward found from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had assembled there, yet being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more than eight hundred of which, including the ships of the preceding year, and those private vessels which each had built for his own convenience, had appeared at one time, they had quitted the coast and concealed themselves among the higher points.

His rebus gestis, Labieno in continente cum tribus legionibus et equitum milibus duobus relicto ut portus tueretur et rem frumentariam provideret quaeque in Gallia gererentur cognosceret consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet, ipse cum quinque legionibus et pari numero equitum, quem in continenti reliquerat, ad solis occasum naves solvit et leni Africo provectus media circiter nocte vento intermisso cursum non tenuit, et longius delatus aestu orta luce sub sinistra Britanniam relictam conspexit. Tum rursus aestus commutationem secutus remis contendit ut eam partem insulae caperet, qua optimum esse egressum superiore aestate cognoverat. Qua in re admodum fuit militum virtus laudanda, qui vectoriis gravibusque navigiis non intermisso remigandi labore longarum navium cursum adaequarunt. Accessum est ad Britanniam omnibus navibus meridiano fere tempore, neque in eo loco hostis est visus; sed, ut postea Caesar ex captivis cognovit, cum magnae manus eo convenissent, multitudine navium perterritae, quae cum annotinis privatisque quas sui quisque commodi fecerat amplius octingentae uno erant visae tempore, a litore discesserant ac se in superiora loca abdiderant.

5:9. Caesar, having disembarked his army and chosen a convenient place for the camp, when he discovered from the prisoners in what

part the forces of the enemy had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts and 300 horse at the sea, to be a guard to the ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third watch, fearing the less for the ships, for this reason because he was leaving them fastened at anchor upon an even and open shore; and he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the ships. He himself, having advanced by night about twelve miles, espied the forces of the enemy. They, advancing to the river with their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground, began to annoy our men and give battle. Being repulsed by our cavalry, they concealed themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war; for all entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees. They themselves rushed out of the woods to fight here and there, and prevented our men from entering their fortifications. But the soldiers of the seventh legion, having formed a testudo and thrown up a rampart against the fortification, took the place and drove them out of the woods, receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursue them in their flight any great distance; both because he was ignorant of the nature of the ground, and because, as a great part of the day was spent, he wished time to be left for the fortification of the camp.

Caesar eito exercitu et loco castris idoneo capto, ubi ex captivis cognovit quo in loco hostium copiae consedisent, cohortibus decem ad mare relictis et equitibus trecentis, qui praesidio navibus essent, de tertia vigilia ad hostes contendit, eo minus veritus navibus, quod in litore molli atque aperto deligatas ad ancoram relinquebat, et praesidio navibus Q. Atrium praefecit. Ipse noctu progressus milia passuum circiter XII hostium copias conspicatus est. Illi equitatu atque essedis ad flumen progressi ex loco superiore nostros prohibere

et proelium committere coeperunt. Repulsi ab equitatu se in silvas abdiderunt, locum nacti egregie et natura et opere munitum, quem domestici belli, ut videbantur, causa iam ante praeparaverant: nam crebris arboribus succisis omnes introitus erant praeclusi. Ipsi ex silvis rari propugnabant nostrosque intra munitiones ingredi prohibebant. At milites legionis septimae, testudine facta et aggere ad munitiones adiecto, locum ceperunt eosque ex silvis expulerunt paucis vulneribus acceptis. Sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat.

5:10. The next day, early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and horse in three divisions on an expedition to pursue those who had fled. These having advanced a little way, when already the rear [of the enemy] was in sight, some horse came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to report that the preceding night, a very great storm having arisen, almost all the ships were dashed to pieces and cast upon the shore, because neither the anchors and cables could resist, nor could the sailors and pilots sustain the violence of the storm; and thus great damage was received by that collision of the ships.

Postridie eius diei mane tripertito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit, ut eos qui fugerant persequerentur. His aliquantum itineris progressis, cum iam extremi essent in prospectu, equites a Quinto Atrio ad Caesarem venerunt, qui nuntiarent superiore nocte maxima coorta tempestate prope omnes naves adflictas atque in litore eiectas esse, quod neque ancorae funesque subsisterent, neque nautae gubernatoresque vim tempestatis pati possent; itaque ex eo concursu navium magnum esse incommodum acceptum.

5:11. These things being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions

and cavalry to be recalled and to cease from their march; he himself returns to the ships: he sees clearly before him almost the same things which he had heard of from the messengers and by letter, so that, about forty ships being lost, the remainder seemed capable of being repaired with much labor. Therefore he selects workmen from the legions, and orders others to be sent for from the continent; he writes to Labienus to build as many ships as he could with those legions which were with him. He himself, though the matter was one of great difficulty and labor, yet thought it to be most expedient for all the ships to be brought up on shore and joined with the camp by one fortification. In these matters he employed about ten days, the labor of the soldiers being unremitting even during the hours of night. The ships having been brought up on shore and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same forces as he did before as a guard for the ships; he sets out in person for the same place that he had returned from. When he had come thither, greater forces of the Britons had already assembled at that place, the chief command and management of the war having been intrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose territories a river, which is called the Thames, separates, from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea. At an earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and the other states; but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons had placed him over the whole war and the conduct of it.

His rebus cognitis Caesar legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet, ipse ad naves revertitur; eadem fere quae ex nuntiis litterisque cognoverat coram perspicit, sic ut amissis circiter XL navibus reliquae tamen refici posse magno negotio viderentur. Itaque ex legionibus fabros deligit et ex continenti alios arcessi iubet; Labieno scribit, ut quam plurimas posset eis legionibus, quae sunt

apud eum, naves instituat. Ipse, etsi res erat multae operae ac laboris, tamen commodissimum esse statuit omnes naves subduci et cum castris una munitione coniungi. In his rebus circiter dies X consumit ne nocturnis quidem temporibus ad laborem militum intermissis. Subductis navibus castrisque egregie munitis easdem copias, quas ante, praesidio navibus reliquit: ipse eodem unde redierat proficiscitur. Eo cum venisset, maiores iam undique in eum locum copiae Britannorum convenerant summa imperi bellicae administrandi communi consilio permissa Cassivellauno, cuius fines a maritimis civitatibus flumen dividit, quod appellatur Tamesis, a mari circiter milia passuum LXXX. Huic superiore tempore cum reliquis civitatibus continentia bella intercesserant; sed nostro adventu permoti Britanni hunc toti bello imperioque praefecerant.

5:12. The interior portion of Britain is inhabited by those of whom they say that it is handed down by tradition that they were born in the island itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over from the country of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war; almost all of whom are called by the names of those states from which being sprung they went thither, and having waged war, continued there and began to cultivate the lands. The number of the people is countless, and their buildings exceedingly numerous, for the most part very like those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brass or iron rings, determined at a certain weight, as their money. Tin is produced in the midland regions; in the maritime, iron; but the quantity of it is small: they employ brass, which is imported. There, as in Gaul, is timber of every description, except beech and fir. They do not regard it lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the goose; they, however, breed them for amusement and pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, the colds

being less severe.

Britanniae pars interior ab eis incolitur quos natos in insula ipsi memoria proditum dicunt, maritima ab eis, qui praedae ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierunt (qui omnes fere eis nominibus civitatum appellantur, quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerunt) et bello illato ibi permanserunt atque agros colere coeperunt. Hominum est infinita multitudo creberrimaque aedificia fere Gallicis consimilia, pecorum magnus numerus. Utuntur aut aere aut nummo aureo aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo. Nascitur ibi plumbum album in mediterraneis regionibus, in maritimis ferrum, sed eius exigua est copia; aere utuntur importato. Materia cuiusque generis ut in Gallia est, praeter fagum atque abietem. Leporem et gallinam et anserem gustare fas non putant; haec tamen alunt animi voluptatisque causa. Loca sunt temperatiora quam in Gallia, remissioribus frigoribus.

5:13. The island is triangular in its form, and one of its sides is opposite to Gaul. One angle of this side, which is in Kent, whither almost all ships from Gaul are directed, [looks] to the east; the lower looks to the south. This side extends about 500 miles. Another side lies toward Spain and the west, on which part is Ireland, less, as is reckoned, than Britain, by one half: but the passage [from it] into Britain is of equal distance with that from Gaul. In the middle of this voyage, is an island, which is called Mona: many smaller islands besides are supposed to lie [there], of which islands some have written that at the time of the winter solstice it is night there for thirty consecutive days. We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascertained nothing, except that, by accurate measurements with water, we perceived the nights to be shorter there than on the continent. The

length of this side, as their account states, is 700 miles. The third side is toward the north, to which portion of the island no land is opposite; but an angle of that side looks principally toward Germany. This side is considered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the whole island is [about] 2,000 miles in circumference.

Insula natura triquetra, cuius unum latus est contra Galliam. Huius lateris alter angulus, qui est ad Cantium, quo fere omnes ex Gallia naves appellantur, ad orientem solem, inferior ad meridiem spectat. Hoc pertinet circiter mila passuum quingenta. Alterum vergit ad Hispaniam atque occidentem solem; qua ex parte est Hibernia, dimidio minor, ut aestimatur, quam Britannia, sed pari spatio transmissus atque ex Gallia est in Britanniam. In hoc medio cursu est insula, quae appellatur Mona: complures praeterea minores subiectae insulae existimantur, de quibus insulis nonnulli scripserunt dies continuos triginta sub bruma esse noctem. Nos nihil de eo percontationibus reperiēbamus, nisi certis ex aqua mensuris breviores esse quam in continenti noctes videbamus. Huius est longitudo lateris, ut fert illorum opinio, septingentorum milium. Tertium est contra septentriones; cui parti nulla est obiecta terra, sed eius angulus lateris maxime ad Germaniam spectat. Hoc milia passuum octingenta in longitudinem esse existimatur. Ita omnis insula est in circuitu vicies centum milium passuum.

5:14. The most civilized of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the Gallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but live on milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. All the Britains, indeed, dye themselves with wood, which occasions a bluish color, and thereby have a more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their

hair long, and have every part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and even twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers among brothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any issue by these wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whom respectively each was first espoused when a virgin.

Ex his omnibus longe sunt humanissimi qui Cantium incolunt, quae regio est maritima omnis, neque multum a Gallica differunt consuetudine. Interiores plerique frumenta non serunt, sed lacte et carne vivunt pellibusque sunt vestiti. Omnes vero se Britanni vitro inficiunt, quod caeruleum efficit colorem, atque hoc horridiores sunt in pugna aspectu; capilloque sunt promisso atque omni parte corporis rasa praeter caput et labrum superius. Vxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes et maxime fratres cum fratribus parentesque cum liberis; sed qui sunt ex his nati, eorum habentur liberi, quo primum virgo quaeque deducta est.

5:15. The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men were conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men were off their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed out of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first of two legions, when these had taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the unusual mode of battle, the enemy broke through

the middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q. Laberius Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The enemy, since more cohorts were sent against them, were repulsed.

Equites hostium essedariiue acriter proelio cum equitatu nostro in itinere conflixerunt, tamen ut nostri omnibus partibus superiores fuerint atque eos in silvas collesque compulerint; sed compluribus interfectis cupidius insecuti nonnullos ex suis amiserunt. At illi intermisso spatio imprudentibus nostris atque occupatis in munitione castrorum subito se ex statione pro castris collocati, acriter pugnaverunt, duabusque missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare atque eis primis legionum duarum, cum hae perexiguo intermisso loci spatio inter se constitissent, novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris per medios audacissime perruperunt seque inde incolumes receperunt. Eo die Quintus Laberius Durus, tribunus militum, interficitur. Illi pluribus submissis cohortibus repelluntur.

5:16. In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took place under the eyes of all and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the weight of their arms, inasmuch as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse also fought with great danger, because they [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat and to those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great distances, and

had detachments placed [in different parts], and then the one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded the wearied.

Toto hoc in genere pugnae, cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem, equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent. Equestris autem proeli ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat. Accedebat huc ut numquam conferti sed rari magnisque intervallis proeliarentur stationesque dispositas haberent, atque alios alii deinceps exciperent, integrique et recentes defetigatis succederent.

5:17. The following day the enemy halted on the hills, a distance from our camp, and presented themselves in small parties, and began to challenge our horse to battle with less spirit than the day before. But at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions, and all the cavalry, with C. Trebonius, the lieutenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew upon the foragers suddenly from all quarters, so that they did not keep off [even] from the standards and the legions. Our men making an attack on them vigorously, repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them until the horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drove the enemy precipitately before them, and slaying a great number of them, did not give them the opportunity either of rallying, or halting, or leaping from their chariots. Immediately after this retreat, the auxiliaries who had assembled from all sides, departed; nor after that time did the enemy ever engage with us in

very large numbers.

Postero die procul a castris hostes in collibus constiterunt rarique se ostendere et lenius quam pridie nostros equites proelio lacessere coeperunt. Sed meridie, cum Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum Gaio Trebonio legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab signis legionibusque non absisterent. Nostri acriter in eos impetu facto reppulerunt neque finem sequendi fecerunt, quoad subsidio confisi equites, cum post se legiones viderent, praecipites hostes egerunt magnoque eorum numero interfecto neque sui colligendi neque consistendi aut ex essedis desiliendi facultatem dederunt. Ex hac fuga protinus, quae undique convenerant, auxilia discesserunt, neque post id tempus umquam summis nobiscum copiis hostes contenderunt.

5:18. Caesar, discovering their design, leads his army into the territories of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which river can be forded in one place only and that with difficulty. When he had arrived there, he perceives that numerous forces of the enemy were marshaled on the other bank of the river; the bank also was defended by sharp stakes fixed in front, and stakes of the same kind fixed under the water were covered by the river. These things being discovered from [some] prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending forward the cavalry, ordered the legions to follow them immediately. But the soldiers advanced with such speed and such ardor, though they stood above the water by their heads only, that the enemy could not sustain the attack of the legions and of the horse, and quitted the banks, and committed themselves to flight.

Caesar cognito consilio eorum ad flumen Tamesim in fines

Cassivellauni exercitum duxit; quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest. Eo cum venisset, animum advertit ad alteram fluminis ripam magnas esse copias hostium instructas. Ripa autem erat acutis sudibus praefixis munita, eiusdemque generis sub aqua defixae sudes flumine tegebantur. His rebus cognitis a captivis perfugisque Caesar praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit. Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua exstarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent.

5:19. Cassivellaunus, as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] of battle being laid aside, the greater part of his forces being dismissed, and about 4,000 charioteers only being left, used to observe our marches and retire a little from the road, and conceal himself in intricate and woody places, and in those neighborhoods in which he had discovered we were about to march, he used to drive the cattle and the inhabitants from the fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the sake of plundering and ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among the fields, he used to send out charioteers from the woods by all the well-known roads and paths, and to the great danger of our horse, engage with them; and this source of fear hindered them from straggling very extensively. The result was, that Caesar did not allow excursions to be made to a great distance from the main body of the legions, and ordered that damage should be done to the enemy in ravaging their lands, and kindling fires only so far as the legionary soldiers could, by their own exertion and marching, accomplish it.

Cassivellaunus, ut supra demonstravimus, omni deposita spe

contentionis dimissis amplioribus copiis milibus circiter quattuor essedariorum relictis itinera nostra servabat paulumque ex via excedebat locisque impeditis ac silvestribus sese occultabat, atque eis regionibus quibus nos iter facturos cognoverat pecora atque homines ex agris in silvas compellebat et, cum equitatus noster liberius praedandi vastandique causa se in agros eiecerat, omnibus viis semitisque essedarios ex silvis emittebat et magno cum periculo nostrorum equitum cum eis confligebat atque hoc metu latius vagari prohibebat. Relinquebatur ut neque longius ab agmine legionum discedi Caesar pateretur, et tantum in agris vastandis incendiisque faciendis hostibus noceretur, quantum labore atque itinere legionarii milites efficere poterant.

5:20. In the mean time, the Trinobantes, almost the most powerful state of those parts, from which the young man, Mandubratius embracing the protection of Caesar had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him (whose father, Imanuentius, had possessed the sovereignty in that state, and had been killed by Cassivellaunus; he himself had escaped death by flight), send ambassadors to Caesar, and promise that they will surrender themselves to him and perform his commands; they entreat him to protect Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send to their state some one to preside over it, and possess the government. Caesar demands forty hostages from them, and corn for his army, and sends Mandubratius to them. They speedily performed the things demanded, and sent hostages to the number appointed, and the corn.

Interim Trinobantes, prope firmissima earum regionum civitas, ex qua Mandubracius adulescens Caesaris fidem secutus ad eum in continentem Galliam venerat, cuius pater in ea civitate regnum

obtinuerat interfectusque erat a Cassivellauno, ipse fuga mortem vitaverat, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata facturos; petunt, ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in civitatem mittat, qui praesit imperiumque obtineat. His Caesar imperat obsides quadraginta frumentumque exercitui Mandubraciumque ad eos mittit. Illi imperata celeriter fecerunt, obsides ad numerum frumentumque miserunt.

5:21. The Trinobantes being protected and secured from any violence of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, sending embassies, surrendered themselves to Caesar. From them he learns that the capital town of Cassivellaunus was not far from that place, and was defended by woods and morasses, and a very large number of men and of cattle had been collected in it. (Now the Britons, when they have fortified the intricate woods, in which they are wont to assemble for the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an enemy, with an intrenchment and a rampart, call them a town.) Thither he proceeds with his legions: he finds the place admirably fortified by nature and art; he, however, undertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy, having remained only a short time, did not sustain the attack of our soldiers, and hurried away on the other side of the town. A great amount of cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.

Trinobantibus defensis adque ab omni militum niuria prohibitis Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, Cassi legationibus missis sese Caesari dedunt. Ab his cognoscit non longe ex eo loco oppidum Cassivellauni abesse silvis paludibusque munitum, quo satis magnus

hominum pecorisque numerus onvenerit. Oppidum autem Britanni vocant, cum silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, quo incursionis hostium vitandae causa convenire consuerunt. Eo proficiscitur cum legionibus: locum reperit egregie natura atque opere munitum; tamen hunc duabus ex partibus oppugnare contendit. Hostes paulisper morati militum nostrorum impetum non tulerunt seseque alia ex parte oppidi eiecerunt. Magnus ibi numerus pecoris repertus, multique in fuga sunt comprehensi atque interfecti.

5:22. While these things are going forward in those places, Cassivellaunus sends messengers into Kent, which, we have observed above, is on the sea, over which districts four several kings reigned, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax, and commands them to collect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm the naval camp. When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally, slaying many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leader named Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this battle was reported to him as so many losses had been sustained, and his territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all by the desertion of the states, sends ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about a surrender through the mediation of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar, since he had determined to pass the winter on the continent, on account of the sudden revolts of Gaul, and as much of the summer did not remain, and he perceived that even that could be easily protracted, demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute Britain should pay each year to the Roman people; he forbids and commands Cassivellaunus that he wage not war against Mandubratius or the Trinobantes.

Dum haec in his locis geruntur, Cassivellaunus ad Cantium, quod

esse ad mare supra demonstravimus, quibus regionibus quattuor reges praeerant, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, Segovax, nuntios mittit atque eis imperat uti coactis omnibus copiis castra navalia de improvviso adorianur atque oppugent. Ei cum ad castra venissent, nostri eruptione facta multis eorum interfectis, capto etiam nobili duce Lugotorige suos incolumes reduxerunt. Cassivellaunus hoc proelio nuntiato tot detrimentis acceptis, vastatis finibus, maxime etiam permotus defectione civitatum legatos per Atrebatem Commium de deditione ad Caesarem mittit. Caesar, cum constituisset hiemare in continenti propter repentinos Galliae motus, neque multum aestatis superesset, atque id facile extrahi posse intellexeret, obsides imperat et quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet constituit; interdicat atque imperat Cassivellauno, ne Mandubracio neu Trinobantibus noceat.

5:23. When he had received the hostages, he leads back the army to the sea, and finds the ships repaired. After launching these, because he had a large number of prisoners, and some of the ships had been lost in the storm, he determines to convey back his army at two embarkations. And it so happened, that out of so large a number of ships, in so many voyages, neither in this nor in the previous year was any ship missing which conveyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent back to him from the continent empty, as the soldiers of the former convoy had been disembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had taken care to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest were driven back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some time in vain, lest he should be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch as the equinox was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiers the more closely, and, a very great calm coming on, after he

had weighed anchor at the beginning of the second watch, he reached land at break of day and brought in all the ships in safety.

Obsidibus acceptis exercitum reducit ad mare, naves invenit refectas. His deductis, quod et captivorum magnum numerum habebat, et nonnullae tempestate deperierant naves, duobus commeatibus exercitum reportare instituit. Ac sic accidit, uti ex tanto navium numero tot navigationibus neque hoc neque superiore anno ulla omnino navis, quae milites portaret, desideraretur; at ex eis, quae inanes ex continenti ad eum remitterentur et prioris commeatus eitis militibus et quas postea Labienus faciendas curaverat numero LX, perpaucae locum caperent, reliquae fere omnes reicerentur. Quas cum aliquamdiu Caesar frustra exspectasset, ne anni tempore a navigatione excluderetur, quod aequinotium suberat, necessario angustius milites collocavit ac summa tranquillitate consecuta, secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia, prima luce terram attigit omnesque incolumes naves perduxit.

5:24. The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of the Gauls held at Samarobriva, because the corn that year had not prospered in Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his army in its winter-quarters differently from the former years, and to distribute the legions among several states: one of them he gave to C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the Morini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. Roscius, into those of the Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus among the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationed three in Belgium; over these he appointed M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion which he had raised last on the other side of the Po, and

five cohorts, he sent among the Eburones, the greatest portion of whom lie between the Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the government of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. He ordered Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take command of these soldiers. The legions being distributed in this manner, he thought he could most easily remedy the scarcity of corn and yet the winter-quarters of all these legions (except that which he had given to L. Roscius, to be led into the most peaceful and tranquil neighborhood) were comprehended within [about] 100 miles. He himself in the mean while, until he had stationed the legions and knew that the several winter- quarters were fortified, determined to stay in Gaul.

Subductis navibus concilioque Gallorum Samarobrivae peracto, quod eo anno frumentum in Gallia propter siccitates angustius provenerat, coactus est aliter ac superioribus annis exercitum in hibernis collocare legionesque in plures civitates distribuere. Ex quibus unam in Morinos ducendam Gaio Fabio legato dedit, alteram in Nervios Quinto Ciceroni, tertiam in Esubios Lucio Roscio; quartam in Remis cum Tito Labieno in confinio Treverorum hiemare iussit. Tres in Belgis collocavit: eis Marcum Crassum quaestorem et Lucium Munatium Plancum et Gaium Trebonium legatos praefecit. Vnam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat, et cohortes V in Eburones, quorum pars maxima est inter Mosam ac Rhenum, qui sub imperio Ambiorigis et Catuvolci erant, misit. Eis militibus Quintum Titurium Sabinum et Lucium Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praeesse iussit. Ad hunc modum distributis legionibus facillime inopiae frumentariae sese mederi posse existimavit. Atque harum tamen omnium legionum hiberna praeter eam, quam Lucio Roscio im pacatissimam et quietissimam partem ducendam dederat, milibus

passuum centum continebantur. Ipse interea, quoad legiones collocatas munitaque hiberna cognovisset, in Gallia morari constituit.

5:25. There was among the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very high rank, whose ancestors had held the sovereignty in his state. To him Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in consideration of his prowess and attachment toward him, because in all his wars he had availed himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies had killed him when in the third year of his reign, many even of his own state being openly promoters [of that act] This event is related to Caesar. He fearing, because several were involved in the act, that the state might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to proceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter there, and arrest and send to him the persons by whose instrumentality he should discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the mean time, he was apprised by all the lieutenants and questors to whom he had assigned the legions, that they had arrived in winter-quarters, and that the place for the quarters was fortified.

Erat in Carnutibus summo loco natus Tasgetius, cuius maiores in sua civitate regnum obtinuerant. Huic Caesar pro eius virtute atque in se benevolentia, quod in omnibus bellis singulari eius opera fuerat usus, maiorum locum restituerat. Tertium iam hunc annum regnantem inimici, multis palam ex civitate eius auctoribus, eum interfecerunt. Defertur ea res ad Caesarem. Ille veritus, quod ad plures pertinebat, ne civitas eorum impulsu deficeret, Lucium Plancum cum legione ex Belgio celeriter in Carnutes proficisci iubet ibique hiemare quorumque opera cognoverat Tasgetium interfectum, hos comprehensos ad se mittere. Interim ab omnibus legatis quaestoreque, quibus legiones tradiderat, certior factus est in hiberna

perventum locumque hibernis esse munitum.

5:26. About fifteen days after they had come into winter-quarters, the beginning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and Cativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom, and had conveyed corn into our winter-quarters, induced by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, excited their people, and after having suddenly assailed the soldiers engaged in procuring wood, came with a large body to attack the camp. When our men had speedily taken up arms and had ascended the rampart, and sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors in a cavalry action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off their troops from the assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men should go forward to a conference, [alleging] that they had some things which they desired to say respecting the common interest, by which they trusted their disputes could be removed.

Diebus circiter XV, quibus in hiberna ventum est, initium repentini tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco; qui, cum ad fines regni sui Sabino Cottaeque praesto fuissent frumentumque in hiberna comportavissent, Indutiomari Treveri nuntiis impulsu suos concitaverunt subitoque oppressis lignatoribus magna manu ad castra oppugnatum venerunt. Cum celeriter nostri arma cepissent vallumque adscendissent atque una ex parte Hispanis equitibus emissis equestri proelio superiores fuissent, desperata re hostes suos ab oppugnatione reducerunt. Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui posse sperarent.

5:27. C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and with him, Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who already on previous occasions, had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference: before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed, that for Caesar's kindness toward him, he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbors; and because his own son and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, when sent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in slavery and in chains; and that he had not done that which he had done in regard to the attacking of the camp, either by his own judgment or desire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that his government was of that nature, that the people had as much authority over him as he over the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the war was this- that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the Gauls; that he could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution of Gaul; that that day was appointed for the storming of all Caesar's winter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to the relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, especially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their common freedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism [he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that he warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to consult for his and his soldiers' safety; that a large force of the Germans had been hired and had passed the Rhine; that it

would arrive in two days: that it was for them to consider whether they thought fit, before the nearest people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers when drawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other rather more; that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give them a safe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was both consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from the winter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his obligations.”

Mittitur ad eos colloquendi causa Gaius Arpineius, eques Romanus, familiaris Quinti Tituri, et Quintus Iunius ex Hispania quidam, qui iam ante missu Caesaris ad Ambiorigem ventitare consuebat; apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est: Sese pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuesset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius ab Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud in servitute et catenis tenuissent; neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem. Civitati porro hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat. Sed esse Galliae commune consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset. Non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur. Quibus quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem officii pro

beneficiis Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo. Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab eis absit. Illud se polliceri et iureiurando confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum. Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre. Hac oratione habita discedit Ambiorix.

5:28. Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had heard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those things were spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to be disregarded; and they were especially influenced by this consideration, that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble state of the Eburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their own accord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a great controversy arises among them. L. Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion “that nothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from the camp without Caesar’s orders;” they declared, “that any forces of the Germans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter-quarters; that this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the first assault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting many wounds upon them; that they were not distressed for corn; that in the mean time relief would come both from the nearest winter- quarters and from Caesar; lastly, they put the query, “what could be more undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting

the most important affairs on the authority of an enemy?"

Arpineius et Iunius, quae audierunt, ad legatos deferunt. Illi repentina re perturbati, etsi ab hoste ea dicebantur, tamen non negligenda existimabant maximeque hac re permovebantur, quod civitatem ignobilem atque humilem Eburonum sua sponte populo Romano bellum facere ausam vix erat credendum. Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magna inter eos existit controversia. Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: quantavis [magnas] copias etiam Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?

5:29. In opposition to those things, Titurius exclaimed, "That they would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disaster had been received in the neighboring winter-quarters; that the opportunity for deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the measure of slaying Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us; that he did not regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the Rhine was near; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that after having received so many

defeats she was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters being extinguished.” Lastly, “who would persuade himself of this, that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds? That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing very formidable, they would go without danger to the nearest legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in dispatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was.”

Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium adiunctis Germanis convenissent aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam; neque aliter Calnutcs interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. Non hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum; magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias; ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris extincta. Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa re Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse? Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem. Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda.

5:30. This discussion having been held on the two sides, when opposition was offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers, “Prevail,” said Sabinus, “if so you wish it;” and he said it with a louder voice, that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him; “nor am I the person among you,” he said, “who is most powerfully alarmed by the danger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if any thing disastrous shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at your hands; these, who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hence with the nearest winter- quarters, may encounter the common condition of war with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated far from the rest, perish either by the sword or by famine.”

Hac in utramque partem disputatione habita, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus acriter resisteretur, “Vincite,” inquit, “si ita vultis,” Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret; “neque is sum,” inquit, “qui gravissime ex vobis mortis periculo terrear: hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, qui, si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe ab ceteris aut ferro aut fame intereant.”

5:31. They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that “they do not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension and obstinacy; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought and approved of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the other hand, they saw no security in dissension.” The matter is prolonged by debate till midnight. At last Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent; the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will march at day- break; the remainder of the night is spent

without sleep, since every soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carry with him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, he would be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why they could not stay without danger, and how that danger would be increased by the fatigue of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day they quit the camp, in a very extended line and with a very large amount of baggage, in such a manner as men who were convinced that the advice was given by Ambiorix, not as an enemy, but as most friendly [toward them].

Consurgitur ex consilio; comprehendunt utrumque et orant, ne sua dissensione et pertinacia rem in summum periculum deducat: facilem esse rem, seu maneant, seu proficiscantur, si modo unum omnes sentiant ac probent; contra in dissensione nullam se salutem perspicere. Res disputatione ad mediam noctem perducitur. Tandem dat Cotta permotus manus: superat sententia Sabini. Pronuntiatur prima luce ituros. Consumitur vigiliis reliqua pars noctis, cum sua quisque miles circumspiceret, quid secum portare posset, quid ex instrumento hibernorum relinquere cogeretur. Omnia excogitantur, quare nec sine periculo maneatur, et languore militum et vigiliis periculum augeatur. Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed ab homine amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum, longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis.

5:32. But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of their intended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiring to rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a suitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for

the arrival of the Romans: and when the greater part of the line of march had descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presented themselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass the rear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a place exceedingly disadvantageous to our men.

At hostes, posteaquam ex nocturno fremitu vigiliisque de profectione eorum senserunt, collocatis insidiis bipertito in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus Romanorum adventum expectabant, et cum se maior pars agminis in magnam convallem demisisset, ex utraque parte eius vallis subito se ostenderunt novissimosque premere et primos prohibere ascensu atque iniquissimo nostris loco proelium committere coeperunt.

5:33. Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothing beforehand, was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging his troops; these very things, however, he did timidly and in such a manner that all resources seemed to fail him: which generally happens to those who are compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, who had reflected that these things might occur on the march, and on that account had not been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the common safety in no respect; both in addressing and encouraging the soldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle those of a soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easily perform every thing by themselves, and provide what was to be done in each place, by reason of the length of the line of march, they ordered [the officers] to give the command that they should leave the baggage and form themselves into an orb, which measure, though in a contingency of that nature it was not to be condemned, still turned out unfortunately; for it both diminished

the hope of our soldiers and rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared that this was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides that happened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the most part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from the baggage whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled with uproar and lamentation.

Tum demum Titurius, qui nihil ante providisset, trepidare et concursare cohortesque disponere, haec tamen ipsa timide atque ut eum omnia deficere viderentur; quod plerumque eis accidere consuevit, qui in ipso negotio consilium capere coguntur. At Cotta, qui cogitasset haec posse in itinere accidere atque ob eam causam profectionis auctor non fuisset, nulla in re communi saluti deerat et in appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat. Cum propter longitudinem agminis minus facile omnia per se obire et, quid quoque loco faciendum esset, providere possent, iusserunt pronuntiare, ut impedimenta relinquerent atque in orbem consisterent. Quod consilium etsi in eiusmodi casu reprehendendum non est, tamen incommode accidit: nam et nostris militibus spem minuit et hostes ad pugnam alacriores effecit, quod non sine summo timore et desperatione id factum videbatur. Praeterea accidit, quod fieri necesse erat, ut vulgo milites ab signis discederent, quae quisque eorum carissima haberet, ab impedimentis petere atque arripere properaret, clamore et fletu omnia complerentur.

5:34. But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the ranks “that no man should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them

consider that all things depended on their victory. Our men were equal to them in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valor, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, orders the command to be issued that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their standards again.

At barbaris consilium non defuit. Nam duces eorum tota acie pronuntiare iusserunt, ne quis ab loco discederet: illorum esse praedam atque illis reservari quaecumque Romani reliquissent: proinde omnia in victoria posita existimarent. Erant et virtute et studio pugnandi pares; nostri, tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant, et quotiens quaeque cohors procurrerat, ab ea parte magnus numerus hostium cadebat. Qua re animadversa Ambiorix pronuntiari iubet, ut procul tela coniciant neu propius accedant et, quam in partem Romani impetum fecerint, cedant (levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil eis noceri posse), rursus se ad signa recipientes insequantur.

5:35. Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort had quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled very precipitately. In the mean time, that part of the Roman army, of necessity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their open flank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from

which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreated and by those who stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wish to keep their place, neither was an opportunity left for valor, nor could they, being crowded together, escape the weapons cast by so large a body of men. Yet, though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and] having received many wounds, they withstood the enemy, and, a great portion of the day being spent, though they fought from day-break till the eighth hour, they did nothing which was unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before had been chief centurion, a brave man and one of great authority, is pierced with a javelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, is slain while he assists his son when surrounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, is wounded full in the mouth by a sling.

Quo praecepto ab eis diligentissime observato, cum quaequam cohors ex orbe excesserat atque impetum fecerat, hostes velocissime refugiebant. Interim eam partem nudari necesse erat et ab latere aperto tela recipi. Rursus cum in eum locum unde erant egressi reverti coeperant, et ab eis qui cesserant et ab eis qui proximi steterant circumveniebantur; sin autem locum tenere vellent, nec virtuti locus relinquebatur, neque ab tanta multitudine coniecta tela conferti vitare poterant. Tamen tot incommodis conflictati, multis vulneribus acceptis resistebant et magna parte diei consumpta, cum a prima luce ad horam octavam pugnaretur, nihil quod ipsis esset indignum committebant. Tum Tito Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat, viro forti et magnae auctoritatis, utrumque femur tragula traicitur; Quintus Lucanius, eiusdem ordinis, fortissime pugnans, dum circumvento filio subvenit, interficitur; Lucius Cotta

legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque adhortans in adversum os funda vulneratur.

5:36. Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he had perceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and his soldiers. He, when addressed, replied, “If he wishes to confer with him, it was permitted; that he hoped what pertained to the safety of the soldiers could be obtained from the people; that to him however certainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to that effect.” He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it would appear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying] that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers’ safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in that perseveres.

His rebus permotus Quintus Titurius, cum procul Ambiorigem suos cohortantem conspexisset, interpretem suum Gnaeum Pompeium ad eum mittit rogatum ut sibi militibusque parcat. Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; sperare a multitudine impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri, inque eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta saucio communicat, si videatur, pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una colloquantur: sperare ab eo de sua ac militum salute impetrari posse. Cotta se ad armatum hostem iturum negat atque in eo perseverat.

5:37. Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at the time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to follow him, and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw down his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to

do the same. In the mean time, while they treat upon the terms, and a longer debate than necessary is designedly entered into by Ambiorix, being surrounded by degrees, he is slain. Then they, according to their custom, shout out “Victory,” and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men, break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together with the greater part of the soldiers; the rest betake themselves to the camp, from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petrosidius, the standard bearer, when he was overpowered by the great number of the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments and is himself slain while fighting with the greatest courage before the camp. They with difficulty sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they all to a man destroy themselves in the night. A few escaping from the battle, made their way to Labienus at winter-quarters, after wandering at random through the woods, and inform him of these events

Sabinus quos in praesentia tribunos militum circum se habebat et primorum ordinum centuriones se sequi iubet et, cum propius Ambiorigem accessisset, iussus arma abicere imperatum facit suisque ut idem faciant imperat. Interim, dum de condicionibus inter se agunt longiorque consulto ab Ambiorige instituitur sermo, paulatim circumventus interficitur. Tum vero suo more victoriam conclamant atque ululatum tollunt impetuque in nostros facto ordines perturbant. Ibi Lucius Cotta pugnans interficitur cum maxima parte militum. Reliqui se in castra recipiunt unde erant egressi. Ex quibus Lucius Petrosidius aquilifer, cum magna multitudine hostium premeretur, aquilam intra vallum proiecit; ipse pro castris fortissime pugnans occiditur. Illi aegre ad noctem oppugnationem sustinent; noctu ad unum omnes desperata salute se ipsi interficiunt. Pauci ex proelio lapsi incertis itineribus per silvas ad Titum Labienum

legatum in hiberna perveniunt atque eum de rebus gestis certiores faciunt.

5:38. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his cavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the Nervii, and entreats “that they should not throw away the opportunity of liberating themselves forever and of punishing the Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them;” [he tells them] “that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly assaulted; he declares himself ready to cooperate in that design. He easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.

Hac victoria sublatus Ambiorix statim cum equitatu in Aduatucos, qui erant eius regno finitimi, proficiscitur; neque noctem neque diem intermittit pedita tumque subsequi iubet. Re demonstrata Aduatucisque concitatis postero die in Nervios pervenit hortaturque, ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque ulciscendi Romanos pro eis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant: interfectos esse legatos duos magnamque partem exercitus interisse demonstrat; nihil esse negoti subito oppressam legionem quae cum Cicerone hiemet interfici; se ad eam rem profitetur adiutorem. Facile hac oratione Nervii persuadet.

5:39. Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith dispatched to the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero,

the report of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him, which was the consequence of a necessary work—that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatici and all their allies and dependents, begin to attack the legion: our men quickly run together to arms and mount the rampart; they sustained the attack that day with great difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope in dispatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors forever.

Itaque confestim dimissis nuntiis ad Ceutrones, Grudios, Levacos, Pleumoxios, Geidumnos, qui omnes sub eorum imperio sunt, quam maximas manus possunt cogunt et de improvviso ad Ciceronis hiberna advolant nondum ad eum fama de Tituri morte perlata. Huic quoque accidit, quod fuit necesse, ut nonnulli milites, qui lignationis munitionisque causa in silvas discessissent, repentino equitum adventu interciperentur. His circumventis magna manu Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci atque horum omnium socii et clientes legionem oppugnare incipiunt. Nostri celeriter ad arma concurrunt, vallum conscendunt. Aegre is dies sustentatur, quod omnem spem hostes in celeritate ponebant atque hanc adepti victoriam in perpetuum se fore victores confidebant.

5:40. Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All these passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During the night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible dispatch out of the timber which they had collected for the purpose

of fortification: the things which seemed necessary to the work are completed. The following day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same manner as the day before; this same thing is done afterward during the remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not even to the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whatever things are required for resisting the assault of the next day are provided during the night: many stakes burned at the end, and a large number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built up, battlements and parapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was in very weak health, did not leave himself the night-time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement and entreaties of the soldiers.

Mittuntur ad Caesarem confestim ab Cicerone litterae magnis propositis praemiis, si pertulissent: obsessis omnibus viis missi interceptiuntur. Noctu ex materia, quam munitionis causa comportaverant, turres admodum CXX excitantur incredibili celeritate; quae deesse operi videbantur, perficiuntur. Hostes postero die multo maioribus coactis copiis castra oppugnant, fossam complent. Eadem ratione, qua pridie, ab nostris resistitur. Hoc idem reliquis deinceps fit diebus. Nulla pars nocturni temporis ad laborem intermittitur; non aegris, non vulneratis facultas quietis datur. Quaecumque ad proximi diei oppugnationem opus sunt noctu comparantur; multae praeustae sudes, magnus muralium pilorum numerus instituitur; turres contabulantur, pinnae loricaeque ex cratibus attexuntur. Ipse Cicero, cum tenuissima valetudine esset, ne nocturnum quidem sibi tempus ad quietem relinquebat, ut ultro militum concursu ae vocibus sibi parcere cogeretur.

5:41. Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him. When permission was granted, they recount the same things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, “that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters of Caesar and of the others were attacked.” They report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining credence; “they are mistaken,” say they, “if they hoped for any relief from those who distrust their own affairs; that they bear such feelings toward Cicero and the Roman people that they deny them nothing but winter-quarters, and are unwilling that the practice should become constant; that through their [the Nervii’s] means it is possible for them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and to proceed without fear into whatever parts they desire.” To these Cicero made only one reply: “that it is not the custom of the Roman people to accept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay down their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and send ambassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar’s] justice, they would obtain the things which they might request.”

Tunc duces principesque Nerviorum qui aliquem sermonis aditum causamque amicitiae cum Cicerone habebant colloqui sese velle dicunt. Facta potestate eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant: omnem esse in armis Galliam; Germanos Rhenum transisse; Caesaris reliquorumque hiberna oppugnari. Addunt etiam de Sabini morte: Ambiorigem ostentant fidei faciendae causa. Errare eos dicunt, si quidquam ab his praesidi sperent, qui suis rebus diffidant; sese tamen hoc esse in Ciceronem populumque Romanum animo, ut nihil nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere

consuetudinem nolint: licere illis incolumibus per se ex hibernis discedere et quascumque in partes velint sine metu proficisci. Cicero ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem: si ab armis discedere velint, se adiutore utantur legatosque ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae petierint, impetraturos.

5:42. Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarters with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet in depth. These military works they had learned from our men in the intercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our army prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from which circumstance, the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference; and during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, and grappling irons, and mantelets, which the same prisoners had taught them.

Ab hac spe repulsi Nervii vallo pedum IX et fossa pedum XV hiberna cingunt. Haec et superiorum annorum consuetudine ab nobis cognoverant et, quos clam de exercitu habebant captivos, ab eis docebantur; sed nulla ferramentorum copia quae esset ad hunc usum idonea, gladiis caespites circumcidere, manibus sagulisque terram exhaurire nitebantur. Qua quidem ex re hominum multitudo cognosci potuit: nam minus horis tribus milium pedum XV in circuitu munitionem perfecerunt reliquisque diebus turres ad altitudinem valli, falces testudinesque, quas idem captivi docuerant, parare ac

facere coeperunt.

5:43. On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind having sprung up, they began to discharge by their slings hot balls made of burned or hardened clay, and heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after the Gallic custom, were thatched with straw. These quickly took fire, and by the violence of the wind, scattered their flames in every part of the camp. The enemy following up their success with a very loud shout, as if victory were already obtained and secured, began to advance their towers and mantelets, and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was the courage of our soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that though they were scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast number of weapons, and were aware that their baggage and their possessions were burning, not only did no one quit the rampart for the purpose of withdrawing from the scene, but scarcely did any one even then look behind; and they all fought most vigorously and most valiantly. This day was by far the most calamitous to our men; it had this result, however, that on that day the largest number of the enemy was wounded and slain, since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and the hindmost did not afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated a little, and a tower having been brought up in a particular place and touching the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort retired from the place in which they were standing, and drew off all their men: they began to call on the enemy by gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but none of them dared to advance. Then stones having been cast from every quarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their tower set on fire.

Septimo oppugnationis die maximo coorto vento ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes fundis et fervefacta iacula in casas, quae more Gallico

stramentis erant tectae, iacere coeperunt. Hae celeriter ignem comprehenderunt et venti magnitudine in omnem locum castrorum distulerunt. Hostes maximo clamore sicuti parta iam atque explorata victoria turres testudinesque agere et scalis vallum ascendere coeperunt. At tanta militum virtus atque ea praesentia animi fuit, ut, cum undique flamma torrerentur maximaque telorum multitudine premerentur suaeque omnia impedimenta atque omnes fortunas conflagrare intellegerent, non modo demigrandi causa de vallo decederet nemo, sed paene ne respiceret quidem quisquam, ac tum omnes acerrime fortissimeque pugnarent. Hic dies nostris longe gravissimus fuit; sed tamen hunc habuit eventum, ut eo die maximus numerus hostium vulneraretur atque interficeretur, ut se sub ipso vallo constipaverant recessumque primis ultimi non dabant. Paulum quidem intermissa flamma et quodam loco turri adacta et contingente vallum tertiae cohortis centuriones ex eo, quo stabant, loco recesserunt suosque omnes removerunt, nutu vocibusque hostes, si introire vellent, vocare coeperunt; quorum progredi ausus est nemo. Tum ex omni parte lapidibus coniectis deturbati, turrisque succensa est.

5:44. In that legion there were two very brave men, centurions, who were now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulvio, and L. Varenus. These used to have continual disputes between them which of them should be preferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost animosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously before the fortifications, Pulvio, one of them, says, "Why do you hesitate, Varenus? or what [better] opportunity of signaling your valor do you seek? This very day shall decide our disputes." When he had uttered these words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the enemy which appeared

the thickest. Nor does Varenus remain within the rampart, but respecting the high opinion of all, follows close after. Then, when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulvio throws his javelin at the enemy, and pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while the latter was wounded and slain, the enemy cover him with their shields, and all throw their weapons at the other and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pulvio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This circumstance turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to draw his sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. His rival runs up to him and succors him in this emergency. Immediately the whole host turn from Pulvio to him, supposing the other to be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword and carries on the combat hand to hand, and having slain one man, for a short time drove back the rest: while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulvio brings relief; and both having slain a great number, retreat into the fortifications amid the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with both in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succor and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the two appeared worthy of being preferred to the other.

Erant in ea legione fortissimi viri, centuriones, qui primis ordinibus appropinquarent, Titus Pullo et Lucius Vorenus. Hi perpetuas inter se controversias habebant, quinam anteferretur, omnibusque annis de locis summis simultatibus contendebant. Ex his Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, “Quid dubitas,” inquit, “ Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas ? hic dies de nostris controversiis iudicabit.” Haec cum dixisset, procedit extra

munionem quaque pars hostium confertissima est visa irrumpit. Ne Voreus quidem tum sese vallo continet, sed omnium veritus existimationem subsequitur. Mediocri spatio relicto Pullo pilum in hostes immittit atque unum ex multitudine procurrentem traicit; quo percusso et exanimato hunc scutis protegunt, in hostem tela universi coniciunt neque dant regrediendi facultatem. Transfigitur scutum Pulloni et verutum in balteo defigitur. Avertit hic casus vaginam et gladium educere conanti dextram moratur manum, impeditumque hostes circumsistunt. Succurrit inimicus illi Voreus et laboranti subvenit. Ad hunc se confestim a Pullone omnis multitudo convertit: illum veruto arbitrantur occisum. Gladio comminus rem gerit Voreus atque uno interfecto reliquos paulum propellit; dum cupidius instat, in locum deiectus inferiorem concidit. Huic rursus circumvento fert subsidium Pullo, atque ambo incolumes compluribus interfectis summa cum laude sese intra munitiones recipiunt. Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur.

5:45. In proportion as the attack became daily more formidable and violent, and particularly, because, as a great number of the soldiers were exhausted with wounds, the matter had come to a small number of defenders, more frequent letters and messages were sent to Caesar; a part of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in the sight of our soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by name Vertico, born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of the blockade had deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades his slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, to convey a letter to Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin; and mixing among the Gauls without any

suspicion by being a Gaul, he reaches Caesar. From him they received information of the imminent danger of Cicero and the legion.

Quanto erat in dies gravior atque asperior oppugnatio, et maxime quod magna parte militum confecta vulneribus res ad paucitatem defensorum pervenerat, tanto crebriores litterae nuntiique ad Caesarem mittebantur; quorum pars deprehensa in conspectu nostrorum militum cum cruciatu necabatur. Erat unus intus Nervius nomine Vertico, loco natus honesto, qui a prima obsidione ad Ciceronem perfugerat suamque ei fidem praestiterat. Hic servo spe libertatis magnisque persuadet praemiis, ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat. Has ille in iaculo illigatas effert et Gallus inter Gallos sine ulla suspitione versatus ad Caesarem pervenit. Ab eo de periculis Ciceronis legionisque cognoscitur.

5:46. Caesar having received the letter about the eleventh hour of the day, immediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus, questor there, whose winter-quarters were twenty-five miles distant from him. He orders the legion to set forward in the middle of the night, and come to him with dispatch. Crassus sets out with the messenger. He sends another to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth his legion into the territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew his march must be made. He writes to Labienus to come with his legion to the frontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the advantage of the commonwealth: he does not consider that the remaining portion of the army, because it was somewhat further distant, should be waited for; but assembles about 400 horse from the nearest winter-quarters.

Caesar acceptis litteris hora circiter XI diei statim nuntium in

Bellovacos ad M. Crassum quaestorem mittit, cuius hiberna aberant ab eo milia passuum XXV; iubet media nocte legionem proficisci celeriterque ad se venire. Exit cum nuntio Crassus. Alterum ad Gaium Fabium legatum mittit, ut in Atrebatium fines legionem adducat, qua sibi iter faciendum sciebat. Scribit Labieno, si rei publicae commodo facere posset, cum legione ad fines Nerviorum veniat. Reliquam partem exercitus, quod paulo aberat longius, non putat exspectandam; equites circiter quadringentos ex proximis hibernis colligit.

5:47. Having been apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at about the third hour, he advances twenty miles that day. He appoints Crassus over Samarobriva and assigns him a legion, because he was leaving there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, the public documents, and all the corn, which he had conveyed thither for passing the winter. Fabius, without delaying a moment, meets him on the march with his legion, as he had been commanded. Labienus, having learned the death of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all the forces of the Treviri had come against him, beginning to fear lest, if he made a departure from his winter-quarters, resembling a flight, he should not be able to support the attack of the enemy, particularly since he knew them to be elated by their recent victory, sends back a letter to Caesar, informing him with what great hazard he would lead out his legion from winter-quarters; he relates at large the affairs which had taken place among the Eburones; he informs him that all the infantry and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a distance of only three miles from his own camp.

Hora circiter tertia ab antecursoribus de Crassi adventu certior factus

eo die milia passuum XX pro cedit. Crassum Samarobrivae praeficit legionemque attribuit, quod ibi impedimenta exercitus, obsides civitatum, litteras publicas frumentumque omne quod eo tolerandae hiemis causa devexerat relinquebat. Fabius, ut imperatum erat, non ita multum moratus in itinere cum legione occurrit. Labienus interitu Sabini et caede cohortium cognita, cum omnes ad eum Treverorum copiae venissent, veritus, si ex hibernis fugae similem profectionem fecisset, ut hostium impetum sustinere posset, praesertim quos recenti victoria efferri sciret, litteras Caesari remittit, quanto cum periculo legionem ex hibernis educturus esset; rem gestam in Eburonibus perscribit; docet omnes equitatus peditatusque copias Treverorum tria milia passuum longe ab suis castris consedissee.

5:48. Caesar, approving of his motives, although he was disappointed in his expectation of three legions, and reduced to two, yet placed his only hopes of the common safety in dispatch. He goes into the territories of the Nervii by long marches. There he learns from some prisoners what things are going on in the camp of Cicero, and in how great jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he induces a certain man of the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he sends written in Greek characters, lest the letter being intercepted, our measures should be discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if he should be unable to enter, to throw his spear with the letter fastened to the thong, inside the fortifications of the camp. He writes in the letter, that he having set out with his legions, will quickly be there: he entreats him to maintain his ancient valor. The Gaul apprehending danger, throws his spear as he has been directed. Is by chance stuck in a tower, and, not being observed by our men for two days, was seen by a certain soldier on the third day: when taken down, it was carried to Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an

assembly of the soldiers, and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of the fires was seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubt of the arrival of the legions.

Caesar consilio eius probato, etsi opinione trium legionum deiectus ad duas redierat, tamen unum communis salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat. Venit magnis itineribus in Nerviorum fines. Ibi ex captivis cognoscit, quae apud Ciceronem gerantur, quantoque in periculo res sit. Tum cuidam ex equitibus Gallis magnis praemiis persuadet uti ad Ciceronem epistolam deferat. Hanc Graecis conscriptam litteris mittit, ne intercepta epistola nostra ab hostibus consilia cognoscantur. Si adire non possit, monet ut tragulam cum epistola ad amentum deligata intra munitionem castrorum abiciat. In litteris scribit se cum legionibus profectum celeriter adfore; hortatur ut pristinam virtutem retineat. Gallus periculum veritus, ut erat praeceptum, tragulam mittit. Haec casu ad turrin adhaesit neque ab nostris biduo animadversa tertio die a quodam milite conspicitur, dempta ad Ciceronem defertur. Ille perlectam in conventu militum recitat maximaque omnes laetitia adficit. Tum fumi incendiorum procul videbantur; quae res omnem dubitationem adventus legionum expulit.

5:49. The Gauls, having discovered the matter through their scouts, abandon the blockade, and march toward Caesar with all their forces; these were about 60,000 armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being now afforded, again begs of that Vertico, the Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to perform his journey warily; he writes in the letter that the enemy had departed and had turned their entire force against him. When this letter was brought to him about the middle of the night, Caesar

apprises his soldiers of its contents, and inspires them with courage for fighting: the following day, at the dawn, he moves his camp, and, having proceeded four miles, he espies the forces of the enemy on the other side of a considerable valley and rivulet. It was an affair of great danger to fight with such large forces in a disadvantageous situation. For the present, therefore, inasmuch as he knew that Cicero was released from the blockade, and thought that he might, on that account, relax his speed, he halted there and fortifies a camp in the most favorable position he can. And this, though it was small in itself, [there being] scarcely 7,000 men, and these too without baggage, still by the narrowness of the passages, he contracts as much as he can, with this object, that he may come into the greatest contempt with the enemy. In the mean while scouts having been sent in all directions, he examines by what most convenient path he might cross the valley.

Galli re cognita per exploratores obsidionem relinquunt, ad Caesarem omnibus copiis contendunt. Hae erant armata circiter milia LX. Cicero data facultate Gallum ab eodem Verticone, quem supra demonstravimus, repetit, qui litteras ad Caesarem deferat; hunc admonet, iter caute diligenterque faciat: perscribit in litteris hostes ab se discessisse omnemque ad eum multitudinem convertisse. Quibus litteris circiter media nocte Caesar adlatis suos facit certiores eosque ad dimicandum animo confirmat. Postero die luce prima movet castra et circiter milia passuum quattuor progressus trans vallem et rivum multitudinem hostium conspicatur. Erat magni periculi res tantulis copiis iniquo loco dimicare; tum, quoniam obsidione liberatum Ciceronem sciebat, aequo animo remittendum de celeritate existimabat: consedit et quam aequissimo loco potest castra communit atque haec, etsi erant exigua per se vix hominum milium

septem praesertim nullis cum impedimentis, tamen angustiiis viarum quam maxime potest contrahit, eo consilio, ut in summam contemptionem hostibus veniat. Interim speculatoribus in omnes partes dimissis explorat quo commodissime itinere vallem transire possit.

5:50. That day, slight skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near the river, both armies kept in their own positions: the Gauls, because they were awaiting larger forces which had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see] if perchance by pretense of fear he could allure the enemy toward his position, so that he might engage in battle, in front of his camp, on this side of the valley; if he could not accomplish this, that, having inquired about the passes, he might cross the valley and the river with the less hazard. At daybreak the cavalry of the enemy approaches to the camp and joins battle with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to give way purposely, and retreat to the camp: at the same time he orders the camp to be fortified with a higher rampart in all directions, the gates to be barricaded, and in executing these things as much confusion to be shown as possible, and to perform them under the pretense of fear.

Eo die parvulis equestribus proeliis ad aquam factis utrique sese suo loco continent: Galli, quod ampliores copias, quae nondum convenerant, expectabant; Caesar, si forte timoris simulatione hostes in suum locum elicere posset, ut citra vallem pro castris proelio contenderet, si id efficere non posset, ut exploratis itineribus minore cum periculo vallem rivumque transiret. Prima luce hostium equitatus ad castra accedit proeliumque cum nostris equitibus committit. Caesar consulto equites cedere seque in castra recipere iubet, simul ex omnibus partibus castra altiore vallo muniri portasque

obstrui atque in his administrandis rebus quam maxime concursari et cum simulatione agi timoris iubet.

5:51. Induced by all these things, the enemy lead over their forces and draw up their line in a disadvantageous position; and as our men also had been led down from the ramparts, they approach nearer, and throw their weapons into the fortification from all sides, and sending heralds round, order it to be proclaimed that, if “any, either Gaul or Roman, was willing to go over to them before the third hour, it was permitted; after that time there would not be permission;” and so much did they disregard our men, that the gates having been blocked up with single rows of turf as a mere appearance, because they did not seem able to burst in that way, some began to pull down the rampart with their hands, others to fill up the trenches. Then Caesar, making a sally from all the gates, and sending out the cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, so that no one at all stood his ground with the intention of fighting; and he slew a great number of them, and deprived all of their arms.

Quibus omnibus rebus hostes invitati copias traducunt aciemque iniquo loco constituunt, nostris vero etiam de vallo deductis propius accedunt et tela intra munitionem ex omnibus partibus coniciunt praeconibusque circummissis pronuntiari iubent, seu quis Gallus seu Romanus velit ante horam tertiam ad se transire, sine periculo licere; post id tempus non fore potestatem: ac sic nostros contempserunt, ut obstructis in speciem portis singulis ordinibus caespitum, quod ea non posse introrumpere videbantur, alii vallum manu scindere, alii fossas complere inciperent. Tum Caesar omnibus portis eruptione facta equitatuque emisso celeriter hostes in fugam dat, sic uti omnino pugnandi causa resisteret nemo, magnumque ex eis numerum occidit

atque omnes armis exuit.

5:52. Caesar, fearing to pursue them very far, because woods and morasses intervened, and also [because] he saw that they suffered no small loss in abandoning their position, reaches Cicero the same day with all his forces safe. He witnesses with surprise the towers, mantelets, and [other] fortifications belonging to the enemy: the legion having been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth soldier had not escaped without wounds. From all these things he judges with what danger and with what great courage matters had been conducted; he commends Cicero according to his desert, and likewise the legion; he addresses individually the centurions and the tribunes of the soldiers, whose valor he had discovered to have been signal. He receives information of the death of Sabinus and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly being held the following day, he states the occurrence; he consoles and encourages the soldiers; he suggests, that the disaster, which had been occasioned by the misconduct and rashness of his lieutenant, should be borne with a patient mind, because by the favor of the immortal gods and their own valor, neither was lasting joy left to the enemy, nor very lasting grief to them.

Longius prosequi veritus, quod silvae paludesque intercedebant neque etiam parvulo detrimento illorum locum relinqui videbat, omnibus suis incolumibus copiis eodem die ad Ciceronem pervenit. Institutas turres, testudines munitionesque hostium admiratur; legione producta cognoscit non decimum quemque esse reliquum militem sine vulnere: ex his omnibus iudicat rebus, quanto cum periculo et quanta cum virtute res sint administratae. Ciceronem pro eius merito legionemque collaudat; centuriones singillatim

tribunosque militum appellat, quorum egregiam fuisse virtutem testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat. De casu Sabini et Cottae certius ex captivis cognoscit. Postero die contione habita rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat: quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetatio neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur.

5:53. In the mean while the report respecting the victory of Caesar is conveyed to Labienus through the country of the Remi with incredible speed, so that, though he was about sixty miles distant from the winter-quarter of Cicero, and Caesar had arrived there after the ninth hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, by which shout an indication of the victory and a congratulation on the part of the Remi were given to Labienus. This report having been carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus the following day, flies by night and leads back all his forces into the country of the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to his winter-quarters; he himself determines to winter with three legions near Samarobriua in three different quarters, and, because such great commotions had arisen in Gaul, he resolved to remain during the whole winter with the army himself. For the disaster respecting the death of Sabinus having been circulated among them, almost all the states of Gaul were deliberating about war, sending messengers and embassies into all quarters, inquiring what further measure they should take, and holding councils by night in secluded places. Nor did any period of the whole winter pass over without fresh anxiety to Caesar, or, without his receiving some intelligence respecting the meetings and commotions of the Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L.

Roscius, the lieutenant whom he had placed over the thirteenth legion, that large forces of those states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricae, had assembled for the purpose of attacking him and were not more than eight miles distant; but intelligence respecting the victory of Caesar being carried [to them], had retreated in such a manner that their departure appeared like a flight.

Interim ad Labienum per Remos incredibili celeritate de victoria Caesaris fama perfertur, ut, cum ab hibernis Ciceronis milia passuum abesset circiter LX, eoque post horam nonam diei Caesar pervenisset, ante mediam noctem ad portas castrorum clamor oreretur, quo clamore significatio victoriae gratulatioque ab Remis Labieno fieret. Hac fama ad Treveros perlata Indutiomarus, qui postero die castra Labieni oppugnare decreverat, noctu profugit copiasque omnes in Treveros reducit. Caesar Fabium cum sua legione remittit in hiberna, ipse cum tribus legionibus circum Samarobrivam trinis hibernis hiemare constituit et, quod tanti motus Galliae exstiterant, totam hiemem ipse ad exercitum manere decrevit. Nam illo incommodo de Sabini morte perlato omnes fere Galliae civitates de bello consultabant, nuntios legationesque in omnes partes dimittebant et quid reliqui consili caperent atque unde initium belli fieret explorabant nocturnaue in locis desertis concilia habebant. Neque ullum fere totius hiemis tempus sine sollicitudine Caesaris intercessit, quin aliquem de consiliis ac motu Gallorum nuntium acciperet. In his ab Lucio Roscio, quem legioni tertiae decimae praefecerat, certior factus est magnas Gallorum copias earum civitatum, quae Armoricae appellantur, oppugnandi sui causa convenisse neque longius milia passuum octo ab hibernis suis afuisse, sed nuntio allato de victoria Caesaris discessisse, adeo ut fugae similis discessus videretur.

5:54. But Caesar, having summoned to him the principal persons of each state, in one case by alarming them, since he declared that he knew what was going on, and in another case by encouraging them, retained a great part of Gaul in its allegiance. The Senones, however, which is a state eminently powerful and one of great influence among the Gauls, attempting by general design to slay Cavarinus, whom Caesar had created king among them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty at the period of the arrival of Caesar in Gaul, and whose ancestors had also previously held it), when he discovered their plot and fled, pursued him even to the frontiers [of the state], and drove him from his kingdom and his home; and, after having sent ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of concluding a peace, when he ordered all their senate to come to him, did not obey that command. So far did it operate among those barbarian people, that there were found some to be the first to wage war; and so great a change of inclinations did it produce in all, that, except the Aedui and the Remi, whom Caesar had always held in especial honor, the one people for their long standing and uniform fidelity toward the Roman people, the other for their late service in the Gallic war, there was scarcely a state which was not suspected by us. And I do not know whether that ought much to be wondered at, as well for several other reasons, as particularly because they who ranked above all nations for prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they had lost so much of that reputation as to submit to commands from the Roman people.

At Caesar principibus cuiusque civitatis ad se evocatis alias territando, cum se scire quae fierent denuntiaret, alias cohortando magnam partem Galliae in officio tenuit. Tamen Senones, quae est civitas in primis firma et magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis,

Cavarinum, quem Caesar apud eos regem constituerat, cuius frater Moritasgus adventu in Galliam Caesaris cuiusque maiores regnum obtinuerant, interficere publico consilio conati, cum ille praesensisset ac profugisset, usque ad fines insecuti regno domoque expulerunt et, missis ad Caesarem satisfaciendi causa legatis, cum is omnem ad se senatum venire iussisset, dicto audientes non fuerunt. Tantum apud homines barbaros valuit esse aliquos repertos principes inferendi belli tantamque omnibus voluntatum commutationem attulit, ut praeter Aeduos et Remos, quos praecipuo semper honore Caesar habuit, alteros pro vetere ac perpetua erga populum Romanum fide, alteros pro recentibus Gallici belli officiis, nulla fere civitas fuerit non suspecta nobis. Idque adeo haud scio mirandumne sit, cum compluribus aliis de causis, tum maxime quod ei, qui virtute belli omnibus gentibus praeferabantur, tantum se eius opinionis deperdidisse ut a populo Romano imperia perferrent gravissime dolebant.

5:55. But the Triviri and Indutiomarus let no part of the entire winter pass without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, importuning the states, promising money, and asserting that, as a large portion of our army had been cut off, a much smaller portion remained. However, none of the German States could be induced to cross the Rhine, since “they had twice essayed it,” they said, “in the war with Ariovistus and in the passage of the Tenchtheri there; that fortune was not to be tempted any more.” Indutiomarus disappointed in this expectation, nevertheless began to raise troops, and discipline them, and procure horses from the neighboring people, and allure to him by great rewards the outlaws and convicts throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he already acquired for himself in Gaul by these means, that embassies were flocking to him in all directions, and

seeking, publicly and privately, his favor and friendship.

Treveri vero atque Indutiomarus totius hiemis nullum tempus intermiserunt, quin trans Rhenum legatos mitterent, civitates sollicitarent, pecunias pollicerentur, magna parte exercitus nostri interfecta multo minorem superesse dicerent partem. Neque tamen ulli civitati Germanorum persuaderi potuit, ut Rhenum transiret, cum se bis expertos dicerent, Ariovisti bello et Tencterorum transitu: non esse amplius fortunam temptaturos. Hac spe lapsus Indutiomarus nihilo minus copias cogere, exercere, a finitimis equos parare, exules damnatosque tota Gallia magnis praemiis ad se allicere coepit. Ac tantam sibi iam his rebus in Gallia auctoritatem comparaverat ut undique ad eum legationes concurrerent, gratiam atque amicitiam publice privatimque peterent.

5:56. When he perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; that on the one side the Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by their consciousness of guilt, on the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci were preparing war against the Romans, and that forces of volunteers would not be wanting to him if he began to advance from his own territories, he proclaims an armed council (this according to the custom of the Gauls in the commencement of war) at which, by a common law, all the youth were wont to assemble in arms, whoever of them comes last is killed in the sight of the whole assembly after being racked with every torture. In that council he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the other faction, his own son-in-law (whom we have above mentioned, as having embraced the protection of Caesar, and never having deserted him) an enemy and confiscates his property. When these things were finished, he asserts in the council that he, invited by the Senones and the Carnutes, and several other

states of Gaul, was about to march thither through the territories of the Remi, devastate their lands, and attack the camp of Labienus: before he does that, he informs them of what he desires to be done.

Vbi intellexit ultro ad se veniri, altera ex parte Senones Carnutesque conscientia facinoris instigari, altera Nervios Aduatucosque bellum Romanis parare, neque sibi voluntariorum copias defore, si ex finibus suis progredi coepisset, armatum concilium indicit. Hoc more Gallorum est initium belli, quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consuerunt; qui ex eis novissimus convenit, in conspectu multitudinis omnibus cruciatibus affectus necatur. In eo concilio Cingetorigem, alterius principem factionis, generum suum, quem supra demonstravimus Caesaris secutum fidem ab eo non discessisse, hostem iudicat bonaque eius publicat. His rebus confectis, in concilio pronuntiat arcessitum se a Senonibus et Carnutibus aliisque compluribus Galliae civitatibus; huc iturum per fines Remorum eorumque agros popula turum ac, priusquam id faciat, castra Labieni oppugnaturum. Quae fieri velit praecipit.

5:57. Labienus, since he was confining himself within a camp strongly fortified by the nature of the ground and by art, had no apprehensions as to his own and the legion's danger, but was devising that he might throw away no opportunity of conducting the war successfully. Accordingly, the speech of Indutiomarus, which he had delivered in the council, having been made known [to him] by Cingetorix and his allies, he sends messengers to the neighboring states and summons horse from all quarters: he appoints to them a fixed day for assembling. In the mean time, Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, nearly every day used to parade close to his [Labienus'] camp; at one time, that he might inform himself of the situation of the camp; at

another time, for the purpose of conferring with or of intimidating him. Labienus confined his men within the fortifications, and promoted the enemy's belief of his fear by whatever methods he could.

Labienus, cum et loci natura et manu munitissimis castris sese teneret, de suo ac legionis periculo nihil timebat; ne quam occasionem rei bene gerendae dimitteret, cogitabat. Itaque a Cingetorige atque eius propinquis oratione Indutiomari cognita, quam in concilio habuerat, nuntios mittit ad finitimas civitates equitesque undique evocat: his certum diem conveniendi dicit. Interim prope cotidie cum omni equitatu Indutiomarus sub castris eius vagabatur, alias ut situm castrorum cognosceret, alias colloquendi aut territandi causa: equites plerumque omnes tela intra vallum coniciebant. Labienus suos intra munitionem continebat timorisque opinionem, quibuscumque poterat rebus, augebat.

5:58. Since Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp with greater defiance, all the cavalry of the neighboring states which he [Labienus] had taken care to have sent for, having been admitted in one night, he confined all his men within the camp by guards with such great strictness, that that fact could by no means be reported or carried to the Treviri. In the mean while, Indutiomarus, according to his daily practice, advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the day there: his horse cast their weapons, and with very insulting language call out our men to battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemy, when they thought proper, depart toward evening in a disorderly and scattered manner, Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by two gates; he gives this command and prohibition, that, when the enemy should be terrified and put to flight (which he

foresaw would happen, as it did), they should all make for Indutiomarus, and no one wound any man before he should have seen him slain, because he was unwilling that he should escape, in consequence of gaining time by the delay [occasioned by the pursuit] of the rest. He offers great rewards for those who should kill him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to the horse. The issue justifies the policy of the man, and since all aimed at one, Indutiomarus is slain, having been overtaken at the very ford of the river, and his head is carried to the camp, the horse, when returning, pursue and slay all whom they can. This affair having been known, all the forces of the Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled, depart; and for a short time after this action, Caesar was less harassed in the government of Gaul.

Cum maiore in dies contemptione Indutiomarus ad castra accederet, nocte una intromissis equitibus omnium finitimarum civitatum quos arcessendos curaverat, tanta diligentia omnes suos custodiis intra castra continuit, ut nulla ratione ea res enuntiari aut ad Treveros perferri posset. Interim ex consuetudine cotidiana Indutiomarus ad castra accedit atque ibi magnam partem diei consumit; equites tela coniciunt et magna cum contumelia verborum nostros ad pugnam evocant. Nullo ab nostris dato responso, ubi visum est, sub vesperum dispersi ac dissipati discedunt. Subito Labienus duabus portis omnem equitatum emittit; praecipit atque interdicat, proterritis hostibus atque in fugam coniectis (quod fore, sicut accidit, videbat) unum omnes peterent Indutiomarus, neu quis quem prius vulneret, quam illum interfectum viderit, quod mora reliquorum spatium nactum illum effugere nolebat; magna proponit eis qui occiderint praemia; summittit cohortes equitibus subsidio. Comprobat hominis consilium fortuna, et cum unum omnes peterent,

in ipso fluminis vado deprehensus Indutiomarus interficitur, caputque eius refertur in castra: redeuntes equites quos possunt consecantur atque occidunt. Hac re cognita omnes Eburonum et Nerviorum quae convenerant copiae discedunt, pauloque habuit post id factum Caesar quietiorem Galliam.

BOOK VI (53 BC)

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6:1. Caesar, expecting for many reasons a greater commotion in Gaul, resolves to hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, his lieutenants: at the same time he requested Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was remaining near the city invested with military command for the interests of the commonwealth, he would command those men whom when consul he had levied by the military oath in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceed to him; thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinion which the Gauls would entertain for the future, that that the resources of Italy should appear so great that if any loss should be sustained in war, not only could it be repaired in a short time, but likewise be further supplied by still larger forces. And when Pompey had granted this to the interests of the commonwealth and the claims of friendship, Caesar having quickly completed the levy by means of his lieutenants, after three regiments had been both formed and brought to him before the winter [had] expired, and the number of those cohorts which he had lost under Q. Titurius had been doubled, taught the Gauls, both by his dispatch and by his forces what the discipline and the power of the Roman people could accomplish.

Multis de causis Caesar maiorem Galliae motum exspectans per Marcum Silanum, Gaium Antistium Reginum, Titum Sextium legatos dilectum habere instituit; simul ab Gnaeo Pompeio proconsule petit, quoniam ipse ad urbem cum imperio rei publicae causa remaneret, quos ex Cisalpina Gallia consulis sacramento rogavisset, ad signa convenire et ad se proficisci iuberet, magni

interesse etiam in reliquum tempus ad opinionem Galliae existimans tantas videri Italiae facultates ut, si quid esset in bello detrimenti acceptum, non modo id brevi tempore sarciri, sed etiam maioribus augeri copiis posset. Quod cum Pompeius et rei publicae et amicitiae tribuisset, celeriter confecto per suos dilectu tribus ante exactam hiemem et constitutis et adductis legionibus duplicatoque earum cohortium numero, quas cum Quinto Titurio amiserat, et celeritate et copiis docuit, quid populi Romani disciplina atque opes possent.

6:2. Indutiomarus having been slain, as we have stated, the government was conferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They cease not to importune the neighboring Germans and to promise them money: when they could not obtain [their object] from those nearest them, they try those more remote. Having found some states willing to accede to their wishes, they enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath, and give hostages as a security for the money: they attach Ambiorix to them by an alliance and confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he saw that war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine were under arms, that the Senones did not assemble according to his command, and were concerting measures with the Carnutes and the neighboring states, that the Germans were importuned by the Treviri in frequent embassies, thought that he ought to take measures for the war earlier [than usual].

Interfecto Indutiomaro, ut docuimus, ad eius propinquos a Treveris imperium defertur. Illi finitimos Germanos sollicitare et pecuniam polliceri non desistunt. Cum ab proximis impetrare non possent, ultiores temptant. Inventis nonnullis civitatibus iureiurando inter se

confirmant obsidibusque de pecunia cavent: Amborigem sibi societate et foedere adiungunt. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, cum undique bellum parari videret, Nervios, Aduatucos ac Menapios adiunctis Cisirhenanis omnibus Germanis esse in armis, Senones ad imperatum non venire et cum Carnutibus finitimisque civitatibus consilia communicare, a Treveris Germanos crebris legationibus sollicitari, maturius sibi de bello cogitandum putavit.

6:3. Accordingly, while the winter was not yet ended, having concentrated the four nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, and before they could either assemble or retreat, after capturing a large number of cattle and of men, and wasting their lands and giving up that booty to the soldiers, compelled them to enter into a surrender and give him hostages. That business having been speedily executed, he again led his legions back into winter-quarters. Having proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning of the spring, as he had been accustomed [to do], when the deputies from the rest, except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come, judging this to be the commencement of war and revolt, that he might appear to consider all things of less consequence [than that war], he transfers the council to Lutetia of the Parisii. These were adjacent to the Senones, and had united their state to them during the memory of their fathers, but were thought to have no part in the present plot. Having proclaimed this from the tribunal, he advances the same day toward the Senones with his legions, and arrives among them by long marches.

Itaque nondum hieme confecta proximis quattuor coactis legionibus de improvviso in fines Nerviorum contendit et, priusquam illi aut convenire aut profugere possent, magno pecoris atque hominum

numero capto atque ea praeda militibus concessa vastatisque agris in deditionem venire atque obsides sibi dare coegit. Eo celeriter confecto negotio rursus in hiberna legiones reduxit. Concilio Galliae primo vere, ut instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent, initium belli ac defectionis hoc esse arbitratus, ut omnia postponere videretur, concilium Lutetiam Parisiorum transfert. Confines erant hi Senonibus civitatemque patrum memoria coniunxerant, sed ab hoc consilio afuisse existimabantur. Hac re pro suggestu pronuntiata eodem die cum legionibus in Senones proficiscitur magnisque itineribus eo pervenit.

6:4. Acco, who had been the author of that enterprise, on being informed of his arrival, orders the people to assemble in the towns; to them, while attempting this, and before it could be accomplished, news is brought that the Romans are close at hand: through necessity they give over their design and send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of imploring pardon; they make advances to him through the Aedui, whose state was from ancient times under the protection of Rome. Caesar readily grants them pardon, and receives their excuse, at the request of the Aedui, because he thought that the summer season was one for an impending war, not for an investigation. Having imposed one hundred hostages, he delivers these to the Aedui to be held in charge by them. To the same place the Carnutes send ambassadors and hostages, employing as their mediators the Remi, under whose protection they were: they receive the same answers. Caesar concludes the council and imposes a levy of cavalry on the states.

Cognito eius adventu Acco, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, iubet in oppida multitudinem convenire. Conantibus, priusquam id effici

posset, adesse Romanos nuntiatur. Necessario sententia desistunt legatosque deprecandi causa ad Caesarem mittunt: adeunt per Aeduos, quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas. Libenter Caesar petentibus Aeduis dat veniam excusationemque accipit, quod aestivum tempus instantis belli, non quaestionis esse arbitrabatur. Obsidibus imperatis centum hos Aeduis custodiendos tradit. Eodem Carnutes legatos obsidesque mittunt uti deprecatoribus Renis, quorum erant in clientela: eadem ferunt responsa. Peragit concilium Caesar equitesque imperat civitatibus.

6:5. This part of Gaul having been tranquilized, he applies himself entirely both in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. He orders Cavarinus to march with him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest any commotion should arise either out of his hot temper, or out of the hatred of the state which he had incurred. After arranging these things, as he considered it certain that Ambiorix would not contend in battle, he watched his other plans attentively. The Menapii bordered on the territories of the Eburones, and were protected by one continued extent of morasses and woods; and they alone out of Gaul had never sent ambassadors to Caesar on the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie of hospitality subsisted between them and Ambiorix: he also discovered that the latter had entered into an alliance with the Germans by means of the Treviri. He thought that these auxiliaries ought to be detached from him before he provoked him to war; lest he, despairing of safety, should either proceed to conceal himself in the territories of the Menapii, or should be driven to coalesce with the Germans beyond the Rhine. Having entered upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the territories of the Treviri and orders two legions to proceed to him: he himself proceeds against the

Menapii with five lightly-equipped legions. They, having assembled no troops, as they relied on the defense of their position, retreat into the woods and morasses, and convey thither all their property.

Hac parte Galliae pacata totus et mente et animo in bellum Treverorum et Ambiorigis insistit. Cavarinum cum equitatu Senonum secum proficisci iubet, ne quis aut ex huius iracundia aut ex eo, quod meruerat, odio civitatis motus existat. His rebus constitutis, quod pro explorato habebat Ambiorigem proelio non esse concertaturum, reliqua eius consilia animo circumspiciebat. Erant Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti, qui uni ex Gallia de pace ad Caesarem legatos numquam miserant. Cum his esse hospitium Ambiorigi sciebat; item per Treveros venisse Germanis in amicitiam cognoverat. Haec prius illi detrahenda auxilia existimabat quam ipsum bello lacesseret, ne desperata salute aut se in Menapios abderet aut cum Transrhenanis congredi cogeretur. Hoc inito consilio totius exercitus impedimenta ad Labienum in Treveros mittit duasque legiones ad eum proficisci iubet; ipse cum legionibus expeditis quinque in Menapios profisciscitur. Illi nulla coacta manu loci praesidio freti in silvas paludesque confugiunt suaque eodem conferunt.

6:6. Caesar, having divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. Crassus his questor, and having hastily constructed some bridges, enters their country in three divisions, burns their houses and villages, and gets possession of a large number of cattle and men. Constrained by these circumstances the Menapii send ambassadors to him for the purpose of suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages, assures them that he will consider them in the number of his enemies if they shall receive within their territories either Ambiorix or his

embassadors. Having determinately settled these things, he left among the Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian, with some cavalry as a guard; he himself proceeds toward the Treviri.

Caesar partitis copiis cum Gaio Fabio legato et Marco Crasso quaestore celeriterque effectis pontibus adit tripertito, aedificia vicosque incendit, magno pecoris atque hominum numero potitur. Quibus rebus coacti Menapii legatos ad eum pacis petendae causa mittunt. Ille obsidibus acceptis hostium se habiturum numero confirmat, si aut Ambiorigem aut eius legatos finibus suis recepissent. His confirmatis rebus Commium Atrebatem cum equitatu custodis loco in Menapiis relinquit; ipse in Treveros proficiscitur.

6:7. While these things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri, having drawn together large forces of infantry and cavalry, were preparing to attack Labienus and the legion which was wintering in their territories, and were already not further distant from him than a journey of two days, when they learn that two legions had arrived by the order of Caesar. Having pitched their camp fifteen miles off, they resolve to await the support of the Germans. Labienus, having learned the design of the enemy, hoping that through their rashness there would be some opportunity of engaging, after leaving a guard of five cohorts for the baggage, advances against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large body of cavalry, and, leaving the space of a mile between them, fortifies his camp. There was between Labienus and the enemy a river difficult to cross, and with steep banks: this neither did he himself design to cross, nor did he suppose the enemy would cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was daily increasing. He [Labienus] openly says in a council that “since the

Germans are said to be approaching, he would not bring into uncertainty his own and the army's fortunes, and the next day would move his camp at early dawn." These words are quickly carried to the enemy, since out of so large a number of cavalry composed of Gauls, nature compelled some to favor the Gallic interests. Labienus, having assembled the tribunes of the soldiers and principal centurions by night, states what his design is, and, that he may the more easily give the enemy a belief of his fears, he orders the camp to be moved with greater noise and confusion than was usual with the Roman people. By these means he makes his departure [appear] like a retreat. These things, also, since the camps were so near, are reported to the enemy by scouts before daylight.

Dum haec a Caesare geruntur, Treveri magnis coactis peditatus equitatusque copiis Labienum cum una legione, quae in eorum finibus hiemaverat, adoriri parabant, iamque ab eo non longius bidui via aberant, cum duas venisse legiones missu Caesaris cognoscunt. Positis castris a milibus passuum XV auxilia Germanorum essepectare constituunt. Labienus hostium cognito consilio sperans temeritate eorum fore aliquam dimicandi facultatem praesidio quinque cohortium impedimentis relicto cum viginti quinque cohortibus magnoque equitatu contra hostem proficiscitur et mille passuum intermisso spatio castra communit. Erat inter Labienum atque hostem difficili transitu flumen ripisque praeuptis. Hoc neque ipse transire habebat in animo neque hostes transituros existi mabat. Augebatur auxiliorum cotidie spes. Loquitur in concilio palam, quoniam Germani appropinquare dicantur, sese suas exercitusque fortunas in dubium non devocaturum et postero die prima luce castra moturum. Celeriter haec ad hostes deferuntur, ut ex magno Gallorum equitum numero nonnullos Gallicis rebus favere natura cogebat. Labienus

noctu tribunis militum primisque ordinibus convocatis, quid sui sit consili proponit et, quo facilius hostibus timoris det suspicionem, maiore strepitu et tumultu, quam populi Romani fert consuetudo castra moveri iubet. His rebus fugae similem profectionem effecit. Haec quoque per exploratores ante lucem in tanta propinquitate castrorum ad hostes deferuntur.

6:8. Scarcely had the rear advanced beyond the fortifications when the Gauls, encouraging one another “not to cast from their hands the anticipated booty, that it was a tedious thing, while the Romans were panic-stricken, to be waiting for the aid of the Germans, and that their dignity did not suffer them to fear to attack with such great forces so small a band, particularly when retreating and encumbered,” do not hesitate to cross the river and give battle in a disadvantageous position. Labienus suspecting that these things would happen, was proceeding quietly, and using the same pretense of a march, in order that he might entice them across the river. Then, having sent forward the baggage some short distance and placed it on a certain eminence, he says, “Soldiers, you have the opportunity you have sought: you hold the enemy in an encumbered and disadvantageous position: display to us, your leaders, the same valor you have oftentimes displayed to your general: imagine that he is present and actually sees these exploits.” At the same time he orders the troops to face about toward the enemy and form in line of battle, and, dispatching a few troops of cavalry as a guard for the baggage, he places the rest of the horse on the wings. Our men, raising a shout, quickly throw their javelins at the enemy. They, when, contrary to their expectation, they saw those whom they believed to be retreating, advance toward them with threatening banners, were not able to sustain even the charge, and, being put to flight at the first

onslaught, sought the nearest woods; Labienus pursuing them with the cavalry, upon a large number being slain, and several taken prisoners, got possession of the state a few days after; for the Germans, who were coming to the aid of the Treviri, having been informed of their flight, retreated to their homes. The relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the promoters of the revolt, accompanying them, quitted their own state with them. The supreme power and government were delivered to Cingetorix, whom we have stated to have remained firm in his allegiance from the commencement.

Vix agmen novissimum extra munitiones processerat, cum Galli cohortati inter se, ne speratam praedam ex manibus dimitterent — longum esse per territis Romanis Germanorum auxilium exspectare, neque suam pati dignitatem ut tantis copiis tam exiguam manum praesertim fugientem atque impeditam adoriri non audeant — flumen transire et iniquo loco committere proelium non dubitant. Quae fore suspicatus Labienus, ut omnes citra flumen eliceret, eadem usus simulatione itineris placide progrediebatur. Tum praemissis paulum impedimentis atque in tumultu quodam collocatis “Habetis,” inquit, “milites, quam petistis facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis: praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate.” Simul signa ad hostem converti aciemque dirigi iubet, et paucis turmis praesidio ad impedimenta dimissis reliquos equites ad latera disponit. Celeriter nostri clamore sublato pila in hostes immittunt. Illi, ubi praeter spem quos fugere credebant infestis signis ad se ire viderunt, impetum modo ferre non potuerunt ac primo concursu in fugam coniecti proximas silvas petierunt. Quos Labienus equitatu consecutus, magno numero interfecto, compluribus captis,

paucis post diebus civitatem recepit. Nam Germani qui auxilio veniebant percepta Treverorum fuga sese domum receperunt. Cum his propinqui Indutiomari, qui defectionis auctores fuerant, comitati eos ex civitate excesserunt. Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum.

6:9. Caesar, after he came from the territories of the Menapii into those of the Treviri, resolved for two reasons to cross the Rhine; one of which was, because they had sent assistance to the Treviri against him; the other, that Ambiorix might not have a retreat among them. Having determined on these matters, he began to build a bridge a little above that place where he had before conveyed over his army. The plan having been known and laid down, the work is accomplished in a few days by the great exertion of the soldiers. Having left a strong guard at the bridge on the side of the Treviri, lest any commotion should suddenly arise among them, he leads over the rest of the forces and the cavalry. The Ubii, who before had sent hostages and come to a capitulation, send ambassadors to him, for the purpose of vindicating themselves, to assure him that “neither had auxiliaries been sent to the Treviri from their state, nor had they violated their allegiance;” they entreat and beseech him “to spare them, lest, in his common hatred of the Germans, the innocent should suffer the penalty of the guilty: they promise to give more hostages, if he desire them.” Having investigated the case, Caesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent by the Suevi; he accepts the apology of the Ubii, and makes the minute inquiries concerning the approaches and the routes to the territories of the Suevi.

Caesar, postquam ex Menapiis in Treveros venit, duabus de causis Rhenum transire constituit; quarum una erat, quod auxilia contra se

Treveris miserant, altera, ne ad eos Ambiorix receptum haberet. His constitutis rebus paulum supra eum locum quo ante exercitum traduxerat facere pontem instituit. Nota atque instituta ratione magno militum studio paucis diebus opus efficitur. Firmo in Treveris ad pontem praesidio relicto, ne quis ab his subito motus oreretur, reliquas copias equitatumque traducit. Vbii, qui ante obsides dederant atque in deditionem venerant, purgandi sui causa ad eum legatos mittunt, qui doceant neque auxilia ex sua civitate in Treveros missa neque ab se fidem laesam: petunt atque orant ut sibi parcat, ne communi odio Germanorum innocentes pro nocentibus poenas pendant; si amplius obsidum vellet, dare pollicentur. Cognita Caesar causa reperit ab Suebis auxilia missa esse; Vbiorum satisfactionem accipit, aditus viasque in Suebos perquirat.

6:10. In the mean time he is informed by the Ubii, a few days after, that the Suevi are drawing all their forces into one place, and are giving orders to those nations which are under their government to send auxiliaries of infantry and of cavalry. Having learned these things, he provides a supply of corn, selects a proper place for his camp, and commands the Ubii to drive off their cattle and carry away all their possessions from the country parts into the towns, hoping that they, being a barbarous and ignorant people, when harassed by the want of provisions, might be brought to an engagement on disadvantageous terms: he orders them to send numerous scouts among the Suevi, and learn what things are going on among them. They execute the orders, and, a few days having intervened, report that all the Suevi, after certain intelligence concerning the army of the Romans had come, retreated with all their own forces and those of their allies, which they had assembled, to the utmost extremities of their territories: that there is a wood there of very great extent, which

is called Bacenis; that this stretches a great way into the interior, and, being opposed as a natural barrier, defends from injuries and incursions the Cherusci against the Suevi, and the Suevi against the Cherusci: that at the entrance of that forest the Suevi had determined to await the coming up of the Romans.

Interim paucis post diebus fit ab Vbiis certior Suebos omnes in unum locum copias cogere atque eis nationibus quae sub eorum sint imperio denuntiare, ut auxilia peditatus equitatusque mittant. His cognitis rebus rem frumentariam providet, castris idoneum locum deligit; Vbiis imperat ut pecora deducant suaque omnia ex agris in oppida conferant, sperans barbaros atque imperitos homines inopia cibarium adductos ad iniquam pugnandi condicionem posse deduci; mandat, ut crebros exploratores in Suebos mittant quaeque apud eos gerantur cognoscant. Illi imperata faciunt et paucis diebus intermissis referunt: Suebos omnes, posteaquam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint, cum omnibus suis sociorumque copiis, quas coegissent, penitus ad extremos fines se recepisse: silvam esse ibi infinita magnitudine, quae appellatur Bacenis; hanc longe introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro obiectam Cheruscos ab Suebis Suebosque ab Cheruscis iniuriis incursionibusque prohibere: ad eius initium silvae Suebos adventum Romanorum exspectare constituisse.

6:11. Since we have come to the place, it does not appear to be foreign to our subject to lay before the reader an account of the manners of Gaul and Germany, and wherein these nations differ from each other. In Gaul there are factions not only in all the states, and in all the cantons and their divisions, but almost in each family, and of these factions those are the leaders who are considered according to their

judgment to possess the greatest influence, upon whose will and determination the management of all affairs and measures depends. And that seems to have been instituted in ancient times with this view, that no one of the common people should be in want of support against one more powerful; for, none [of those leaders] suffers his party to be oppressed and defrauded, and if he do otherwise, he has no influence among his party. This same policy exists throughout the whole of Gaul; for all the states are divided into two factions.

Quoniam ad hunc locum perventum est, non alienum esse videtur de Galliae Germaniaeque moribus et quo differant hae nationes inter sese proponere. In Gallia non solum in omnibus civitatibus atque in omnibus pagis partibusque, sed paene etiam in singulis domibus factiones sunt, earumque factionum principes sunt qui summam auctoritatem eorum iudicio habere existimantur, quorum ad arbitrium iudiciumque summa omnium rerum consiliorumque redeat. Itaque eius rei causa antiquitus institutum videtur, ne quis ex plebe contra potentio rem auxilii egeret: suos enim quisque opprimi et circumveniri non patitur, neque, aliter si faciat, ullam inter suos habet auctoritatem. Haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae: namque omnes civitates in partes divisae sunt duas.

6:12. When Caesar arrived in Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of one faction, the Sequani of the other. Since the latter were less powerful by themselves, inasmuch as the chief influence was from of old among the Aedui, and their dependencies were great, they had united to themselves the Germans and Ariovistus, and had brought them over to their party by great sacrifices and promises. And having fought several successful battles and slain all the nobility of the Aedui, they had so far surpassed them in power, that they brought

over, from the Aedui to themselves, a large portion of their dependents and received from them the sons of their leading men as hostages, and compelled them to swear in their public character that they would enter into no design against them; and held a portion of the neighboring land, seized on by force, and possessed the sovereignty of the whole of Gaul. Divitiacus urged by this necessity, had proceeded to Rome to the senate, for the purpose of entreating assistance, and had returned without accomplishing his object. A change of affairs ensued on the arrival of Caesar, the hostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored, and new acquired through Caesar (because those who had attached themselves to their alliance saw that they enjoyed a better state and a milder government), their other interests, their influence, their reputation were likewise increased, and in consequence, the Sequani lost the sovereignty. The Remi succeeded to their place, and, as it was perceived that they equaled the Aedui in favor with Caesar, those, who on account of their old animosities could by no means coalesce with the Aedui, consigned themselves in clientship to the Remi. The latter carefully protected them. Thus they possessed both a new and suddenly acquired influence. Affairs were then in that position that the Aedui were considered by far the leading people, and the Remi held the second post of honor.

Cum Caesar in Galliam venit, alterius factionis principes erant Aedui, alterius Sequani. Hi cum per se minus valerent, quod summa auctoritas antiquitus erat in Aeduis magnaeque eorum erant clientelae, Germanos atque Ariovistum sibi adiunxerant eosque ad se magnis iacturis pollicitationibusque perduxerant. Proeliis vero compluribus factis secundis atque omni nobilitate Aeduorum interfecta tantum potentia antecesserant, ut magnam partem

clientium ab Aeduis ad se traducerent obsidesque ab eis principum filios acciperent et publice iurare cogerent nihil se contra Sequanos consili inituros et partem finitimi agri per vim occupatam possiderent Galliaeque totius principatum obtinerent. Qua necessitate adductus Diviciacus auxili petendi causa Romam ad senatum profectus infecta re redierat. Adventu Caesaris facta commutatione rerum, obsidibus Aeduis redditis, veteribus clientelis restitutis, novis per Caesarem comparatis, quod hi, qui se ad eorum amicitiam adgregaverant, meliore condicione atque aequiore imperio se uti videbant, reliquis rebus eorum gratia dignitateque amplificata Sequani principatum dimiserant. In eorum locum Remi successerant: quos quod adaequare apud Caesarem gratia intellegebatur, ei, qui propter veteres inimicitias nullo modo cum Aeduis coniungi poterant, se Remis in clientelam dicabant. Hos illi diligenter tuebantur: ita et novam et repente collectam auctoritatem tenebant. Eo tum statu res erat, ut longe principes haberentur Aedui, secundum locum dignitatis Remi obtinerent.

6:13. Throughout all Gaul there are two orders of those men who are of any rank and dignity: for the commonality is held almost in the condition of slaves, and dares to undertake nothing of itself, and is admitted to no deliberation. The greater part, when they are pressed either by debt, or the large amount of their tributes, or the oppression of the more powerful, give themselves up in vassalage to the nobles, who possess over them the same rights without exception as masters over their slaves. But of these two orders, one is that of the Druids, the other that of the knights. The former are engaged in things sacred, conduct the public and the private sacrifices, and interpret all matters of religion. To these a large number of the young men resort for the purpose of instruction, and they [the Druids] are in great

honor among them. For they determine respecting almost all controversies, public and private; and if any crime has been perpetrated, if murder has been committed, if there be any dispute about an inheritance, if any about boundaries, these same persons decide it; they decree rewards and punishments; if any one, either in a private or public capacity, has not submitted to their decision, they interdict him from the sacrifices. This among them is the most heavy punishment. Those who have been thus interdicted are esteemed in the number of the impious and the criminal: all shun them, and avoid their society and conversation, lest they receive some evil from their contact; nor is justice administered to them when seeking it, nor is any dignity bestowed on them. Over all these Druids one presides, who possesses supreme authority among them. Upon his death, if any individual among the rest is pre-eminent in dignity, he succeeds; but, if there are many equal, the election is made by the suffrages of the Druids; sometimes they even contend for the presidency with arms. These assemble at a fixed period of the year in a consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, which is reckoned the central region of the whole of Gaul. Hither all, who have disputes, assemble from every part, and submit to their decrees and determinations. This institution is supposed to have been devised in Britain, and to have been brought over from it into Gaul; and now those who desire to gain a more accurate knowledge of that system generally proceed thither for the purpose of studying it.

In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo. Nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco, quae nihil audet per se, nullo adhibetur consilio. Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus: in hos eadem omnia

sunt iura, quae dominis in servos. Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum. Illi rebus divinis intersunt, sacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur: ad hos magnus adulescentium numerus disciplinae causa concurrit, magnoque hi sunt apud eos honore. Nam fere de omnibus controversiis publicis privatisque constituunt, et, si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes facta, si de hereditate, de finibus controversia est, idem decernunt, praemia poenasque constituunt; si qui aut privatus aut populus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt. Haec poena apud eos est gravissima. Quibus ita est interdictum, hi numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur, his omnes decedunt, aditum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant, neque his petentibus ius redditur neque honos ullus communicatur. His autem omnibus druidibus praeest unus, qui summam inter eos habet auctoritatem. Hoc mortuo aut si qui ex reliquis excellit dignitate succedit, aut, si sunt plures pares, suffragio druidum, nonnumquam etiam armis de principatu contendunt. Hi certo anni tempore in finibus Carnutum, quae regio totius Galliae media habetur, considunt in loco consecrato. Huc omnes undique, qui controversias habent, conveniunt eorumque decretis iudiciisque parent. Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur, et nunc, qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur.

6:14. The Druids do not go to war, nor pay tribute together with the rest; they have an exemption from military service and a dispensation in all matters. Induced by such great advantages, many embrace this profession of their own accord, and [many] are sent to it by their parents and relations. They are said there to learn by heart a great number of verses; accordingly some remain in the course of training

twenty years. Nor do they regard it lawful to commit these to writing, though in almost all other matters, in their public and private transactions, they use Greek characters. That practice they seem to me to have adopted for two reasons; because they neither desire their doctrines to be divulged among the mass of the people, nor those who learn, to devote themselves the less to the efforts of memory, relying on writing; since it generally occurs to most men, that, in their dependence on writing, they relax their diligence in learning thoroughly, and their employment of the memory. They wish to inculcate this as one of their leading tenets, that souls do not become extinct, but pass after death from one body to another, and they think that men by this tenet are in a great degree excited to valor, the fear of death being disregarded. They likewise discuss and impart to the youth many things respecting the stars and their motion, respecting the extent of the world and of our earth, respecting the nature of things, respecting the power and the majesty of the immortal gods.

Druides a bello abesse consuerunt neque tributa una cum reliquis pendunt; militiae vacationem omniumque rerum habent immunitatem. Tantis excitati praemiis et sua sponte multi in disciplinam conveniunt et a parentibus propinquisque mittuntur. Magnum ibi numerum versuum ediscere dicuntur. Itaque annos nonnulli videnos in disciplina permanent. Neque fas esse existimant ea litteris mandare, cum in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus Graecis litteris utantur. Id mihi duabus de causis instituisse videntur, quod neque in vulgum disciplinam efferri velint neque eos, qui discunt, litteris confisos minus memoriae studere: quod fere plerisque accidit, ut praesidio litterarum diligentiam in perdiscendo ac memoriam remittant. In primis hoc volunt persuadere, non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios, atque hoc maxime

ad virtutem excitari putant metu mortis neglecto. Multa praeterea de sideribus atque eorum motu, de mundi ac terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de deorum immortalium vi ac potestate disputant et iuventuti tradunt.

6:15. The other order is that of the knights. These, when there is occasion and any war occurs (which before Caesar's arrival was for the most part wont to happen every year, as either they on their part were inflecting injuries or repelling those which others inflected on them), are all engaged in war. And those of them most distinguished by birth and resources, have the greatest number of vassals and dependents about them. They acknowledge this sort of influence and power only.

Alterum genus est equitum. Hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum incidit (quod fere ante Caesaris adventum quotannis accidere solebat, uti aut ipsi iniurias inferrent aut illatas propulsarent), omnes in bello versantur, atque eorum ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque noverunt.

6:16. The nation of all the Gauls is extremely devoted to superstitious rites; and on that account they who are troubled with unusually severe diseases, and they who are engaged in battles and dangers, either sacrifice men as victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them, and employ the Druids as the performers of those sacrifices; because they think that unless the life of a man be offered for the life of a man, the mind of the immortal gods can not be rendered propitious, and they have sacrifices of that kind ordained for national purposes. Others have figures of vast size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they fill with living men, which being set on fire, the men perish

enveloped in the flames. They consider that the oblation of such as have been taken in theft, or in robbery, or any other offense, is more acceptable to the immortal gods; but when a supply of that class is wanting, they have recourse to the oblation of even the innocent.

Natio est omnis Gallorum admodum dedita religionibus, atque ob eam causam, qui sunt adfecti gravioribus morbis quique in proeliis periculisque versantur, aut pro victimis homines immolant aut se immolatuos vovent administrisque ad ea sacrificia druidibus utuntur, quod, pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur, non posse deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur, publiceque eiusdem generis habent instituta sacrificia. Alii immani magnitudine simulacra habent, quorum contexta viminibus membra vivis hominibus complent; quibus succensis circumventi flamma exanimantur homines. Supplicia eorum qui in furto aut in latrocinio aut aliqua noxia sint comprehensi gratiora dis immortalibus esse arbitrantur; sed, cum eius generis copia defecit, etiam ad innocentium supplicia descendunt.

6:17. They worship as their divinity, Mercury in particular, and have many images of him, and regard him as the inventor of all arts, they consider him the guide of their journeys and marches, and believe him to have great influence over the acquisition of gain and mercantile transactions. Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva; respecting these deities they have for the most part the same belief as other nations: that Apollo averts diseases, that Minerva imparts the invention of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses the sovereignty of the heavenly powers; that Mars presides over wars. To him, when they have determined to engage in battle, they commonly vow those things which they shall take in war.

When they have conquered, they sacrifice whatever captured animals may have survived the conflict, and collect the other things into one place. In many states you may see piles of these things heaped up in their consecrated spots; nor does it often happen that any one, disregarding the sanctity of the case, dares either to secrete in his house things captured, or take away those deposited; and the most severe punishment, with torture, has been established for such a deed.

Deum maxime Mercurium colunt. Huius sunt plurima simulacra: hunc omnium inventorem artium ferunt, hunc viarum atque itinerum ducem, hunc ad quaestus pecuniae mercaturasque habere vim maximam arbitrantur. Post hunc Apollinem et Martem et Iovem et Minervam. De his eandem fere, quam reliquae gentes, habent opinionem: Apollinem morbos depellere, Minervam operum atque artificiorum initia tradere, Iovem imperium caelestium tenere, Martem bella regere. Huic, cum proelio dimicare constituerunt, ea quae bello ceperint plerumque devovent: cum superaverunt, animalia capta immolant reliquasque res in unum locum conferunt. Multis in civitatibus harum rerum exstructos tumulos locis consecratis conspicari licet; neque saepe accidit, ut neglecta quispiam religione aut capta apud se occultare aut posita tollere auderet, gravissimumque ei rei supplicium cum cruciatu constitutum est.

6:18. All the Gauls assert that they are descended from the god Dis, and say that this tradition has been handed down by the Druids. For that reason they compute the divisions of every season, not by the number of days, but of nights; they keep birthdays and the beginnings of months and years in such an order that the day follows the night. Among the other usages of their life, they differ in this

from almost all other nations, that they do not permit their children to approach them openly until they are grown up so as to be able to bear the service of war; and they regard it as indecorous for a son of boyish age to stand in public in the presence of his father.

Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos praedicant idque ab druidibus proditum dicunt. Ob eam causam spatia omnis temporis non numero dierum sed noctium finiunt; dies natales et mensum et annorum initia sic observant ut noctem dies subsequatur. In reliquis vitae institutis hoc fere ab reliquis differunt, quod suos liberos, nisi cum adoleverunt, ut munus militiae sustinere possint, palam ad se adire non patiuntur filiumque puerili aetate in publico in conspectu patris adsistere turpe ducunt.

6:19. Whatever sums of money the husbands have received in the name of dowry from their wives, making an estimate of it, they add the same amount out of their own estates. An account is kept of all this money conjointly, and the profits are laid by: whichever of them shall have survived [the other], to that one the portion of both reverts together with the profits of the previous time. Husbands have power of life and death over their wives as well as over their children: and when the father of a family, born in a more than commonly distinguished rank, has died, his relations assemble, and, if the circumstances of his death are suspicious, hold an investigation upon the wives in the manner adopted toward slaves; and, if proof be obtained, put them to severe torture, and kill them. Their funerals, considering the state of civilization among the Gauls, are magnificent and costly; and they cast into the fire all things, including living creatures, which they suppose to have been dear to them when alive; and, a little before this period, slaves and dependents, who were

ascertained to have been beloved by them, were, after the regular funeral rites were completed, burnt together with them.

Viri, quantas pecunias ab uxoribus dotis nomine acceperunt, tantas ex suis bonis aestimatione facta cum dotibus communicant. Huius omnis pecuniae coniunctim ratio habetur fructusque servantur: uter eorum vita superarit, ad eum pars utriusque cum fructibus superiorum temporum pervenit. Viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos, vitae necisque habent potestatem; et cum paterfamiliae illustriore loco natus decessit, eius propinqui conveniunt et, de morte si res in suspicionem venit, de uxoribus in servilem modum quaestionem habent et, si compertum est, igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas interficiunt. Funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica et sumptuosa; omniaque quae vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia, ac paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab eis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.

6:20. Those states which are considered to conduct their commonwealth more judiciously, have it ordained by their laws, that, if any person shall have heard by rumor and report from his neighbors any thing concerning the commonwealth, he shall convey it to the magistrate, and not impart it to any other; because it has been discovered that inconsiderate and inexperienced men were often alarmed by false reports, and driven to some rash act, or else took hasty measures in affairs of the highest importance. The magistrates conceal those things which require to be kept unknown; and they disclose to the people whatever they determine to be expedient. It is not lawful to speak of the commonwealth, except in council.

Quae civitates commodius suam rem publicam administrare

existimantur, habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de re publica a finitimis rumore aut fama acceperit, uti ad magistratum deferat neve cum quo alio communicet, quod saepe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terreri et ad facinus impelli et de summis rebus consilium capere cognitum est. Magistratus quae visa sunt occultant quaeque esse ex usu iudicaverunt multitudini produnt. De re publica nisi per concilium loqui non conceditur.

6:21. The Germans differ much from these usages, for they have neither Druids to preside over sacred offices, nor do they pay great regard to sacrifices. They rank in the number of the gods those alone whom they behold, and by whose instrumentality they are obviously benefited, namely, the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not heard of the other deities even by report. Their whole life is occupied in hunting and in the pursuits of the military art; from childhood they devote themselves to fatigue and hardships. Those who have remained chaste for the longest time, receive the greatest commendation among their people; they think that by this the growth is promoted, by this the physical powers are increased and the sinews are strengthened. And to have had knowledge of a woman before the twentieth year they reckon among the most disgraceful acts; of which matter there is no concealment, because they bathe promiscuously in the rivers and [only] use skins or small cloaks of deer's hides, a large portion of the body being in consequence naked.

Germani multum ab hac consuetudine differunt. Nam neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis praesint, neque sacrificiis student. Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus iuvantur, Solem et Vulcanum et Lunam, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt. Vita omnis in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris

consistit: ab parvulis labori ac duritiae student. Qui diutissime impuberes permanserunt, maximam inter suos ferunt laudem: hoc ali staturam, ali vires nervosque confirmari putant. Intra annum vero vicesimum feminae notitiam habuisse in turpissimis habent rebus; cuius rei nulla est occultatio, quod et promiscue in fluminibus perluuntur et pellibus aut parvis renonum tegimentis utuntur magna corporis parte nuda.

6:22. They do not pay much attention to agriculture, and a large portion of their food consists in milk, cheese, and flesh; nor has any one a fixed quantity of land or his own individual limits; but the magistrates and the leading men each year apportion to the tribes and families, who have united together, as much land as, and in the place in which, they think proper, and the year after compel them to remove elsewhere. For this enactment they advance many reasons—lest seduced by long-continued custom, they may exchange their ardor in the waging of war for agriculture; lest they may be anxious to acquire extensive estates, and the more powerful drive the weaker from their possessions; lest they construct their houses with too great a desire to avoid cold and heat; lest the desire of wealth spring up, from which cause divisions and discords arise; and that they may keep the common people in a contented state of mind, when each sees his own means placed on an equality with [those of] the most powerful.

Agriculturae non student, maiorque pars eorum victus in lacte, caseo, carne consistit. Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios; sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt. Eius rei

multas adferunt causas: ne adsidua consuetudine capti studium belli gerendi agricultura commutent; ne latos fines parare studeant, potentioresque humiliores possessionibus expellant; ne accuratius ad frigora atque aestus vitandos aedificent; ne qua oriatur pecuniae cupiditas, qua ex re factiones dissensionesque nascuntur; ut animi aequitate plebem contineant, cum suas quisque opes cum potentissimis aequari videat.

6:23. It is the greatest glory to the several states to have as wide deserts as possible around them, their frontiers having been laid waste. They consider this the real evidence of their prowess, that their neighbors shall be driven out of their lands and abandon them, and that no one dare settle near them; at the same time they think that they shall be on that account the more secure, because they have removed the apprehension of a sudden incursion. When a state either repels war waged against it, or wages it against another, magistrates are chosen to preside over that war with such authority, that they have power of life and death. In peace there is no common magistrate, but the chiefs of provinces and cantons administer justice and determine controversies among their own people. Robberies which are committed beyond the boundaries of each state bear no infamy, and they avow that these are committed for the purpose of disciplining their youth and of preventing sloth. And when any of their chiefs has said in an assembly "that he will be their leader, let those who are willing to follow, give in their names;" they who approve of both the enterprise and the man arise and promise their assistance and are applauded by the people; such of them as have not followed him are accounted in the number of deserters and traitors, and confidence in all matters is afterward refused them. To injure guests they regard as impious; they defend from wrong those who

have come to them for any purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable; to them the houses of all are open and maintenance is freely supplied.

Civitatibus maxima laus est quam latissime circum se vastatis finibus solitudines habere. Hoc proprium virtutis existimant, expulsos agris finitimos cedere, neque quemquam prope audere consistere; simul hoc se fore tutiores arbitrantur repentinae incursionis timore sublato. Cum bellum civitas aut illa tum defendit aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello praesint, ut vitae necisque habeant potestatem, deliguntur. In pace nullus est communis magistratus, sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt. Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant. Atque ubi quis ex principibus in concilio dixit se ducem fore, qui sequi velint, profiteantur, consurgunt ei qui et causam et hominem probant suumque auxilium pollicentur atque ab multitudine collaudantur: qui ex his secuti non sunt, in desertorum ac proditorum numero ducuntur, omniumque his rerum postea fides derogatur. Hospitem violare fas non putant; qui quacumque de causa ad eos venerunt, ab iniuria prohibent, sanctos habent, hisque omnium domus patent victusque communicatur.

6:24. And there was formerly a time when the Gauls excelled the Germans in prowess, and waged war on them offensively, and, on account of the great number of their people and the insufficiency of their land, sent colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the Volcae Tectosages, seized on those parts of Germany which are the most fruitful [and lie] around the Hercynian forest, (which, I perceive, was known by report to Eratosthenes and some other Greeks, and which

they call Orcynia), and settled there. Which nation to this time retains its position in those settlements, and has a very high character for justice and military merit; now also they continue in the same scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Germans, and use the same food and dress; but their proximity to the Province and knowledge of commodities from countries beyond the sea supplies to the Gauls many things tending to luxury as well as civilization. Accustomed by degrees to be overmatched and worsted in many engagements, they do not even compare themselves to the Germans in prowess.

Ac fuit antea tempus, cum Germanos Galli virtute superarent, ultro bella inferrent, propter hominum multitudinem agrique inopiam trans Rhenum colonias mitterent. Itaque ea quae fertilissima Germaniae sunt loca circum Hercyniam silvam, quam Eratostheni et quibusdam Graecis fama notam esse video, quam illi Orcyniam appellant, Volcae Tectosages occupaverunt atque ibi consederunt; quae gens ad hoc tempus his sedibus sese continet summamque habet iustitiae et bellicae laudis opinionem. Nunc quod in eadem inopia, egestate, patientia qua Germani permanent, eodem victu et cultu corporis utuntur; Gallis autem provinciarum propinquitas et transmarinarum rerum notitia multa ad copiam atque usus largitur, paulatim adsuefacti superari multisque victi proeliis ne se quidem ipsi cum illis virtute comparant.

6:25. The breadth of this Hercynian forest, which has been referred to above, is to a quick traveler, a journey of nine days. For it can not be otherwise computed, nor are they acquainted with the measures of roads. It begins at the frontiers of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and extends in a right line along the river Danube to the territories of the Daci and the Anartes; it bends thence to the left in a different

direction from the river, and owing to its extent touches the confines of many nations; nor is there any person belonging to this part of Germany who says that he either has gone to the extremity of that forest, though he had advanced a journey of sixty days, or has heard in what place it begins. It is certain that many kinds of wild beast are produced in it which have not been seen in other parts; of which the following are such as differ principally from other animals, and appear worthy of being committed to record.

Huius Hercyniae silvae, quae supra demonstrata est, latitudo novem dierum iter expedito patet: non enim aliter finiri potest, neque mensuras itinerum noverunt. Oritur ab Helvetiorum et Nemetum et Rauracorum finibus rectaque fluminis Danubi regione pertinet ad fines Dacorum et Anartium; hinc se flectit sinistrorsus diversis ab flumine regionibus multarumque gentium fines propter magnitudinem attingit; neque quisquam est huius Germaniae, qui se aut adisse ad initium eius silvae dicat, cum dierum iter LX processerit, aut, quo ex loco oriatur, acceperit: multaque in ea genera ferarum nasci constat, quae reliquis in locis visa non sint; ex quibus quae maxime differant ab ceteris et memoriae prodenda videantur haec sunt.

6:26. There is an ox of the shape of a stag, between whose ears a horn rises from the middle of the forehead, higher and straighter than those horns which are known to us. From the top of this, branches, like palms, stretch out a considerable distance. The shape of the female and of the male is the, same; the appearance and the size of the horns is the same.

Est bos cervi figura, cuius a media fronte inter aures unum cornu exsistit excelsius magisque directum his, quae nobis nota sunt,

cornibus: ab eius summo sicut palmae ramique late divunduntur. Eadem est feminae marisque natura, eadem forma magnitudoque cornuum.

6:27. There are also [animals] which are called elks. The shape of these, and the varied color of their skins, is much like roes, but in size they surpass them a little and are destitute of horns, and have legs without joints and ligatures; nor do they lie down for the purpose of rest, nor, if they have been thrown down by any accident, can they raise or lift themselves up. Trees serve as beds to them; they lean themselves against them, and thus reclining only slightly, they take their rest; when the huntsmen have discovered from the footsteps of these animals whither they are accustomed to betake themselves, they either undermine all the trees at the roots, or cut into them so far that the upper part of the trees may appear to be left standing. When they have leant upon them, according to their habit, they knock down by their weight the unsupported trees, and fall down themselves along with them.

Sunt item, quae appellantur alces. Harum est consimilis capris figura et varietas pellium, sed magnitudine paulo antecedunt mutilaeque sunt cornibus et crura sine nodis articulisque habent neque quietis causa procumbunt neque, si quo adflictae casu conciderunt, erigere sese aut sublevare possunt. His sunt arbores pro cubilibus: ad eas se applicant atque ita paulum modo reclinatae quietem capiunt. Quarum ex vestigiis cum est animadversum a venatoribus, quo se recipere consuerint, omnes eo loco aut ab radicibus subruunt aut accidunt arbores, tantum ut summa species earum stantium relinquatur. Huc cum se consuetudine reclinaverunt, infirmas arbores pondere adfligunt atque una ipsae concidunt.

6:28. There is a third kind, consisting of those animals which are called uri. These are a little below the elephant in size, and of the appearance, color, and shape of a bull. Their strength and speed are extraordinary; they spare neither man nor wild beast which they have espied. These the Germans take with much pains in pits and kill them. The young men harden themselves with this exercise, and practice themselves in this kind of hunting, and those who have slain the greatest number of them, having produced the horns in public, to serve as evidence, receive great praise. But not even when taken very young can they be rendered familiar to men and tamed. The size, shape, and appearance of their horns differ much from the horns of our oxen. These they anxiously seek after, and bind at the tips with silver, and use as cups at their most sumptuous entertainments.

Tertium est genus eorum, qui uri appellantur. Hi sunt magnitudine paulo infra elephantos, specie et colore et figura tauri. Magna vis eorum est et magna velocitas, neque homini neque ferae quam conspexerunt parcent. Hos studiose foveis captos interficiunt. Hoc se labore durant adulescentes atque hoc genere venationis exercent, et qui plurimos ex his interfecerunt, relatis in publicum cornibus, quae sint testimonio, magnam ferunt laudem. Sed adsuescere ad homines et mansuefieri ne parvuli quidem excepti possunt. Amplitudo cornuum et figura et species multum a nostrorum boum cornibus differt. Haec studiose conquisita ab labris argento circumcludunt atque in amplissimis epulis pro poculis utuntur.

6:29. Caesar, after he discovered through the Ubian scouts that the Suevi had retired into their woods, apprehending a scarcity of corn, because, as we have observed above, all the Germans pay very little attention to agriculture, resolved not to proceed any further; but, that

he might not altogether relieve the barbarians from the fear of his return, and that he might delay their succors, having led back his army, he breaks down, to the length of 200 feet, the further end of the bridge, which joined the banks of the Ubii, and at the extremity of the bridge raises towers of four stories, and stations a guard of twelve cohorts for the purpose of defending the bridge, and strengthens the place with considerable fortifications. Over that fort and guard he appointed C. Volcatius Tullus, a young man; he himself, when the corn began to ripen, having set forth for the war with Ambiorix (through the forest Arduenna, which is the largest of all Gaul, and reaches from the banks of the Rhine and the frontiers of the Treviri to those of the Nervii, and extends over more than 500 miles), he sends forward L. Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try if he might gain any advantage by rapid marches and the advantage of time, he warns him to forbid fires being made in the camp, lest any indication of his approach be given at a distance: he tells him that he will follow immediately.

Caesar, postquam per Vbios exploratores comperit Suebos sese in silvas recepisse, inopiam frumenti veritus, quod, ut supra demonstravimus, minime omnes Germani agriculturae student, constituit non progredi longius; sed, ne omnino metum reditus sui barbaris tolleret atque ut eorum auxilia tardaret, reducto exercitu partem ultimam pontis, quae ripas Vbiorum contingebat, in longitudinem pedum ducentorum rescindit atque in extremo ponte turrim tabulatorum quattuor constituit praesidiumque cohortium duodecim pontis tuendi causa ponit magnisque eum locum munitionibus firmat. Ei loco praesidioque Gaium Volcatium Tullum adulescentem praefecit. Ipse, cum maturescere frumenta inciperent, ad bellum Ambiorigis profectus per Arduennam silvam, quae est

totius Galliae maxima atque ab ripis Rheni finibusque Treverorum ad Nervios pertinet milibusque amplius quingentis in longitudinem patet, Lucium Minucium Basilum cum omni equitatu praemittit, si quid celeritate itineris atque opportunitate temporis proficere possit; monet, ut ignes in castris fieri prohibeat, ne qua eius adventus procul significatio fiat: sese confestim subsequi dicit.

6:30. Basilus does as he was commanded; having performed his march rapidly, and even surpassed the expectations of all, he surprises in the fields many not expecting him; through their information he advances toward Ambiorix himself, to the place in which he was said to be with a few horse. Fortune accomplishes much, not only in other matters, but also in the art of war. For as it happened by a remarkable chance, that he fell upon [Ambiorix] himself unguarded and unprepared, and that his arrival was seen by the people before the report or information of his arrival was carried thither; so it was an incident of extraordinary fortune that, although every implement of war which he was accustomed to have about him was seized, and his chariots and horses surprised, yet he himself escaped death. But it was effected owing to this circumstance, that his house being surrounded by a wood (as are generally the dwellings of the Gauls, who, for the purpose of avoiding heat, mostly seek the neighborhood of woods and rivers), his attendants and friends in a narrow spot sustained for a short time the attack of our horse. While they were fighting, one of his followers mounted him on a horse; the woods sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended much both toward his encountering and his escaping danger.

Basilus, ut imperatum est, facit. Celeriter contraque omnium opinionem confecto itinere multos in agris inopinantesprehendit:

eorum indicio ad ipsum Amborigem contendit, quo in loco cum paucis equitibus esse dicebatur. Multum cum in omnibus rebus tum in re militari potest fortuna. Nam sicut magno accidit casu ut in ipsum incautum etiam atque imparatum incideret, priusque eius adventus ab omnibus videretur, quam fama ac nuntius adferretur: sic magnae fuit fortunae omni militari instrumento, quod circum se habebat, erepto, raedis equisque comprehensis ipsum effugere mortem. Sed hoc quoque factum est, quod aedificio circumdato silva, ut sunt fere domicilia Gallorum, qui vitandi aestus causa plerumque silvarum atque fluminum petunt propinquitates, comites familiaresque eius angusto in loco paulisper equitum nostrorum vim sustinuerunt. His pugnantibus illum in equum quidam ex suis intulit: fugientem silvae texerunt. Sic et ad subeundum periculum et ad vitandum multum fortuna valuit.

6:31. Whether Ambiorix did not collect his forces from cool deliberation, because he considered he ought not to engage in a battle, or [whether] he was debarred by time and prevented by the sudden arrival of our horse, when he supposed the rest of the army was closely following, is doubtful: but certainly, dispatching messengers through the country, he ordered every one to provide for himself; and a part of them fled into the forest Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses; those who were nearest the ocean concealed themselves in the islands which the tides usually form; many, departing from their territories, committed themselves and all their possessions to perfect strangers. Cativolcus, king of one half of the Eburones, who had entered into the design together with Ambiorix, since, being now worn out by age, he was unable to endure the fatigue either of war or flight, having cursed Ambiorix with every imprecation, as the person who had been the contriver of that

measure, destroyed himself with the juice of the yew- tree, of which there is a great abundance in Gaul and Germany.

Ambiorix copias suas iudicione non conduxerit, quod proelio dimicandum non existimarit, an tempore exclusus et repentino equitum adventu prohibitus, cum reliquum exercitum subsequi crederet, dubium est. Sed certe dimissis per agros nuntiis sibi quemque consulere iussit. Quorum pars in Arduennam silvam, pars in continentes paludes profugit; qui proximi Oceano fuerunt, his insulis sese occultaverunt, quas aestus efficere consuerunt: multi ex suis finibus egressi se suaque omnia alienissimis crediderunt. Catuvolcus, rex dimidiae partis Eburonum, qui una cum Ambiorige consilium inierat, aetate iam confectus, cum laborem aut belli aut fugae ferre non posset, omnibus precibus detestatus Amborigem, qui eius consilii auctor fuisset, taxo, cuius magna in Gallia Germanique copia est, se exanimavit.

6:32. The Segui and Condrusi, of the nation and number of the Germans, and who are between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent ambassadors to Caesar to entreat that he would not regard them in the number of his enemies, nor consider that the cause of all the Germans on this side the Rhine was one and the same; that they had formed no plans of war, and had sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. Caesar, having ascertained this fact by an examination of his prisoners, commanded that if any of the Eburones in their flight had repaired to them, they should be sent back to him; he assures them that if they did that, he will not injure their territories. Then, having divided his forces into three parts, he sent the baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort. This is nearly in the middle of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had been

quartered for the purpose of wintering. This place he selected as well on other accounts as because the fortifications of the previous year remained, in order that he might relieve the labor of the soldiers. He left the fourteenth legion as a guard for the baggage, one of those three which he had lately raised in Italy and brought over. Over that legion and camp he places Q. Tullius Cicero and gives him 200 horse.

Segni Condrusique, ex gente et numero Germanorum, qui sunt inter Eburones Treverosque, legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret: nihil se de bello cogitavisse, nulla Ambiorigi auxilia misisse. Caesar explorata re quaestione captivorum, si qui ad eos Eburones ex fuga convenissent, ad se ut reducerentur, imperavit; si ita fecissent, fines eorum se violaturum negavit. Tum copiis in tres partes distributis impedimenta omnium legionum Aduatucam contulit. Id castelli nomen est. Hoc fere est in mediis Eburonum finibus, ubi Titurius atque Aurunculeius hiemandi causa consederant. Hunc cum reliquis rebus locum probabat, tum quod superioris anni munitiones integrae manebant, ut militum laborem sublevaret. Praesidio impedimentis legionem quartamdecimam reliquit, unam ex eis tribus, quas proxime conscriptas ex Italia traduxerat. Ei legioni castrisque Quintum Tullium Ciceronem praeficit ducentosque equites attribuit.

6:33. Having divided the army, he orders T. Labienus to proceed with three legions toward the ocean into those parts which border on the Menapii; he sends C. Trebonius with a like number of legions to lay waste that district which lies contiguous to the Aduatuci; he himself determines to go with the remaining three to the river Sambre, which

flows into the Meuse, and to the most remote parts of Arduenna, whither he heard that Ambiorix had gone with a few horse. When departing, he promises that he will return before the end of the seventh day, on which day he was aware corn was due to that legion which was being left in garrison. He directs Labienus and Trebonius to return by the same day, if they can do so agreeably to the interests of the republic; so that their measures having been mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemy having been discovered, they might be able to commence a different line of operations.

Partito exercitu Titum Labienum cum legionibus tribus ad Oceanum versus in eas partes quae Menapios attingunt proficisci iubet; Gaium Trebonium cum pari legionum numero ad eam regionem quae ad Aduatucos adiacet depopulandam mittit; ipse cum reliquis tribus ad flumen Scaldem, quod influit in Mosam, extremasque Arduennae partis ire constituit, quo cum paucis equitibus profectum Ambiorigem audiebat. Discedens post diem septimum sese reversurum confirmat; quam ad diem ei legioni quae in praesidio relinquebatur deberi frumentum sciebat. Labienum Treboniumque hortatur, si rei publicae commodo facere possint, ad eum diem revertantur, ut rursus communicato consilio exploratisque hostium rationibus aliud initium belli capere possint.

6:34. There was, as we have above observed, no regular army, nor a town, nor a garrison which could defend itself by arms; but the people were scattered in all directions. Where either a hidden valley, or a woody spot, or a difficult morass furnished any hope of protection or of security to any one, there he had fixed himself. These places were known to those who dwelt in the neighborhood, and the matter demanded great attention, not so much in protecting the main

body of the army (for no peril could occur to them altogether from those alarmed and scattered troops), as in preserving individual soldiers; which in some measure tended to the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty was leading many too far, and the woods with their unknown and hidden routes would not allow them to go in large bodies. If he desired the business to be completed and the race of those infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of men must be sent in several directions and the soldiers must be detached on all sides; if he were disposed to keep the companies at their standards, as the established discipline and practice of the Roman army required, the situation itself was a safeguard to the barbarians, nor was there wanting to individuals the daring to lay secret ambuscades and beset scattered soldiers. But amid difficulties of this nature as far as precautions could be taken by vigilance, such precautions were taken; so that some opportunities of injuring the enemy were neglected, though the minds of all were burning to take revenge, rather than that injury should be effected with any loss to our soldiers. Caesar dispatches messengers to the neighboring states; by the hope of booty he invites all to him, for the purpose of plundering the Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls might be hazarded in the woods rather than the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in order that a large force being drawn around them, the race and name of that state may be annihilated for such a crime. A large number from all quarters speedily assembles.

Erat, ut supra demonstravimus, manus certa nulla, non oppidum, non praesidium, quod se armis defenderet, sed in omnes partes dispersa multitudo. Vbi cuique aut valles abdita aut locus silvestris aut palus impedita spem praesidi aut salutis aliquam offerebat, consederat. Haec loca vicinitatibus erant nota, magnamque res diligentiam

requirebat non in summa exercitus tuenda (nullum enim poterat universis ab perterritis ac dispersis periculum accidere), sed in singulis militibus conservandis; quae tamen ex parte res ad salutem exercitus pertinebat. Nam et praedae cupiditas multos longius evocabat, et silvae incertis occultisque itineribus confertos adire prohibebant. Si negotium confici stirpemque hominum sceleratorum interfici vellet, dimittendae plures manus diducendique erant milites; si continere ad signa manipulos vellet, ut instituta ratio et consuetudo exercitus Romani postulabat, locus ipse erat praesidio barbaris, neque ex occulto insidiandi et dispersos circumveniendi singulis deerat audacia. Vt in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. Dimittit ad finitimas civitates nuntios Caesar: omnes ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur, simul ut magna multitudine circumfusa pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur. Magnus undique numerus celeriter convenit.

6:35. These things were going on in all parts of the territories of the Eburones, and the seventh day was drawing near, by which day Caesar had purposed to return to the baggage and the legion. Here it might be learned how much fortune achieves in war, and how great casualties she produces. The enemy having been scattered and alarmed, as we related above, there was no force which might produce even a slight occasion of fear. The report extends beyond the Rhine to the Germans that the Eburones are being pillaged, and that all were without distinction invited to the plunder. The Sigambri, who are nearest to the Rhine, by whom, we have mentioned above,

the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were received after their retreat, collect 2,000 horse; they cross the Rhine in ships and barks thirty miles below that place where the bridge was entire and the garrison left by Caesar; they arrive at the frontiers of the Eburones, surprise many who were scattered in flight, and get possession of a large amount of cattle, of which barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by booty, they advance further; neither morass nor forest obstructs these men, born amid war and depredations; they inquire of their prisoners in what part Caesar is; they find that he has advanced further, and learn that all the army has removed. Thereon one of the prisoners says, "Why do you pursue such wretched and trifling spoil; you, to whom it is granted to become even now most richly endowed by fortune? In three hours you can reach Aduatuca; there the Roman army has deposited all its fortunes; there is so little of a garrison that not even the wall can be manned, nor dare any one go beyond the fortifications." A hope having been presented them, the Germans leave in concealment the plunder they had acquired; they themselves hasten to Aduatuca, employing as their guide the same man by whose information they had become informed of these things.

Haec in omnibus Eburonum partibus gerebantur, diesque appetebat septimus, quem ad diem Caesar ad impedimenta legionemque reverti constituerat. Hic quantum in bello fortuna possit et quantos adferat casus cognosci potuit. Dissipatis ac perterritis hostibus, ut demonstravimus, manus erat nulla quae parvam modo causam timoris adferret. Trans Rhenum ad Germanos pervenit fama, diripi Eburones atque ultro omnes ad praedam evocari. Cogunt equitum duo milia Sugambri, qui sunt proximi Rheno, a quibus receptos ex fuga Tencteros atque Vsipetes supra docuimus. Transeunt Rhenum navibus ratibusque triginta milibus passuum infra eum locum, ubi

pons erat perfectus praesidiumque ab Caesare relictum: primos Eburonum fines adeunt; multos ex fuga dispersos excipiunt, magno pecoris numero, cuius sunt cupidissimi barbari, potiuntur. Invitati praeda longius procedunt. Non hos palus in bello latrociniisque natos, non silvae morantur. Quibus in locis sit Caesar ex captivis quaerunt; profectum longius reperiunt omnemque exercitum discessisse cognoscunt. Atque unus ex captivis “Quid vos,” inquit, “hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamini praedam, quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? Tribus horis Aduatucam venire potestis: huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit: praesidi tantum est, ut ne murus quidem cingi possit, neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat.” Oblata spe Germani quam nacti erant praedam in occulto relinquunt; ipsi Aduatucam contendunt usi eodem duce, cuius haec indicio cognoverant.

6:36. Cicero, who during all the foregoing days had kept his soldiers in camp with the greatest exactness, and agreeable to the injunctions of Caesar, had not permitted even any of the camp-followers to go beyond the fortification, distrusting on the seventh day that Caesar would keep his promise as to the number of days, because he heard that he had proceeded further, and no report as to his return was brought to him, and being urged at the same time by the expressions of those who called his tolerance almost a siege, if, forsooth, it was not permitted them to go out of the camp, since he might expect no disaster, whereby he could be injured, within three miles of the camp, while nine legions and all the cavalry were under arms, and the enemy scattered and almost annihilated, sent five cohorts into the neighboring corn-lands, between which and the camp only one hill intervened, for the purpose of foraging. Many soldiers of the legions had been left invalided in the camp, of whom those who had

recovered in this space of time, being about 300, are sent together under one standard; a large number of soldiers' attendants besides, with a great number of beasts of burden, which had remained in the camp, permission being granted, follow them.

Cicero, qui omnes superiores dies praeceptis Caesaris cum summa diligentia milites in castris continuisset ac ne calonem quidem quemquam extra munitionem egredi passus esset, septimo die diffidens de numero dierum Caesarem fidem servaturum, quod longius progressum audiebat, neque ulla de reditu eius fama adferebatur, simul eorum permotus vocibus, qui illius patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant, siquidem ex castris egredi non liceret, nullum eiusmodi casum exspectans, quo novem oppositis legionibus maximoque equitatu dispersis ac paene deletis hostibus in milibus passuum tribus offendi posset, quinque cohortes frumentatum in proximas segetes mittit, quas inter et castra unus omnino collis intererat. Complures erant ex legionibus aegri relict; ex quibus qui hoc spatio dierum convalescerant, circiter CCC, sub vexillo una mittuntur; magna praeterea multitudo calonum, magna vis iumentorum, quae in castris subsederant, facta potestate sequitur.

6:37. At this very time, the German horse by chance came up, and immediately, with the same speed with which they had advanced, attempt to force the camp at the Decuman gate, nor were they seen, in consequence of woods lying in the way on that side, before they were just reaching the camp: so much so, that the sutlers who had their booths under the rampart had not an opportunity of retreating within the camp. Our men, not anticipating it, are perplexed by the sudden affair, and the cohort on the outpost scarcely sustains the first attack. The enemy spread themselves on the other sides to ascertain

if they could find any access. Our men with difficulty defend the gates; the very position of itself and the fortification secures the other accesses. There is a panic in the entire camp, and one inquires of another the cause of the confusion, nor do they readily determine whither the standards should be borne, nor into what quarter each should betake himself. One avows that the camp is already taken, another maintains that, the enemy having destroyed the army and commander-in-chief, are come hither as conquerors; most form strange superstitious fancies from the spot, and place before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta and Titurius, who had fallen in the same fort. All being greatly disconcerted by this alarm, the belief of the barbarians is strengthened that there is no garrison within, as they had heard from their prisoner. They endeavor to force an entrance and encourage one another not to cast from their hands so valuable a prize.

Hoc ipso tempore et casu Germani equites interveniunt protinusque eodem illo, quo venerant, cursu ab decumana porta in castra irrumpere conantur, nec prius sunt visi obiectis ab ea parte silvis, quam castris appropinquarent, usque eo ut qui sub vallo tenderent mercatores recipiendi sui facultatem non haberent. Inopinantes nostri re nova perturbantur, ac vix primum impetum cohors in statione sustinet. Circumfunduntur ex reliquis hostes partibus, si quem aditum reperire possent. Aegre portas nostri tuentur, reliquos aditus locus ipse per se munitioque defendit. Totis trepidatur castris, atque alius ex alio causam tumultus quaerit; neque quo signa ferantur neque quam in partem quisque conveniat provident. Alius iam castra capta pronuntiat, alius deleto exercitu atque imperatore victores barbaros venisse contendit; plerique novas sibi ex loco religiones fingunt Cottaque et Tituri calamitatem, qui in eodem occiderint castello,

ante oculos ponunt. Tali timore omnibus perterritis confirmatur opinio barbaris, ut ex captivo audierant, nullum esse intus praesidium. Perrumpere nituntur seque ipsi adhortantur, ne tantam fortunam ex manibus dimittant.

6:38. P. Sextius Baculus, who had led a principal century under Caesar (of whom we have made mention in previous engagements), had been left an invalid in the garrison, and had now been five days without food. He, distrusting his own safety and that of all, goes forth from his tent unarmed; he sees that the enemy are close at hand and that the matter is in the utmost danger; he snatches arms from those nearest, and stations himself at the gate. The centurions of that cohort which was on guard follow him; for a short time they sustain the fight together. Sextius faints, after receiving many wounds; he is with difficulty saved, drawn away by the hands of the soldiers. This space having intervened, the others resume courage so far as to venture to take their place on the fortifications and present the aspect of defenders.

Erat aeger cum praesidio relictus Publius Sextius Baculus, qui primum pilum ad Caesarem duxerat, cuius mentionem superioribus proeliis fecimus, ac diem iam quintum cibo caruerat. Hic diffusus suae atque omnium saluti inermis ex tabernaculo prodit: videt imminere hostes atque in summo esse rem discrimine: capit arma a proximis atque in porta consistit. Consequuntur hunc centuriones eius cohortis quae in statione erat: paulisper una proelium sustinent. Relinquit animus Sextium gravibus acceptis vulneribus: aegre per manus tractus servatur. Hoc spatio interposito reliqui sese confirmant tantum, ut in munitionibus consistere audeant speciemque defensorum praebeant.

6:39. The foraging having in the mean time been completed, our soldiers distinctly hear the shout; the horse hasten on before and discover in what danger the affair is. But here there is no fortification to receive them, in their alarm: those last enlisted, and unskilled in military discipline turn their faces to the military tribune and the centurions; they wait to find what orders may be given by them. No one is so courageous as not to be disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair. The barbarians, espying our standard in the distance, desist from the attack; at first they suppose that the legions, which they had learned from their prisoners had removed further off, had returned; afterward, despising their small number, they make an attack on them at all sides.

Interim confecta frumentatione milites nostri clamorem exaudiunt: praecurrunt equites; quanto res sit in periculo cognoscunt. Hic vero nulla munitio est quae perterritos recipiat: modo conscripti atque usus militaris imperiti ad tribunum militum centurionesque ora convertunt; quid ab his praecipiat exspectant. Nemo est tam fortis quin rei novitate perturbetur. Barbari signa procul conspicati oppugnatione desistunt: redisse primo legiones credunt, quas longius discessisse ex captivis cognoverant; postea despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt.

6:40. The camp-followers run forward to the nearest rising ground; being speedily driven from this they throw themselves among the standards and companies: they thus so much the more alarm the soldiers already affrighted. Some propose that, forming a wedge, they suddenly break through, since the camp was so near; and if any part should be surrounded and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest may be saved; others, that they take their stand on an eminence,

and all undergo the same destiny. The veteran soldiers whom we stated to have set out together [with the others] under a standard, do not approve of this. Therefore encouraging each other, under the conduct of Caius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been appointed over them, they break through the midst of the enemy, and arrive in the camp safe to a man. The camp attendants and the horse following close upon them with the same impetuosity, are saved by the courage of the soldiers. But those who had taken their stand upon the eminence having even now acquired no experience of military matters, neither could persevere in that resolution which they approved of, namely, to defend themselves from their higher position, nor imitate that vigor and speed which they had observed to have availed others; but, attempting to reach the camp, had descended into an unfavorable situation. The centurions, some of whom had been promoted for their valor from the lower ranks of other legions to higher ranks in this legion, in order that they might not forfeit their glory for military exploits previously acquired, fell together fighting most valiantly. The enemy having been dislodged by their valor, a part of the soldiers arrived safe in camp contrary to their expectations; a part perished, surrounded by the barbarians.

Calones in proximum tumulum procurrunt. Hinc celeriter deiecti se in signa manipulosque coniciunt: eo magis timidos perterrent milites. Alii cuneo facto ut celeriter perrumpant censeant, quoniam tam propinqua sint castra, et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt; alii, ut in iugo consistant atque eundem omnes ferant casum. Hoc veteres non probant milites, quos sub vexillo una profectos docuimus. Itaque inter se cohortati duce Gaio Trebonio, equite Romano, qui eis erat praepositus, per medios hostes perrumpunt incolumesque ad unum omnes in castra

perveniunt. Hos subsecuti calones equitesque eodem impetu militum virtute servantur. At ei qui in iugo constiterant, nullo etiam nunc usu rei militaris percepto neque in eo quod probaverant consilio permanere, ut se loco superiore defenderent, neque eam quam prodesse aliis vim celeritatemque viderant imitari potuerunt, sed se in castra recipere conati iniquum in locum demiserunt. Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti, ne ante partam rei militaris laudem amitterent, fortissime pugnantes conciderunt. Militum pars horum virtute summotis hostibus praeter spem incolumis in castra pervenit, pars a barbaris circumventa periit.

6:41. The Germans, despairing of taking the camp by storm, because they saw that our men had taken up their position on the fortifications, retreated beyond the Rhine with that plunder which they had deposited in the woods. And so great was the alarm, even after the departure of the enemy, that when C. Volusenus, who had been sent with the cavalry, arrived that night, he could not gain credence that Caesar was close at hand with his army safe. Fear had so pre-occupied the minds of all, that their reason being almost estranged, they said that all the other forces having been cut off, the cavalry alone had arrived there by flight, and asserted that, if the army were safe, the Germans would not have attacked the camp; which fear the arrival of Caesar removed.

Germani desperata expugnatione castrorum, quod nostros iam constitisse in munitionibus videbant, cum ea praeda quam in silvis deposuerant trans Rhenum sese receperunt. Ac tantus fuit etiam post discessum hostium terror ut ea nocte, cum Gaius Volusenus missus cum equitatu ad castra venisset, fidem non faceret adesse cum

incolumi Caesarem exercitu. Sic omnino animos timor praeoccupaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent neque incolumi exercitu Germanos castra oppugnatuos fuisse contenderent. Quem timorem Caesaris adventus sustulit.

6:42. He, on his return, being well aware of the casualties of war, complained of one thing [only], namely, that the cohorts had been sent away from the outposts and garrison [duty], and pointed out that room ought not to have been left for even the most trivial casualty; that fortune had exercised great influence in the sudden arrival of their enemy; much greater, in that she had turned the barbarians away from the very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all which events, it seemed the most surprising, that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with this object, that they might plunder the territories of Ambiorix, being led to the camp of the Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable service.

Reversus ille eventus belli non ignorans unum, quod cohortes ex statione et praesidio essent emissae, questus ne minimo quidem casu locum relinqui debuisset, multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse iudicavit, multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum barbaros avertisset. Quarum omnium rerum maxime admirandum videbatur, quod Germani, qui eo consilio Rhenum transierant, ut Ambiorigis fines depopularentur, ad castra Romanorum delati optatissimum Ambiorigi beneficium obtulerunt.

6:43. Caesar, having again marched to harass the enemy, after collecting a large number [of auxiliaries] from the neighboring states, dispatches them in all directions. All the villages and all the buildings, which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was being driven off

from all parts; the corn not only was being consumed by so great numbers of cattle and men, but also had fallen to the earth, owing to the time of the year and the storms; so that if any had concealed themselves for the present, still, it appeared likely that they must perish through want of all things, when the army should be drawn off. And frequently it came to that point, as so large a body of cavalry had been sent abroad in all directions, that the prisoners declared Ambiorix had just then been seen by them in flight, and had not even passed out of sight, so that the hope of overtaking him being raised, and unbounded exertions having been resorted to, those who thought they should acquire the highest favor with Caesar, nearly overcame nature by their ardor, and continually, a little only seemed wanting to complete success; but he rescued himself by [means of] lurking-places and forests, and, concealed by the night made for other districts and quarters, with no greater guard than that of four horsemen, to whom along he ventured to confide his life.

Caesar rursus ad vexandos hostes profectus magno coacto numero ex finitimis civitatibus in omnes partes dimittit. Omnes vici atque omnia aedificia quae quisque conspexerat incendebantur; praeda ex omnibus locis agebatur; frumenta non solum tanta multitudine iumentorum atque hominum consumebantur, sed etiam anni tempore atque imbribus procubuerant ut, si qui etiam in praesentia se occultassent, tamen his deducto exercitu rerum omnium inopia pereundum videretur. Ac saepe in eum locum ventum est tanto in omnes partes diviso equitatu, ut modo visum ab se Ambiorigem in fuga circumspicerent captivi nec plane etiam abisse ex conspectu contenderent, ut spe consequendi illata atque infinito labore suscepto, qui se summam ab Caesare gratiam inituros putarent, paene naturam studio vincerent, semperque paulum ad summam felicitatem defuisse

videretur, atque ille latebris aut saltibus se eriperet et noctu occultatus alias regiones partesque peteret non maiore equitum praesidio quam quattuor, quibus solis vitam suam committere audebat.

6:44. Having devastated the country in such a manner, Caesar leads back his army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum of the Remi, and, having summoned a council of Gaul to assemble at that place, he resolved to hold an investigation respecting the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes, and having pronounced a most severe sentence upon Acco, who had been the contriver of that plot, he punished him after the custom of our ancestors. Some fearing a trial, fled; when he had forbidden these fire and water, he stationed in winter quarters two legions at the frontiers of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, the remaining six at Agendicum, in the territories of the Senones; and, having provided corn for the army, he set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes.

Tali modo vastatis regionibus exercitum Caesar duarum cohortium damno Durocortorum Remorum reducit concilioque in eum locum Galliae indicto de coniuratione Senonum et Carnutum quaestionem habere instituit et de Accone, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, graviore sententia pronuntiata more maiorum supplicium sumpsit. Nonnulli iudicium veriti profugerunt. Quibus cum aqua atque igni interdixisset, duas legiones ad fines Treverorum, duas in Lingonibus, sex reliquas in Senonum finibus Agedinci in hibernis collocavit frumentoque exercitui proviso, ut instituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

BOOK VII (52 BC)

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7:1. Gaul being tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, sets out for Italy to hold the provincial assizes. There he receives intelligence of the death of Clodius; and, being informed of the decree of the senate, [to the effect] that all the youth of Italy should take the military oath, he determined to hold a levy throughout the entire province. Report of these events is rapidly borne into Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls themselves add to the report, and invent what the case seemed to require, [namely] that Caesar was detained by commotions in the city, and could not, amid so violent dissensions, come to his army. Animated by this opportunity, they who already, previously to this occurrence, were indignant that they were reduced beneath the dominion of Rome, begin to organize their plans for war more openly and daringly. The leading men of Gaul, having convened councils among themselves in the woods, and retired places, complain of the death of Acco: they point out that this fate may fall in turn on themselves: they bewail the unhappy fate of Gaul; and by every sort of promises and rewards, they earnestly solicit some to begin the war, and assert the freedom of Gaul at the hazard of their lives. They say that special care should be paid to this, that Caesar should be cut off from his army before their secret plans should be divulged. That this was easy, because neither would the legions, in the absence of their general, dare to leave their winter quarters, nor could the general reach his army without a guard: finally, that it was better to be slain in battle, than not to recover their ancient glory in war, and that freedom which they had received from their forefathers.

Quieta Gallia Caesar, ut constituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos proficiscitur. Ibi cognoscit de Clodii caede [de] senatusque consulto certior factus, ut omnes iuniores Italiae coniurarent, delectum tota provincia habere instituit. Eae res in Galliam Transalpinam celeriter perferuntur. Addunt ipsi et ad fingunt rumoribus Galli, quod res poscere videbatur, retineri urbano motu Caesarem neque in tantis dissensionibus ad exercitum venire posse. Hac impulsu occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt. Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis queruntur de Acconis morte; posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant: miserantur communem Galliae fortunam: omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemius deposcunt qui belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent. In primis rationem esse habendam dicunt, priusquam eorum clandestina consilia efferantur, ut Caesar ab exercitu intercludatur. Id esse facile, quod neque legiones audeant absente imperatore ex hibernis egredi, neque imperator sine praesidio ad legiones pervenire possit. Postremo in acie praestare interfici quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare.

7:2. While these things are in agitation, the Carnutes declare “that they would decline no danger for the sake of the general safety, and promise” that they would be the first of all to begin the war; and since they can not at present take precautions, by giving and receiving hostages, that the affair shall not be divulged, they require that a solemn assurance be given them by oath and plighted honor, their military standards being brought together (in which manner their most sacred obligations are made binding), that they should not be deserted by the rest of the Gauls on commencing the war.

His rebus agitatis profitentur Carnutes se nullum periculum communis salutis causa recusare principesque ex omnibus bellum facturos pollicentur et, quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint ne res efferatur, ut iureiurando ac fide sanciantur, petunt, collatis militaribus signis, quo more eorum gravissima caerimonia continetur, ne facto initio belli ab reliquis deserantur. Tum collaudatis Carnutibus, dato iureiurando ab omnibus qui aderant, tempore eius rei constituto ab concilio disceditur.

7.3. When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, under the command of Cotuatus and Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together at Genabum, and slay the Roman citizens who had settled there for the purpose of trading (among the rest, Caius Fusius Cita, a distinguished Roman knight, who by Caesar's orders had presided over the provision department), and plunder their property. The report is quickly spread among all the states of Gaul; for, whenever a more important and remarkable event takes place, they transmit the intelligence through their lands and districts by a shout; the others take it up in succession, and pass it to their neighbors, as happened on this occasion; for the things which were done at Genabum at sunrise, were heard in the territories of the Arverni before the end of the first watch, which is an extent of more than a hundred and sixty miles.

Vbi ea dies venit, Carnutes Cotuato et Conconnetodumno ducibus, desperatis hominibus, Cenabum signo dato concurrunt civesque Romanos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant, in his Gaium Fufium Citam, honestum equitem Romanum, qui rei frumentariae iussu Caesaris praeerat, interficiunt bonaque eorum diripiunt. Celeriter ad omnes Galliae civitates fama perfertur. Nam ubicumque maior atque

illustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant; hunc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accidit. Nam quae Cenabi oriente sole gesta essent, ante primam confectam vigiliam in finibus Arvernorum audita sunt, quod spatium est milium passuum circiter centum LX.

7:4. There in like manner, Vercingetorix the son of Celtillus the Arvernian, a young man of the highest power (whose father had held the supremacy of entire Gaul, and had been put to death by his fellow-citizens, for this reason, because he aimed at sovereign power), summoned together his dependents, and easily excited them. On his design being made known, they rush to arms: he is expelled from the town of Gergovia, by his uncle Gobanitio and the rest of the nobles, who were of opinion, that such an enterprise ought not to be hazarded: he did not however desist, but held in the country a levy of the needy and desperate. Having collected such a body of troops, he brings over to his sentiments such of his fellow-citizens as he has access to: he exhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the general freedom, and having assembled great forces he drives from the state his opponents, by whom he had been expelled a short time previously. He is saluted king by his partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his interests the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, and all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferred on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demands hostages from all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers to be sent to him immediately; he determines what quantity of arms each state shall prepare at home, and before what time; he pays particular attention to the cavalry. To the utmost vigilance he adds

the utmost rigor of authority; and by the severity of his punishments brings over the wavering: for on the commission of a greater crime he puts the perpetrators to death by fire and every sort of tortures; for a slighter cause, he sends home the offenders with their ears cut off, or one of their eyes put out, that they may be an example to the rest, and frighten others by the severity of their punishment.

Simili ratione ibi Vercingetorix, Celtilli filius, Arvernus, summae potentiae adulescens, cuius pater principatum Galliae totius obtinuerat et ob eam causam, quod regnum appetebat, ab civitate erat interfectus, convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit. Cognito eius consilio ad arma concurritur. Prohibetur ab Gobannitione, patruo suo, reliquisque principibus, qui hanc temptandam fortunam non existimabant; expellitur ex oppido Gergovia; non destitit tamen atque in agris habet dilectum egentium ac perditorum. Hac coacta manu, quoscumque adit ex civitate ad suam sententiam perducit; hortatur ut communis libertatis causa arma capiant, magnisque coactis copiis adversarios suos a quibus paulo ante erat eiectus expellit ex civitate. Rex ab suis appellatur. Dimittit quoque versus legationes; obtestatur ut in fide maneat. Celeriter sibi Senones, Parisios, Pictones, Cadurcos, Turonos, Aulercos, Lemovices, Andos reliquosque omnes qui Oceanum attingunt adiungit: omnium consensu ad eum defertur imperium. Qua oblata potestate omnibus his civitatibus obsides imperat, certum numerum militum ad se celeriter adduci iubet, armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi quodque ante tempus efficiat constituit; in primis equitatu studet. Summae diligentiae summam imperi severitatem addit; magnitudine supplicii dubitantes cogit. Nam maiore commisso delicto igni atque omnibus tormentis necat, levio de causa auribus desectis aut singulis effossis oculis domum remittit, ut sint reliquis documento et magnitudine poenae

perterreant alios.

7:5. Having quickly collected an army by their punishments, he sends Lucterius, one of the Cadurci, a man the utmost daring, with part of his forces, into the territory of the Ruteni; and marches in person into the country of the Bituriges. On his arrival, the Bituriges send ambassadors to the Aedui, under whose protection they were, to solicit aid in order that they might more easily resist the forces of the enemy. The Aedui, by the advice of the lieutenants whom Caesar had left with the army, send supplies of horse and foot to succor the Bituriges. When they came to the river Loire, which separates the Bituriges from the Aedui, they delayed a few days there, and, not daring to pass the river, return home, and send back word to the lieutenants that they had returned through fear of the treachery of the Bituriges, who, they ascertained, had formed this design, that if the Aedui should cross the river, the Bituriges on the one side, and the Arverni on the other, should surround them. Whether they did this for the reason which they alleged to the lieutenants, or influenced by treachery, we think that we ought not to state as certain, because we have no proof. On their departure, the Bituriges immediately unite themselves to the Arverni.

His suppliciis celeriter coacto exercitu Lucterium Cadurcum, summae hominem audaciae, cum parte copiarum in Rutenos mittit; ipse in Bituriges proficiscitur. Eius adventu Bituriges ad Aeduos, quorum erant in fide, legatos mittunt subsidium rogatum, quo facilius hostium copias sustinere possint. Aedui de consilio legatorum, quos Caesar ad exercitum reliquerat, copias equitatus peditatusque subsidio Biturigibus mittunt. Qui cum ad flumen Ligerim venissent, quod Bituriges ab Aeduis dividit, paucos dies ibi morati neque

flumen transire ausi domum revertuntur legatisque nostris renuntiant se Biturigum perfidiam veritos revertisse, quibus id consili fuisse cognoverint, ut, si flumen transissent, una ex parte ipsi, altera Arverni se circumstiterent. Id eane de causa, quam legatis pronuntiarunt, an perfidia adducti fecerint, quod nihil nobis constat, non videtur pro certo esse proponendum. Bituriges eorum discessu statim cum Arvernīs iunguntur.

7:6. These affairs being announced to Caesar in Italy, at the time when he understood that matters in the city had been reduced to a more tranquil state by the energy of Cneius Pompey, he set out for Transalpine Gaul. After he had arrived there, he was greatly at a loss to know by what means he could reach his army. For if he should summon the legions into the province, he was aware that on their march they would have to fight in his absence; he foresaw too that if he himself should endeavor to reach the army, he would act injudiciously, in trusting his safety even to those who seemed to be tranquilized.

His rebus in Italiam Caesari nuntiatis, cum iam ille urbanas res virtute Cn. Pompei commodiorem in statum pervenisse intellexeret, in Transalpinam Galliam profectus est. Eo cum venisset, magna difficultate adficiebatur, qua ratione ad exercitum pervenire posset. Nam si legiones in provinciam arcesseret, se absente in itinere proelio dimicaturas intellegebat; si ipse ad exercitum contenderet, ne eis quidem eo tempore qui quieti viderentur suam salutem recte committi videbat.

7:7. In the mean time Luciterius the Cadurcan, having been sent into the country of the Ruteni, gains over that state to the Arverni. Having advanced into the country of the Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receives

hostages from both nations, and, assembling a numerous force, marches to make a descent on the province in the direction of Narbo. Caesar, when this circumstance was announced to him, thought that the march to Narbo ought to take the precedence of all his other plans. When he arrived there, he encourages the timid and stations garrisons among the Ruteni, in the province of the Volcae Arecomici, and the country around Narbo which was in the vicinity of the enemy; he orders a portion of the forces from the province, and the recruits which he had brought from Italy, to rendezvous among the Helvii who border on the territories of the Arverni.

Interim Lucterius Cadurcus in Rutenos missus eam civitatem Arvernīs conciliat. Progressus in Nitiobriges et Gabalos ab utrisque obsides accipit et magna coacta manu in provinciam Narbonem versus eruptionem facere contendit. Qua re nuntiata Caesar omnibus consiliis antevertendum existimavit, ut Narbonem proficisceretur. Eo cum venisset, timentes confirmat, praesidia in Rutenis provincialibus, Volcis Arecomicis, Tolosatibus circumque Narbonem, quae loca hostibus erant finitima, constituit; partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque, quod ex Italia adduxerat, in Helvios, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire iubet.

7:8. These matters being arranged, and Lucterius now checked and forced to retreat, because he thought it dangerous to enter the line of Roman garrisons, Caesar marches into the country of the Helvii; although mount Cevennes, which separates the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked up the way with very deep snow, as it was the severest season of the year; yet having cleared away the snow to the depth of six feet, and having opened the roads, he reaches the territories of the Arverni, with infinite labor to his soldiers. This

people being surprised, because they considered themselves defended by the Cevennes as by a wall, and the paths at this season of the year had never before been passable even to individuals, he orders the cavalry to extend themselves as far as they could, and strike as great a panic as possible into the enemy. These proceedings are speedily announced to Vercingetorix by rumor and his messengers. Around him all the Arverni crowd in alarm, and solemnly entreat him to protect their property, and not to suffer them to be plundered by the enemy, especially as he saw that all the war was transferred into their country. Being prevailed upon by their entreaties he moves his camp from the country of the Bituriges in the direction of the Arverni.

His rebus comparatis, represso iam Lucterio et remoto, quod intrare intra praesidia periculosum putabat, in Helvios proficiscitur. Etsi mons Cevenna, qui Arvernos ab Helviis discludit, durissimo tempore anni altissima nive iter impediabat, tamen discussa nive sex in altitudinem pedum atque ita viis patefactis summo militum sudore ad fines Arvernorum pervenit. Quibus oppressis inopinantibus, quod se Cevenna ut muro munitos existimabant, ac ne singulari quidem umquam homini eo tempore anni semitae patuerant, equitibus imperat, ut quam latissime possint vagentur et quam maximum hostibus terrorem inferant. Celeriter haec fama ac nuntiis ad Vercingetorigem perferuntur; quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumsistunt atque obsecrant, ut suis fortunis consulat, neve ab hostibus diripiautur, praesertim cum videat omne ad se bellum translatum. Quorum ille precibus per motus castra ex Biturigibus movet in Arveruos versus.

7:9. Caesar, having delayed two days in that place, because he had

anticipated that, in the natural course of events, such would be the conduct of Vercingetorix, leaves the army under pretense of raising recruits and cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man, in command of these forces; he gives him instructions that the cavalry should range as extensively as possible in all directions; that he would exert himself not to be absent from the camp longer than three days. Having arranged these matters, he marches to Vienna by as long journeys as he can, when his own soldiers did not expect him. Finding there a fresh body of cavalry, which he had sent on to that place several days before, marching incessantly night and day, he advanced rapidly through the territory of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, in which two legions were wintering, that, if any plan affecting his own safety should have been organized by the Aedui, he might defeat it by the rapidity of his movements. When he arrived there, he sends information to the rest of the legions, and gathers all his army into one place before intelligence of his arrival could be announced to the Arverni. Vercingetorix, on hearing this circumstance, leads back his army into the country of the Bituriges; and after marching from it to Gergovia, a town of the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after defeating them in the Helvetian war, and had rendered tributary to the Aedui, he determined to attack it.

At Caesar biduum in his locis moratus, quod haec de Vercingetorige usu ventura opinione praeceperat, per causam supplementi equitatusque cogendi ab exercitu discedit; Brutum adolescentem his copiis praeficit; hunc monet, ut in omnes partes equites quam latissime pervagentur: daturum se operam, ne longius triduo ab castris absit. His constitutis rebus suis inopinantibus quam maximis potest itineribus Viennam pervenit. Ibi nactus recentem equitatum, quem multis ante diebus eo praemiserat, neque diurno neque

nocturno itinere intermisso per fines Aeduorum in Lingones contendit, ubi duae legiones hiemabant, ut, si quid etiam de sua salute ab Aeduis iniretur consili, celeritate praecurreret. Eo cum pervenisset, ad reliquas legiones mittit priusque omnes in unum locum cogit quam de eius adventu Arvernīs nuntiari posset. Hac re cognita Vercingetorix rursus in Bituriges exercitum reducit atque inde profectus Gorgobinam, Boiorum oppidum, quos ibi Helvetico proelio victos Caesar collocaverat Aeduisque attribuerat, oppugnare instituit.

7:10. This action caused great perplexity to Caesar in the selection of his plans; [he feared] lest, if he should confine his legions in one place for the remaining portion of the winter, all Gaul should revolt when the tributaries of the Aedui were subdued, because it would appear that there was in him no protection for his friends; but if he should draw them too soon out of their winter quarters, he might be distressed by the want of provisions, in consequence of the difficulty of conveyance. It seemed better, however, to endure every hardship than to alienate the affections of all his allies, by submitting to such an insult. Having, therefore, impressed on the Aedui the necessity of supplying him with provisions, he sends forward messengers to the Boii to inform them of his arrival, and encourage them to remain firm in their allegiance, and resist the attack of the enemy with great resolution. Having left two legions and the luggage of the entire army at Agendicum, he marches to the Boii.

Magnam haec res Caesari difficultatem ad consilium capiendum adferebat, si reliquam partem hiemis uno loco legiones contineret, ne stipendiariis Aeduorum expugnatis cuncta Gallia deficeret, quod nullum amicis in eo praesidium videretur positum esse; si maturius

ex hibernis educeret, ne ab re frumentaria duris subvectionibus laboraret. Praestare visum est tamen omnis difficultates perpeti, quam tanta contumelia accepta omnium suorum voluntates alienare. Itaque cohortatus Aeduos de supportando commeatu praemittit ad Boios qui de suo adventu doceant hortenturque ut in fide maneant atque hostium impetum magno animo sustineant. Duabus Agedinci legionibus atque impedimentis totius exer citus relictis ad Boios proficiscitur.

7:11. On the second day, when he came to Vellaunodunum, a town of the Senones, he determined to attack it, in order that he might not leave an enemy in his rear, and might the more easily procure supplies of provisions, and draw a line of circumvallation around it in two days: on the third day, ambassadors being sent from the town to treat of a capitulation, he orders their arms to be brought together, their cattle to be brought forth, and six hundred hostages to be given. He leaves Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to complete these arrangements; he himself sets out with the intention of marching as soon as possible, to Genabum, a town of the Carnutes, who having then for the first time received information of the siege of Vellaunodunum, as they thought that it would be protracted to a longer time, were preparing a garrison to send to Genabum for the defense of that town. Caesar arrived here in two days; after pitching his camp before the town, being prevented by the time of the day, he defers the attack to the next day, and orders his soldiers to prepare whatever was necessary for that enterprise; and as a bridge over the Loire connected the town of Genabum with the opposite bank, fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by night from the town, he orders two legions to keep watch under arms. The people of Genabum came forth silently from the city before midnight, and

began to cross the river. When this circumstance was announced by scouts, Caesar, having set fire to the gates, sends in the legions which he had ordered to be ready, and obtains possession of the town so completely, that very few of the whole number of the enemy escaped being taken alive, because the narrowness of the bridge and the roads prevented the multitude from escaping. He pillages and burns the town, gives the booty to the soldiers, then leads his army over the Loire, and marches into the territories of the Bituriges.

Altero die cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset, ne quem post se hostem relinqueret, quo expeditiore re frumentaria uteretur, oppugnare instituit idque biduo circumvallavit; tertio die missis ex oppido legatis de deditione arma conferri, iumenta produci, sescentos obsides dari iubet. Ea qui conficeret, a. Trebonium legatum relinquit. Ipse, ut quam primum iter faceret, Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur; qui tum primum allato nuntio de oppugnatione Vellaunoduni, cum longius eam rem ductum iri existimarent, praesidium Cenabi tuendi causa, quod eo mitterent, comparabant. Huc biduo pervenit. Castris ante oppidum positis diei tempore exclusus in posterum oppugnationem differt quaeque ad eam rem usui sint militibus imperat et, quod oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat, veritus ne noctu ex oppido profugerent, duas legiones in armis excubare iubet. Cenabenses paulo ante mediam noctem silentio ex oppido egressi flumen transire coeperunt. Qua re per exploratores nuntiata Caesar legiones quas expeditas esse iusserat portis incensis intromittit atque oppido potitur, perpaucis ex hostium numero desideratis quin cuncti caperentur, quod pontis atque itinerum angustiae multitudinis fugam intercluserant. Oppidum diripit atque incendit, praedam militibus donat, exercitum Ligerem traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit.

7:12. Vercingetorix, when he ascertained the arrival of Caesar, desisted from the siege [of Gergovia], and marched to meet Caesar. The latter had commenced to besiege Noviodunum; and when ambassadors came from this town to beg that he would pardon them and spare their lives, in order that he might execute the rest of his designs with the rapidity by which he had accomplished most of them, he orders their arms to be collected, their horses to be brought forth, and hostages to be given. A part of the hostages being now delivered up, when the rest of the terms were being performed, a few centurions and soldiers being sent into the town to collect the arms and horses, the enemy's cavalry which had outstripped the main body of Vercingetorix's army, was seen at a distance; as soon as the townsmen beheld them, and entertained hopes of assistance, raising a shout, they began to take up arms, shut the gates, and line the walls. When the centurions in the town understood from the signal-making of the Gauls that they were forming some new design, they drew their swords and seized the gates, and recovered all their men safe.

Vercingetorix, ubi de Caesaris adventu cognovit, oppugnatione destitit atque obviam Caesari proficiscitur. Ille oppidum Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum oppugnare instituerat. Quo ex oppido cum legati ad eum venissent oratum ut sibi ignosceret suaeque vitae consuleret, ut celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus, arma conferri, equos produci, obsides dari iubet. Parte iam obsidum tradita, cum reliqua administrarentur, centurionibus et paucis militibus intromissis, qui arma iumentaue conquirerent, equitatus hostium procul visus est, qui agmen Vercingetorigis antecesserat. Quem simul atque oppidani conspexerunt atque in spem auxili venerunt, clamore sublato arma capere, portas claudere, murum complere coeperunt. Centuriones in oppido, cum ex

significatione Gallorum novi aliquid ab eis iniri consili intellexissent, gladiis destrictis portas occupaverunt suosque omnes incolumes receperunt.

7:13. Caesar orders the horse to be drawn out of the camp, and commences a cavalry action. His men being now distressed, Caesar sends to their aid about four hundred German horse, which he had determined, at the beginning, to keep with himself. The Gauls could not withstand their attack, but were put to flight, and retreated to their main body, after losing a great number of men. When they were routed, the townsmen, again intimidated, arrested those persons by whose exertions they thought that the mob had been roused, and brought them to Caesar, and surrendered themselves to him. When these affairs were accomplished, Caesar marched to the Avaricum, which was the largest and best fortified town in the territories of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile tract of country; because he confidently expected that on taking that town, he would reduce beneath his dominion the state of the Bituriges.

Caesar ex castris equitatum educi iubet, proelium equestre committit: laborantibus iam suis Germanos equites circiter CCCC summittit, quos ab initio habere secum instituerat. Eorum impetum Galli sustinere non potuerunt atque in fugam coniecti multis amissis se ad agmen receperunt. Quibus profligatis rursus oppidani perterriti comprehensos eos, quorum opera plebem concitatam existimabant, ad Caesarem perduxerunt seseque ei dederunt. Quibus rebus confectis, Caesar ad oppidum Avaricum, quod erat maximum munitissimumque in finibus Biturigum atque agri fertilissima regione, profectus est, quod eo oppido recepto civitatem Biturigum se in potestatem redacturum confidebat.

7:14. Vercingetorix, after sustaining such a series of losses at Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum, summons his men to a council. He impresses on them “that the war must be prosecuted on a very different system from that which had been previously adopted; but they should by all means aim at this object, that the Romans should be prevented from foraging and procuring provisions; that this was easy, because they themselves were well supplied with cavalry, and were likewise assisted by the season of the year; that forage could not be cut; that the enemy must necessarily disperse, and look for it in the houses, that all these might be daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that the interests of private property must be neglected for the sake of the general safety; that the villages and houses ought to be fired, over such an extent of country in every direction from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable of scouring in their search for forage. That an abundance of these necessities could be supplied to them, because they would be assisted by the resources of those in whose territories the war would be waged: that the Romans either would not bear the privation, or else would advance to any distance from the camp with considerable danger; and that it made no difference whether they slew them or stripped them of their baggage, since, if it was lost, they could not carry on the war. Besides that, the towns ought to be burned which were not secured against every danger by their fortifications or natural advantages; that there should not be places of retreat for their own countrymen for declining military service, nor be exposed to the Romans as inducements to carry off abundance of provisions and plunder. If these sacrifices should appear heavy or galling, that they ought to consider it much more distressing that their wives and children should be dragged off to slavery, and themselves slain; the evils

which must necessarily befall the conquered.

Vercingetorix tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat. Docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea gestum sit. Omnibus modis huic rei studendum, ut pabulatione et commeatu Romani prohibeantur. Id esse facile, quod equitatu ipsi abundant et quod anni tempore sublevantur. Pabulum secari non posse; necessario dispersos hostes ex aedificiis petere: hos omnes cotidie ab equitibus deligi posse. Praeterea salutis causa rei familiaris commoda negligenda: vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio ab via quoque versus, quo pabulandi causa adire posse videantur. Harum ipsis rerum copiam suppetere, quod, quorum in finibus bellum geratur, eorum opibus sublevantur: Romanos aut inopiam non laturos aut magno periculo longius ab castris processuros; neque interesse, ipsosne interficiant, impedimentisne exuant, quibus amissis bellum geri non possit. Praeterea oppida incendi oportere, quae non munitione et loci natura ab omni sint periculo tuta, neu suis sint ad detractandam militiam receptacula neu Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus praedamque tollendam. Haec si gravia aut acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimare, liberos, coniuges in servitutem abstrahi, ipsos interfici; quae sit necesse accidere victis.

7:15. This opinion having been approved of by unanimous consent, more than twenty towns of the Bituriges are burned in one day. Conflagrations are beheld in every quarter; and although all bore this with great regret, yet they laid before themselves this consolation, that, as the victory was certain, they could quickly recover their losses. There is a debate concerning Avaricum in the general council, whether they should decide, that it should be burned or defended.

The Bituriges threw themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, and entreat that they should not be compelled to set fire with their own hands to the fairest city of almost the whole of Gaul, which was both a protection and ornament to the state; they say that “they could easily defend it, owing to the nature of the ground, for, being inclosed almost on every side by a river and a marsh, it had only one entrance, and that very narrow.” Permission being granted to them at their earnest request, Vercingetorix at first dissuades them from it, but afterward concedes the point, owing to their entreaties and the compassion of the soldiers. A proper garrison is selected for the town.

Omnium consensu hac sententia probata uno die amplius XX urbes Biturigum iucenduntur. Hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus: in omnibus partibus incendia conspiciuntur; quae etsi magno cum dolore omnes ferebant, tamen hoc sibi solati proponebant, quod se prope explorata victoria celeriter amissa reciperaturos confidebant. Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeret an defendi. Procumbunt omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges, ne pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem, quae praesidio et ornamento sit civitati, suis manibus succendere cogarentur: facile se loci natura defensuros dicunt, quod prope ex omnibus partibus flumine et palude circumdata unum habeat et perangustum aditum. Datur petentibus venia dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi. Defensores oppido idonei deliguntur.

7:16. Vercingetorix follows closely upon Caesar by shorter marches, and selects for his camp a place defended by woods and marshes, at the distance of fifteen miles from Avaricum. There he received

intelligence by trusty scouts, every hour in the day, of what was going on at Avaricum, and ordered whatever he wished to be done; he closely watched all our expeditions for corn and forage, and whenever they were compelled to go to a greater distance, he attacked them when dispersed, and inflicted severe loss upon them; although the evil was remedied by our men, as far as precautions could be taken, by going forth at irregular times' and by different ways.

Vercingetorix minoribus Caesarem itineribus subsequitur et locum castris deligit paludibus silvisque munitum ab Avarico longe milia passuum XVI. Ibi per certos exploratores in singula diei tempora quae ad Avaricum agerentur cognoscebat et quid fieri vellet imperabat. Omnes nostras pabulationes frumentationesque observabat dispersosque, cum longius necessario procederent, adoriebatur magnoque incommodo adficiebat, etsi, quantum ratione provideri poterat, ab nostris occurrebatur, ut incertis temporibus diversisque itineribus iretur.

7:17. Caesar pitching his camp at that side of the town which was not defended by the river and marsh, and had a very narrow approach, as we have mentioned, began to raise the vineae and erect two towers: for the nature of the place prevented him from drawing a line of circumvallation. He never ceased to importune the Boii and Aedui for supplies of corn; of whom the one [the Aedui], because they were acting with no zeal, did not aid him much; the others [the Boii], as their resources were not great, quickly consumed what they had. Although the army was distressed by the greatest want of corn, through the poverty of the Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the houses, to such a degree, that for several days the

soldiers were without corn, and satisfied their extreme hunger with cattle driven from the remote villages; yet no language was heard from them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people and their former victories. Moreover, when Caesar addressed the legions, one by one, when at work, and said that he would raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too severely, they unanimously begged him “not to do so; that they had served for several years under his command in such a manner that they never submitted to insult, and never abandoned an enterprise without accomplishing it; that they should consider it a disgrace if they abandoned the siege after commencing it; that it was better to endure every hardship than to not avenge the names of the Roman citizens who perished at Genabum by the perfidy of the Gauls.” They intrusted the same declarations to the centurions and military tribunes, that through them they might be communicated to Caesar.

Castris ad eam partem oppidi positis Caesar, quae intermissa [a] flumine et a paludibus aditum, ut supra diximus, angustum habebat, aggerem apparare, vineas agere, turres duas constituere coepit: nam circumvallare loci natura prohibebat. De re frumentaria Boios atque Aeduos adhortari non destitit; quorum alteri, quod nullo studio agebant, non multum adiuvabant, alteri non magnis facultatibus, quod civitas erat exigua et infirma, celeriter quod habuerunt consumpserunt. Summa difficultate rei frumentariae adfecto exercitu tenuitate Boiorum, indiligentia Aeduum, incendiis aedificiorum, usque eo ut complures dies frumento milites caruerint et pecore ex longinquioribus vicis adacto extremam famem sustentarent, nulla tamen vox est ab eis audita populi Romani maiestate et superioribus victoriis indigna. Quin etiam Caesar cum in opere singulas legiones appellaret et, si acerbius inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum

oppugnationem diceret, universi ab eo, ne id faceret, petebant: sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam acciperent, nusquam infecta re discederent: hoc se ignominiae laturos loco, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent: praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis, qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent, parentarent. Haec eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum mandabant, ut per eos ad Caesarem deferrentur.

7:18. When the towers had now approached the walls, Caesar ascertained from the captives that Vercingetorix after destroying the forage, had pitched his camp nearer Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalry and light-armed infantry, who generally fought among the horse, had gone to lay an ambushade in that quarter, to which he thought that our troops would come the next day to forage. On learning these facts, he set out from the camp secretly at midnight, and reached the camp of the enemy early in the morning. They having quickly learned the arrival of Caesar by scouts, hid their cars and baggage in the thickest parts of the woods, and drew up all their forces in a lofty and open space: which circumstance being announced, Caesar immediately ordered the baggage to be piled, and the arms to be got ready.

Cum iam muro turre appropinquassent, ex captivis Caesar cognovit Vercingetorigem consumpto pabulo castra movisse propius Avaricum atque ipsum cum equitatu expeditisque, qui inter equites proeliari consuessent, insidiarum causa eo profectum, quo nostros postero die pabulatum venturos arbitraretur. Quibus rebus cognitis media nocte silentio profectus ad hostium castra mane pervenit. Illi celeriter per exploratores adventu Caesaris cognito carros impedimenta que sua in artiores silvas abdiderunt, copias omnes in

loco edito atque aperto instruxerunt. Qua re nuntiata Caesar celeriter sarcinas conferri, arma expediri iussit.

7:19. There was a hill of a gentle ascent from the bottom; a dangerous and impassable marsh, not more than fifty feet broad, begirt it on almost every side. The Gauls, having broken down the bridges, posted themselves on this hill, in confidence of their position, and being drawn up in tribes according to their respective states, held all the fords and passages of that marsh with trusty guards, thus determined that if the Romans should attempt to force the marsh, they would overpower them from the higher ground while sticking in it, so that whoever saw the nearness of the position, would imagine that the two armies were prepared to fight on almost equal terms; but whoever should view accurately the disadvantage of position, would discover that they were showing off an empty affectation of courage. Caesar clearly points out to his soldiers, who were indignant that the enemy could bear the sight of them at the distance of so short a space, and were earnestly demanding the signal for action, “with how great loss and the death of how many gallant men the victory would necessarily be purchased: and when he saw them so determined to decline no danger for his renown, that he ought to be considered guilty of the utmost injustice if he did not hold their life dearer than his personal safety.” Having thus consoled his soldiers, he leads them back on the same day to the camp, and determined to prepare the other things which were necessary for the siege of the town.

Collis erat leniter ab infimo acclivis. Hunc ex omnibus fere partibus palus difficilis atque impedita cingebat non latior pedibus quinquaginta. Hoc se colle interruptis pontibus Galli fiducia loci continebant generatimque distributi in civitates omnia vada ac saltus

eius paludis obtinebant sic animo parati, ut, si eam paludem Romani perrumpere conarentur, haesitantes premerent ex loco superiore; ut qui propinquitatem loci videret paratos prope aequo Marte ad dimicandum existimaret, qui iniqui tatem condicionis perspiceret inani simulatione sese ostentare cognosceret. Indignantibus milites Gaesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli ecentes edocet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum tortum morte necesse sit constare victoriam; quos cum sic animo paratos videat, ut nullum pro sua laude periculum recusent, summae se iniquitatis condemnari debere, nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem. Sic milites consolatus eodem die reducit in castra reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinebant oppidi administrare instituit.

7:20. Vercingetorix, when he had returned to his men, was accused of treason, in that he had moved his camp nearer the Romans, in that he had gone away with all the cavalry, in that he had left so great forces without a commander, in that, on his departure, the Romans had come at such a favorable season, and with such dispatch; that all these circumstances could not have happened accidentally or without design; that he preferred holding the sovereignty of Gaul by the grant of Caesar to acquiring it by their favor. Being accused in such a manner, he made the following reply to these charges:— “That his moving his camp had been caused by want of forage, and had been done even by their advice; that his approaching near the Romans had been a measure dictated by the favorable nature of the ground, which would defend him by its natural strength; that the service of the cavalry could not have been requisite in marshy ground, and was useful in that place to which they had gone; that he, on his departure, had given the supreme command to no one intentionally, lest he

should be induced by the eagerness of the multitude to hazard an engagement, to which he perceived that all were inclined, owing to their want of energy, because they were unable to endure fatigue any longer. That, if the Romans in the mean time came up by chance, they [the Gauls] should feel grateful to fortune; if invited by the information of some one they should feel grateful to him, because they were enabled to see distinctly from the higher ground the smallness of the number of their enemy, and despise the courage of those who, not daring to fight, retreated disgracefully into their camp. That he desired no power from Caesar by treachery, since he could have it by victory, which was now assured to himself and to all the Gauls; nay, that he would even give them back the command, if they thought that they conferred honor on him, rather than received safety from him. That you may be assured," said he, "that I speak these words with truth; -listen to these Roman soldiers!" He produces some camp-followers whom he had surprised on a foraging expedition some days before, and had tortured by famine and confinement. They being previously instructed in what answers they should make when examined, say, "That they were legionary soldiers, that, urged by famine and want, they had recently gone forth from the camp, [to see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; that the whole army was distressed by a similar scarcity, nor had any one now sufficient strength, nor could bear the labor of the work; and therefore that the general was determined, if he made no progress in the siege, to draw off his army in three days." "These benefits," says Vercingetorix, "you receive from me, whom you accuse of treason-me, by whose exertions you see so powerful and victorious an army almost destroyed by famine, without shedding one drop of your blood; and I have taken precautions that no state

shall admit within its territories this army in its ignominious flight from this place.”

Vercingetorix, cum ad suos redisset, prodicionis insimulatus, quod castra propius Romanos movisset, quod cum omni equitatu discessisset, quod sine imperio tantas copias reliquisset, quod eius discessu Romani tanta opportunitate et celeritate venissent: non haec omnia fortuito aut sine consilio accidere potuisse; regnum illum Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio — tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit: Quod castra movisset, factum inopia pabuli etiam ipsis hortantibus; quod propius Romanos accessisset, persuasum loci opportunitate, qui se ipsum munitione defenderet: equitum vero operam neque in loco palustri desiderari debuisse et illic fuisse utilem, quo sint profecti. Summam imperi se consulto nulli discedentem tradidisse, ne is multitudinis studio ad dimicandum impelleretur; cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non possent. Romani si casu intervenerint, fortunae, si alicuius indicio vocati, huic habendam gratiam, quod et paucitatem eorum ex loco superiore cognoscere et virtutem despicere potuerint, qui dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint. Imperium se ab Caesare per prodicionem nullum desiderare, quod habere victoria posset, quae iam esset sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata: quin etiam ipsis remittere, si sibi magis honorem tribuere, quam ab se salutem accipere videantur. “Haec ut intellegatis,” inquit, “a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites.” Producit servos, quos in pabulatione paucis ante diebus exceperat et fame vinculisque excruciaverat. Hi iam ante edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent, milites se esse legionarios dicunt; fame et inopia adductos clam ex castris exisse, si quid frumenti aut pecoris in agris reperire possent: simili omnem exercitum inopia premi, nec iam

vires sufficere cuiusquam nec ferre operis laborem posse: itaque statuisset imperatorem, si nihil in oppugnatione oppidi profecissent, triduo exercitum deducere. “Haec,” inquit, “a me,” Vercingetorix, “beneficia habetis, quem proditoris insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine tantum exercitum victorem fame consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est.”

7:21. The whole multitude raise a shout and clash their arms, according to their custom, as they usually do in the case of him of whose speech they approve; [they exclaim] that Vercingetorix was a consummate general, and that they had no doubt of his honor; that the war could not be conducted with greater prudence. They determine that ten thousand men should be picked out of the entire army and sent into the town, and decide that the general safety should not be intrusted to the Bituriges alone, because they were aware that the glory of the victory must rest with the Bituriges, if they made good the defense of the town.

Conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo consuerunt cuius orationem approbant: summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem, nec de eius fide dubitandum, nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse. Statuunt, ut X milia hominum delecta ex omnibus copiis in oppidum mittantur, nec solis Biturigibus communem salutem committendam censent, quod paene in eo, si id oppidum retinuissent, summam victoriae constare intellegebant.

7:22. To the extraordinary valor of our soldiers, devices of every sort were opposed by the Gauls; since they are a nation of consummate ingenuity, and most skillful in imitating and making those things which are imparted by any one; for they turned aside the hooks with

nooses, and when they had caught hold of them firmly, drew them on by means of engines, and undermined the mound the more skillfully on this account, because there are in their territories extensive iron mines, and consequently every description of mining operations is known and practiced by them. They had furnished, more over, the whole wall on every side with turrets, and had covered them with skins. Besides, in their frequent sallies by day and night, they attempted either to set fire to the mound, or attack our soldiers when engaged in the works; and, moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of their own towers, they equaled the height of ours, as fast as the mound had daily raised them, and countermined our mines, and impeded the working of them by stakes bent and sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch and stones of very great weight, and prevented them from approaching the walls.

Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia cuius que modi Gallorum occurrebant, ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab quoque traduntur, aptissimum. Nam et laqueis falces avertebant, quas, cum destinaverant, tormentis introrsus reducebant, et aggerem cuniculis subtrahebant, eo scientius quod apud eos magnae sunt ferrariae atque omne genus cuniculorum notum atque usitatum est. Totum autem murum ex omni parte turribus contabulaverant atque has coriis intexerant. Tum crebris diurnis nocturnisque eruptionibus aut aggeri ignem inferebant aut milites occupatos in opere adoriebantur, et nostrarum turrium altitudinem, quantum has cotidianus agger expresserat, commissis suarum turrium malis adaequabant, et apertos cuniculos praeusta et praeacuta materia et pice fervefacta et maximi ponderis saxis morabantur moenibusque appropinquare prohibebant.

7:23. But this is usually the form of all the Gallic walls. Straight beams, connected lengthwise and two feet distant from each other at equal intervals, are placed together on the ground; these are mortised on the inside, and covered with plenty of earth. But the intervals which we have mentioned, are closed up in front by large stones. These being thus laid and cemented together, another row is added above, in such a manner, that the same interval may be observed, and that the beams may not touch one another, but equal spaces intervening, each row of beams is kept firmly in its place by a row of stones. In this manner the whole wall is consolidated, until the regular height of the wall be completed. This work, with respect to appearance and variety, is not unsightly, owing to the alternate rows of beams and stones, which preserve their order in right lines; and, besides, it possesses great advantages as regards utility and the defense of cities; for the stone protects it from fire, and the wood from the battering ram, since it [the wood] being mortised in the inside with rows of beams, generally forty feet each in length, can neither be broken through nor torn asunder.

Muri autem omnes Gallici hac fere forma sunt. Trabes directae perpetuae in longitudinem paribus intervallis, distantes inter se binos pedes, in solo collocantur. Hae revinciuntur introrsus et multo aggregere vestiuntur: ea autem, quae diximus, inter valla grandibus in fronte saxi effarciuntur. His collocatis et coagmentatis alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, sed paribus intermissae spatiis singulae singulis saxi interiectis arte contineantur. Sic deinceps omne opus contextitur, dum iusta muri altitudo expleatur. Hoc cum in speciem varietatemque opus deforme non est alternis trabibus ac saxi, quae rectis lineis suos ordines servant, tum ad utilitatem et defensionem urbium

summam habet opportunitatem, quod et ab incendio lapis et ab ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedes quadragenos plerumque introrsus revincta neque perrumpi neque distrahi potest.

7:24. The siege having been impeded by so many disadvantages, the soldiers, although they were retarded during the whole time by the mud, cold, and constant showers, yet by their incessant labor overcame all these obstacles, and in twenty-five days raised a mound three hundred and thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. When it almost touched the enemy's walls, and Caesar, according to his usual custom, kept watch at the work, and encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue the work for a moment: a little before the third watch they discovered that the mound was sinking, since the enemy had set it on fire by a mine; and at the same time a shout was raised along the entire wall, and a sally was made from two gates on each side of the turrets. Some at a distance were casting torches and dry wood from the wall on the mound, others were pouring on it pitch, and other materials, by which the flame might be excited, so that a plan could hardly be formed, as to where they should first run to the defense, or to what part aid should be brought. However, as two legions always kept guard before the camp by Caesar's orders, and several of them were at stated times at the work, measures were promptly taken, that some should oppose the sallying party, others draw back the towers and make a cut in the rampart; and moreover, that the whole army should hasten from the camp to extinguish the flames.

His tot rebus impedita oppugnatione milites, cum toto tempore frigore et assiduis imbribus tardarentur, tamen continenti labore omnia haec superaverunt et diebus XXV aggerem latum pedes CCCXXX, altum pedes LXXX extruxerunt. Cum is murum hostium

paene contingeret, et Caesar ad opus consuetudine excubaret milites que hortaretur, ne quod omnino tempus ab opere intermitteretur, paulo ante tertiam vigiliam est animadversum fumare aggerem, quem cuniculo hostes succenderant, eodemque tempore toto muro clamore sublato duabus portis ab utroque latere turrium eruptio fiebat, alii faces atque aridam materiem de muro in aggerem eminus iaciebant, picem reliquasque res, quibus ignis excitari potest, fundebant, ut quo primum curreretur aut cui rei ferretur auxilium vix ratio iniri posset. Tamen, quod instituto Caesaris semper duae legiones pro castris excubabant pluresque partitis temporibus erant in opere, celeriter factum est, ut alii eruptionibus resisterent, alii turres reducerent aggeremque inter scinderent, omnis vero ex castris multitudo ad restinguendum concurreret.

7:25. When the battle was going on in every direction, the rest of the night being now spent, and fresh hopes of victory always arose before the enemy: the more so on this account because they saw the coverings of our towers burnt away, and perceived, that we, being exposed, could not easily go to give assistance, and they themselves were always relieving the weary with fresh men, and considered that all the safety of Gaul rested on this crisis; there happened in my own view a circumstance which, having appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought not to be omitted. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town, who was casting into the fire opposite the turret balls of tallow and fire which were passed along to him, was pierced with a dart on the right side and fell dead. One of those next him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the same office: when the second man was slain in the same manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third: nor was this post left vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of the mound having

been extinguished, and the enemy repulsed in every direction, an end was put to the fighting.

Cum in omnibus locis consumpta iam reliqua parte noctis pugnaretur, semperque hostibus spes victoriae redintegraretur, eo magis, quod deustos pluteos turrium videbant nec facile adire apertos ad auxiliandum animadvertabant, semperque ipsi recentes defessis succederent omnemque Galliae salutem in illo vestigio temporis positam arbitrarentur, accidit inspectantibus nobis quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non existimavimus. Quidam ante portam oppidi Gallus per manus sebi ac picis traditas glebas in ignem e regione turris proiciebat: scorpione ab latere dextro traiectus exanimatusque concidit. Hunc ex proximis unus iacentem transgressus eodem illo munere fungebatur; eadem ratione ictu scorpionis exanimato alteri successit tertius et tertio quartus, nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus quam restincto aggere atque omni ex parte summotis hostibus finis est pugnandi factus.

7:26. The Gauls having tried every expedient, as nothing had succeeded, adopted the design of fleeing from the town the next day, by the advice and order of Vercingetorix. They hoped that, by attempting it at the dead of night, they would effect it without any great loss of men, because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far distant from the town, and the extensive marsh which intervened, was likely to retard the Romans in the pursuit. And they were now preparing to execute this by night, when the matrons suddenly ran out-into the streets, and weeping cast themselves at the feet of their husbands, and requested of them, with every entreaty, that they should not abandon themselves and their common children to the

enemy for punishment, because the weakness of their nature and physical powers prevented them from taking to flight. When they saw that they (as fear does not generally admit of mercy in extreme danger) persisted in their resolution, they began to shout aloud, and give intelligence of their flight to the Romans. The Gauls being intimidated by fear of this, lest the passes should be pre-occupied by the Roman cavalry, desisted from their design.

Omnia experti Galli, quod res nulla successerat, postero die consilium ceperunt ex oppido profugere hortante et iubente Vercingetorige. Id silentio noctis conati non magna iactura suorum sese effecturos sperabant, propterea quod neque longe ab oppido castra Vercingetorigis aberant, et palus, quae perpetua intercedebat, Romanos ad insequendum tardabat. Iamque hoc facere noctu apparabant, cum matres familiae repente in publicum procurrerunt flentesque proiectae ad pedes suorum omnibus precibus petierunt, ne se et communes liberos hostibus ad supplicium dederent, quos ad capiendam fugam naturae et virium infirmitas impediret. Vbi eos in sententia perstare viderunt, quod plerumque in summo periculo timor misericordiam non recipit, conclamare et significare de fuga Romanis coeperunt. Quo timore perterriti Galli, ne ab equitatu Romanorum viae praeoccuparentur, consilio destiterunt.

7:27. The next day Caesar, the tower being advanced, and the works which he had determined to raise being arranged, a violent storm arising, thought this no bad time for executing his designs, because he observed the guards arranged on the walls a little too negligently, and therefore ordered his own men to engage in their work more remissly, and pointed out what he wished to be done. He drew up his soldiers in a secret position within the vineae, and exhorts them to

reap, at least, the harvest of victory proportionate to their exertions. He proposed a reward for those who should first scale the walls, and gave the signal to the soldiers. They suddenly flew out from all quarters and quickly filled the walls.

Postero die Caesar promota turri perfectisque operibus quae facere instituerat, magno coorto imbre non inutilem hanc ad capiendum consilium tempestatem arbitratus est, quod paulo incautius custodias in muro dispositas videbat, suosque languidius in opere versari iussit et quid fieri vellet ostendit. Legionibusque intra vineas in occulto expeditis, cohortatus ut aliquando pro tantis laboribus fructum victoriae perciperent, eis qui primi murum ascendissent praemia proposuit militibusque signum dedit. Illi subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt.

7:28. The enemy being alarmed by the suddenness of the attack, were dislodged from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge, in the market place and the open streets, with this intention that, if an attack should be made on any side, they should fight with their line drawn up to receive it. When they saw no one descending to the level ground, and the enemy extending themselves along the entire wall in every direction, fearing lest every hope of flight should be cut off, they cast away their arms, and sought, without stopping, the most remote parts of the town. A part was then slain by the infantry when they were crowding upon one another in the narrow passage of the gates; and a part having got without the gates, were cut to pieces by the cavalry: nor was there one who was anxious for the plunder. Thus, being excited by the massacre at Genabum and the fatigue of the siege, they spared neither those worn out with years, women, or children. Finally, out of all that number, which amounted

to about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who fled from the town when they heard the first alarm, reached Vercingetorix in safety: and he, the night being now far spent, received them in silence after their flight (fearing that any sedition should arise in the camp from their entrance in a body and the compassion of the soldiers), so that, having arranged his friends and the chiefs of the states at a distance on the road, he took precautions that they should be separated and conducted to their fellow countrymen, to whatever part of the camp had been assigned to each state from the beginning.

Hostes re nova perterriti muro turribusque deiecti in foro ac locis patentioribus cuneatim constiterunt, hoc animo ut si qua ex parte obviam contra veniretur acie instructa depugnarent. Vbi neminem in aequum locum sese demittere, sed toto undique muro circumfundi viderunt, veriti ne omnino spes fugae tolleretur, abiectis armis ultimas oppidi partes continenti impetu petiverunt, parsque ibi, cum angusto exitu portarum se ipsi premerent, a militibus, pars iam egressa portis ab equitibus est interfecta; nec fuit quisquam, qui praedae studeret. Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt. Denique ex omni numero, qui fuit circiter milium XL, vix DCCC, qui primo clamore audito se ex oppido ieecerunt, incolumes ad Vercingetorigem pervenerunt. Quos ille multa iam nocte silentio ex fuga excepit, veritus ne qua in castris ex eorum concursu et misericordia vulgi seditio oreretur, ut procul in via dispositis familiaribus suis principibusque civitatum disparandos deducendosque ad suos curaret, quae cuique civitati pars castrorum ab initio obvenerat.

7:29. Vercingetorix having convened an assembly on the following

day, consoled and encouraged his soldiers in the following words: “That they should not be too much depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their loss; that the Romans did not conquer by valor nor in the field, but by a kind of art and skill in assault, with which they themselves were unacquainted; that whoever expected every event in the war to be favorable, erred; that it never was his opinion that Avaricum should be defended, of the truth of which statement he had themselves as witnesses, but that it was owing to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and the too ready compliance of the rest, that this loss was sustained; that, however, he would soon compensate it by superior advantages; for that he would, by his exertions, bring over those states which severed themselves from the rest of the Gauls, and would create a general unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, the union of which not even the whole earth could withstand, and that he had it already almost effected; that in the mean time it was reasonable that he should prevail on them, for the sake of the general safety, to begin to fortify their camp, in order that they might the more easily sustain the sudden attacks of the enemy.”

Postero die concilio convocato consolatus cohortatusque est ne se admodum animo demitterent, ne perturbarentur incommodo. Non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis, cuius rei fuerint ipsi imperiti. Errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus expectent. Sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum acciperetur. Id tamen se celeriter maioribus commodis sanaturum. Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum

possit obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere. Interea aequum esse ab eis communis salutis causa impetrari ut castra munire instituerent, quo facilius repentinos hostium impetus sustinerent.

7:30. This speech was not disagreeable to the Gauls, principally, because he himself was not disheartened by receiving so severe a loss, and had not concealed himself, nor shunned the eyes of the people: and he was believed to possess greater foresight and sounder judgment than the rest, because, when the affair was undecided, he had at first been of opinion that Avaricum should be burnt, and afterward that it should be abandoned. Accordingly, as ill success weakens the authority of other generals, so, on the contrary, his dignity increased daily, although a loss was sustained: at the same time they began to entertain hopes, on his assertion, of uniting the rest of the states to themselves, and on this occasion, for the first time, the Gauls began to fortify their camps, and were so alarmed that although they were men unaccustomed to toil, yet they were of opinion that they ought to endure and suffer every thing which should be imposed upon them.

Fuit haec oratio non ingrata Gallis, et maxime, quod ipse animo non defecerat tanto accepto incommodo neque se in occultum abdiderat et conspectum multitudinis fugerat; plusque animo providere et praesentire existimabatur, quod re integra primo incendendum Avaricum, post deserendum censuerat. Itaque ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversae auctoritatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in dies augebatur. Simul in spem veniebant eius adfirmatione de reliquis adiungendis civitatibus; primumque eo tempore Galli castra munire instituerunt et sic sunt animo confirmati, homines insueti laboris, ut omnia quae

imperarentur sibi patienda existimarent.

7:31. Nor did Vercingetorix use less efforts than he had promised, to gain over the other states, and [in consequence] endeavored to entice their leaders by gifts and promises. For this object he selected fitting emissaries, by whose subtle pleading or private friendship, each of the nobles could be most easily influenced. He takes care that those who fled to him on the storming of Avaricum should be provided with arms and clothes. At the same time that his diminished forces should be recruited, he levies a fixed quota of soldiers from each state, and defines the number and day before which he should wish them brought to the camp, and orders all the archers, of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, to be collected and sent to him. By these means, the troops which were lost at Avaricum are speedily replaced. In the mean time, Teutomarus, the son of Ollovicon, the king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had received the appellation of friend from our senate, came to him with a great number of his own horse and those whom he had hired from Aquitania.

Nec minus quam est pollicitus Vercingetorix animo laborabat ut reliquas civitates adiungeret, atque eas donis pollicitationibusque alliciebat. Huic rei idoneos homines deligebat, quorum quisque aut oratione subdola aut amicitia facillime capere posset. Qui Avarico expugnato refugerant, armandos vestiendosque curat; simul, ut deminutae copiae redintegrarentur, imperat certum numerum militum civitatibus, quem et quam ante diem in castra adduci velit, sagittariosque omnes, quorum erat permagnus numerus in Gallia, conquiri et ad se mitti iubet. His rebus celeriter id quod Avarici deperierat expletur. Interim Teutomatus, Olloviconis filius, rex Nitiobrigum, cuius pater ab senatu nostro amicus erat appellatus,

cum magno equitum suorum numero et quos ex Aquitania conduxerat ad eum pervenit.

7:32. Caesar, after delaying several days at Avaricum, and, finding there the greatest plenty of corn and other provisions, refreshed his army after their fatigue and privation. The winter being almost ended, when he was invited by the favorable season of the year to prosecute the war and march against the enemy, [and try] whether he could draw them from the marshes and woods, or else press them by a blockade; some noblemen of the Aedui came to him as ambassadors to entreat “that in an extreme emergency he should succor their state; that their affairs were in the utmost danger, because, whereas single magistrates had been usually appointed in ancient times and held the power of king for a single year, two persons now exercised this office, and each asserted that he was appointed according to their laws. That one of them was Convictolitanis, a powerful and illustrious youth; the other Cotus, sprung from a most ancient family, and personally a man of very great influence and extensive connections. His brother Valetiacus had borne the same office during the last year: that the whole state was up in arms; the senate divided, the people divided; that each of them had his own adherents; and that, if the animosity would be fomented any longer, the result would be that one part of the state would come to a collision with the other; that it rested with his activity and influence to prevent it.”

Caesar Avarici complures dies commoratus summamque ibi copiam frumenti et reliqui commeatus nactus exercitum ex labore atque inopia refecit. Iam prope hieme confecta cum ipso anni tempore ad gerendum bellum vocaretur et ad hostem proficisci constituisset, sive

eum ex paludibus silvisque elicere sive obsidione premere posset, legati ad eum principes Aeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario tempore civitati subveniat: summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat. Horum esse alterum Convictolitavem, florentem et illustrem adulescentem, alterum Cotum, antiquissima familia natum atque ipsum hominem summae potentiae et magnae cognationis, cuius frater Vaetiachus proximo anno eundem magistratum gesserit. Civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas. Quod si diutius alatur controversia, fore uti pars cum parte civitatis confligat. Id ne accidat, positum in eius diligentia atque auctoritate.

7:33. Although Caesar considered it ruinous to leave the war and the enemy, yet, being well aware what great evils generally arise from internal dissensions, lest a state so powerful and so closely connected with the Roman people, which he himself had always fostered and honored in every respect, should have recourse to violence and arms, and that the party which had less confidence in its own power should summon aid from Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this movement; and because, by the laws of the Aedui, it was not permitted those who held the supreme authority to leave the country, he determined to go in person to the Aedui, lest he should appear to infringe upon their government and laws, and summoned all the senate, and those between whom the dispute was, to meet him at Decetia. When almost all the state had assembled there, and he was informed that one brother had been declared magistrate by the other, when only a few persons were privately summoned for the purpose, at a different time and place from what he ought, whereas the laws

not only forbade two belonging to one family to be elected magistrates while each was alive, but even deterred them from being in the senate, he compelled Cotus to resign his office; he ordered Convictolitanis, who had been elected by the priests, according to the usage of the state, in the presence of the magistrates, to hold the supreme authority.

Caesar, etsi a bello atque hoste discedere detrimentosum esse existimabat, tamen non ignorans quanta ex dissensionibus incommoda oriri consuessent, ne tanta et tam coniuncta populo Romano civitas, quam ipse semper aluisset omnibusque rebus ornasset, ad vim atque arma descenderet, atque ea pars quae minus sibi confideret auxilia a Vercingetorige arcesseret, huic rei praevertendum existimavit et, quod legibus Aeduorum eis, qui summum magistratum obtinerent, excedere ex finibus non liceret, ne quid de iure aut de legibus eorum deminuisse videretur, ipse in Aeduos proficisci statuit senatumque omnem et quos inter controversia esset ad se Decetiam evocavit. Cum prope omnis civitas eo convenisset, docereturque paucis clam convocatis alio loco, alio tempore atque oportuerit fratrem a fratre renuntiatum, cum leges duo ex una familia vivo utroque non solum magistratus creari vetarent, sed etiam in senatu esse prohiberent, Cotum imperium deponere coegit, Convictolitavem, qui per sacerdotes more civitatis intermissis magistratibus esset creatus, potestatem obtinere iussit.

7:34. Having pronounced this decree between [the contending parties], he exhorted the Aedui to bury in oblivion their disputes and dissensions, and, laying aside all these things, devote themselves to the war, and expect from him, on the conquest of Gaul, those rewards which they should have earned, and send speedily to him all their

cavalry and ten thousand infantry, which he might place in different garrisons to protect his convoys of provisions, and then divided his army into two parts: he gave Labienus four legions to lead into the country of the Senones and Parisii; and led in person six into the country of the Arverni, in the direction of the town of Gergovia, along the banks of the Allier. He gave part of the cavalry to Labienus and kept part to himself. Vercingetorix, on learning this circumstance, broke down all the bridges over the river and began to march on the other bank of the Allier.

Hoc decreto interposito cohortatus Aeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque omnibus omissis his rebus huic bello servirent eaque quae meruissent praemia ab se devicta Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter mitterent, quae in praesidiis rei frumentariae causa disponeret, exercitum in duas partes divisit: quattuor legiones in Senones Parisiosque Labieno ducendas dedit, sex ipse in Arvernos ad oppidum Gergoviam secundum flumen Elaver duxit; equitatus partem illi attribuit, partem sibi reliquit. Qua re cognita Vercingetorix omnibus interruptis eius fluminis pontibus ab altera fluminis parte iter facere coepit.

7:35. When each army was in sight of the other, and was pitching their camp almost opposite that of the enemy, scouts being distributed in every quarter, lest the Romans should build a bridge and bring over their troops; it was to Caesar a matter attended with great difficulties, lest he should be hindered from passing the river during the greater part of the summer, as the Allier can not generally be forded before the autumn. Therefore, that this might not happen, having pitched his camp in a woody place opposite to one of those bridges which

Vercingetorix had taken care should be broken down, the next day he stopped behind with two legions in a secret place; he sent on the rest of the forces as usual, with all the baggage, after having selected some cohorts, that the number of the legions might appear to be complete. Having ordered these to advance as far as they could, when now, from the time of day, he conjectured they had come to an encampment, he began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles, the lower part of which remained entire. Having quickly finished the work and led his legions across, he selected a fit place for a camp, and recalled the rest of his troops. Vercingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went before him by forced marches, in order that he might not be compelled to come to an action against his will.

Cum uterque utrimque exisset exercitus, in conspectu fereque e regione castris castra ponebant dispositis exploratoribus, necubi effecto ponte Romani copias traducerent. Erat in magnis Caesaris difficultatibus res, ne maiorem aestatis partem flumine impediretur, quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet. Itaque, ne id accideret, silvestri loco castris positus e regione unius eorum pontium, quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat, postero die cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit; reliquas copias cum omnibus impedimentis, ut consueverat, misit, apertis quibusdam cohortibus, uti numerus legionum constare videretur. His quam longissime possent egredi iussis, cum iam ex diei tempore coniecturam ceperat in castra perventum, isdem sublicis, quarum pars inferior integra remanebat, pontem reficere coepit. Celeriter effecto opere legionibusque traductis et loco castris idoneo delecto reliquas copias revocavit. Vercingetorix re cognita, ne contra suam voluntatem dimicare cogeretur, magnis itineribus antecessit.

7:36. Caesar, in five days' march, went from that place to Gergovia, and after engaging in a slight cavalry skirmish that day, on viewing the situation of the city, which, being built on a very high mountain, was very difficult of access, he despaired of taking it by storm, and determined to take no measures with regard to besieging it before he should secure a supply of provisions. But Vercingetorix, having pitched his camp on the mountain near the town, placed the forces of each state separately and at small intervals around himself, and having occupied all the hills of that range as far as they commanded a view [of the Roman encampment], he presented a formidable appearance; he ordered the rulers of the states, whom he had selected as his council of war, to come to him daily at the dawn, whether any measure seemed to require deliberation or execution. Nor did he allow almost any day to pass without testing in a cavalry action, the archers being intermixed, what spirit and valor there was in each of his own men. There was a hill opposite the town, at the very foot of that mountain, strongly fortified and precipitous on every side (which if our men could gain, they seemed likely to exclude the enemy from a great share of their supply of water, and from free foraging; but this place was occupied by them with a weak garrison): however, Caesar set out from the camp in the silence of night, and dislodging the garrison before succor could come from the town, he got possession of the place and posted two legions there, and drew from the greater camp to the less a double trench twelve feet broad, so that the soldiers could even singly pass secure from any sudden attack of the enemy.

Caesar ex eo loco quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit equestrique eo die proelio levi facto perspecto urbis situ, quae posita in altissimo monte omnes aditus difficiles habebat, de expugnatione desperavit,

de obsessione non prius agendum constituit, quam rem frumentariam expedisset. At Vercingetorix castris, prope oppidum positus, mediocribus circum se intervallis separatim singularum civitatum copias collocaverat atque omnibus eius iugi collibus occupatis, qua despici poterat, horribilem speciem praebebat; principesque earum civitatum, quos sibi ad consilium capiendum delegerat, prima luce cotidie ad se convenire iubebat, seu quid communicandum, seu quid administrandum videretur; neque ullum fere diem intermittebat quin equestri proelio interiectis sagittariis, quid in quoque esset animi ac virtutis suorum perspiceret. Erat e regione oppidi collis sub ipsis radicibus montis, egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumciscus; quem si tenerent nostri, et aquae magna parte et pabulatione libera prohibitori hostes videbantur. Sed is locus praesidio ab his non nimis firmo tenebatur. Tamen silentio noctis Caesar ex castris egressus, priusquam subsidio ex oppido veniri posset, deiecto praesidio potitus loco duas ibi legiones collocavit fossamque duplicem duodenum pedum a maioribus castris ad minora perduxit, ut tuto ab repentino hostium incursu etiam singuli commeare possent.

7:37. While these affairs were going on at Gergovia, Convictolanis, the Aeduan, to whom we have observed the magistracy was adjudged by Caesar, being bribed by the Arverni, holds a conference with certain young men, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, who were born of a most noble family. He shares the bribe with them, and exhorts them to “remember that they were free and born for empire; that the state of the Aedui was the only one which retarded the most certain victory of the Gauls; that the rest were held in check by its authority; and, if it was brought over, the Romans would not have room to stand on in Gaul; that he had received some kindness from Caesar, only so far, however, as gaining a most just cause by his

decision; but that he assigned more weight to the general freedom; for, why should the Aedui go to Caesar to decide concerning their rights and laws, rather than the Romans come to the Aedui?" The young men being easily won over by the speech of the magistrate and the bribe, when they declared that they would even be leaders in the plot, a plan for accomplishing it was considered, because they were confident their state could not be induced to undertake the war on slight grounds. It was resolved that Litavicus should have the command of the ten thousand, which were being sent to Caesar for the war, and should have charge of them on their march, and that his brothers should go before him to Caesar. They arrange the other measures, and the manner in which they should have them done.

Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Convictolitavis Aeduus, cui magistratum adiudicatum a Caesare demonstravimus, sollicitatus ab Arvernīs pecunia cum quibusdam adolescentibus colloquitur; quorum erat princeps Litavicus atque eius fratres, amplissima familia nati adolescentes. Cum his praemium communicat hortaturque, ut se liberos et imperio natos meminerint. Vnam esse Aeduorum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam detineat; eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis in Gallia non fore. Esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum, sic tamen, ut iustissimam apud eum causam obtinuerit; sed plus communi libertati tribuere. Cur enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam Romani ad Aeduos veniant? Celeriter adolescentibus et oratione magistratus et praemio deductis, cum se vel principes eius consili fore profiterentur, ratio perficiendi quaerebatur, quod civitatem temere ad suscipiendum bellum adduci posse non confidebant. Placuit ut Litavicus decem illis milibus, quae Caesari ad bellum mitterentur, praeficeretur atque

ea ducenda curaret, fratresque eius ad Caesarem praecurrerent. Reliqua qua ratione agi placeat constituunt.

7:38. Litavicus, having received the command of the army, suddenly convened the soldiers, when he was about thirty miles distant from Gergovia, and, weeping, said, “Soldiers, whither are we going? All our knights and all our nobles have perished. Eporedirix and Viridomarus, the principal men of the state, being accused of treason, have been slain by the Romans without any permission to plead their cause. Learn this intelligence from those who have escaped from the massacre; for I, since my brothers and all my relations have been slain, am prevented by grief from declaring what has taken place. Persons are brought forward whom he had instructed in what he would have them say, and make the same statements to the soldiery as Litavicus had made: that all the knights of the Aedui were slain because they were said to have held conferences with the Arverni; that they had concealed themselves among the multitude of soldiers, and had escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The Aedui shout aloud and conjure Litavicus to provide for their safety. As if, said he, it were a matter of deliberation, and not of necessity, for us to go to Gergovia and unite ourselves to the Arverni. Or have we any reasons to doubt that the Romans, after perpetrating the atrocious crime, are now hastening to slay us? Therefore, if there be any spirit in us, let us avenge the death of those who have perished in a most unworthy manner, and let us slay these robbers.” He points to the Roman citizens, who had accompanied them, in reliance on his protection. He immediately seizes a great quantity of corn and provisions, cruelly tortures them, and then puts them to death, sends messengers throughout the entire state of the Aedui, and rouses them completely by the same falsehood concerning the slaughter of their knights and

nobles; he earnestly advises them to avenge, in the same manner as he did, the wrongs, which they had received.

Litaviccus accepto exercitu, cum milia passuum circiter XXX ab Gergovia abesset, convocatis subito militibus lacrimans, “Quo proficiscimur,” inquit, “milites? Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit; principes civitatis, Eporedorix et Viridomarus, insimulati prodicionis ab Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt. Haec ab ipsis cognoscite, qui ex ipsa caede fugerunt: nam ego fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore prohibeor, quae gesta sunt, pronuntiare.” Producentur hi quos ille edocuerat quae dici vellet, atque eadem, quae Litaviccus pronuntiaverat, multitudini exponunt: multos equites Aeduorum interfectos, quod collocuti cum Arvernīs dicerentur; ipsos se inter multitudinem militum occultasse atque ex media caede fugisse. Conclamant Aedui et Litaviccum obsecrant ut sibi consulat. “Quasi vero,” inquit ille, “consili sit res, ac non necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernīs nosmet coniungere. An dubitamus quin nefario facinore admissio Romani iam ad nos interficiendos concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est, persequamur eorum mortem qui indignissime interierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus.” Ostendit cives Romanos, qui eius praesidi fiducia una erant: magnum numerum frumenti commeatusque diripit, ipsos crudeliter excruciatos interficit. Nuntios tota civitate Aeduorum dimittit, eodem mendacio de caede equitum et principum permovet; hortatur ut simili ratione atque ipse fecerit suas iniurias persequantur.

7:39. Eporedirix, the Aeduan , a young man born in the highest rank and possessing very great influence at home, and, along with Viridomarus, of equal age and influence, but of inferior birth, whom

Caesar had raised from a humble position to the highest rank, on being recommended to him by Divitiacus, had come in the number of horse, being summoned by Caesar by name. These had a dispute with each other for precedence, and in the struggle between the magistrates they had contended with their utmost efforts, the one for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotsus. Of these Eporedirix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays the matter before Caesar almost at midnight; he entreats that Caesar should not suffer their state to swerve from the alliance with the Roman people, owing to the depraved counsels of a few young men which he foresaw would be the consequence if so many thousand men should unite themselves to the enemy, as their relations could not neglect their safety, nor the state regard it as a matter of slight importance.

Eporedorix Aeduus, summo loco natus adolescens et summae domi potentiae, et una Viridomarus, pari aetate et gratia, sed genere dispari, quem Caesar ab Diviciario sibi traditum ex humili loco ad summam dignitatem perduxerat, in equitum numero convenerant nominatim ab eo evocati. His erat inter se de principatu contentio, et in illa magistratum controversia alter pro Convictolitavi, alter pro Coto summis opibus pugnaverant. Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavici consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem defert; orat ne patiatur civitatem pravis adolescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi Romani deficere; quod futurum provideat, si se tot hominum milia cum hostibus coniunxerint, quorum salutem neque propinqui neglegere, neque civitas levi momento aestimare posset.

7:40. Caesar felt great anxiety on this intelligence, because he had always especially indulged the state of the Aedui, and, without any hesitation, draws out from the camp four light-armed legions and all

the cavalry: nor had he time, at such a crisis, to contract the camp, because the affair seemed to depend upon dispatch. He leaves Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with two legions to guard the camp. When he ordered the brothers of Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers that they had fled a short time before to the camp of the enemy. He encouraged his soldiers “not to be disheartened by the labor of the journey on such a necessary occasion,” and, after advancing twenty-five miles, all being most eager, he came in sight of the army of the Aedui, and, by sending on his cavalry, retards and impedes their march; he then issues strict orders to all his soldiers to kill no one. He commands Eporedirix and Viridomarus, who they thought were killed, to move among the cavalry and address their friends. When they were recognized and the treachery of Litavicus discovered, the Aedui began to extend their hands to intimate submission, and, laying down their arms, to deprecate death. Litavicus, with his clansmen, who after the custom of the Gauls consider it a crime to desert their patrons, even in extreme misfortune, flees forth to Gergovia.

Magna adfectus sollicitudine hoc nuntio Caesar, quod semper Aeduorum civitati praecipue indulserat, nulla interposita dubitatione legiones expeditas quattuor equitatumque omnem ex castris educit; nec fuit spatium tali tempore ad contrahenda castra, quod res posita in celeritate videbatur; Gaium Fabium legatum eum legionibus duabus castris praesidio relinquit. Fratres Litavicci eum comprehendi iussisset, paulo ante reperit ad hostes fugisse. Adhortatus milites, ne necessario tempore itineris labore permoveantur, cupidissimis omnibus progressus milia passuum XXV agmen Aeduorum conspicatus immisso equitatu iter eorum moratur atque impedit interdicique omnibus ne quemquam interficiant. Eporedorigem et

Viridomarum, quos illi interfectos existimabant, inter equites versari suosque appellare iubet. His cognitis et Litavici fraude perspecta Aedui manus tendere, deditionem significare et proiectis armis mortem deprecari incipiunt. Litavicus cum suis clientibus, quibus more Gallorum nefas est etiam in extrema fortuna deserere patronos, Gergoviam profugit.

7:41. Caesar, after sending messengers to the state of the Aedui, to inform them that they whom he could have put to death by the right of war were spared through his kindness, and after giving three hours of the night to his army for his repose, directed his march to Gergovia. Almost in the middle of the journey, a party of horse that were sent by Fabius stated in how great danger matters were, they inform him that the camp was attacked by a very powerful army, while fresh men were frequently relieving the wearied, and exhausting our soldiers by the incessant toil, since on account of the size of the camp, they had constantly to remain on the rampart; that many had been wounded by the immense number of arrows and all kinds of missiles; that the engines were of great service in withstanding them; that Fabius, at their departure, leaving only two gates open, was blocking up the rest, and was adding breast-works to the ramparts, and was preparing himself for a similar casualty on the following day. Caesar, after receiving this information, reached the camp before sunrise owing to the very great zeal of his soldiers.

Caesar nuntiis ad civitatem Aeduorum missis, qui suo beneficio conservatos docerent quos iure belli interficere potuisset, tribusque horis noctis exercitui ad quietem datis castra ad Gergoviam movit. Medio fere itinere equites a Fabio missi, quanto res in periculo fuerit, exponunt. Summis copiis castra oppugnata demonstrant, cum crebro

integri defessis succederent nostrosque assiduo labore defatigarent, quibus propter magnitudinem castrorum perpetuo esset isdem in vallo permanendum. Multitudine sagittarum atque omnis generis telorum multos vulneratos; ad haec sustinenda magno usui fuisse tormenta. Fabium discessu eorum duabus relictis portis obstruere ceteras pluteosque vallo addere et se in posterum diem similemque casum apparare. His rebus cognitis Caesar summo studio militum ante ortum solis in castra pervenit.

7:42. While these things are going on at Gergovia, the Aedui, on receiving the first announcements from Litavicus, leave themselves no time to ascertain the truth of those statements. Some are stimulated by avarice, others by revenge and credulity, which is an innate propensity in that race of men to such a degree that they consider a slight rumor as an ascertained fact. They plunder the property of the Roman citizens, and either massacre them or drag them away to slavery. Convictolitanis increases the evil state of affairs, and goads on the people to fury, that by the commission of some outrage they may be ashamed to return to propriety. They entice from the town of Cabillonis, by a promise of safety, Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was on his march to his legion; they compel those who had settled there for the purpose of trading to do the same. By constantly attacking them on their march they strip them of all their baggage; they besiege day and night those that resisted; when many were slain on both sides, they excite a great number to arms.

Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Aedui primis nuntiis ab Litavico acceptis nullum sibi ad cognoscendum spatium relinquunt. Impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas, quae maxime illi hominum

generi est innata, ut levem auditionem habeant pro re comperta. Bona civium Romanorum diripiunt, caedes faciunt, in servitutem abstrahunt. Adiuvat rem proclinatam Convictolitavis plebemque ad furorem impellit, ut facinore admissio ad sanitatem reverti pudeat. Marcum Aristium, tribunum militum, iter ad legionem facientem fide data ex oppido Cabillono educunt: idem facere cogunt eos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant. Hos continuo (in) itinere adorti omnibus impedimentis exuunt; repugnantes diem noctemque obsident; multis utrimque interfectis maiorem multitudinem armatorum concitant.

7:43. In the mean time, when intelligence was brought that all their soldiers were in Caesar's power, they run in a body to Aristius; they assure him that nothing had been done by public authority; they order an inquiry to be made about the plundered property; they confiscate the property of Litavicus and his brothers; they send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of clearing themselves. They do all this with a view to recover their soldiers; but being contaminated by guilt, and charmed by the gains arising from the plundered property, as that act was shared in by many, and being tempted by the fear of punishment, they began to form plans of war and stir up the other states by embassies. Although Caesar was aware of this proceeding, yet he addresses the ambassadors with as much mildness as he can: "That he did not think worse of the state on account of the ignorance and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminish his regard for the Aedui." He himself, fearing a greater commotion in Gaul, in order to prevent his being surrounded by all the states, began to form plans as to the manner in which he should return from Gergovia and again concentrate his forces, lest a departure arising from the fear of a revolt should seem like a flight.

Interim nuntio allato omnes eorum milites in potestate Caesaris teneri, concurrunt ad Aristium, nihil publico factum consilio demonstrant; quaestionem de bonis direptis decernunt, Litavici fatrumque bona publicant, legatos ad Caesarem sui purgandi gratia mittunt. Haec faciunt reciperandorum suorum causa; sed contaminati facinore et capti compendio ex direptis bonis, quod ea res ad multos pertinebat, timore poenae exterriti consilia clam de bello inire incipiunt civitatesque reliquas legationibus sollicitant. Quae tametsi Caesar intellegebat, tamen quam mitissime potest legatos appellat: nihil se propter inscientiam levitatemque vulgi gravius de civitate iudicare neque de sua in Aeduos benevolentia deminuere. Ipse maiorem Galliae motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumsisteretur, consilia inibat quemadmodum ab Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret, ne profectio nata ab timore defectionis similis fugae videretur.

7:44. While he was considering these things an opportunity of acting successfully seemed to offer. For, when he had come into the smaller camp for the purpose of securing the works, he noticed that the hill in the possession of the enemy was stripped of men, although, on the former days, it could scarcely be seen on account of the numbers on it. Being astonished, he inquires the reason of it from the deserters, a great number of whom flocked to him daily. They all concurred in asserting, what Caesar himself had already ascertained by his scouts, that the back of that hill was almost level; but likewise woody and narrow, by which there was a pass to the other side of the town; that they had serious apprehensions for this place, and had no other idea, on the occupation of one hill by the Romans, than that, if they should lose the other, they would be almost surrounded, and cut off from all egress and foraging; that they were all summoned by Vercingetorix

to fortify this place.

Haec cogitanti accidere visa est facultas bene rei gerendae. Nam cum in minora castra operis perspiciendi causa venisset, animadvertit collem, qui ab hostibus tenebatur, nudatum hominibus, qui superioribus diebus vix prae multitudine cerni poterat. Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam, quorum magnus ad eum cotidie numerus confluebat. Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed hunc silvestrem et angustum, qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; huic loco vehementer illos timere nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur: ad hunc muniendum omnes a Vercingetorige evocatos.

7:45. Caesar, on being informed of this circumstance, sends several troops of horse to the place immediately after midnight; he orders them to range in every quarter with more tumult than usual. At dawn he orders a large quantity of baggage to be drawn out of the camp, and the muleteers with helmets, in the appearance and guise of horsemen, to ride round the hills. To these he adds a few cavalry, with instructions to range more widely to make a show. He orders them all to seek the same quarter by a long circuit; these proceedings were seen at a distance from the town, as Gergovia commanded a view of the camp, nor could the Gauls ascertain at so great a distance, what certainty there was in the maneuver. He sends one legion to the same hill, and after it had marched a little, stations it in the lower ground, and congeals it in the woods. The suspicion of the Gauls are increased, and all their forces are marched to that place to defend it. Caesar, having perceived the camp of the enemy deserted,

covers the military insignia of his men, conceals the standards, and transfers his soldiers in small bodies from the greater to the less camp, and points out to the lieutenants whom he had placed in command over the respective legions, what he should wish to be done; he particularly advises them to restrain their men from advancing too far, through their desire of fighting, or their hope of plunder, he sets before them what disadvantages the unfavorable nature of the ground carries with it; that they could be assisted by dispatch alone: that success depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. After stating these particulars, he gives the signal for action, and detaches the Aedui at the same time by another ascent on the right.

Hac re cognita Caesar mittit complures equitum turmas; eis de media nocte imperat, ut paulo tumultuosius omnibus locis vagarentur. Prima luce magnum numerum impedimentorum ex castris mulorumque produci deque his stramenta detrahi mulionesque cum cassidibus equitum specie ac simulatione collibus circumvehi iubet. His paucos addit equites qui latius ostentationis causa vagarentur. Longo circuitu easdem omnes iubet petere regiones. Haec procul ex oppido videbantur, ut erat a Gergovia despectus in castra, neque tanto spatio certi quid esset explorari poterat. Legionem unam eodem iugo mittit et paulum progressam inferiore constituit loco silvisque occultat. Augetur Gallis suspicio, atque omnes illo ad munitionem copiae traducuntur. Vacua castra hostium Caesar conspicatus tectis insignibus suorum occultatisque signis militaribus raros milites, ne ex oppido animadverterentur, ex maioribus castris in minora traducit legatisque, quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit ostendit: in primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur; quid iniquitas loci habeat

incommodi proponit: hoc una celeritate posse mutari; occasionis esse rem, non proeli. His rebus eitis signum dat et ab dextra parte alio ascensu eodem tempore Aeduos mittit.

7:46. The town wall was 1200 paces distant from the plain and foot of the ascent, in a straight line, if no gap intervened; whatever circuit was added to this ascent, to make the hill easy, increased the length of the route. But almost in the middle of the hill, the Gauls had previously built a wall six feet high, made of large stones, and extending in length as far as the nature of the ground permitted, as a barrier to retard the advance of our men; and leaving all the lower space empty, they had filled the upper part of the hill, as far as the wall of the town, with their camps very close to one another. The soldiers, on the signal being given, quickly advance to this fortification, and passing over it, make themselves masters of the separate camps. And so great was their activity in taking the camps, that Teutomarus, the king of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly surprised in his tent, as he had gone to rest at noon, with difficulty escaped from the hands of the plunderers, with the upper part of his person naked, and his horse wounded.

Oppidi murus ab planitie atque initio ascensus recta regione, si nullus anfractus intercederet, MCC passus aberat: quidquid huc circuitus ad molliendum clivum accesserat, id spatium itineris augebat. A medio fere colle in longitudinem, ut natura montis ferebat, ex grandibus saxis sex pedum murum qui nostrorum impetum tardaret praeduxerant Galli, atque inferiore omni spatio vacuo relicto superiorem partem collis usque ad murum oppidi densissimis castris compleverant. Milites dato signo celeriter ad munitionem perveniunt eamque transgressi trinis castris potiuntur; ac tanta fuit in castris

capiendis celeritas, ut Teutomatus, rex Nitiobrigum, subito in tabernaculo oppressus, ut meridie conquieverat, superiore corporis parte nudata vulnerato equo vix se ex manibus praedantium militum eriperet.

7:47. Caesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of the tenth legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers of the other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, because there was a very large valley between them, were however kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar's orders; but being animated by the prospect of speedy victory, and the flight of the enemy, and the favorable battles of former periods, they thought nothing so difficult that their bravery could not accomplish it; nor did they put an end to the pursuit, until they drew nigh to the wall of the town and the gates. But then, when a shout arose in every quarter of the city, those who were at a distance being alarmed by the sudden tumult, fled hastily from the town, since they thought that the enemy were within the gates. The matrons begin to cast their clothes and silver over the wall, and bending over as far as the lower part of the bosom, with outstretched hands beseech the Romans to spare them, and not to sacrifice to their resentment even women and children, as they had done at Avaricum. Some of them let themselves down from the walls by their hands, and surrendered to our soldiers. Lucius Fabius a centurion of the eighth legion, who, it was ascertained, had said that day among his fellow soldiers that he was excited by the plunder of Avaricum, and would not allow any one to mount the wall before him, finding three men of his own company, and being raised up by them, scaled the wall. He himself, in turn, taking hold of them one by one drew them

up to the wall.

Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat, Caesar receptui cani iussit legionique decimae, quacum erat, continuo signa constituit. Ac reliquarum legionum milites non exaudito sono tubae, quod satis magna valles intercedebat, tamen ab tribunis militum legatisque, ut erat a Caesare praeceptum, retinebantur. Sed elati spe celeris victoriae et hostium fuga et superiorum temporum secundis proeliis nihil adeo arduum sibi esse existimaverunt quod non virtute consequi possent, neque finem prius sequendi fecerunt quam muro oppidi portisque appropinquarent. Tum vero ex omnibus urbis partibus orto clamore, qui longius aberant repentino tumultu perterriti, cum hostem intra portas esse existimarent, sese ex oppido eiecerunt. Matres familiae de muro vestem argentumque iactabant et pectore nudo prominentes passis manibus obtestabantur Romanos, ut sibi parcerent neu, sicut Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus quidem atque infantibus abstinerent: nonnullae de muris per manus demissae sese militibus tradebant. Lucius Fabius, centurio legionis VIII, quem inter suos eo die dixisse constabat excitari se Avaricensibus praemiis neque commissurum, ut prius quisquam murum ascenderet, tres suos nactus manipulares atque ab eis sublevatus murum ascendit: hos ipse rursus singulos exceptans in murum extulit.

7:48. In the mean time those who had gone to the other part of the town to defend it, as we have mentioned above, at first, aroused by hearing the shouts, and, afterward, by frequent accounts, that the town was in possession of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry, and hastened in larger numbers to that quarter. As each first came he stood beneath the wall, and increased the number of his countrymen engaged in action. When a great multitude of them had assembled,

the matrons, who a little before were stretching their hands from the walls to the Romans, began to beseech their countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion to show their disheveled hair, and bring their children into public view. Neither in position nor in numbers was the contest an equal one to the Romans; at the same time, being exhausted by running and the long continuation of the fight, they could not easily withstand fresh and vigorous troops.

Interim ei qui ad alteram partem oppidi, ut supra demonstravimus, munitionis causa convenerant, primo exaudito clamore, inde etiam crebris nuntiis incitati, oppidum a Romanis teneri, praemissis equitibus magno concursu eo contenderunt. Eorum ut quisque primus venerat, sub muro consistebat suorumque pugnantium numerum augebat. Quorum cum magna multitudo convenisset, matres familiae, quae paulo ante Romanis de muro manus tendebant, suos obtestari et more Gallico passum capillum ostentare liberosque in conspectum proferre coeperunt. Erat Romanis nec loco nec numero aequa contentio; simul et cursu et spatio pugnae defatigati non facile recentes atque integros sustinebant.

7:49. Caesar, when he perceived that his soldiers were fighting on unfavorable ground, and that the enemy's forces were increasing, being alarmed for the safety of his troops, sent orders to Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts quickly from the camp, and post them at the foot of the hill, on the right wing of the enemy; that if he should see our men driven from the ground, he should deter the enemy from following too closely. He himself, advancing with the legion a little from that place where he had taken his post, awaited the issue of the battle.

Caesar, cum iniquo loco pugnari hostiumque augeri copias videret, praemetuens suis ad Titum Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit, ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret, ut, si nostros loco depulsos vidisset, quo minus libere hostes insequerentur terreret. Ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus, ubi constiterat, eventum pugnae exspectabat.

7:50. While the fight was going on most vigorously, hand to hand, and the enemy depended on their position and numbers, our men on their bravery, the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank, as Caesar had sent them by another ascent on the right, for the sake of creating a diversion. These, from the similarity of their arms, greatly terrified our men; and although they were discovered to have their right shoulders bare, which was usually the sign of those reduced to peace, yet the soldiers suspected that this very thing was done by the enemy to deceive them. At the same time Lucius Fabius the centurion, and those who had scaled the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were cast from the wall. Marcus Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, after attempting to hew down the gates, was overpowered by numbers, and, despairing of his safety, having already received many wounds, said to the soldiers of his own company who followed him: "Since I can not save you as well as myself, I shall at least provide for your safety, since I, allured by the love of glory, led you into this danger, do you save yourselves when an opportunity is given." At the same time he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and slaying two of them, drove back the rest a little from the gate. When his men attempted to aid him, "In vain," he says, "you endeavor to procure me safety, since blood and strength are now failing me, therefore leave this, while you have the

opportunity, and retreat to the legion.” Thus he fell fighting a few moments after, and saved his men by his own death.

Cum acerrime comminus pugnaretur, hostes loco et numero, nostri virtute confiderent, subito sunt Aedui visi ab latere nostris aperto, quos Caesar ab dextra parte alio ascensu manus destinandae causa miserat. Hi similitudine armorum vehementer nostros perterruerunt, ac tametsi dextris humeris exsertis animadvertebantur, quod insigne pacatum esse consuevit, tamen id ipsum sui fallendi causa milites ab hostibus factum existimabant. Eodem tempore Lucius Fabius centurio quique una murum ascenderant circumventi atque interfecti muro praecipitabantur. Marcus Petronius, eiusdem legionis centurio, cum portam excidere conatus esset, a multitudine oppressus ac sibi desperans multis iam vulneribus acceptis manipularibus suis, qui illum secuti erant, “Quoniam,” inquit, “me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. Vos data facultate vobis consulite.” Simul in medios hostes irrupit duobusque interfectis reliquos a porta paulum summovit. Conantibus auxiliari suis “Frustra,” inquit, “meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem recipite.” Ita puguans post paulum concidit ac suis saluti fuit.

7:51. Our soldiers, being hard pressed on every side, were dislodged from their position, with the loss of forty-six centurions; but the tenth legion, which had been posted in reserve on ground a little more level, checked the Gauls in their eager pursuit. It was supported by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, which, being led from the smaller camp, had, under the command of Titus Sextius, occupied the higher

ground. The legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and faced the enemy. Vercingetorix led back his men from the part of the hill within the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred of the soldiers were missing.

Nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deiecti sunt loco. Sed intolerantius Gallos insequentes legio decima tardavit, quae pro subsidio paulo aequiore loco constiterat. Hanc rursus XIII legionis cohortes exceperunt, quae ex castris minoribus eductae cum Tito Sextio legato ceperant locum superiorem. Legiones, ubi primum planitiem attigerunt, infestis contra hostes signis constiterunt. Vercingetorix ab radicibus collis suos intra munitiones reduxit. Eo die milites sunt paulo minus septingenti desiderati.

7:52. On the next day, Caesar, having called a meeting, censured the rashness and avarice of his soldiers, “In that they had judged for themselves how far they ought to proceed, or what they ought to do, and could not be kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants;” and stated, “what the disadvantage of the ground could effect, what opinion he himself had entertained at Avaricum, when having surprised the enemy without either general or cavalry, he had given up a certain victory, lest even a trifling loss should occur in the contest owing to the disadvantage of position. That as much as he admired the greatness of their courage, since neither the fortifications of the camp, nor the height of the mountain, nor the wall of the town could retard them; in the same degree he censured their licentiousness and arrogance, because they thought that they knew more than their general concerning victory, and the issue of actions: and that he required in his soldiers forbearance and self-command,

not less than valor and magnanimity.”

Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque ab tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent. Euit quid iniquitas loci posset, quid ipse ad Avaricum sensisset, cum sine duce et sine equitatu deprehensis hostibus exploratam victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione propter iniquitatem loci accideret. Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; nec minus se ab milite modestiam et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare.

7:53. Having held this assembly, and having encouraged the soldiers at the conclusion of his speech, “That they should not be dispirited on this account, nor attribute to the valor of the enemy, what the disadvantage of position had caused;” entertaining the same views of his departure that he had previously had, he led forth the legions from the camp, and drew up his army in order of battle in a suitable place. When Vercingetorix, nevertheless, would not descend to the level ground, a slight cavalry action, and that a successful one, having taken place, he led back his army into the camp. When he had done this, the next day, thinking that he had done enough to lower the pride of the Gauls, and to encourage the minds of his soldiers, he moved his camp in the direction of the Aedui. The enemy not even then pursuing us, on the third day he repaired the bridge over the

river Allier, and led over his whole army.

Hac habita contione et ad extremam orationem confirmatis militibus, ne ob hanc causam animo permoverentur neu quod iniquitas loci attulisset id virtuti hostium tribuerent, eadem de profectione cogitans quae ante senserat legiones ex castris eduxit aciemque idoneo loco constituit. Cum Vercingetorix nihil magis in aequum locum descenderet, levi facto equestri proelio atque secundo in castra exercitum reduxit. Cum hoc idem postero die fecisset, satis ad Gallicam ostentationem minuendam militumque animos confirmandos factum existimans in Aeduos movit castra. Ne tum quidem insecutis hostibus tertio die ad flumen Elaver venit; pontem refecit exercitumque traduxit.

7:54. Having then held an interview with Viridomarus and Eporedirix the Aeduans, he learns that Litavicus had set out with all the cavalry to raise the Aedui; that it was necessary that they too should go before him to confirm the state in their allegiance. Although he now saw distinctly the treachery of the Aedui in many things, and was of opinion that the revolt of the entire state would be hastened by their departure; yet he thought that they should not be detained, lest he should appear either to offer an insult, or betray some suspicion of fear. He briefly states to them when departing his services toward the Aedui: in what a state and how humbled he had found them, driven into their towns, deprived of their lands, stripped of all their forces, a tribute imposed on them, and hostages wrested from them with the utmost insult; and to what condition and to what greatness he had raised them, [so much so] that they had not only recovered their former position, but seemed to surpass the dignity and influence of all the previous eras of their history. After giving these admonitions

he dismissed them.

Ibi a Viridomaro atque Eporedorige Aeduis appellatus discit cum omni equitatu Litavicum ad sollicitandos Aeduos profectum: opus esse ipsos antecedere ad confirmandam civitatem. Etsi multis iam rebus perfidiam Aeduorum perspectam habebat atque horum discessu admaturari defectionem civitatis existimabat, tamen eos retinendos non constituit, ne aut inferre iniuriam videretur aut dare timoris aliquam suspicionem. Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita euit, quos et quam humiles accepisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio, obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis, et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset, ut non solum in pristinum statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse viderentur. His datis mandatis eos ab se dimisit.

7:55. Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, advantageously situated on the banks of the Loire. Caesar had conveyed hither all the hostages of Gaul, the corn, public money, a great part of his own baggage and that of his army; he had sent hither a great number of horses, which he had purchased in Italy and Spain on account of this war. When Eporedirix and Viridomarus came to this place, and received information of the disposition of the state, that Litavicus had been admitted by the Aedui into Bibracte, which is a town of the greatest importance among them, that Convictolitanis the chief magistrate and a great part of the senate had gone to meet him, that ambassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix to negotiate a peace and alliance; they thought that so great an opportunity ought not to be neglected. Therefore, having put to the sword the garrison of Noviodunum, and those who had assembled there for the purpose

of trading or were on their march, they divided the money and horses among themselves; they took care that the hostages of the [different] states should be brought to Bibracte, to the chief magistrate; they burned the town to prevent its being of any service to the Romans, as they were of opinion that they could not hold it; they carried away in their vessels whatever corn they could in the hurry, they destroyed the remainder, by [throwing it] into the river or setting it on fire, they themselves began to collect forces from the neighboring country, to place guards and garrisons in different positions along the banks of the Loire, and to display the cavalry on all sides to strike terror into the Romans, [to try] if they could cut them off from a supply of provisions. In which expectation they were much aided, from the circumstance that the Loire had swollen to such a degree from the melting of the snows, that it did not seem capable of being forded at all.

Noviodunum erat oppidum Aeduorum ad ripas Ligeris opportuno loco positum. Huc Caesar omnes obsides Galliae, frumentum, pecuniam publicam, suorum atque exercitus impedimentorum magnam partem contulerat; huc magnum numerum equorum huius belli causa in Italia atque Hispania coemptum miserat. Eo cum Eporedorix Viridomarusque venissent et de statu civitatis cognovissent, Litavicum Bibracti ab Aeduis receptum, quod est oppidum apud eos maximae auctoritatis, Convictolitavim magistratum magnamque partem senatus ad eum convenisse, legatos ad Vercingetorigem de pace et amicitia concilianda publice missos, non praetermittendum tantum commodum existimaverunt. Itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant pecuniam atque equos inter se partiti sunt; obsides civitatum Bibracte ad magistratum deducendos curaverunt; oppidum,

quod a se teneri non posse iudicabant, ne cui esset usui Romanis, incenderunt; frumenti quod subito potuerunt navibus avexerunt, reliquum flumine atque incendio corruperunt. Ipsi ex finitimis regionibus copias cogere, praesidia custodiasque ad ripas Ligeris disponere equitatumque omnibus locis iniciendi timoris causa ostentare coeperunt, si ab re frumentaria Romanos excludere aut adductos inopia in provinciam expellere possent. Quam ad spem multum eos adiuwabatur, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur.

7:56. Caesar on being informed of these movements was of opinion that he ought to make haste, even if he should run some risk in completing the bridges, in order that he might engage before greater forces of the enemy should be collected in that place. For no one even then considered it an absolutely necessary act, that changing his design he should direct his march into the Province, both because the infamy and disgrace of the thing, and the intervening mount Cevennes, and the difficulty of the roads prevented him; and especially because he had serious apprehensions for the safety of Labienus whom he had detached, and those legions whom he had sent with him. Therefore, having made very long marches by day and night, he came to the river Loire, contrary to the expectation of all; and having by means of the cavalry, found out a ford, suitable enough considering the emergency, of such depth that their arms and shoulders could be above water for supporting their accoutrements, he dispersed his cavalry in such a manner as to break the force of the current, and having confounded the enemy at the first sight, led his army across the river in safety; and finding corn and cattle in the fields, after refreshing his army with them, he determined to march into the country of the Senones.

Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar maturandum sibi censuit, si esset in perficiendis pontibus periclitandum, ut prius quam essent maiores eo coactae copiae dimicaret. Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, id ne metu quidem necessario faciendum existimabat; cum infamia atque indignitas rei et oppositus mons Cevenna viarumque difficultas impendebat, tum maxime quod abiuncto Labieno atque eis legionibus quas una miserat vehementer timebat. Itaque admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis contra omnium opinionem ad Ligerem venit vadoque per equites invento pro rei necessitate opportuno, ut brachia modo atque humeri ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu qui vim fluminis refringeret, atque hostibus primo aspectu perturbatis, incolumem exercitum traduxit frumentumque in agris et pecoris copiam nactus repleto his rebus exercitu iter in Senones facere instituit.

7:57. While these things are being done by Caesar, Labienus, leaving at Agendicum the recruits who had lately arrived from Italy, to guard the baggage, marches with four legions to Lutetia (which is a town of the Parisii, situated on an island on the river Seine), whose arrival being discovered by the enemy, numerous forces arrived from the neighboring states. The supreme command is intrusted to Camalugenus one of the Aulerici, who, although almost worn out with age, was called to that honor on account of his extraordinary knowledge of military tactics. He, when he observed that there was a large marsh which communicated with the Seine, and rendered all that country impassable, encamped there, and determined to prevent our troops from passing it.

Dum haec apud Caesarem geruntur, Labienus eo supplemento, quod

nuper ex Italia venerat, relicto Agedinci, ut esset impedimentis praesidio, cum quattuor legionibus Lutetiam proficiscitur. Id est oppidum Parisiorum, quod positum est in insula fluminis Sequanae. Cuius adventu ab hostibus cognito magnae ex finitimis civitatibus copiae convenerunt. Summa imperi traditur Camulogeno Aulerco, qui prope confectus aetate tamen propter singularem scientiam rei militaris ad eum est honorem evocatus. Is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem, quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit.

7:58. Labienus at first attempted to raise Vineae, fill up the marsh with hurdles and clay, and secure a road. After he perceived that this was too difficult to accomplish, he issued in silence from his camp at the third watch, and reached Melodunum by the same route by which he came. This is a town of the Senones, situated on an island in the Seine, as we have just before observed of Lutetia. Having seized upon about fifty ships and quickly joined them together, and having placed soldiers in them, he intimidated by his unexpected arrival the inhabitants, of whom a great number had been called out to the war, and obtains possession of the town without a contest. Having repaired the bridge, which the enemy had broken down during the preceding days, he led over his army, and began to march along the banks of the river to Lutetia. The enemy, on learning the circumstance from those who had escaped from Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia, and order the bridges of that town to be broken down: they themselves set out from the marsh, and take their position on the banks of the Seine, over against Lutetia and opposite the camp of Labienus.

Labienus primo vineas agere, cratibus atque aggere paludem explorare atque iter munire conabatur. Postquam id difficilius confieri animadvertit, silentio e castris tertia vigilia egressus eodem quo venerat itinere Metiosedum pervenit. Id est oppidum Senonum in insula Sequanae positum, ut paulo ante de Lutetia diximus. Deprensas navibus circiter quinquaginta celeriterque coniunctis atque eo militibus iniectis et rei novitate perterritis oppidanis, quorum magna pars erat ad bellum evocata, sine contentione oppido potitur. Refecto ponte, quem superioribus diebus hostes resciderant, exercitum traducit et secundo flumine ad Lutetiam iter facere coepit. Hostes re cognita ab eis, qui Metiosedo fugerant, Lutetiam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi profecti a palude ad ripas Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni castra considunt.

7:59. Caesar was now reported to have departed from Gergovia; intelligence was likewise brought to them concerning the revolt of the Aedui, and a successful rising in Gaul; and that Caesar, having been prevented from prosecuting his journey and crossing the Loire, and having been compelled by the want of corn, had marched hastily to the province. But the Bellovaci, who had been previously disaffected of themselves, on learning the revolt of the Aedui, began to assemble forces and openly to prepare for war. Then Labienus, as the change in affairs was so great, thought that he must adopt a very different system from what he had previously intended, and he did not now think of making any new acquisitions, or of provoking the enemy to an action; but that he might bring back his army safe to Agendicum. For, on one side, the Bellovaci, a state which held the highest reputation for prowess in Gaul, were pressing on him; and Camulogenus, with a disciplined and well- equipped army, held the other side; moreover, a very great river separated and cut off the

legions from the garrison and baggage. He saw that, in consequence of such great difficulties being thrown in his way, he must seek aid from his own energy of disposition.

Iam Caesar a Gergovia discessisse audiebatur, iam de Aeduorum defectione et secundo Galliae motu rumores adferebantur, Gallique in colloquiis interclusum itinere et Ligeri Caesarem inopia frumenti coactum in provinciam contendisse confirmabant. Bellovaci autem defectione Aeduorum cognita, qui ante erant per se infideles, manus cogere atque aperte bellum parare coeperunt. Tum Labienus tanta rerum commutatione longe aliud sibi capiendum consilium atque antea senserat intellegebat, neque iam, ut aliquid adquireret proelioque hostes lacerasset, sed ut incolumem exercitum Agedincum reduceret, cogitabat. Namque altera ex parte Bellovaci, quae civitas in Gallia maximam habet opinionem virtutis, instabant, alteram Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat; tum legiones a praesidio atque impedimentis interclusas maximum flumen distinebat. Tantis subito difficultatibus obiectis ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat.

7:60. Having, therefore, called a council of war a little before evening, he exhorted his soldiers to execute with diligence and energy such commands as he should give; he assigns the ships which he had brought from Melodunum to Roman knights, one to each, and orders them to fall down the river silently for four miles, at the end of the fourth watch, and there wait for him. He leaves the five cohorts, which he considered to be the most steady in action, to guard the camp; he orders the five remaining cohorts of the same legion to proceed a little after midnight up the river with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He collects also some small boats; and sends them in

the same direction, with orders to make a loud noise in rowing. He himself, a little after, marched out in silence, and, at the head of three legions, seeks that place to which he had ordered the ships to be brought.

Sub vesperum consilio convocato cohortatus ut ea quae imperasset diligenter industrieque administrarent, naves, quas Metiosedo deduxerat, singulas equitibus Romanis attribuit, et prima confecta vigilia quattuor milia passuum secundo flumine silentio progredi ibique se exspectari iubet. Quinque cohortes, quas minime firmas ad dimicandum esse existimabat, castris praesidio relinquit; quinque eiusdem legionis reliquas de media nocte cum omnibus impedimentis adverso flumine magno tumultu proficisci imperat. Conquirat etiam lintres: has magno sonitu remorum incitatus in eandem partem mittit. Ipse post paulo silentio egressus cum tribus legionibus eum locum petit quo naves appellari iusserat.

7:61. When he had arrived there, the enemy's scouts, as they were stationed along every part of the river, not expecting an attack, because a great storm had suddenly arisen, were surprised by our soldiers: the infantry and cavalry are quickly transported, under the superintendence of the Roman knights, whom he had appointed to that office. Almost at the same time, a little before daylight, intelligence was given to the enemy that there was an unusual tumult in the camp of the Romans, and that a strong force was marching up the river, and that the sound of oars was distinctly heard in the same quarter, and that soldiers were being conveyed across in ships a little below. On hearing these things, because they were of opinion that the legions were passing in three different places, and that the entire army, being terrified by the revolt of the Aedui, were preparing for

flight, they divided their forces also into three divisions. For leaving a guard opposite to the camp and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum, with orders to advance as far as the ships would proceed, they led the rest of their troops against Labienus.

Eo cum esset ventum, exploratores hostium, ut omni fluminis parte erant dispositi, inopinantes, quod magna subito erat coorta tempestas, ab nostris opprimuntur; exercitus equitatusque equitibus Romanis administrantibus, quos ei negotio praefecerat, celeriter transmittitur. Vno fere tempore sub lucem hostibus nuntiatur in castris Romanorum praeter consuetudinem tumultuari et magnum ire agmen adverso flumine sonitumque remorum in eadem parte exaudiri et paulo infra milites navibus transportari. Quibus rebus auditis, quod existimabant tribus locis transire legiones atque omnes perturbatos defectione Aeduorum fugam parare, suas quoque copias in tres partes distribuerunt. Nam praesidio e regione castrorum relicto et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa, quae tantum progrediatur, quantum naves processissent, reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt.

7:62. By day-break all our soldiers were brought across, and the army of the enemy was in sight. Labienus, having encouraged his soldiers “to retain the memory of their ancient valor, and so many most successful actions, and imagine Caesar himself, under whose command they had so often routed the enemy, to be present,” gives the signal for action. At the first onset the enemy are beaten and put to flight in the right wing, where the seventh legion stood: on the left wing, which position the twelfth legion held, although the first ranks fell transfixed by the javelins of the Romans, yet the rest resisted most bravely; nor did any one of them show the slightest intention of flying. Camulogenus, the general of the enemy, was present and

encouraged his troops. But when the issue of the victory was still uncertain, and the circumstances which were taking place on the left wing were announced to the tribunes of the seventh legion, they faced about their legion to the enemy's rear and attacked it: not even then did any one retreat, but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus met the same fate. But those who were left as a guard opposite the camp of Labienus, when they heard that the battle was commenced, marched to aid their countrymen and take possession of a hill, but were unable to withstand the attack of the victorious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with their own fugitives, such as the woods and mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces by our cavalry. When this battle was finished, Labienus returns to Agedicum, where the baggage of the whole army had been left: from it he marched with all his forces to Caesar.

Prima luce et nostri omnes erant transportati, et hostium acies cernebatur. Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum proeliorum retinerent memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent, dat signum proeli. Primo concursu ab dextro cornu, ubi septima legio constiterat, hostes pelluntur atque in fugam coniciuntur; ab sinistro, quem locum duodecima legio tenebat, cum primi ordines hostium transfixi telis concidissent, tamen acerrime reliqui resistebant, nec dabat suspicionem fugae quisquam. Ipse dux hostium Camulogenus suis aderat atque eos cohortabatur. Incerto nunc etiam exitu victoriae, cum septimae legionis tribunis esset nuntiatum quae in sinistro cornu gererentur, post tergum hostium legionem ostenderunt signaque intulerunt. Ne eo quidem tempore quisquam loco cessit, sed circumventi omnes interfectique sunt. Eandem fortunam tulit Camulogenus. At ei qui praesidio contra

castra Labieni erant relictī, cum proelium commissum audissent, subsidio suis ierunt collemque ceperunt, neque nostrorum militum victorum impetum sustinere potuerunt. Sic cum suis fugientibus permixti, quos non silvae montesque texerunt, ab equitatu sunt interfecti. Hoc negotio confecto Labienus revertitur Agedincum, ubi impedimenta totius exercitus relictā erant: inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit.

7:63. The revolt of the Aedui being known, the war grows more dangerous. Embassies are sent by them in all directions: as far as they can prevail by influence, authority, or money, they strive to excite the state [to revolt]. Having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar had deposited with them, they terrify the hesitating by putting them to death. The Aedui request Vercingetorix to come to them and communicate his plans of conducting the war. On obtaining this request they insist that the chief command should be assigned to them; and when the affair became a disputed question, a council of all Gaul is summoned to Bibracte. They came together in great numbers and from every quarter to the same place. The decision is left to the votes of the mass; all to a man approve of Vercingetorix as their general. The Remi, Lingones, and Treviri were absent from this meeting; the two former because they attached themselves to the alliance of Rome; the Treviri because they were very remote and were hard pressed by the Germans; which was also the reason of their being absent during the whole war, and their sending auxiliaries to neither party. The Aedui are highly indignant at being deprived of the chief command; they lament the change of fortune, and miss Caesar's indulgence toward them; however, after engaging in the war, they do not dare to pursue their own measures apart from the rest. Eporedirix and Viridomarus, youths of the

greatest promise, submit reluctantly to Vercingetorix.

Defectione Aeduum cognita bellum augetur. Legationes in omnes partes circummittuntur: quantum gratia, auctoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas civitates nituntur; nacti obsides, quos Caesar apud eos deposuerat, horum supplicio dubitantes territant. Petunt a Vercingetorige Aedui ut ad se veniat rationesque belli gerendi communicet. Re impetrata contendunt ut ipsis summa imperi tradatur, et re in controversiam deducta totius Galliae concilium Bibracte indicitur. Eodem conveniunt undique frequentes. Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur: ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant imperatorem. Ab hoc concilio Remi, Lingones, Treveri afuerunt: illi, quod amicitiam Romanorum sequebantur; Treveri, quod aberant longius et ab Germanis premebantur, quae fuit causa quare toto abessent bello et neutris auxilia mitterent. Magno dolore Aedui ferunt se deiectos principatu, queruntur fortunae commutationem et Caesaris indulgentiam in se requirunt, neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent. Inviti summae spei adolescentes Eporedorix et Viridomarus Vercingetorigi parent.

7:64. The latter demands hostages from the remaining states; nay, more, appointed a day for this proceeding; he orders all the cavalry, fifteen thousand in number, to quickly assemble here; he says that he will be content with the infantry which he had before, and would not tempt fortune nor come to a regular engagement; but since he had abundance of cavalry, it would be very easy for him to prevent the Romans from obtaining forage or corn, provided that they themselves should resolutely destroy their corn and set fire to their houses; by which sacrifice of private property they would evidently

obtain perpetual dominion and freedom. After arranging these matters, he levies ten thousand infantry on the Aedui and Segusiani, who border on our province: to these he adds eight hundred horse. He sets over them the brother of Eporedirix, and orders him to wage war against the Allobroges. On the other side he sends the Gabali and the nearest cantons of the Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends the Ruteni and Cadurci to lay waste the territories of the Volcae Arecomici. Besides, by secret messages and embassies, he tampers with the Allobroges, whose minds, he hopes, had not yet settled down after the excitement of the late war. To their nobles he promises money, and to their state the dominion of the whole province.

Ipsē imperat reliquis civitatibus obsides diemque ei rei constituit. Omnes equites, quindecim milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet; peditatu quem antea habuerit se fore contentum dicit, neque fortunam temptaturum aut in acie dimicaturum, sed, quoniam abundet equitatu, perfacile esse factu frumentationibus pabulationibusque Romanos prohibere, aequo modo animo sua ipsi frumenta corrumpant aedificiaque incendant, qua rei familiaris iactura perpetuum imperium libertatemque se consequi videant. His constitutis rebus Aeduis Segusiavisque, qui sunt finitimi provinciae, decem milia peditum imperat; huc addit equites octingentos. His praeficit fratrem Eporedorigis bellumque inferri Allobrogibus iubet. Altera ex parte Gabalos proximosque pagos Arvernorum in Helvios, item Rutenos Cadurcosque ad fines Volcarum Arecomicorum depopulandos mittit. Nihilominus clandestinis nuntiis legationibusque Allobrogas sollicitat, quorum mentes nondum ab superiore bello resedissem sperabat. Horum principibus pecunias, civitati autem imperium totius provinciae pollicetur.

7:65. The only guards provided against all these contingencies were twenty-two cohorts, which were collected from the entire province by Lucius Caesar, the lieutenant, and opposed to the enemy in every quarter. The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in battle with their neighbors, are defeated, and Caius Valerius Donotaurus, the son of Caburus, the principal man of the state, and several others, being slain, they are forced to retire within their towns and fortifications. The Allobroges, placing guards along the course of the Rhine, defend their frontiers with great vigilance and energy. Caesar, as he perceived that the enemy were superior in cavalry, and he himself could receive no aid from the Province or Italy, while all communication was cut off, sends across the Rhine into Germany to those states which he had subdued in the preceding campaigns, and summons from them cavalry and the light- armed infantry, who were accustomed to engage among them. On their arrival, as they were mounted on unserviceable horses, he takes horses from the military tribunes and the rest, nay, even from the Roman knights and veterans, and distributes them among the Germans.

Ad hos omnes casus provisa erant praesidia cohortium duarum et viginti, quae ex ipsa provincia ab Lucio Caesare legato ad omnes partes opponebantur. Helvii sua sponte cum finitimis proelio congressi pelluntur et Gaio Valerio Donnotauro, Caburi filio, principe civitatis, compluribusque aliis interfectis intra oppida ac muros compelluntur. Allobroges crebris ad Rhodanum dispositis praesidiis magna cum cura et diligentia suos fines tuentur. Caesar, quod hostes equitatu superiores esse intellegebat et interclusis omnibus itineribus nulla re ex provincia atque Italia sublevari poterat, trans Rhenum in Germaniam mittit ad eas civitates quas superioribus annis pacaverat, equitesque ab his arcessit et levis

armaturae pedites, qui inter eos proeliari consuerant. Eorum adventu, quod minus idoneis equis utebantur, a tribunis militum reliquisque equitibus Romanis atque evocatis equos sumit Germanisque distribuit.

7:66. In the mean time, whilst these things are going on, the forces of the enemy from the Arverni, and the cavalry which had been demanded from all Gaul, meet together. A great number of these having been collected, when Caesar was marching into the country of the Sequani, through the confines of the Lingones, in order that he might the more easily render aid to the province, Vercingetorix encamped in three camps, about ten miles from the Romans: and having summoned the commanders of the cavalry to a council, he shows that the time of victory was come; that the Romans were fleeing into the Province and leaving Gaul; that this was sufficient for obtaining immediate freedom; but was of little moment in acquiring peace and tranquillity for the future; for the Romans would return after assembling greater forces and would not put an end to the war. Therefore they should attack them on their march, when encumbered. If the infantry should [be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and be retarded by doing so, the march could not be accomplished: if, abandoning their baggage they should provide for their safety (a result which, he trusted, was more like to ensue), they would lose both property and character. For as to the enemy's horse, they ought not to entertain a doubt that none of them would dare to advance beyond the main body. In order that they [the Gauls] may do so with greater spirit, he would marshal all their forces before the camp, and intimidate the enemy. The cavalry unanimously shout out, "That they ought to bind themselves by a most sacred oath, that he should not be received under a roof, nor have access to his children, parents, or

wife, who shall not twice have ridden through the enemy's army."

Interea, dum haec geruntur, hostium copiae ex Arvernīs equitesque qui totī Galliae erant imperati conveniunt. Magno horum coacto numero, cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret, quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferri posset, circiter milia passuum decem ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit convocatisque ad concilium praefectis equitum venisse tempus victoriae demonstrat. Fugere in provinciam Romanos Galliaque excedere. Id sibi ad praesentem obtinendam libertatem satis esse; ad reliqui temporis pacem atque otium parum profici: maioribus enim coactis copiis reversuros neque finem bellandi facturos. Proinde agmine impeditos adorirantur. Si pedites suis auxilium ferant atque in eo morentur, iter facere non posse; si, id quod magis futurum confidat, relictis impedimentis suae salutis consulant, et usu rerum necessariarum et dignitate spoliatum iri. Nam de equitibus hostium, quin nemo eorum progredi modo extra agmen audeat, et ipsos quidem non debere dubitare, et quo maiore faciant animo, copias se omnes pro castris habiturum et terrori hostibus futurum. Conclamant equites sanctissimo iureiurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos, ne ad parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium perequitasset.

7:67. This proposal receiving general approbation, and all being forced to take the oath, on the next day the cavalry were divided into three parts, and two of these divisions made a demonstration on our two flanks; while one in front began to obstruct our march. On this circumstance being announced, Caesar orders his cavalry also to form three divisions and charge the enemy. Then the action commences simultaneously in every part: the main body halts; the

baggage is received within the ranks of the legions. If our men seemed to be distressed, or hard pressed in any quarter, Caesar usually ordered the troops to advance, and the army to wheel round in that quarter; which conduct retarded the enemy in the pursuit, and encouraged our men by the hope of support. At length the Germans, on the right wing, having gained the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy from their position and pursue them even as far as the river at which Vercingetorix with the infantry was stationed, and slay several of them. The rest, on observing this action, fearing lest they should be surrounded, betake themselves to flight. A slaughter ensues in every direction, and three of the noblest of the Aedui are taken and brought to Caesar: Cotus, the commander of the cavalry, who had been engaged in the contest with Convictolitanis the last election, Cavarillus, who had held the command of the infantry after the revolt of Litavicus, and Eporedirix, under whose command the Aedui had engaged in war against the Sequani, before the arrival of Caesar.

Probata re atque omnibus iureiurando adactis postero die in tres partes distributo equitatu duae se acies ab duobus lateribus ostendunt, una primo agmine iter impedire coepit. Qua re nuntiata Caesar suum quoque equitatum tripertito divisum contra hostem ire iubet. Pugnatur una omnibus in partibus. Consistit agmen; impedimenta intra legiones recipiuntur. Si qua in parte nostri laborare aut gravius premi videbantur, eo signa inferri Caesar aciemque constitui iubebat; quae res et hostes ad insequendum tardabat et nostros spe auxilii confirmabat. Tandem Germani ab dextro latere summum iugum nacti hostes loco depellunt; fugientes usque ad flumen, ubi Vercingetorix cum pedestribus copiis consederat, persequuntur compluresque interficiunt. Qua re animadversa reliqui ne circumirentur veriti se fugae mandant. Omnibus locis fit caedes. Tres nobilissimi Aedui

capti ad Caesarem perducuntur: Cotus, praefectus equitum, qui controversiam cum Convictolitavi proximis comitiis habuerat, et Cavarillus, qui post defectionem Litavici pedestribus copiis praefuerat, et Eporodorix, quo duce ante adventum Caesaris Aedui cum Sequanis bello contenderant.

7:68. All his cavalry being routed, Vercingetorix led back his troops in the same order as he had arranged them before the camp, and immediately began to march to Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii, and ordered the baggage to be speedily brought forth from the camp, and follow him closely. Caesar, having conveyed his baggage to the nearest hill, and having left two legions to guard it, pursued as far as the time of day would permit, and after slaying about three thousand of the rear of the enemy, encamped at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitering the situation of the city, finding that the enemy were panic-stricken, because the cavalry in which they placed their chief reliance, were beaten, he encouraged his men to endure the toil, and began to draw a line of circumvallation round Alesia.

Fugato omni equitatu Vercingetorix copias, ut pro castris collocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam, quod est oppidum Mandubiorum, iter facere coepit celeriterque impedimenta ex castris educi et se subsequi iussit. Caesar impedimentis in proximum collem deductis, duabus legionibus praesidio relictis, secutus quantum diei tempus est passum, circiter tribus milibus hostium ex novissimo agmine interfectis altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit. Perspecto urbis situ perterritisque hostibus, quod equitatu, qua maxime parte exercitus confidebant, erant pulsi, adhortatus ad laborem milites circumvallare instituit.

7:69. The town itself was situated on the top of a hill, in a very lofty position, so that it did not appear likely to be taken, except by a regular siege. Two rivers, on two different sides, washed the foot of the hill. Before the town lay a plain of about three miles in length; on every other side hills at a moderate distance, and of an equal degree of height, surrounded the town. The army of the Gauls had filled all the space under the wall, comprising a part of the hill which looked to the rising sun, and had drawn in front a trench and a stone wall six feet high. The circuit of that fortification, which was commenced by the Romans, comprised eleven miles. The camp was pitched in a strong position, and twenty-three redoubts were raised in it, in which sentinels were placed by day, lest any sally should be made suddenly; and by night the same were occupied by watches and strong guards.

Ipsum erat oppidum Alesia in colle summo admodum edito loco, ut nisi obsidione expugnari non posse videretur; cuius collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina subleebant. Ante id oppidum planities circiter milia passuum tria in longitudinem patebat: reliquis ex omnibus partibus colles mediocri interiecto spatio pari altitudinis fastigio oppidum cingebant. Sub muro, quae pars collis ad orientem solem spectabat, hunc omnem locum copiae Gallorum compleverant fossamque et maceriam sex in altitudinem pedum praeduxerant. Eius munitionis quae ab Romanis instituebatur circuitus XI milia passuum tenebat. Castra opportunis locis erant posita ibique castella viginti tria facta, quibus in castellis interdum stationes ponebantur, ne qua subito eruptio fieret: haec eadem noctu excubitoribus ac firmis praesidiis tenebantur.

7:70. The work having been begun, a cavalry action ensues in that

plain, which we have already described as broken by hills, and extending three miles in length. The contest is maintained on both sides with the utmost vigor; Caesar sends the Germans to aid our troops when distressed, and draws up the legions in front of the camp, lest any sally should be suddenly made by the enemy's infantry. The courage of our men is increased by the additional support of the legions; the enemy being put to flight, hinder one another by their numbers, and as only the narrower gates were left open, are crowded together in them; then the Germans pursue them with vigor even to the fortifications. A great slaughter ensues; some leave their horses, and endeavor to cross the ditch and climb the wall. Caesar orders the legions which he had drawn up in front of the rampart to advance a little. The Gauls, who were within the fortifications, were no less panic-stricken, thinking that the enemy were coming that moment against them, and unanimously shout "to arms;" some in their alarm rush into the town; Vercingetorix orders the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be left undefended. The Germans retreat, after slaying many and taking several horses.

Opere instituto fit equestre proelium in ea planitie, quam intermissam collibus tria milia passuum in longitudinem patere supra demonstravimus. Summa vi ab utrisque contenditur. Laborantibus nostris Caesar Germanos summittit legionesque pro castris constituit, ne qua subito irruptio ab hostium peditatu fiat. Praesidio legionum addito nostris animus augetur: hostes in fugam coniecti se ipsi multitudine impediunt atque angustioribus portis relictis coacervantur. Germani acrius usque ad munitiones sequuntur. Fit magna caedes: nonnulli relictis equis fossam transire et maceriam transcendere conantur. Paulum legiones Caesar quas pro vallo constituerat promoveri iubet. Non minus qui intra munitiones erant

perturbantur Galli: veniri ad se confestim existimantes ad arma conclamant; nonnulli perterriti in oppidum irrumpunt. Vercingetorix iubet portas claudi, ne castra nudentur. Multis interfectis, compluribus equis captis Germani sese recipiunt.

7:71. Vercingetorix adopts the design of sending away all his cavalry by night, before the fortifications should be completed by the Romans. He charges them when departing “that each of them should go to his respective state, and press for the war all who were old enough to bear arms; he states his own merits, and conjures them to consider his safety, and not surrender him who had deserved so well of the general freedom, to the enemy for torture; he points out to them that, if they should be remiss, eighty thousand chosen men would perish with him; that upon making a calculation, he had barely corn for thirty days, but could hold out a little longer by economy.” After giving these instructions he silently dismisses the cavalry in the second watch, [on that side] where our works were not completed; he orders all the corn to be brought to himself; he ordains capital punishment to such as should not obey; he distributes among them, man by man, the cattle, great quantities of which had been driven there by the Mandubii; he began to measure out the corn sparingly, and by little and little; he receives into the town all the forces which he had posted in front of it. In this manner he prepares to await the succors from Gaul, and carry on the war.

Vercingetorix, priusquam munitiones ab Romanis perficiantur, consilium capit omnem ab se equitatum noctu dimittere. Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant. Sua in illos merita proponit obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem

habeant neu se optime de communi libertate meritum in cruciatum hostibus dedant. Quod si indiligentiores fuerint, milia hominum delecta octoginta una secum interitura demonstrat. Ratione inita se exigue dierum triginta habere frumentum, sed paulo etiam longius tolerari posse parcendo. His datis mandatis, qua opus erat intermissum, secunda vigilia silentio equitatum mittit. Frumentum omne ad se referri iubet; capitis poenam eis qui non paruerint constituit: pecus, cuius magna erat copia ab Mandubiis compulsa, viritim distribuit; frumentum parce et paulatim metiri instituit; copias omnes quas pro oppido collocaverat in oppidum recepit. His rationibus auxilia Galliae exspectare et bellum parat administrare.

7:72. Caesar, on learning these proceedings from the deserters and captives, adopted the following system of fortification; he dug a trench twenty feet deep, with perpendicular sides, in such a manner that the base of this trench should extend so far as the edges were apart at the top. He raised all his other works at a distance of four hundred feet from that ditch; [he did] that with this intention, lest (since he necessarily embraced so extensive an area, and the whole works could not be easily surrounded by a line of soldiers) a large number of the enemy should suddenly, or by night, sally against the fortifications; or lest they should by day cast weapons against our men while occupied with the works. Having left this interval, he drew two trenches fifteen feet broad, and of the same depth; the innermost of them, being in low and level ground, he filled with water conveyed from the river. Behind these he raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high; to this he added a parapet and battlements, with large stakes cut like stags' horns, projecting from the junction of the parapet and battlements, to prevent the enemy from scaling it, and surrounded the entire work with turrets, which were eighty feet

distant from one another.

Quibus rebus cognitis ex perfugis et captivis, Caesar haec genera munitionis instituit. Fossam pedum viginti directis lateribus duxit, ut eius fossae solum tantundem pateret quantum summae fossae labra distarent. Reliquas omnes munitiones ab ea fossa pedes quadringentos reduxit, [id] hoc consilio, quoniam tantum esset necessario spatium complexus, nec facile totum corpus corona militum cingeretur, ne de improvise aut noctu ad munitiones hostium multitudo advolaret aut interdiu tela in nostros operi destinatos conicere possent. Hoc intermisso spatio duas fossas quindecim pedes latas, eadem altitudine perduxit, quarum anteriorem campestribus ac demissis locis aqua ex flumine derivata complevit. Post eas aggerem ac vallum duodecim pedum extruxit. Huic loricae pinnaeque adiecit grandibus cervis eminentibus ad commissuras pluteorum atque aggeris, qui ascensum hostium tardarent, et turres toto opere circumdedit, quae pedes LXXX inter se distarent.

7:73. It was necessary, at one and the same time, to procure timber [for the rampart], lay in supplies of corn, and raise also extensive fortifications, and the available troops were in consequence of this reduced in number, since they used to advance to some distance from the camp, and sometimes the Gauls endeavored to attack our works, and to make a sally from the town by several gates and in great force. Caesar thought that further additions should be made to these works, in order that the fortifications might be defensible by a small number of soldiers. Having, therefore, cut down the trunks of trees or very thick branches, and having stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened them into a point, he drew a continued trench every where five feet deep. These stakes being sunk into this trench, and fastened

firmly at the bottom, to prevent the possibility of their being torn up, had their branches only projecting from the ground. There were five rows in connection with, and intersecting each other; and whoever entered within them were likely to impale themselves on very sharp stakes. The soldiers called these “cippi.” Before these, which were arranged in oblique rows in the form of a quincunx, pits three feet deep were dug, which gradually diminished in depth to the bottom. In these pits tapering stakes, of the thickness of a man’s thigh; sharpened at the top and hardened in the fire, were sunk in such a manner as to project from the ground not more than four inches; at the same time for the purpose of giving them strength and stability, they were each filled with trampled clay to the height of one foot from the bottom: the rest of the pit was covered over with osiers and twigs, to conceal the deceit. Eight rows of this kind were dug, and were three feet distant from each other. They called this a lily from its resemblance to that flower. Stakes a foot long, with iron hooks attached to them, were entirely sunk in the ground before these, and were planted in every place at small intervals; these they called spurs.

Erat eodem tempore et materiari et frumentari et tantas munitiones fieri necesse deminutis nostris copiis quae longius ab castris progrediebantur: ac non numquam opera nostra Galli temptare atque eruptionem ex oppido pluribus portis summa vi facere conabantur. Quare ad haec rursus opera addendum Caesar putavit, quo minore numero militum munitiones defendi possent. Itaque truncis arborum aut admodum firmis ramis abscisis atque horum delibratis ac praeacutis cacuminibus perpetuae fossae quinos pedes altae ducebantur. Huc illi stipites demissi et ab infimo revincti, ne revelli possent, ab ramis eminebant. Quini erant ordines coniuncti inter se

atque implicati; quo qui intraverant, se ipsi acutissimis vallis induebant. Hos cippos appellabant. Ante quos obliquis ordinibus in quincuncem dispositis scrobes tres in altitudinem pedes fodiebantur paulatim angustiore ad infimum fastigio. Huc teretes stipites feminis crassitudine ab summo praeacuti et praeusti demittebantur, ita ut non amplius digitis quattuor ex terra eminerent; simul confirmandi et stabiliendi causa singuli ab infimo solo pedes terra exculcabantur, reliqua pars scrobis ad occultandas insidias viminibus ac virgultis integebatur. Huius generis octoni ordines ducti ternos inter se pedes distabant. Id ex similitudine floris liliū appellabant. Ante haec taleae pedem longae ferreis hamis infixis totae in terram infodiebantur mediocribusque intermissis spatiis omnibus locis disserebantur; quos stimulos nominabant.

7:74. After completing these works, saving selected as level ground as he could, considering the nature of the country, and having inclosed an area of fourteen miles, he constructed, against an external enemy, fortifications of the same kind in every respect, and separate from these, so that the guards of the fortifications could not be surrounded even by immense numbers, if such a circumstance should take place owing to the departure of the enemy's cavalry; and in order that the Roman soldiers might not be compelled to go out of the camp with great risk, he orders all to provide forage and corn for thirty days.

His rebus perfectis regiones secutus quam potuit aequissimas pro loci natura quattuordecim milia passuum complexus pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit, ut ne magna quidem multitudine, si ita accidat, munitionum praesidia circumfundi possent; ac ne cum periculo ex castris egredi cogatur, dierum triginta pabulum frumentumque habere omnes

convectum iubet.

7:75. While those things are carried on at Alesia, the Gauls, having convened a council of their chief nobility, determine that all who could bear arms should not be called out, which was the opinion of Vercingetorix, but that a fixed number should be levied from each state; lest, when so great a multitude assembled together, they could neither govern nor distinguish their men, nor have the means of supplying them with corn. They demand thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui and their dependents, the Segusiani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices; an equal number from the Arverni in conjunction with the Eleuteti Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni, who were accustomed to be under the command of the Arverni; twelve thousand each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Sentones, Ruteni, and Carnutes; ten thousand from the Bellovaci; the same number from the Lemovici; eight thousand each from the Pictones, and Turoni, and Parisii, and Helvii; five thousand each from the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges; the same number from the Aulerci Cenomani; four thousand from the Atrebates; three thousand each from the Bellocassi, Lexovii, and Aulerci Ebuovices; thirty thousand from the Rauraci, and Boii; six thousand from all the states together, which border on the Atlantic, and which in their dialect are called Armoricae (in which number are comprehended the Curisolites, Rhedones, Ambibari, Caltes, Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did not contribute their number, as they said that they would wage war against the Romans on their own account, and at their own discretion, and would not obey the order of any one: however, at the request of Commius, they sent two thousand, in consideration of a tie of hospitality which subsisted

between him and them.

Dum haec apud Alesiam geruntur, Galli concilio principum indicto non omnes eos qui arma ferre possent, ut censuit Vercingetorix, convocandos statuunt, sed certum numerum cuique ex civitate imperandum, ne tanta multitudine confusa nec moderari nec discernere suos nec frumentandi rationem habere possent. Imperant Aeduis atque eorum clientibus, Segusiavis, Ambivaretis, Aulercis Brannovicibus, Blannoviis, milia XXXV; parem numerum Arvernīs adiunctis Eleutetis, Cadurcis, Gabalis, Vellaviis, qui sub imperio Arvernorum esse consuerunt; Sequanis, Senonibus, Biturigibus, Santonis, Rutenis, Carnutibus duodena milia; Bellovacis X; totidem Lemovicibus; octona Pictonibus et Turonis et Parisiis et Helvetiis; [Suessionibus,] Ambianis, Mediomatricis, Petrocoriis, Nerviis, Morinis, Nitiobrigibus quina milia; Aulercis Cenomanis totidem; Atrebatibus [IIII milibus]; Veliocassis, Lexoviis et Aulercis Ebuovicibus terna; Rauracis et Boiis bina; [XXX milia] universis civitatibus, quae Oceanum attingunt quaeque eorum consuetudine Armoricae appellantur, quo sunt in numero Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, Venelli. Ex his Bellovaci suum numerum non compleverunt, quod se suo nomine atque arbitrio cum Romanis bellum gesturos dicebant neque cuiusquam imperio obtemperaturos; rogati tamen ab Commio pro eius hospitio duo milia una miserunt.

7:76. Caesar had, as we have previously narrated, availed himself of the faithful and valuable services of this Commius, in Britain, in former years: in consideration of which merits he had exempted from taxes his [Commius's] state, and had conferred on Commius himself the country of the Morini. Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls

in asserting their freedom, and recovering their ancient renown in war, that they were influenced neither by favors, nor by the recollection of private friendship; and all earnestly directed their energies and resources to that war, and collected eight thousand cavalry, and about two hundred and forty thousand infantry. These were reviewed in the country of the Aedui, and a calculation was made of their numbers: commanders were appointed: the supreme command is intrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedirix the Aeduans, and Vergasillaunus the Arvernian, the cousin-german of Vercingetorix. To them are assigned men selected from each state, by whose advice the war should be conducted. All march to Alesia, sanguine and full of confidence: nor was there a single individual who imagined that the Romans could withstand the sight of such an immense host: especially in an action carried on both in front and rear, when [on the inside] the besieged would sally from the town and attack the enemy, and on the outside so great forces of cavalry and infantry would be seen.

Huius opera Commi, ut antea demonstravimus, fideli atque utili superioribus annis erat usus in Britannia Caesar; quibus ille pro meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat. Tamen tanta universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent. Coactis equitum VIII milibus et peditum circiter CCL haec in Aeduum finibus recensebantur, numerusque inibat, praefecti constituebantur. Commio Atrebat, Viridomaro et Eporedorigi Aeduis, Vercassivellauno Arverno, consobrino Vercingetorigis, summa imperi traditur. His delecti ex civitatibus attribuuntur,

quorum consilio bellum administraretur. Omnes alacres et fiduciae pleni ad Alesiam proficiscuntur, neque erat omnium quisquam qui aspectum modo tantae multitudinis sustineri posse arbitraretur, praesertim ancipiti proelio, cum ex oppido eruptione pugnaretur, foris tantae copiae equitatus peditatusque cernerentur.

7:77. But those who were blockaded at Alesia, the day being past, on which they had expected auxiliaries from their countrymen, and all their corn being consumed ignorant of what was going on among the Aedui, convened an assembly and deliberated on the exigency of their situation. After various opinions had been expressed among them, some of which proposed a surrender, others a sally, while their strength would support it, the speech of Critognatus ought not to be omitted for its singular and detestable cruelty. He sprung from the noblest family among the Arverni, and possessing great influence, says, "I shall pay no attention to the opinion of those who call a most disgraceful surrender by the name of a capitulation; nor do I think that they ought to be considered as citizens, or summoned to the council. My business is with those who approve of a sally: in whose advice the memory of our ancient prowess seems to dwell in the opinion of you all. To be unable to bear privation for a short time is disgraceful cowardice, not true valor. Those who voluntarily offer themselves to death are more easily found than those who would calmly endure distress. And I would approve of this opinion (for honor is a powerful motive with me), could I foresee no other loss, save that of life; but let us, in adopting our design, look back on all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our aid. What courage do you think would our relatives and friends have, if eighty thousand men were butchered in one spot, supposing that they should be forced to come to an action almost over our corpses? Do not utterly deprive

them of your aid, for they have spurned all thoughts of personal danger on account of your safety; nor by your folly, rashness, and cowardice, crush all Gaul and doom it to an eternal slavery. Do you doubt their fidelity and firmness because they have not come at the appointed day? What then? Do you suppose that the Romans are employed every day in the outer fortifications for mere amusement? If you can not be assured by their dispatches, since every avenue is blocked up, take the Romans as evidence that their approach is drawing near; since they, intimidated by alarm at this, labor night and day at their works. What, therefore, is my design? To do as our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, which was by no means equally momentous who, when driven into their towns, and oppressed by similar privations, supported life by the corpses of those who appeared useless for war on account of their age, and did not surrender to the enemy: and even if we had not a precedent for such cruel conduct, still I should consider it most glorious that one should be established, and delivered to posterity. For in what was that war like this? The Cimbri, after laying Gaul waste, and inflicting great calamities, at length departed from our country, and sought other lands; they left us our rights, laws, lands, and liberty. But what other motive or wish have the Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle in the lands and states of those whom they have learned by fame to be noble and powerful in war, and impose on them perpetual slavery? For they never have carried on wars on any other terms. But if you know not these things which are going on in distant countries, look to the neighboring Gaul, which being reduced to the form of a province, stripped of its rights and laws, and subjected to Roman despotism, is oppressed by perpetual slavery.”

At ei, qui Alesiae obsidebantur praeterita die, qua auxilia suorum

exspectaverant, consumpto omni frumento, inscii quid in Aeduis gereretur, concilio coacto de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Ac variis dictis sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppetere, eruptionem censebat, non praetereunda oratio Critognati videtur propter eius singularem et nefariam crudelitatem. Hic summo in Arvernīs ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis, “Nihil,” inquit, “de eorum sententia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam servitutem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad concilium adhibendos censeo. Cum his mihi res sit, qui eruptionem probant; quorum in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinae residere virtutis memoria videtur. Animi est ista mollitia, non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. Atque ego hanc sententiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae nostrae iacturam fieri viderem: sed in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus. Quid hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis consanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur? Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetuae servituti subicere. An, quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis? Si illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepito, his utimini testibus appropinquare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere versantur. Quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari bello Cimbrorum

Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt neque se hostibus tradiderunt. Cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen libertatis causa institui et posteris prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem. Nam quid illi simile bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaue illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reliquerunt. Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considerare atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt. Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitude.”

7:78. When different opinions were expressed, they determined that those who, owing to age or ill health, were unserviceable for war, should depart from the town, and that themselves should try every expedient before they had recourse to the advice of Critognatus: however, that they would rather adopt that design, if circumstances should compel them and their allies should delay, than accept any terms of a surrender or peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the town, are compelled to go forth with their wives and children. When these came to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they begged of the soldiers by every entreaty to receive them as slaves and relieve them with food. But Caesar, placing guards on the rampart, forbade them to be admitted.

Sententiis dictis constituunt ut ei qui valetudine aut aetate inutiles

sunt bello oppido excedant, atque omnia prius experiantur, quam ad Critognati sententiam descendant: illo tamen potius utendum consilio, si res cogat atque auxilia morentur, quam aut deditionis aut pacis subeundam condicionem. Mandubii, qui eos oppido receperant, cum liberis atque uxoribus exire coguntur. Hi, cum ad munitiones Romanorum accessissent, flentes omnibus precibus orabant, ut se in servitutem receptos cibo iuarent. At Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recipi prohibebat.

7:79. In the mean time, Commius and the rest of the leaders, to whom the supreme command had been intrusted, came with all their forces to Alesia, and having occupied the entire hill, encamped not more than a mile from our fortifications. The following day, having led forth their cavalry from the camp, they fill all that plain, which, we have related, extended three miles in length, and drew out their infantry a little from that place, and post them on the higher ground. The town Alesia commanded a view of the whole plain. The besieged run together when these auxiliaries were seen; mutual congratulations ensue, and the minds of all are elated with joy. Accordingly, drawing out their troops, they encamp before the town, and cover the nearest trench with hurdles and fill it up with earth, and make ready for a sally and every casualty.

Interea Commius reliquique duces quibus summa imperi permissa erat cum omnibus copiis ad Alesiam perveniunt et colle exteriori occupato non longius mille passibus ab nostris munitionibus considunt. Postero die equitatu ex castris educto omnem eam planitiem, quam in longitudinem tria milia passuum patere demonstravimus, complent pedestresque copias paulum ab eo loco abditas in locis superioribus constituunt. Erat ex oppido Alesia

despectus in campum. Concurrent his auxiliis visis; fit gratulatio inter eos, atque omnium animi ad laetitiam excitantur. Itaque productis copiis ante oppidum considunt et proximam fossam cratibus integunt atque aggere explent seque ad eruptionem atque omnes casus comparant.

7:80. Caesar, having stationed his army on both sides of the fortifications, in order that, if occasion should arise, each should hold and know his own post, orders the cavalry to issue forth from the camp and commence action. There was a commanding view from the entire camp, which occupied a ridge of hills; and the minds of all the soldiers anxiously awaited the issue of the battle. The Gauls had scattered archers and light- armed infantry here and there, among their cavalry, to give relief to their retreating troops, and sustain the impetuosity of our cavalry. Several of our soldiers were unexpectedly wounded by these, and left the battle. When the Gauls were confident that their countrymen were the conquerors in the action, and beheld our men hard pressed by numbers, both those who were hemmed in by the line of circumvallation and those who had come to aid them, supported the spirits of their men by shouts and yells from every quarter. As the action was carried on in sight of all, neither a brave nor cowardly act could be concealed; both the desire of praise and the fear of ignominy, urged on each party to valor. After fighting from noon almost to sunset, without victory inclining in favor of either, the Germans, on one side, made a charge against the enemy in a compact body, and drove them back; and, when they were put to flight, the archers were surrounded and cut to pieces. In other parts, likewise, our men pursued to the camp the retreating enemy, and did not give them an opportunity of rallying. But those who had come forth from Alesia returned into the town dejected and

almost despairing of success.

Caesar omni exercitu ad utramque partem munitionum disposito, ut, si usus veniat, suum quisque locum teneat et noverit, equitatum ex castris educi et proelium committi iubet. Erat ex omnibus castris, quae summum undique iugum tenebant, despectus, atque omnes milites intenti pugnae proventum exspectabant. Galli inter equites raros sagittarios expeditosque levis armaturae interiecerant, qui suis cedentibus auxilio succurrerent et nostrorum equitum impetus sustinerent. Ab his complures de improvviso vulnerati proelio excedebant. Cum suos pugna superiores esse Galli confiderent et nostros multitudine premi viderent, ex omnibus partibus et ei qui munitionibus continebantur et hi qui ad auxilium convenerant clamore et ululatu suorum animos confirmabant. Quod in conspectu omnium res gerebatur neque recte ac turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabant. Cum a meridie prope ad solis occasum dubia victoria pugnaretur, Germani una in parte confertis turmis in hostes impetum fecerunt eosque propulerunt; quibus in fugam coniectis sagittarii circumventi interfectique sunt. Item ex reliquis partibus nostri cedentes usque ad castra insecuti sui colligendi facultatem non dederunt. At ei qui ab Alesia processerant maesti prope victoria desperata se in oppidum receperunt.

7:81. The Gauls, after the interval of a day and after making, during that time, an immense number of hurdles, scaling- ladders, and iron hooks, silently went forth from the camp at midnight and approached the fortifications in the plain. Raising a shout suddenly, that by this intimation those who were beseiged in the town might learn their arrival, they began to cast down hurdles and dislodge our men from

the rampart by slings, arrows, and stones, and executed the other movements which are requisite in storming. At the same time, Vercingetorix, having heard the shout, gives the signal to his troops by a trumpet, and leads them forth from the town. Our troops, as each man's post had been assigned him some days before, man the fortifications; they intimidate the Gauls by slings, large stones, stakes which they had placed along the works, and bullets. All view being prevented by the darkness, many wounds are received on both sides; several missiles, are thrown from the engines. But Marcus Antonius, and Caius Trebonius, the lieutenants, to whom the defense of these parts had been allotted, draughted troops from the redoubts which were more remote, and sent them to aid our troops, in whatever direction they understood that they were hard pressed.

Vno die intermisso Galli atque hoc spatio magno cratium, scalarum, harpagonum numero effecto media nocte silentio ex castris egressi ad campestris munitiones accedunt. Subito clamore sublato, qua significatione qui in oppido obsidebantur de suo adventu cognoscere possent, crates proicere, fundis, sagittis, lapidibus nostros de vallo proturbare reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinent parant administrare. Eodem tempore clamore exaudito dat tuba signum suis Vercingetorix atque ex oppido educit. Nostri, ut superioribus diebus, ut cuique erat locus attributus, ad munitiones accedunt; fundis librilibus sudibusque quas in opere disposuerant ac glandibus Gallos proterrent. Prospectu tenebris adempto multa utrimque vulnera accipiuntur. Complura tormentis tela coniciuntur. At Marcus Antonius et Gaius Trebonius legati, quibus hae partes ad defendendum obvenerant, qua ex parte nostros premi intellexerant, his auxilio ex ulterioribus castellis deductos submittebant.

7:82. While the Gauls were at a distance from the fortification, they did more execution, owing to the immense number of their weapons: after they came nearer, they either unawares empaled themselves on the spurs, or were pierced by the mural darts from the ramparts and towers, and thus perished. After receiving many wounds on all sides, and having forced no part of the works, when day drew nigh, fearing lest they should be surrounded by a sally made from the higher camp on the exposed flank, they retreated to their countrymen. But those within, while they bring forward those things which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for a sally, fill up the nearest trenches; having delayed a long time in executing these movements, they learned the retreat of their countrymen before they drew nigh to the fortifications. Thus they returned to the town without accomplishing their object.

Dum longius ab munitione aberant Galli, plus multitudine telorum proficiebant; posteaquam propius successerunt, aut se stimulis inopinantes induebant aut in scrobes delati transfodiebantur aut ex vallo ac turribus traiecti pilis muralibus interibant. Multis undique vulneribus acceptis nulla munitione perrupta, cum lux appeteret, veriti ne ab latere aperto ex superioribus castris eruptione circumvenirentur, se ad suos receperunt. At interiores, dum ea quae a Vercingetorige ad eruptionem praeparata erant proferunt, priores fossas expleant, diutius in his rebus administrandis morati prius suos discessisse cognoverunt, quam munitionibus appropinquarent. Ita re infecta in oppidum reverterunt.

7:83. The Gauls, having been twice repulsed with great loss, consult what they should do; they avail themselves of the information of those who were well acquainted with the country; from them they

ascertain the position and fortification of the upper camp. There was, on the north side, a hill, which our men could not include in their works, on account of the extent of the circuit, and had necessarily made their camp in ground almost disadvantageous, and pretty steep. Caius Antistius Reginus, and Caius Caninius Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with two legions, were in possession of this camp. The leaders of the enemy, having reconnoitered the country by their scouts, select from the entire army sixty thousand men, belonging to those states, which bear the highest character for courage; they privately arrange among themselves what they wished to be done, and in what manner; they decide that the attack should take place when it should seem to be noon. They appoint over their forces Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the four generals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix. He, having issued from the camp at the first watch, and having almost completed his march a little before the dawn, hid himself behind the mountain, and ordered his soldiers to refresh themselves after their labor during the night. When noon now seemed to draw nigh, he marched hastily against that camp which we have mentioned before; and, at the same time, the cavalry began to approach the fortifications in the plain, and the rest of the forces to make a demonstration in front of the camp.

Bis magno cum detrimento repulsi Galli quid agant consulunt; locorum peritos adhibent: ex his superiorum castrorum situs munitionesque cognoscunt. Erat a septentrionibus collis, quem propter magnitudinem circuitus opere circumplecti non potuerant nostri: necessario paene iniquo loco et leniter declivi castra fecerunt. Haec Gaius Antistius Reginus et Gaius Caninius Rebilus legati cum duabus legionibus obtinebant. Cognitis per exploratores regionibus duces hostium LX milia ex omni numero deligunt earum civitatum

quae maximam virtutis opinionem habebant; quid quoque pacto agi placeat occulte inter se constituunt; adeundi tempus definiunt, cum meridies esse videatur. His copiis Vercassivellaunum Arvernum, unum ex quattuor ducibus, propinquum Vercingetorigis, praeficiunt. Ille ex castris prima vigilia egressus prope confecto sub lucem itinere post montem se occultavit militesque ex nocturno labore sese reficere iussit. Cum iam meridies appropinquare videretur, ad ea castra quae supra demonstravimus contendit; eodemque tempore equitatus ad campestris munitiones accedere et reliquae copiae pro castris sese ostendere coeperunt.

7:84. Vercingetorix, having beheld his countrymen from the citadel of Alesia, issues forth from the town; he brings forth from the camp long hooks, movable pent-houses, mural hooks, and other things, which he had prepared for the purpose of making a sally. They engage on all sides at once and every expedient is adopted. They flocked to whatever part of the works seemed weakest. The army of the Romans is distributed along their extensive lines, and with difficulty meets the enemy in every quarter. The shouts which were raised by the combatants in their rear, had a great tendency to intimidate our men, because they perceived that their danger rested on the valor of others: for generally all evils which are distant most powerfully alarm men's minds.

Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur; crates, longurios, musculos, falces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat profert. Pugnatur uno tempore omnibus locis, atque omnia temptantur: quae minime visa pars firma est, huc concurritur. Romanorum manus tantis munitionibus distinetur nec facile pluribus locis occurrit. Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui post

tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident salute constare: omnia enim plerumque quae absunt vehementius hominum mentes perturbant.

7:85. Caesar, having selected a commanding situation, sees distinctly whatever is going on in every quarter, and sends assistance to his troops when hard pressed. The idea uppermost in the minds of both parties is, that the present is the time in which they would have the fairest opportunity of making a struggle; the Gauls despairing of all safety, unless they should succeed in forcing the lines: the Romans expecting an end to all their labors if they should gain the day. The principal struggle is at the upper lines, to which as we have said Vergasillaunus was sent. The least elevation of ground, added to a declivity, exercises a momentous influence. Some are casting missiles, others, forming a testudo, advance to the attack; fresh men by turns relieve the wearied. The earth, heaped up by all against the fortifications, gives the means of ascent to the Gauls, and covers those works which the Romans had concealed in the ground. Our men have no longer arms or strength.

Caesar idoneum locum nactus quid quaque ex parte geratur cognoscit; laborantibus summittit. Vtrisque ad animum occurrit unum esse illud tempus, quo maxime contendere conveniat: Galli, nisi perfregerint munitiones, de omni salute desperant; Romani, si rem obtinuerint, finem laborum omnium expectant. Maxime ad superiores munitiones laboratur, quo Vercassivellaunum missum demonstravimus. Iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium magnum habet momentum. Alii tela coniciunt, alii testudine facta subeunt; defatigatis in vicem integri succedunt. Agger ab universis in munitionem coniectus et ascensum dat Gallis et ea quae in terra

occultaverant Romani contegit; nec iam arma nostris nec vires suppetunt.

7:86. Caesar, on observing these movements, sends Labienus with six cohorts to relieve his distressed soldiers: he orders him, if he should be unable to withstand them, to draw off the cohorts and make a sally; but not to do this except through necessity. He himself goes to the rest, and exhorts them not to succumb to the toil; he shows them that the fruits of all former engagements depend on that day and hour. The Gauls within, despairing of forcing the fortifications in the plains on account of the greatness of the works, attempt the places precipitous in ascent: hither they bring the engines which they had prepared; by the immense number of their missiles they dislodge the defenders from the turrets: they fill the ditches with clay and hurdles, then clear the way; they tear down the rampart and breast-work with hooks.

His rebus cognitis Caesar Labienum cum cohortibus sex subsidio laborantibus mittit: imperat, si sustinere non posset, deductis cohortibus eruptione pugnaret; id nisi necessario ne faciat. Ipse adit reliquos, cohortatur ne labori succumbant; omnium superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere. Interiores desperatis campestribus locis propter magnitudinem munitionum loca praeupta ex ascensu temptant: huc ea quae paraverant conferunt. Multitudine telorum ex turribus propugnantes deturbant, aggere et cratibus fossas explent, falcibus vallum ac loricam rescindunt.

7:87. Caesar sends at first young Brutus, with six cohorts, and afterward Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with seven others: finally, as they fought more obstinately, he leads up fresh men to the assistance

of his soldiers. After renewing the action, and repulsing the enemy, he marches in the direction in which he had sent Labienus, drafts four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, and orders part of the cavalry to follow him, and part to make the circuit of the external fortifications and attack the enemy in the rear. Labienus, when neither the ramparts or ditches could check the onset of the enemy, informs Caesar by messengers of what he intended to do. Caesar hastens to share in the action.

Mittit primo Brutum adulescentem cum cohortibus Caesar, post cum aliis Gaium Fabium legatum; postremo ipse, cum vehementius pugnaretur, integros subsidio adducit. Restituto proelio ac repulsis hostibus eo quo Labienum miserat contendit; cohortes quattuor ex proximo castello deducit, equitum partem sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et ab tergo hostes adoriri iubet. Labienus, postquam neque aggeres neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidus deductas fors obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios facit certiore quid faciendum existimet. Accelerat Caesar, ut proelio intersit.

7:88. His arrival being known from the color of his robe, and the troops of cavalry, and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him being seen, as these low and sloping grounds were plainly visible from the eminences, the enemy join battle. A shout being raised by both sides, it was succeeded by a general shout along the ramparts and whole line of fortifications. Our troops, laying aside their javelins, carry on the engagement with their swords. The cavalry is suddenly seen in the rear of the Gauls; the other cohorts advance rapidly; the enemy turn their backs; the cavalry intercept them in their flight, and a great slaughter ensues. Sedulius the general

and chief of the Lemovices is slain; Vergasillaunus the Arvernian, is taken alive in the flight, seventy-four military standards are brought to Caesar, and few out of so great a number return safe to their camp. The besieged, beholding from the town the slaughter and flight of their countrymen, despairing of safety, lead back their troops from the fortifications. A flight of the Gauls from their camp immediately ensues on hearing of this disaster, and had not the soldiers been wearied by sending frequent reinforcements, and the labor of the entire day, all the enemy's forces could have been destroyed. Immediately after midnight, the cavalry are sent out and overtake the rear, a great number are taken or cut to pieces, the rest by flight escape in different directions to their respective states.

Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat, turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt. Vtrimque clamore sublato excipit rursus ex vallo atque omnibus munitionibus clamor. Nostri omissis pilis gladiis rem gerunt. Repente post tergum equitatus cernitur; cohortes aliae appropinquant. Hostes terga vertunt; fugientibus equites occurrunt. Fit magna caedes. Sedulius, dux et princeps Lemovicum, occiditur; Vercassivellaunus Arvernus vivus in fuga comprehenditur; signa militaria septuaginta quattuor ad Caesarem referuntur: pauci ex tanto numero se incolumes in castra recipiunt. Conspicati ex oppido caedem et fugam suorum desperata salute copias a munitionibus reducant. Fit protinus hac re audita ex castris Gallorum fuga. Quod nisi crebris subsidiis ac totius diei labore milites essent defessi, omnes hostium copiae deleri potuissent. De media nocte missus equitatus novissimum agmen consequitur: magnus numerus capitur atque interficitur; reliqui ex fuga in civitates discedunt.

7:89. Vercingetorix, having convened a council the following day, declares, "That he had undertaken that war, not on account of his own exigences, but on account of the general freedom; and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself to them for either purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by his death, or surrender him alive. Embassadors are sent to Caesar on this subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftains delivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of the camp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They surrender Vercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, their respective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to each soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.

Postero die Vercingetorix concilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatum, sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat, et quoniam sit fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint. Mittuntur de his rebus ad Caesarem legati. Iubet arma tradi, principes produci. Ipse in munitione pro castris consedit: eo duces producuntur; Vercingetorix deditur, arma prociuntur. Reservatis Aeduis atque Arvernīs, si per eos civitates recipere posset, ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singula praedae nomine distribuit.

7:90. After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country of the] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place embassadors are sent by the Arveni, who promise that they will execute his commands. He demands a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winter- quarters; he restores about twenty thousand

captives to the Aedui and Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the] Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus Sempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from the Bellovaci in their neighborhood. He sends Caius Antistius Reginus into the [country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius into the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus into those of the Ruteni, with one legion each. He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo and Matisco on the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself determines to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty-days is decreed by the senate at Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's dispatches.

His rebus confectis in Aeduos proficiscitur; civitatem recipit. Eo legati ab Arvernibus missi quae imperaret se facturos pollicentur. Imperat magnum numerum obsidum. Legiones in hiberna mittit. Captivorum circiter viginti milia Aeduis Arvernisque reddit. Titum Labienum duabus cum legionibus et equitatu in Sequanos proficisci iubet: huic Marcum Sempronium Rutilum attribuit. Gaium Fabium legatum et Lucium Minucium Basilum cum legionibus duabus in Remis collocat, ne quam ab finitimis Bellovacis calamitatem accipiant. Gaium Antistium Reginum in Ambivaretos, Titum Sextium in Bituriges, Gaium Caninium Rebilum in Rutenos cum singulis legionibus mittit. Quintum Tullium Ciceronem et Publium Sulpicium Cabilloni et Matiscone in Aeduis ad Ararim rei frumentariae causa collocat. Ipse Bibracte hiemare constituit. His litteris cognitis Romae dierum viginti supplicatio redditur.

BOOK VIII (51-50 BC)

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8:0. Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in a most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my inability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation of the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be compared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; and recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactions in Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we see no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read them could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might the more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in presuming to intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all hands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it is not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published for the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that historians seem rather deprived of, than furnished with material. At which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed not only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war; and though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and

those which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, while I urge every apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the charge of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any one be put in competition with him. Farewell.

Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum cotidiana mea recusatio non difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur deprecationem habere, rem difficillimam suscepi. Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius scriptis, contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris. Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis. Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur: qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur. Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecere scimus. Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum. Mihi ne illud quidem accidit, ut Alexandrino atque Africano bello interesssem; quae bella quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro testimonio sumus dicturi. Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis causas colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo, quod me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare

comparari. Vale.

8:1. Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged war incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers after so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought him that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile intention, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason was assigned; namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able to resist the Romans, with any force they could collect in one place; and hoped that if several states made war in different places at the same time, the Roman army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to prosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline any inconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay, the rest should be enabled to assert their liberty.

Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore aestate nullum bellandi tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete reficere a tantis laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere. Cuius rei verisimilis causa adferebatur, quod Gallis omnibus cogrutum esset neque ulla multitudo in unum locum coacta resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa bella complures eodem tempore intulissent civitates, satis auxili aut spati aut copiarum habiturum exercitum populi Romani ad omnia persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem incommodi recusandam, si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in libertatem.

8:2. That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his questor, in charge of his quarters, and set out himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of January, from the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he had stationed in the country of the Bituriges, not far from the

territories of the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his army into the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who, possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be deterred, by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlike preparation, and forming combinations.

Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur, Caesar Marcum Antonium quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum praesidio pridie Kal. Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem XIII, quam non longe a finibus Aeduorum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum, eique adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat. Binis cohortibus ad impedimenta tuenda relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros Biturigum inducit, qui, cum latos fines et complura oppida haberent, unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent.

8:3. By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to an unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our horse, while cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before they had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's invasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns, was forbidden by Caesar's orders; lest if he advanced far, forage and corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as were able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to the neighboring states, relying either on private friendship, or public alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them in every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safety of others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he both

retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the wavering to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges, when they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to his friendship, and that the neighboring states had given hostages, without incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection, they did the same.

Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod imparatis disiectisque accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes prius ab equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent. Namque etiam illud vulgare incursionis hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes incendius terrerentur. Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere Romanorum, in finitimas civitates aut privatis hospitibus confisi aut societate consiliorum confugerant. Frustra: nam Caesar magni sitineribus omnibus locis occurrit nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de domestica salute cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et dubitantes terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat. Tali condicione proposita Bituriges, cum sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius amicitiam finitimasque civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in fidem receptas esse, idem fecerunt.

8:4. Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labor and patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two hundred sesterii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given instead of plunder: and sending his legions back to quarters, he

himself returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. While he was dispensing justice there, the Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aid against the Carnutes, who they complained had made war against them. Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen days in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of quarters on the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former Commentary, to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he marches in pursuit of the Carnutes.

Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac patientia, qui brumalibus diebus itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus intolerandis studiosissime permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios, centurionibus tot milia nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur legionibusque in hiberna remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte. Ibi cum ius diceret, Bituriges ad eum legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos intulisse bellum sibi querebantur. Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius decem et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIII et VI ex hibernis ab Arare educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa superiore commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad persequendos Carnutes proficiscitur.

8:5. When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the Carnutes, terrified by the suffering of other states, deserted their villages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to meet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves against the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several towns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took up his quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes;

and lodged his men in houses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the tents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he sends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not without effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The Carnutes, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of danger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they were driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighboring states.

Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata, calamitate ceterorum ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae hiemis causa constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant (nuper enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiant. Caesar erumpentes eo maxime tempore acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites nolle, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo castra ponit atque in tecta partim Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter stramentis tentoriorum integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites compegit. Equites tamen et auxiliosos pedites in omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse dicebantur hostes; nec frustra: nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri revertuntur. Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum praesidio tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte amissa suorum dissipantur in finitimas civitates.

8:6. Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of

consequence could be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius, with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: and being informed by frequent embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci (who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and the neighboring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and Comius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at a general rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the territories of the Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of the Remi: and moreover, considering that not only his honor, but his interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of the republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion out of quarters, and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with his two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Trebonius for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his own toils.

Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis haberet convenientes manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur, quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum summum bellum posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit; ipse, cum crebris legationibus Remorum certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque praestabant, finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco et Commio Atrebate exercitus comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut omni multitudine in fines Suessionum, qui Remis erant attributi, facerent impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad dignitatem sed etiam ad salutem suam

iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime de re publica meritos accipere, legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus undecimam; litteras autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum legiones duas quas habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit. Ita, quantum hibernorum opportunitas bellicae ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo labore in vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat.

8:7. As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops of horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders bring him back word, that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was general from all parts) but had been sent back to watch our motions. Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the Bellovaci were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all the Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along with them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and that they had chosen for their camp, an elevated position, surrounded by a dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by Correus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the name of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left the camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come to a resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desire of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as was

reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by ambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other necessities.

His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos proficiscitur castrisque in eorum finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in omnes partes ad aliquos excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia cognosceret. Equites officio functi renuntiant paucos in aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui agrorum colendorum causa remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter demigratum), sed qui speculandi causa essent remissi. A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse, itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Velio casses, Atrebatas; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in posteriores silvas contulisse. Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent. Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita. Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebis cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur; si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et

frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos.

8:8. When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from the concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans which were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash resolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use every exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small force and come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguished valor, the seventh, eighth and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for experience and valor. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it the intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In order if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance of only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner, that the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the baggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole train of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.

Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum cognosset atque ea quae proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a temeritate barbarorum remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum statuit, quo celerius hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem. Singularis enim virtutis veterrimas legiones VII, VIII, VIII habebat, summae spei delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo iam stipendio

tamen in collatione reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac virtutis ceperat opinionem. Itaque consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad se essent delatae omnibus eitis animos multitudinis confirmat. Si forte hostes trium legionum numero posset elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio septima, octava, nona ante omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium impedimentorum agmen, quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse consuevit, cogeret undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere hostibus posset quam ipsi depoposcissent. Hac ratione paene quadrato agmine instructo in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum adducit.

8:9. When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar, saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array; either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or with the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces before the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished to bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high, with breastworks built on it proportioned to its height and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories high, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid across and covered over; which should be guarded in front by small parapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of soldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by their height might throw their darts with more daring and to a greater distance; the other which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on the rampart, would be protected by their

galleries from darts falling on their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a considerable height.

Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo gradu legiones accedere Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiducia consilia perlata, sive certamiuis periculo sive subito adventu sive exspectatione nostri consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore decedunt. Caesar, etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium valle intermissa magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente castra castris hostium confert. Haec imperat vallo pedum XII muniri, lorikulam pro [hac] ratione eius altitudinis inaedicari; fossam duplicem pedum denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in altitudinem trium tabulorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi, quorum frontes viminea loracula munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa, duplici propugnatorum ordine defenderentur, quorum alter ex pontibus, quo tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque permetteret tela, alter, qui propior hostem in ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus telis tegetetur. Portis fores altioresque turres imposuit.

8:10. Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hoped that the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would raise confidence in the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to make a distant excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be secured by the works with a very small force. In the mean time there were frequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out between the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on the other hand the enemy passed

it and beat back our men. Moreover there happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of private houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country were surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish hopes in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I said had gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry, and though the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated by their arrival.

Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium. Namque et operum magnitudinem et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris allaturum, et cum pabulatum frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis copiis castra munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi. Interim crebro paucis utrimque procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam tamen paludem nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque transibant acriusque hostes insequabantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem transgressi nostros longius summovebant. Accidebat autem cotidianis pabulationibus (id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex aedificiis pabulum conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi pabulatores circumvenirentur; quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes incitabat barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad auxilia Germanorum arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi numero non amplius erant quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari nitebantur.

8:11. Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within

their camp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and that it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the place inclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote to Trebonius to send with all dispatch for the thirteenth legion which was in winter quarters among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants; and then to come to him by forced marches with the three legions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, and other states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard his foraging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack of the enemy.

Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures dies castris palude et loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra eorum sine dimicatione perniciose nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset legionem XIII, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat, arcesseret atque ita cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se veniret; ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum reliquarumque civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio pabulationibus mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent.

8:12. As this continued for several days, and their vigilance was relaxed by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), the Bellovaci, having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations of our horse, lie in ambush with a select body of foot in a place covered with woods; to it they sent their horse the next day, who were first to decoy our men into the ambushade, and then when they were surrounded, to attack them. It was the lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whom that day had been allotted to perform this duty; for, having suddenly got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and

despising their weakness, in consequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too eagerly, and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being, by this means thrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usual in cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus the governor of their state, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to sit on horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the custom of the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the command, nor would he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the barbarians were puffed up, and inflated at the success of this battle, in killing the prince, and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this loss, to examine the country, and post their guards with more caution, and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.

Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine diligentia minueretur, quod plerumque accidit diu turnitate, Bellovaci delecta manu peditum cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum silvestribus locis insidias disponunt eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum elicerent nostros, deinde circumventos aggrederentur. Cuius mali sors incidit Remis, quibus ille dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi, cum repente hostium equites animad vertissent ac numero superiores paucitatem contempsissent, cupidius insecuti peditibus undique sunt circumdati. Quo facto perturbati celerius quam consuetudo fert equestris proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe civitatis, praefecto equitum; qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti, tamen consuetudine Gallorum neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda praefectura usus erat neque dimicari sine se voluerat. Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto, nostrique detrimento admonentur diligentius exploratis

locis stationes disponere ac mode ratiù cedentem insequi hostem.

8:13. In the mean time daily skirmishes take place continually in view of both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In one of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the Rhine, to fight, intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed the marsh, and slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued the rest, so terrified them, that not only those who were attacked hand to hand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who were stationed at a greater distance to support them, fled disgracefully; and being often beaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired into their camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled further. Their danger threw their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult to judge whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage or more dejected by a trifling calamity.

Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia in conspectu utrorumque castrorum, quae ad vada transitus quae fiebant paludis. Qua contentione Germani, quos propterea Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi proeliarentur, cum constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque resistentibus interfectis pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui aut comminus opprimebantur aut eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius subsidiari consuerant, turpiter refugerunt, nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli pudore coacti longius profugerent. Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus insolentiores an adverso mediocri casu timidiores essent.

8:14. After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with his legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night all who were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them their whole baggage. While they are preparing their disorderly and confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast multitude of wagons, even when they have very light baggage), being overtaken by day- light, they drew their forces out before their camp, to prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage had advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it prudent to attack them when standing on their defense, with such a steep hill in their favor, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they could quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was divided from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he could not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by a small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his army across, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which was fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up his army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which he could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy.

Compluribus diebus isdem in castris consumptis, cum propius accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum cognossent, duces Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu dimittunt eos quos aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant, unaque reliqua impedimenta. Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant agmen (magna enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit), oppressi luce copias armatorum pro suis

instruunt castris, ne prius Romani persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum processisset. At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos tanto collis ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut discedere ex eo loco sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non possent. Ita, cum palude impedita a castris castra dividi videret, quae trans eundi difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare posset, adque id iugum quod trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri valle a castris eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata legiones traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi fastigio duobus ab lateribus muniebatur. Ibi legionibus instructis ad ultimum iugum pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa tela in llostium cuneos conici possent.

8:15. The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their position, though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to ascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties, lest they should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, and therefore remained in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that they persisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and, measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be fortified. Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the rampart and stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horses bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, and that they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the same place without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure a retreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks on which they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up in order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), of which they had great plenty in

their camp, and piled them in the front of their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set them all on fire at one and the same time. The continued blaze soon screened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner happened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.

Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare non recusarent, si forte Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias distributas dimittere non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie permanserunt. Quorum pertinacia cogruta Caesar XX cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco metatis muniri iubet castra. Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit. Bellovacii, cum Romanos ad insequendum paratos viderent neque pernoctare aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem loco possent, tale consilium sui recipiendi ceperunt. Fasces, ubi consederant (namque in acie sedere Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia, inter se traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo pronuntiato uno tempore incenderunt. Ita continens flamma copias omnes repente a conspectu texit Romanorum. Quod ubi accidit, barbari vehementissimo cursu refugerunt.

8:16. Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that method to favor their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a party of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and that the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavor to draw our men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly. The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and

dense line of flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able to see their horse's heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat, through fear of an ambuscade. Thus by a flight, full at once of cowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles, and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerous ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to the Roman foragers.

Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit. Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt. Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt. Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites peditesque disponent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus inferebant.

8:17. After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered from a certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the Romans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance of corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drew out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of light infantry, and himself advanced with the

legions as fast as he could.

Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo quodam comperit Caesar Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex peditum delegisse equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco collocaret, quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros suspicaretur. Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam solebat educit equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio consuerat, praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum legionibus quam potest maxime appropinquat.

8:18. The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a level piece of ground, not more than a mile in extent, inclosed on every side by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they surrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good order to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and willing to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. On their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party and attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise in engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to themselves.

Hostes in insidus dispositi, cum sibi delegissent campum ad rem gerendam non amplius patentem in omnes partes passibus mille, silvis undique aut impeditissimo flumine munitum, velut indagine hunc insidiis circumdederunt. Explorato hostium consilio nostri ad proeliandum animo atque armis parati, cum subsequentibus legionibus nullam dimicationem recusarent, turmatim in eum locum devenerunt. Quorum adventu cum sibi Correus oblatam occasionem

rei gerendae existimaret, primum cum paucis se ostendit atque in proximas turmas impetum fecit. Nostri constanter incursum sustinent insidiatorum neque plures in unum locum conveniunt; quod plerumque equestribus proeliis cum propter aliquem timorem accidit, tum multitudine ipsorum detrimentum accipitur.

8:19. When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of our men fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be surrounded, the rest of the enemy broke out from the woods while Correus was engaged. The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigor, and continued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of foot gradually advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced our horse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before the legions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with the horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some time doubtful, but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first charge, became superior from this very circumstance that, though suddenly attacked from an ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the mean time the legions were approaching, and several messengers arrived with notice to our men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was near at hand, with his forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, our men, confiding in the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely, fearing, lest if they should be slow in their operations they should let the legions participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy lose courage and attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they were themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrap the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost the greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whithersoever chance carried them; some sought the woods, others

the river, but were vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the mean time, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of quarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our men, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him.

Cum dispositis turmis in vicem rari proeliarentur neque ab lateribus circumveniri suos paterentur, erumpunt ceteri Correo proeliante ex silvis. Fit magna contentione diversum proelium. Quod cum diutius pari Marte iniretur, paulatim ex silvis instructa multitudo procedit peditum, quae nostros coegit cedere equites. Quibus celeriter subveniunt levis armaturae pedites, quos ante legiones missos docui, turmisque nostrorum interpositi constanter proeliantur. Pugnatur aliquamdiu pari contentione; deinde, ut ratio postulabat proeli, qui sustinuerant primos impetus insidiarum hoc ipso fiunt superiores, quod nullum ab insidiantibus imprudentes acceperant detrimentum. Accedunt propius interim legiones, crebrique eodem tempore et nostris et hostibus nuntii adferuntur, imperatorem instructis copiis adesse. Qua re cognita praesidio cohortium confisi nostri acerrime proeliantur, ne, si tardius rem gessissent, victoriae gloriam communicasse cum legionibus viderentur; hostes concidunt animis atque itineribus diversis fugam quaerunt. Nequiquam: nam quibus difficultatibus locorum Romanos claudere voluerant, eis ipsi tenebantur. Victi tamen percussique maiore parte amissa consternati profugiunt partim silvis petitis, partim flumine (qui tamen in fuga a nostris acriter insequentibus conficiuntur), eum interim nulla calamitate victus Correus excedere proelio silvasque petere aut invitantibus nostris ad deditionem potuit adduci, quin fortissime proeliando compluresque vulnerando cogeret elatos iracundia

victores in se tela conicere.

8:20. After this transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately after the battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so great a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon their camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action, though he saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched his army over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, being informed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded men who having escaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after the defeat, and learning that every thing had turned out unfavorable, that Correus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off, imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling a council in haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send ambassadors and hostages to Caesar.

Tali modo re gesta recentibus proeli vestigiis ingressus Caesar, cum victos tanta calamitate existimaret hostes nuntio accepto locum castrorum relicturos, quae non longius ab ea caede abesse plus minus octo milibus dicebantur, tametsi flumine impeditum transitum videbat, tamen exercitu traducto progreditur. At Bellovaci reliquaeque civitates repente ex fuga paucis atque his vulneratis receptis, qui silvarum beneficio casum evitaverant, omnibus adversis, cognita calamitate, interfecto Correo, amisso equitatu et fortissimis peditibus, cum adventare Romanos existimarent, concilio repente cantu tubarum convocato conclamant, legati obsidesque ad Caesarem mittantur.

8:21. This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius the Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed

auxiliaries for that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; and requested that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy, which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them before the engagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from his usual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power of the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousand of their choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to bring the fatal news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from the battle one advantage, of some importance, considering their loss; that Correus, the author of the rebellion, and agitator of the people, was slain: for that while he lived the senate had never equal influence in the state with the giddy populace.

Hoc omnibus probato consilio Commius Atrebas ad eos confugit Germanos, a quibus ad id bellum auxilia mutuatus erat. Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. Adflctas opes equestri proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios caedis. Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse.

8:22. Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these supplications, that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, in conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that they had persevered the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and were

not brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of the rest: that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easily transferred to the dead; but that no one person could have such influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raise a war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in opposition to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he was satisfied with the punishment, which they had drawn upon themselves.

Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditione esse perductos. Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent.

8:23. The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer to their countrymen and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in from the other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the] Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all except Comius, whose fears restrained him from intrusting his safety to any person's honor. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius was tampering with the state, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar, thought he might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that he would not come to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put him on his guard by the attempt, he

sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with orders to have him put to death under pretense of conference. To effect his purpose, he sent with him some chosen centurions. When they came to the conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had taken hold of Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprised at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented by the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the first blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design to fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had received a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen, dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, it was said that Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of any Roman.

Nocte insequenti legati responsa ad suos referunt, obsides conficiunt. Concurrent reliquarum civitatum legati, quae Bellovacorum speculabantur eventum; obsides dant, imperata faciunt excepto Commio, quem timor prohibebat cuiusquam fidei suam committere salutem. Nam superiore anno Titus Labienus, Caesare in Gallia citeriore ius dicente, cum Commium comperisset sollicitare civitates et coniurationem contra Caesarem facere, infidelitatem eius sine ulla perfidia iudicavit comprimi posse. Quem quia non arbitrabatur vocatum in castra venturum, ne temptando cautiorem faceret, Gaium Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum per simulationem colloqui curaret interficiendum. Ad eam rem delectos idoneos ei tradit centuriones. Cum in colloquium ventum esset, et, ut convenerat, manum Commi Volusenus arripuisset, centurio vel insueta re permotus vel celeriter a familiaribus prohibitus Commi conficere hominem non potuit; graviter tamen primo ictu gladio caput percussit. Cum utrimque gladii dstricti essent, non tam pugnandi

quam diffugiendi fuit utrorumque consilium: nostrorum, quod mortifero vulnere Commium credebant adfectum; Gallorum, quod insidius cognitis plura quam videbant extimescebant. Quo facto statuisset Commius dicebatur numquam in conspectum cuiusquam Romani venire.

8:24. When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlike nations, perceived that there was now no state which could make preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing and fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved to detach his army into different parts of the country. He kept with himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius Fabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of Gaul, because it was rumored that some states had risen in arms, and he did not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that country, was strong enough to protect it with two legions. He ordered Titus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the twelfth legion which had been under him in winter quarters, to Hither Gaul, to protect the Roman colonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of barbarians similar to that which had happened the year before to the Tergestines, who were cut off by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself marched to depopulate the country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced to fly, but despaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought it most consistent with his honor to waste his country both of inhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of his countrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might be excluded from a return to his state for the calamities which he had brought on it.

Bellicosissimis gentibus devictis Caesar, cum videret nullam iam

esse civitatem quae bellum pararet quo sibi resisteret, sed nonnullos ex oppidis demigrare, ex agris diffugere ad praesens imperium evitandum, plures in partes exercitum dimittere constituit. M. Antonium quaestorem cum legione duodecima sibi coniungit. C. Fabium legatum cum cohortibus XXV mittit in diversissimam partem Galliae, quod ibi quasdam civitates in armis esse audiebat neque C. Caninium Rebilum legatum, qui in illis regionibus erat, satis firmas duas legiones habere existimabat. Titum Labienum ad se evocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis, in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias civium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentino latrocinio atque impetu illorum erant oppressi. Ipse ad vastandos depopulandosque fines Ambiorigis proficiscitur; quem perterritum ac fugientem cum redigi posse in suam potestatem desperasset, proximum suae dignitatis esse ducebat, adeo fines eius vastare civibus, aedificiis, pecore, ut odio suorum Ambiorix, si quos fortuna reliquos fecisset, nullum reditum propter tantas calamitates haberet in civitatem.

8:25. After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword, fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent Labienus with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from its vicinity to Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but little from the Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and never continued in its allegiance, except when awed by the presence of his army.

Cum in omnes partes finium Ambiorigis aut legiones aut auxilia dimisisset atque omnia caedibus, incendiis, rapinis vastasset, magno

numero hominum interfecto aut capto Labienum cum duabus legionibus in Treveros mittit, quorum civitas propter Germaniae vicinitatem cotidianis exercitata bellis cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebat neque imperata umquam nisi exercitu coacta faciebat.

8:26. In the mean time Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received information by letters and messages from Duracius, who had always continued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his state had revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in the country of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he was approaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius was shut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the enemy with his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus, having notice of Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the legions, and prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spending several days in the attempt, and losing a considerable number of men, without being able to make a breach in any part of the works, he returned again to the siege of Limonum.

Interim Gaius Caninius legatus, cum magnam multitudinem convenisse hostium in fines Pictonum litteris nuntiisque Durati cognosceret, qui perpetuo in amicitia manserat Romanorum, cum pars quaedam civitatis eius defecisset, ad oppidum Lemonum contendit. Quo cum adventaret atque ex captivis certius cognosceret multis hominum milibus a Dumnaco, duce Andium, Duratium clausum Lemoni oppugnari neque infirmas legiones hostibus committere auderet, castra posuit loco munito. Dumnacus, cum

appropinquare Caninium cognosset, copiis omnibus ad legiones conversis castra Romanorum oppugnare instituit. Cum complures dies in oppugnatione consumpsisset et magno suorum detrimento nullam partem munitionum convellere potuisset, rursus ad obsidendum Lemonum redit.

8:27. At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many states to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by taking hostages; he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of the proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bring assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus, hearing of the approach of Fabius, and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be forced to withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehension from the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place with all his forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently secure from danger, unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deep a river to pass except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet being informed of the nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it, he judged it most likely that the enemy would take that way, which he found they did take. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered his cavalry to advance no farther before the legions than that they could return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear and attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having executed the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.

Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem

recipit, obsidibus firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in Pictonibus gerantur. Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus adventu Fabi cognito desperata salute, si tempore eodem coactus esset et Romanum externum sustinere hostem et respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine Ligeri, quod erat ponte propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset. Fabius, etsi nondum in conspectum venerat hostibus neque se Caninio coniunxerat, tamen doctus ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum credidit hostes perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros. Itaque cum copiis ad eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum procedere ante agmen imperat legionum, quantum cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in eadem se reciperet castra. Consecuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum, invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in itinere adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur. Ita re bene gesta se recipiunt in castra.

8:28. The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with orders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself should come up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus Atius Varus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill, encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troops in convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. The enemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, and making a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battle was warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they had conquered the day before, and knowing that the legions were following them, animated both by the disgrace of retreating, and a desire of concluding the battle

expeditiously by their own courage, fought most valiantly against the foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forces would come against them, as they had experienced the day before, thought they had got a favorable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry.

Insequenti nocte Fabius equites praemittit sic paratos ut confligerent atque omne agmen morarentur, dum consequeretur ipse. Cuius praeceptis ut res gereretur, Quintus Atius Varus, praefectus equitum, singularis et animi et prudentiae vir, suos hortatur agmenque hostium consecutus turmas partim idoneis locis disponit, parte equitum proelium committit. Confligit audacius equitatus hostium succedentibus sibi peditibus, qui toto agmine subsistentes equitibus suis contra nostros ferunt auxilium. Fit proelium acri certamine. Namque nostri contemptis pridie superatis hostibus, cum subsequi legiones meminissent, et pudore cedendi et cupiditate per se conficiendi proeli fortissime contra pedites proeliantur, hostesque nihil amplius copiarum accessurum credentes, ut pridie cognoverant, delendi equitatus nostri nacti occasionem videbantur.

8:29. After the conflict had continued for some time with great violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the foot should by turns assist the horse. Then the legions, marching in close order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this sight, the barbarian horse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that breaking through the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with a loud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little before had vigorously engaged them, while they made resistance, being elated with joy at their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured round them as they ran, and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, or their arms to give a blow, so long did they

continue the slaughter of the enemy in that battle, and having killed above twelve thousand men in arms, or such as threw away their arms through fear, they took their whole train of baggage.

Cum aliquamdiu summa contentione dimicaretur, Dumnacus instruit aciem quae suis esset equitibus in vicem praesidio, cum repente confertae legiones in conspectum hostium veniunt. Quibus visis percussae barbarorum turmae ac perterritae acies hostium, perturbato impedimentorum agmine, magno clamore discursuque passim fugae se mandant. At nostri equites, qui paulo ante cum resistantibus fortissime conflixerant, laetitia victoriae elati magno undique clamore sublato cedentibus circumfusi, quantum equorum vires ad persequendum dextraeque ad caedendum valent, tantum eo proelio interficiunt. Itaque amplius milibus XII aut armatorum aut eorum qui eo timore arma proiecerant interfectis omnis multitudo capitur impedimentorum.

8:30. After this defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian (who in the beginning of the revolt of Gaul had collected from all quarters men of desperate fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty, called in the exiles of the whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers, and intercepted the Roman baggage and provisions), was marching to the province with five thousand men, being all he could collect after the defeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in a former commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in the first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caninius went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be incurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by the depredations of a band of desperate men.

Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, servis ad libertatem vocatis, exulibus omnium civitatum adscitis, receptis latronibus impedimenta et commeatus Romanorum interceperat, non amplius hominum duobus milibus ex fuga collectis provinciam petere unaque consilium cum eo Lucterium Cadurcum cepisse, quem superiore commentario prima defectione Galliae facere in provinciam voluisse impetum cognitum est, Caninius legatus cum legionibus duabus ad eos persequendos contendit, ne detrimento aut timore provinciae magna infamia perditorum hominum latrociniis caperetur.

8:31. Caius Fabius set off with the rest of the army to the Carnutes and those other states, whose force he was informed, had served as auxiliaries in that battle, which he fought against Dumnacus. For he had no doubt that they would be more submissive after their recent sufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they might be easily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. On this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious in recovering the states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed had never mentioned peace, submitted and gave hostages: and the other states, which lie in the remotest parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean, and which are called Armoricae, influenced by the example of the Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions, without delay comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own territories, wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself in the most remote parts of Gaul.

Gaius Fabius cum reliquo exercitu in Carnutes ceterasque proficiscitur civitates, quarum eo proelio, quod cum Dumnaco

fecerat, copias esse accisas sciebat. Non enim dubitabat quin recenti calamitate summissiores essent futurae, dato vero spatio ac tempore eodem instigante Dumnaco possent concitari. Qua in re summa felicitas celeritasque in recipiendis civitatibus Fabium consequitur. Nam Carnutes, qui saepe vexati numquam pacis fecerant mentionem, datis obsidibus veniunt in deditionem, ceteraeque civitates positae in ultimis Galliae finibus Oceano coniunctae, quae Armoricae appellantur, auctoritate adductae Carnutum adventu Fabi legio numque imperata sine mora faciunt. Dumnacus suis finibus expulsus errans latitansque solus extremas Galliae regiones petere est coactus.

8:32. But Drapes in conjunction with Luterius, knowing that Caninius was at hand with the legions, and that they themselves could not without certain destruction enter the boundaries of the province, while an army was in pursuit of them, and being no longer at liberty to roam up and down and pillage, halt in the country of the Cadurci, as Luterius had once in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence over the inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of new projects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his own and Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage to him, and strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on the inhabitants to join him.

At Drappes unaque Lucterius, cum legiones Caniniumque adesse cognoscerent nec se sine certa pernicie persequente exercitu putarent provinciae fines intrare posse nec iam libere vagandi latrociniorumque faciendorum facultatem haberent, in finibus consistunt Cadurcorum. Ibi cum Lucterius apud suos cives quondam integris rebus multum potuisset, semperque auctor novorum consiliorum magnam apud barbaros auctoritatem haberet, oppidum

Vxellodunum, quod in clientela fuerat eius, egregie natura loci munitum, occupat suis et Drappetis copiis oppidanosque sibi coniungit.

8:33. After Caninius had rapidly marched to this place, and perceived that all parts of the town were secured by very craggy rocks, which it would be difficult for men in arms to climb even if they met with no resistance; and moreover, observing that the town's people were possessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if they attempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could not escape our horse, or even our legions; he divided his forces into three parts, and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intention of drawing lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the fatigue.

Quo cum confestim Gaius Caninius venisset animadverteretque omnes oppidi partes prae-ruptissimis saxis esse munitas, quo defendente nullo tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile, magna autem impedimenta oppidanorum videret, quae si clandestina fuga subtrahere conarentur, effugere non modo equitatum, sed ne legiones quidem possent, tripertito cohortibus divisus trina excelsissimo loco castra fecit; a quibus paulatim, quantum copiae patiebantur, vallum in oppidi circuitum ducere instituit.

8:34. When the townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by the recollection of the distress at Alesia, they began to dread similar consequences from a siege; and above all Luterius, who had experienced that fatal event, cautioned them to make provisions of corn; they therefore resolve by general consent to leave part of their troops behind, and set out with their light troops to bring in corn. The scheme having met with approbation, the following night Drapes and

Luterius leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town with the rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some of whom were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable to prevent their taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes also attacks were made on our little forts by sallies at night. For this reason Caninius deferred drawing his works round the whole town, lest he should be unable to protect them when completed, or by disposing his garrisons in several places, should make them too weak.

Quod cum animadverterent oppidani miserrimaque Alesiae memoria solliciti similem casum obsessionis vererentur, maximeque ex omnibus Luterius, qui fortunae illius periculum fecerat, moneret frumenti rationem esse habendam, constituunt omnium consensu parte ibi relictâ copiarum ipsi cum expeditis ad importandum frumentum proficisci. Eo consilio probato proxima nocte duobus milibus armatorum relictis reliquos ex oppido Drappes et Luterius educunt. Hi paucos dies morati ex finibus Cadurcorum, qui partim re frumentaria sublevare eos cupiebant, partim prohibere quo minus sumerent non poterant, magnum numerum frumenti comparant, nonnumquam autem expeditionibus nocturnis castella nostrorum adoriuntur. Quam ob causam Gaius Caninius toto oppido munitiones circumdare moratur, ne aut opus effectum tueri non possit aut plurimis in locis infirma disponat praesidia.

8:35. Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn, occupying a position at about ten miles distance from the town, intending from it to convey the corn into the town by degrees. They chose each his respective department. Drapes stayed behind in the camp with part of the army to protect it; Luterius conveys the train

with provisions into the town. Accordingly, having disposed guards here and there along the road, about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by narrow paths through the woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their noise being heard by the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out, having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly with the ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the convoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled by different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived, they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single man to be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but did not return to the camp.

Magna copia frumenti comparata considunt Drappes et Luterius non longius ab oppido X milibus, unde paulatim frumentum in oppidum supportarent. Ipsi inter se provincias partiuntur: Drappes castris praesidio cum parte copiarum restitit; Luterius agmen iumentorum ad oppidum ducit. Dispositis ibi praesidiis hora noctis circiter decima silvestribus angustisque itineribus frumentum importare in oppidum instituit. Quorum strepitum vigiles castrorum cum sensissent, exploratoresque missi quae gererentur renuntiassent, Caninius celeriter cum cohortibus armatis ex proximis castellis in frumentarios sub ipsam lucem impetum fecit. Ei repentino malo perterriti diffugiunt ad sua praesidia; quae nostri ut viderunt, acrius contra armatos incitati neminem ex eo numero vivum capi patiuntur. Profugit inde cum paucis Luterius nec se recipit in eastr.

8:36. After this success, Caninius learned from some prisoners, that a part of the forces was encamped with Drapes, not more than ten miles off: which being confirmed by several, supposing that after the

defeat of one general, the rest would be terrified, and might be easily conquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none of the enemy had fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice of the calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger in making the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot, men of great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among the three camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him. When he had advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he had sent before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom of barbarians, was pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that the higher grounds were unoccupied: but that the German horse had made a sudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence, he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on a signal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession of the higher grounds. Upon this the German horse observing the Roman colors, fought with great vigor. Immediately all the cohorts attack them on every side; and having either killed or made prisoners of them all, gained great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was taken prisoner.

Re bene gesta Caninius ex captivis comperit partem copiarum cum Drappete esse in castris a milibus longe non amplius XII. Qua re ex compluribus cognita, cum intellegeret fugato duce altero perterritos reliquos facile opprimi posse, magnae felicitatis esse arbitrabatur neminem ex caede refugisse in castra qui de accepta calamitate nuntium Drappeti perferret. Sed in experiendo cum periculum nullum videret, equitatum omnem Germanosque pedites, summae velocitatis homines, ad castra hostium praemittit; ipse legionem unam in trina castra distribuit, alteram secum expeditam ducit. Cum

propius hostes accessisset, ab exploratoribus quos praemiserat cognoscit castra eorum, ut barbarorum fere consuetudo est, relictis locis superioribus ad ripas fluminis esse demissa; at Germanos equitesque imprudentibus omnibus de improvise advolasse proeliumque commisisse. Qua re cognita legionem armatam instructamque adducit. Ita repente omnibus ex partibus signo dato loca superiora capiuntur. Quod ubi accidit, Germani equitesque signis legionis visis vehementissime proeliantur. Confestim cohortes undique impetum faciunt omnibusque aut interfectis aut captis magna praeda potiuntur. Capitur ipse eo proelio Drappes.

8:37. Caninius, having accomplished the business so successfully, without having scarcely a man wounded, returned to besiege the town; and, having destroyed the enemy without, for fear of whom he had been prevented from strengthening his redoubts, and surrounding the enemy with his lines, he orders the work to be completed on every side. The next day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and took upon him the siege of one side.

Caninius felicissime re gesta sine ullo paene militis vulnere ad obsidendos oppidanos revertitur externoque hoste deleto, cuius timore antea dividere praesidia et munitione oppidanos circumdare prohibitus erat, opera undique imperat administrari. Venit eodem cum suis copiis postero die Gaius Fabius partemque oppidi sumit ad obsidendum.

8:38. In the mean time, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country of the Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that the Belgae might have no opportunity of forming new plans in future. He himself visits the other states, demands a great number of hostages, and by his encouraging language allays the apprehensions of all. When he came

to the Carnutes, in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that the war first broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt, they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state the sooner from its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of that treason, and the instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up to punishment. And though the latter did not dare to trust his life even to his own countrymen, yet such diligent search was made by them all, that he was soon brought to our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by the clamors of the soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for they alleged that all the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought to be imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and his head cut off.

Caesar interim M. Antonium quaestorem cum cohortibus XV in Bellovacis relinquit, ne qua rursus novorum consiliorum capiendorum Belgis facultas daretur. Ipse reliquas civitates adit, obsides plures imperat, timentes omnium animos consolatione sanat. Cum in Carnutes venisset, quorum in civitate superiore commentario Caesar euit initium belli esse ortum, quod praecipue eos propter conscientiam facti timere animadvertibat, quo celerius civitatem timore liberaret, principem sceleris illius et concitorem belli, Gutruatum, ad supplicium depoposcit. Qui etsi ne civibus quidem suis se committebat, tamen celeriter omnium cura quaesitus in castra perducitur. Cogitur in eius supplicium Caesar contra suam naturam concursu maximo militum, qui ei omnia pericula et detrimenta belli accepta referebant, adeo ut verberibus exanimatum corpus securi feriretur.

8:39. Here Caesar was informed by numerous letters from Caninius of

what had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and in what conduct the town's people persisted: and though he despised the smallness of their numbers, yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaul in general should adopt an idea that she did not want strength but perseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states, relying on the advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert their liberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his command was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold out for that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend. He therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants, behind him, with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches. He hastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius.

Ibi crebris litteris Canini fit certior quae de Drappete et Lucterio gesta essent, quoque in consilio permanerent oppidani. Quorum etsi paucitatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficiendam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad resistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in libertatem, cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur. Itaque Q. Calenum legatum cum legionibus reliquit qui iustis itineribus subsequeretur; ipse cum omni equitatu quam potest celerrime ad Caninium contendit.

8:40. Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation, and perceiving that the town was surrounded by the works, and that the enemy had no possible means of retiring from the assault, and being likewise informed by the deserters that the

townsmen had abundance of corn, he endeavoured to prevent their getting water. A river divided the valley below, which almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on which Uxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground prevented his turning the current: for it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that no drains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. But the descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, the besieged could neither come to the river nor retire up the precipice without hazard of their lives. Caesar perceiving the difficulty, disposed archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to the easiest descents, placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen from getting water at the river, which obliged them afterward to go all to one place to procure water.

Cum contra expectationem omnium Caesar Vxellodunum venisset oppidumque operibus clausum animadverteret neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla condicione posse, magna autem copia frumenti abundare oppidanos ex perfugis cognosset, aqua prohibere hostem temptare coepit. Flumen infimam vallem dividebat, quae totum paene montem cingebat, in quo positum erat praeruptum undique oppidum Vxellodunum. Hoc avertere loci natura prohibebat: in infimis enim sic radicibus montis ferebatur, ut nullam in partem depressis fossis derivari posset. Erat autem oppidanis difficilis et praeruptus eo descensus, ut prohibentibus nostris sine vulneribus ac periculo vitae neque adire flumen neque arduo se recipere possent ascensu. Qua difficultate eorum cogmta Caesar sagittariis funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra facillimos descensus collocatis aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos.

8:41. Close under the walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out

on that part, which for the space of nearly three hundred feet, was not surrounded by the river. While every other person wished that the besieged could be debarred from this spring, Caesar alone saw that it could be effected, though not without great danger. Opposite to it he began to advance the vineae toward the mountain, and to throw up a mound, with great labor and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen ran down from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and wounded several of our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterred from moving forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity the difficulties of situation. At the same time they work mines, and move the crates and vineae to the source of the fountain. This was the only work which they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixty feet high was raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, not with the intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for that could not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of the spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that led to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger, not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but a great number of men also died of thirst.

Quorum omnis postea multitudo aquatorum unum in locum conveniebat sub ipsius oppidi murum, ubi magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat. Hoc fonte prohiberi posse oppidanos cum optarent reliqui, Caesar unus videret, e regione eius vineas agere adversus montem et aggerem instruere coepit magno cum labore et continua dimicatione. Oppidani enim loco superiore decurrunt et eminus sine periculo proeliantur multosque pertinaciter succedentes vulnerant; non deterrentur tamen milites nostri vineas proferre et labore atque

operibus locorum vincere difficultates. Eodem tempore cuniculos tectos ab vineis agunt ad caput fontis; quod genus operis sine ullo periculo, sine suspicione hostium facere licebat. Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris decem tabulatorum, non quidem quae moenibus aequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae superare fontis fastigium posset. Ex ea cum tela tormentis iacerentur ad fontis aditum, nec sine periculo possent aquari oppidani, non tantum pecora atque iumenta, sed etiam magna hostium multitudo siti consumebatur.

8:42. Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow, pitch, and dried wood: these they set on fire, and roll down on our works. At the same time, they fight most furiously, to deter the Romans, by the engagement and danger, from extinguishing the flames. Instantly a great blaze arose in the works. For whatever they threw down the precipice, striking against the vineae and agger, communicated the fire to whatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other hand, though they were engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and laboring under the disadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence of mind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of our army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every man faced the weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a manner as he could, that his valor might be the better known and attested.

Quo malo perterriti oppidani cupas sebo, pice, scandulis complent; eas ardentes in opera provolvunt eodemque tempore acerrime proeliantur, ut ab incendio restinguendo dimicationis periculo deterreant Romanos. Magna repente in ipsis operibus flamma exstitit. Quaecumque enim per locum praecipitem missa erant, ea vineis et

aggere suppressa comprehendebant id ipsum quod morabatur. Milites contra nostri, quamquam periculoso genere proeli locoque iniquo premebantur, tamen omnia fortissimo sustinebant animo. Res enim gerebatur et excelso loco et in conspectu exercitus nostri, magnusque utrimque clamor oriebatur. Ita quam quisque poterat maxime insignis, quo notior testatiorque virtus esset eius, telis hostium flammaeque se offerebat.

8:43. Caesar, observing that several of his men were wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, under pretense of assailing the walls, to raise a shout: at which the besieged being frightened, and not knowing what was going on in other places, call off their armed troops from attacking our works, and dispose them on the walls. Thus our men without hazarding a battle, gained time partly to extinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off the communication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinate resistance, and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces by drought, persevered in their resolution: at last the veins of the spring were cut across by our mines, and turned from their course. By this their constant spring was suddenly dried up, which reduced them to such despair that they imagined that it was not done by the art of man, but the will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at length submitted.

Caesar cum complures suos vulnerari videret, ex omnibus oppidi partibus cohortes montem ascendere et simulatione moenium occupandorum clamorem undique iubet tollere. Quo facto perterriti oppidani, cum quid ageretur in locis reliquis essent suspensi, revocant ab impugnandis operibus armatos murisque disponunt. Ita nostri fine proeli facto celeriter opera flamma comprehensa partim

restinguunt, partim interscindunt. Cum pertinaciter resisterent oppidani, magna etiam parte amissa siti suorum in sententia permanerent, ad postremum cuniculis venae fontis intercisae sunt atque aversae. Quo facto repente perennis exaruit fons tantumque attulit oppidanis salutis desperationem, ut id non hominum consilio, sed deorum voluntate factum putarent. Itaque se necessitate coacti tradiderunt.

8:44. Caesar, being convinced that his lenity was known to all men, and being under no fears of being thought to act severely from a natural cruelty, and perceiving that there would be no end to his troubles if several states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in different places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishment on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne arms against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said was taken by Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from his captivity, or through fear of severer punishments, abstained from food for several days, and thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, I have related, had escaped from the battle, having fallen into the hands of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for he frequently changed his quarters, and threw himself on the honor of several persons, as he saw that he dare not remain long in one place, and was conscious how great an enemy he deserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, a sincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any hesitation, a prisoner to Caesar.

Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur ne quid crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse, neque

exitum consiliorum suorum animadverteret, si tali ratione diversis in locis plures consilia inissent, exemplo supplici deterrendos reliquos existimavit. Itaque omnibus qui arma tulerant manus praecidit vitamque concessit, quo testator esset poena improborum. Drappes, quem captum esse a Caninio docui, sive indignitate et dolore vinculorum sive timore gravioris supplici paucis diebus cibo se abstinuit atque ita interiit. Eodem tempore Lacterius, quem profugisse ex proelio scripsi, cum in potestatem venisset Epasnacti Arverni (crebro enim mutandis locis multorum fidei se committebat, quod nusquam diutius sine periculo commoraturus videbatur, cum sibi conscius esset, quam inimicum deberet Caesarem habere), hunc Epasnactus Arvernus, amicissimus populi Romani, sine dubitatione ulla vinctum ad Caesarem deduxit.

8:45. In the mean time, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry action among the Treviri; and, having killed several of them and of the Germans, who never refused their aid to any person against the Romans, he got their chiefs alive into his power, and, among them, Surus, an Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valor and birth, and was the only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time.

Labienus interim in Treveris equestre proelium facit secundum compluribusque Treveris interfectis et Germanis, qui nullis adversus Romanos auxilia denegabant, principes eorum vivos redigit in suam potestatem atque in his Surum Aedmlm, qui et virtutis et generis summam nobilitatem habebat solusque ex Aeduis ad id tempus permanserat in armis.

8:46. Caesar, being informed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good success in all parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former

campaigns [Celtic] Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone in person to Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by Marcus Crassus, set out for it with two legions, designing to spend the latter part of the summer there. This affair he executed with his usual dispatch and good fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sent ambassadors to him and delivered hostages. These affairs being concluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry toward Narbo, and drew off his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four legions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two he detached to the Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influence throughout all Gaul. Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confines of the Carnutes, to keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering on the ocean; the other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices, at a small distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might be without an army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ran through all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes, and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good opportunity of learning how every person was disposed toward the republic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by the fidelity and assistance of the Province.

Ea re cognita Caesar, cum in omnibus partibus Galliae bene res geri videret iudicaretque superioribus aestivis Galliam devictam subactamque esse, Aquitaniam numquam adisset, per Publium Crassum quadam ex parte devicisset, cum duabus legionibus in eam partem Galliae est profectus, ut ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum. Quam rem sicuti cetera celeriter feliciterque confecit. Namque omnes Aquitaniae civitates legatos ad Caesarem miserunt

obsidesque ei dederunt. Quibus rebus gestis ipse equitum praesidio Narbonem profecto est, exercitum per legatos in hiberna deduxit: quattuor legiones in Belgio collocavit cum M. Antonio et C. Trebonio et P. Vatinio legatis, duas legiones in Aeduos deduxit, quorum in omni Gallia summam esse auctoritatem sciebat, duas in Turonis ad fines Carnutum posuit, quae omnem illam regionem coniunctam Oceano continerent, duas reliquas in Lemovicum finibus non longe ab Arvernīs, ne qua pars Galliae vacua ab exercitu esset. Paucos dies ipse in provincia moratus, cum celeriter omnes conventus percucurrisset, publicas controversias cognosset, bene meritis praemia tribuisset (cognoscendi enim maximam facultatem habebat, quali quisque fuisset animo in totius Galliae defectione, quam sustinuerat fidelitate atque auxiliis provinciae illius), his confectis rebus ad legiones in Belgium se recipit hibernatque Nemetocennae.

8:47. Having finished these affairs, he returned to his legions among the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna: there he got intelligence that Comius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement with his cavalry. For when Antonius had gone into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebates continued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which I before mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon every commotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them in the management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans, supported himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry, infested the roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringing provisions to the Roman quarters.

Ibi cognoscit Commium Atrebatem proelio cum equitatu suo

contendisse. Nam cum Antonius in hiberna venisset, civitasque Atrebatum in officio esset, Commius, qui post illam vulnerationem, quam supra commemoravi, semper ad omnes motus paratus suis civibus esse consuesset, ne consilia belli quaerentibus auctor armorum duxque deesset, parente Romanis civitate cum suis equitibus latrociniis se suos que alebat infestisque itineribus commeatus complures, qui comportabantur in hiberna Romanorum, interceptabat.

8:48. Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed commander of the horse under Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to that valor which was pre- eminent in him, a great aversion to Comius, on which account he executed the more willingly the orders which he received. Having, therefore, laid ambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry and came off successful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus, through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him with a small party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn Volusenus to a considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden, appealed to the honor of all about him for assistance not to suffer the wound, which he had perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and, wheeling his horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to the commander. All his horse following his example, made a few of our men turn their backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thigh with great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longer hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy. When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to

death in striving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escaped this misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, being severely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of losing his life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having either gratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest part of his followers, sent ambassadors to Antonius, and assured him that he would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever Antonius should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreated that this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not be obliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged that his request originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it and accepted his hostages. Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year's transactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do, because the following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus were consuls, produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no person may be left in ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army were at that time, have thought proper to write a few words in addition to this commentary.

Erat attributus Antonio praefectus equitum C. Volusenus Quadratus qui cum eo hibernaret. Hunc Antonius ad persequendum equitatum hostium mittit. Volusenus ad eam virtutem, quae singularis erat in eo, magnum odium Commi adiungebat, quo libentius id faceret quod imperabatur. Itaque dispositis insidiis saepius equites eius adgressus secunda proelia faciebat. Novissime, cum vehementius contenderetur, ac Volusenus ipsius intercipiendi Commi cupiditate pertinacius eum cum paucis insecutus esset, ille autem fuga vehementi Volusenum produxisset longius, inimicus homini suorum invocat fidem atque auxilium, ne sua vulnera per fidem imposita

paterentur impunita, conversoque equo se a ceteris incautius permittit in praefectum. Faciunt hoc idem omnes eius equites paucosque nostros convertunt atque insequuntur. Commius incensum calcaribus equum coniungit equo Quadrati lanceaque infesta magnis viribus medium femur traicit Voluseni. Praefecto vulnerato non dubitant nostri resistere et conversis equis hostem pelleri. Quod ubi accidit, complures hostium magno nostrorum impetu perculsi vulnerantur ac partim in fuga proteruntur, partim intercipiuntur; quod malum dux equi velocitate evitavit: graviter adeo vulneratus praefectus, ut vitae periculum aditurus videretur, refertur in castra. Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus firmat; unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani. Cuius postulationem Antonius cum iudicaret ab iusto nasci timore, veniam petenti dedit, obsides accepit. Scio Caesarem singulorum annorum singulos commentarios confecisse; quod ego non existimavi mihi esse faciendum, propterea quod insequens annus, L. Paulo C. Marcello consulibus, nullas habet magnopere Galliae res gestas. Ne quis tamen ignoraret, quibus in locis Caesar exercitusque eo tempore fuissent, pauca esse scribenda coniungendaque huic commentario statui.

8:49. Caesar, while in winter quarters in the country of the Belgae, made it his only business to keep the states in amity with him, and to give none either hopes of, or pretext for a revolt. For nothing was further from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging in another war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing his army out of the country, any war should be left unfinished, which the Gauls would cheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger.

Therefore, by treating the states with respect, making rich presents to the leading men, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjection lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessful battles) in obedience.

Caesar in Belgio cum hiemaret, unum illud propositum habebat, continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum. Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo susciperet. Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace continuit.

8:50. When the winter quarters were broken up he himself, contrary to his usual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the longest possible stages, in order to visit the free towns and colonies, that he might recommend to them the petition of Marcus Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood. For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in favor of a man strongly attached to him, whom he had sent home before him to attend the election, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few men, who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's influence when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road, before he reached Italy that he was created augur, yet he thought himself in honor bound to visit the free towns and colonies, to return them thanks for rendering such service to Antonius by their presence in such great numbers [at the election], and at the same time to recommend to them himself, and his honor in his suit for the consulate the ensuing year. For his adversaries

arrogantly boasted that Lucius Lentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip Caesar of all honor and dignity: and that the consulate had been injuriously taken from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior in votes and interest, because he was united to Caesar, both by friendship, and by serving as lieutenant under him.

Ipsē hibernis peractis contra consuetudinem in Italiam quam maximis itineribus est profectus, ut municipia et colonias appellaret, quibus M. Antoni quaestoris sui, commendaverat sacerdoti petitionem. Contendebat enim gratia cum libenter pro homine sibi coniunctissimo, quem paulo ante praemiseraat ad petitionem, tum acriter contra factionem et potentiam paucorum, qui M. Antoni repulsa Caesaris decedentis gratiam convellere cupiebant. Hunc etsi augurem prius faetum quam Italiam attingeret in itinere audierat, tamen non minus iustam sibi causam municipia et colonias adeundi existimavit, ut eis gratias ageret, quod frequentiam atque officium suum Antonio praestitissent, simulque se et honorem suum sequentis anni commendaret, propterea quod insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragiisque valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset.

8:51. Caesar, on his arrival, was received by the principal towns and colonies with incredible respect and affection; for this was the first time he came since the war against united Gaul. Nothing was omitted which could be thought of for the ornament of the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass. All the people with their children went out to meet him. Sacrifices were offered up in

every quarter. The market places and temples were laid out with entertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph. So great was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranks of the people.

Exceptus est Caesaris adventus ab omnibus municipiis et coloniis incredibili honore atque amore. Tum primum enim veniebat ab illo universae Galliae bello. Nihil relinquebatur quod ad ornatum portarum, itinerum, locorum omnium qua Caesar iturus erat excogitari poterat. Cum liberis omnis multitudo obviam procedebat, hostiae omnibus locis immolabantur, tricliniis stratis fora templaque occupabantur, ut vel exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset. Tanta erat magnificentia apud opulentiores, cupiditas apud humiliores.

8:52. When Caesar had gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, he returned with the greatest haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and having ordered all his legions to march from winter quarters to the territories of the Treviri, he went thither and reviewed them. He made Titus Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might be the more inclined to support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself made such journeys as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by change of air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited by his enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by the contrivance of a few, that the senate should interpose their authority to deprive him of a part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any story concerning Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do any thing in opposition to the authority of the senate; for he thought that his cause would be easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For Caius Curio, one of the tribunes of

the people, having undertaken to defend Caesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that if the dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey's authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both should resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city would be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed this, but of himself called upon the senate to divide on the question. But the consuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and regulating matters as they desired, they broke up the meeting.

Cum omnes regiones Galliae togatae Caesar percucurrisset, summa celeritate ad exercitum Nemetocennam rediit legionibusque ex omnibus hibernis ad fines Treverorum evocatis eo profectus est ibique exercitum lustravit. T. Labienum Galliae togatae praefecit, quo maiore commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. Ipse tantum itinerum faciebat, quantum satis esse ad mutationem locorum propter salubritatem existimabat. Ibi quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab inimicis suis sollicitari certiorque fiebat id agi paucorum consiliis, ut interposita senatus auctoritate aliqua parte exercitus spoliaretur, tamen neque de Labieno credidit quidquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem ut aliquid faceret potuit adduci. Iudicabat enim liberis sententiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri. Nam C. Curio, tribunus plebis, cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris laederet, et quoniam Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrorem foro inferrent, discederet uterque ab armis exercitusque dimitteret: fore eo facto liberam et sui iuris civitatem. Neque hoc tantum pollicitus est, sed etiam sc. per discessionem facere coepit; quod ne fieret consules amique Pompei iusserunt atque ita rem morando discusserrunt.

8:53. This testimony of the unanimous voice of the senate was very great, and consistent with their former conduct; for the preceding year, when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he proposed to the senate, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to dispose of Caesar's province, before the expiration of his command, and when the votes were called for, and Marcellus, who endeavored to advance his own dignity, by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate went over to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken by this, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interest by enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply with whatever they had resolved on.

Magnum hoc testimonium senatus erat universi conveniensque superiori facto. Nam Marcellus proximo anno, cum impugnetur Caesaris dignitatem, contra legem Pompei et Crassi rettulerat ante tempus ad senatum de Caesaris provinciis, sententiisque dictis discessionem faciente Marcello, qui sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat, senatus frequens in alia omnia transiit. Quibus non frangebantur animi inimicorum Caesaris, sed admonebantur quo maiores pararent necessitates, quibus cogi posset senatus id probare, quod ipsi constituissent.

8:54. After this a decree was passed by the senate, that one legion should be sent by Pompey, and another by Caesar, to the Parthian war. But these two legions were evidently drawn from Caesar alone. For the first legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if it belonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's province. Caesar, however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies, sent the legion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the senate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to

himself, and which was quartered in Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the thirteenth into Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had drafted the fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placed Caius Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached Caius Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would be most secure, if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valor, and the Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe by his armies.

Fit deinde senatus consultum, ut ad bellum Parthi cum legio una a Cn. Pompeio, altera a C. Caesare mitteretur; neque obscure duae legiones uni detrahuntur. Nam Cn. Pompeius legionem primam, quam ad Caesarem miserat, confectam ex delectu provinciae Caesaris, eam tamquam ex suo numero dedit. Caesar tamen, cum de voluntate minime dubium esset adversariorum suorum, Pompeio legionem remisit et suo nomine quintam decimam, quam in Gallia citeriore habuerat, ex senatus consulto iubet tradi. In eius locum tertiam decimam legionem in Italiam mittit quae praesidia tueretur, ex quibus praesidiis quinta decima deducebatur. Ipse exercitui distribuit hiberna: C. Trebonium cum legionibus quattuor in Belgio collocat, C. Fabium cum totidem in Aeduos deducit. Sic enim existimabat tutissimam fore Galliam, si Belgae, quorum maxima virtus, Aedui, quorum auctoritas summa esset, exercitibus continerentur. Ipse in Italiam profectus est.

8:55. He himself set out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival that the two legions sent home by him and which, by the senate's decree, should have been sent to the Parthian war, had been delivered over to Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul, and were retained in Italy. Although from this transaction it was evident to every one that

war was designed against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to any thing, as long as there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an equitable manner, rather than to have recourse to arms.

Quo cum venisset, cognoscit per C. Marcellum consulem legiones duas ab se remissas, quae ex senatus consulto deberent ad Parthicum bellum duci, Cn. Pompeio traditas atque in Italia retentas esse. Hoc facto quamquam nulli erat dubium, quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belli gerendi. Contendit...

THE CIVIL WAR

BOOK I (50 BC)

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VOSSIUS'S SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST BOOK

1:0. I will now say nothing concerning the absurd opinion of those who assert that the following Commentaries on the Civil War were not written by Caesar himself. Even without the authority of Suetonius, the diction itself would be sufficient to convince the most skeptical that Caesar and no other was the author. I am of the opinion of those who think that the beginning of these Commentaries is lost. For I can not be convinced that Caesar commenced so abruptly; and History itself gives sufficient evidence that many circumstances require to be previously stated. For which reason we thought that it would be well worth our attention to compile from Plutarch, Appian, and Dion, a narrative of such facts as seemed necessary to fill up the chasm; these facts are as follows: “When Caesar, after reducing all Transalpine Gaul, had passed into Cisalpine Gaul, he determined for many reasons to send ambassadors to Rome to request for him the consulate, and a prolongation of the command of his province. Pompey, who was estranged from Caesar, although he was not as yet at open enmity with him, determined neither to aid him by his influence nor openly oppose him on this occasion. But the consuls Lentulus and Marcellus, who had previously been on unfriendly terms with Caesar, resolved to use all means in their power to prevent him from gaining his object. Marcellus in particular did not hesitate to offer Caesar other insults. Caesar had lately planned the colony of Novumcomum in Gaul: Marcellus, not content with taking

from it the right of citizenship, ordered the principal man of the colony to be arrested and scourged at Rome, and sent him to make his complaints to Caesar: an insult of this description had never before been offered to a Roman citizen. While these transactions are taking place, Caius Curio, tribune of the commons, comes to Caesar in his province. Curio had made many and energetic struggles, in behalf of the republic and Caesar's cause: at length when he perceived that all his efforts were vain, he fled through fear of his adversaries, and informed Caesar of all the transactions that had taken place, and of the efforts made by his enemies to crush him. Caesar received Curio with great kindness, as he was a man of the highest rank, and had great claims on himself and the republic, and thanked him warmly for his numerous personal favors. But Curio, as war was being openly prepared against Caesar, advised him to concentrate his troops, and rescue the republic now oppressed by a few daring men. Caesar, although he was not ignorant of the real state of affairs, was however of opinion that particular regard should be paid to the tranquility of the republic, lest any one should suppose that he was the originator of the war. Therefore, through his friends, he made this one request, that two legions, and the province of Cisalpine Gaul, and Illyricum, should be left him. All these acts were performed by Caesar, with the hope that his enemies might be induced by the justice of his demands, to preserve the peace of the republic. Even Pompey himself did not dare to oppose them. But when Caesar could not obtain his request from the consuls, he wrote to the senate a letter, in which he briefly stated his exploits and public services, and entreated that he should not be deprived of the favor of the people, who had ordered, that he, although absent, should be considered a candidate at the next elections; and he stated

also that he would disband his army, if the senate and people of Rome would pass a resolution to that effect, provided that Pompey would do the same. That, as long as the latter should retain the command of his army, no just reason could exist that he [Caesar] should disband his troops and expose himself to the insults of his enemies. He intrusts this letter to Curio to bear to its destination; the latter traveled one hundred and sixty miles with incredible dispatch, and reached the city in three days' time, before the beginning of January, and before the consuls could pass any decree concerning Caesar's command. Curio, after accomplishing his journey, kept the letter, and did not give it up, until there was a crowded meeting of the senate, and the tribunes of the commons were present; for he was afraid, lest, if he gave it up previously, the consuls should suppress it.

1:1. When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to suffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail, that any question should be put to the senate on the subject of the letter. The consuls put the question on the regulation of the state. Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not fail the senate and republic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly and resolutely, but if they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his favor, as they did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and not submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means of regaining Caesar's favor and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same purport, "that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if the senate would support him; but if they should hesitate and act without energy, they would in vain implore his aid, if they should require it hereafter."

Litteris C. Caesaris consulibus redditis aegre ab his impetratum est summa tribunorum plebis contentione, ut in senatu recitarentur; ut vero ex litteris ad senatum referretur, impetrari non potuit. Referunt consules de re publica [in civitate]. [Incitat] L. Lentulus consul senatu rei publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum: habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, senatum imploraturum.

1:2. This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city, and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips of Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, as Marcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that the question ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levies were made throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protection the senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thought proper;" as Marcus Calidius afterward, who was of opinion, "that Pompey should set out for his province, that there might be no cause for arms; that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced from him, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near the city to do him injury:" as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost word for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, who peremptorily refused to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus, overawed by his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate, intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a present army, and

the threats of Pompey's friends, unwillingly and reluctantly adopted Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a certain day, and should he not do so, he should be considered as acting against the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the people, interposed. The question was immediately put on their interposition. Violent opinions were expressed; whoever spoke with the greatest acrimony and cruelty was most highly commended by Caesar's enemies.

Haec Scipionis oratio, quod senatus in urbe habebatur Pompeiusque aberat, ex ipsius ore Pompei mitti videbatur. Dixerat aliquis leniorem sententiam, ut primo M. Marcellus, ingressus in eam orationem, non oportere ante de ea re ad senatum referri, quam dilectus tota Italia habiti et exercitus conscripti essent, quo praesidio tuto et libere senatus, quae vellet, decernere auderet; ut M. Calidius, qui censebat, ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficereceretur, ne qua esset armorum causa: timere Caesarem ereptis ab eo duabus legionibus, ne ad eius periculum reservare et retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur; ut M. Rufus, qui sententiam Calidii paucis fere mutatis rebus sequebatur. Hi omnes convicio L. Lentuli consulis correpti exagitabantur. Lentulus sententiam Calidii pronuntiaturum se omnia negavit. Marcellus perterritus conviciis a sua sententia discessit. Sic vocibus consulis, terrore praesentis exercitus, minis amicorum Pompei plerique compulsi inviti et coacti Scipionis sententiam sequuntur: uti ante certam diem Caesar exercitum dimittat; si non faciat, eum adversus rem publicam facturum videri. Intercedit M. Antonius, Q. Cassius, tribuni plebis. Refertur confestim de intersessione tribunorum. Dicuntur sententiae graves; ut quisque acerbissime crudelissimeque dixit, ita quam maxime ab inimicis Caesaris collaudatur.

1:3. The senate having broken up in the evening, all who belonged to that order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, and secured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved and excited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served in Pompey's armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewards and promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions, which had been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the comitium were crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consul's friends, all Pompey's connections, all those who bore any ancient enmity to Caesar, were forced into the senate house. By their concourse and declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and the greater part deprived of the power of speaking their sentiments with freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as did likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs, and require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions were expressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to Caesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure.

Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes, qui sunt eius ordinis, a Pompeio evocantur. Laudat promptos Pompeius atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque incitat. Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, multi ex duabus legionibus, quae sunt traditae a Caesare, arcessuntur. Completur urbs et ipsum comitium tribunis, centurionibus, evocatis. Omnes amici consulum, necessarii Pompei atque eorum, qui veteres inimicitias cum Caesare gerebant, in senatum coguntur; quorum vocibus et concursu terrentur infirmiores, dubii confirmantur, plerisque vero libere decernendi potestas eripitur. Pollicetur L. Piso censor sese iturum ad Caesarem, item L. Roscius praetor, qui de his

rebus eum doceant: sex dies ad eam rem conficiendam spatii postulant. Dicuntur etiam ab nonnullis sententiae, ut legati ad Caesarem mittantur, qui voluntatem senatus ei proponant.

1:4. All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all, in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge against Caesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government of an army and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from such princes as should receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and boasted among his friends, that he would be a second Sylla, to whom the supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a province and armies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of his connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover [he was influenced by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an ostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at that time had great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature. Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwilling that any person should bear an equal degree of dignity, had wholly alienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured a reconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom he had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At the same time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by converting the two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to [augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring matters to a war.

Omnibus his resistitur, omnibusque oratio consulis, Scipionis, Catonis opponitur. Catonem veteres inimicitiae Caesaris incitant et dolor repulsae. Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac

provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionibus movetur, seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperii redeat. Scipionem eadem spes provinciae atque exercituum impellit, quos se pro necessitudine partituro cum Pompeio arbitratur, simul iudiciorum metus, adulatio atque ostentatio sui et potentium, qui in re publica iudiciisque tum plurimum pollebant. Ipse Pompeius, ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus, et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat, totum se ab eius amicitia averterat et cum communibus inimicis in gratiam redierat, quorum ipse maximam partem illo affinitatis tempore iniunxerat Caesari; simul infamia duarum legionum permotus, quas ab itinere Asiae Syriaeque ad suam potentiam dominatumque converterat, rem ad arma deduci studebat.

1:5. For these reasons every thing was done in a hasty and disorderly manner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform him [of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people to deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, which Sylla had left them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventh day they were obliged to think of their own safety, which the most turbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, nor to fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighth month. Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate (which was never resorted to even by daring proposers except when the city was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public safety was despaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and proconsuls in the city, should take care that the state received no injury." These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides of January; therefore, in the first five days, on which the senate could meet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two days of election excepted, the severest and most

virulent decrees were passed against Caesar's government, and against those most illustrious characters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately made their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then at Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matters could be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the part of his enemies.

His de causis aguntur omnia raptim atque turbate. Nec docendi Caesaris propinquis eius spatium datur, nec tribunis plebis sui periculi deprecandi neque etiam extremi iuris intercessione retinendi, quod L. Sulla reliquerat, facultas tribuitur, sed de sua salute septimo die cogitare coguntur, quod illi turbulentissimi superioribus temporibus tribuni plebis octavo denique mense suarum actionum respicere ac timere consueverant. Decurritur ad illud extremum atque ultimum senatus consultum, quo nisi paene in ipso urbis incendio atque in desperatione omnium salutis sceleratorum audacia numquam ante descensum est: dent operam consules, praetores, tribuni plebis, quique pro consulibus sint ad urbem, ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat. Haec senatusconsulto perscribuntur a.d. VII Id. Ian. Itaque V primis diebus, quibus haberi senatus potuit, qua ex die consulatum iniit Lentulus, biduo excepto comitali et de imperio Caesaris et de amplissimis viris, tribunis plebis, gravissime acerbissimeque decernitur. Profugiunt statim ex urbe tribuni plebis seseque ad Caesarem conferunt. Is eo tempore erat Ravennae exspectabatque suis lenissimis postulatis responsa, si qua hominum aequitate res ad otium deduci posset.

1:6. During the succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city. Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through Scipio. He applauded the courage and firmness of the senate,

acquainted them with his force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he was moreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected, and that he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him. Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that levies should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as propraetor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey from the public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba should be [honored with the title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said that he would not allow this motion for the present. Philip, one of the tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respecting the other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular, the remainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria, Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private motive, and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provinces praetors were sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer to the people on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath, and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the military habit, after offering their vows: a circumstance which had never before happened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictors in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times. Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from the municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. All distinctions between things human and divine, are confounded.

Proximis diebus habetur extra urbem senatus. Pompeius eadem illa, quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit; senatus virtutem constantiamque collaudat; copias suas exponit; legiones habere sese paratas X; praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in

Caesarem milites neque eis posse persuaderi, uti eum defendant aut sequantur. Statim de reliquis rebus ad senatum refertur: tota Italia delectus habeatur; Faustus Sulla propere in Mauretanium mittatur; pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur. Refertur etiam de rege Iuba, ut socius sit atque amicus; Marcellus vero passurum se in praesentia negat. De Fausto impedit Philippus, tribunus plebis. De reliquis rebus senatusconsulta perscribuntur. Provinciae privatis decernuntur duae consulares, reliquae praetoriae. Scipioni obvenit Syria, L. Domitio Gallia; Philippus et Cotta privato consilio praetereuntur, neque eorum sortes deiciuntur. In reliquas provincias praetores mittuntur. Neque exspectant, quod superioribus annis acciderat, ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur paludatque votis nuncupatis exeant. Consules, quod ante id tempus accidit nunquam, ex urbe proficiscuntur, lictoresque habent in urbe et Capitolio privati contra omnia vetustatis exempla. Tota Italia delectus habentur, arma imperantur; pecuniae a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tolluntur: omnia divina humanaque iura permiscuntur.

1:7. These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued his soldiers; he reminded them “of the wrongs done to him at all times by his enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him and led astray by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory, though he had always favored and promoted Pompey’s honor and dignity. He complained that an innovation had been introduced into the republic, that the intercession of the tribunes, which had been restored a few years before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed by force of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every other power, had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; that Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had taken away the

privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate decreed, 'that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained no injury' (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to repair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when the tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and possessed themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (and these instances of former times, he showed them were expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing of this kind was attempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was promulgated, no intrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he exhorted them to defend from the malice of his enemies the reputation and honor of that general under whose command they had for nine years most successfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, and subdued all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which was present (for in the beginning of the disturbances he had called it out, his other legions not having yet arrived), all cry out that they are ready to defend their general, and the tribunes of the commons, from all injuries.

Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur, quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta. Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen intercessionem liberam reliquisse. Pompeium, qui amissa restituisset videretur, dona etiam, quae ante habuerint, ademisse. Quotienscumque sit decretum, darent operam

magistratus, ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet (qua voce et quo senatus consulto populus Romanus ad arma sit vocatus), factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia, in secessione populi templis locisque editoribus occupatis: atque haec superioris aetatis exempla expiata Saturnini atque Gracchorum casibus docet; quarum rerum illo tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem. nulla lex promulgata, non cum populo agi coeptum, nulla secessio facta. Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu v VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaeque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. Conclamant legionis XIII, quae aderat, milites — hanc enim initio tumultus evocaverat, reliquae nondum convenerant — sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere.

1:8. Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of his soldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met the tribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his other legions from winter quarters; and ordered them to follow him. Thither came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant-general under Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech, and stating for what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a private nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himself to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for the republic, to a design of affronting him; that he had ever preferred the interest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar, too, for his own honor, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to the public good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies, lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. He spoke a few words to

the same purport from himself, in addition to Pompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in the same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey had empowered him to do so.

Cognita militum voluntate Ariminum cum ea legione proficiscitur ibique tribunos plebis, qui ad eum profugerant, convenit; reliquas legiones ex hibernis evocat et subsequi iubet. Eo L. Caesar adulescens venit, cuius pater Caesaris erat legatus. Is reliquo sermone confecto, cuius rei causa venerat, habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea, quae rei publicae causa egerit, in suam contumeliam vertat. Semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis, ut, cum illis nocere se speret, rei publicae noceat. Pauca eiusdem generis addit cum excusatione Pompei coniuncta. Eadem fere atque eisdem verbis praetor Roscius agit cum Caesare sibi Pompeium commemorasse demonstrat.

1:9. Though these things seemed to have no tendency toward redressing his injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could communicate his wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that, as they had conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a great dispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears. "That the honor of the republic had ever been his first object, and dearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favor of the Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of his enemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and

dragged back to the city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid to his suit for the consulate at the next election, though he was not present; that, however, he had patiently submitted to this loss of honor, for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters to the senate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of their armies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were made throughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him, under the pretense of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that the state was in arms. To what did all these things tend, unless to his ruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and to endure every thing for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own province; let them both disband their armies; let all persons in Italy lay down their arms; let all fears be removed from the city; let free elections, and the whole republic be resigned to the direction of the senate and Roman people. That these things might be the more easily performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either let Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be that all their disputes would be settled by an interview."

Quae res etsi nihil ad levandas iniurias pertinere videbantur, tamen idoneos nactus homines, per quos ea, quae vellet, ad eum perferrentur, petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua quoque ad eum postulata deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint. Sibi semper primam rei publicae fuisse dignitatem vitaeque potiore. Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset. Tamen hanc iacturam honoris

sui rei publicae causa aequo animo tulisse; cum litteras ad senatum miserit, ut omnes ab exercitibus discederent, ne id quidem impetravisse. Tota Italia delectus haberi, retineri legiones II, quae ab se simulatione Parthici belli sint abductae, civitatem esse in armis. Quonam haec omnia nisi ad suam perniciem pertinere? Sed tamen ad omnia se descendere paratum atque omnia pati rei publicae causa. Proficiscatur Pompeius in suas provincias, ipsi exercitus dimittant, discedant in Italia omnes ab armis, metus e civitate tollatur, libera comitia atque omnis res publica senatui populoque Romano permittatur. Haec quo facilius certisque condicionibus fiant et iureiurando sanciantur, aut ipse propius accedat aut se patiatur accedere: fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur.

1:10. Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went to Capua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to them Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sent written proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was, that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband his army: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In the mean time, until security was given that Caesar would perform his promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies.

Acceptis mandatis Roscius cum L. Caesare Capuam pervenit ibique consules Pompeiumque invenit; postulata Caesaris renuntiat. Illi deliberata re respondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt; quorum haec erat summa: Caesar in Galliam reverteretur, Arimino excederet, exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset, Pompeium in Hispanias iturum. Interea, quoad fides esset data Caesarem facturum, quae polliceretur, non intermissuros consules

Pompeiumque delectus.

1:11. It was not an equitable proposal, to require that Caesar should quit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] should himself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another, and desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, while he himself was making new levies: and that he should merely promise to go to his province, without naming the day on which he would set out; so that if he should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired, yet he would not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting a falsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising to set out to meet him, made the expectation of peace appear very hopeless. Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum to Arretium; he himself staid at Ariminum with two legions, with the intention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and Ancona, with a cohort each.

Erat iniqua condicio postulare, ut Caesar Arimino excederet atque in provinciam reverteretur, ipsum et provincias et legiones alienas tenere; exercitum Caesaris velle dimitti, delectus habere; polliceri se in provinciam iturum neque, ante quem diem iturus sit, definire, ut, si peracto consulatu Caesar profectus esset, nulla tamen mendacii religione obstrictus videretur; tempus vero colloquio non dare neque accessurum polliceri magnam pacis desperationem afferebat. Itaque ab Arimino M. Antonium cum cohortibus V Arretium mittit; ipse Arimini cum duabus subsistit ibique delectum habere instituit; Pisaurum, Fanum, Anconam singulis cohortibus occupat.

1:12. In the mean time, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the

town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined toward himself, he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it and made his escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the thirteenth legion from the garrison, and set out for Auximum, a town into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country of Picenum, to raise new levies.

Interea certior factus Iguvium Thermum praetorem cohortibus V tenere, oppidum munire, omniumque esse Iguvinorum optimam erga se voluntatem, Curionem cum tribus cohortibus, quas Pisauri et Arimini habebat, mittit. Cuius adventu cognito diffusus municipii voluntati Thermus cohortes ex urbe reducit et profugit. Milites in itinere ab eo discedunt ac domum revertuntur. Curio summa omnium voluntate Iguvium recepit. Quibus rebus cognitis confisus municipiorum voluntatibus Caesar cohortes legionis XIII ex praesidiis deducit Auximumque proficiscitur; quod oppidum Attius cohortibus introductis tenebat delectumque toto Piceno circummissis senatoribus habebat.

1:13. Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them to determine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen would suffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the

republic, after performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their town and walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion of posterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A fear of Caesar's front rank having pursued him, obliged him to halt, and when the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of them disperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along with them, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. But Caesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful for their conduct.

Adventu Caesaris cognito decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt; docent sui iudicii rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui. Quorum oratione permotus Varus praesidium, quod introduxerat, ex oppido educit ac profugit. Hunc ex primo ordine pauci Caesaris consecuti milites consistere coegerunt. Commisso proelio deseritur a suis Varus; nonnulla pars militum domum discedit; reliqui ad Caesarem perveniunt, atque una cum eis deprensus L. Pupius, primi pili centurio, adducitur, qui hunc eundem ordinem in exercitu Cn. Pompei antea duxerat. At Caesar milites Attianos collaudat, Pupium dimittit, Auximatibus agit gratias seque eorum facti memorem fore pollicetur.

1:14. Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great a panic spread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open the

treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediately on opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falsely rumored that Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were already at the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most of the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and was on his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and had disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped within the city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua they first began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raise levies in the colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law: and Lentulus brought into the public market place the gladiators which Caesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people, and confirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered them to attend him; but afterward, being warned by his friends that this action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them among the slaves of the district of Campania, to keep guard there.

Quibus rebus Romam nuntiatis tantus repente terror invasit, ut cum Lentulus consul ad aperiendum aerarium venisset ad pecuniamque Pompeio ex senatusconsulto proferendam, protinus aperto sanctiore aerario ex urbe profugeret. Caesar enim adventare iam iamque et adesse eius equites falso nuntiabantur. Hunc Marcellus collega et plerique magistratus consecuti sunt. Cn. Pompeius pridie eius diei ex urbe profectus iter ad legiones habebat, quas a Caesare acceptas in Apulia hibernorum causa disposuerat. Delectus circa urbem intermittuntur; nihil citra Capuam tutum esse omnibus videtur. Capuae primum se confirmant et colligunt delectumque colonorum, qui lege Iulia Capuam deducti erant, habere instituunt; gladiatoresque, quos ibi Caesar in ludo habebat, ad forum productos

Lentulus spe libertatis confirmat atque iis equos attribuit et se sequi iussit; quos postea monitus ab suis, quod ea res omnium iudicio reprehendebatur, circum familias conventus Campani custodiae causa distribuit.

1:15. Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum. All the governors in these countries most cheerfully received him, and aided his army with every necessary. Embassadors came to him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and built at his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with his orders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the mean time, the twelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched to Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that town with ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fled from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, was deserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the road with a small number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey into Picenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius, being informed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers from him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighboring countries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Among them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with six cohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which he made up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys to Corfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar was advancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighboring states.

Auximo Caesar progressus omnem agrum Picenum percurrit. Cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant. Etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat, ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur. Milites imperat: mittunt. Interea legio XII Caesarem consequitur. Cum his duabus Asculum Picenulu proficiscitur. Id oppidum Lentulus Spinther X cohortibus tenebat; qui Caesaris adventu cognito profugit ex oppido cohortesque secum abducere conatus magna parte militum deseritur. Relictus in itinere cum paucis incidit in Vibullium Rufum missum a Pompeio in agrum Picenum confirmandorum hominum causa. A quo factus Vibullius certior, quae res in Piceno gererentur, milites ab eo accipit, ipsum dimittit. Item ex finitimis regionibus quas potest contrahit cohortes ex delectibus Pompeianis; in his Camerino fugientem Lucilium Hirrum cum sex cohortibus, quas ibi in praesidio habuerat, excipit; quibus coactis XII efficit. Cum his ad Domitium Ahenobarbum Corfinium magnis itineribus pervenit Caesaremque adesse cum legionibus duabus nuntiat. Domitius per se circiter XX cohortes Alba, ex Marsis et Paelignis, finitimis ab regionibus coegerat.

1:16. Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered the soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a muster to be made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, he marched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius from the town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, at three miles' distance from it. An engagement taking place there with Caesar's advanced-guard, Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from the bridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marched his

legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by the walls.

Recepto Firmo expulsoque Lentulo Caesar conquiri milites, qui ab eo discesserant, delectumque institui iubet; ipse unum diem ibi rei frumentariae causa moratus Corfinium contendit. Eo cum venisset, cohortes V praemissae a Domitio ex oppido pontem fluminis interrompebant, qui erat ab oppido milia passuum circiter III. Ibi cum antecursoribus Caesaris proelio commisso celeriter Domitiani a ponte repulsi se in oppidum receperunt. Caesar legionibus transductis ad oppidum constitit iuxtaque murum castra posuit.

1:17. Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well acquainted with the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded, with dispatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to his assistance. That Caesar could be easily inclosed by the two armies, through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtaining supplies: unless he did so, that he and upward of thirty cohorts, and a great number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger. In the mean time he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls, and assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In a speech to the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; to every private soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to the centurions and veterans.

Re cognita Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito praemio cum litteris mittit, qui petant atque orent, ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi posse frumentoque prohiberi. Quod nisi fecerit, se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum. Interim suos

cohortatus tormenta in muris disponit certasque cuique partes ad custodiam urbis attribuit; militibus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, quaterna in singulos iugera, et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque.

1:18. In the mean time, word was brought to Caesar that the people of Sulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts of the eighth legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards, threw open their gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers, went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped off the walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged that he might be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had set out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his own army, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesar employed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in corn from the neighboring free towns, and waiting for the rest of his forces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second camp on another part of the town, and gave the command of it to Curio. He determined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during the remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of the work was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.

Interim Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses, quod oppidum a Corfinio VII milium intervallo abest, cupere ea facere, quae vellet, sed a Q.

Lucretio senatore et Attio Peligno prohiberi, qui id oppidum VII cohortium praesidio tenebant. Mittit eo M. Antonium cum legionis XIII cohortibus V. Sulmonenses simulatque signa nostra viderunt, portas aperuerunt universique, et oppidani et milites, obviam gratulantes Antonio exierunt. Lucretius et Attius de muro se deiecerunt. Attius ad Antonium deductus petit ut ad Caesarem mitteretur. Antonius cum cohortibus et Attio eodem die, quo profectus erat, revertitur. Caesar eas cohortes cum exercitu suo coniunxit Attiumque incolumem dimisit. Caesar primis diebus castra magnis operibus munire et ex finitimis municipiis frumentum comportare reliquasque copias exspectare instituit. Eo triduo legio VIII ad eum venit cohortesque ex novis Galliae dilectibus XXII equitesque ab rege Norico circiter CCC. Quorum adventu altera castra ad alteram oppidi partem ponit; his castris Curionem praefecit. Reliquis diebus oppidum vallo castellisque circummunire instituit. Cuius operis maxima parte effecta eodem fere tempore missi a Pompeio revertuntur.

1:19. Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; and encouraged them not to despond, but to provide every thing necessary for the defense of the town. He held private conferences with a few of his most intimate friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. As Domitius's countenance did not agree with his words, and he did every thing with more confusion and fear than he had shown on the preceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his friends, contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as he avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in answer, "That he would

not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius had retreated into the town of Corfinium without either his advice or consent. Therefore, if any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius] should come to him with the whole force.” But the blockade and works round the town prevented his escape.

Litteris perlectis Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum hortaturque eos, ne animo deficiant quaeque usui ad defendendum oppidum sint parent. Ipse arcano cum paucis familiaribus suis colloquitur consiliumque fugae capere constituit. Cum vultus Domiti cum oratione non consentiret, atque omnia trepidantius timidiusque ageret, quam superioribus diebus consuesset, multumque cum suis consiliandi causa secreto praeter consuetudinem colloqueretur, concilia conventusque hominum fugeret, res diutius tegi dissimularique non potuit. Pompeius enim rescripserat: sese rem in summum periculum deducturum non esse, neque suo consilio aut voluntate Domitium se in oppidum Corfinium contulisse; proinde, si qua fuisset facultas, ad se cum omnibus copiis veniret. Id ne fieri posset, obsidione atque oppidi circummunitione fiebat.

1:20. Domitius’s design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Corfinium early in the evening began to mutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes and centurions, and the most respectable among themselves: “that they were besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almost finished; that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectations they had confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his own escape; that they ought to provide for their own safety.” At first the Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of the town which

they thought the strongest. And so violent a dispute arose between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms. However, in a little time, by messengers sent from one side to the other, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight, of which they were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent brought Domitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and sent deputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready to throw open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and deliver up Domitius alive into his hands."

Divulgato Domiti consilio milites, qui erant Corfinii, prima vesperi secessionem faciunt atque ita inter se per tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui generis colloquuntur: obsideri se a Caesare, opera munitionesque prope esse perfectas; ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium capere: debere se suae salutis rationem habere. Ab his primo Marsi dissentire incipiunt eamque oppidi partem, quae munitissima videretur, occupant, tantaque inter eos dissensio exsistit, ut manum conserere atque armis dimicare conentur; post paulo tamen internuntiis ultro citroque missis quae ignorabant, de L. Domiti fuga, cognoscunt. Itaque omnes uno consilio Domitium productum in publicum circumsistunt et custodiunt legatosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas aperire, quaeque imperaverit facere et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestati tradere.

1:21. Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it of great consequence to become master of the town as soon as possible, and to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should be wrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or

fictitious messages, because in war great events are often brought about by trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town should be plundered by the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent them back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He disposed his soldiers on the works which he had begun, not at certain intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of sentinels and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed a circle round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and general officers to ride round; and exhorted them not only to be on their guard against sallies from the town, but also to watch that no single person should get out privately. Nor was any man so negligent or drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was their expectation raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to different objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of another.

Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, etsi magni interesse arbitrabatur quam primum oppido potiri cohortesque ad se in castra traducere, ne qua aut largitionibus aut animi confirmatione aut falsis nuntiis commutatio fieret voluntatis, quod saepe in bello parvis momentis magni casus intercederent, tamen veritus, ne militum introitu et nocturni temporis licentia oppidum diriperetur, eos, qui venerant, collaudat atque in oppidum dimittit, portas murosque adservari iubet. Ipse eis operibus, quae facere instituerat, milites disponit non certis spatiis intermissis, ut erat superiorum dierum consuetudo, sed perpetuis vigiliis stationibusque, ut contingant inter se atque omnem munitionem expleant; tribunos militum et praefectos circummittit atque hortatur, non solum ab eruptionibus caveant, sed etiam

singulorum hominum occultos exitus adservent. Neque vero tam remisso ac languido animo quisquam omnium fuit, qui ea nocte conquieverit. Tanta erat summae rerum exspectatio, ut alius in aliam partem mente atque animo traheretur, quid ipsis Corfiniensibus, quid Domitio, quid Lentulo, quid reliquis accideret, qui quosque eventus exciperent.

1:22. About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels and guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview with Caesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he was escorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him till they brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for his life, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of their former friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favors to him were very great; in that through his interest he had been admitted into the college of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointed to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his suit for the consulate. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told him, "that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], but to protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their dignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by a few factious men. Encouraged by this address, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that the security which he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement to the rest to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they were induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave being granted him, he departed.

Quarta vigilia circiter Lentulus Spinther de muro cum vigiliis custodibusque nostris colloquitur; velle, si sibi fiat potestas, Caesarem convenire. Facta potestate ex oppido mittitur, neque ab eo prius Domitiani milites discedunt, quam in conspectum Caesaris deducatur. Cum eo de salute sua agit, orat atque obsecrat, ut sibi parcat, veteremque amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se beneficia exponit; quae erant maxima: quod per eum in collegium pontificum venerat, quod provinciam Hispaniam ex praetura habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus erat sublevatus. Cuius orationem Caesar interpellat: se non maleficii causa ex provincia egressum, sed uti se a contumeliis inimicorum defenderet, ut tribunos plebis in ea re ex civitate expulsos in suam dignitatem restitueret, ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret. Cuius oratione confirmatus Lentulus, ut in oppidum reverti liceat, petit: quod de sua salute impetraverit, fore etiam reliquis ad suam spem solatio; adeo esse perterritos nonnullos, ut suae vitae durius consulere cogantur. Facta potestate discedit.

1:23. When day appeared, Caesar ordered all the senators and their children, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights to be brought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal towns. When they were brought before him he protected them from the insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that they had not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his very extraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty sesteria, which

Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the public treasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he gave them back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate with respect to the life of men than in money matters, though he knew that it was public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that day decamped and performed the regular march. He staid only seven days before Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of the Marrucinians, Frentanian's and Larinates.

Caesar, ubi luxit, omnes senatores senatorumque liberos, tribunos militum equitesque Romanos ad se produci iubet. Erant quinquaginta; ordinis senatorii L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinter, L. Caecilius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus quaestor, L. Rubrius; praeterea filius Domiti alique complures adulescentes et magnus numerus equitum Romanorum et decurionum, quos ex municipiis Domitius evocaverat. Hos omnes productos a contumeliis militum conviciisque prohibet; pauca apud eos loquitur, [queritur] quod sibi a parte eorum gratia relata non sit pro suis in eos maximis beneficiis; dimittit omnes incolumes. HS

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, quod advexerat Domitius atque in publico deposuerat, allatum ad se ab IIII viris Corfiniensibus Domitio reddit, ne continentior in vita hominum quam in pecunia fuisse videatur, etsi eam pecuniam publicam esse constabat datamque a Pompeio in stipendium. Milites Domitianos sacramentum apud se dicere iubet atque eo die castra movet iustumque iter conficit VII omnino dies ad Corfinium commoratus, et per fines Marrucinatorum, Frentanorum, Larinatum in Apuliam pervenit.

1:24. Pompey, being informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marches from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundisium. He orders all the forces raised every where by the new levies to repair to him. He gives arms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for them. Of these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, the praetor, fled from Alba, with six cohorts: Rutilus, Lupus, the praetor, from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at a distance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the praetor, carried their colors to Curius and went over to him. In like manner, during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with the main body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, from Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and brought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As hitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march to him at Brundisium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and general safety that he should have an interview with Pompey; and that the same advantage could not be gained at a great distance when the proposals were conveyed to them by others, as if terms were argued by them both in person."

Pompeius his rebus cognitis, quae erant ad Corfinium gestae, Luceria proficiscitur Canusium atque inde Brundisium. Copias undique omnes ex novis dilectibus ad se cogi iubet; servos, pastores armat atque eis equos attribuit; ex his circiter CCC equites conficit. L. Manlius praetor Alba cum cohortibus sex profugit, Rutilius Lupus praetor Tarracina cum tribus; quae procul equitatum Caesaris conspicatae, cui praeerat Vibius Curius, relicto praetore signa ad Curium transferunt atque ad eum transeunt. Item reliquis itineribus nonnullae cohortes in agmen Caesaris, aliae in equites incidunt.

Reducitur ad eum depensus ex itinere N. Magius Cremona, praefectus fabrum Cn. Pompei. Quem Caesar ad eum remittit cum mandatis: quoniam ad id tempus facultas colloquendi non fuerit, atque ipse Brundisium sit venturus, interesse rei publicae et communis salutis se cum Pompeio colloqui; neque vero idem profici longo itineris spatio, cum per alios condiciones ferantur, ac si coram de omnibus condicionibus disceptetur.

1:25. Having delivered this message he marched to Brundisium with six legions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had raised in the late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all Domitius's cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army, and that Pompey remained at Brundisium with twenty cohorts; but could not find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey staid behind to keep possession of Brundisium, that he might the more easily command the whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy and the coast of Greece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of it, or whether he remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, he determined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by the harbor of Brundisium. The plan of his work was as follows: Where the mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on either side, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so far that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixed double floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These he fastened with four anchors at the four corners, that they might not be carried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them, he then joined to them other floats of equal size.

These he covered over with earth and mold, that he might not be prevented from access to them to defend them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with a parapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, two stories high, to secure them the better from being attacked by the shipping and set on fire.

His datis mandatis Brundisium cum legionibus VI pervenit, veteranis III et reliquis, quas ex novo dilectu confecerat atque in itinere compleverat; Domitianas enim cohortes protinus a Corfinio in Siciliam miserat. Reperit consules Dyrrachium profectos cum magna parte exercitus, Pompeium remanere Brundisii cum cohortibus viginti; neque certum inveniri poterat, obtinendine Brundisii causa ibi remansisset, quo facilius omne Hadriaticum mare ex ultimis Italiae partibus regionibusque Graeciae in potestate haberet atque ex utraque parte bellum administrare posset, an inopia navium ibi restitisset, veritusque ne ille Italiam dimittendam non existimaret, exitus administrationesque Brundisini portus impedire instituit. Quorum operum haec erat ratio. Qua fauces erant angustissimae portus, moles atque aggerem ab utraque parte litoris iaciebat, quod his locis erat vadosum mare. Longius progressus, cum agger altiore aqua contineri non posset, rates duplices quoquo versus pedum XXX e regione molis collocabat. Has quaternis ancoris ex IIII angulis destinabat, ne fluctibus moverentur. His perfectis collocatisque alias deinceps pari magnitudine rates iungebat. Has terra atque aggere integebat, ne aditus atque incursus ad defendendum impediretur. A fronte atque ab utroque latere cratibus ac pluteis protegebat; in quarta quaque earum turres binorum tabulatorum excitabat, quo commodius ab impetu navium incendiisque defenderet.

1:26. To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships,

which he found in the harbor of Brundisium: on them he erected turrets three stories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and all sorts of weapons, drove them among Caesar's works, to break through the floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes every day at a distance with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesar conducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yet to be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; and though his attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous prosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means to persevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius Rebilus to have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend and relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but, above all things, requires that he should be admitted to an interview with Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowed him, that the consequence would be that both parties would lay down their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory and reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice and agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the conference with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns with answer that, as the consuls were absent, no treaty of composition could be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore thought it time at length to give over the attempt which he had often made in vain, and act with energy in the war.

Contra haec Pompeius naves magnas onerarias, quas in portu Brundisino deprehenderat, adornabat. Ibi tures cum ternis tabulatis erigebat easque multis tormentis et omni genere telorum completas ad opera Caesaris adpellebat, ut rates perrumperet atque opera

disturbaret. Sic cotidie utrimque eminus fundis, sagittis reliquisque telis pugnabatur. Atque haec Caesar ita administrabat, ut condiciones pacis dimittendas non existimaret; ac tametsi magnopere admirabatur Magium, quem ad Pompeium cum mandatis miserat, ad se non remitti, atque ea res saepe temptata etsi impetus eius consiliaque tardabat, tamen omnibus rebus in eo perseverandum putabat. Itaque Caninium Rebilum legatum, familiarem necessariumque Scriboni Libonis, mittit ad eum colloquii causa; mandat, ut Libonem de concilianda pace hortetur; imprimis, ut ipse cum Pompeio colloqueretur, postulat; magnopere sese confidere demonstrat, si eius rei sit potestas facta, fore, ut aequis condicionibus ab armis discedatur. Cuius rei magnam partem laudis atque existimationis ad Libonem perventuram, si illo auctore atque agente ab armis sit discessum. Libo a colloquio Canini digressus ad Pompeium proficiscitur. Paulo post renuntiat, quod consules absint, sine illis non posse agi de compositione. Ita saepius rem frustra temptatam Caesar aliquando dimittendam sibi iudicat et de bello agendum.

1:27. When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and after nine days were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first division of the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned to Brundisium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determined from the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure on the arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar's attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town at the moment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across the streets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground by means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastened in the ground and sharpened at the ends

two passages and roads without the walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, he ordered his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here and there, on the wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers and slingers. These he designed to call off by a certain signal, when all the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for them in a secure place.

Prope dimidia parte operis a Caesare effecta diebusque in ea re consumptis VIII naves a consulibus Dyrrachio remissae, quae priorem partem exercitus eo deportaverant, Brundisium revertuntur. Pompeius sive operibus Caesaris permotus sive etiam quod ab initio Italia excedere constituerat, adventu navium profectionem parare incipit et, quo facilius impetum Caesaris tardaret, ne sub ipsa profectione milites oppidum irrumperent, portas obstruit, vicos plateasque inaedificat, fossas transversas viis praeducit atque ibi sudes stipitesque praeacutos defigit. Haec levibus cratibus terraque inaequat; aditus autem atque itinera duo, quae extra murum ad portum ferebant, maximis defixis trabibus atque eis praeacutis praesequit. His paratis rebus milites silentio naves conscendere iubet, expeditos autem ex evocatis, sagittariis funditoribusque raros in muro turribusque disponit. Hos certo signo revocare constituit, cum omnes milites naves conscendissent, atque eis expedito loco actuaria navigia relinquit.

1:28. The people of Brundisium, irritated by the insolence of Pompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were in favor of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware of Pompey's departure, while his men were running up and down, and busied about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar, being apprised of the design by them, ordered

scaling-ladders to be got ready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any opportunity of coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldiers who had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by the signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to the ships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: but being cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and covered trenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants by a long circuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats and small craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struck against Caesar's moles.

Brundisini Pompeianorum militum iniuriis atque ipsius Pompei contumeliis permoti Caesaris rebus favebant. Itaque cognita Pompei profectione concursantibus illis atque in ea re occupatis vulgo ex tectis significabant. Per quos re cognita Caesar scalas parari militesque armari iubet, ne quam rei gerendae facultatem dimittat. Pompeius sub noctem naves solvit. Qui erant in muro custodiae causa collocati, eo signo, quod convenerat, revocantur notisque itineribus ad naves decurrunt. Milites positis scalis muros ascendunt, sed moniti a Brundisinis, ut vallum caecum fossasque caveant, subsistunt et longo itinere ab his circumducti ad portum perveniunt duasque naves cum militibus, quae ad moles Caesaris adhaeserant, scaphis lintribusque reprehendunt, reprehensas excipiunt.

1:29. Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossing the sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to a conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary to effect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his ships,

had deprived him of the means of pursuing him at present. The only resource left to Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of Gaul, Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the season of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwilling that, in the mean time, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one of which was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be confirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should be provided, and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence.

Caesar etsi ad spem conficiendi negotii maxime probabat coactis navibus mare transire et Pompeium sequi, priusquam ille sese transmarinis auxiliis confirmaret, tamen eius rei moram temporisque longinquitatem timebat, quod omnibus coactis navibus Pompeius praesentem facultatem insequendi sui ademerat. Relinquebatur, ut ex longinquioribus regionibus Galliae Picenique et a freto naves essent exspectandae. Id propter anni tempus longum atque impeditum videbatur. Interea veterem exercitum, duas Hispanias confirmari, quarum erat altera maximis beneficiis Pompei devincta, auxilia, equitatum parari, Galliam Italiamque temptari se absente nolebat.

1:30. Therefore, for the present he relinquished all intention of pursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded the magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have them convoyed to Brundisium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with one legion to Sardinia; Curio, the propraetor, to Sicily with three legions; and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately transport his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of Sardinia: Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had the government of Africa. The Caralitani,

as soon as they heard that Valerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their own accord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he understood that the whole province was combined [against him], fled from Sardinia to Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, and demanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed with great zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani and Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horse and foot from the states of Sicily. When these things were nearly completed, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint that he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken an unnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when questioned by him and other members in the senate, had assured them that every thing was ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaints in a public assembly, he fled from his province.

Itaque in praesentia Pompei sequendi rationem omittit, in Hispaniam proficisci constituit: duumviris municipiorum omnium imperat, ut naves conquirant Brundisiumque deducendas curent. Mittit in Sardiniam cum legione una Valerium legatum, in Siciliam Curionem pro praetore cum legionibus duabus; eundem, cum Siciliam recepisset, protinus in Africam traducere exercitum iubet. Sardiniam obtinebat M. Cotta, Siciliam M. Cato; Africam sorte Tubero obtinere debebat. Caralitani, simul ad se Valerium mitti audierunt, nondum profecto ex Italia sua sponte Cottam ex oppido eiciunt. Ille perterritus, quod omnem provinciam consentire intellegebat, ex Sardinia in Africam profugit. Cato in Sicilia naves longas veteres reficiebat, novas civitatibus imperabat. Haec magno studio agebat. In Lucanis Brutiisque per legatos suos civium Romanorum delectus

habebat, equitum peditumque certum numerum a civitatibus Siciliae exigebat. Quibus rebus paene perfectis adventu Curionis cognito queritur in contione sese proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio, qui omnibus rebus imparatissimis non necessarium bellum suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset. Haec in contione questus ex provincia fugit.

1:31. Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their governors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of the province, who, having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightway fled to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of his own accord, and making levies, had raised two legions. From his acquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge of that province, he found the means of effecting this; because a few years before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained that province. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his entering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though laboring under sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor and quit the place.

Nacti vacuas ab imperiis Sardiniam Valerius, Curio Siciliam, cum exercitibus eo perveniunt. Tubero cum in Africam venisset, invenit in provincia cum imperio Attium Varum; qui ad Auximum, ut supra demonstravimus, amissis cohortibus protinus ex fuga in Africam pervenerat atque eam sua sponte vacuam occupaverat delectuque habito duas legiones effecerat, hominum et locorum notitia et usu eius provinciae nactus aditus ad ea conanda, quod paucis ante annis ex praetura eam provinciam obtinuerat. Hic venientem Uticam

navibus Tuberone portu atque oppido prohibet neque adfectum valetudine filium exponere in terra patitur, sed sublatis ancoris excedere eo loco cogit.

1:32. When these affairs were dispatched, Caesar, that there might be an intermission from labor for the rest of the season, drew off his soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome. Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of his enemies; and told them, "That he aimed at no extraordinary honor, but had waited for the time appointed by law, for standing candidate for the consulate, being contented with what was allowed to every citizen. That a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people (notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a very violent opposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by a tedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though absent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapproved of the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, why should he debar him [Caesar] from the people's favor? He made mention of his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all armies should be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both of dignity and honor. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refused to comply with what they required from others, and had rather that all things should be thrown into confusion, than that they should lose their power and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking away his legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges of the tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an interview which had been refused him. For which reasons, he begged and desired that they would undertake the management of the republic, and unite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear they declined it, he

would not be a burden to them, but take the management of it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted in the senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in those persons to whom ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that sent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for his part, as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so he was desirous of excelling them in justice and equity.”

His rebus confectis Caesar, ut reliquum tempus a labore intermitteretur, milites in proxima municipia deducit; ipse ad urbem proficiscitur. Coacto senatu iniurias inimicorum commemorat. Docet se nullum extraordinarium honorem appetisse, sed exspectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo fuisse contentum, quod omnibus civibus pateret. Latum ab X tribunis plebis contradicentibus inimicis, Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina consuetudine dicendi mora dies extrahente, ut sui ratio absentis haberetur, ipso consule Pompeio ; qui si improbasset, cur ferri passus esset? Si probasset, cur se uti populi beneficio prohibuisset? Patientiam proponit suam, cum de exercitibus dimittendis ultro postulavisset; in quo iacturam dignitatis atque honoris ipse facturus esset. Acerbitatem inimicorum docet, qui, quod ab altero postularent, in se recusarent, atque omnia permisceri mallent, quam imperium exercitusque dimittere. Iniuriam in eripiendis legionibus praedicat, crudelitatem et insolentiam in circumscribendis tribunis plebis; condiciones a se latas, expetita colloquia et denegata commemorat. Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat, ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum administrent. Sin timore defugiant, illis se oneri non futurum et per se rem publicam administraturum. Legatos ad Pompeium de compositione mitti oportere, neque se reformidare, quod in senatu Pompeius paulo

ante dixisset, ad quos legati mitterentur, his auctoritatem attribui timoremque eorum, qui mitterent significari. Tenuis atque infirmi haec animi videri. Se vero, ut operibus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate velle superare.

1:33. The senate approved of sending deputies, but none could be found fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his own private fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, had declared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree of estimation, those who staid in Rome and those in Caesar's camp. Thus three days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, Lucius Metellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, to prevent this, and to embarrass every thing else which Caesar should propose. Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending several days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he had intended.

Probat rem senatus de mittendis legatis: sed, qui mitterentur, non reperiebantur, maximeque timoris causa pro se quisque id munus legationis recusabat. Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco, qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent. Sic triduum disputationibus excusationibusque extrahitur. Subicitur etiam L. Metellus, tribunus plebis, ab inimicis Caesaris, qui hanc rem distrahat, reliquasque res, quascumque agere instituerit, impediatur. Cuius cognito consilio Caesar frustra diebus aliquot consumptis, ne reliquum tempus amittat, infectis eis, quae agere destinaverat, ab urbe proficiscitur atque in ulteriorem Galliam pervenit.

1:34. On his arrival there, he was informed that Vibullius Rufus,

whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty, was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seize Massilia with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some private persons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noble men of Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome had exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from their minds the memory of his former favors. On receiving this message, the Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to them the Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and who inhabited the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise conveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and from all the forts into the city; had opened armories in the city; and were repairing the walls, the fleet, and the gates.

Quo cum venisset, cognoscit missum a Pompeio Vibullium Rufum, quem paucis ante diebus Corfinio captum ipse dimiserat; profectum item Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis septem, quas Igilii et in Cosano a privatis coactas servis, libertis, colonis suis compleverat; praemissos etiam legatos Massilienses domum, nobiles adulescentes, quos ab urbe discedens Pompeius erat adhortatus, ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent. Quibus mandatis acceptis Massilienses portas Caesari clausuerant; Albicos, barbaros homines, qui in eorum fide antiquitus erant montesque supra Massiliam incolebant, ad se vocaverant; frumentum ex finitimis regionibus atque ex omnibus castellis in urbem convexerant; armorum officinas in urbe instituerant; muros portas classem reficiebant.

1:35. Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia to attend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates [in the following language]; “that they ought to follow the precedent set by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man.” He made use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them to reason. The deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by the authority of the state bring him back this answer: “That they understood that the Roman people was divided into two factions: that they had neither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause; but that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar, the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to their state the lands of the Vocae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter had assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented their revenue. Wherefore, having received equal favors from both, they ought to show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other, nor admit either into their city or harbors.”

Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos; cum his agit, ne initium inferendi belli a Massiliensibus oriatur: debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. Reliqua, quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur, commemorat. Cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec Caesari renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum Romanum in partes duas; neque sui iudicii neque suarum esse virium discernere, utra pars iustiore habeat causam. Principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem patronos civitatis; quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice iis concesserit, alter bello victos Sallyas attribuerit vectigaliaque auxerit. Quare paribus eorum beneficiis parem se

quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare aut urbe aut portibus recipere.

1:36. While this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived at Massilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and made governor of it. The chief management of the war was intrusted to him. At his command they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbor; they apply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished to rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, all the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of their lading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event take place. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vineae to assault the town, and to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed and rigged in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down), and being brought to Massilia, he put under the command of Decimus Brutus; and left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city.

Haec dum inter eos aguntur, Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit atque ab eis receptus urbi praeficitur; summa ei belli administrandi permittitur. Eius imperio classem quoquo versus dimittunt; onerarias naves, quas ubique possunt, deprehendunt atque in portum deducunt, parum clavis aut materia atque armamentis instructis ad reliquas armandas reficiendasque utuntur; frumenti quod inventum est, in publicum conferunt; reliquas merces commeatusque ad obsidionem urbis, si accidat, reservant. Quibus iniuriis permotus Caesar legiones tres Massiliam adducit; turres vineasque ad oppugnationem urbis agere, naves longas Arelate numero XII facere instituit. Quibus

effectis armatisque diebus XXX, a qua die materia caesa est, adductisque Massiliam his D. Brutum praeficit, C. Trebonium legatum ad oppugnationem Massiliae relinquit.

1:37. While he was preparing and getting these things in readiness, he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three legions, which he had disposed to winter quarters in Narbo, and the neighboring country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes of the Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by detachments from Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey's lieutenants. He desired the other legions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to follow close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition, dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up with the army of Afranius.

Dum haec parat atque administrat, C. Fabium legatum cum legionibus III, quas Narbone circumque ea loca hiemandi causa disposuerat, in Hispaniam praemittit celeriterque saltus Pyrenaeos occupari iubet, qui eo tempore ab L. Afranio legato praesidiis tenebantur. Reliquas legiones, quae longius hiemabant, subsequi iubet. Fabius, ut erat imperatum, adhibita celeritate praesidium ex saltu deiecit magnisque itineribus ad exercitum Afrani contendit.

1:38. On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have already mentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with three legions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to the river Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana to the country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number of legions) divided among themselves their respective departments. Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the

Vettones, and join Afranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain with what legions he had. These matters being settled, reinforcements of horse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from the Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on the ocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched through the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent to carry on the war in the vicinity of Herba, on account of the advantages of its situation.

Adventu L.Vibulli Rufi, quem a Pompeio missum in Hispaniam demonstratum est, Afranius et Petreius et Varro, legati Pompei, quorum unus Hispaniam citeriorem tribus legionibus, alter ulteriorem a saltu Castulonensi ad Anam duabus legionibus, tertius ab Ana Vettonum agrum Lusitaniamque pari numero legionum optinebat, officia inter se partiuntur, uti Petreius ex Lusitania per Vettones cum omnibus copiis ad Afranium proficiscatur, Varro cum eis, quas habebat, legionibus omnem ulteriorem Hispaniam tueatur. His rebus constitutis equites auxiliaque toti Lusitaniae a Petreio, Celtiberiae, Cantabris barbarisque omnibus, qui ad Oceanum pertinent, ab Afranio imperantur. Quibus coactis celeriter Petreius per Vettones ad Afranium pervenit, constituuntque communi consilio bellum ad Ilerdam propter ipsius opportunitatem gerere.

1:39. Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two. There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and Further Spain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province had shields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horse raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, with about six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which had served under him in all his former wars, and the same number

from Gaul, which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the most noble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from the Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. He had been informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with his legions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowed money from the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed among his soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured the interest of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by his liberality he purchased the affections of his army.

Erant, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones Afranii tres, Petreii duae, praeterea scutatae citerioris provinciae et caetratae ulterioris Hispaniae cohortes circiter LXXX equitumque utriusque provinciae circiter V milia. Caesar legiones in Hispaniam praemiserat VI, auxilia peditum V milia, equitum III milia, quae omnibus superioribus bellis habuerat, et parem ex Gallia numerum, quam ipse pacaverat, nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo et fortissimo quoque evocato, huc optimi generis hominum ex Aquitanis montanisque, qui Galliam provinciam attingunt addiderat. Audierat Pompeium per Mauretaniam cum legionibus iter in Hispaniam facere confestimque esse venturum. Simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit; has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit.

1:40. Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighboring states by letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre, at the distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging parties over these bridges, because he had already consumed all the

forage that was on his side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almost the same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse had frequent skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as was their constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to the foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horse were following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and the mass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from the main army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber and hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediately crossed his own bridge, which communicated between his camp and the town, with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched against Fabius's two legions. When his approach was announced, Lucius Plancus, who had the command of those legions, compelled by the emergency, took post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts, that it might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the horse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a distance by both sides the colors of two legions, which Caius Fabius had sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting, as the event verified, that the enemy's generals would take advantage of the opportunity which fortune had put in their way, to attack our men. Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general led back his legions to their respective camps.

Fabius finitimarum civitatum animos litteris nuntiisque temptabat. In Sicori flumine pontes effecerat duos distantes inter se milia passuum IIII. His pontibus pabulatum mittebat, quod ea quae citra flumen fuerant, superioribus diebus consumpserat. Hoc idem fere atque eadem de causa Pompeiani exercitus duces faciebant, crebroque inter

se equestribus proeliis contendebant. Huc cum cotidiana consuetudine congressae pabulatoribus praesidio propiore ponte legiones Fabianae duae flumen transissent, impedimentaue et omnis equitatus sequeretur, subito vi ventorum et aquae magnitudine pons est interruptus et reliqua multitudo equitum interclusa. Quo cognito a Petreio et Afranio ex aggere atque cratibus, quae flumine ferebantur, celeriter suo ponte Afranius, quem oppido castrisque coniunctum habebat, legiones IIII equitatumque omnem traiecit duabusque Fabianis occurrit legionibus. Cuius adventu nuntiato L. Plancus, qui legionibus praeerat, necessaria re coactus locum capit superiorem diversamque aciem in duas partes constituit, ne ab equitatu circumveniri posset. Ita congressus impari numero magnos impetus legionum equitatusque sustinet. Commisso ab equitibus proelio signa legionum duarum procul ab utrisque conspiciuntur, quas C. Fabius ulteriore ponte subsidio nostris miserat suspicatus fore id, quod accidit, ut duces adversariorum occasione et beneficio fortunae ad nostros opprimendos uterentur. Quarum adventu proelium dirimitur, ac suas uterque legiones reducit in castra.

1:41. In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse, which he had retained for a body guard. The bridge which had been broken down by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finished in the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he left behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all his baggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda, with all his forces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp of Afranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offered him battle on equal terms. When this affair was made, Afranius drew out his forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. When Caesar perceived that Afranius declined

coming to an engagement, he resolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance from the very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers while engaged in their works, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, or disturbed in their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall, which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the front opposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first and second lines confined under arms, as was from the first appointed. Behind them the third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that the whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was being fortified.

Eo biduo Caesar cum equitibus DCCCC, quos sibi praesidio reliquerat, in castra pervenit. Pons, qui fuerat tempestate interruptus, paene erat reffectus; hunc noctu perfici iussit. Ipse cognita locorum natura ponti castrisque praesidio sex cohortes reliquit atque omnia impedimenta et postero die omnibus copiis triplici instructa acie ad Ilerdam proficiscitur et sub castris Afranii constitit et ibi paulisper sub armis moratus facit aequo loco pugnandi potestatem. Potestate facta Afranius copias educit et in medio colle sub castris constituit. Caesar, ubi cognovit per Afranium stare, quo minus proelio dimicaretur, ab infimis radicibus montis intermissis circiter passibus CCCC castra facere constituit et, ne in opere faciundo milites repentino hostium incursu exterrerentur atque opere prohiberentur, vallo muniri vetuit, quod eminere et procul videri necesse erat, sed a fronte contra hostem pedum XV fossam fieri iussit. Prima et secunda acies in armis, ut ab initio constituta erat, permanebat; post has opus in occulto a III acie fiebat. Sic omne prius est perfectum, quam intellexeretur ab Afranio castra muniri. Sub vesperum Caesar intra hanc fossam legiones reducit atque ibi sub armis proxima nocte

conquiescit.

1:42. In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this trench, and rested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept his whole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from a considerable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in his work; and to each legion, one after the other, he assigned one side of the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to be cut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage to oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the work, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, and challenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work, relying on the protection of the three legions, and the strength of the fosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great distance from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp. The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered the other cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to be removed to it.

Postero die omnem exercitum intra fossam continet et, quod longius erat agger petendus, in praesentia similem rationem operis instituit singulaque latera castrorum singulis attribuit legionibus munienda fossasque ad eandem magnitudinem perfici iubet; reliquas legiones in armis expeditas contra hostem constituit. Afranius Petreiusque terrendi causa atque operis impediendi copias suas ad infimas montis radices producunt et proelio lacesunt, neque idcirco Caesar opus intermittit confisus praesidio legionum trium et munitione fossae. Illi non diu commorati nec longius ab infimo colle progressi copias in castra reducunt. Tertio die Caesar vallo castra communit; reliquas cohortes, quas in superioribus castris reliquerat, impedimenta ad

se traduci iubet.

1:43. Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afranius and Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred paces broad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above the level: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortify it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge, and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation of this he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army in an advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion to hasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the cohorts which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent a nearer way to occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and as Afranius's men had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed, and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn their backs and retreat to the standards of legions.

Erat inter oppidum Ilerdam et proximum collem, ubi castra Petreius atque Afranius habebant, planities circiter passuum CCC, atque in hoc fere medio spatio tumulus erat paulo editior; quem si occupavisset Caesar et communisset, ab oppido et ponte et commeatu omni, quem in oppidum contulerant, se interclusurum adversarios confidebat. Hoc sperans legiones III ex castris educit acieque in locis idoneis instructa unius legionis antesignanos procurrere atque eum tumulum occupare iubet. Qua re cognita celeriter quae in statione pro castris erant Afranii cohortes breviori itinere ad eundem occupandum locum mittuntur. Contenditur proelio, et quod prius in tumulum Afraniani venerant, nostri repelluntur atque aliis submissis subsidiis terga vertere seque ad

signa legionum recipere coguntur.

1:44. The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed they thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed to this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced by the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time. This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such a description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not to quit their colors, nor, without good reason to give up the post which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but retreated to the next hill.

Genus erat pugnae militum illorum, ut magno impetu primo procurrerent, audacter locum caperent, ordines suos non magnopere servarent, rari dispersique pugnarent; si premerentur, pedem referre et loco excedere non turpe existimarent cum Lusitanis reliquisque barbaris barbaro genere quodam pugnae assuefacti; quod fere fit, quibus quisque in locis miles inveteraverit, ut multum earum regionum consuetudine moveatur. Haec tum ratio nostros perturbavit insuetos huius generis pugnae: circumiri enim sese ab aperto latere procurrentibus singulis arbitrabantur; ipsi autem suos ordines servare neque ab signis discedere neque sine gravi causa eum locum, quem ceperant, dimitti censuerant oportere. Itaque perturbatis antesignanis

legio, quae in eo cornu constiterat, locum non tenuit atque in proximum collem sese recepit.

1:45. Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because it had occurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged his men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked the insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in their turn, to show their backs, and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous to repair the dishonor which had been sustained, having rashly pursued the fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to the foot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when they wished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising ground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and was so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle, would fill it; but no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horse could be of no service to them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed, the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for near four hundred paces. Our men had to retreat this way, as they had, through their eagerness, advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this place, which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of its narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, so that no weapon was thrown at them without effect; yet they exerted their valor and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were increasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the camp through the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar was obliged to do the same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to that post.

Caesar paene omni acie perterrita, quod praeter opinionem consuetudinemque acciderat, cohortatus suos legionem nonam subsidio ducit; hostem insolenter atque acriter nostros insequentem supprimit rursusque terga vertere seque ad oppidum Ilerdam recipere et sub muro consistere cogit. Sed nonae legionis milites elati studio, dum sarcire acceptum detrimentum volunt, temere insecuti longius fugientes in locum iniquum progrediuntur et sub montem, in quo erat oppidum positum Ilerda, succedunt. Hinc se recipere cum vellent, rursus illi ex loco superiore nostros premebant. Praeruptus locus erat utraque ex parte directus ac tantum in latitudinem patebat, ut tres instructae cohortes eum locum explerent, ut neque subsidia ab lateribus submitti neque equites laborantibus usui esse possent. Ab oppido autem declivis locus tenui fastigio vergebat in longitudinem passuum circiter CCCC. Hac nostris erat receptus, quod eo incitati studio inconsultius processerant; hoc pugnabatur loco, et propter angustias iniquo et quod sub ipsis radicibus montis constiterant, ut nullum frustra telum in eos mitteretur. Tamen virtute et patientia nitebantur atque omnia vulnera sustinebant. Augebatur illis copia, atque ex castris cohortes per oppidum crebro submittebantur, ut integri defessis succederent. Hoc idem Caesar facere cogeatur, ut submissis in eundem locum cohortibus defessos reciperet.

1:46. After the battle had in this manner continued incessantly for five hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers, having spent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemy up the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. The cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by their fears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. Our cavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or low ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, riding

between the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such were the various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter about seventy of our men fell: among them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion of the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary valor, had been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About six hundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party there were killed Titus Caecilius, principal centurion, and four other centurions, and above two hundred men.

Hoc cum esset modo pugnatum continenter horis quinque nostrique gravius a multitudine premerentur, consumptis omnibus telis gladiis destrictis impetum adversus montem in cohortes faciunt, paucisque deiectis reliquos sese convertere cogunt. Submotis sub murum cohortibus ac nonnullam partem propter terrorem in oppidum compulsis facilis est nostris receptus datus. Equitatus autem noster ab utroque latere, etsi deiectis atque inferioribus locis constiterat, tamen summa in iugum virtute connititur atque inter duas acies perequitans commodiorem ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat. Ita vario certamine pugnatum est. Nostri in primo congressu circiter LXX ceciderunt, in his Q. Fulgenius ex primo hastato legionis XIII, qui propter eximiam virtutem ex inferioribus ordinibus in eum locum pervenerat; vulnerantur amplius DC. Ex Afranianis interficiuntur T. Caecilius, primi pili centurio, et praeter eum centuriones IIII, milites amplius CC.

1:47. But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this day, that each party thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers, because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yet they had stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, had kept the post on the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute;

and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours, because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and the disparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, had advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly from the higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the hill, about which the contest had been, with strong works and posted a garrison on it.

Sed haec eius diei praefertur opinio, ut se utrique superiores discessisse existimarent: Afraniani, quod, cum esse omnium iudicio inferiores viderentur, comminus tam diu stetissent et nostrorum impetum sustinuissent et initio locum tumulumque tenuissent, quae causa pugnandi fuerat, et nostros primo congressu terga vertere coegissent; nostri autem, quod iniquo loco atque impari congressi numero quinque horis proelium sustinuissent, quod montem gladiis destrictis ascendissent, quod ex loco superiore terga vertere adversarios coegissent atque in oppidum compulissent. Illi eum tumulum, pro quo pugnatum est, magnis operibus munierunt praesidiumque ibi posuerunt.

1:48. In two days after this transaction, there happened an unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed that there were never seen higher floods in those countries; it swept down the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the banks of the river, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius had built—a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army. For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers, the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for the space of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within these narrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar's

cause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could the convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp. Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year, when there was no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states were exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, before Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had been already consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a secondary resource against want, had been removed by the states to a great distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to get forage or corn, were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, and the targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well acquainted with the country, and could readily swim across the river, because it is the custom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders.

Accidit etiam repentinum incommodum biduo, quo haec gesta sunt. Tanta enim tempestas cooritur, ut numquam illis locis maiores aquas fuisse constaret. Tum autem ex omnibus montibus nives proluit ac summas ripas fluminis superavit pontesque ambo, quos C. Fabius fecerat, uno die interrupit. Quae res magnas difficultates exercitui Caesaris attulit. Castra enim, ut supra demonstratum est, cum essent inter flumina duo, Sicorim et Cingam, spatio milium XXX, neutrum horum transiri poterat, necessarioque omnes his angustiis continebantur. Neque civitates, quae ad Caesaris amicitiam accesserant, frumentum supportare, neque ei, qui pabulatum longius progressi erant, interclusi fluminibus reverti neque maximi commeatus, qui ex Italia Galliaque veniebant, in castra pervenire poterant. Tempus erat autem difficillimum, quo neque frumenta in hibernis erant neque multum a maturitate aberant; ac civitates

exinanitae, quod Afranius paene omne frumentum ante Caesaris adventum Ilerdam convexerat, reliqui si quid fuerat, Caesar superioribus diebus consumpserat; pecora, quod secundum poterat esse inopiae subsidium, propter bellum finitimae civitates longius removerant. Qui erant pabulandi aut frumentandi causa progressi, hos levis armaturae Lusitani peritique earum regionum cetrati citerioris Hispaniae consecabantur; quibus erat proclive tranare flumen, quod consuetudo eorum omnium est, ut sine utribus ad exercitum non eant.

1:49. But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a great stock of corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity was coming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. The bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these without any danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had no access, were as yet untouched.

At exercitus Afranii omnium rerum abundabat copia. Multum erat frumentum provisum et convectum superioribus temporibus, multum ex omni provincia comportabatur; magna copia pabuli suppetebat. Harum omnium rerum facultates sine ullo periculo pons Ilerdae praebebat et loca trans flumen integra, quo omnino Caesar adire non poterat.

1:50. Those floods continued several days. Caesar endeavored to repair the bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him: and the cohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed; and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the river and the height of the water, but especially because their darts were thrown from the whole course of the bank on one confined spot; and it was no easy matter at one and the same time to

execute a work in a very rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.

Hae permanserunt aquae dies complures. Conatus est Caesar reficere pontes; sed nec magnitudo fluminis permittebat, neque ad ripam dispositae cohortes adversariorum perfici patiebantur. Quod illis prohibere erat facile cum ipsius fluminis natura atque aquae magnitudine, tum quod ex totis ripis in unum atque angustum locum tela iaciebantur; atque erat difficile eodem tempore rapidissimo flumine opera perficere et tela vitare.

1:51. Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great convoys, which were on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage, according to the Gallic custom of traveling, had arrived there; there were besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slaves and freed men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as every one followed his own humor, and all traveled without apprehension, taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several young noblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian rank; there were ambassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. The river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out in the beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horse soon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few, they withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought on equal terms; but when the legions began to approach, having lost a few men, they retreated to the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this battle was of great importance to the security of our men; for having gained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were missing that day

about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable number of servants and baggage.

Nuntiatur Afranio magnos commeatus, qui iter habebant ad Caesarem, ad flumen constitisse. Venerant eo sagittarii ex Rutenis, equites ex Gallia cum multis carris magnisque impedimentis, ut fert Gallica consuetudo. Erant praeterea cuiusque generis hominum milia circiter VI cum servis liberisque; sed nullus ordo, nullum imperium certum, cum suo quisque consilio uteretur atque omnes sine timore iter facerent usi superiorum temporum atque itinerum licentia. Erant complures honesti adulescentes, senatorum filii et ordinis equestris; erant legationes civitatum; erant legati Caesaris. Hos omnes flumina continebant. Ad hos opprimendos cum omni equitatu tribusque legionibus Afranius de nocte proficiscitur imprudentesque ante missis equitibus aggreditur. Celeriter sese tamen Galli equites expediunt proeliumque committunt. Ei, dum pari certamine res geri potuit, magnum hostium numerum pauci sustinuerunt; sed ubi signa legionum appropinquare coeperunt, paucis amissis sese in proximos montes conferunt. Hoc pugnae tempus magnum attulit nostris ad salutem momentum; nacti enim spatium se in loca superiora receperunt. Desiderati sunt eo die sagittarii circiter CC, equites pauci, calonum atque impedimentorum non magnus numerus.

1:52. However, by all these things, the price of provisions was raised, which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of present scarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had now reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished the strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasing every day; and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and fortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle

with the want of every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of all things, and were considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded from those states which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, as they had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers to the more distant states, and endeavored to remedy the present scarcity by every resource in his power.

His tamen omnibus annona crevit; quae fere res non solum inopia praesentis, sed etiam futuri temporis timore ingravescere consuevit. Iamque ad denarios L in singulos modios annona pervenerat, et militum vires inopia frumenti deminuerat, atque incommoda in dies augebantur; et ita paucis diebus magna erat facta rerum commutatio ac se fortuna inclinaverat, ut nostri magna inopia necessariorum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur. Caesar eis civitatibus, quae ad eius amicitiam accesserant, quod minor erat frumenti copia, pecus imperabat; calones ad longinquoiores civitates dimittebat; ipse praesentem inopiam quibus poterat subsidiis tutabatur.

1:53. Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their acquaintances. Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to be almost at an end. When these letters and dispatches were received at Rome, a great concourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, and congratulations ran high; several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey; some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others, that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, and to have come last of all.

Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant; multa rumor affingebat, ut

paene bellum confectum videretur. Quibus litteris nuntiisque Romam perlatis magni domum concursus ad Afranium magnaeque gratulationes fiebant; multi ex Italia ad Cn. Pompeium proficiscebantur, alii, ut principes talem nuntium attulisse, alii ne eventum belli exspectasse aut ex omnibus novissimi venisse viderentur.

1:54. When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavorable position, and all the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and the bridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships of the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taught him. First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the rest of the hulk of the ships was wrought with wicker work, and covered over with hides. When these were finished, he drew them down to the river in wagons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and transported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden took possession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately fortified, before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterward transported a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it in two days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp, the convoys, and those who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for the provisions.

Cum in his angustiis res esset, atque omnes viae ab Afranianis militibus equitibusque obsiderentur, nec pontes perfici possent, imperat militibus Caesar, ut naves faciant, cuius generis eum superioribus annis usus Britanniae docuerat. Carinae ac prima statumina ex levi materia fiebant; reliquum corpus navium viminibus contextum coriis integebatur. Has perfectas carris iunctis devehit

noctu milia passuum a castris XXII militesque his navibus flumen transportat continentemque ripae collem improvise occupat. Hunc celeriter, priusquam ab adversariis sentiat, communit. Huc legionem postea traicit atque ex utraque parte pontem instituit, biduo perficit. Ita commeatus et qui frumenti causa processerant tuto ad se recipit et rem frumentariam expedire incipit.

1:55. The same day he made a great part of his horse pass the river, who, falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed without any suspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people; and when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy, our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one to protect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beat them back, and they cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort, which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and after putting it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to the camp over the same bridge.

Eodem die equitum magnam partem flumen traiecit. Qui inopinantes pabulatores et sine ullo dissipatos timore aggressi magnum numerum iumentorum atque hominum intercipiunt cohortibusque cetratis subsidio missis scienter in duas partes sese distribuunt, alii ut praedae praesidio sint, alii ut venientibus resistent atque eos propellant, unamque cohortem, quae temere ante ceteras extra aciem procurrebat, seclusam ab reliquis circumveniunt atque interficiunt incolumesque cum magna praeda eodem ponte in castra revertuntur.

1:56. While these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians, adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, of which eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels, that our fleet might be terrified by numbers; they man them with a

great number of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been already made, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required certain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists and shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thus furnished with every necessary, he advanced with great confidence against our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at an island opposite to Massilia.

Dum haec ad Ilerdam geruntur, Massilienses usi L. Domitii consilio naves longas expediunt numero XVII, quarum erant XI tectae. Multa huc minora navigia addunt, ut ipsa multitudine nostra classis terreatur. Magnum numerum sagittariorum, magnum Albicorum, de quibus supra demonstratum est, imponunt atque hos praemiis pollicitationibusque incitant. Certas sibi deposcit naves Domitius atque has colonis pastoribusque, quos secum adduxerat, complet. Sic omnibus rebus instructa classe magna fiducia ad nostras naves procedunt, quibus praeerat D. Brutus. Hae ad insulam, quae est contra Massiliam, stationes obtinebant.

1:57. Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but Caesar had appointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions, antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in that service. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thus prepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out from the harbor, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with great courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on the highlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valor: and being lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their minds their recent promises: and

the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope of liberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the presence of their masters.

Erat multo inferior numero navium Brutus; sed electos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros, antesignanos, centuriones, Caesar ei classi attribuerat, qui sibi id muneris depoposcerant. Hi manus ferreas atque harpagones paraverant magnoque numero pilorum, tragularum reliquorumque telorum se instruxerant. Ita cognito hostium adventu suas naves ex portu educunt, cum Massiliensibus confligunt. Pugnatum est utrimque fortissime atque acerrime; neque multum Albici nostris virtute cedebant, homines asperi et montani, exercitati in armis; atque hi modo digressi a Massiliensibus recentem eorum pollicitationem animis continebant, pastoresque Domitii spe libertatis excitati sub oculis domini suam probare operam studebant.

1:58. The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness of their ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock, and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening their line they endeavored to surround us, or to attack single ships with several of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars, if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they had recourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valor of the mountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skillful pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, were moreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which having been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easily maneuvered. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one of theirs. And throwing in the

grappling-irons, and holding both ships fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's; and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some of their ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest into the harbor. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those that were taken.

Ipsi Massilienses et celeritate navium et scientia gubernatorum confisi nostros eludebant impetusque eorum excipiebant et, quoad licebat latiore uti spatio, producta longius acie circumvenire nostros aut pluribus navibus adoriri singulas aut remos transcurrentes detergere, si possent, contendebant; cum propius erat necessario ventum, ab scientia gubernatorum atque artificiis ad virtutem montanorum confugiebant. Nostri cum minus exercitatis remigibus minusque peritis gubernatoribus utebantur, qui repente ex onerariis navibus erant producti neque dum etiam vocabulis armamentorum cognitis, tum etiam tarditate et gravitate navium impediabantur; factae enim subito ex humida materia non eundem usum celeritatis habebant. Itaque, dum locus comminus pugnandi daretur, aequo animo singulas binis navibus obiciebant atque iniecta manu ferrea et retenta utraque nave diversi pugnabant atque in hostium naves transcendebant et magno numero Albicorum et pastorum interfecto partem navium deprimunt, nonnullas cum hominibus capiunt, reliquas in portum compellunt. Eo die naves Massiliensium cum eis, quae sunt captae, intereunt VIII.

1:59. When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the bridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn. The enemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as freely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a

small distance from the camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged within narrower bounds: at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, or descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of their expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolved to leave off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the practice of all nations, to go out at night.

Hoc primum Caesari ad Ilerdam nuntiatur; simul perfecto ponte celeriter fortuna mutatur. Illi perterriti virtute equitum minus libere, minus audacter vagabantur, alias non longo a castris progressi spatio, ut celerem receptum haberent, angustius pabulabantur, alias longiore circuitu custodias stationesque equitum vitabant, aut aliquo accepto detrimento aut procul equitatu viso ex medio itinere proiectis sarcinis fugiebant. Postremo et plures intermittere dies et praeter consuetudinem omnium noctu constituerant pabulari.

1:60. In the mean time the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under the government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors to Caesar, and offer to submit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani, and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell near the river Ebro. He requires of them all, to assist him with corn, to which they agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country, they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of the Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar, from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colors with them. A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridge being finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a way opened for the receiving of corn, and the rumors of the assistance of legions which

were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head, through Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant states revolt from Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar.

Interim Oscenses et Calagurritani, qui erant Oscensibus contributi, mittunt ad eum legatos seseque imperata facturos pollicentur. Hos Tarraconenses et Iacetani et Ausetani et paucis post diebus Illurgavonenses, qui flumen Hiberum attingunt, insequuntur. Petit ab his omnibus, ut se frumento iuvent. Pollicentur atque omnibus undique conquisitis iumentis in castra deportant. Transit etiam cohors Illurgavonensis ad eum cognito civitatis consilio et signa ex statione transfert. Magna celeriter commutatio rerum. Perfecto ponte, magnis quinque civitatibus ad amicitiam adiunctis, expedita re frumentaria, extinctis rumoribus de auxiliis legionum, quae cum Pompeio per Mauritaniam venire dicebantur, multae longinquiores civitates ab Afranio desciscunt et Caesaris amicitiam sequuntur.

1:61. While the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things, Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a long circuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began to sink several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a part of the river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almost finished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest they should be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar was very strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts, and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstance that confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties, that, which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered by Pompey, still trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the other which had remained firm in Pompey's

interest, loved him for the favors which they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to the barbarians. From these they expected considerable aid, both of horse and foot, and hoped to protract the war till winter, in a friendly country. Having come to this resolution, they gave orders to collect all the ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a town situated on the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At this part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened together, and transported two legions over the river Segre, and fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.

Quibus rebus perterritis animis adversariorum Caesar, ne semper magno circuitu per pontem equitatus esset mittendus, nactus idoneum locum fossas pedum XXX in latitudinem complures facere instituit, quibus partem aliquam Sicoris averteret vadumque in eo flumine efficeret. His paene effectis magnum in timorem Afranius Petreiusque perveniunt, ne omnino frumento pabuloque intercluderentur, quod multum Caesar equitatu valebat. Itaque constituunt illis locis excedere et in Celtiberiam bellum transferre. Huic consilio suffragabatur etiam illa res, quod ex duobus contrariis generibus, quae superiore bello cum Sertorio steterant civitates, victae nomen atque imperium absentis Pompei timebant, quae in amicitia manserant, magnis affectae beneficiis eum diligebant; Caesaris autem erat in barbaris nomen obscurius. Hic magnos equitatus magnaque auxilia exspectabant et suis locis bellum in hiemem ducere cogitabant. Hoc inito consilio toto flumine Hibernaves conquiri et Octogesam adduci iubent. Id erat oppidum positum ad Hiberum miliaque passuum a castris aberat XXX. Ad eum locum fluminis navibus iunctis pontem imperant fieri legionesque duas flumen Sicorim traducunt, castraque muniunt vallo pedum XII.

1:62. Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar continued his work day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to drain the river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were both able and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to pass the river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of their breast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not only by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current. However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridge being nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre.

Qua re per exploratores cognita summo labore militum Caesar continuato diem noctemque opere in flumine avertendo huc iam rem deduxerat, ut equites, etsi difficulter atque aegre fiebat, possent tamen atque auderent flumen transire, pedites vero tantummodo umeris ac summo pectore exstarent et cum altitudine aquae tum etiam rapiditate fluminis ad transeundum impedirentur. Sed tamen eodem fere tempore pons in Hiberno prope effectus nuntiabatur, et in Sicori vadum reperiebatur.

1:63. Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought to hasten their march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed one camp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before. Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since with his cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; so that they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse, which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreius had broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared on their rear, and spreading

round them in great numbers, retard and impede their march.

Iam vero eo magis illi maturandum iter existimabant. Itaque duabus auxiliariis cohortibus Ilerdae praesidio relictis omnibus copiis Sicorim transeunt et cum duabus legionibus, quas superioribus diebus traduxerant, castra coniungunt. Relinquebatur Caesari nihil, nisi uti equitatu agmen adversariorum male haberet et carperet. Pons enim ipsius magnum circuitum habebat, ut multo breviori itinere illi ad Hiberum pervenire possent. Equites ab eo missi flumen transeunt et, cum de tertia vigilia Petreius atque Afranius castra movissent, repente sese ad novissimum agmen ostendunt et magna multitudine circumfusa morari atque iter impedire incipiunt.

1:64. At break of day, it was perceived from the rising grounds which joined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by our horse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at other times, that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by a general charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them when they wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered in parties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily protracted. They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreated them to inform Caesar that he need not spare their labor or consider their danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture to ford the river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal and importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river so exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make a trial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or strength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from each century, and left

them, with one legion besides, to guard the camp: the rest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, having disposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below the ford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away by the force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, and not a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew out his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions: and so great was the ardor of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the addition of a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording the river, before the ninth hour of the day they came up with those who had set out at the third watch.

Prima luce ex superioribus locis, quae Caesaris castris erant coniuncta, cernebatur equitatus nostri proelio novissimos illorum premi vehementer ac nonnumquam sustineri extremum agmen atque interrumpi, alias inferri signa et universarum cohortium impetu nostros propelli, dein rursus conversos insequi. Totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum non necessario longius duci; centuriones tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare, ut per eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen, qua traductus esset equitatus. Quorum studio et vocibus excitatus Caesar, etsi timebat tantae magnitudini fluminis exercitum obicere, conandum tamen atque experiendum iudicat. Itaque infirmiores milites ex omnibus centuriis deligi iubet, quorum aut animus aut vires videbantur sustinere non posse. Hos cum legione una praesidio castris relinquit; reliquas legiones expeditas educit magnoque numero iumentorum in flumine supra atque infra constituto traducit exercitum. Pauci ex his militibus abrepti vi fluminis ab equitatu excipiuntur ac sublevantur; interit tamen nemo. Traducto incolumi

exercitu copias instruit triplicemque aciem ducere incipit. Ac tantum fuit in militibus studii, ut milium sex ad iter addito circuitu magnaue ad vadum fluminis mora interposita eos, qui de tertia vigilia exissent, ante horam diei VIII consequerentur.

1:65. When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a distance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on a rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on the plain that he might not expose them to battle while fatigued; and when the enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them. They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had intended, for there were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow roads awaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these mountains that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in the narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forces across the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was their interest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued by the skirmishes all day, and by the labor of their march, they deferred it till the following day; Caesar likewise encamped on the next hill.

Quos ubi Afranius procul visos cum Petreio conspexit, nova re perterritus locis superioribus constitit aciemque instruit. Caesar in campis exercitum reficit, ne defessum proelio obiciat; rursus conantes progredi insequitur et moratur. Illi necessario maturius, quam constituerant, castra ponunt. Suberant enim montes, atque a milibus passuum V itinera difficilia atque angusta excipiebant. Hos montes intrasse cupiebant, ut equitatum effugerent Caesaris praesidiisque in angustiis collocatis exercitum itinere prohiberent, ipsi sine periculo ac timore Hiberum copias traducerent. Quod fuit

illis conandum atque omni ratione efficiendum; sed totius diei pugna atque itineris labore defessi rem in posterum diem distulerunt. Caesar quoque in proximo colle castra ponit.

1:66. About midnight a few of their men who had gone some distance from the camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is informed by them that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of the camp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal to be given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage. When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in the night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they should be confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop to their march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreius went out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. A similar movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa, was detached with a small party to explore the nature of the country. Each returned with the same account to his camp, that there was a level road for the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough and mountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of the defiles would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress.

Media circiter nocte eis, qui aquandi causa longius a castris processerant, ab equitibus correptis fit ab his certior Caesar duces adversariorum silentio copias castris educere. Quo cognito signum dari iubet et vasa militari more conclamari. Illi exaudito clamore veriti, ne noctu impediti sub onere configere cogerentur aut ne ab equitatu Caesaris in angustius tenerentur, iter supprimunt copiasque in castris continent. Postero die Petreius cum paucis equitibus occulte ad exploranda loca proficiscitur. Hoc idem fit ex castris Caesaris.

Mittitur L. Decidius Sasa cum paucis, qui loci naturam perspiciat. Uterque idem suis renuntiat: V milia passuum proxima intercedere itineris campestris, inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui prior has angustias occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negotii.

1:67. There was a debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius, and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of opinion that they should begin their march at night, “for they might reach the defiles before they should be discovered.” Others, because a shout had been raised the night before in Caesar’s camp, used this as an argument that they could not leave the camp unnoticed: “that Caesar’s cavalry were patrolling the whole night, and that all the ways and roads were beset; that battles at night ought to be avoided, because, in civil dissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears than his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of shame in the eyes of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions had the same effect: by these things the soldiers would be restrained and awed to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force their way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet the post which they desired might be secured with safety to the main body of the army.” This opinion prevailed in the council, and the next day, at the dawn, they resolved to set forward.

Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. Plerique censebant, ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam sentiretur. Alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris, argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam exiri. Circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaue proelia esse vitanda, quod

perterritus miles in civili dissensione timori magis quam religioni consulere consuerit. At lucem multum per se pudorem omnium oculis, multum etiam tribunorum militum et centurionum praesentiam afferre; quibus rebus coerceri milites et in officio contineri soleant. Quare omni ratione esse interdiu perrumpendum: etsi aliquo accepto detrimento, tamen summa exercitus salva locum, quem petant, capi posse. Haec vincit in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proficisci.

1:68. Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the moment the sky began to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at the head of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for the road which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy's camp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to cross extensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places, interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of their march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would be a period to all their toils, if they could cut off the enemy from the Ebro and intercept their convoys.

Caesar exploratis regionibus albente caelo omnes copias castris educit magnoque circuitu nullo certo itinere exercitum ducit. Nam quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Octogesam pertinebant castris hostium oppositis tenebantur. Ipsi erant transcendendae valles maximae ac difficillimae; saxa multis locis praerupta iter impediabant, ut arma per manus necessario traderentur, militesque inermes sublevatique alii ab aliis magnam partem itineris conficerent. Sed hunc laborem recusabat nemo, quod eum omnium laborum

finem fore existimabant, si hostem Hiberno intercludere et frumento prohibere potuissent.

1:69. At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp to look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that we were forced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to Ilerda." For our route was different from what we proposed, and we appeared to be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded their own prudence in keeping within their camp, and it was a strong confirmation of their opinion, that they saw we marched without wagons or baggage, which made them confident that we could not long endure want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, and observed our van was already passing the line of their camp, there was nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary to march from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was raised, and all the army, except a few which were left to guard the camp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro.

Ac primo Afraniani milites visendi causa laeti ex castris procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus prosequerantur nostros: necessarii victus inopia coactos fugere atque ad Ilerdam reverti. Erat enim iter a proposito diversum, contrariamque in partem iri videbatur. Duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus efferebant, quod se castris tenuissent; multumque eorum opinionem adiuwabatur, quod sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant, ut non posse inopiam diutius sustinere confiderent. Sed, ubi paulatim retorqueri agmen ad dextram conspexerunt iamque primos superare regionem castrorum animum adverterunt, nemo erat adeo tardus aut fugiens laboris, quin statim castris exeundum atque occurrendum putaret.

Conclamatur ad arma, atque omnes copiae paucis praesidio relictis cohortibus exeunt rectoque ad Hiberum itinere contendunt.

1:70. The contest depended entirely on dispatch, which should first get possession of the defile and the mountains. The difficulty of the roads delayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces, retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced to this point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gained the mountains, which they desired, they would themselves avoid all danger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, being intercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given. Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a plain behind large rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing the enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, and seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it. Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest mountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with all expedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going to the same place with all his forces, then altering his route, and crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making toward it in an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them, nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of the two armies.

Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montesque occuparent; sed exercitum Caesaris viarum difficultates tardabant, Afranii copias equitatus Caesaris insequens morabatur. Res tamen ab Afranianis huc erat necessario deducta, ut, si priores

montes, quos petebant, attigissent, ipsi periculum vitarent, impedimenta totius exercitus cohortesque in castris relictas servare non possent; quibus interclusis exercitu Caesaris auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat. Confecit prior iter Caesar atque ex magnis rupibus nactus planitiem in hac contra hostem aciem instruit. Afranius, cum ab equitatu novissimum agmen premeretur, ante se hostem videret, collem quendam nactus ibi constitit. Ex eo loco IIII cetratorum cohortes in montem, qui erat in conspectu omnium excelsissimus, mittit. Hunc magno cursu concitatos iubet occupare, eo consilio, uti ipse eodem omnibus copiis contenderet et mutato itinere iugis Octogesam perveniret. Hunc cum obliquo itinere cetrati peterent, conspicatus equitatus Caesaris in cohortes impetum fecit; nec minimam partem temporis equitum vim cetrati sustinere potuerunt omnesque ab eis circumventi in conspectu utriusque exercitus interficiuntur.

1:71. There was now an opportunity for managing affairs successfully, nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a loss before their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surrounded by our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and open ground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants, centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged "that he would not hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all the soldiers were very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by several circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assisted their party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did not sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one place, did not observe either rank or order. But if he had any apprehensions from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity would be given him of coming to battle in some other

place: for that Afranius must certainly come down, and would not be able to remain there for want of water.”

Erat occasio bene gerendae rei. Neque vero id Caesarem fugiebat, tanto sub oculis accepto detrimento perterritum exercitum sustinere non posse, praesertim circumdatum undique equitatu, cum in loco aequo atque aperto confligeretur; idque ex omnibus partibus ab eo flagitabatur. Concurrerant legati, centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos. Afranianos contra multis rebus sui timoris signa misisse: quod suis non subvenissent, quod de colle non decederent, quod vix equitum incursus sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis conferti neque ordines neque signa servarent. Quod si iniquitatem loci timeret, datum iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio nec sine aqua permanere posset.

1:72. Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair without an engagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off the enemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, even in a successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded, who had deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune? especially when it was as much a general's duty to conquer by tactics as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for those citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his object without any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was not generally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not come to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He persevered however in his

resolution, and retired a little from that place to abate the enemy's fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity, retired to their camp. Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains, and cut off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close to the enemy as he could.

Caesar in eam spem venerat, se sine pugna et sine vulnere suorum rem conficere posse, quod re frumentaria adversarios interclusisset. Cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? praesertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio superare quam gladio. Movebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat; quibus salvis atque incolumibus rem obtinere malebat. Hoc consilium Caesaris plerisque non probabatur: milites vero palam inter se loquebantur, quoniam talis occasio victoriae dimitteretur, etiam cum vellet Caesar, sese non esse pugnatuos. Ille in sua sententia perseverat et paulum ex eo loco digreditur, ut timorem adversariis minuat. Petreius atque Afranius oblata facultate in castra sese referunt. Caesar praesidiis montibus dispositis omni ad Hiberum intercluso itinere quam proxime potest hostium castris castra communit.

1:73. The day following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed that they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro, consulted as to what other course they should take. There were two roads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if they should march to it. While they were deliberating on these matters, intelligence was brought them that their watering parties were attacked by our horse: upon which information, they dispose several parties of horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and

intermix some legionary cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp to the water, that they might be able to procure water within their lines, both without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided this task between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.

Postero die duces adversariorum perturbati, quod omnem rei frumentariae fluminisque Hiberi spem dimiserant, de reliquis rebus consultabant. Erat unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti vellent; alterum, si Tarraconem peterent. Haec consiliantibus eis nuntiantur aquatores ab equitatu premi nostro. Qua re cognita crebras stationes disponunt equitum et cohortium alariarum legionariasque intericiunt cohortes vallumque ex castris ad aquam ducere incipiunt, ut intra munitionem et sine timore et sine stationibus aquari possent. Id opus inter se Petreius atque Afranius partiuntur ipsique perficiundi operis causa longius progrediuntur.

1:74. The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free opportunity of conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquired each for whatever acquaintance or fellow-citizen he had in our camp, and invited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparing them the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledged that they were alive through their kindness; then they inquired about the honor of our general, and whether they could with safety intrust themselves to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not done so in the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against their relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the general's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might not appear

guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When they were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that they would immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of the first rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In the mean time some of them invite their acquaintances, and bring them to their camp, others are brought away by their friends, so that the two camps seemed to be united into one, and several of the tribunes and centurions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The same was done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their assistance, and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired after their acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means of being recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man, endeavored, by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for his own and his father's life. Every place was filled with mirth and congratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had escaped so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his conduct was applauded by all.

Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, et quem quisque in castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirunt atque evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnibus, quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde de imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint, queruntur. His provocati sermonibus fidem ab imperatore de Petreii atque Afranii vita petunt, ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu suos prodidisse videantur. Quibus confirmatis rebus se statim signa translaturus confirmant legatosque

de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt. Interim alii suos in castra invitandi causa adducunt, alii ab suis abducuntur, adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur; compluresque tribuni militum et centuriones ad Caesarem veniunt seque ei commendant. Idem hoc fit a principibus Hispaniae, quos evocaverant et secum in castris habebant obsidum loco. Hi suos notos hospitesque quaerebant, per quem quisque eorum aditum commendationis haberet ad Caesarem. Afranii etiam filius adulescens de sua ac parentis sui salute cum Caesare per Sulpicium legatum agebat. Erant plena laetitia et gratulatione omnia, eorum, qui tanta pericula vitasse, et eorum, qui sine vulnere tantas res confecisse videbantur, magnumque fructum suae pristinae lenitatis omnium iudicio Caesar ferebat, consiliumque eius a cunctis probabatur.

1:75. When these circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left the work which he had begun, and returned to his camp, determined as it appeared, whatever should be the event, to bear it with an even and steady mind. Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics; with them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreign horse, his dependents, whom he commonly kept near him to guard his person, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the conferences of the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as many as he caught. The rest formed into a body, and being alarmed by the unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew their swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their camp, defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made good their retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the cohorts which were on guard.

Quibus rebus nuntiatis Afranius ab instituto opere discedit seque in

castra recipit, sic paratus, ut videbatur, ut, quicumque accidisset casus, hunc quieto et aequo animo ferret. Petreius vero non deserit sese. Armat familiam; cum hac et praetoria cohorte cetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficiariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consuevit, improvise ad vallum advolat, colloquia militum interruptit, nostros repellit a castris, quos deprendit interficit. Reliqui coeunt inter se et repentino periculo exterriti sinistras sagis involvunt gladiosque destringunt atque ita se a cetratis equitibusque defendunt castrorum propinquitate confisi seque in castra recipiunt et ab eis cohortibus, quae erant in statione ad portas, defenduntur.

1:76. Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every manipule, calling the soldiers by their names, and entreating with tears that they would not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to the vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in crowds to the general's pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that they would not desert nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form any design distinct from the general interest. He himself swore first to the tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same oath. The tribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers were brought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, that whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon as they were produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium, but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let them out at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals, the cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed all hopes of surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and reduced matters to the former state of war.

Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu se neu Pompeium, imperatorem suum, adversariis ad supplicium tradant, obsecrat. Fit celeriter concursus in praetorium. Postulat, ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium capturos. Princeps in haec verba iurat ipse; idem iusiurandum adigit Afranium; subsequuntur tribuni militum centurionesque; centuriatim producti milites idem iurant. Edicunt, penes quem quisque sit Caesaris miles, ut producat: productos palam in praetorio interficiunt. Sed plerosque ei, qui receperant, celant noctuque per vallum emittunt. Sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in supplicio, nova religio iurisiurandi spem praesentis deditionis sustulit mentesque militum convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit.

1:77. Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his camp to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest diligence, and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several voluntarily remained with him, and he afterward treated them with great respect. The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Roman knights the honor of tribunes.

Caesar, qui milites adversariorum in castra per tempus colloqui venerant, summa diligentia conquiri et remitti iubet. Sed ex numero tribunorum militum centurionumque nonnulli sua voluntate apud eum remanserunt. Quos ille postea magno in honore habuit; centuriones in priores ordines, equites Romanos in tribunicium restituit honorem.

1:78. Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and procured water with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn, because they had beef ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last

twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they had but few opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were not accustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of them came over to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these difficulties; but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because they had left some corn there; and there they hoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at a greater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit of many changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set out from their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and retard their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a moment passed in which their rear was not engaged with our horse.

Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur aegre. Frumenti copiam legionarii nonnullam habebant, quod dierum XXII ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant efferre, cetrati auxiliaresque nullam, quorum erant et facultates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera portanda. Itaque magnus eorum cotidie numerus ad Caesarem perfugiebat. In his erat angustia res. Sed ex propositis consiliis duobus explicitius videbatur Ilerdam reverti, quod ibi paulum frumenti reliquerant. Ibi se reliquum consilium explicaturos confidebant. Tarraco aberat longius; quo spatio plures rem posse casus recipere intellegebant. Hoc probato consilio ex castris proficiscuntur. Caesar equitatu praemisso, qui novissimum agmen carperet atque impediret, ipse cum legionibus subsequitur. Nullum intercedebat tempus, quin extremi cum equitibus proeliarentur.

1:79. Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts closed their rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If they had a

mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily secured them from any danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds, protected the rest in their ascent. When they approached a valley or declivity, and the advanced men could not impart assistance to the tardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds with advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the only plan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they should give orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse our horse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with the utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passed it, should face about again on the next hill. For so far were they from deriving any assistance from their horse (of which they had a large number), that they were obliged to receive them into the center of their army, and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by former battles. And on their march no one could quit the line without being taken by Caesar's horse.

Genus erat hoc pugnae. Expeditae cohortes novissimum agmen clauderant pluresque in locis campestribus subsistebant. Si mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat, quod ex locis superioribus, qui antecesserant, suos ascendentes protegebant; cum vallis aut locus declivis suberat, neque ei, qui antecesserant, morantibus opem ferre poterant, equites vero ex loco superiore in aversos tela coniciebant, tum magno erat in periculo res. Relinquebatur, ut, cum eiusmodi locis esset appropinquatum, legionum signa consistere iuberent magnoque impetu equitatum repellerent, eo submoto repente incitati cursu sese in valles universi demitterent atque ita transgressi rursus in locis superioribus consisterent. Nam tantum ab equitum suorum auxiliis aberant, quorum numerum habebant magnum, ut eos superioribus perterritos

proeliis in medium reciperent agmen ultroque eos tuerentur; quorum nulli ex itinere excedere licebat, quin ab equitatu Caesaris exciperetur.

1:80. While skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced but slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as then happened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassed by our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there in trenched themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, they suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopes that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and charged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and several privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them.

Tali dum pugnatur modo, lente atque paulatim proceditur, crebroque, ut sint auxilio suis, subsistunt; ut tum accidit. Milia enim progressi IIII vehementiusque peragitati ab equitatu montem excelsum capiunt ibique una fronte contra hostem castra muniunt neque iumentis onera deponunt. Ubi Caesaris castra posita tabernaculaque constituta et dimissos equites pabulandi causa animum adverterunt, sese subito proripiunt hora circiter sexta eiusdem diei et spem nacti morae discessu nostrorum equitum iter facere incipiunt. Qua re animum

adversa Caesar refectis legionibus subsequitur, praesidio impedimentis paucas cohortes relinquit; hora x subsequi pabulatores equitesque revocari iubet. Celeriter equitatus ad cotidianum itineris officium revertitur. Pugnatur acriter ad novissimum agmen, adeo ut paene terga convertant, compluresque milites, etiam nonnulli centuriones, interficiuntur. Instabat agmen Caesaris atque universum imminebat.

1:81. Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose a convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground naturally unfavorable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the whole night in extending their work, and turning their camp to ours. The next day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that manner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extended their camp, they were further distant from the water; and one evil was remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. The next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more desirous that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to come to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavored to surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to check their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.

Tum vero neque ad explorandum idoneum locum castris neque ad progrediendum data facultate consistunt necessario et procul ab aqua et natura iniquo loco castra ponunt. Sed isdem de causis Caesar, quae supra sunt demonstratae, proelio non lacessit et eo die tabernacula statui passus non est, quo paratiores essent ad insequendum omnes, sive noctu sive interdiu erumperent. Illi animadverso vitio castrorum tota nocte munitiones proferunt castraque castris convertunt. Hoc idem postero die a prima luce faciunt totumque in ea re diem consumunt. Sed quantum opere processerant et castra protulerant, tanto aberant ab aqua longius, et praesenti malo aliis malis remedia dabantur. Prima nocte aquandi causa nemo egreditur ex castris; proximo die praesidio in castris relicto universas ad aquam copias educunt, pabulum mittitur nemo. His eos suppliciis male haberi Caesar et necessariam subire deditionem quam proelio decertare malebat. Conatur tamen eos vallo fossaque circummunire, ut quam maxime repentinas eorum eruptiones demoretur; quo necessario descensuros existimabat. Illi et inopia pabuli adducti et, quo essent expeditiores, omnia sarcinaria iumenta interfici iubent.

1:82. In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent. By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's work was finished. To interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth hour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before their camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and ordering the horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshaled his army: for to appear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers and the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage. But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing to engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the camps, even if the enemy were put to

flight, would not contribute much to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would afford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For this reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance if they attacked him, but not to be the first to provoke the battle.

In his operibus consiliisque biduum consumitur; tertio die magna iam pars operis Caesaris processerat. Illi impediendae reliquae munitionis causa hora circiter VIII signo dato legiones educunt aciemque sub castris instruunt. Caesar ab opere legiones revocat, equitatum omnem convenire iubet, aciem instruit; contra opinionem enim militum famamque omnium videri proelium defugisse magnum detrimentum afferebat. Sed eisdem de causis, quae sunt cognitae, quo minus dimicare vellet, movebatur, atque hoc etiam magis, quod spatii brevitate etiam in fugam coniectis adversariis non multum ad summam victoria iuvare poterat. Non enim amplius pedum milibus duobus ab castris castra distabant; hinc duas partes acies occupabant duae; tertia vacabat ad incursum atque impetum militum relictam. Si proelium committeretur, propinquitatem castrorum celerem superatis ex fuga receptum dabat. Hac de causa constituerat signa inferentibus resistere, prior proelio non lacerare.

1:83. Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, the auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and three others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed in

the center of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works which he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a ford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light armed Germans and a party of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along the banks to guard them.

Acies erat Afraniana duplex legionum V; tertium in subsidiis locum alariae cohortes obtinebant; Caesaris triplex; sed primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex V legionibus tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cuiusque legionis subsequerantur; sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat. Tali instructa acie tenere uterque propositum videbatur: Caesar, ne nisi coactus proelium committeret; ille, ut opera Caesaris impediret. Producitur tamen res, aciesque ad solis occasum continentur; inde utrique in castra discedunt. Postero die munitiones institutas Caesar parat perficere; illi vadum fluminis Sicoris temptare, si transire possent. Qua re animadversa Caesar Germanos levis armaturae equitumque partem flumen traiecit crebrasque in ripis custodias disponit.

1:84. At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been four days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers. When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They

met in the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies Afranius spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general, Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but confessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was any room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer the most severe penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most submissive and humble language.

Tandem omnibus rebus obsessi, quantum iam diem sine pabulo retentis iumentis, aquae, lignorum, frumenti inopia colloquium petunt et id, si fieri possit, semoto a militibus loco. Ubi id a Caesare negatum et, palam si colloqui vellent, concessum est, datur obsidis loco Caesari filius Afranii. Venitur in eum locum, quem Caesar delegit. Audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut ipsis aut militibus succensendum, quod fidem erga imperatorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint. Sed satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplicii tulisse perpressos omnium rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. Itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, si qui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeat. Haec quam potest demississime et subiectissime exponit.

1:85. Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for mercy became no man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty: himself, in having declined to engage on favorable terms, in an advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and even Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a peace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all. Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the laws either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore, they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and most earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or his present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for so many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful fleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent to command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him: that none of these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the use of the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need of no such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him; that against him a new sort of government was established, that the same person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of

the city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the magistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should not be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, but persons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse of age was not admitted; but persons of tried experience in former wars were called up to take the command of the armies: that with respect to him only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to all generals, that, after a successful war, they should return home and disband their armies, if not with some mark of honor, at least without disgrace; that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would still submit to them; nor did he now desire to take their army from them and keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult matter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him: and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, and disband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure no person; that these were the last and only conditions of peace.”

Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partes vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: se, qui etiam bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, configere noluerit, ut quam integerrima essent ad pacem omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservavit et texerit; illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partes in misericordia constitisse: ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; eos neque colloqui neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse. Accidisse igitur his,

quod plerumque hominum nimia pertinacia atque arrogantia accidere soleat, uti eo recurrant et id cupidissime petant, quod paulo ante contempserint. Neque nunc se illorum humilitate neque aliqua temporis opportunitate postulare, quibus rebus opes augeantur suae; sed eos exercitus, quos contra se multos iam annos aluerint, velle dimitti. Neque enim sex legiones alia de causa missas in Hispaniam septimamque ibi conscriptam neque tot tantasque classes paratas neque submissos duces rei militaris peritos. Nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil ad usum provinciae provisum, quae propter diuturnitatem pacis nullum auxilium desiderarit. Omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annis obtineat; in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur; in se etiam aetatis excusationem nihil valere, cum superioribus bellis probati ad obtinendos exercitus evocentur; in se uno non servari, quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus, ut rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore aliquo aut certe sine ignominia domum revertantur exercitumque dimittant. Quae tamen omnia et se tulisse patienter et esse laturum; neque nunc id agere, ut ab illis abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod tamen sibi difficile non sit, sed ne illi habeant, quo contra se uti possint. Proinde, ut esset dictum, provinciis excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se nociturum nemini. Hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem.

1:86. It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, as might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expected some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was

introduced about the place and time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should be discharged immediately; for although every security might be given, that they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was brought to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possession in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var. Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that no person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military oath under him.

Id vero militibus fuit pergratum et iucundum, ut ex ipsa significatione cognosci potuit, ut, qui aliquid iusti incommodi exspectavissent, ultro praemium missionis ferrent. Nam cum de loco et tempore eius rei controversia inferretur, et voce et manibus universi ex vallo, ubi constiterant, significare coeperunt, ut statim dimitterentur, neque omni interposita fide firmum esse posse, si in aliud tempus differretur. Paucis cum esset in utramque partem verbis disputatum, res huc deducitur, ut ei, qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania, statim, reliqui ad Varum flumen dimittantur; ne quid eis noceatur, neu quis invitus sacramentum dicere cogatur, a Caesare cavetur.

1:87. Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the present time till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation being made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterward among

themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that Caesar should take cognizance of it; and both parties were content with his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in two days, Caesar ordered two of his legions, to go before, the rest to follow the vanquished enemy; that they should encamp at a small distance from each other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions, they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army was disbanded.

Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniatur, se frumentum daturum pollicetur. Addit etiam, ut, quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes milites suos, eis, qui amiserint, restituatur; militibus aequa facta aestimatione pecuniam pro his rebus dissolvit. Quasumque postea controversias inter se milites habuerunt, sua sponte ad Caesarem in ius adierunt. Petreius atque Afranius cum stipendium ab legionibus paene seditione facta flagitarentur, cuius illi diem nondum venisse dicerent, Caesar ut cognosceret, postulatum est, eoque utrique, quod statuit, contenti fuerunt. Parte circiter tertia exercitus eo biduo dimissa duas legiones suas antecedere, reliquas subsequi iussit, ut non longo inter se spatio castra facerent, eique negotio Q. Fufium Calenum legatum praeficit. Hoc eius praescripto ex Hispania ad Varum flumen est iter factum, atque ibi reliqua pars exercitus dimissa est.

BOOK II (49 BC)

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2:1. While these things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius, Caesar's lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault of Massilia, began to raise a mound, vineae, and turrets against the town, on two sides; one of which was next the harbor and docks, the other on that part where there is a passage from Gaul and Spain to that sea which forces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almost on three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the only side which has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches to the fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a very deep valley, required a long and difficult siege. To accomplish these works, Caius Trebonius sends for a great quantity of carriages and men from the whole Province, and orders hurdles and materials to be furnished. These things being provided, he raised a mound eighty feet in height.

Dum haec in Hispania geruntur, C. Trebonius legatus, qui ad oppugnationem Massiliae relictus erat, duabus ex partibus aggerem, vineas turresque ad oppidum agere instituit. Una erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad portam, qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania, ad id mare, quod adiacet ad ostium Rhodani. Massilia enim fere tribus ex oppidi partibus mari alluitur; reliqua quarta est, quae aditum habeat ab terra. Huius quoque spatii pars ea, quae ad arcem pertinet, loci natura et valle altissima munita longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem. Ad ea perficienda opera C. Trebonius magnam iumentorum atque hominum multitudinem ex omni provincia vocat; vimina materiamque comportari iubet. Quibus comparatis rebus aggerem in altitudinem pedum LXXX exstruit.

2:2. But so great a store of every thing necessary for a war had been a long time before laid up in the town, and so great a number of engines, that no vineae made of hurdles could withstand their force. For poles twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, and these too shot from very large engines, sank into the ground through four rows of hurdles. Therefore the arches of the vineae were covered over with beams a foot thick, fastened together, and under this the materials of the agger were handed from one to another. Before this was carried a testudo sixty feet long, for leveling the ground, made also of very strong timber, and covered over with every thing that was capable of protecting it against the fire and stones thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the works, the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of engines retarded the progress of our works. Besides, frequent sallies were made from the town by the Albici, and fire was thrown on our mound and turrets. These our men easily repulsed, and, doing considerable damage to those who sallied, beat them back into the town.

Sed tanti erant antiquitus in oppido omnium rerum ad bellum apparatus tantaque multitudo tormentorum, ut eorum vim nullae contextae viminibus vineae sustinere possent. Asseres enim pedum XII cuspidibus praefixi atque hi maximis bllistis missi per IIII ordines cratium in terra defigebantur. Itaque pedalibus lignis coniunctis inter se porticus integebantur, atque hac agger inter manus proferebatur. Antecedebat testudo pedum LX aequandi loci causa facta item ex fortissimis lignis, convoluta omnibus rebus, quibus ignis iactus et lapides defendi possent. Sed magnitudo operum, altitudo muri atque turrium, multitudo tormentorum omnem administrationem tardabat. Crebrae etiam per Albicos eruptiones fiebant ex oppido ignesque aggeri et turribus inferebantur; quae facile

nostri milites repellebant magnisque ultro illatis detrimentis eos, qui eruptionem fecerant, in oppidum reiciebant.

2:3. In the mean time, Lucius Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey with a fleet of sixteen sail, a few of which had beaks of brass, to the assistance of Lucius Domitius and the Massilians, passed the straits of Sicily without the knowledge or expectation of Curio, and, putting with his fleet into Messana, and making the nobles and senate take flight with the sudden terror, carried off one of their ships out of dock. Having joined this to his other ships, he made good his voyage to Massilia, and having sent in a galley privately, acquaints Domitius and the Massilians of his arrival, and earnestly encourages them to hazard another battle with Brutus's fleet with the addition of his aid.

Interim L Nasidius, a Cn. Pompeio cum classe navium XVI, in quibus paucae erant aeratae, L. Domitio Massiliensibusque subsidio missus, freto Siciliae imprudente atque inopinante Curione pervehitur appulsisque Messanam navibus atque inde propter repentinum terrorem principum ac senatus fuga facta navem ex navalibus eorum deducit. Hac adiuncta ad reliquas naves cursum Massiliam versus perficit praemissaque clam navicula Domitium Massiliensesque de suo adventu certiores facit eosque magnopere hortatur, ut rursus cum Bruti classe additis suis auxiliis confligant.

2:4. The Massilians, since their former loss, had brought the same number of old ships from the docks, and had repaired and fitted them out with great industry: they had a large supply of seamen and pilots. They had got several fishing-smacks, and covered them over, that the seamen might be secure against darts: these they filled with archers and engines. With a fleet thus appointed, encouraged by the entreaties and tears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succor

the state in this hour of distress, they went on board with no less spirit and confidence than they had fought before. For it happens, from a common infirmity of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence, or more vehemently alarmed at things unseen, concealed, and unknown, as was the case then. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the state with the most sanguine hopes and wishes. Having got a fair wind, they sailed out of port and went to Nasidius to Taurois, which is a fort belonging to the Massilians, and there ranged their fleet and again encouraged each other to engage and communicated their plan of operation. The command of the right division was given to the Massilians, that of the left to Nasidius.

Massilienses post superius incommodum veteres ad eundem numerum ex navalibus productas naves refecerant summaque industria armaverant (remigum, gubernatorum magna copia suppetebat) piscatoriasque adiecerant atque contexerant, ut essent ab ictu telorum remiges tuti; has sagittariis tormentisque compleverunt. Tali modo instructa classe omnium seniorum, matrum familiae, virginum precibus et fletu excitati, extremo tempore civitati subvenirent, non minore animo ac fiducia, quam ante dimicaverant, naves conscendunt. Communi enim fit vitio naturae, ut inusitatis atque incognitis rebus magis confidamus vehementiusque exterreamur; ut tum accidit. Adventus enim L. Nasidii summa spe et voluntate civitatem compleverat. Nacti idoneum ventum ex portu exeunt et Tauroenta, quod est castellum Massilensium, ad Nasidium perveniunt ibique naves expediunt rursusque se ad confligendum animo confirmant et consilia communicant. Dextra pars attribuitur Massiliensibus, sinistra Nasidio.

2:5. Brutus sailed to the same place with an augmented fleet; for to

those made by Caesar at Arelas were added six ships taken from the Massilians, which he had refitted since the last battle and had furnished with every necessary. Accordingly, having encouraged his men to despise a vanquished people whom they had conquered when yet unbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence and spirit. From Trebonius's camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the town- how all the youth which remained in it, and all persons of more advanced years, with their wives and children, and the public guards, were either extending their hands from the wall to the heavens, or were repairing to the temples of the immortal gods, and prostrating themselves before their images, were entreating them to grant them victory. Nor was there a single person who did not imagine that his future fortune depended on the issue of that day; for the choice of their youth and the most respectable of every age, being expressly invited and solicited, had gone on board the fleet, that if any adverse fate should befall them they might see that nothing was left for them to attempt, and, if they proved victorious, they might have hopes of preserving the city, either by their internal resources or by foreign assistance.

Eodem Brutus contendit aucto navium numero. Nam ad eas, quae factae erant Arelate per Caesarem, captivae Massiliensium accesserant sex. Has superioribus diebus refecerat atque omnibus rebus instruxerat. Itaque suos cohortatus, quos integros superarissent ut victos contemnerent, plenus spei bonae atque animi adversus eos proficiscitur. Facile erat ex castris C. Trebonii atque omnibus superioribus locis prospicere in urbem, ut omnis iuventus, quae in oppido remanserat, omnesque superioris aetatis cum liberis atque uxoribus ex publicis locis custodiisque aut e muro ad caelum manus tenderent, aut templa deorum immortalium adirent et ante simulacra

proiecti victoriam ab diis ecerent. Neque erat quisquam omnium, quin in eius diei casu suarum omnium fortunarum eventum consistere existimaret. Nam et honesti ex iuventute et cuiusque aetatis amplissimi nominatim evocati atque obsecrati naves conscenderant ut, si quid adversi accidisset, ne ad conandum quidem sibi quicquam reliqui fore viderent; si superavissent, vel domesticis opibus vel externis auxiliis de salute urbis confiderent.

2:6. When the battle was begun, no effort of valor was wanting to the Massilians, but, mindful of the instructions which they had a little before received from their friends, they fought with such spirit as if they supposed that they would never have another opportunity to attempt a defense, and as if they believed that those whose lives should be endangered in the battle would not long precede the fate of the rest of the citizens, who, if the city was taken, must undergo the same fortune of war. Our ships being at some distance from each other, room was allowed both for the skill of their pilots and the maueuvering of their ships; and if at any time ours, gaining an advantage by casting the iron hooks on board their ships, grappled with them, from all parts they assisted those who were distressed. Nor, after being joined by the Albici, did they decline coming to close engagement, nor were they much inferior to our men in valor. At the same time, showers of darts, thrown from a distance from the lesser ships, suddenly inflicted several wounds on our men when off their guard and otherwise engaged; and two of their three-decked galleys; having descried the ship of Decimus Brutus, which could be easily distinguished by its flag, rowed up against him with great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus, seeing into their designs, by the swiftness of his ship extricated himself with such address as to get clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity of their

motion they struck against each other with such violence that they were both excessively injured by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one of them being broken off, the whole ship was ready to founder, which circumstance being observed, the ships of Brutus's fleet, which were nearest that station, attack them when in this disorder and sink them both.

Commisso proelio Massiliensibus res nulla ad virtutem defuit; sed memores eorum praeceptorum, quae paulo ante ab suis acceperant, hoc animo decertabant, ut nullum aliud tempus ad conandum habituri viderentur, et quibus in pugna vitae periculum accideret, non ita multo se reliquorum civium fatum antecedere existimarent, quibus urbe capta eadem esset belli fortuna patienda. Diductisque nostris paulatim navibus et artificio gubernatorum et mobilitati navium locus dabatur, et si quando nostri facultatem nacti ferreis manibus iniectis navem religaverant, undique suis laborantibus succurrebant. Neque vero coniuncti Albici comminus pugnando deficiebant neque multum cedebant virtute nostris. Simul ex minoribus navibus magna vis eminus missa telorum multa nostris de improvise imprudentibus atque impeditis vulnera inferebant. Conspicataeque naves triremes duae navem D. Bruti, quae ex insigni facile agnosci poterat, duabus ex partibus sese in eam incitaverant Sed tantum re provisa Brutus celeritate navis enisus est, ut parvo momento antecederet. Illae adeo graviter inter se incitatae conflixerunt, ut vehementissime utraque ex concursu laborarent, altera vero prae fracto rostro tota collabefieret. Qua re animadversa, quae proximae ei loco ex Bruti classe naves erant, in eas impeditas impetum faciunt celeriterque ambas deprimunt.

2:7. But Nasidius's ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; for

the sight of their country, or the entreaties of their relations, did not urge them to run a desperate risk of their lives. Therefore, of the number of the ships not one was lost: of the fleet of the Massilians five were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with Nasidius: all that escaped made the best of their way to Hither Spain, but one of the rest was sent forward to Massilia for the purpose of bearing this intelligence, and when it came near the city, the whole people crowded out to hear the tidings, and, on being informed of the event, were so oppressed with grief, that one would have imagined that the city had been taken by an enemy at the same moment. The Massilians, however, began to make the necessary preparations for the defense of their city with unwearied energy.

Sed Nasidianae naves nullo usui fuerunt celeriterque pugna excesserunt; non enim has aut conspectus patriae aut propinquorum praecepta ad extremum vitae periculum adire cogebant. Itaque ex eo numero navium nulla desiderata est: ex Massiliensium classe V sunt depressae, IV captae, una cum Nasidianis profugit; quae omnes citeriorem Hispaniam petiverunt. At ex reliquis una praemissa Massiliam huius nuntii perferendi gratia cum iam appropinquaret urbi, omnis sese multitudo ad cognoscendum effudit, et re cognita tantus luctus excepit, ut urbs ab hostibus capta eodem vestigio videretur. Massilienses tamen nihilo secius ad defensionem urbis reliqua apparare coeperunt.

2:8. The legionary soldiers who had the management of the works on the right side, observed, from the frequent sallies of the enemy, that it might prove a great protection to them to build a turret of brick under the wall for a fort and place of refuge, which they at first built low and small, [to guard them] against sudden attacks. To it they

retreated, and from it they made defense if any superior force attacked them; and from it they sallied out either to repel or pursue the enemy. It extended thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the walls was five feet. But afterward, as experience is the best master in every thing on which the wit of man is employed, it was found that it might be of considerable service if it was raised to the usual height of turrets, which was effected in the following manner.

Est animadverum ab legionibus, qui dextram partem operis administrabant, ex crebris hostium eruptionibus magno sibi ease praesidio posse, si ibi pro castello ac receptaculo turrim ex latere sub muro fecissent. Quam primo ad repentinos incursus humilem parvamque fecerunt. Huc se referebant; hinc, si qua maior oppresserat vis, propugnabant; hinc ad repellendum et prosequendum hostem procurrebant. Patebat haec quoque versus pedes XXX, sed parietum crassitudo pedes V. Postea vero, ut est rerum omnium magister usus, hominum adhibita sollertia inventum est magno esse usui posse, si haec esset in altitudinem turris elata. Id hac ratione perfectum est.

2:9. When the turret was raised to the height for flooring, they laid it on the walls in such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered by the outer face of the wall, that nothing should project to which the enemy's fire might adhere. They, moreover, built over the joists with small bricks as high as the protection of the plutei and vineae permitted them; and on that place they laid two beams across, angleways, at a small distance from the outer walls, to support the rafters which were to cover the turret, and on the beams they laid joists across in a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks. These joists they made somewhat longer, to project beyond the outside of

the wall, that they might serve to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel all blows while they were building the walls between that and the next floor, and the floor of this story they faced with bricks and mortar, that the enemy's fire might do them no damage; and on this they spread mattresses, lest the weapons thrown from engines should break through the flooring, or stones from catapults should batter the brick work. They, moreover, made three mats of cable ropes, each of them the length of the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging them round the turret on the three sides which faced the enemy, fastened them to the projecting joists. For this was the only sort of defense which, they had learned by experience in other places, could not be pierced by darts or engines. But when that part of the turret which was completed was protected and secured against every attempt of the enemy, they removed the plutei to other works. They began to suspend gradually, and raise by screws from the first-floor, the entire roof of the turret, and then they elevated it as high as the length of the mats allowed. Hid and secured within these coverings, they built up the walls with bricks, and again, by another turn of the screw, cleared a place for themselves to proceed with the building; and, when they thought it time to lay another floor, they laid the ends of the beams, covered in by the outer bricks in like manner as in the first story, and from that story they again raised the uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this manner, securely and without a blow or danger, they raised it six stories high, and in laying the materials left loop-holes in such places as they thought proper for working their engines.

Ubi turris altitudo perducta est ad contabulationem, eam in parietes instruxerunt, ita ut capita tignorum extrema parietum structura tegerentur, ne quid emineret, ubi ignis hostium adhaeresceret. Hanc

super contignationem, quantum tectum plutei ac vinearum passum est, laterculo adstruxerunt supraque eum locum duo tigna transversa iniecerunt non longe ab extremis parietibus, quibus suspenderent eam contignationem, quae turri tegimento esset futura, supraque ea tigna directo transversas trabes iniecerunt easque axibus religaverunt (has trabes paulo longiores atque eminentiores, quam extremi parietes erant, effecerant, ut esset ubi tegimenta praependere possent ad defendendos ictus ac repellendos, cum infra eam contignationem parietes exstruerentur) eamque contabulationem summam lateribus lutoque constraverunt, ne quid ignis hostium nocere posset, centonesque insuper iniecerunt, ne aut tela tormentis immissa tabulationem perfringerent, aut saxa ex catapultis latericium discuterent Storias autem ex funibus ancorariis tres in longitudinem parietum turris latas IIII pedes fecerunt easque ex tribus partibus, quae ad hostes vergebant, eminentibus trabibus circum turrim praependentes religaverunt; quod unum genus tegimenti aliis locis erant experti nullo telo neque tormento traici posse. Ubi vero ea pars turris, quae erat perfecta, tecta atque munita est ab omni ictu hostium, pluteos ad alia opera abduxerunt; turris tectum per se ipsum pressionibus ex contignatione prima suspendere ac tollere coeperunt Ubi, quantum storiarum demissio patiebatur, tantum elevarant, intra haec tegimenta abditi atque muniti parietes lateribus exstruebant rursusque alia pressione ad aedificandum sibi locum expediebant. Ubi tempus alterius contabulationis videbatur, tigna item ut primo tecta extremis lateribus instruebant exque ea contignatione rursus summam contabulationem storiasque elevabant. Ita tuto ac sine ullo vulnere ac periculo sex tabulata exstruxerunt fenestrasque, quibus in locis visum est, ad tormenta mittenda in struendo reliquerunt.

2:10. When they were confident that they could protect the works

which lay around from this turret, they resolved to build a musculus, sixty feet long, of timber, two feet square, and to extend it from the brick tower to the enemy's tower and wall. This was the form of it: first, two beams of equal length were laid on the ground, at the distance of four feet from each other; and in them were fastened small pillars, five feet high, which were joined together by braces, with a gentle slope, on which the timber which they must place to support the roof of the musculus should be laid: upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with iron plates and nails. To the upper covering of the musculus and the upper beams, they fastened laths, four fingers square, to support the tiles which were to cover the musculus. The roof being thus sloped and laid over in rows in the same manner as the joists were laid on the braces, the musculus was covered with tiles and mortar, to secure it against fire, which might be thrown from the wall. Over the tiles hides are spread, to prevent the water let in on them by spouts from dissolving the cement of the bricks. Again, the hides were covered over with mattresses, that they might not be destroyed by fire or stones. The soldiers under the protection of the vineae, finish this whole work to the very tower; and suddenly, before the enemy were aware of it, moved it forward by naval machinery, by putting rollers under it, close up to the enemy's turret, so that it even touched the building.

Ubi ex ea turri, quae circum essent opera, tueri se posse confisi sunt, musculum pedes LX longum ex materia bipedali, quem a turri latericia ad hostium turrim murumque perducerent, facere instituerunt; cuius musculi haec erat forma. Duae primum trabes in solo aequae longae distantes inter se pedes IIII collocantur, inque eis columellae pedum in altitudinem V defiguntur. Has inter se capreolis molli fastigio coniungunt, ubi tigna, quae musculi tegendi causa

ponant, collocentur. Eo super tigna bipedalia iniciunt eaque laminis clavisque religant. Ad extremum musculi tectum trabesque extremas quadratas regulas IIII patentes digitos defigunt, quae lateres, qui super musculo struantur, contineant. Ita fastigato atque ordinatim structo, ut trabes erant in capreolis collocatae, lateribus lutoque musculus, ut ab igni, qui ex muro iaceretur, tutus esset, contegitur. Super lateres coria inducuntur, ne canalibus aqua immissa lateres diluere posset Coria autem, ne rursus igni ac lapidibus corrumpantur, centonibus conteguntur. Hoc opus omne tectum vineis ad ipsam turrim perficiunt subitoque inopinantibus hostibus machinatione navali, phalangis subiectis, ad turrim hostium admovent, ut aedificio iungatur.

2:11. The townsmen, affrighted at this unexpected stroke, bring forward with levers the largest stones they can procure, and pitching them from the wall, roll them down on the musculus. The strength of the timber withstood the shock; and whatever fell on it slid off, on account of the sloping roof. When they perceived this, they altered their plan, and set fire to barrels, filled with resin and tar, and rolled them down from the wall on the musculus. As soon as they fell on it, they slid off again, and were removed from its side by long poles and forks. In the mean time, the soldiers, under cover of the musculus, were rooting out with crow- bars the lowest stones of the enemy's turret, with which the foundation was laid. The musculus was defended by darts, thrown from engines by our men from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten off from the wall and turrets; nor was a fair opportunity of defending the walls given them. At length several stones being picked away from the foundation of that turret next the musculus, part of it fell down suddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned forward.

Quo malo perterriti subito oppidani saxa quam maxima possunt vectibus promovent praecipitataque muro in musculum devolvunt. Ictum firmitas materiae sustinet, et quicquid incidit fastigio musculi elabitur. Id ubi vident, mutant consilium: cupas taeda ac pice refertas incendunt easque de muro in musculum devolvunt. Involutae labuntur, delapsae ab lateribus longuriis furcisque ab opere removentur. Interim sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium, quibus fundamenta continebantur, convellunt. Musculus ex turri latericia a nostris telis tormentisque defenditur; hostes ex muro ac turibus submoventur: non datur libera muri defendendi facultas. Compluribus iam lapidibus ex ea, quae suberat, turri subductis repentina ruina pars eius turris concidit, pars reliqua consequens procumbebat: cum hostes urbis direptione perterriti inermes cum infulis se porta foras universi proripiunt ad legatos atque exercitum supplices manus tendunt.

2:12. Hereupon, the enemy distressed at the sudden fall of the turret, surprised at the unforeseen calamity, awed by the wrath of the gods, and dreading the pillage of their city, rush all together out of the gate unarmed, with their temples bound with fillets, and suppliantly stretch out their hands to the officers and the army. At this uncommon occurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped, and the soldiers, turning away from the battle, ran eagerly to hear and listen to them. When the enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they all fell down at their feet, and besought them “to wait till Caesar’s arrival; they saw that their city was taken, our works completed, and their tower undermined, therefore they desisted from a defense; that no obstacle could arise, to prevent their being instantly plundered at a beck, as soon as he arrived, if they refused to submit to his orders.” They inform them that, “if the turret had

entirely fallen down, the soldiers could not be withheld from forcing into the town and sacking it, in hopes of getting spoil.” These and several other arguments to the same effect were delivered, as they were a people of great learning, with great pathos and lamentations.

Qua nova re oblata omnis administratio belli consistit, militesque aversi a proelio ad studium audiendi et cognoscendi feruntur. Ubi hostes ad legatos exercitumque pervenerunt, universi se ad pedes proiciunt; orant, ut adventus Caesaris exspectetur: captam suam urbem videre: opera perfecta, turrim subrutam; itaque ab defensione desistere. Nullam exoriri moram posse, quo minus, cum venisset, si imperata non facerent ad nutum, e vestigio diriperentur. Docent, si omnino turris concidisset, non posse milites contineri, quin spe praedae in urbem irrumperent urbemque delerent. Haec atque eiusdem generis complura ut ab hominibus doctis magna cum misericordia fletuque pronuntiantur.

2:13. The lieutenants moved with compassion, draw off the soldiers from the work, desist from the assault, and leave sentinels on the works. A sort of truce having been made through compassion for the besieged, the arrival of Caesar is anxiously awaited; not a dart was thrown from the walls or by our men, but all remit their care and diligence, as if the business was at an end. For Caesar had given Trebonius strict charge not to suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest the soldiers, too much irritated both by abhorrence of their revolt, by the contempt shown to them, and by their long labor, should put to the sword all the grown up inhabitants, as they threatened to do. And it was with difficulty that they were then restrained from breaking into the town, and they were much displeased, because they imagined that they were prevented by

Trebonius from taking possession of it.

Quibus rebus commoti legati milites ex opere deducunt, oppugnatione desistunt; operibus custodias relinquunt. Indutiarum quodam genere misericordia facto adventus Caesaris exspectatur. Nullum ex muro, nullum a nostris mittitur telum; ut re confecta omnes curam et diligentiam remittunt. Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat, ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui et diutino labore omnes puberes interficerent; quod se facturos minabantur, aegreque tunc sunt retenti, quin oppidum irrumperent, graviterque cum rem tulerunt, quod stetisse per Trebonium, quo minus oppido potirentur, videbatur.

2:14. But the enemy, destitute of all honor, only waited a time and opportunity for fraud and treachery. And after an interval of some days, when our men were careless and negligent, on a sudden, at noon, when some were dispersed, and others indulging themselves in rest on the very works, after the fatigue of the day, and their arms were all laid by and covered up, they sallied out from the gates, and, the wind being high and favorable to them, they set fire to our works; and the wind spread it in such a manner that, in the same instant, the agger, plutei, testudo, tower, and engines all caught the flames and were consumed before we could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed at such an unexpected turn of fortune, lay hold on such arms as they could find. Some rush from the camp; an attack is made on the enemy: but they were prevented, by arrows and engines from the walls; from pursuing them when they fled. They retired to their walls, and there, without fear, set the musculus and brick tower on fire. Thus, by the perfidy of the enemy and the violence of the storm,

the labor of many months was destroyed in a moment. The Massilians made the same attempt the next day, having got such another storm. They sallied out against the other tower and agger, and fought with more confidence. But as our men had on the former occasion given up all thoughts of a contest, so, warned by the event of the preceding day, they had made every preparation for a defense. Accordingly, they slew several, and forced the rest to retreat into the town without effecting their design.

At hostes sine fide tempus atque occasionem fraudis ac doli quaerunt interiectisque aliquot diebus nostris languentibus atque animo remissis subito meridiano tempore, cum alius discessisset, alius ex diutino labore in ipsis operibus quieti se dedisset, arma vero omnia reposita contactaque essent, portis se foras erumpunt, secundo magnoque vento ignem operibus inferunt. Hunc sic distulit ventus, uti uno tempore agger, pluvi, testudo, turris, tormenta flammam conciperent et prius haec omnia consumerentur, quam, quemadmodum accidisset, animadverti posset. Nostri repentina fortuna permoti arma, quae possunt, arripiunt; alii ex castris sese incitant. Fit in hostes impetus; sed de muro sagittis tormentisque fugientes persequi prohibentur. Illi sub murum se recipiunt ibique musculum turrimque latericiam libere incendunt. Ita multorum mensium labor hostium perfidia et vi tempestatis puncto temporis interiit. Temptaverunt hoc idem Massilienses postero die. Eandem nacti tempestatem maiore cum fiducia ad alteram turrim aggeremque eruptione pugnaverunt multumque ignem intulerunt. Sed ut superioris temporis contentionem nostri omnem remiserant, ita proximi diei casu admoniti omnia ad defensionem paraverant. Itaque multis interfectis reliquos infecta re in oppidum reppulerunt.

2:15. Trebonius began to provide and repair what had been destroyed, with much greater zeal on the part of the soldiers; for when they saw that their extraordinary pains and preparations had an unfortunate issue, they were fired with indignation that, in consequence of the impious violation of the truce, their valor should be held in derision. There was no place left them from which the materials for their mound could be fetched, in consequence of all the timber, far and wide, in the territories of the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away; they began therefore to make an agger of a new construction, never heard of before, of two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floors over them of almost the same breadth with the agger, made of timber. But wherever the space between the walls, or the weakness of the timber, seemed to require it, pillars were placed underneath and traversed beams laid on to strengthen the work, and the space which was floored was covered over with hurdles, and the hurdles plastered over with mortar. The soldiers, covered over head by the floor, on the right and left by the wall, and in the front by the mantlets, carried whatever materials were necessary for the building without danger: the business was soon finished-the loss of their laborious work was soon repaired by the dexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates for making sallies were left in the wall in such places as they thought proper.

Trebonius ea, quae sunt amissa, multo majore militum studio administrare et reficere instituit. Nam ubi tantos suos labores et apparatus male cecidisse viderunt indutiisque per scelus violatis suam virtutem irrisui fore perdoluerunt, quod, unde agger omnino comportari posset, nihil erat reliquum, omnibus arboribus longe lateque in finibus Massiliensium excisis et convectis, aggerem novi generis atque inauditum ex latericiis duobus muris senum pedum

crassitudine atque eorum murorum contignatione facere instituerunt aequa fere altitudine, atque ille congesticius ex materia fuerat agger. Ubi aut spatium inter muros aut imbecillitas materiae postulare videretur, pilae interponuntur, traversaria tigna iniciuntur, quae firmamento esse possint, et quicquid est contignatum cratibus consternitur, crates luto integuntur. Sub tecto miles dextra ac sinistra muro tectus, adversus plutei obiectu, operi quaecumque sunt usui sine periculo supportat. Celeriter res administratur; diuturni laboris detrimentum sollertia et virtute militum brevi reconciliatur. Portae, quibus locis videtur, eruptionis causa in muro relinquuntur.

2:16. But when the enemy perceived that those works, which they had hoped could not be replaced without a great length of time, were put into so thorough repair by a few day's labor and diligence, that there was no room for perfidy or sallies, and that no means were left them by which they could either hurt the men by resistance or the works by fire, and when they found by former examples that their town could be surrounded with a wall and turrets on every part by which it was accessible by land, in such a manner that they could not have room to stand on their own fortifications, because our works were built almost on the top of their walls by our army, and darts could be thrown from our hands, and when they perceived that all advantage arising from their engines, on which they had built great hopes, was totally lost, and that though they had an opportunity of fighting with us on equal terms from walls and turrets, they could perceive that they were not equal to our men in bravery, they had recourse to the same proposals of surrender as before.

Quod ubi hostes viderunt, ea, quae vix longinquo spatio refici non posse sperassent, paucorum dierum opera et labore ita refecta, ut

nullus perfidiae neque eruptioni locus esset nec quicquam omnino relinqueretur, qua aut telis militibus aut igni operibus noceri posset, eodemque exemplo sentiunt totam urbem, qua sit aditus ab terra, muro turribusque circumiri posse, sic ut ipsis consistendi in suis munitionibus locus non esset, cum paene inaedificata muris ab exercitu nostro moenia viderentur ac telum manu coniceretur, suorumque tormentorum usum, quibus ipsi magna speravissent, spatio propinquitatis interire parique condicione ex muro ac turribus bellandi data se virtute nostris adaequare non posse intellegunt, ad easdem deditionis condiciones recurrunt.

2:17. In Further Spain, Marcus Varro, in the beginning of the disturbances, when he heard of the circumstances which took place in Italy, being diffident of Pompey's success, used to speak in a very friendly manner of Caesar. That though, being pre-engaged to Cneius Pompey in quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honor to him, that, nevertheless, there existed a very intimate tie between him and Caesar; that he was not ignorant of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who bore an office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the disposition of the whole province to Caesar. These sentiments he constantly expressed in his ordinary conversation, and did not attach himself to either party. But afterward, when he found that Caesar was detained before Massilia, that the forces of Petreius had effected a junction with the army of Afranius, that considerable reinforcements had come to their assistance, that there were great hopes and expectations, and heard that the whole Hither province had entered into a confederacy, and of the difficulties to which Caesar was reduced afterward at Ilerda for want of provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller and more exaggerated account of these matters, he began to regulate his movements by those of fortune.

M. Varro in ulteriore Hispania initio cognitis eis rebus, quae sunt in Italia gestae, diffidens Pompeianis rebus amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: pracoccupatum sese legatione ab Cn. Pompeio teneri obstrictum fide; necessitudinem quidem sibi nihilo minorem cum Caesare intercedere, neque se ignorare, quod esset officium legati, qui fiduciarium operam obtineret, quae vires suae, quae voluntas erga Caesarem totius provinciae. Haec omnibus ferebat sermonibus neque se in ullam partem movebat. Postea vero, cum Caesarem ad Massiliam detineri cognovit, copias Petreii cum exercitu Afranii esse coniunctas, magna auxilia convenisse, magna esse in spe atque exspectari et consentire omnem citeriorem provinciam, quaeque postea acciderant, de angustiis ad Ilerdam rei fumentariae, accepit, atque haec ad eum latius atque inflatius Afranius perscribebat, se quoque ad motus fortunae movere coepit.

2:18. He made levies throughout the province; and, having completed his two legions, he added to them about thirty auxiliary cohorts; he collected a large quantity of corn to send partly to the Masilians, partly to Afranius and Petreius. He commanded the inhabitants of Gades to build ten ships of war; besides, he took care that several others should be built in Spain. He removed all the money and ornaments from the temple of Hercules to the town of Gades, and sent six cohorts thither from the province to guard them, and gave the command of the town of Gades to Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend of Domitius, who had come thither sent by Domitius to recover an estate for him; and he deposited all the arms, both public and private, in Gallonius's house. He himself [Varro] made severe harangues against Caesar. He often pronounced from his tribunal that Caesar had fought several unsuccessful battles, and that a great number of his men had deserted to Afranius. That he had

these accounts from undoubted messengers, and authority on which he could rely. By these means he terrified the Roman citizens of that province, and obliged them to promise him for the service of the state one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight of silver, and a hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat. He laid heavier burdens on those states which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar, and billeted troops on them; he passed judgment against some private persons, and condemned to confiscation the properties of those who had spoken or made orations against the republic, and forced the whole province to take an oath of allegiance to him and Pompey. Being informed of all that happened in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. This was his plan of operations. He was to retire with his two legions to Gades, and to lay up all the shipping and provisions there. For he had been informed that the whole province was inclined to favor Caesar's party. He thought that the war might be easily protracted in an island, if he was provided with corn and shipping. Caesar, although called back to Italy by many and important matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of war behind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had many dependents and clients in the hither province.

Delectum habuit tota provincia, legionibus completis duabus cohortes circiter XXX alarias addidit. Frumenti magnum numerum coegit, quod Massiliensibus, item quod Afranio Petreioque mitteret. Naves longas X Gaditanis ut facerent imperavit, complures praeterea Hispali faciendas curavit. Pecuniam omnem omniaque ornamenta ex fano Herculis in oppidum Gades contulit; eo sex cohortes praesidii causa ex provincia misit Gaiumque Gallonium, equitem Romanum, familiarem Domitii, qui eo procurandae hereditatis causa venerat missus a Domitio, oppido Gadibus praefecit; arma omnia privata ac

publica in domum Gallonii contulit. Ipse habuit graves in Caesarem contiones. Saepe ex tribunali praedicavit adversa Caesarem proelia fecisse, magnum numerum ab eo militum ad Afranium perfugisse: haec se certis nuntiis, certis auctoribus comperisse. Quibus rebus perterritos cives Romanos eius provinciae sibi ad rem publicam administrandam HS[CLXXX] [18,000,000] et argenti pondo XX milia, tritici modium CXX milia polliceri coegit. Quas Caesari esse amicas civitates arbitrabatur, his graviora onera iniungebat praesidiaque eo deducebat et iudicia in privatos reddebat qui verba atque orationem adversus rem publicam habuissent: eorum bona in publicum addicebat, Provinciam omnem in sua et Pompei verba iusiurandum adigebat. Cognitis eis rebus, quae sunt gestae in citeriore Hispania, bellum parabat. Ratio autem haec erat belli, ut se cum II legionibus Gades conferret, naves frumentumque omne ibi contineret; provinciam enim omnem Caesaris rebus favere cognoverat. In insula frumento navibusque comparatis bellum duci non difficile existimabat. Caesar, etsi multis necessariisque rebus in Italiam revocabatur, tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispaniis relinquere, quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat.

2:19. Having therefore sent two legions into Further Spain under the command of Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people; he himself advances with six hundred horse by forced marches, and issues a proclamation, appointing a day on which the magistrates and nobility of all the states should attend him at Corduba. This proclamation being published through the whole province, there was not a state that did not send a part of their senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and not a Roman citizen of any note but appeared that day. At the same time the senate at Corduba shut the gates of their own

accord against Varro, and posted guards and sentinels on the wall and in the turrets, and detained two cohorts (called *Colonicae*, which had come there accidentally), for the defense of the town. About the same time the people of Carmona, which is by far the strongest state in the whole province, of themselves drove out of the town the cohorts, and shut the gates against them, although three cohorts had been detached by Varro to garrison the citadel.

Itaque duabus legionibus missis in ulteriorem Hispaniam cum Q. Cassio, tribuno plebis, ipse DC cum equitibus magnis itineribus progreditur edictumque praemittit, ad quam diem magistratus principesque omnium civitatum sibi esse praesto Cordubae vellet. Quo edicto tota provincia pervulgato nulla fuit civitas, quin ad id tempus partem senatus Cordubam mitteret, non civis Romanus paulo notior, quin ad diem conveniret. Simul ipse Cordubae conventus per se portas Varroni clausit, custodias vigiliasque in turribus muroque disposuit, cohortes duas, quae colonicae appellabantur, cum eo casu venissent, tuendi oppidi causa apud se retinuit. Eisdem diebus Carmo nenses, quae est longe firmissima totius provinciae civitas, deductis tribus in arcem oppidi cohortibus a Varrone praesidio, per se cohortes eiecit portasque praeclusit.

2:20. But Varro was in greater haste on this account to reach Gades with his legion as soon as possible, lest he should be stopped either on his march or on crossing over to the island. The affection of the province to Caesar proved so great and so favorable, that he received a letter from Gades, before he was far advanced on his march: that as soon as the nobility of Gades heard of Caesar's proclamation, they had combined with the tribune of the cohorts, which were in garrison there, to drive Gallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and

island for Caesar. That having agreed on the design they had sent notice to Gallonius, to quit Gades of his own accord while he could do it with safety; if he did not, they would take measures for themselves; that for fear of this Gallonius had been induced to quit the town. When this was known, one of Varro's two legions, which was called Vernacula, carried off the colors from Varro's camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired to Hispalis, and took post in the market and public places without doing any injury, and the Roman citizens residing there approved so highly of this act, that every one most earnestly offered to entertain them in their houses. When Varro, terrified at these things, having altered his route, proposed going to Italica, he was informed by his friends that the gates were shut against him. Then indeed, when intercepted from every road, he sends word to Caesar, that he was ready to deliver up the legion which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus Caesar, and orders him to deliver it up to him. Varro, having delivered up the legion, went to Caesar to Corduba, and having laid before him the public accounts, handed over to him most faithfully whatever money he had, and told him what quantity of corn and shipping he had, and where.

Hoc vero magis properare Varro, ut cum legionibus quam primum Gades contenderet, ne itinere aut traiectu intercluderetur: tanta ac tam secunda in Caesarem voluntas provinciae reperiebatur. Progresso ei paulo longius litterae Gadibus redduntur: simulatque sit cognitum de edicto Caesaris, consensisse Gaditanos principes eum tribunis cohortium, quae essent ibi in praesidio, ut Gallonium ex oppido expellerent, urbem insulamque Caesari servarent. Hoc inito consilio denunciavisse Gallonio, ut sua sponte, dum sine periculo liceret, excederet Gadibus; si id non fecisset, sibi consilium capturos. Hoc

timore adductum Gallonium Gadibus excessisse. His cognitis rebus altera ex duabus legionibus, quae vernacula appellabatur, ex castris Varronis adstante et inspectante ipso signa sustulit seseque Hispalim recepit atque in foro et porticibus sine maleficio consedit. Quod factum adeo eius conventus cives Romani comprobaverunt, ut domum ad se quisque hospitio cupidissime reciperet. Quibus rebus perterritus Varro, cum itinere converso sese Italicam venturum praemisisset, certior ab suis factus est praeclusas esse portas. Tum vero omni interclusus itinere ad Caesarem mittit, paratum se esse legionem, cui iusserit, tradere. Ille ad eum Sextum Caesarem mittit atque huic tradi iubet. Tradita legione Varro Cordubam ad Caesarem venit; relatis ad eum publicis cum fide rationibus quod penes eum est pecuniae tradit et, quid ubique habeat frumenti et navium, ostendit.

2:21. Caesar made a public oration at Corduba, in which he returned thanks to all severally: to the Roman citizens, because they had been zealous to keep the town in their own power; to the Spaniards, for having driven out the garrison; to the Gaditani, for having defeated the attempts of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the Tribunes and Centurions who had gone there as a guard, for having by their valor confirmed them in their purpose. He remitted the tax which the Roman citizens had promised to Varro for the public use: he restored their goods to those who he was informed had incurred that penalty by speaking too freely, having given public and private rewards to some he filled the rest with flattering hopes of his future intentions; and having staid two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades; he ordered the money and ornaments which had been carried away from the temple of Hercules, and lodged in the houses of private persons, to be replaced in the temple. He made Quintus Cassius governor of the province, and assigned him four legions. He

himself, with those ships which Marcus Varro had built, and others which the Gaditani had built by Varro's orders, arrived in a few days at Tarraco, where ambassadors from the greatest part of the nearer province waited his arrival. Having in the same manner conferred marks of honor both publicly and privately on some states, he left Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence to Massilia. There he was informed that a law was passed for creating a dictator, and that he had been nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus the praetor.

Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus Romanis, quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere; Hispanis, quod praesidia expulissent; Gaditanis, quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque in libertatem vindicassent; tribunis militum centurionibusque, qui eo praesidii causa venerant, quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmassent. Pecunias, quas erant in publicum Varroni cives Romani polliciti, remittit; bona restituit eis, quos liberius locutos hanc poenam tulisse cognoverat. Tributis quibusdam populis publicis privatisque praemiis reliquos in posterum bona spe complet biduumque Cordubae commoratus Gades proficiscitur; pecunias monumentaque, quae ex fano Herculis collata erant in privatam domum, referri in templum iubet. Provinciae Q. Cassium praeficit; huic III legiones attribuit. Ipse eis navibus, quas M. Varro quasque Gaditani iussu Varronis fecerant, Tarraconem paucis diebus pervenit. Ibi totius fere citerioris provinciae legationes Caesaris adventum exspectabant. Eadem ratione privatim ac publice quibusdam civitatibus habitis honoribus Tarracone discedit pedibusque Narbonem atque inde Massiliam perverit, Ibi legem de dictatore latam seseque dictatorem dictum a M. Lepido praetore cognoscit.

2:22. The Massilians, wearied out by misfortunes of every sort, reduced to the lowest ebb for want of corn, conquered in two engagements at sea, defeated in their frequent sallies, and struggling moreover with a fatal pestilence, from their long confinement and change of victuals (for they all subsisted on old millet and damaged barley, which they had formerly provided and laid up in the public stores against an emergency of this kind), their turret being demolished, a great part of their wall having given way, and despairing of any aid, either from the provinces or their armies, for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar's power, resolved to surrender now without dissimulation. But a few days before, Lucius Domitius, having discovered the intention of the Massilians, and having procured three ships, two of which he gave up to his friends, went on board the third himself, having got a brisk wind, put out to sea. Some ships, which by Brutus's orders were constantly cruising near the port, having espied him, weighed anchor, and pursued him. But of these, the ship on board of which he was, persevered itself, and continuing its flight, and by the aid of the wind got out of sight: the other two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys put back again into the harbor. The Massilians conveyed their arms and engines out of the town, as they were ordered: brought their ships out of the port and docks, and delivered up the money in their treasury. When these affairs were dispatched, Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to their renown and antiquity than to any claim they could lay to his favor, left two legions in garrison there, sent the rest to Italy, and set out himself for Rome.

Massilienses omnibus defessi malis, rei frumentariae ad summam inopiam adducti, bis navali proelio superati, crebris eruptionibus fusi, gravi etiam pestilentia conflictati ex diutina conclusione et mutatione

victus (panico enim vetere atque hordeo corrupto omnes alebantur, quod ad huiusmodi casus antiquitus paratum in publicum contulerant) deiecta turri, labefacta magna parte muri, auxiliis provinciarum et exercituum desperatis, quos in Caesaris potestatem venisse cognoverant, sese dedere sine fraude constituunt. Sed paucis ante diebus L. Domitius cognita Massiliensium voluntate navibus III comparatis, ex quibus duas familiaribus suis attribuerat, unam ipse conscenderat nactus turbidam tempestatem profectus est. Hunc conspicatae naves, quae iussu Bruti consuetudine cotidiana ad portum excubabant, sublati ancoris sequi coeperunt. Ex his unum ipsius navigium contendit et fugere perseveravit auxilioque tempestatis ex conspectu abiit, duo perterrita concursustrarum navium sese in portum receperunt. Massilienses arma tormenta ex oppido, ut est imperatum, proferunt, naves ex portu navalibusque educunt, pecuniam ex publico tradunt. Quibus rebus confectis Caesar magis eos pro nomine et vetustate, quam pro meritis in se civitatis conservans duas ibi legiones praesidio relinquit, ceteras in Italiam mittit; ipse ad urbem proficiscitur.

2:23. About the same time Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily to Africa, and from the first despising the forces of Publius Attius Varus, transported only two of the four legions which he had received from Caesar, and five hundred horse, and having spent two days and three nights on the voyage, arrived at a place called Aquilaria, which is about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and in the summer season has a convenient harbor, and is inclosed by two projecting promontories. Lucius Caesar the son, who was waiting his arrival near Clupea with ten ships which had been taken near Utica in a war with the pirates, and which Publius Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at the number of our ships, fled

the sea, and running his three-decked covered galley on the nearest shore, left her there and made his escape by land to Adrumetum. Caius Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion, guarded this town. The rest of Caesar's fleet, after his flight, retired to Adrumetum. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, pursued him with twelve ships, which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy to the merchantmen, and seeing a ship left on the shore, he brought her off by a towing rope, and returned with his fleet to Curio.

Eisdem temporibus C. Curio in Africam profectus ex Sicilia et iam ab initio copias P. Attii Vari despiciens duas legiones ex IIII, quas a Caesare acceperat, D equites transportabat biduoque et noctibus tribus navigatione consumptis appellit ad eum locum, qui appellatur Anquillaria. Hic locus abest a Clupeis passuum XXII milia habetque non incommodam aestate stationem et duobus eminentibus promuntoriis continetur. Huius adventum L. Caesar filius cum X longis navibus ad Clupea praestolans, quas naves Uticae ex praedonum bello subductas P. Attius reficiendas huius belli causa curaverat, veritus navium multitudinem ex alto refugerat appulsaque ad proximum litus trireme constrata et in litore relictas pedibus Adrumetum perfugerat. Id oppidum C. Considius Longus unius legionis praesidio tuebatur. Reliquae Caesaris naves eius fuga se Adrumetum receperunt. Hunc secutus Marcius Rufas quaestor navibus XII, quas praesidio onerariis navibus Curio ex Sicilia eduxerat, postquam in litore relictam navem conspexit, hanc remulco abstraxit; ipse ad C. Curionem cum classe redit.

2:24. Curio detached Marcus before with the fleet to Utica, and marched thither with his army. Having advanced two days, he came to the river Bagrada, and there left Caius Caninius Rebilus, the

lieutenant, with the legions; and went forward himself with the horse to view the Cornelian camp, because that was reckoned a very eligible position for encamping. It is a straight ridge, projecting into the sea, steep and rough on both sides, but the ascent is more gentle on that part which lies opposite Utica. It is not more than a mile distant from Utica in a direct line. But on this road there is a spring, to which the sea comes up, and overflows; an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person would avoid it, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town.

Curio Marcium Uticam navibus praemittit; ipse eodem cum exercitu proficiscitur biduque iter progressus ad flumen Bagradam pervenit. Ibi C. Caninium Rebilum legatum cum legionibus reliquit; ipse cum equitatu antecedit ad castra exploranda Cornelia, quod is locus peridoneus castris habebatur. Id autem est iugum directum eminens in mare, utraque ex parte praeruptum atque asperum, sed tamen paulo leniore fastigio ab ea parte, quae ad Uticam vergit. Abest directo itinere ab Utica paulo amplius passuum milibus III. Sed hoc itinere est fons, quo mare succedit longius, lateque is locus restagnat; quem si qui vitare voluerit, sex milium circuitu in oppidum pervenit.

2:25. Having examined this place, Curio got a view of Varus's camp, joining the wall and town, at the gate called Bellica, well fortified by its natural situation, on one side by the town itself, on the other by a theater which is before the town, the approaches to the town being rendered difficult and narrow by the very extensive out- buildings of that structure. At the same time he observed the roads very full of carriages and cattle, which they were conveying from the country into the town on the sudden alarm. He sent his cavalry after them to plunder them and get the spoil. And at the same time Varus had

detached as a guard for them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred foot, which king Juba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries a few days before. There was a friendship subsisting between his [Juba's] father and Pompey, and a feud between him and Curio, because he, when a tribune of the people, had proposed a law, in which he endeavored to make public property of the kingdom of Juba. The horse engaged; but the Numidians were not able to stand our first charge; but a hundred and twenty being killed, the rest retreated into their camp near the town. In the mean time, on the arrival of his men of war, Curio ordered proclamation to be made to the merchant ships, which lay at anchor before Utica, in number about two hundred, that he would treat as enemies all that did not set sail immediately for the Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation was made, in an instant they all weighed anchor and left Utica, and repaired to the place commanded them. This circumstance furnished the army with plenty of every thing.

Hoc explorato loco Curio castra Vari conspicit muro oppidoque coniuncta ad portam, quae appellatur Belica, admodum munita natura loci, una ex parte ipso oppido Utica, altero a theatro, quod est ante oppidum, substructionibus eius operis maximis, aditu ad castra difficili et angusto. Simul animadvertit multa undique portari atque agi plenissimis viis, quae repentini tumultus timore ex agris in urbem conferantur. Huc equitatum mittit, ut diriperet atque haberet loco praedae; eodemque tempore his rebus subsidio DC Numidae ex oppido peditesque CCCC mittuntur a Varo, quos auxilii causa rex Iuba paucis diebus ante Uticam miserat. Huic et paternum hospitium cum Pompeio et simultas cum Curione intercedebat, quod tribunus plebis legem promulgaverat, qua lege regnum Iubae publicaverat. Concurrent equites inter se; neque vero primum impetum nostrorum

Numidae ferre potuerunt, sed interfectis circiter CXX reliqui se in castra ad oppidum receperunt. Interim adventu longarum navium Curio pronuntiare onerariis navibus iubet, quae stabant ad Uticam numero circiter CC, se in hostium habiturum loco, qui non e vestigio ad castra Cornelia naves traduxisset. Qua pronuntiatione facta temporis puncto sublatis ancoris omnes Uticam relinquunt et quo imperatum est transeunt. Quae res omnium rerum copia complevit exercitum.

2:26. After these transactions, Curio returned to his camp to Bragada; and by a general shout of the whole army was saluted imperator. The next day he led his army to Utica, and encamped near the town. Before the works of the camp were finished, the horse upon guard brought him word that a large supply of horse and foot sent by king Juba were on their march to Utica, and at the same time a cloud of dust was observed, and in a moment the front of the line was in sight. Curio, surprised at the suddenness of the affair, sent on the horse to receive their first charge, and detain them. He immediately called off his legions from the work, and put them in battle array. The horse began the battle: and before the legions could be completely marshaled and take their ground, the king's entire forces being thrown into disorder and confusion, because they had marched without any order, and were under no apprehensions, betake themselves to flight: almost all the enemy's horse being safe, because they made a speedy retreat into the town along the shore, Caesar's soldiers slay a great number of their infantry.

His rebus gestis Curio se in castra ad Bagradam recipit atque universi exercitus conclamatione imperator appellatur posteroque die exercitum Uticam ducit et prope oppidum castra ponit. Nondum

opere castrorum perfecto equites ex statione nuntiant magna auxilia equitum peditumque ab rege missa Uticam venire; eodemque tempore vis magna pulveris cernebatur, et vestigio temporis primum agmen erat in conspectu. Novitate rei Curio permotus praemittit equites, qui primum impetum sustineant ac morentur; ipse celeriter ab opere deductis legionibus aciem instruit. Equitesque committunt proelium et, priusquam plane legiones explicari et consistere possent, tota auxilia regis impedita ac perturbata, quod nullo ordine et sine timore iter fecerant, in fugam coniciunt equitatuque omni fere incolumi, quod se per litora celeriter in oppidum recepit, magnum peditum numerum interficiunt.

2:27. The next night two Marsian centurions with twenty-two men belonging to the companies, deserted from Curio's camp to Attius Varus. They, whether they uttered the sentiments which they really entertained, or wished to gratify Varus (for what we wish we readily give credit to, and what we think ourselves, we hope is the opinion of other men), assured him, that the minds of the whole army were disaffected to Curio, that it was very expedient that the armies should be brought in view of each other, and an opportunity of a conference be given. Induced by their opinion, Varus the next day led his troops out of the camp: Curio did so in like manner, and with only one small valley between them, each drew up his forces.

Proxima nocte centuriones Marsi duo ex castris Curionis cum manipularibus suis XXII ad Attium Varum perfugiunt. Hi, sive vere quam habuerant opinionem ad eum perferunt, sive etiam auribus Vari serviunt (nam, quae volumus, et credimus libenter et, quae sentimus ipsi, reliquos sentire speramus), confirmant quidem certe totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione maximeque opus esse in

conspectum exercitus venire et colloquendi dare facultatem. Qua opinione adductus Varus postero die mane legiones ex castris educit. Facit idem Curio, atque una valle non magna interiecta suas uterque copias instruit.

2:28. In Varus's army there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus who, as we have mentioned before, was at Corfinium. When Caesar gave him his liberty, he went over to Africa; now, Curio had transported to Africa those legions which Caesar had received under his command a short time before at Corfinium; so that the officers and companies were still the same, excepting the change of a few centurions. Quintilius, making this a pretext for addressing them, began to go round Curio's lines, and to entreat the soldiers "not to lose all recollection of the oath which they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear arms against those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the same hardships in a siege, nor fight for those by whom they had been opprobriously called deserters." To this he added a few words by way of encouragement, what they might expect from his own liberality, if they should follow him and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, no intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio's army, and thus both generals led back their troops to their camp.

Erat in exercitu Vari Sextus Quintilius Varus, quem fuisse Corfinii supra demonstratum est. Hic dimissus a Caesare in Africam venerat, legionesque eas traduxerat Curio, quas superioribus temporibus Corfinlo receperat Caesar, adeo ut paucis mutatis centurionibus eidem ordines manipulique constarent. Hanc nactus appellationis causam Quintilius circuire aciem Curionis atque obsecrare milites coepit, ne primam sacramenti, quod apud Domitium atque apud se

quaestorem dixissent, memoriam deponerent, neu contra eos arma ferrent, qui eadem essent usi fortuna eademque in obsidione perpessi, neu pro his pugnarent, a quibus cum contumelia perfugae appellarentur. Huc pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae ab sua liberalitate, si se atque Attium secuti essent, expectare deberent. Hac habita oratione nullam in partem ab exercitu Curionis fit significatio, atque ita suas uterque copias reducit.

2:29. However, a great and general fear spread through Curio's camp, for it is soon increased by the various discourses of men. For every one formed an opinion of his own; and to what he had heard from others, added his own apprehensions. When this had spread from a single author to several persons, and was handed from one another, there appeared to be many authors for such sentiments as these: "That it was a civil war; that they were men; and therefore that it was lawful for them to act freely, and follow which party they pleased." These were the legions which a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the custom of offering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had changed Caesar's kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in general did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those which passed in the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiers heard them with displeasure. Some additions were also made to them by those who wished to be thought more zealous in their duty.

At in castris Curionis magnus omnium incessit timor animis. Is variis hominum sermonibus celeriter augetur. Unusquisque enim opiniones fingeat et ad id, quod ab alio audierat, sui aliquid timoris addebat. Hoc ubi uno auctore ad plures permanaverat, atque alius alii tradiderat, plures auctores eius rei videbantur. Civile bellum; genus

hominum, cui liceret libere facere et sequi, quod vellet; legiones eae, quae paulo ante apud adversarios fuerant, nam etiam Caesaris beneficium mutaverat consuetudo, qua offerrentur; municipia etiam diversis partibus coniuncta, namque ex Marsis Pelignisque veniebant ei qui superiore nocte: haec in contuberniis commilitesque nonnulli graviora; sermones militum dubii durius accipiebantur, nonnulli etiam ab eis, qui diligentiores videri volebant, fingeantur.

2:30. For these reasons, having called a council, Curio began to deliberate on the general welfare. There were some opinions, which advised by all means an attempt to be made, and an attack on Varus's camp; for when such sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, they thought idleness was improper. In short, they said "that it was better bravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to be deserted and surrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit to the greatest cruelties." There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought to withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longer interval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way of thinking; and also, that if any misfortune should befall them, they might have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the great number of their ships.

Quibus de causis consilio convocato de summa rerum deliberare incipit. Erant sententiae, quae conandum omnibus modis castraque Vari oppugnanda censerent, quod in huiusmodi militum consiliis otium maxime contrarium esse arbitrarentur; postremo praestare dicebant per virtutem in pugna belli fortunam experiri, quam desertos et circumventos ab suis gravissimum supplicium perpeti. Erant, qui censerent de tertia vigilia in castra Cornelia recedendum, ut maiore spatio temporis interiecto militum mentes sanarentur, simul, si quid

gravius accidisset, magna multitudine navium et tutius et facilius in Siciliam receptus daretur.

2:31. Curio, censuring both measures, said, “that the one was as deficient in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the latter advised a shameful flight, and the former recommended us to engage at a great disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we rely that we can storm a camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed, what advantage do we gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered considerable loss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of his army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp imply but a shameful flight and universal despair, and the alienation of the army? For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they are distrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear them; because our fears augment the licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal of the former. But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of the reports of the disaffection of the army (which I indeed am confident are either altogether groundless, or at least less than they are supposed to be), how much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it, than by our conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an army to be as carefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increase the enemy’s hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight, in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have a fairer opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either by shame or fear, to the display of which the night is most averse. Wherefore, I am neither so rash as to give my opinion that we ought to attack their camp without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fear as to despond: and I imagine that every expedient ought first to be tried; and I am in a great degree confident that I shall form the same opinions as

yourselves on this matter.”

Curio utrumque improbens consilium, quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi, tantum alteri superesse dicebat: hos turpissimae fugae rationem habere, illos etiam iniquo loco dimicandum putare. “Qua enim,” inquit, “fiducia et opere et natura loci munitissima castra expugnari posse confidimus? Aut vero quid proficimus, si accepto magno detrimento ab oppugnatione castrorum discedimus? Quasi non et felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia colligant! Castrorum autem mutatio quid habet nisi turpem fugam et desperationem omnium et alienationem exercitus? Nam neque prudentes suspicari oportet sibi parum credi, neque improbos scire sese timeri, quod his licentiam timor augeat noster, illis studia deminuat.” “Quod si iam,” inquit, “haec explorata habeamus, quae de exercitus alienatione dicuntur, quae quidem ego aut omnino falsa aut certe minora opinione esse confido, quanto haec dissimulari et occultari, quam per nos confirmari praestet? An non, uti corporis vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda sunt tegenda, ne spem adversariis augeamus? At etiam, ut media nocte proficiscamur, addunt, quo maiorem, credo, licentiam habeant, qui peccare conentur. Namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur; quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Quare neque tanti sum animi, ut sine spe castra oppugnanda censeam, neque tanti timoris, uti spe deficiam, atque omnia prius experienda arbitror magna ex parte iam me una vobiscum de re iudicium facturum confido.”

2:32. Having broken up the council, he called the soldiers together, and reminded them “what advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal at Corfinium; how by their good offices and influence he had

brought over a great part of Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipal towns afterward imitated you and your conduct; nor was it without reason that Caesar judged so favorably, and the enemy so harshly of you. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged to shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established by your conduct. Caesar committed me, whom he considered his dearest friend, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was not able to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some here present who encourage you to revolt from us; for what can they wish for more, than at once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? or what baser opinions could they in their resentment entertain of you, than that you would betray those who acknowledged themselves indebted to you for every thing, and put yourselves in the power of those who think they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard of Caesar's exploits in Spain? that he routed two armies, conquered two generals, recovered two provinces, and effected all this within forty days after he came in sight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand against him while they were uninjured, resist him when they are ruined? Will you, who took part with Caesar while victory was uncertain, take part with the conquered enemy when the fortune of the war is decided, and when you ought to reap the reward of your services? For they say that they have been deserted and betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. But did you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Did he not, when you were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties, cast you off? Did he not, without your privacy, endeavor to effect his own escape? When you were betrayed by him, were you not preserved by Caesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your oath to him, when, after having thrown up

the ensigns of power, and abdicated his government, he became a private person, and a captive in another's power? A new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard the oath, by which you are at present bound; and have respect only to that which was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and his diminution of rank. But I suppose, although you are pleased with Caesar, you are offended with me; however, I shall not boast of my services to you, which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations. But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards of labor at the conclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely to be, not even you can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own diligence and good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived? Are you sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the loss of a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routed the enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse? That I carried out of the very harbor and bay two hundred of the enemy's victualers, and reduced them to that situation that they can receive no supplies either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves from this fortune and these generals; and prefer the disgrace of Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of both Spains, and the prestige of the African war? I, for my part, wished to be called a soldier of Caesar's; you honored me with the title of Imperator. If you repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former name that you may not appear to have conferred the honor on me as a reproach."

Dimisso consilio contionem advocat militum. Commemorat, quo sit eorum usus studio ad Corfinium Caesar, ut magnam partem Italiae beneficio atque auctoritate eorum suam fecerit. "Vos enim vestrumque factum omnia," inquit, "deinceps municipia sunt secuta,

neque sine causa et Caesar amicissime de vobis et illi gravissime iudicaverunt. Pompeius enim nullo proelio pulsus vestri facti praeiudicio demotus Italia excessit; Caesar me, quem sibi carissimum habuit, provinciam Siciliam atque Africam, sine quibus urbem atque Italiam tueri non potest, vestrae fidei commisit. At sunt, qui vos hortentur, ut a nobis desciscatis. Quid enim est illis optatius, quam uno tempore et nos circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere? aut quid irati gravius de vobis sentire possunt, quam ut eos prodatis, qui se vobis omnia debere iudicant, in eorum potestatem veniatis, qui se per vos perisse existimant? An vero in Hispania res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos exercitus, duos superatos duces, duas receptas provincias? haec acta diebus XL, quibus in conspectum adversariorum venerit Caesar? An, qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt, perditum resistant? vos autem incerta victoria Caesarem secuti diiudicata iam belli fortuna victum sequamini, cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis? Desertos enim se ac proditos a vobis dicunt et prioris sacramenti mentionem faciunt. Vosne vero L. Domitium, an vos Domitius deseruit? Nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos proiecit ille? nonne sibi clam salutem fuga petivit? nonne proditi per illum Caesaris beneficio estis conservati? Sacramento quidem vos tenere qui potuit, cum proiectis fascibus et deposito imperio privatus et captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem? Relinquitur nova religio, ut eo neglecto sacramento, quo tenemini, respiciatis illud, quod deditione ducis et capitis deminutione sublatum est. At, credo, si Caesarem probatis, in me offenditis. Qui de meis in vos meritis praedicaturus non sum, quae sunt adhuc et mea voluntate et vestra expectatione leviora; sed tamen sui laboris milites semper eventu belli praemia petiverunt, qui qualis sit futurus, ne vos quidem dubitatis: diligentiam quidem

nostram aut, quem ad finem adhuc res processit, fortunam cur praeteream? An poenitet vos, quod salvum atque incolumem exercitum nulla omnino nave desiderata traduxerim? quod classem hostium primo impetu adveniens profligaverim? quod his per biduum equestri proelio superaverim? quod ex portu sinuque adversariorum CC naves oneratas abduxerim eoque illos compulerim, ut neque pedestri itinere neque navibus commeatu iuvare possint? Hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis Corfiniensem ignominiam, Italiae fugam, Hispaniarum deditionem, Africi belli praeiudicia, sequimini! Equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. Cuius si vos poenitet, vestrum vobis beneficium remitto, mihi meum nomen restituite, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini.”

2:33. The soldiers, being affected by this oration, frequently attempted to interrupt him while he was speaking, so that they appeared to bear with excessive anguish the suspicion of treachery, and when he was leaving the assembly they unanimously besought him to be of good spirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their fidelity and courage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all were changed by this act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, whenever opportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out his forces and ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where they had been posted the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw out his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either to tamper with our men or to engage on equal terms he might not miss the opportunity.

Qua oratione permoti milites crebro etiam dicentern interpellabant, ut magno cum dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur,

discedentem vero ex contione universi cohortantur, magno sit animo, necubi dubitet proelium committere et suam fidem virtutemque experiri. Quo facto commutata omnium et voluntate et opinione consensu summo constituit Curio, cum primum sit data potestas, proelio rem committere posteroque die productos eodem loco, quo superioribus diebus constiterat, in acie collocat. Ne Varus quidem dubitat copias producere, sive sollicitandi milites sive aequo loco dimicandi detur occasio, ne facultatem praetermittat.

2:34. There lay between the two armies a valley, as already mentioned, not very deep, but of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting till the enemy's forces should attempt to pass it, that they might engage with the advantage of the ground. At the same time on the left wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and several light-armed infantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending into the valley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of the Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand, but, setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: the light-infantry being deserted by those who had come out along with them, were surrounded and cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facing that way, saw their men flee and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily knowing that he had great experience in military matters, cried out, "You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do you hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely "expressed this, that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions which they had made to him the day before," then ordered them to follow him, and ran far before them all. The valley was so difficult of ascent that the foremost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind. But the

minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and the flight and slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; and they all imagined that they were already surrounded by our horse, and, therefore, before a dart could be thrown, or our men come near them, Varus's whole army turned their backs and retreated to their camp.

Erat vallis inter duas acies, ut supra demonstratum est, non ita magna, at difficili et arduo ascensu. Hanc uterque, si adversariorum copiae transire conarentur, exspectabat, quo aequiore loco proelium committeret. Simul ab sinistro cornu P. Attii equitatus omnis et una levis armaturae interiecti complures, cum se in vallem demitterent, cernebantur. Ad eos Curio equitatum et duas Marrucinatorum cohortes mittit; quorum primum impetum equites hostium non tulerunt, sed admissis equis ad suos refugerunt; relictis ab his, qui una procurrerant levis armaturae, circumveniebantur atque interficiebantur ab nostris. Huc tota Vari conversa acies suos fugere et concidi videbat. Tunc Rebilus, legatus Caesaris, quem Curio secum ex Sicilia duxerat, quod magnum habere usum in re militari sciebat, "perterritum," inquit, "hostem vides, Curio: quid dubitas uti temporis opportunitate?" Ille unum elocutus, ut memoria tenerent milites ea, quae pridie sibi confirmassent, sequi sese iubet et praecurrit ante omnes. Adeo erat impedita vallis, ut in ascensu nisi sublevati a suis primi non facile eniterentur. Sed praeoccupatus animus Attianorum militum timore et fuga et caede suorum nihil de resistendo cogitabat, omnesque se iam ab equitatu circumveniri arbitrabantur. Itaque priusquam telum abici posset, aut nostri propius accederent, omnis Vari acies terga vertit seque in castra recepit.

2:35. In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian common soldier in Curio's army, pursuing the enemy's rear, with a loud voice shouted to Varus

by his name, and often called him, so that he seemed to be one of his soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give him advice. When Varus, after been repeatedly called, stopped and looked at him, and inquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword at his naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the danger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surrounded by the soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude and crowds of those that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the passage stopped, and a greater number perished in that place without a stroke than in the battle and flight. Nor were we far from driving them from this camp; and some of them ran straightway to the town without halting. But both the nature of the ground and the strength of the fortifications prevented our access to the camp; for Curio's soldiers, marching out to battle, were without those things which were requisite for storming a camp. Curio, therefore, led his army back to the camp, with all his troops safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundred were killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after Curio's return, and several more, under pretext of their wounds, but in fact through fear, withdrew from the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving and knowing the terror of his army, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and a few tents for show, at the third watch led back his army quietly into the town.

Qua in fuga Fabius Pelignus quidam ex infimis ordinibus de exercitu Curionis primus agmen fugientium consecutus magna voce Varum nomine appellans requirebat, uti unus esse ex eius militibus et monere aliquid velle ac dicere videretur. Ubi ille saepius appellatus aspexit ac restitit et, quis esset aut quid vellet, quaesivit, umerum apertum gladio appetit paulumque afuit, quin Varum interficeret;

quod ille periculum sublato ad eius conatum scuto vitavit. Fabius a proximis militibus circumventus interficitur. Hac fugientium multitudine ac turba portae castrorum occupantur atque iter impeditur, pluresque in eo loco sine vulnere quam in proelio aut fuga intereunt, neque multum afuit, quin etiam castris expellerentur, ac nonnulli protinus eodem cursu in oppidum contenderunt. Sed cum loci natura et munitio castrorum aditum prohibebant, tum quod ad proelium egressi Curionis milites eis rebus indigebant, quae ad oppugnationem castrorum erant usui. Itaque Curio exercitum in castra reducit suis omnibus praeter Fabium incolumibus, ex numero adversariorum circiter DC interfectis ac mille vulneratis; qui omnes discessu Curionis multique praeterea per simulationem vulnere ex castris in oppidum propter timorem sese recipiunt. Qua re animadversa Varus et terrore exercitus cognito bucinatore in castris et paucis ad speciem tabernaculis relictis de tertia vigilia silentio exercitum in oppidum reducit.

2:36. The next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw lines about it. In the town there was a multitude of people, ignorant of war, owing to the length of the peace; some of them Uticans, very well inclined to Caesar, for his favors to them; the Roman population was composed of persons differing widely in their sentiments. The terror occasioned by former battles was very great; and therefore, they openly talked of surrendering, and argued with Attius that he should not suffer the fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy. While these things were in agitation, couriers, who had been sent forward, arrived from king Juba, with the intelligence that he was on his march, with considerable forces, and encouraged them to protect and defend their city, a circumstance which greatly comforted their desponding hearts.

Postero die Curio obsidere Uticam et vallo circummunire instituit. Erat in oppido multitudo insolens belli diuturnitate otii, Uticenses pro quibusdam Caesaris in se beneficiis illi amicissimi, conventus is, qui ex variis generibus constaret, terror ex superioribus proeliis magnus. Itaque de deditione omnes palam loquebantur et cum P. Attio agebant, ne sua pertinacia omnium fortunas perturbari vellet. Haec cum agerentur, nuntii praemissi ab rege Iuba venerunt, qui illum adesse cum magnis copiis dicerent et de custodia ac defensione urbis hortarentur. Quae res eorum perterritos animos confirmavit.

2:37. The same intelligence was brought to Curio; but for some time he could not give credit to it, because he had so great confidence in his own good fortune. And at this time Caesar's success in Spain was announced in Africa by messages and letters. Being elated by all these things, he imagined that the king would not dare to attempt any thing against him. But when he found out, from undoubted authority, that his forces were less than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning his works, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here he began to lay in corn and wood, and to fortify his camp, and immediately dispatched orders to Sicily, that his two legions and the remainder of his cavalry should be sent to him. His camp was well adapted for protracting a war, from the nature and strength of the situation, from its proximity to the sea, and the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had been stored up from the neighboring salt-pits. Timber could not fail him from the number of trees, nor corn, with which the lands abounded. Wherefore, with the general consent, Curio determined to wait for the rest of his forces, and protract the war.

Nuntiabantur haec eadem Curioni, sed aliquamdiu fides fieri non

poterat: tantam habebat suarum rerum fiduciam. Iamque Caesaris in Hispania res secundae in Africam nuntiis ac litteris perferebantur. Quibus omnibus rebus sublatus nihil contra se regem nisurum existimabat. Sed ubi certis auctoribus comperit minus V et XX milibus longe ab Utica eius copias abesse, relictis munitionibus sese in castra Cornelia recepit. Huc frumentum comportare, castra munire, materiam conferre coepit statimque in Siciliam misit, uti duae legiones reliquusque equitatus ad se mitteretur. Castra erant ad bellum ducendum aptissima natura loci et munitione et maris propinquitate et aquae et salis copia, cuius magna vis iam ex proximis erat salinis eo congesta. Non materia multitudine arborum, non frumentum, cuius erant plenissimi agri, deficere poterat. Itaque omnium suorum consensu Curio reliquas copias exspectare et bellum ducere parabat.

2:38. This plan being settled, and his conduct approved of, he is informed by some deserters from the town that Juba had staid behind in his own kingdom, being called home by a neighboring war, and a dispute with the people of Leptis; and that Sabura, his commander-in-chief, who had been sent with a small force, was drawing near to Utica. Curio rashly believing this information, altered his design, and resolved to hazard a battle. His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune and confidence of success, contributed much to confirm this resolution. Induced by these motives, early in the night he sent all his cavalry to the enemy's camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom we have already spoken, was the commander. But the king was coming after them with all his forces, and was posted at a distance of six miles behind Sabura. The horse that were sent perform their march that night, and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly; for the Numidians, after the usual barbarous custom,

encamped here and there without any regularity. The cavalry having attacked them, when sunk in sleep and dispersed, killed a great number of them; many were frightened and ran away. After which the horse returned to Curio, and brought some, prisoners with them.

His constitutis rebus probatisque consiliis ex perfugis quibusdam oppidanis audit Iubam revocatum finitimo bello et controversiis Leptitanorum restitisse in regno, Saburram, eius praefectum, cum mediocribus copiis missum Uticae appropinquare. His auctoribus temere credens consilium commutat et proelio rem committere constituit. Multum ad hanc rem probandam adiuvat adulescentia, magnitudo animi, superioris temporis proventus, fiducia rei bene gerendae. His rebus impulsus equitatum omnem prima nocte ad castra hostium mittit ad flumen Bagradam, quibus praeerat Saburra, de quo ante erat auditum; sed rex omnibus copiis insequebatur et sex milium passuum intervallo a Saburra consederat. Equites missi nocte iter conficiunt, imprudentes atque inopinantes hostes aggrediuntur. Numidae enim quadam barbara consuetudine nullis ordinibus passim consederant. Hos oppressos somno et dispersos adorti magnum eorum numerum interficiunt; multi perterriti profugiunt. Quo facto ad Curionem equites revertuntur captivosque ad eum reducunt.

2:39. Curio had set out at the fourth watch with all his forces, except five cohorts which he left to guard the camp. Having advanced six miles, he met the horse, heard what had happened and inquired from the captives who commanded the camp at Bagrada. They replied Sabura. Through eagerness to perform his journey, he neglected to make further inquiries, but looking back to the company next him, “Don’t you see, soldiers,” says he, “that the answer of the prisoners corresponds with the account of the deserters, that the king is not

with him, and that he sent only a small force which was not able to withstand a few horse? Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin to think of rewarding you, and returning you thanks.” The achievements of the horse were great in themselves, especially if their small number be compared with the vast host of Numidians. However, the account was enlarged by themselves, as men are naturally inclined to boast of their own merit. Besides, many spoils were produced; the men and horses that were taken were brought into their sight, that they might imagine that every moment of time which intervened was a delay to their conquest. By this means the hope of Curio were seconded by the ardor of the soldiers. He ordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his march, that he might attack them as soon as possible, while in consternation after their flight. But the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the preceding night, were not able to keep up with him, but fell behind in different places. Even this did not abate Curio’s hopes.

Curio cum omnibus copiis quarta vigilia exierat cohortibus V castris praesidio relictis. Progressus milia passuum VI equites convenit, rem gestam cognovit; e captivis quaerit, quis castris ad Bagradam praesit: respondent Saburram. Reliqua studio itineris conficiendi quaerere praetermittit proximaque respiciens signa, “videtisne,” inquit, “milites, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire? abesse regem, exiguas esse copias missas, quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? Proinde ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus.” Erant per se magna, quae gesserant equites, praesertim cum eorum exiguus numerus cum tanta multitudine Numidarum confertur. Haec tamen ab ipsis inflatius commemorabantur, ut de suis homines laudibus libenter praedicant. Multa praeterea spolia praeferebantur, capti

homines equique producebantur, ut, quicquid intercederet temporis, hoc omne victoriam morari videretur. Ita spei Curionis militum studia non deerant. Equites sequi iubet sese iterque accelerat, ut quam maxime ex fuga perterritos adoriri posset. At illi itinere totius noctis confecti subsequi non poterant, atque alii alio loco resistebant. Ne haec quidem Curionem ad spem morabantur.

2:40. Juba, being informed by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent to his relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, which he was accustomed to keep near him to guard his person, and that part of his infantry on which he had the greatest dependence, and he himself followed slowly after with the rest of his forces and forty elephants, suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before, he himself would follow them. Sabura drew up his army, both horse and foot, and commanded them to give way gradually and retreat through the pretense of fear; that when it was necessary he would give them the signal for battle, and such orders as he found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea of their present behavior was calculated to confirm his former hopes, imagined that the enemy were running away, and led his army from the rising grounds down to the plain.

Iuba certior factus a Saburra de nocturno proelio II milia Hispanorum et Gallorum equitum, quos suae custodiae causa circum se habere consuerat, et peditum eam partem, cui maxime confidebat, Saburrae submisit; ipse cum reliquis copiis elephantisque LX lentius subsequitur. Suspiciatus praemissis equitibus ipsum affore Curionem Saburra copias equitum peditumque instruit atque his imperat, ut simulatione timoris paulatim cedant ac pedem referant: sese, cum opus esset, signum proelii daturum et, quod rem postulare cognovisset, imperaturum. Curio ad superiorem spem addita

praesentis temporis olinione, hostes fugere arbitratus copias ex locis superioribus in campum deducit.

2:41. And when he had advanced from this place about sixteen miles, his army being exhausted with the fatigue, he halted. Sabura gave his men the signal, marshaled his army, and began to go around his ranks and encourage them. But he made use of the foot only for show; and sent the horse to the charge: Curio was not deficient in skill, and encouraged his men to rest all their hopes in their valor. Neither were the soldiers, though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted with fatigue, deficient in ardor to engage, and courage: but the latter were in number but two hundred: the rest had dropped behind on the march. Wherever they charged they forced the enemy to give ground, but they were not able to pursue them far when they fled, or to press their horses too severely. Besides, the enemy's cavalry began to surround us on both wings and to trample down our rear. When any cohorts ran forward out of the line, the Numidians, being fresh, by their speed avoided our charge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to return to their post, and cut them off from the main body. So that it did not appear safe either to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue from the line, and run the risk. The enemy's troops were frequently reinforced by assistance sent from Juba; strength began to fail our men through fatigue; and those who had been wounded could neither quit the field nor retire to a place of safety, because the whole field was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry. Therefore, despairing of their own safety, as men usually do in the last moment of their lives, they either lamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended their parents to the survivors, if fortune should save any from the impending danger. All were full of fear and grief.

Quibus ex locis cum longius esset progressus, confecto iam labore exercitu XII milium spatio constitit. Dat suis signum Saburra, aciem constituit et circumire ordines atque hortari incipit; sed peditatu dumtaxat procul ad speciem utitur, equites in aciem immittit. Non deest negotio Curio suosque hortatur, ut spem omnem in virtute reponant. Ne militibus quidem ut defessis neque equitibus ut paucis et labore confectis studium ad pugnandum virtusque deerat; sed hi erant numero CC, reliqui in itinere substiterant. Hi, quamcumque in partem impetum fecerant, hostes loco cedere cogebant, sed neque longius fugientes prosequi neque vehementius equos incitare poterant. At equitatus hostium ab utroque cornu circuire aciem nostram et aversos proterere incipit. Cum cohortes ex acie procucurrissent, Numidae integri celeritate impetum nostrorum effugiebant rursusque ad ordines suos se recipientes circuibant et ab acie excludebant. Sic neque in loco manere ordinesque servare neque procurrere et casum subire tutum videbatur. Hostium copiae submissis ab rege auxiliis crebro augebantur; nostros vires lassitudine deficiebant, simul ei, qui vulnera acceperant, neque acie excedere neque in locum tutum referri poterant, quod tota acies equitatu hostium circumdata tenebatur. Hi de sua salute desperantes, ut extremo vitae tempore homines facere consuerunt, aut suam mortem miserabantur aut parentes suos commendabant, si quos ex eo periculo fortuna servare potuisset. Plena erant omnia timoris et luctus.

2:42. When Curio perceived that in the general consternation neither his exhortations nor entreaties were attended to, imagining that the only hope of escaping in their deplorable situation was to gain the nearest hills, he ordered the colors to be borne that way. But a party of horse, that had been sent by Sabura, had already got possession of

them. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme despair: and some of them were killed by the cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell to the ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander of the cavalry, standing round Curio with a small party of horse, urged Curio to endeavor to escape by flight, and to hasten to his camp; and assured him that he would not forsake him. But Curio declared that he would never more appear in Caesar's sight, after losing the army which had been committed by Caesar, to his charge, and accordingly fought till he was killed. Very few of the horse escaped from that battle, but those who had staid behind to refresh their horses having perceived at a distance the defeat of the whole army, retired in safety to their camp.

Curio, ubi perterritis omnibus neque cohortationes suas neque preces audiri intellegit, unam ut in miseris rebus spem reliquam salutis esse arbitratus, proximos colles capere universos atque eo signa inferri iubet. Hos quoque praeoccupat missus a Saburra equitatus. Tum vero ad summam desperationem nostri perveniunt et partim fugientes ab equitatu interficiuntur, partim integri procumbunt. Hortatur Curionem Cn. Domitius, praefectus equitum, cum paucis equitibus circumsistens, ut fuga salutem petat atque in castra contendat, et se ab eo non discessurum pollicetur. At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quem a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur. Equites ex proelio perpauci se recipiunt; sed ei, quos ad novissimum agmen equorum reficiendorum causa substitisse demonstratum est, fuga totius exercitus procul animadversa sese incolumes in castra conferunt. Milites ad unum omnes interficiuntur.

2:43. The soldiers were all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, the

quaestor, who was left behind in the camp by Curio, having got intelligence of these things, encouraged his men not to be disheartened. They beg and entreat to be transported to Sicily. He consented, and ordered the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought close to the shore early in the evening. But so great was the terror in general, that some said that Juba's forces were marching up, others that Varus was hastening with his legions, and that they already saw the dust raised by their coming; of which not one circumstance had happened: others suspected that the enemy's fleet would immediately be upon them. Therefore in the general consternation, every man consulted his own safety. Those who were on board of the fleet, were in a hurry to set sail, and their flight hastened the masters of the ships of burden. A few small fishing boats attended their duty and his orders. But as the shores were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine who of such a vast number should first get on board, that some of the vessels sank with the weight of the multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed them from coming to the shore.

His rebus cognitis Marcius Rufus quaestor in castris relictus a Curione cohortatur suos, ne animo deficiant. Illi orant atque obsecrant, ut in Siciliam navibus reportentur. Pollicetur magistrisque imperat navium, ut primo vespere omnes scaphas ad litus appulsas habeant. Sed tantus fuit omnium terror, ut alii adesse copias Iubae dicerent, alii cum legionibus instare Varum iamque se pulverem venientium cernere, quarum rerum nihil omnino acciderat, alii classem hostium celeriter advolaturam suspicarentur. Itaque perterritis omnibus sibi quisque consulebat. Qui in classe erant, proficisci properabant. Horum fuga navium onerariarum magistros incitabat; pauci lenunculi ad officium imperiumque conveniebant.

Sed tanta erat completis litoribus contentio, qui potissimum ex magno numero conscenderent, ut multitudine atque onere nonnulli deprimerentur, reliqui hoc timore propius adire tardarentur.

2:44. From which circumstances it happened that a few foot and aged men, that could prevail either through interest or pity, or who were able to swim to the ships, were taken on board, and landed safe in Sicily. The rest of the troops sent their centurions as deputies to Varus at night, and surrendered themselves to him. But Juba the next day having spied their cohorts before the town, claimed them as his booty, and ordered great part of them to be put to the sword; a few he selected and sent home to his own realm. Although Varus complained that his honor was insulted by Juba, yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rode on horseback into the town, attended by several senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, and in a few days arranged and ordered what he would have done in Utica, and in a few days more returned to his own kingdom, with all his forces.

Quibus rebus accidit, ut pauci milites patresque familiae, qui aut gratia aut misericordia valerent aut naves adnare possent, recepti in Siciliam incolumes pervenirent. Reliquae copiae missis ad Varum noctu legatorum numero centurionibus sese ei dederunt. Quarum cohortium milites postero die ante oppidum Iuba conspicatus suam esse praedicans praedam magnam partem eorum interfici iussit, paucos electos in regnum remisit, cum Varus suam fidem ab eo laedi quereretur neque resistere auderet. Ipse equo in oppidum vectus prosequentibus compluribus senatoribus, quo in numero erat Ser. Sulpicius et Licinius Damasippus paucis, quae fieri vellet, Uticae constituit atque imperavit diebusque post paucis se in regnum cum

omnibus copiis recepit.

BOOK III (48-47 BC)

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3:1. Julius Caesar, holding the election as dictator, was himself appointed consul with Publius Servilius; for this was the year in which it was permitted by the laws that he should be chosen consul. This business being ended, as credit was beginning to fail in Italy, and the debts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators should be appointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions and properties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war, and that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This he thought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of an abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and dissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewise restored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes, first submitting the question to the people) some persons condemned for bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time when Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another pronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service to him in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them; setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because they had put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they ought to be restored rather by the judgment of the people than appear admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful in repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of their prerogative of exercising this bounty.

Dictatore habente comitia Caesare consules creantur Iulius Caesar et

P. Servilius: is enim erat annus, quo per leges ei consulem fieri liceret. His rebus confectis, cum fides tota Italia esset angustior neque creditae pecuniae solverentur, constituit, ut arbitri darentur; per eos fierent aestimationes possessionum et rerum, quanti quaeque earum ante bellum fuisset, atque hac creditoribus traderentur. Hoc et ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum minuendumve, qui fere bella et civiles dissensiones sequi consuevit, et ad debitorum tuendam existimationem esse aptissimum existimavit. Itemque praetoribus tribunisque plebis rogationes ad populum ferentibus nonnullos ambitus Pompeia lege damnatos illis temporibus, quibus in urbe praesidia legionum Pompeius habuerat, quae iudicia aliis audientibus iudicibus, aliis sententiam ferentibus singulis diebus erant perfecta, in integrum restituit, qui se illi initio civilis belli obtulerant, si sua opera in bello uti vellet, proinde aestimans, ac si usus esset, quoniam aui fecissent potestatem. Statuerat enim prius hos iudicio populi debere restitui, quam suo beneficio videri receptos, ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in praeferendo populi beneficio videretur.

3:2. In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival, and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and having resigned the dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, where he had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But he scarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteen thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcity of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting a speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very short of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, and the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a severe autumn in

Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of the whole army.

His rebus et feriis Latinis comitiisque omnibus perficiendis XI dies tribuit dictaturaque se abdicat et ab urbe proficiscitur Brundisiumque pervenit. Eo legiones XII, equitatum omnem venire iusserat. Sed tantum navium repperit, ut anguste XV milia legionariorum militum, DC equites transportari possent. Hoc unum Caesari ad celeritatem conficiendi belli defuit. Atque hae ipsae copiae hoc infrequentiores imponuntur, quod multi Gallicis tot bellis defecerant, longumque iter ex Hispania magnum numerum deminuerat, et gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium ex saluberrimis Galliae et Hispaniae regionibus omnem exercitum valetudine temptaverat.

3:3. Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during which he was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected a numerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had given directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government, to count down to him a large sum.

Pompeius annum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus, quod vacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat, magnam ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis, Corcyra, Athenis, Ponto, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice, Aegypto classem coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curaverat; magnam imperatam Asiae, Syriae

regibusque omnibus et dynastis et tetrarchis et liberis Achaiae populis pecuniam exegerat, magnam societates Carum provinciarum, quas ipse obtinebat, sibi numerare coegerat.

3:4. He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy, which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, which being composed of two he called the Gemella; one from Crete and Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been levied by the activity of Lentulus. Besides, he had distributed among his legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the soldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two legions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria, and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts of slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; six hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, five hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number from Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia there were two hundred, of extraordinary valor, commanded by Rascipolis; five hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus Gabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the son, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among his own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus, had given three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the other sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. To these were added Dardanians and Bessians, some of them mercenaries;

others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians, and troops from other nations and states, which completed the number which we mentioned before.

Legiones effecerat civium Romanorum VIII: V ex Italia, quas traduxerat; unam ex Cilicia veteranam, quam factam ex duabus gemellam appellabat; unam ex Creta et Macedonia ex veteranis militibus, qui dimissi a superioribus imperatoribus in his provinciis consederant; duas ex Asia, quas Lentulus consul conscribendas curaverat. Praeterea magnum numerum ex Thessalia, Boeotia, Achaia Epiroque supplementi nomine in legiones distribuerat: his Antonianos milites admiscuerat. Praeter has exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones II. Sagittarios Creta, Lacedaemone, ex Ponto atque Syria reliquisque civitatibus III milia numero habebat, funditorum cohortes sescenarias II, equitum VII milia. Ex quibus DC Gallos Deiotarus adduxerat, D Ariobarzanes ex Cappadocia; ad eundem numerum Cotys ex Thracia dederat et Sadalam filium miserat; ex Macedonia CC erant, quibus Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute; D ex Gabinianis Alexandria, Gallos Germanosque, quos ibi A. Gabinius praesidii causa apud regem Ptolomaeum reliquerat, Pompeius filius eum classe adduxerat; DCCC ex servis suis pastorumque suorum numero coegerat; CCC Tarcondarius Castor et Domnilaus ex Gallograecia dederant (horum alter una venerat, alter filium miserat); CC ex Syria a Commageno Antiocho, cui magna Pompeius praemia tribuit, missi erant, in his plerique hippotoxotae. Huc Dardanos, Bessos partim mercenarios, partim imperio aut gratia comparatos, item Macedones, Thessalos ac reliquarum gentium et civitatum adiecerat atque eum, quem supra demonstravimus, numerum expleverat.

3:5. He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other seaports, to hinder Caesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed his fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey, the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: the Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, in conjunction with Caius Coponius: and the Liburnian and Achaian, by Scribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed commander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated every matter. The chief direction rested upon him.

Frumenti vim maximam ex Thessalia, Asia, Aegypto, Creta, Cyrenis reliquisque regionibus comparaverat. Hiemare Dyrrachii, Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat, ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritima classem disposuerat. Praeerat Aegyptiis navibus Pompeius filius, Asiaticis D. Laelius et C. Triarius, Syriacis C. Cassius, Rhodiis C. Marcellus cum C. Coponio, Liburnicae atque Achaicae classi Scribonius Libo et M. Octavius. Toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat; ad hunc summa imperii respiciebat.

3:6. When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers: "That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of their toils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slaves and baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greater number of men might be put on board: that they might expect every thing from victory and his liberality." They cried out with one voice, "he might give what orders he pleased, that they would

cheerfully fulfill them.” He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with seven legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land, between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with a safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at a place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.

Caesar, ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus omnibus, imperaret, quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse facturos, II. Non. Ian. naves solvit. Impositae, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones VII. Postridie terram attigit. Inter Cerauniorum saxa et alia loca periculosa quietam nactus stationem et portus omnes timens, quos teneri ab adversariis arbitrabatur, ad eum locum, qui appellabatur Palaeste, omnibus navibus ad unam incolumibum milites euit.

3:7. Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the orders of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten ships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of the harbor; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, only four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered and his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at the continent, before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached those regions.

Erat Orici Lucretius Vespillo et Minucius Rufus cum Asiaticis navibus XVIII, quibus iussu D. Laelii praeerant, M. Bibulus cum navibus ex Corcyrae. Sed neque illi sibi confisi ex portu prodire sunt ausi, cum Caesar omnino XII naves longas praesidio duxisset, in quibus erant constratae IIII, neque Bibulus impeditis navibus dispersisque remigibus satis mature occurrit, quod prius ad continentem visus est Caesar, quam de eius adventu fama omnino in eas regiones perferretur.

3:8. Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the same night to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry. The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Calenus, with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the ships having put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the night breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus at Corcyra, being informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of our ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken about thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them all on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to deter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the harbors and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depth of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting for reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach.

Eitis militibus naves eadem nocte Brundisium a Caesare remittuntur, ut reliquae legiones equitatusque transportari possent. Huic officio praepositus erat Fufius Calenus legatus, qui celeritatem in

transportandis legionibus adhiberet. Sed serius a terra provectae naves neque usae nocturna aura in redeundo offenderunt. Bibulus enim Corcyrae certior factus de adventu Caesaris, sperans alicui se parti onustarum navium occurrere posse, inanibus occurrit et nactus circiter XXX in eas indiligentiae suae ac doloris iracundiam erupit omnesque incendit eodemque igne nautas dominosque navium interfecit, magnitudine poenae reliquos terreri sperans. Hoc confecto negotio a Sasonis ad Curici portum stationes litoraue omnia longe lateque classibus occupavit custodiisque diligentius dispositis ipse gravissima hieme in navibus excubans neque ullum laborem aut munus despiciens, neque subsidium exspectans si in Caesaris complexum venire posset...

3:9. But after the departure Of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius sailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona, and having spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issa off from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail with the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved to storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation and a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it; but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the last resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear arms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their engines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded the town with five encampments, and began to press them at once with a siege and storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and their greatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies to Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences they bore by

their own resources, as well as they could: and after a long interval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops more remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemy were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, to keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselves into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, they made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that, attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the fourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and having killed a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for refuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was now approaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, after sustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.

Discessu Liburnarum ex Illyrico M. Octavius cum eis, quas habebat, navibus Salonas pervenit. Ibi concitatis Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris Issam a Caesaris amicitia avertit; conventum Salonis cum neque pollicitationibus neque denuntiatione periculi permovere posset, oppidum oppugnare instituit. Est autem oppidum et loci natura et colle munitum. Sed celeriter cives Romani ligneis effectis turribus his sese munierunt et, cum essent infirmi ad resistendum propter paucitatem hominum crebris confecti vulneribus, ad extremum auxilium descenderunt servosque omnes puberes liberaverunt et praeseclis omnium mulierum crinibus tormenta effecerunt. Quorum cognita sententia Octavius quinque castris oppidum circumdedit atque uno tempore obsidione et oppugnationibus eos premere coepit. Illi omnia perpeti parati maxime a re frumentaria laborabant. Cui rei missis ad Caesarem legatis auxilium ab eo petebant; reliqua, ut poterant, incommoda per se sustinebant. Et longo interposito spatio

cum diuturnitas oppugnationis neglegentiores Octavianos effecisset, nacti occasionem meridiani temporis discessu eorum pueris mulieribusque in muro dispositis, ne quid cotidianae consuetudinis desideraretur, ipsi manu facta cum eis, quos nuper liberaverant, in proxima Octavii castra irruperunt. His expugnatis eodem impetu altera sunt adorti, inde tertia et quarta et deinceps reliqua omnibusque eos castris expulerunt et magno numero interfecto reliquos atque ipsum Octavium in naves confugere coegerunt. Hic fuit oppugnationis exitus. Iamque hiems appropinquabat, et tantis detrimentis acceptis Octavius desperata oppugnatione oppidi Dyrrachium sese ad Pompeium recepit.

3:10. We have mentioned, that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's had fallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterward in Spain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favors conferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he had an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals: "That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, and forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficient loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson and instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities, by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily, Cardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio, and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his soldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and the republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient experience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the only time to treat for peace; when each had confidence in his own strength, and both seemed on an equal footing.

Since, if fortune showed ever so little favor to either, he who thought himself superior, would not submit to terms of accommodation; nor would be content with an equal division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That as they could not agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate and people in Rome. That in the mean time, it ought to content the republic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a public assembly that they would disband their forces within the three following days. That having divested themselves of the arms and auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they must both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. To give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all his forces on the land, even his garrisons.

Demonstravimus L. Vibullium Rufum, Pompei praefectum, bis in potestatem pervenisse Caesaris atque ab eo esse dimissum, semel ad Corfinium, iterum in Hispania. Hunc pro suis beneficiis Caesar idoneum iudicaverat, quem cum mandatis ad Cn. Pompeium mitteret, eundemque apud Cn. Pompeium auctoritatem habere intellegebat. Erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrumque pertinaciae finem facere et ab armis discedere neque amplius fortunam periclitari. Satis esse magna utrimque incommoda accepta, quae pro disciplina et praeceptis habere possent, ut reliquos casus timerent: ilium Italia expulsum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis et cohortibus in Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum centum atque XXX; se morte Curionis et detrimento Africani exercitus tanto militumque deditione ad Curictam. Proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent, cum, quantum in bello fortuna posset, iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent documento. Hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si

vero alteri paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum confideret. Condiciones pacis, quoniam antea convenire non potuissent, Romae ab senatu et a populo peti debere. Interea et rei publicae et ipsis placere oportere, si uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum. Depositis armis auxiliisque, quibus nunc confiderent, necessario populi senatusque iudicio fore utrumque contentum. Haec quo facilius Pompeio probari possent, omnes suas terrestres ubique copias dimissurum...

3:11. Vibullius, having received this commission from Caesar, thought it no less necessary to give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach, that he might adopt such plans as the circumstance required, than to inform him of Caesar's message; and therefore continuing his journey by night as well as by day, and taking fresh horses for dispatch, he posted away to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was marching toward him with all his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia, and was on his march from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium; but surprised at the unexpected news, he determined to go to Apollonia by speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all the maritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set off the same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, who was governor of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison of Parthinians in it, endeavored to shut the gates and defend the town, and ordered the Greeks to man the walls, and to take arms. But as they refused to fight against the power of the Roman people, and as the citizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit Caesar, despairing of any assistance, he threw open the gates, and

surrendered himself and the town to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him.

Vibullius eitis Corcyrae non minus necessarium esse existimavit de repentino adventu Caesaris Pompeium fieri certiores, uti ad id consilium capere posset, antequam de mandatis agi inciperetur, atque ideo continuato nocte ac die itinere atque omnibus oppidis mutatis ad celeritatem iumentis ad Pompeium contendit, ut adesse Caesarem nuntiaret. Pompeius erat eo tempore in Candavia iterque ex Macedonia in hiberna Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque habebat. Sed re nova perturbatus maioribus itineribus Apolloniam petere coepit, ne Caesar orae maritimae civitates occuparet. At ille eitis militibus eodem die Oricum proficiscitur. Quo cum venisset, L. Torquatus, qui iussu Pompei oppido praeerat praesidiumque ibi Parthinorum habebat, conatus portis clausis oppidum defendere, cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnatuuros esse negarent, oppidani autem etiam sua sponte Caesarem recipere conarentur, desperatis omnibus auxiliis portas aperuit et se atque oppidum Caesari dedit incolumisque ab eo conservatus est.

3:12. Having taken Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay to Apollonia. Staberius the governor, hearing of his approach, began to bring water into the citadel, and to fortify it, and to demand hostages of the town's people. But they refuse to give any, or to shut their gates against the consul, or to take upon them to judge contrary to what all Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he knew their inclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of Apollonia sent ambassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town. Their example was followed by the

inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, and the other neighboring states, and all Epirus: and they sent ambassadors to Caesar, and promised to obey his commands.

Recepto Caesar Orico nulla interposita mora Apolloniam proficiscitur. Cuius adventu audito L. Staberius, qui ibi praeerat, aquam comportare in arcem atque eam munire obsidesque ab Apolloniatibus exigere coepit. Illi vero daturos se negare, neque portas consuli praeclusuros, neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populusque Romanus indicavisset. Quorum cognita voluntate clam profugit Apollonia Staberius. Illi ad Caesarem legatos mittunt oppidoque recipiunt. Hos sequuntur Bullidenses, Amantini et reliquae finitimae civitates totaque Epiros et legatis ad Caesarem missis, quae imperaret, facturos pollicentur.

3:13. But Pompey having received information of the transactions at Oricum and Apollonia, began to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, and endeavored to reach it, marching day and night. As soon as it was said that Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell upon Pompey's army, because in his haste he had made no distinction between night and day, and had marched without intermission, that they almost every man deserted their colors in Epirus and the neighboring countries; several threw down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight. But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders for measuring out the ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing in their fright, Labienus first stepped forward and swore that he would never desert him, and would share whatever fate fortune should assign to him. The other lieutenants took the same oath, and the tribunes and centurions followed their example: and the whole army swore in like manner.

Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in the possession of Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river Apsus, in the territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved his support might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts; and there he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions from Italy, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching his camp on the other side of the river Apsus, collected there all his troops and auxiliaries.

At Pompeius cognitis his rebus, quae erant Orici atque Apolloniae gestae, Dyrrachio timens diurnis eo nocturnisque itineribus contendit. Simul Caesar appropinquare dicebatur, tantusque terror incidit eius exercitui, quod properans noctem diei coniunxerat neque iter intermiserat, ut paene omnes ex Epiro finitimisque regionibus signa relinquerent, complures arma proicerent ac fugae simile iter videretur. Sed cum prope Dyrrachium Pompeius constitisset castraque metari iussisset, perterrito etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset. Hoc idem reliqui iurant legati; tribuni militum centurionesque sequuntur, atque idem omnis exercitus iurat. Caesar praeoccupato itinere ad Dyrrachium finem properandi facit castraque ad flumen Apsum ponit in finibus Apolloniatum, ut bene meritae civitates tutae essent praesidio, ibique reliquarum ex Italia legionum adventum expectare et sub pellibus hiemare constituit. Hoc idem Pompeius fecit et trans flumen Apsum positis castris eo copias omnes auxiliaque conduxit.

3:14. Kalenus, having put the legions and cavalry on board at Brundisium, as Caesar had directed him, as far as the number of his ships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a little distance

from port, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was informed, that all the ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's fleet: on receiving this information he returned into the harbor, and recalled all the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did not obey Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was private property, bore away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who spared neither slaves nor free men, nor even children; but put all to the sword. Thus the safety of the whole army depended on a very short space of time and a great casualty.

Calenus legionibus equitibusque Brundisii in naves impositis, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, quantum navium facultatem habebat, naves solvit paulumque a portu progressus litteras a Caesare accipit, quibus est certior factus portus litoraue omnia classibus adversariorum teneri. Quo cognito se in portum recipit navesque omnes revocat Una ex his, quae perseveravit neque imperio Caleni obtemperavit, quod erat sine militibus privatoque consilio administrabatur, delata Oricum atque a Bibulo expugnata est; qui de servis liberisque omnibus ad impuberes supplicium sumit et ad unum interficit. Ita exiguo tempore magnoque casu totius exercitus salus constitit.

3:15. Bibulus, as has been observed before, lay with his fleet near Oricum, and as he debarred Caesar of the liberty of the sea and harbors, so he was deprived of all intercourse with the country by land; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed in different places by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or water, or even anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, and distressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that he was obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions, but even wood and water; and it once happened

that, meeting with violent storms, they were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on the hides that covered their decks; yet all these difficulties they bore patiently and without repining, and thought they ought not to leave the shores and harbors free from blockade. But when they were suffering under the distress which I have mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus, they both called from on ship-board, to Marcus Acilius and Statius Marcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the town, the other the guards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on affairs of importance, if permission should be granted them. They add something further to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat about an accommodation. In the mean time they requested a truce, and obtained it from them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and it was well known that Caesar desired it above all things, and it was imagined that some advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals.

Bibulus, ut supra demonstratum est, erat cum classe ad Oricum et, sicuti mari portibusque Caesarem prohibebat, ita ipse omni terra earum regionum prohibebatur; praesidiis enim dispositis omnia litora a Caesare tenebantur, neque lignandi atque aquandi neque naves ad terram religandi potestas fiebat. Erat res in magna difficultate, summisque angustiiis rerum necessariarum premebantur, adeo ut cogerentur sicuti reliquum commeatum ita ligna atque aquam Corcyra navibus onerariis supportare; atque etiam uno tempore accidit, ut difficilioribus usi tempestatibus ex pellibus, quibus erant tectae naves, nocturnum excipere rorem cogerentur; quas tamen difficultates patienter atque aequo animo ferebant neque sibi nudanda litora et relinquendos portus existimabant. Sed cum essent in quibus demonstravi angustiiis, ac se Libo cum Bibulo coniunxisset, loquuntur ambo ex navibus cum M. Acilio et Statio Murco legatis;

quorum alter oppidi muris, alter praesidiis terrestribus praeerat: velle se de maximis rebus cum Caesare loqui, si sibi eius rei facultas detur. Huc addunt pauca rei confirmandae causa, ut de compositione acturi viderentur. Interim postulant ut sint indutiae, atque ab eis impetrant. Magnum enim, quod afferebant, videbatur, et Caesarem id summe sciebant cupere, et profectum aliquid Vibullil mandatis existimabatur.

3:16. Caesar having set out with one legion to gain possession of the more remote states, and to provide corn, of which he had but a small quantity, was at this time at Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. There receiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing him of Libo's and Bibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and returned himself to Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference. Libo came and made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong passion, and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was aedile and praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lest affairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by the warmth of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's most earnest wish, that they should be reconciled and lay down their arms, but they were not authorized to treat on that subject, because they resigned the whole management of the war, and all other matters to Pompey, by order of the council. But when they were acquainted with Caesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey, who would conclude all of himself by their persuasions. In the mean time, let the truce be continued till the messengers could return from him; and let no injury be done on either side." To this he added a few words of the cause for which they fought, and of his own forces and resources.

Caesar eo tempore cum legione una profectus ad recipiendas ultiores civitates et rem frumentariam expediendam, qua angusta utebatur, erat ad Buthrotum, oppidum oppositum Corcyrae. Ibi certior ab Acilio et Murco per litteras factus de postulatis Libonis et Bibuli legionem relinquit; ipse Oricum revertitur. Eo cum venisset, evocantur illi ad colloquium. Prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum, quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas: ob eam causam colloquium vitasse, ne res maximae spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia impedirentur. Suam summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem, ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur, sed potestatem eius rei nullam habere, propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint. Sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium, atque illum reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis. Interea manerent indutiae, dum ab illo rediri posset, neve alter alteri noceret. Huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque suis.

3:17. To this, Caesar did not then think proper to make any reply, nor do we now think it worth recording. But Caesar required “that he should be allowed to send commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer no personal injury; and that either they should grant it, or should take his commissioners in charge, and convey them to Pompey. That as to the truce, the war in its present state was so divided, that they by their fleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries; while he prevented them from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they wished that this restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish their blockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like manner would retain the other; that nevertheless, the treaty of accommodation might still be carried on,

though these points were not conceded, and that they need not be an impediment to it.” They would neither receive Caesar’s commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred the whole to Pompey. They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one point respecting a truce. But when Caesar perceived that they had proposed the conference merely to avoid present danger and distress, but that they offered no hopes or terms of peace, he applied his thoughts to the prosecution of the war.

Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Caesar existimavit, neque nunc, ut memoriae prodantur, satis causae putamus. Postulabat Caesar, ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium sine periculo mittere liceret, idque ipsi fore reciperent aut acceptos per se ad eum perducerent. Quod ad indutias pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam, ut illi classe naves auxiliaque sua impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos prohiberet. Si hoc sibi remitti vellent, remitterent ipsi de maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent, se quoque id retenturum. Nihilo minus tamen agi posse de compositione, ut haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi esse impedimento. Libo neque legatos Caesaris recipere neque periculum praestare eorum, sed totam rem ad Pompeium reicere: unum instare de indutiis vehementissimeque contendere. Quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis periculi atque inopiae vitandae causa omnem orationem instituisse neque ullam spem aut condicionem pacis afferre, ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit.

3:18. Bibulus, being prevented from landing for several days, and being seized with a violent distemper from the cold and fatigue, as he could neither be cured on board, nor was willing to desert the charge which he had taken upon him, was unable to bear up against the

violence of the disease. On his death, the sole command devolved on no single individual, but each admiral managed his own division separately, and at his own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which Caesar's unexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver Caesar's message in the presence of Libo, Lucius Luceius, and Theophanes, to whom Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He had scarcely entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbade him to proceed. "What need," says he, "have I of life or Rome, if the world shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar: an opinion which can never be removed while it shall be thought that I have been brought back by him to Italy, from which I set out." After the conclusion of the war, Caesar was informed of these expressions by some persons who were present at the conversation. He attempted, however, by other means to bring about a negotiation of peace.

Bibulus multos dies terra prohibitus et graviore morbo ex frigore et labore implicitus, cum neque curari posset neque susceptum officium deserere vellet, vim morbi sustinere non potuit. Eo mortuo ad neminem unum summa imperii redit, sed separatim suam quisque classem ad arbitrium suum administrabat. Vibullius sedato tumultu, quem repentinus adventus Caesaris concitaverat, ubi primum e re visum est, adhibito Libone et L. Luceio et Theophane, quibuscum communicare de maximis rebus Pompeius consueverat, de mandatis Caesaris agere instituit. Quem ingressum in sermonem Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit. "Quid mihi," inquit, "aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum, reductus existimabor bello periecto." Ab eis Caesar haec facta cognovit, qui sermoni interfuerunt; conatus tamen nihilo minus est

allis rationibus per colloquia de pace agere.

3:19. Between Pompey's and Caesar's camp there was only the river Apsus, and the soldiers frequently conversed with each other; and by a private arrangement among themselves, no weapons were thrown during their conferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to the bank of the river, to make such proposals as should appear most conducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice [asking], "Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treat of peace? a concession which had been made even to fugitives on the Pyrenean mountains, and to robbers, especially when by so doing they would prevent citizens from fighting against citizens." Having spoken much in humble language, as became a man pleading for his own and the general safety and being listened to with silence by the soldiers of both armies, he received an answer from the enemy's party that Aulus Varro proposed coming the next day to a conference, and that deputies from both sides might come without danger, and explain their wishes, and accordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When the deputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled, and the expectations of every person concerning this subject were raised very high, and their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace. Titus Labienus walked forward from the crowd, and in submissive terms began to speak of peace, and to argue with Vatinius. But their conversation was suddenly interrupted by darts thrown from all sides, from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the arms of the soldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and some privates; hereupon Labienus exclaimed, "Forbear, then, to speak any more about an accommodation, for we can have no peace

unless we carry Caesar's head back with us.”

Inter bina castra Pompei atque Caesaris unum flumen tantum intererat Apsus, crebraque inter se colloquia milites habebant, neque ullum interim telum per pactiones loquentium traiciebatur. Mittit P. Vatinium legatum ad ripam ipsam fluminis, qui ea, quae maxime ad pacem pertinere viderentur, ageret et crebro magna voce pronuntiaret, liceretne civibus ad cives de pace legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim eum id agerent, ne cives cum civibus armis decertarent? Multa suppliciter locutus est, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus. Responsum est ab altera parte Aulum Varronem profiteri se altera die ad colloquium venturum atque una visurum, quemadmodum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent; certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. Quo cum esset postero die ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaue erat exspectatio eius rei, atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur. Qua ex frequentia, Titus Labienus prodit, sed missa oratione de pace, loqui atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit. Quorum mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa; quae ille obtectus armis militum vitavit; vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, centuriones militesque nonnulli. Tum Labienus: “desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest.”

3:20. At the same time in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of the praetors, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on entering into his office, fixed his tribunal near the bench of Caius Trebonius, the city praetor, and promised if any person appealed to him in regard to

the valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as appointed by Caesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened, from the justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought that in such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderation and compassion), that not one could be found who would offer himself the first to lodge an appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his own private calamities, or the general distresses of the times, or to assert the difficulty of setting the goods to sale, is the behavior of a man even of a moderate temper; but to retain their possessions entire, and at the same time acknowledge themselves in debt, what sort of spirit, and what impudence would it not have argued! Therefore nobody was found so unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius proved more severe to those very persons for whose advantage it had been designed; and starting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear to have engaged in so dishonorable an affair without effecting something, he promulgated a law that all debts should be discharged in six equal payments, of six months each, without interest.

Eisdem temporibus M. Caelius Rufus praetor causa debitorum suscepta initio magistratus tribunal suum iuxta C. Treboni, praetoris urbani, sellam collocavit et, si quis appellavisset de aestimatione et de solutionibus, quae per arbitrum fierent, ut Caesar praesens constituerat, fore auxilio pollicebatur. Sed fiebat aequitate decreti et humanitate Treboni, qui his temporibus clementer et moderate ius dicendum existimabat, ut reperiri non possent, a quibus initium appellandi nasceretur. Nam fortasse inopiam excusare et calamitatem aut propriam suam aut temporum queri et difficultates auctionandi proponere etiam mediocris est animi; integras vero tenere possessiones, qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius

impudentiae est? Itaque, hoc qui postulare reperiebatur nemo. Atque ipsis, ad quorum commodum pertinebat, durior inventus est Caelius. Et ab hoc profectus initio, ne frustra ingressus turpem causam videretur, legem promulgavit, ut sexenni die sine usuris creditae pecuniae solvantur.

3:21. When Servilius, the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him, and he himself effected less than he expected, in order to raise the passions of the people, he dropped it, and promulgated two others; one, by which he remitted the annual rents of the houses to the tenants, the other, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made an assault on Caius Trebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him from his tribunal. The consul Servilius informed the senate of his proceedings, who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the management of the republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate; and when he was attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of the rostrum. Stung with the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended in public that he would go to Caesar, but privately sent messengers to Milo, who had murdered Clodius, and had been condemned for it; and having invited him into Italy, because he had engaged the remains of the gladiators to his interest, by making them ample presents, he joined him, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds. When he himself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his military standards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples, and the design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed, and Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because the Roman citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he ought to be treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design, and changed his route.

Cum resisteret Servilius consul reliquique magistratus, et minus opinione sua efficeret, ad hominum excitanda studia sublata priore lege duas promulgavit: unam, qua mercedes habitationum annuas conductoribus donavit, aliam tabularum novarum, impetuque multitudinis in C. Trebonium facto et nonnullis vulneratis eum de tribunali deturbavit. De quibus rebus Servilius consul ad senatum rettulit, senatusque Caelium ab re publica removendum censuit. Hoc decreto eum consul senatu prohibuit et contionari conantem de rostris deduxit. Ille ignominia et dolore permotus palam se proficisci ad Caesarem simulavit; clam nuntiis ad Milonem missis, qui Clodio interfecto eo nomine erat damnatus, atque eo in Italiam evocato, quod magnis muneribus datis gladiatoriac familiae reliquias habebat, sibi coniunxit atque eum in Thurinum ad sollicitandos pastores praemisit. Ipse cum Casilinum venisset, uno que tempore signa eius militaria atque arma Capuae essent comprehensa et familia Neapoli visa, quae prodicionem oppidi appareret, patefactis consiliis exclusus Capua et periculum veritus, quod conventus arma ceperat atque eum hostis loco habendum existimabat, consilio destitit atque eo itinere sese avertit.

3:22. Milo in the mean time dispatched letters to the free towns, purporting that he acted as he did by the orders and commands of Pompey, conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he endeavored to engage in his interest all persons whom he imagined were under difficulties by reason of their debts. But not being able to prevail with them, he set at liberty some slaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa in the district of Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown from the wall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one legion, he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar, went to Thurii, where he was put to

death as he was tampering with some of the freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallic and Spanish horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison. And thus these mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and kept the magistrates employed, found a speedy and happy issue.

Interim Milo dimissis circum municipia litteris, se ea, quae faceret, iussu atque imperio facere Pompei, quae mandata ad se per Vibullium delata essent, quos ex acre alieno laborare arbitrabatur, sollicitabat. Apud quos cum proficere nihil posset, quibusdam solutis ergastulis Cosam in agro Thurino oppugnare coepit. Eo cum a Q. Pedio praetore cum legione... lapide ictus ex muro periit. Et Caelius profectus, ut dictitabat, ad Caesarem pervenit Thurios. Ubi cum quosdam eius municipii sollicitaret equitibusque Caesaris Gallis atque Hispanis, qui eo praesidii causa missi erant, pecuniam polliceretur, ab his est interfectus. Ita magnarum initia rerum, quae occupatione magistratuum et temporum sollicitam Italiam habebant, celerem et facilem exitum habuerunt.

3:23. Libo having sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships, which he commanded, came to Brundisium, and seized an island, which lies opposite to the harbor; judging it better to guard that place, which was our only pass to sea, than to keep all the shores and ports blocked up by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with some of our transports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with corn; he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed a party of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from their station, and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that he dispatched letters to Pompey, and if he pleased he might order the rest of the ships to be hauled upon shore and repaired; for

that with his own fleet he could prevent Caesar from receiving his auxiliaries.

Libo profectus ab Orico cum classe, cui praeerat, navium L, Brundisium venit insulamque, quae contra portum Brundisinum est, occupavit, quod praestare arbitrabatur unum locum, qua necessarius nostris erat egressus, quam omnia litora ac portus custodia clausos teneri. Hic repentino adventu naves onerarias quasdam nactus incendit et unam frumento onustam abduxit magnumque nostris terrorem iniecit et noctu militibus ac sagittariis in terram eitis praesidium equitum deiecit et adeo loci opportunitate profecit, uti ad Pompeium litteras mitteret, naves reliquas, si vellet, subduci et refici iubcret: sua classe auxilia sese Caesaris prohibiturum.

3:24. Antonius was at this time at Brundisium, and relying on the valor of his troops, covered about sixty of the long-boats belonging to the men-of-war with penthouses and bulwarks of hurdles, and put on board them select soldiers; and disposed them separately along the shore: and under the pretext of keeping the seamen in exercise, he ordered two three- banked galleys, which he had built at Brundisium, to row to the mouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing boldly toward him, he sent five four- banked galleys against them, in hopes of intercepting them. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers retreated within the harbor. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture them, pursued them unguardedly: for instantly the boats of Antonius, on a certain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against the enemy; and at the first charge took one of the four- banked galleys, with the seamen and marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. In addition to this loss, they were prevented from getting water by the horse which

Antonius had disposed along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed at the distress and disgrace, departed from Brundisium, and abandoned the blockade.

Erat eo tempore Antonius Brundisii; is virtute militum confisus scaphas navium magnarum circiter LX cratibus pluteisque contextit eoque milites delectos imposuit atque eas in litore pluribus locis separatim disposuit navesque triremes duas, quas Brundisii faciendas curaverat, per causam exercendorum remigum ad fauces portus prodire iussit. Has cum audacius progressas Libo vidisset, sperans intercipi posse, quadriremes V ad eas misit. Quae cum navibus nostris appropinquassent, nostri veterani in portum refugiebant: illi studio incitati incautius sequebantur. Iam ex omnibus partibus subito Antonianae scaphae signo dato se in hostes incitaverunt primoque impeto unam ex his quadriremibus cum remigibus defensoribusque suis ceperunt, reliquas turpiter refugere coegerunt. Ad hoc detrimentum accessit, ut equitibus per oram maritimam ab Antonio dispositis aquari prohiberentur. Qua necessitate et ignominia permotus Libo discessit a Brundisio obsessionemque nostrorum omisit.

3:25. Several months had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, and Caesar's legions and shipping were not coming to him from Brundisium, and he imagined that some opportunities had been neglected, for the winds had at least been often favorable, and he thought that he must trust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the more eager were those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and were more confident of preventing our getting assistance: they received frequent reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not prevented Caesar's arrival at the first, they

should at least stop the remainder of his army: and they were expecting that the season for transporting troops, would become more unfavorable every day, as the winds grew calmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble on this account, wrote in severe terms to his officers at Brundisium, [and gave them orders] that as soon as they found the wind to answer, they should not let the opportunity of setting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course to the shore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground. That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet, because they dare not venture too far from the harbor.

Multi iam menses erant et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant. Ac nonnullae eius rei praetermissae occasiones Caesari videbantur, quod certi saepe flaverant venti, quibus necessario committendum existimabat. Quantoque eius amplius processerat temporis, tanto erant alacriores ad custodias, qui classibus praeerant, maioremque fiduciam prohibendi habebant, et crebris Pompei litteris castigabantur, quoniam primo venientem Caesarem non prohibuissent, ut reliquos eius exercitus impedirent, duriusque cotidie tempus ad transportandum lenioribus ventis exspectabant. Quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad suos severius scripsit, nacti idoneum ventum ne occasionem navigandi dimitterent, sive ad litora Apolloniaticum [sive ad Labeaticum] cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere possent. Haec a custodiis classium loca maxime vacabant, quod se longius a portibus committere non audebant.

3:26. They [his officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by the instructions of Marcus Antonius, and Fusius Kalenus, and animated by the soldiers strongly encouraging them, and declining no danger

for Caesar's safety, having got a southerly wind, weighed anchor, and the next day were carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and being seen from the continent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian fleet at Dyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had almost come up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south wind sprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from his attempt, but hoped by the labor and perseverance of his seamen to be able to bear up against the violence of the storm; and although we were carried beyond Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he nevertheless continued to chase us. Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness, for they were still afraid of being attacked by the enemy's fleet, if the wind abated, having come near a port, called Nymphaeum, about three miles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port is protected from a south- west wind, but is not secure against a south wind); and thought less danger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the enemy. But as soon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had blown for two days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west.

Illi adhibita audacia et virtute administrantibus M. Antonio et Fufio Caleno, multum ipsis militibus hortantibus neque ullum periculum pro salute Caesaris recusantibus nacti austrum naves solvunt atque altero die Apolloniam praetervehuntur. Qui cum essent ex continenti visi, Coponius, qui Dyrrachii classi Rhodiae praeerat, naves ex portu educit, et cum iam nostris remissiore vento appropinquasset, idem auster increbuit nostrisque praesidio fuit. Neque vero ille ob eam causam conatu desistebat, sed labore et perseverantia nautarum etiam vim tempestatis superari posse sperabat praetervectosque Dyrrachium magna vi venti nihilo secius sequebatur. Nostri usi

fortunae beneficio tamen impetum classis timebant, si forte ventus remisisset. Nacti portum, qui appellatur Nymphaeum, ultra Lissum milia passuum III, eo naves introduxerunt (qui portus ab Africo tegebatur, ab austro non erat tutus) leviusque tempestatis quam classis periculum aestimaverunt. Quo simulatque introitum est, incredibili felicitate auster, qui per biduum flaverat, in Africum se vertit.

3:27. Here one might observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, a moment before, were alarmed for ourselves, were safely lodged in a very secure harbor: and they who had threatened ruin to our fleet, were forced to be uneasy on their own account: and thus, by a change of circumstances, the storm protected our ships, and damaged the Rhodian fleet to such a degree that all their decked ships, sixteen in number, foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the prodigious number of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashed against the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent them all safe home.

Hic subitam commutationem fortunae videre licuit. Qui modo sibi timuerant, hos tutissimus portus recipiebat; qui nostris navibus periculum intulerant, de suo timere cogeantur. Itaque tempore commutato tempestas et nostros textit et naves Rhodias afflixit, ita ut ad unam omnes, constratae numero XVI, eliderentur et naufragio interirent, et ex magno remigum propugnatorumque numero pars ad scopulos allisa interficeretur, pars ab nostris detraheretur; quos omnes conservatos Caesar domum dimisit.

3:28. Two of our ships, that had not kept up with the rest, being overtaken by the night, and not knowing what port the rest had made to, came to an anchor opposite Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who

commanded Pompey's fleet, detached after them several barges and small craft, and attempted to take them. At the same time, he treated with them about capitulating, and promised them their lives if they would surrender. One of them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other was manned with somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen what security men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightened at the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea, and with sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first received his oath, that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they were brought before him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they were inhumanly put to death in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteran legion, who had also struggled, not only with the inclemency of the weather, but by laboring at the pump, thought it their duty to remit nothing of their former valor: and having protracted the beginning of the night in settling the terms, under pretense of surrendering, they obliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a convenient place on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and at day-break, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, who guarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, beside some armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made a brave defense, and having killed some of them, retreated in safety to our army.

Nostrae naves duae tardius cursu confecto in noctem coniectae, cum ignorarent, quem locum reliquae cepissent, contra Lissum in ancoris constiterunt. Has scaphis minoribusque navigiis compluribus immissis Otacilius Crassus, qui Lissi praeerat, expugnare parabat; simul de deditione eorum agebat et incolumitatem deditis pollicebatur. Harum altera navis CCXX e legione tironum sustulerat,

altera ex veterana paulo minus CC. Hic cognosci licuit, quantum esset hominibus praesidii in animi firmitudine. Tirones enim multitudine navium perterriti et salo nauseaque confecti iureiurando accepto, nihil eis nocituros hostes, se Otacilio dediderunt; qui omnes ad eum producti contra religionem iurisiurandi in eius conspectu crudelissime interficiuntur. At veteranae legionis milites, item conflictati et tempestatis et sentinae vitiis, neque ex pristina virtute remittendum aliquid putaverunt, et tractandis condicionibus et simulatione deditionis extracto primo noctis tempore gubernatorem in terram navem eicere cogunt, ipsi idoneum locum nacti reliquam noctis partem ibi confecerunt et luce prima missis ad eos ab Otacilio equitibus, qui eam partem orae maritimae asservabant, circiter CCCC, quique eos armati ex praesidio secuti sunt, se defenderunt et nonnullis eorum interfectis incolumes se ad nostros receperunt.

3:29. After this action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, a town which Caesar had before assigned them, and had carefully fortified, received Antony into their town, and gave him every assistance. Otacilius, apprehensive for his own safety, escaped out of the town, and went to Pompey. All his forces, whose number amounted to three veteran legions, and one of recruits, and about eight hundred horse being landed, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to transport the remainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a sort of Gallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey, imagining Italy defenseless, should transport his army thither (and this notion was spread among the common people), Caesar might have some means of pursuing him; and he sent messengers to him with great dispatch, to inform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and what number of troops he had brought over with him.

Quo facto conventus civium Romanorum, qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum eis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat, Antonium recepit omnibusque rebus iuvit. Otacilius sibi timens ex oppido fugit et ad Pompeium pervenit. Eitis omnibus copiis Antonius, quarum erat summa veteranarum trium legionum uniusque tironum et equitum DCCC, plerasque naves in Italiam remittit ad reliquos milites equitesque transportandos, pontones, quod est genus navium Gallicarum, Lissi relinquit, hoc consilio, ut si forte Pompeius vacuum existimans Italiam eo traiecisset exercitum, quae opinio erat edita in vulgus, aliquam Caesar ad insequendum facultatem haberet, nuntiosque ad eum celeriter mittit, quibus regionibus exercitum euisset et quid militum transvexisset.

3:30. Caesar and Pompey received this intelligence almost at the same time; for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium. They directed their march after them by land; but at first they were ignorant to what part they had been carried; but when they were informed of it, they each adopted a different plan; Caesar, to form a junction with Antonius as soon as possible; Pompey, to oppose Antonius's forces on their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon them unexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out their armies from their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey, privately by night; Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march a longer circuit up the river to find a ford. Pompey's route being easy, because he was not obliged to cross the river, he advanced rapidly and by forced marches against Antonius, and being informed of his approach, chose a convenient situation, where he posted his forces; and kept his men close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled, that his arrival might be the more secret. An account of this was immediately carried to Antonius by the

Greeks. He dispatched messengers to Caesar, and confined himself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar, came up with him. On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in between two armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces to Asparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in a convenient situation.

Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi, ut iter secundum eas terra direxerant, sed quo essent eae delatae, primus diebus ignorabant. Cognitaque re diversa sibi ambo consilia capiunt: Caesar, ut quam primum se cum Antonio coniungeret; Pompeius, ut venientibus in itinere se opponeret, si imprudentes ex insidiis, adoriri posset, eodemque die uterque eorum ex castris stativis a flumine Apso exercitum educunt: Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque interdiu. Sed Caesari circuitu maiore iter erat longius, adverso flumine, ut vado transire posset; Pompeius, quia expedito itinere flumen ei transeundum non erat, magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit atque eum ubi appropinquare cognovit, idoneum locum nactus ibi copias collocavit suosque omnes in castris continuit ignesque fieri prohibuit, quo occultior esset eius adventus. Haec ad Antonium statim per Graecos deferuntur. Ille missis ad Caesarem nuntiis unum diem sese castris tenuit; altero die ad eum pervenit Caesar. Cuius adventu cognito Pompeius, ne duobus circumcluderetur exercitibus, ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium Dyrrachinorum pervenit atque ibi idoneo loco castra ponit.

3:31. During these times, Scipio, though he had sustained some losses near mount Amanus, had assumed to himself the title of emperor,

after which he demanded large sums of money from the states and princes. He had also exacted from the tax-gatherers, two years' rents that they owed; and enjoined them to lend him the amount of the next year, and demanded a supply of horse from the whole province. When they were collected, leaving behind him his neighboring enemies, the Parthians (who shortly before had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and had kept Marcus Bibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of Syria; and when he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and fear of the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers, "That they would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but would never bear arms against a countryman and consul;" he drew off his legions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, and made them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to his interest, permitted them to plunder the cities.

His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat. Quo facto civitatibus tyrannisque magnas imperaverat pecunias, item a publicanis suae provinciae debitam biennii pecuniam exegerat et ab eisdem insequentis anni mutuam praeceperat equitesque toti provinciae imperaverat. Quibus coactis, finitimis hostibus Parthis post se relictis, qui paulo ante M. Crassum imperatorem interfecerant et M. Bibulum in obsidione habuerant, legiones equitesque ex Syria deduxerat. Summamque in sollicitudinem ac timorem Parthici belli provincia cum venisset, ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur, sese, contra hostem si ducerentur, ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturos, deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit.

3:32. In the mean time, the money which had been demanded from the province at large, was most vigorously exacted. Besides, many new imposts of different kinds were devised to gratify his avarice. A tax of so much a head was laid on every slave and child. Columns, doors, corn, soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages, were made subject to a duty. Wherever a name could be found for any thing, it was deemed a sufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed to collect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village and fort: and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigor and inhumanity, was esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The province was overrun with bailiffs and officers, and crowded with overseers and tax-gatherers; who, besides the duties imposed, exacted a gratuity for themselves; for they asserted, that being expelled from their own homes and countries, they stood in need of every necessary; endeavoring by a plausible pretense, to color the most infamous conduct. To this was added the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in times of war; the whole sums being called in, on which occasion, they alleged that the delay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years, the debt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes were exacted, not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporation and every state. And they said that these were loans, exacted by the senate's decree. The taxes of the ensuing year were demanded beforehand as a loan from the collectors, as on their first appointment.

Interim acerbissime imperatae pecuniae tota provincia exigebantur. Multa praeterea generatim ad avaritiam excogitabantur. In capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur; columnaria, ostiaria, frumentum, milites, arma, remiges, tormenta, vecturae

imperabantur; cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat, hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur. Non solum urbibus, sed paene vicis castellisque singulis cum imperio praeficiebantur. Qui horum quid acerbissime crudelissimeque fecerat, is et vir et civis optimus habebatur. Erat plena lictorum et imperiorum provincia, differta praefectis atque exactoribus: qui praeter imperatas pecunias suo etiam privato compendio serviebant; dictitabant enim se domo patriaque expulsos omnibus necessariis egere rebus, ut honesta praescriptione rem turpissimam tegerent. Accedebant ad haec gravissimae usurae, quod in bello plerumque accidere consuevit universis imperatis pecuniis; quibus in rebus prolationem diei donationem esse dicebant. Itaque aes alienum provinciae eo biennio multiplicatum est. Neque minus ob eam causam civibus Romanis eius provinciae, sed in singulos conventus singulasque civitates certae pecuniae imperabantur, mutuasque illas ex senatusconsulto exigere dictitabant; publicanis, ut in Syria fecerant, insequentis anni vectigal promutuum.

3:33. Moreover, Scipio ordered the money formerly lodged in the temple of Diana at Ephesus, to be taken out with the statues of that goddess, which remained there. When Scipio came to the temple, letters were delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence of several senators, whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him] that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to him with his army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received the letter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for his journey to Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstance saved the money at Ephesus.

Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiquitus pecunias Scipio

tolli iubebat. Certaue eius rei die constituta cum in fanum ventum esset adhibitis compluribus ordinis senatorii, quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei redduntur a Pompeio, mare transisse cum legionibus Caesarem: properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque posthaberet. His litteris acceptis quos advocaverat dimittit; ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque post diebus est profectus. Haec res Ephesiae pecuniae salutem attulit.

3:34. Caesar, having effected a junction with Antonius's army, and having drawn his legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guard the coast, thought he ought to sound the inclination of the provinces, and march further into the country; and when ambassadors came to him from Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in those countries would obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them, he dispatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legion composed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: and Caius Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse, into Aetolia. He recommended them to be especially careful to provide corn, because those regions were nearest to him. He ordered Cneius Domitius Calvinus to march into Macedonia with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, and five hundred horse; from which province, Menedemus, the principal man of those regions, on that side which is called the Free, having come as ambassador, assured him of the most devoted affection of all his subjects.

Caesar Antonii exercitu coniuncto deducta Orico legione, quam tuendae orae maritimae causa posuerat, temptandas sibi provincias longiusque procedendum existimabat et, cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati venissent, qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum

gentium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur XXVII, atque equitibus CC in Thessaliam, C. Calvisium Sabinum cum cohortibus V paucisque equitibus in Aetoliam misit; maxime eos, quod erant propinquae regiones, de re frumentaria ut providerent, hortatus est. Cn. Domitium Calvinum cum legionibus duabus, XI et XII, et equitibus D in Macedoniam proficisci iussit; cuius provinciae ab ea parte, quae libera appellabatur, Menedemus, princeps earum regionum, missus legatus omnium suorum excellens studium profitebatur.

3:35. Of these Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being very kindly received, dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon and Naupactus, and made himself master of the whole country. Cassius went to Thessaly with his legion. As there were two factions there, he, found the citizens divided in their inclinations. Hegasaretus, a man of established power, favored Pompey's interest. Petreius, a young man of a most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and his friends' influence.

Ex his Calvisius primo adventu summa omnium Aetolorum receptus voluntate, praesidiis adversariorum Calydone et Naupacto eiectis, omni Aetolia potitus est. Cassius in Thessaliam cum legione pervenit. Hic cum essent factiones duae, varia voluntate civitatum utebatur: Hegesaretos, veteris homo potentiae, Pompeianis rebus studebat; Petraeus, summae nobilitatis adolescens, suis ac suorum opibus Caesarem enixe invabat.

3:36. At the same time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and when numerous embassies had begun to wait on him from many of the states, news was brought that Scipio was approaching with his legions, which occasioned various opinions and reports; for in

strange events, rumor generally goes before. Without making any delay in any part of Macedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when he was come within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden toward Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, that news of his march and arrival came together; for to render his march expeditious, he left the baggage of his legions behind him at the river Haliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care of Marcus Favonius, with a guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to build a strong fort there. At the same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used to infest the neighborhood of Macedonia, flew to attack Cassius's camp, at which Cassius being alarmed, and having received information of Scipio's approach, and seen the horse, which he imagined to be Scipio's, he betook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly, and thence began to make his route toward Ambracia. But when Scipio was hastening to pursue him, dispatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius was marching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintain the garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance. On receipt of these dispatches, Scipio changed his designs and his route, desisted from his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieve Favonius. Accordingly, continuing his march day and night, he came to him so opportunely, that the dust raised by Domitius's army, and Scipio's advanced guard, were observed at the same instant. Thus, the vigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the expedition of Scipio, Favonius.

Eodemque tempore Domitius in Macedoniam venit; et cum ad eum frequentes civitatum legationes convenire coepissent, nuntiatum est adesse Scipionem cum legionibus, magna opinione et fama omnium;

nam plerumque in novitate rem fama antecedit. Hic nullo in loco Macedoniae moratus magno impetu tetendit ad Domitium et, cum ab eo milia passuum XX afuisset, subito se ad Cassium Longinum in Thessaliam convertit. Hoc adeo celeriter fecit, ut simul adesse et venire nuntiaretur, et quo iter expeditius faceret, M. Favonium ad flumen Aliacmonem, quod Macedoniam a Thessalia dividit, cum cohortibus VIII praesidio impedimentis legionum reliquit castellumque ibi muniri iussit. Eodem tempore equitatus regis Cotyis ad castra Cassii advolavit, qui circum Thessaliam esse consuevit. Tum timore perterritus Cassius cognito Scipionis adventu visisque equitibus, quos Scipionis esse arbitrabatur, ad montes se convertit, qui Thessaliam cingunt, atque ex his locis Ambraciam versus iter facere coepit. At Scipionem properantem sequi litterae sunt consecutae a M. Favonio, Domitium cum legionibus adesse neque se praesidium, ubi constitutus esset, sine auxilio Scipionis tenere posse. Quibus litteris acceptis consilium Scipio iterque commutat; Cassium sequi desistit, Favonio auxilium ferre contendit. Itaque die ac nocte continuato itinere ad eum pervenit, tam opportuno tempore, ut simul Domitiani exercitus pulvis cerneretur, et primi antecursores Scipionis viderentur. Ita Cassio industria Domitii, Favonio Scipionis celeritas salutem attulit.

3:37. Scipio, having staid for two days in his camp, along the river Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's camp, on the third day, at dawn, led his army across a ford, and having made a regular encampment the day following, drew up his forces in front of his camp. Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but should draw out his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six miles in breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio's camp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his

intrenchment. However, Domitius with difficulty restrained his men, and prevented their beginning a battle; the more so as a rivulet with steep banks, joining Scipio's camp, retarded the progress of our men. When Scipio perceived the eagerness and alacrity of our troops to engage, suspecting that he should be obliged the next day, either to fight, against his inclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within his camp, though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly, made a shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving the signal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from which he came, and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation. After a few days, he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night, where our men had usually gone to forage for several days before. And when Quintus Varus, commander of Domitius's horse, came there as usual, they suddenly rushed from their ambush. But our men bravely supported their charge, and returned quickly every man to his own rank, and in their turn, made a general charge on the enemy; and having killed about eighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their camp with the loss of only two men.

Scipio biduum castris stativis moratus ad flumen, quod inter eum et Domitii castra fluebat, Aliacmonem, tertio die prima luce exercitum vado traducit et castris positus postero die mane copias ante frontem castrorum instruit. Domitius tum quoque sibi dubitandum non putavit, quin productis legionibus proelio decertaret. Sed cum esset inter bina castra campus circiter milium passuum II, Domitius castris Scipionis aciem suam subiecit; ille a vallo non discedere perseveravit. Ac tamen aegre retentis Domitianis militibus est factum, ne proelio contenderetur, et maxime, quod rivus difficilibus ripis subiectus castris Scipionis progressus nostrorum impediabat.

Quorum studium alacritatemque pugnandi cum cognovisset Scipio, suspicatus fore, ut postero die aut invitus dimicare cogeretur aut magna cum infamia castris se contineret, qui magna expectatione venisset, temere progressus turpem habuit exitum et noctu ne conclamatis quidem vasis flumen transit atque in eandem partem, ex qua venerat, redit ibique prope flumen edito natura loco castra posuit. Paucis diebus interpositis noctu insidias equitum collocavit, quo in loco superioribus fere diebus nostri pabulari consueverant; et cum cotidiana consuetudine Qu. Varus, praefectus equitum Domitii, venisset, subito illi ex insidiis consurrexerunt. Sed nostri fortiter impetum eorum tulerunt, celeriterque ad suos quisque ordines rediit, atque ultro universi in hostes impetum fecerunt; ex his circiter LXXX interfectis, reliquis in fugam coniectis, duobus amissis in castra se receperunt.

3:38. After these transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio to a battle, pretended to be obliged to change his position through want of corn, and having given the signal for decamping, advanced about three miles, and posted his army and cavalry in a convenient place, concealed from the enemy's view. Scipio being in readiness to pursue him, detached his cavalry and a considerable number of light infantry to explore Domitius's route. When they had marched a short way, and their foremost troops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions being raised by the neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest who followed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt. Our men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, and thinking it in vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in their power, intercepted them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of the horse, but he made his escape: they either killed or took prisoners all the rest of these

two troops, and brought them to Domitius.

His rebus gestis Domitius, sperans Scipionem ad pugnam elici posse, simulavit sese angustiis rei frumentariae adductum castra movere, vasisque militari more conclamatis progressus milia passuum III loco idoneo et occulto omnem exercitum equitatumque collocavit. Scipio ad sequendum paratus equitum magnam partem ad explorandum iter Domitii et cognoscendum praemisit. Qui cum essent progressi, primaeque turmae insidias intravissent, ex fremitu equorum illata suspitione ad suos se recipere coeperunt, quique hos sequebantur celerem eorum receptum conspicati restiterunt. Nostri, cognitis insidiis, ne frustra reliquos expectarent, duas nacti turmas exceperunt (in his fuit M. Opimius, praefectus equitum), reliquos omnes aut interfecerunt aut captos ad Domitium deduxerunt.

3:39. Caesar, having drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, as before mentioned, left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, and committed to them the charge of his ships of war, which he had transported from Italy. Acilius, as lieutenant-general, had the charge of this duty and the command of the town; he drew the ships into the inner part of the harbor, behind the town, and fastened them to the shore, and sank a merchant- ship in the mouth of the harbor to block it up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret, and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers, and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack.

Deductis orae maritimae praesidiis Caesar, ut supra demonstratum est, III cohortes Orici oppidi tuendi causa reliquit isdemque custodiam navium longarum tradidit, quas ex Italia traduxerat. Huic officio oppidoque Acilius Caninus legatus praeerat. Is naves nostras interiorem in portum post oppidum reduxit et ad terram deligavit

faucibusque portus navem onerariam submersam obiecit et huic alteram coniunxit; super quam turrim effectam ad ipsum introitum portus opposuit et militibus complevit tuendamque ad omnes repentinos casus tradidit.

3:40. Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got intelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship, that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with several ropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watch the port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets, so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh men constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting the town on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order to divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and the immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men that were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in small boats; and at the, same time he seized a natural mole on the opposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. He carried over land, into the inner part of the harbor, four galleys, by putting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Then attacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore, and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest on fire. After dispatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and went himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left within the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm Lissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defense of the Roman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers which

Caesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in the assault, he returned without effecting his object.

Quibus cognitis rebus Cn. Pompeius filius, qui classi Aegyptiae praeerat, ad Oricum venit submersamque navim remulco multisque contendens funibus adduxit atque alteram navem, quae erat ad custodiam ab Acilio posita, pluribus aggressus navibus, in quibus ad libram fecerat turres, ut ex superiore pugnans loco integrosque semper defatigatis submittens et reliquis partibus simul ex terra scalis et classe moenia oppidi temptans, uti adversariorum manus diduceret, labore et multitudine telorum nostros vicit, deiectisque defensoribus, qui omnes scaphis excepti refugerant, eam navem expugnavit, eodemque tempore ex altera parte molem tenuit naturalem obiectam, quae paene insulam oppidum effecerat, et IIII biremes subiectis scutulis impulsas vectibus in interiorem portum traduxit. Ita ex utraque parte naves longas aggressus, quae erant deligatae ad terram atque inanes, IIII ex his abduxit, reliquas incendit. Hoc confecto negotio D. Laelium ab Asiatica classe abductum reliquit, qui commeatus Bullide atque Amantia importari in oppidum prohibebat. Ipse Lissum profectus naves onerarias XXX a M. Antonio relictas intra portum aggressus omnes incendit; Lissum expugnare conatus defendentibus civibus Romanis, qui eius conventus erant, militibusque, quos praesidii causa miserat Caesar, triduum moratus paucis in oppugnatione amissis re infecta inde discessit.

3:41. As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out for that place with his army, and having taken the capital of the Parthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, he reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped

beside him; and the day following having drawn out all his forces before his camp, he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within his trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his forces by a long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road to Dyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow him to Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off, because he had deposited there all his provisions and material of war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design, because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction from that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him to shift his quarters; but having afterward got true intelligence from his scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking a shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his troops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very small part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium, when the van of Pompey's army was visible at a distance, and there he encamped.

Caesar, postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse cognovit, eodem cum exercitu profectus expugnato in itinere oppido Parthinorum, in quo Pompeius praesidium habebat, tertio die ad Pompeium pervenit iuxtaque eum castra posuit et postridie eductis omnibus copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit. Ubi illum suis locis se tenere animadvertit, reducto in castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit. Itaque postero die omnibus copiis magno circuitu difficili angustoque itinere Dyrrachium profectus est sperans Pompeium aut Dyrrachium compelli aut ab eo intercludi posse, quod omnem commeatum totiusque belli apparatus eo contulisset; ut

accidit Pompeim enim primo ignorans eius consilium, quod diverso ab ea regione itinere profectum videbat, angustiis rei frumentariae compulsus discessisse existimabat; postea per exploratores certior factus postero die castra movit, brevior itinere se occurrere ei posse sperans. Quod fore suspicatus Caesar militesque adhortatus, ut aequo animo laborem ferrent, parvam partem noctis itinere intermisso mane Dyrrachium venit, cum primum agmen Pompei procul cerneretur, atque ibi castra posuit.

3:42. Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect his purpose, took a new resolution, and intrenched himself strongly on a rising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size can come in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his men of war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought from Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar, imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, and despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were guarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his own fleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn; and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in certain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for the neighboring states. He likewise gave directions that search should be made for whatever corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, and all the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from the nature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and the people commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey had foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off

all the corn, which he collected by means of his horse.

Pompeim interclusus Dyrrachio, ubi propositum tenere non potuit, secundo usus consilio edito loco, qui appellatur Petra aditumque habet navibus mediocrem atque eas a quibusdam protegit ventis, castra communit. Eo partem navium longarum convenire, frumentum commeatumque ab Asia atque omnibus regionibus, quas tenebat, comportari imperat. Caesar longius bellum ductum iri existimans et de Italicis commeatibus desperans, quod tanta diligentia omni litora a Pompeianis tenebantur, classesque ipsius, quas hieme in Sicilia, Gallia, Italia fecerat, morabantur, in Epirum rei frumentariae causa Q. Tillium et L. Canuleium legatum misit, quodque hae regiones aberant longius, locis certis horrea constituit vecturasque frumenti finitimis civitatibus descripsit. Item Lisso Parthinisque et omnibus castellis quod esset frumenti conquiri iussit. Id erat perexiguum cum ipsius agri natura, quod sunt loca aspera ac montuosa ac plerumque frumento utuntur importato, tum quod Pompeius haec providerat et superioribus diebus praedae loco Parthinos habuerat frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus per equites comportarat.

3:43. Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursued measures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey's camps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of all occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing a fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each position allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey, with these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was strong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other necessaries from all sides with less danger;

secondly, to prevent Pompey from foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in the operations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on which he saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report should have spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, and dare not hazard a battle.

Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar consilium capit ex loci natura. Erant enim circum castra Pompei permulti editi atque asperi colles. Hos primum praesidiis tenuit castellaque ibi communit. Inde, ut loci cuiusque natura ferebat, ex castello in castellum perducta munitione circumvallare Pompeium instituit, haec spectans, quod angusta re frumentaria utebatur quodque Pompeius multitudine equitum valebat, quo minore periculo undique frumentum commeatumque exercitui supportare posset, simul, uti pabulatione Pompeium prohiberet equitatumque eius ad rem gerendam inutilem efficeret, tertio, ut auctoritatem qua ille maxime apud exteras nationes niti videbatur, minueret, cum fama per orbem terrarum percrebuisset, illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.

3:44. Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium, because he had lodged his material there, his weapons, arms, and engines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships; nor was he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle, which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but to adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills as he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his troops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so it happened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of fifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuit there were several fields lately sown, in which the

cattle might feed in the mean time. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawing lines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid that Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear; so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit within ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them on the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to inclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had resolved not to oppose him with his whole force, or to come to a general engagement, yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers, with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, and filled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers made coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or raw hides to defend them against the weapons.

Pompeius neque a mari Dyrrachioque discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatus belli, tela, arma, tormenta ibi collocaverat frumentumque exercitui navibus supportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat, nisi proelio decertare vellet; quod eo tempore statuerat non esse faciendum. Relinquebatur, ut extremam rationem belli sequens quam plurimos colles occuparet et quam latissimas regiones praesidiis teneret Caesarisque copias, quam maxime posset, distineret; idque accidit. Castellis enim XXIII effectis XV milia passuum circuitu amplexus hoc spatium pabulabatur; multaue erant intra eum locum manu sata, quibus interim iumenta pasceret. Atque ut nostri perpetua munitione providebant, ne quo loco erumperent Pompeiani ac nostros post tergum adorirentur, ita illi interiore spatio perpetuas munitiones efficiebant, ne quem locum nostri intrare atque ipsos a tergo circumvenire possent. Sed illi

operibus vincebant, quod et numero militum praestabant et interiore spatio minorem circuitum habebant. Quaecumque erant loca Caesari capienda, etsi prohibere Pompeius totis copiis et dimicare non constituerat, tamen suis locis sagittarios funditoresque mittebat, quorum magnum habebat numerum, multique ex nostris vulnerabantur, magnusque incesserat timor sagittarum, atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent.

3:45. In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power. Caesar, to confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and several skirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, when Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun to fortify it, Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite the same place, and endeavored to annoy the men while at work; and as the approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with archers and slingers, and afterward by detaching a strong party of light infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works; and it was no easy matter for our men at once to defend themselves, and to proceed with their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops were wounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post; his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on with more spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imagined that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey said that day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he would consent to be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected a retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they had rashly advanced."

In occupandis praesidiis magna vi uterque nitebatur: Caesar, ut quam angustissime Pompeium contineret; Pompeius, ut quam plurimos colles quam maximo circuitu occuparet, crebraque ob eam causam proelia fiebant. In his cum legio Caesaris nona praesidium quoddam occupavisset et munire coepisset, huic loco propinquum et contrarium collem Pompeius occupavit nostrosque opere prohibere coepit et, cum una ex parte prope aequum aditum haberet, primum sagittariis funditoribusque circumiectis, postea levis armaturae magna multitudine missa tormentisque prolatis munitiones impediabat; neque erat facile nostris uno tempore propugnare et munire. Caesar, cum suos ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret, recipere se iussit et loco excedere. Erat per declive receptus. Illi autem hoc acrius instabant neque regredi nostros patiebantur, quod timore adducti locum relinquere videbantur. Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse: non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae.

3:46. Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered hurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placed opposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth to be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles; and the ground to be made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers in convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things being completed, he ordered his legions to file off: Pompey's men insultingly and boldly pursued and chased us, leveling the hurdles that were thrown up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained, when his men were almost half way

down the hill, he encouraged them by Antonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be sounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth legion suddenly closing their files, threw their javelins, and advancing impetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey's men precipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; but their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that lay in a long line before them, and the palisadoes which were in their way, and the trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat without injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat on this side of that place, completed their fortifications.

Caesar receptui suorum timens crates ad extremum tumultum contra hostem proferri et adversas locari, intra has mediocri latitudine fossam tectis militibus obduci iussit locumque in omnes partes quam maxime impediri. Ipse idoneis locis funditores instruxit, ut praesidio nostris se recipientibus essent. His rebus comparatis legionem reduci iussit. Pompeiani hoc insolentius atque audacius nostros premere et instare coeperunt cratesque pro munitione obiectas propulerunt, ut fossas transcenderent. Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, veritus, ne non reducti, sed reiecti viderentur, maiusque detrimentum caperetur, a medio fere spatio suos per Antonium, qui ei legioni praeerat, cohortatus tuba signum dari atque in hostes impetum fieri iussit. Milites legionis VIII subito conspirtiati pila coniecerunt et ex inferiore loco adversus clivum incitati cursu praecipites Pompeianos egerunt et terga vertere coegerunt; quibus ad recipiendum crates deiectae longuriique obiecti et institutae fossae magno impedimento fuerunt. Nostri vero, qui satis habebant sine detrimento discedere, compluribus interfectis V omnino suorum amissis quietissime se

receperunt pauloque citra eum locum allis comprehensis collibus munitiones perfecerunt.

3:47. This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on account of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works, and the manner of attack and defense, as on account of other circumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, have attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat; or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have had a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of a siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, with an inferior force, was inclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number of ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from any point, that would not be favorable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar, having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress, but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they remembered that they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by labor and patience had concluded a dangerous war. They recollected too that they had suffered an alarming scarcity at Alesia, and a much greater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over mighty nations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, and they held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantities from Epirus.

Erat nova et inusitata belli ratio cum tot castellorum numero tantoque spatio et tantis munitionibus et toto obsidionis genere, tum etiam reliquis rebus. Nam quicumque alterum obsidere conati sunt, percussos atque infirmos hostes adorti aut proelio superatos aut

aliqua offensione permotos continuerunt, cum ipsi numero equitum militumque praestarent; causa autem obsidionis haec fere esse consuevit, ut frumento hostes prohiberent. At tum integras atque incolumes copias Caesar inferiore militum numero continebat, cum illi omnium rerum copia abundarent; cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus conveniebat, quae commeatum supportarent, neque ullus flare ventus poterat, quin aliqua ex parte secundum cursum haberent. Ipse autem consumptis omnibus longe lateque frumentis summis erat in angustiis. Sed tamen haec singulari patientia milites ferebant. Recordabantur enim eadem se superiore anno in Hispania perpressos labore et patientia maximum bellum confecisse, meminerant ad Alesiam magnam se inopiam perpressos, multo etiam maiorem ad Avaricum, maximarum gentium victores discessisse. Non illi hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recusabant; pecus vero cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant.

3:48. There was a sort of root called chara, discovered by the troops which served under Valerius. This they mixed up with milk, and it greatly contributed to relieve their want. They made it into a sort of bread. They had great plenty of it; loaves made of this, when Pompey's men upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among them to damp their hopes.

Est autem genus radicis inventum ab eis, qui fuerant vacui ab operibus, quod appellatur chara, quod admixtum lacte multum inopiam levabat. Id ad similitudinem panis efficiebant. Eius erat magna copia. Ex hoc effectos panes, cum in colloquiis Pompeiani famem nostris obiectarent, vulgo in eos iaciebant, ut spem eorum minuerent.

3:49. The corn was now beginning to ripen, and their hope supported

their want, as they were confident of having abundance in a short time. And there were frequently heard declarations of the soldiers on guard, in discourse with each other, that they would rather live on the bark of the trees, than let Pompey escape from their hands. For they were often told by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain their horses, and that their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were not in good health from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from the noisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue to them, being men unaccustomed to work, and laboring under a great want of water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers and streams which ran to the sea, or had dammed them up with strong works. And as the country was mountainous, and the valleys narrow at the bottom, he inclosed them with piles sunk in the ground, and heaped up mold against them to keep in the water. They were therefore obliged to search for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells, and they had this labor in addition to their daily works. And even these springs were at a considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon dried up with the heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance of water, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and they had a prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laid before them by the ripening of the grain.

Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant, atque ipsa spes inopiam sustentabat, quod celeriter se habituros copiam confidebant; crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur, prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros. Libenter etiam ex perfugis cognoscebant equos eorum tolerari, reliqua vero iumenta interisse; uti autem ipsos valetudine non bona, cum angustiis loci et odore taetro ex multitudine

cadaverum et cotidianis laboribus insuetos operum, tum aquae summa inopia affectos. Omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos, qui ad mare pertinebant, Caesar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant loca montuosa et aspera, angustias vallium publicis in terram demissis praesaepserat terramque aggresserat, ut aquam contineret. Itaque illi necessario loca sequi demissa ac palustria et puteos fodere cogebantur atque hunc laborem ad cotidiana opera addebant; qui tamen fontes a quibusdam praesidiis aberant longius et celeriter aestibus exarescebant. At Caesaris exercitus optima valetudine summaque aquae copia utebatur, tum commeatus omni genere praeter frumentum abundabat; quibus cotidie melius succedere tempus maioremque spem maturitate frumentorum proponi videbant.

3:50. In this new kind of war, new methods of managing it were invented by both generals. Pompey's men, perceiving by our fires at night, at what part of the works our cohorts were on guard, coming silently upon them discharged their arrows at random among the whole multitude, and instantly retired to their camp; as a remedy against which our men were taught by experience to light their fires in one place, and keep guard in another. Note: The translator felt that some of the original text was missing at this point.

In novo genere belli novae ab utrisque bellandi rationes reperiabantur. Illi, cum animadvertissent ex ignibus noctu cohortes nostras ad munitiones excubare, silentio aggressi universi intra multitudinem sagittas coniciebant et se confestim ad suos recipiebant. Quibus rebus nostri usu docti haec reperiabant remedia, ut alio loco ignes facerent...

3:51. In the mean time, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure

had left governor of his camp, came up with two legions to assist the cohort; upon whose arrival Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor did they stand the sight and charge of our men, and the foremost falling, the rest turned their backs and quitted the field. But Sylla called our men in from the pursuit, lest their ardor should carry them too far, but most people imagine that if he had consented to a vigorous pursuit, the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however does not appear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general, and of a commander-in-chief, are very different; the one is bound to act entirely according to his instructions, the other to regulate his conduct without control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed by Caesar to take care of the camp, and having rescued his men, was satisfied with that, and did not desire to hazard a battle (although this circumstance might probably have had a successful issue), that he might not be thought to have assumed the part of the general. One circumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making good a retreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and were posted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep, they dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and there was but a short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing the business, they had protracted the battle almost till night. Taking therefore measures suited to their exigency, and to the shortness of the time, Pompey possessed himself of an eminence, at such a distance from our fort that no weapon discharged from an engine could reach him. Here he took up a position, and fortified it, and kept all his forces there.

Interim certior factus P. Sulla, quem discedens castris praefecerat Caesar, auxilio cohorti venit cum legionibus duabus; cuius adventu facile sunt repulsi Pompeiani. Neque vero conspectum aut impetum

nostrorum tulerunt, primisque deiectis reliqui se verterunt et loco cesserunt. Sed insequentes nostros, ne longius prosequerentur, Sulla revocavit. At plerique existimant, si acrius insequi voluisset, bellum eo die potuisse finire. Cuius consilium reprehendendum non videtur. Aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. Sulla a Caesare in castris relictus liberatis suis hoc fuit contentus neque proelio decertare voluit, quae res tamen fortasse aliquem reciperet casum, ne imperatorias sibi partes sumpsisse videretur. Pompeianis magnam res ad receptum difficultatem afferebat. Nam ex iniquo progressi loco in summo constiterant; si per declive sese reciperent, nostros ex superiore insequentes loco verebantur; neque multum ad solis occasum temporis supererat; spe enim conficiendi negotii prope in noctem rem duxerant. Ita necessario atque ex tempore capto consilio Pompeius tumulum quendam occupavit, qui tantum aberat a nostro castello, ut telum tormento missum adigi non posset. Hoc consedit loco atque eum communivit omnesque ibi copias continuit.

3:52. At the same time, there were engagements in two other places; for Pompey had attacked several forts at once, in order to divide our forces; that no relief might be sent from the neighboring posts. In one place, Volcatius Tullus sustained the charge of a legion with three cohorts, and beat them off the field. In another, the Germans, having sallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy, and retreated safe to our camp.

Eodem tempore duobus praeterea locis pugnatum est: nam plura castella Pompeius pariter distinendae manus causa temptaverat, ne ex proximis praesidiis succurri posset. Uno loco Volcatius Tullus impetum legionis sustinuit cohortibus tribus atque eam loco depulit;

altero Germani munitiones nostras egressi compluribus interfectis sese ad suos incolumes receperunt.

3:53. Thus six engagements having happened in one day, three at Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications, when a computation was made of the number of slain, we found that about two thousand fell on Pompey's side, several of them volunteer veterans and centurions. Among them was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus, who as praetor had formerly had the government of Asia, and six military standards were taken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the action. But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and in one cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous to produce testimony of the fatigue they under went, and the danger they sustained, they counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been thrown into the fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva, which was brought to him, were found two hundred and thirty holes. In reward for this man's services, both to himself and the public, Caesar presented to him two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, and declared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion. For it appeared that the fort had been in a great measure saved by his exertions; and he afterward very amply rewarded the cohorts with double pay, corn, clothing, and other military honors.

Ita uno die VI proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium, tribus ad munitiones, cum horum omnium ratio haberetur, ad duorum milium numero ex Pompeianis cecidisse reperiēbamus, evocatos centurionesque complures (in eo fuit numero Valerius Flaccus, L. filius, eius, qui praetor Asiam obtinuerat); signaque sunt militaria sex relata. Nostri non amplius XX omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. Sed

in castello nemo fuit omnino militum, quin vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt. Et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium afferre vellent, milia sagittarum circiter XXX in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina CXX. Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritis et de re publica, donatum milibus CC collaudatumque ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit (eius enim opera castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat) cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, veste, cibariis militaribusque donis amplissime donavit

3:54. Pompey, having made great additions to his works in the night, the following days built turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feet high, faced that part of his camp with mantelets; and after an interval of five days, taking advantage of a second cloudy night, he barricaded all the gates of his camp to hinder a pursuit, and about midnight, quietly marched off his army, and retreated to his old fortifications.

Pompeius noctu magnis additis munitionibus reliquis diebus turres exstruxit, et in altitudinem pedum XV effectis operibus vineis eam partem castrorum obtexit, et quinque intermissis diebus alteram noctem subnubilam nactus obstructis omnibus castrorum portis et ad impediendum obicibus obiectis tertia inita vigilia silentio exercitum eduxit et se in antiquas munitiones recepit.

3:55. Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilocheis, being reduced, as we have related, by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought he ought to attempt the conquest of Achaia, and to advance further into the country. Accordingly, he detached Fufius thither, and ordered Quintus Sabinus and Cassius to join him with their cohorts.

Upon notice of their approach, Rutilius Lupus, who commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, began to fortify the Isthmus, to prevent Fufius from coming into Achaia. Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, by a voluntary submission of those states. Some he subdued by force, the rest he endeavored to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending deputies round to them. In these things, principally, Fusius was employed.

Omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet, ut paene castris Pompei legiones subiceret; tantumque a vallo eius prima acies aberat, uti ne telum tormento adigi posset. Pompeius autem, ut famam opinionemque hominum teneret, sic pro castris exercitum constituebat, ut tertia acies vallum contingeret, omnis quidem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo coniectis protegi posset.

3:56. Every day afterward, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground, and offered Pompey battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey's camp; and his front line was at no greater distance from the rampart than that no weapon from their engines could reach it. But Pompey, to save his credit and reputation with the world, drew out his legions, but so close to his camp, that his rear line might touch the rampart, and that his whole army, when drawn up, might be protected by the darts discharged from it.

Aetolia, Acarnania, Amphilochis per Cassium Longinum et Calvisium Sabinum, ut demonstravimus, receptis temptandam sibi Achaiam ac paulo longius progrediendum existimabat Caesar. Itaque eo Calenum misit eique Sabinum et Cassium cum cohortibus adiungit. Quorum cognito adventu Rutilius Lupus, qui Achaiam missus a Pompeio obtinebat, Isthmum praemunire instituit, ut Achaia

Fufium prohiberet. Calenus Delphos, Thebas, Orchomenum voluntate ipsarum civitatum recepit, nonnullas urbes per vim expugnavit, reliquas civitates circummissis legationibus amicitia Caesari conciliare studebat. In his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus.

3:57. While these things were going forward in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, and when it was certainly known that Scipio was arrived in Macedonia, Caesar, never losing sight of his first intention, sends Clodius to him, an intimate friend to both, whom Caesar, on the introduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted into the number of his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and instructions to Pompey, the substance of which was as follows: "That he had made every effort toward peace, and imputed the ill success of those efforts to the fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those negotiations; because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an improper time. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freely explain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degree enforce his advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error; that he commanded an army independent of Pompey, so that besides his authority, he had strength to compel; and if he did so, all men would be indebted to him for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, and the preservation of the empire." These proposals Clodius made to him, and for some days at the first appeared to have met with a favorable reception, but afterward was not admitted to an audience; for Scipio being reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterward when the war was ended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned to Caesar.

Haec cum in Achaia atque apud Dyrrachium gererentur, Scipionemque in Macedoniam venisse constaret, non oblitus pristini

instituti Caesar mittit ad eum A. Clodium, suum atque illius familiarem, quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero habere instituerat. Huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum; quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc effecisse: hoc arbitrari vitio factum eorum, quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur. Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere quae probasset exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellere atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet. Quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii uni omnes acceptam relatuos. Haec ad eum mandata Clodius refert ac primis diebus, ut videbatur, libenter auditus reliquis ad colloquium non admittitur, castigato Scipione a Favonio, ut postea confecto bello reperiebamus, infectaque re sese ad Caeaarem recepit.

3:58. Caesar, that he might the more easily keep Pompey's horse inclosed within Dyrrachium, and prevent them from foraging, fortified the two narrow passes already mentioned with strong works, and erected forts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived no advantage from his cavalry, after a few days had them conveyed back to his camp by sea. Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his horses upon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reeds pounded. For the corn which had been sown within the lines was already consumed, and they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodder from Corcyra and Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as the quantity of that fell short, to increase it by mixing barley with it, and by these methods support their cavalry. But when not only the barley and fodder in these parts were

consumed, and the herbs cut away, when the leaves too were not to be found on the trees, the horses being almost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt by a sally.

Caesar, quo facilius equitatum Pompeianum ad Dyrrachium contineret et pabulatione prohiberet, aditus duos, quos esse angustos demonstravimus, magnis operibus praemunivit castellaque his locis posuit. Pompeius, ubi nihil profici equitatu cognovit, paucis intermissis diebus rursus eum navibus ad se intra munitiones recipit. Erat summa inopia pabuli, adeo ut foliis ex arboribus strictis et teneris harundinum radicibus contusis equos alerent (frumenta enim, quae fuerant intra munitiones sata, consumpserant); cogeantur Corcyra atque Acarnania longo interiecto navigationis spatio pabulum supportare, quodque erat eius rei minor copia, hordeo adaugere atque his rationibus equitatum tolerare. Sed postquam non modo hordeum pabulumque omnibus locis herbaeque desectae, sed etiam frons ex arboribus deficiebat, corruptis equis macie conandum sibi aliquid Pompeius de eruptione existimavit.

3:59. In the number of Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers, named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Abducillus, who for several years possessed the chief power in his own state; men of singular valor, whose gallant services Caesar had found very useful in all his wars in Gaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed the offices of greatest honor in their own country, and took care to have them chosen into the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands taken from the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy had made them affluent. Their valor had not only procured them Caesar's esteem, but they were beloved by the whole army. But presuming on Caesar's friendship, and elated

with the arrogance natural to a foolish and barbarous people, they despised their countrymen, defrauded their cavalry of their pay, and applied all the plunder to their own use. Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a body to Caesar, and openly complained of their ill usage; and to their other charges added, that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged pay applied to their own use.

Erant apud Caesarem in equitum numero Allobroges duo fratres, Raucillus et Egus, Adbucilli filii, qui principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat, singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimaque erat usus. His domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. Hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant, sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur; sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertabant. Quibus illi rebus permoti universi Caesarem adierunt palamque de eorum iniuriis sunt questi et ad cetera addiderunt falsum ab his equitum numerum deferri, quorum stipendium averterent.

3:60. Caesar, not thinking it a proper time to call them to account, and willing to pardon many faults, on account of their valor, deferred the whole matter, and gave them a private rebuke, for having made a traffic of their troops, and advised them to expect every thing from his friendship, and by his past favors to measure their future hopes. This however, gave them great offense, and made them contemptible

in the eyes of the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from the reproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and a consciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imagining that they were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day, they resolved to break off from us, to put their fortune to a new hazard, and to make trial of new connections. And having conferred with a few of their clients, to whom they could venture to intrust so base an action, they first attempted to assassinate Caius Volusenus, general of the horse (as was discovered at the end of the war), that they might appear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important service on him. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and no opportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money they could, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for what they had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, they deserted to Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot.

Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam distulit; illos secreto castigavit, quod quaestui equites haberent, monuitque, ut ex sua amicitia omnia exspectarent et ex praeteritis suis officiis reliqua sperarent. Magnam tamen haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad omnes attulit, idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectationibus tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia intellegebant. Quo pudore adducti et fortasse non se liberari, sed in aliud tempus reservari arbitrati discedere a nobis et novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri constituerunt. Et cum paucis collocuti clientibus suis, quibus tantum facinus committere audebant, primum conati sunt praefectum equitum C. Volusenum interficere, ut postea bello

confecto cognitum est, ut cum munere aliquo perfugisse ad Pompelum viderentur; postquam id difficilius visum est neque facultas perficiendi dabatur, quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mutuati, proinde ac si suis satisfacere et fraudata restituere vellent, multis coemptis equis ad Pompeium transierunt cum eis, quos sui consilii participes habebant.

3:61. As they were persons nobly descended and of liberal education, and had come with a great retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned men of courage, and had been in great esteem with Caesar, and as it was a new and uncommon event, Pompey carried them round all his works, and made an ostentatious show of them, for till that day, not a soldier, either horse or foot had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, though there were desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar: but more commonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in those countries, which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, having been acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in our works, or what appeared to the best judges of military matters to be deficient, the particular times, the distance of places, and the various attention of the guards, according to the different temper and character of the officer who commanded the different posts, gave an exact account of all to Pompey.

Quos Pompeius, quod erant honesto loco nati et instructi liberaliter magnoque comitatu et multis iumentis venerant virique fortes habebantur et in honore apud Caesarem fuerant, quodque novum et praeter consuetudinem acciderat, omnia sua praesidia circumduxit atque ostentavit. Nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a Pompeio ad

Caesarem perfugerent, vulgo vero universi in Epiro atque Aetolia conscripti milites earumque regionum omnium, quae a Caesare tenebantur. Sed hi cognitis omnibus rebus, seu quid in munitionibus perfectum non erat, seu quid a peritioribus rei militaris desiderari videbatur, temporibusque rerum et spatiis locorum, custodiarum varia diligentia animadversa, prout cuiusque eorum, qui negotiis praeerant, aut natura aut studium ferebat, haec ad Pompeium omnia detulerunt.

3:62. Upon receiving this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formed the design of attempting a sally, as before mentioned, ordered the soldiers to make ozier coverings for their helmets, and to provide fascines. These things being prepared, he embarked on board small boats and row galleys by night, a considerable number of light infantry and archers, with all their fascines, and immediately after midnight, he marched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the outposts, to that part of our works which extended toward the sea, and were at the furthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sent the ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armed troops; and all the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each he gave particular instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar had posted Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and as he was not in a good state of health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent to assist him in the command.

Quibus ille cognitis rebus eruptionisque iam ante capto consilio, ut demonstratum est, tegimenta galeis milites ex viminibus facere atque aggerem iubet comportare. His paratis rebus magnum numerum levis armaturae et sagittariorum aggeremque omnem noctu in scaphas et naves actuarias imponit et de media nocte cohortes LX ex maximis

castris praesidiisque deductas ad eam partem munitionum ducit, quae pertinebant ad mare longissimeque a maximis castris Caesaris aberant. Eodem naves, quas demonstravimus, aggere et levis armaturae militibus completas, quasque ad Dyrrachium naves longas habebat, mittit et, quid a quoque fieri velit, praecipit. Ad eas munitiones Caesar Lentulum Marcellinum quaestorem cum legione VIII positum habebat. Huic, quod valetudine minus commoda utebatur, Fulvium Postumum adiutorem submiserat.

3:63. At this place, fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart ten feet high, and the top of the rampart was ten feet in breadth. At an interval of six hundred feet from that there was another rampart turned the contrary way, with the works lower. For some days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might be surrounded by sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be attacked on both sides, he might have the means of defending himself. But the extent of the lines, and the incessant labor for so many days, because he had inclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did not allow time to finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which should make a communication between the other two, was not yet completed. This circumstance was known to Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogian deserters, and proved of great disadvantage to us. For when our cohorts of the ninth legion were on guard by the sea-side, Pompey's army arrived suddenly by break of day, and their approach was a surprise to our men, and at the same time, the soldiers that came by sea, cast their darts on the front rampart; and the ditches were filled with fascines: and the legionary soldiers terrified those that defended the inner rampart, by applying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of all sorts, and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every side.

Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over their helmets, were a great security to them against the blows of stones which were the only weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our men were oppressed in every manner, and were scarcely able to make resistance, the defect in our works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers, landing between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished, attacked our men in the rear, and having beat them from both sides of the fortification, obliged them to flee.

Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat: ab eo intermisso spatio pedum DC alter conversus in contrariam partem erat vallus humiliore paulo munitione. Hoc enim superioribus diebus timens Caesar, ne navibus nostri circumvenirentur, duplicem eo loco fecerat vallum, ut, si ancipiti proelio dimicaretur, posset resisti. Sed operum magnitudo et continens omnium dierum labor, quod milium passuum in circuitu XVII munitiones erat complexus, perficiendi spatium non dabat. Itaque contra mare transversum vallum, qui has duas munitiones coniungeret, nondum perfecerat. Quae res nota erat Pompeio delata per Allobrogas perfugas, magnumque nostris attulerat incommodum. Nam ut ad mare duo cohortes nonae legionis excubuerant, accessere subito prima luce Pompeiani; simul navibus circumvecti milites in exteriorum vallum tela iaciebant, fossaeque aggere complebantur, et legionarii interioris munitionis defensores scalis admotis tormentis cuiusque generis telisque terrebant, magnaque multitudo sagittariorum ab utraque parte circumfundebatur. Multum autem ab ictu lapidum, quod unum nostris erat telum, viminea tegimenta galeis imposita defendebant. Itaque cum omnibus rebus nostri premerentur atque aegre resisterent animadversum est vitium munitionis, quod supra demonstratum est,

atque inter duos vallos, qua perfectum opus non erat, Pompeiani navibus eiti in aversos nostros impetum fecerunt atque ex utraque munitione deiectos terga vertere coegerunt

3:64. Marcellinus, being informed of this disorder, detached some cohorts to the relief of our men, who seeing them flee from the camp, were neither able to persuade them to rally at their approach, nor themselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in like manner, whatever additional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears of the defeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was prevented by the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer was dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of our horse, he said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatest care for many years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my last moments restore it to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjure you, suffer a dishonor to be sustained in the field, which never before happened to Caesar's army, but deliver it safe into his hands." By this accident the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions of the first cohorts were killed, except the principal.

Hoc tumultu nuntiato Marcellinus cohortes subsidio nostris laborantibus submittit ex castris; quae fugientes conspicatae neque illos suo adventu confirmare potuerunt neque ipsae hostium impetum tulerunt. Itaque quodcumque addebatur subsidii, id corruptum timore fugientium terrorem et periculum augebat; hominum enim multitudine receptus impediabatur. In eo proelio cum gravi vulnere esset affectus aquilifer et a viribus deficeretur, conspicatus equites nostros, "hanc ego," inquit, "et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non

accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum deferte.” Hoc casu aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem.

3:65. And now the Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, were approaching Marcellinus’s camp, and had struck no small terror into the rest of the cohorts, when Marcus Antonius, who commanded the nearest fort, being informed of what had happened, was observed descending from the rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked the Pompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extreme affright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke of all the forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted off some cohorts from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. And having there learned the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that Pompey had forced our works, and had encamped along the coast, so that he was at liberty to forage, and had a communication with his shipping, he altered his plan for conducting the war, as his design had not succeeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near Pompey.

Iamque Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabant non mediocri terrore illato reliquis cohortibus, et M. Antonius, qui proximum locum praesidiorum tenebat, ea re nuntiata cum cohortibus XII descendens ex loco superiore cernebatur. Cuius adventus Pompeianos compressit nostrosque firmavit, ut se ex maximo timore colligerent. Neque multo post Caesar significatione per castella fumo facta, ut erat superioris temporis consuetudo, deductis quibusdam cohortibus ex praesidiis eodem venit. Qui cognito detrimento eum animadvertisset Pompeium extra munitiones egressum, castra secundum mare munire, ut libere pabulari posset

nec minus aditum navibus haberet, commutata ratione belli, quoniam propositum non tenuerat, castra iuxta Pompeium munire iussit.

3:66. When this work was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that some cohorts, which to them appeared like a legion, were retired behind the wood, and were on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two camps was as follows: a few days before, when Caesar's ninth legion had opposed a party of Pompey's troops, and were endeavoring to inclose them, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place. This camp joined a certain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea. Afterward, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar removed his camp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days, Pompey took possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the inner rampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By this means, the lesser camp, included within the greater, answered the purpose of a fort and citadel. He had also carried an intrenchment from the left angle of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that his soldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water. But he too, changing his design for reasons not necessary to be mentioned, abandoned the place. In this condition the camp remained for several days, the works being all entire.

Qua perfecta munitione animadversum est a speculatoribus Caesaris, cohortes quasdam, quod instar legionis videretur, esse post silvam et in vetera castra duci. Castrorum sic situs erat. Superioribus diebus nona Caesaris legio, cum se obiecisset Pompeianis copiis atque opere, ut demonstravimus, circummuniret, castra eo loco posuit. Haec silvam quandam contingebant neque longius a mari passibus CCC aberant. Post mutato consilio quibusdam de causis Caesar paulo

ultra eum locum castra transtulit, paucisque intermissis diebus eadem Pompeius occupaverat et, quod eo loco plures erat legiones habiturus, relicto interiore vallo maiorem adiecerat munitionem. Ita minora castra inclusa maioribus castelli atque arcis locum obtinebant. Item ab angulo catrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passus CCCC, quo liberius a periculo milites aquarentur. Sed is quoque mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, quas commemorari necesse non est, eo loco excesserat. Ita complures dies inania manserant castra; munitiones quidem omnes integrae erant.

3:67. Caesar's scouts brought him word that the standard of a legion was carried to this place. That the same thing was seen he was assured by those in the higher forts. This place was a half a mile distant from Pompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise this legion, and anxious to repair the loss sustained that day, left two cohorts employed in the works to make an appearance of intrenching himself, and by a different route, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts amounting to thirty- three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so many centurions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, he marched in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nor did this first opinion deceive him. For he reached the place before Pompey could have notice of it; and though the works were strong, yet having made the attack with the left wing which he commanded in person, he obliged the Pompeians to quit the rampart in disorder. A barricade had been raised before the gates, at which a short contest was maintained, our men endeavoring to force their way in, and the enemy to defend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that Caius Antonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. But the valor of our men prevailed, and having cut down the

barricade, they first forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which was inclosed within it; and as the legion on its repulse had retired to this, they slew several defending themselves there.

Eo signa legionis illata speculatores Caesari renuntiarunt. Hoc idem visum ex superioribus quibusdam castellis confirmaverunt. Is locus aberat a novis Pompei castris circiter passus quingentos. Hanc legionem sperans Caesar se opprimere posse et cupiens eius diei detrimentum sarcire, reliquit in opere cohortes duas, quae speciem munitionis praeberent; ipse diverso itinere quam potuit occultissime reliquas cohortes, numero XXXIII, in quibus erat legio nona multis amissis centurionibus deminutoque militum numero, ad legionem Pompei castraque minora duplici acie eduxit. Neque eum prima opinio fefellit. Nam et pervenit prius, quam Pompeius sentire posset, et tametsi erant munitiones castrorum magnae, tamen sinistro cornu, ubi erat ipse, celeriter aggressus Pompeianos ex vallo deturbavit. Erat obiectus portis ericius. Hic paulisper est pugnatum, cum irrumpere nostri conarentur, illi castra defenderent, fortissime Tito Pulione, cuius opera proditum exercitum C. Antoni demonstravimus, eo loco propugnante. Sed tamen nostri virtute vicerunt excisoque ericio primo in maiora castra, post etiam in castellum, quod erat inclusum maioribus castris, irruerunt, quo pulsa legio sese receperat, et nonnullos ibi repugnantes interfecerunt.

3:68. But Fortune who exerts a powerful influence as well in other matters, as especially in war, effects great changes from trifling causes, as happened at this time. For the cohorts on Caesar's right wing, through ignorance of the place, followed the direction of that rampart which ran along from the camp to the river, while they were in search of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But

when they found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, they immediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all our cavalry.

Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. Munitionem, quam pertinere a castris ad flumen supra demonstravimus, dextri Caesaris cornu cohortes ignorantia loci sunt secutae, cum portam quaererent castrorumque eam munitionem esse arbitrarentur. Quod cum esset animadversum coniunctam esse flumini, prorutis munitionibus defendente nullo transcenderunt, omnisque noster equitatus eas cohortes est secutus.

3:69. In the mean time Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned, being informed of what had happened, marched with the fifth legion, which he called away from their work to support his party; and at the same time his cavalry were advancing up to ours, and an army in order of battle, was seen at a distance by our men who had taken possession of the camp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a stand at the Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry, who had mounted the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive of their retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing which had been separated from the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to prevent their being overpowered within the lines, were endeavoring to retreat by the same way as they burst in; and most of them, lest they should be engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet high into the trenches; and the first being trodden to death, the rest procured their safety, and escaped over their bodies. The soldiers

of the left wing, perceiving from the rampart that Pompey was advancing, and their own friends fleeing, being afraid that they should be inclosed between the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both within and without, strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All was disorder, consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold of the colors of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, some left their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner; others through fear even threw away their colors. Nor did a single man face about.

Interim Pompeius hac satis longa interiecta mora et re nuntiata V legiones ab opere deductas subsidio suis duxit, eodemque tempore equitatus eius nostris equitibus appropinquabat, et acies instructa a nostris, qui castra occupaverant, cernebatur, omniaque sunt subito mutata. Legio Pompeiana celeris spe subsidii confirmata ab decumana porta resistere conabatur atque ultro in nostros impetum faciebat. Equitatus Caesaris, quod angusto itinere per aggeres ascendebat, receptui suo timens initium fugae faciebat. Dextrum cornu, quod erat a sinistro seclusum, terrore equitum animadverso, ne intra munitionem opprimeretur, ea parte, quam proruerat, sese recipiebat, ac plerique ex his, ne in angustias inciderent, ex X pedum munitione se in fossas praecipitabant, primisque oppressis reliqui per horum corpora salutem sibi atque exitum pariebant. Sinistro cornu milites, cum ex vallo Pompeium adesse et suos fugere cernerent, veriti, ne angustis intercluderentur, cum extra et intus hostem haberent, eodem, quo venerant, receptu sibi consulebant, omniaque erant tumultus, timoris, fugae plena, adeo ut, cum Caesar signa fugientium manu prenderet et consistere iuberet, alii admissis equis eodem cursu confugerent, alii metu etiam signa dimitterent, neque quisquam omnino consisteret.

3:70. In this calamity, the following favorable circumstance occurred to prevent the ruin of our whole army, viz., that Pompey suspecting an ambuscade (because, as I suppose, the success had far exceeded his hopes, as he had seen his men a moment before fleeing from the camp), durst not for some time approach the fortification; and that his horse were retarded from pursuing, because the passes and gates were in possession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling circumstance proved of great importance to each party; for the rampart drawn from the camp to the river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's victory, after he had forged Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding the rapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army.

His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant, quo minus omnis deleteretur exercitus, quod Pompeius insidias timens, credo, quod haec praeter spem acciderant eius, qui paulo ante ex castris fugientes suos conspexerat, munitionibus appropinquare aliquamdiu non audebat, equitesque eius angustis spatiis atque his ab Caesaris militibus occupatis ad insequendum tardabantur. Ita parvae res magnum in utramque partem momentum habuerunt. Munitiones enim a castris ad flumen perductae expugnatis iam castris Pompei prope iam expeditam Caesaris victoriam interpellaverunt, eadem res celeritate insequentium tardata nostris salutem attulit.

3:71. In the two actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty rank and file, several Roman knights of distinction, Felginas Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius Felginas from Placentia; Aulus Gravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from Capua; and thirty- two military tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part of all these perished without a wound, being trodden to death in the

trenches, on the ramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight of their own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; this title he retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterward. But neither in his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he use the laurel as a mark of honor. But Labienus, having obtained his consent that the prisoners should be delivered up to him, had them all brought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompey might place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and calling them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting manner whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put to death in the sight of the whole army.

Duobus his unius diei proeliis Caesar desideravit milites DCCCCLX et notos equites Romanos Tuticanum Gallum, senatoris filium, C. Fleginatem Placentia, A. Granium Puteolis, M. Sacrativirum Capua, tribunos militum et centuriones XXXII; sed horum omnium pars magna in fossis munitionibusque et fluminis ripis oppressa suorum in terrore ac fuga sine ullo vulnere interiit; signaque sunt militaria amissa XXXII. Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus. Hoc nomen obtinuit atque ita se postea salutari passus est, sed neque in litteris scribere est solitus, neque in fascibus insignia laureae praetulit. At Labienus, cum ab eo impetravisset, ut sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes productos ostentationis, ut videbatur, causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit.

3:72. Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at this success, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war, but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not

consider that the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place and the confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having first possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from within and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into two parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the causes of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the contest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and that our men had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of room, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not reflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, either from groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, have oftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army has been unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or the oversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by their valor, and as if no change could ever take place, they published the success of the day throughout the world by reports and letters.

His rebus tantum fiducia ac spiritus Pompeianis accessit, ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse iam viderentur. Non illi paucitatem nostrorum militum, non iniquitatem loci atque angustias praeoccupatis castris et ancipitem terrorem intra extraque munitiones, non abscisum in duas partes exercitum, cum altera alteri auxilium ferre non posset, causae fuisse cogitabant. Non ad haec addebant non concursu acri facto, non proelio dimicatum, sibi quae ipsos multitudine atque angustiis maius attulisse detrimentum, quam ab hoste accepissent. Non denique communes belli casus recordabantur, quam parvulae saepe causae vel falsae suspicionis vel terroris repentini vel obiectae religionis magna detrimenta intulissent, quotiens vel ducis vitio vel culpa tribuni in exercitu esset offensum;

sed, proinde ac si virtute vicissent, neque ulla commutatio rerum posset accidere, per orbem terrarum fama ac litteris victoriam eius diei concelebrabant.

3:73. Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to change the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once called in all outposts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into one place, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them “not to be troubled at what had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their many successful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, a trifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whose favor they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; through whose favor they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a most warlike people under the command of the most skillful and experienced generals; through whose favor they had reduced to submission the neighboring states that abounded with corn; in fine, that they ought to remember with what success they had been all transported safe through blockading fleets of the enemy, which possessed not only the ports, but even the coasts; that if all their attempts were not crowned with success, the defects of Fortune must be supplied by industry; and whatever loss had been sustained, ought to be attributed rather to her caprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen a safe ground for the engagement, that he had possessed himself of the enemy’s camp; that he had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered resistance; but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune herself had interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all now to use their utmost efforts to repair by their valor the loss which had been incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to their advantage, as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face

the enemy would be the first to offer themselves to battle.

Caesar a superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit. Itaque uno tempore praesidiis omnibus deductis et oppugnatione dimissa coactoque in unum locum exercitu contionem apud milites habuit hortatusque est, ne ea, quae accidissent, graviter ferrent neve his rebus terrentur multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum et id mediocre opponerent. Habendam fortunae gratiam, quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere cepissent, quod duas Hispanias bellicosissimorum hominum peritissimis atque exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in potestatem redegissent; denique recordari debere, qua felicitate inter medias hostium classes oppletis non solum portibus, sed etiam litoribus omnes incolumes essent transportati. Si non omnia caderent secunda, fortunam esse industria sublevandam. Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpa debere tribui. Locum se aequum ad dimicandum dedisse, potitum esse hostium castris, expulisse ac superasse pugnantes. Sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam fortuna partam iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset, dandam omnibus operam, ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur. Quod si esset factum, futurum, uti ad Gergoviam contigisset, ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, atque qui ante dimicare timuissent, ultro se proelio offerrent.

3:74. Having concluded his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers, and reduced them to the ranks; for the whole army was seized with such grief at their loss and with such an ardent desire of repairing their disgrace, that not a man required the command of his tribune or centurion, but they imposed each on himself severer labors

than usual as a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with eagerness to meet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly affected at their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue in their present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle. But, on the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence in men so lately thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allow them time to recover their dejected spirits; and having abandoned his works, he was apprehensive of being distressed for want of corn.

Hac habita contione nonnullos signiferos ignominia notavit ac loco movit. Exercitui quidem omni tantus incessit ex incommodo dolor tantumque studium infamiae sarcindae, ut nemo aut tribuni aut centurionis imperium desideraret, et sibi quisque etiam poenae loco graviores imponeret labores, simulque omnes arderent cupiditate pugnandi, cum superioris etiam ordinis nonnulli ratione permoti manendum eo loco et rem proelio committendam existimarent. Contra ea Caesar neque satis militibus perterritis confidebat spatiumque interponendum ad recreandos animos putabat, et relictis munitionibus magnopere rei frumentariae timebat.

3:75. Accordingly, suffering no time to intervene but what was necessary for a proper attention to be paid to the sick and wounded, he sent on all his baggage privately in the beginning of the night from his camp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt till they had performed their journey; and he detached one legion with them as a convoy. This affair being concluded, having retained only two legions in his camp, he marched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning by several gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a short space after, that the military practice

might be preserved, and his march known as late as possible, he ordered the signal for decamping to be given; and setting out immediately and following the rear of his own army, he was soon out of sight of the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon as he had notice of his design, make any delay to pursue him; but with a view to surprise them while encumbered with baggage on their march, and not yet recovered from their fright, he led his army out of his camp, and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not able to come up with them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched without baggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep, their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them to action. To oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with them about four hundred of his advanced light troops, who attacked their horse with such success, that having routed them all, and killed several, they returned without any loss to the main body.

Itaque nulla interposita mora sauciorum modo et aegrorum habitatione impedimenta omnia silentio prima nocte ex castris Apolloniam praemisit. Haec conquiescere ante iter confectum vetuit. His una legio missa praesidio est. His explicitis rebus duas in castris legiones retinuit, reliquas de quarta vigilia compluribus portis eductas eodem itinere praemisit parvoque spatio intermisso, ut et militare institutum servaretur, et quam serissime eius profectio cognosceretur conclamari iussit statimque egressus et novissimum agmen consecutus celeriter ex conspectu castrorum discessit. Neque vero Pompeius cognito consilio eius moram ullam ad insequendum intulit; sed eodem spectans, si itinere impeditos perterritos deprehendere posset, exercitum e castris eduxit equitatumque praemisit ad novissimum agmen demorandum, neque consequi

potuit, quod multum expedito itinere antecesserat Caesar. Sed cum ventum esset ad flumen Genusum, quod ripis erat impeditis, consecutus equitatus novissimos proelio detinebat. Huic suos Caesar equites opposuit expeditosque antesignanos admiscuit CCCC; qui tantum profecerunt, ut equestri proelio commisso pellerent omnes compluresque interficerent ipsique incolumes se ad agmen reciperent.

3:76. Having performed the exact march which he had proposed that day, and having led his army over the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself in his old camp opposite Asparagium; and kept his soldiers close within the intrenchments and ordered the horse, who had been sent out under pretense of foraging, to retire immediately into the camp, through the Decuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the same day's march, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, as they had no work (the fortifications being entire), made long excursions, some to collect wood and forage; others, invited by the nearness of the former camp, laid up their arms in their tents, and quitted the intrenchments in order to bring what they had left behind them, because the design of marching being adopted in a hurry, they had left a considerable part of their wagons and luggage behind. Being thus incapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about noon he gave the signal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's march, he advanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him, because his troops were dispersed.

Confecto iusto itinere eius diei Caesar traductoque exercitu flumen Genusum veteribus suis in castris contra Asparagium consedit militesque omnes intra vallum continuit equitatumque per causam

pabulandi emissum confestim decumana porta in castra se recipere iussit. Simili ratione Pompeius confecto eius diei itinere in suis veteribus castris ad Asparagium consedit. Eius milites, quod ab opere integris munitionibus vacabant, alii lignandi pabulandique causa longius progrediebantur, alii, quod subito consilium profectionis ceperant magna parte impedimentorum et sarcinarum relictis, ad haec repetenda invitati propinquitate superiorum castrorum, depositis in contubernio armis, vallum relinquebant. Quibus ad sequendum impeditis Caesar, quod fore providerat, meridiano fere tempore signo profectionis dato exercitum educit duplicatoque eius diei itinere VIII milia passuum ex eo loco procedit; quod facere Pompeius discessu militum non potuit.

3:77. The next day Caesar sent his baggage forward early in the night, and marched off himself immediately after the fourth watch: that if he should be under the necessity of risking an engagement, he might meet a sudden attack with an army free from incumbrance. He did so for several days successively, by which means he was enabled to effect his march over the deepest rivers, and through the most intricate roads without any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and the fatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exerted himself by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had got the start of him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, and determined to follow other measures.

Postero die Caesar similiter praemissis prima nocte impedimentis de quarta vigilia ipse egreditur, ut, si qua esset imposita dimicandi necessitas, subitum casum expedito exercitu subiret. Hoc idem reliquis fecit diebus. Quibus rebus perfectum est, ut altissimis fluminibus atque impeditissimis itineribus nullum acciperet

incommodum. Pompeius primi diei mora illata et reliquorum dierum frustra labore suscepto, cum se magnis itineribus extenderet et praegressos consequi cuperet, quarto die finem sequendi fecit atque aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.

3:78. Caesar was obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded, pay his army, confirm his friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. But for these matters, he allowed no more time than was necessary for a person in haste. And being apprehensive for Domitius, lest he should be surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all speed and earnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the whole campaign on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, he would be drawn off from the sea, and from those forces which he had provided in Dyrrachium, and separated from his corn and magazines, and be obliged to carry on the war on equal terms; but if he crossed over into Italy, Caesar, having effected a junction with Domitius, would march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; but if he endeavored to storm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the whole coast, he hoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to come to his assistance. Accordingly, Caesar dispatching couriers, writes to Domitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and having stationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he set forward on his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also, guessing at Caesar's design, determined to hasten to Scipio, that if Caesar should march in that direction, he might be ready to relieve him; but that if Caesar should be unwilling to quit the sea-coast and Corcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself might fall on Domitius with all his forces.

Caesari ad saucios deponendos, stipendium exercitui dandum, socios confirmandos, praesidium urbibus relinquendum necesse erat adire Apolloniam. Sed his rebus tantum temporis tribuit, quantum erat properanti necesse; timens Domitio, ne adventu Pompei praeoccuparetur, ad eum omni celeritate et studio incitatus ferebatur. Totius autem rei consilium his rationibus explicabat, ut, si Pompeius eodem contenderet, abductum ilium a mari atque ab eis copiis, quas Dyrrachii comparaverat, abstractum pari condicione belli secum decertare cogeret; si in Italiam transiret, coniuncto exercitu cum Domitio per Illyricum Italiae subsidio proficisceretur; si Apolloniam Oricumque oppugnare et se omni maritima ora excludere conaretur, obsesso Scipione necessario illum suis auxilium ferre cogeret. Itaque praemissis nuntiis ad Cn. Domitium Caesar ei scripsit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit, praesidioque Apolloniae cohortibus IIII, Lissi I, III Orici relictis, quique erant ex vulneribus aegri depositis, per Epirum atque Athamaniam iter facere coepit. Pompeius quoque de Caesaris consilio coniectura iudicans ad Scipionem properandum sibi existimabat: si Caesar iter illo haberet, ut subsidium Scipioni ferret; si ab ora maritima Oricoque discedere nollet, quod legiones equitatumque ex Italia exspectaret, ipse ut omnibus copiis Domitium aggrederetur.

3:79. For these reasons, each of them studied dispatch, that he might succor his friends, and not miss an opportunity of surprising his enemies. But Caesar's engagements at Apollonia had carried him aside from the direct road. Pompey had taken the short road to Macedonia, through Candavia. To this was added another unexpected disadvantage, that Domitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite Scipio, had quitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched to Heraclea Sentica, a city subject to

Candavia; so that fortune herself seemed to throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up to this time. Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all the provinces and states, with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, very much enlarged and exaggerated beyond the real facts, a rumor had been circulated, that Caesar had been defeated and forced to flee, and had lost almost all his forces. These reports had made the roads dangerous, and drawn off some states from his alliance: whence it happened, that the messengers dispatched by Caesar, by several different roads to Domitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any means to accomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue of Aegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on the road a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, because they had served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave them an account of all that had happened, and informed them of Caesar's departure, and Pompey's arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours' march distant, having got intelligence from these, by the courtesy of the enemy, avoided the danger, and met Caesar coming to join him at Aeginium, a town on the confines of and opposite to Thessaly.

His de causis uterque eorum celeritati studebat, et suis ut esset auxilio, et ad opprimendos adversarios ne occasione temporis deesset. Sed Caesarem Apollonia a directo itinere averterat; Pompeius per Candaviam iter in Macedoniam expeditum habebat. Accessit etiam ex improvise aliud incommodum, quod Domitius, qui dies complures castris Scipionis castra collata habuisset, rei frumentariae causa ab eo discesserat et Heracliam, quae est subiecta Candaviae, iter fecerat, ut ipsa fortuna illum obicere Pompeio videretur. Haec ad id tempus Caesar ignorabat. Simul a Pompeio litteris per omnes provincias

civitatesque dimissis proelio ad Dyrrachium facto latius inflatusque multo, quam res erat gesta, fama percrebuerat, pulsum fugere Caesarem paene omnibus copiis amissis; haec itinera infesta reddiderat, haec civitates nonnullas ab eius amicitia avertebat. Quibus accidit rebus, ut pluribus dimissi itineribus a Caesare ad Domitium et a Domitio ad Caesarem nulla ratione iter conficere possent. Sed Allobroges, Raucilli atque Egi familiares, quos perfugisse ad Pompeium demonstravimus, conspicati in itinere exploratores Domitii, seu pristina sua consuetudine, quod una in Gallia bella gesserant, seu gloria elati cuncta, ut erant acta, euerunt et Caesaris profectionem et adventum Pompei docuerunt. A quibus Domitius certior factus vix IIII horarum spatio antecedens hostium beneficio periculum vitavit et ad Aeginium, quod est oppidum obiectum Thessaliae, Caesari venienti occurrit.

3:80. The two armies being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which is the first town of Thessaly on the road from Epirus. Now, the Thessalians, a few months before, had of themselves sent ambassadors to Caesar, offering him the free use of every thing in their power, and requesting a garrison for their protection. But the report, already spoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in many particulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which, Androstenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be the companion of Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in his misfortunes, collected all the people, both slaves and freemen from the country into the town and shut the gates, and dispatched messengers to Scipio and Pompey "to come to his relief, that he could depend on the strength of the town, if succor was speedily sent; but that it could not withstand a long siege." Scipio, as soon as he received advice of the departure of the armies from

Dyrrachium, had marched with his legions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Caesar having fortified his camp, ordered scaling-ladders and pent-houses to be made for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as they were ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage it would be to assist them with all sorts of necessaries, if they made themselves masters of a rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time to strike terror into other states by the example of this, and to effect this with speed, before auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, taking advantage of the unusual ardor of the soldiers, he began his assault on the town at a little after three o'clock on the very day on which he arrived, and took it, though defended with very high walls, before sunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and immediately decamped from before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such rapidity as to outstrip any messenger or rumor of the taking of Gomphi.

Coniuncto exercitu Caesar Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae venientibus ab Epiro; quae gens paucis ante mensibus ultro ad Caesarem legatos miserat, ut suis omnibus facultatibus uteretur, praesidiumque ab eo militum petierat. Sed eo fama iam praecurrerat, quam supra docuimus, de proelio Dyrrachino, quod multis auxerat partibus. Itaque Androstenes, praetor Thessaliae, cum se victoriae Pompei comitem esse mallet quam socium Caesaris in rebus adversis, omnem ex agris multitudinem servorum ac liberorum in oppidum cogit portasque praeccludit et ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit, ut sibi subsidio veniant: se confidere munitionibus oppidi, si celeriter succurratur; longinquam oppugnationem sustinere non posse. Scipio discessu exercituum ab Dyrrachio cognito Larisam legiones adduxerat; Pompeius nondum Thessaliae appropinquabat. Caesar castris munitis scalas

musculosque ad repentinam oppugnationem fieri et crates parari iussit. Quibus rebus effectis cohortatus milites docuit, quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, priusquam auxilia concurrerent. Itaque usus singulari militum studio eodem, quo venerat, die post horam nonam oppidum altissimis moenibus oppugnare aggressus ante solis oocasum expugnavit et ad diripiendum militibus concessit statimque ab oppido castra movit et Metropolim venit, sic ut nuntios expugnati oppidi famamque antecederet.

3:81. The inhabitants of Metropolis, at first influenced by the same rumors, followed the same measures, shut the gates and manned their walls. But when they were made acquainted with the fate of the city of Gomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar had ordered to be brought up to the walls, they threw open their gates. As he preserved them with the greatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly (except Larissa, which was awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing the fate of the inhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gave admission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a position convenient for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground, he determined there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the center of all his warlike operations.

Metropolitae primum eodem usu consilio isdem permoti rumoribus portas clausurunt murosque armatis compleverunt; sed postea casu civitatis Gomphensis cognito ex captivis, quos Caesar ad murum producendos curaverat, portas aperuerunt. Quibus diligentissime conservatis collata fortuna Metropolitum cum casu Gomphensium

nulla Thessaliae fuit civitas praeter Larisaeos, qui magnis exercitibus Scipionis tenebantur, quin Caesari parerent atque imperata facerent. Ille idoneum locum in agris nactus, qua prope iam matura frumenta erant, ibi adventum exspectare Pompei eoque omnem belli rationem conferre constituit.

3:82. Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days after, and having harangued the combined army, returned thanks to his own men, and exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was now secured, they should endeavor to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And receiving all the legions into one camp, he shared his honors with Scipio, ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to be erected for him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two such powerful armies united, their former expectations were confirmed, and their hopes of victory so much increased, that whatever time intervened was considered as so much delay to their return into Italy; and whenever Pompey acted with slowness and caution, they used to exclaim, that it was the business only of a single day, but that he had a passion for power, and was delighted in having persons of consular and praetorian rank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openly about rewards and priesthods, and disposed of the consulate for several years to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and properties of all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warm debate, whether Lucius Hirtius, who had been sent by Pompey against the Parthians, should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in his absence at the next election; his friends imploring Pompey's honor to fulfill the engagements which he had made to him at his departure, that he might not seem deceived through his authority: while others, embarked in equal labor and danger, pleaded that no individual ought

to have a preference before all the rest.

Pompeius paucis post diebus in Thessaliam pervenit contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes, receptisque omnibus in una castra legionibus suum cum Scipione honorem partitur classicumque apud eum cani et alterum illi iubet praetorium tendi. Auctis copiis Pompei duobusque magnis exercitibus coniunctis pristina omnium confirmatur opinio, et spes victoriae augetur, adeo ut, quicquid intercederet temporis, id morari reditum in Italiam videretur, et si quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. Iamque inter se palam de praemiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum, qui in castris erant Caesaris, petebant; magnaue inter eos in consilio fuit controversia, oporteretne Lucili Hirri, quod is a Pompeio ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetoriis absentis rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implorarent Pompei, praestaret, quod proficiscenti recepisset, ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur, reliqui, in labore pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet, recusarent.

3:83. Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, in their daily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, openly abused each other in the most scurrilous language. Lentulus urging the respect due to his age, Domitius boasting his interest in the city and his dignity, and Scipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus charged Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action that happened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that

it was his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should be given to all the senators, who had taken part with them in the war, and that they should pass sentence on every single person who had staid behind at Rome, or who had been within Pompey's garrisons and had not contributed their assistance in the military operations; that by the first billet they should have power to acquit, by the second to pass sentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary fine. In short, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honors or sums of money which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies; and never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in what manner they should use their victory.

Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris Domitius, Scipio Spintherque Lentulus cotidianis contentionibus ad gravissimas verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentulus aetatis honorem ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gratiam dignitatemque iactaret, Scipio affinitate Pompei confideret. Postulavit etiam L. Afranium proditionis exercitus Acutius Rufus apud Pompeium, quod gestum in Hispania diceret. Et L. Domitius in consilio dixit placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas dari ad iudicandum eis, qui ordinis essent senatorii belloque una cum ipsis interfuissent, sententiasque de singulis ferrent, qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent: unam fore tabellam, qui liberandos omni periculo censerent; alteram, qui capitis damnarent; tertiam, qui pecunia multarent. Postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimicitiis agebant nec, quibus rationibus superare possent, sed, quemadmodum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant.

3:84. Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a sufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when Caesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of his troops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intention or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out of the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their own ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterward for several days in succession, he advanced from his own camp, and led them up to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct inspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to his former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees inferior in number, he selected the youngest and most active of the advanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, and they by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. By these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse would dare even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's, if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number. For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, and killed one of the two Allobrogians, who had deserted to Pompey, as we before observed, and several others.

Re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus et satis longo spatio temporis a Dyrrachinis proeliis intermisso, quo satis perspectum habere militum animum videretur, temptandum Caesar existimavit, quidnam Pompeius propositi aut voluntatis ad dimicandum haberet. Itaque exercitum ex castris eduxit aciemque instruxit, primum suis locis pauloque a castris Pompei longius, continentibus vero diebus, ut progredereetur a castris suis collibusque Pompeianis aciem subiceret. Quae res in dies confirmatiorem eius

exercitum efficiebat. Superius tamen institutum in equitibus, quod demonstravimus, servabat, ut, quoniam numero multis partibus esset inferior, adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis electis ad pernecitatem armis inter equites proeliari iuberet, qui cotidiana consuetudine usum quoque eius generis proeliorum perciperent. His erat rebus effectum, ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis VII milium Pompeianorum impetum, cum adesset usus, sustinere auderent neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrerentur. Namque etiam per eos dies proelium secundum equestre fecit atque unum Allobrogem ex duobus, quos perfugisse ad Pompeium supra docuimus, cum quibusdam interfecit.

3:85. Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at the very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, that Caesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar, seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judged it the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from that post and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting his camp and removing from place to place, he might be more conveniently supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get some opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters being settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents struck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily practice, Pompey's army had advanced further than usual from his intrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action on equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when they were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer," says he, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which has been our constant

wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. We shall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity.” He immediately marched out at the head of his troops.

Pompeius, qui castra in colle habebat, ad infimas radices montis aciem instruebat semper, ut videbatur, exspectans, si iniquis locis Caesar se subiceret. Caesar nulla ratione ad pugnam elici posse Pompeium existimans hanc sibi commodissimam belli rationem iudicavit, uti castra ex eo loco moveret semperque esset in itineribus, haec spectans, ut movendis castris pluribusque adeundis locis commodiore re frumentaria uteretur, simulque in itinere ut aliquam occasionem dimicandi nancisceretur et insolitum ad laborem Pompei exercitum cotidianis itineribus defatigaret. His constitutis rebus, signo iam profectionis dato tabernaculisque detensis animadversum est paulo ante extra cotidianam consuetudinem longius a vallo esse aciem Pompei progressam, ut non iniquo loco posse dimicari videretur. Tum Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, “differendum est” inquit, “iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus; animo simus ad dimicandum parati: non facile occasionem postea reperiemus”; confestimque expeditas copias educit.

3:86. Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimous solicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle. For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before the battalions came to battle, Caesar’s army would be put to the rout. When most people expressed their surprise at it, “I know,” says he, “that I promise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed, that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to

execute it, as soon as the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, and inclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this means we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions, and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far outnumber them in cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice to be ready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity which they had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint the opinion generally entertained of their experience and valor.

Pompeius quoque, ut postea cognitum est, suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare. Namque etiam in consilio superioribus diebus dixerat, priusquam concurrerent acies, fore uti exercitus Caesaris pelleretur. Id cum essent plerique admirati, "scio me," inquit, "paene incredibilem rem polliceri; sed rationem consilii mei accipite, quo firmiore animo in proelium prodeatis. Persuasi equitibus nostris (idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt), ut, cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggrederentur et circumventa ab tergo acie prius perturbatum exercitum pellerent, quam a nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. Ita sine periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem difficile non est, cum tantum equitatu valeamus." Simul denuntiavit, ut essent animo parati in posterum et, quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe rogativissent, ne suam neu reliquorum opinionem fallerent.

3:87. After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of Caesar's forces, as to extol Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums. "Think not, Pompey," says he, "that this is the army

which conquered Gaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles, and do not speak at random on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of that army now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarily happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilence in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on the continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are composed of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have been recruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part from the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forces perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium.” Having so said, he took an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and he encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it. After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and joy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that in a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made by a general of such experience.

Hunc Labienus excepit et, cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferret, “ noli,” inquit, “existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. Perexigua pars illius exercitus superest; magna pars deperiit, quod accidere tot proeliss fuit necesse, multos autumnus pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi domum discesserunt, multi sunt relictis in continenti. An non audistis ex eis, qui per causam valetudinis remanserunt, cohortes esse Brundisi factas? Hae copiae, quas videtis, ex dilectibus horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt refectae, et plerique sunt ex coloniis Transpadanis. Ac tamen quod fuit roboris duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis interiit.” Hae cum dixisset, iuravit se

nisi victorem in castra non reversurum reliquosque, ut idem facerent, hortatus est. Hoc laudans Pompeius idem iuravit; nec vero ex reliquis fuit quisquam, qui iurare dubitaret. Haec cum facta sunt in consilio, magna spe et laetitia omnium discessum est; ac iam animo victoriam praecipiebant, quod de re tanta et a tam perito imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur.

3:88. When Caesar had approached near Pompey's camp, he observed that his army was drawn up in the following manner: On the left wing were the two legions, delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of the disputes in compliance with the senate's decree, one of which was called the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio with the Syrian legions commanded the center. The Cilician legion in conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over by Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the center and the wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted to forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers, who having received favors from him in former wars, flocked to his standard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The seven remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and the neighboring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steep banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and slingers, on his left wing.

Caesar, cum Pompei castris appropinquasset, ad hunc modum aciem eius instructam animadvertit. Erant in sinistro cornu legiones duae traditae a Caesare initio dissensionis ex senatusconsulto; quarum una prima, altera tertia appellabatur. In eo loco ipse erat Pompeius. Mediam aciem Scipio cum legionibus Syriacis tenebat. Ciliciensis

legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis, quas traductas ab Afranio docuimus, in dextro cornu erant collocatae. Has firmissimas se habere Pompeius existimabat. Reliquas inter aciem mediam cornuaque interiecerat numeroque cohortes CX expleverat. Haec erant milia XLV, evocatorum circiter duo, quae ex beneficiariis superiorum exercituum ad eum convenerant; quae tot acie disperserat. Reliquas cohortes VII castris propinquisque castellis praesidio disposuerat. Dextrum cornu eius rivus quidam impeditis ripis muniebat; quam ob causam cunctum equitatum, sagittarios funditoresque omnes sinistro cornu obiecerat.

3:89. Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so.

Caesar superius institutum servans decimam legionem in dextro cornu, nonam in sinistro collocaverat, tametsi erat Dyrrachinis proeliis vehementer attenuata, et huic sic adiunxit octavam, ut paene unam ex duabus efficeret, atque alteram alteri praesidio esse iusserat. Cohortes in acie LXXX constitutas habebat, quae summa erat milium XXII; cohortes VII castris praesidio reliquerat. Sinistro cornu Antonium, dextro P. Sullam, media acie Cn. Domitium praeposuerat. Ipse contra Pompeium constitit. Simul his rebus animadversis, quas demonstravimus, timens, ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuque opposuit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare. Simul tertiae aciei totique exercitui imperavit, ne iniussu suo concurreret: se, cum id fieri vellet, vexillo signum daturum.

3:90. When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the military custom, and spoke to them of the favors that they had constantly received from him, he took especial care to remind them “that he could call his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had sought peace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference [with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in what manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo to send ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood of his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or other of her armies.” After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet the signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were very impatient for the onset.

Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaque in eum

perpetui temporis officia praedicaret, imprimis commemoravit: testibus se militibus uti posse, quanto studio pacem petisset; quae per Vatinium in colloquiis, quae per Aulum Clodium eum Scipione egisset, quibus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis legatis contendisset. Neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse. Hac habita oratione ecentibus militibus et studio pugnae ardentibus tuba signum dedit.

3:91. There was in Caesar's army, a volunteer of the name of Crastinus, who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man of pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me, my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general as you have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall be won, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty." At the same time he looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such a manner to-day, that you will feel grateful to me living or dead." After uttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about one hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed.

Erat C. Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum in legione X duxerat, vir singulari virtute. Hic signo dato, "sequimini me," inquit, "manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro imperatori quam constituistis operam date. Unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus." Simul respiciens Caesarem, "faciam," inquit, "hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas." Haec cum dixisset, primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit, atque eum electi milites circiter CXX voluntarii eiusdem cohortis sunt prosecuti.

3:92. There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficed for the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers to await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, or suffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have done this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and that Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while in disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force if the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after running over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted by the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient reason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a desire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavor not to repress, but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised; by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and their own army inspired with courage.

Inter duas acies tantum erat relictum spatii, ut satis esset ad concursum utriusque exercitus. Sed Pompeius suis praedixerat, ut Caesaris impetum exciperent neve se loco moverent aciemque eius distrahi paterentur; idque admonitu C. Triarii fecisse dicebatur, ut primus incursus visque militum infringeretur aciesque distenderetur, atque in suis ordinibus dispositi dispersos adorirentur; leviusque casura pila sperabat in loco retentis militibus, quam si ipsi immissis telis occurrissent, simul fore, ut duplicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur et lassitudine conficerentur. Quod nobis quidem nulla

ratione factum a Pompeio videtur, propterea quod est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent; neque frustra antiquitus institutum est, ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque universi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostes terreri et suos incitari existimaverunt.

3:93. But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with their javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men did not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom, and being practiced in former battles, they of their own accord repressed their speed, and halted almost midway; that they might not come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins, and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood our charge, and maintained their ranks; and having launched their javelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse, according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, and his whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did not withstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey's horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, and flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to his fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantly rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a man of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenseless, were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled about upon

Pompey's left wing, while his infantry still continued to make battle, and attacked them in the rear.

Sed nostri milites dato signo cum infestis pilis procucurrissent atque animum advertissent non concurrere a Pompeianis, usu periti ac superioribus pugnis exercitati sua sponte cursum represserunt et ad medium fere spatium constiterunt, ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent, parvoque intermisso temporis spatio ac rursus renovato cursu pila miserunt celeriterque, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, gladios strinxerunt. Neque vero Pompeiani huic rei defuerunt. Nam et tela missa exceperunt et impetum legionum tulerunt et ordines suos servarunt pilisque missis ad gladios redierunt. Eodem tempore equites ab sinistro Pompei cornu, ut erat imperatum, universi procucurrerunt, omnisque multitudo sagittariorum se profudit. Quorum impetum noster equitatus non tulit, sed paulatim loco motus cessit, equitesque Pompei hoc acrius instare et se turmatim explicare aciemque nostram a latere aperto circumire coeperunt. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, quartae aciei, quam instituerat sex cohortium, dedit signum. Illi celeriter procucurrerunt infestisque signis tanta vi in Pompei equites impetum fecerunt, ut eorum nemo consisteret, omnesque conversi non solum loco excederent, sed protinus incitati fuga montes altissimos peterent. Quibus submotis omnes sagittarii funditoresque destituti inermes sine praesidio interfecti sunt. Eodem impetu cohortes sinistrum cornu pugnantibus etiam tum ac resistantibus in acie Pompeianis circumierunt eosque a tergo sunt adorti.

3:94. At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which till then had not been engaged, but had kept their post. Thus, new and fresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and others

having made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able to maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in his opinion, that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to his soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts, which he had placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by them the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be the first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part of his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown into confusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreated straightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions, whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, that the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp," says he, "defend it with diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the other gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having thus said, he retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue.

Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar, quae quiescente fuerat et se ad id tempus loco tenuerat, procurrere iussit. Ita cum recentes atque integri defessis successissent, alii autem a tergo adorirentur, sustinere Pompeiani non potuerunt, atque universi terga verterunt. Neque vero Caesarem fefellit, quin ab eis cohortibus, quae contra equitatum in quarta acie collocatae essent, initium victoriae oriretur, ut ipse in cohortandis militibus pronuntiaverat. Ab his enim primum equitatus est pulsus, ab isdem factae caedes sagittariorum ac funditorum, ab isdem acies Pompeiana a sinistra parte circumita atque initium fugae factum. Sed Pompeius, ut equitatum suum pulsum vidit atque eam partem, cui maxime confidebat, perterritam animadvertit, aliis quoque diffusus acie excessit protinusque se in castra equo contulit et

eis centurionibus, quos in statione ad praetoriam portam posuerat, clare, ut milites exaudirent, “tuemini,” inquit, “castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo.” Haec cum dixisset, se in praetorium contulit summae rei diffidens et tamen eventum exspectans.

3:95. Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into their intrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respite to recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of fortune’s kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued by the intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, being prepared to undergo any labor, they cheerfully obeyed his command. The camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guard it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries. For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle, affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and military standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their further escape than on the defense of the camp. Nor could the troops who were posted on the battlements, long withstand the immense number of our darts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under the conduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the high mountains which joined the camp.

Caesar Pompeianis ex fuga intra vallum compulsis nullum spatium perterritis dari oportere existimans milites cohortatus est, ut beneficio fortunae uterentur castraque oppugnarent. Qui, etsi magno aestu fatigati (nam ad meridiem res erat perducta), tamen ad omnem laborem animo parati imperio paruerunt. Castra a cohortibus, quae ibi praesidio erant relictæ, industrie defendebantur, multo etiam

acrius a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis. Nam qui acie refugerant milites, et animo perterriti et lassitudine confecti, missis plerique armis signisque militaribus, magis de reliqua fuga quam de castrorum defensione cogitabant. Neque vero diutius, qui in vallo constiterant, multitudinem telorum sustinere potuerunt, sed confecti vulneribus locum reliquerunt, protinusque omnes ducibus usi centurionibus tribunisque militum in altissimos montes, qui ad castra pertinebant, confugerunt.

3:96. In Pompey's camp you might see arbors in which tables were laid, a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered with fresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and many other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and a confidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that they had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulged themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in want of common necessities. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the trenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit, went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same dispatch, collecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nor night, he arrived at the seaside, attended by only thirty horse, and went on board a victualing barque, often complaining, as we have been told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had expected victory, as they began the fight.

In castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti

pondus eitum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Lucii etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta edera, multaque praeterea, quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse, qui non necessarias conquirent voluptates. At hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitui Caesaris luxuriam obieiebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent. Pompeius, iam cum intra vallum nostri versarentur, equum nactus, detractis insignibus imperatoris, decumana porta se ex castris eiecit protinusque equo citato Larisam contendit. Neque ibi constitit, sed eadem celeritate, paucos suos ex fuga nactus, nocturno itinere non intermisso, comitatu equitum XXX ad mare pervenit navemque frumentariam conscendit, saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse, ut, a quo genere hominum victoriam sperasset, ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur.

3:97. Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his soldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity of completing their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began to draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians distrusting the position, as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began to retreat toward Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops, and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back a part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a shorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew up his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain, whose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops, though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labor the whole day, and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off the communication

between the river and the mountain, that the enemy might not get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sent ambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who had espoused that party, made their escape by night.

Caesar castris potitus a militibus contendit, ne in praeda occupati reliqui negotii gerendi facultatem dimitterent. Qua re impetrata montem opere circummunire instituit. Pompeiani, quod is mons erat sine aqua, diffisi ei loco relicto monte universi iugis eius Larisam versus se recipere coeperunt. Qua re animadversa Caesar copias suas divisit partemque legionum in castris Pompei remanere iussit, partem in sua castra remisit, IIII secum legiones duxit commodioreque itinere Pompeianis occurrere coepit et progressus milia passuum VI aciem instruxit. Qua re animadversa Pompeiani in quodam monte constiterunt. Hunc montem flumen sublebat. Caesar milites cohortatus, etsi totius diei continenti labore erant confecti noxque iam suberat, tamen munitione flumen a monte seclisit, ne noctu aquari Pompeiani possent. Quo perfecto opere illi de deditione missis legatis agere coeperunt. Pauci ordinis senatorii, qui se cum eis coniunxerant, nocte fuga salutem petiverunt.

3:98. At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on the mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, and pile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears, implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and having spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers, that no injury should be done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this diligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and

meet him, and those which were with him to take their turn of rest, and go back to the camp: and the same day went to Larissa

Caesar prima luce omnes eos, qui in monte consederant, ex superioribus locis in planiciem descendere atque arma proicere iussit. Quod ubi sine recusatione fecerunt passisque palmis proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt, consolatus consurgere iussit et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur, neu quid sui desiderarent. Hac adhibita diligentia ex castris sibi legiones alias occurrere et eas, quas secum duxerat, in vicem requiescere atque in castra reverti iussit eodemque die Larisam pervenit.

3:99. In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing, but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus, also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most courageously, lost his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false which he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highest opinion of his behavior in that battle, and thought him highly deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for even the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to Sylla. Several others took shelter in the neighboring states. One hundred and eighty standards of colors, and nine eagles, were brought to Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, his strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse.

In eo proelio non amplius CC milites desideravit, sed centuriones, fortes viros, circiter XXX amisit. Interfectus est etiam fortissime

pugnans Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto. Neque id fuit falsum, quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat. Sic enim Caesar existimabat, eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse, optimeque eum de se meritum iudicabat. Ex Pompeiano exercitu circiter milia XV cecidisse videbantur, sed in deditionem venerunt amplius milia XXIII (namque etiam cohortes, quae praesidio in castellis fuerant, sese Sullae dediderunt), multi praeterea in finitimas civitates refugerunt; signaque militaria ex proelio ad Caesarem sunt relata CLXXX et aquilae VIII. L. Domitius ex castris in montem refugiens, cum vires eum lassitudine defecissent, ab equitibus est interfectus.

3:100. About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at Brundisium and in the same manner, as Libo had done before, possessed himself of an island opposite the harbor of Brundisium. In like manner, Valinius, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barks, endeavored to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-banked galley and two smaller vessels that had ventured further than the rest into a narrow part of the harbor: and likewise disposing the horse along the shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. But Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till he had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced either by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want of necessaries, to quit the port and islands.

Eodem tempore D. Laelius cum classe ad Brundisium venit

eademque ratione, qua factum a Libone antea demonstravimus, insulam obiectam portui Brundisino tenuit. Similiter Vatinius, qui Brundisio praeerat, tectis instructisque scaphis elicuit naves Laelianas atque ex his longius productam unam quinqueremem et minores duas in angustiis portus cepit itemque per equites dispositos aqua prohibere classarios instituit. Sed Laelius tempore anni commodiore usus ad navigandum onerariis navibus Corcyra Dyrrachioque aquam suis supportabat, neque a proposito deterrebatur neque ante proelium in Thessalia factum cognitum aut ignominia amissarum navium aut necessariarum rerum inopia ex portu insulaque expelli potuit.

3:101. Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cicilians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided into two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding one division at Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messina, Cassius got into Messina with his fleet, before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, and having found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the wind being high and favorable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch, and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius's fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty of which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror that though there was a legion in garrison at Messina, the town with difficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory been brought at that instant by the horse stationed-along the coast, it was generally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town was maintained till the news arrived very opportunely: and Cassius set sail from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships being moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same manner as before. The

wind being favorable, he sent into the port about forty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both sides, five ships were burned to ashes. And when the fire began to spread wider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions, who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids, could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the ships and weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two five-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he made his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were taken besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action in Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with his fleet from that coast.

Isdem fere temporibus C. Cassius cum classe Syrorum et Phoenicum et Cilicum in Siciliam venit, et cum esset Caesaris classis divisa in duas partes, dimidia parti praeesset P. Sulpicius praetor ad Vibonem, dimidia M. Pomponius ad Messanam, prius Cassius ad Messanam navibus advolavit, quam Pomponius de eius adventu cognosceret, perturbatumque eum nactus nullis custodiis neque ordinibus certis, magno vento et secundo completas onerarias naves taeda et pice et stupa reliquisque rebus, quae sunt ad incendia, in Pomponianam classem immisit atque omnes naves incendit XXXV, e quibus erant XX constratae. Tantusque eo facto timor incessit, ut, cum esset legio praesidio Messanae, vix oppidum defenderetur, et nisi eo ipso tempore quidam nuntii de Caesaris victoria per dispositos equites essent allati, existimabant plerique futurum fuisse, uti amitteretur. Sed opportunissime nuntiis allatis oppidum est defensum; Cassiusque ad Sulpicianam inde classem profectus est

Vibonem, applicatisque nostris ad terram navibus pari atque antea ratione Cassius secundum nactus ventum onerarias naves praeparatas ad incendium immisit, et flamma ab utroque cornu comprehensa naves sunt combustae quinque. Cumque ignis magnitudine venti latius serperet, milites, qui ex veteribus legionibus erant relictis praesidio navibus ex numero aegrorum, ignominiam non tulerunt, sed sua sponte naves conscenderunt et a terra solverunt impetuque facto in Cassianam classem quinqueres duas, in quarum altera erat Cassius, ceperunt; sed Cassius exceptus scapha refugit; praeterea duae sunt depressae triremes. Neque multo post de proelio facto in Thessalia cognitum est, ut ipsis Pompeianis fides fieret; nam ante id tempus fingi a legatis amicisque Caesaris arbitrabantur. Quibus rebus cognitis ex his locis Cassius cum classe discessit.

3:102. Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursue Pompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able to provide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on every day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legion to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompey at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians and Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued it with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as possible his design of fleeing further, or to endeavor to keep possession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is impossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling together his friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for his necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from that place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained two days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus.

There he is informed that, by the consent of all the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the castle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers had been dispatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge in the neighboring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that if they did, that it would be attended with imminent danger to their lives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been consul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and to several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight, and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; and having received a message to leave that neighborhood, set sail much against their will; for the rumor of Caesar's approach had now reached those states.

Caesar omnibus rebus relictis persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit, quascumque in partes se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset, et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat, cotidie progrediebatur legionemque unam minoribus itineribus subsequi iussit. Erat edictum Pompei nomine Amphipoli propositum, uti omnes eius provinciae iuniores, Graeci civesque Romani, iurandi causa convenirent. Sed utrum avertendae suspicionis causa Pompeius proposuisset, ut quam diutissime longioris fugae consilium occultaret, an ut novis dilectibus, si nemo premeret, Macedoniam tenere conaretur, existimari non poterat. Ipse ad ancoram unam noctem constitit et vocatis ad se Amphipoli hospitibus et pecunia ad necessarios sumptus corrogata, cognito Caesaris adventu, ex eo loco discessit et Mytilenas paucis diebus venit. Biduum tempestate retentus navibusque aliis additis actuariis in Ciliciam atque inde Cyprum pervenit. Ibi cognoscit consensu omnium Antiochensium civiumque

Romanorum, qui illic negotiarentur, arma capta esse excludendi sui causa nuntiosque dimissos ad eos, qui se ex fuga in finitimas civitates recepissem dicerentur, ne Antiochiam adirent: id si fecissent, magno eorum capitis periculo futurum. Idem hoc L. Lentulo, qui superiore anno consul fuerat, et P. Lentulo consulari ac nonnullis aliis acciderat Rhodi; qui cum ex fuga Pompeium sequerentur atque in insulam venissent, oppido ac portu recepti non erant missisque ad eos nuntiis, ut ex his locis discederent contra voluntatem suam naves solverant. Iamque de Caesaris adventu fama ad civitates perferebatur.

3:103. Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside his design of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from the farmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, and having put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for military purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from the slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, and such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, he sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was there with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he had expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from his. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria, and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in consideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted between his father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed their commission, began to converse with less restraint with the king's troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not to think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several of Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in

Syria, and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.

Quibus cognitis rebus Pompeius deposito adeundae Syriae consilio pecunia societatis sublata et a quibusdam privatis sumpta et aeris magno pondere ad militarem usum in naves imposito duobusque milibus hominum armatis, partim quos ex familiis societatum delegerat, partim a negotiatoribus coegerat, quosque ex suis quisque ad hanc rem idoneos existimabat, Pelusium pervenit. Ibi casu rex erat Ptolomaeus, puer aetate, magnis copiis cum sorore Cleopatra bellum gerens, quam paucis ante mensibus per suos propinquos atque amicos regno expulerat; castraque Cleopatrae non longo spatio ab eius castris distabant. Ad eum Pompeius misit, ut pro hospitio atque amicitia patris Alexandria reciperetur atque illius opibus in calamitate tegeretur. Sed qui ab eo missi erant, confecto legationis officio liberius cum militibus regis colloqui coeperunt eosque hortari, ut suum officium Pompeio praestarent, neve eius fortunam despicerent. In hoc erant numero complures Pompei milites, quos ex eius exercitu acceptos in Syria Gabinius Alexandriam traduxerat belloque confecto apud Ptolomaeum, patrem pueri, reliquerat.

3:104. The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the minority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, as they afterward declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army, and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as in adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave a favorable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king; but secretly laid a plot against him, and dispatched Achilles, captain of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius

Septimius a military tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and deluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the pirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in a small boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achilles and Septimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's order, and put to death in prison.

His tum cognitis rebus amici regis, qui propter aetatem eius in procuratione erant regni, sive timore adducti, ut postea praedicabant, sollicitato exercitu regio ne Pompeius Alexandriam Aegyptumque occuparet, sive despecta eius fortuna, ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis inimici exsistunt, his, qui erant ab eo missi, palam liberaliter responderunt eumque ad regem venire iusserunt; ipsi clam consilio inito Achillam, praefectum regium, singulari hominem audacia, et L. Septimium, tribunum militum, ad interficiendum Pompeium miserunt. Ab his liberaliter ipse appellatus et quadam notitia Septimii productus, quod bello praedonum apud eum ordinem duxerat, naviculam parvulam conscendit cum paucis suis: ibi ab Achilla et Septimio interficitur. Item L. Lentulus comprehenditur ab rege et in custodia necatur.

3:105. When Caesar arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius had attempted to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; and for this purpose had convened all the senators in the province that he might have them to attest the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar's arrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two occasions, Caesar saved the money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in the temple of Minerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the very day on which Caesar had

gained his battle, the image of Victory which was placed before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about toward the portal and entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch in Syria, such a shout of an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard that the citizens ran in arms to the walls. The same thing happened at Ptolemais; a sound of drums too was heard at Pergamus, in the private and retired parts of the temple, into which none but the priests are allowed admission, and which the Greeks call *Adyta* (the inaccessible), and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which there stood a statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown that had sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, and shot up above the roof.

Caesar, cum in Asiam venisset, reperiebat T. Ampium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano Dianae eiusque rei causa senatores omnes ex provincia evocasse, ut his testibus in summa pecuniae uteretur, sed interpellatum adventu Caesaris profugisse. Ita duobus temporibus Ephesiae pecuniae Caesar auxilium tulit. Item constabat Elide in templo Minervae repetitis atque enumeratis diebus, quo die proelium secundum Caesar fecisset, simulacrum Victoriae, quod ante ipsam Minervam collocatum esset et ante ad simulacrum Minervae spectavisset, ad valvas se templi limenque convertisse. Eodemque die Antiochiae in Syria bis tantus exercitus clamor et signorum sonus exauditus est, ut in muris armata civitas discurreret. Hoc idem Ptolomaide accidit. Pergami in occultis ac reconditis templi, quo praeter sacerdotes adire fas non est, quae Graeci ‘*adyta*’ appellant, tympana sonuerunt. Item Trallibus in templo Victoriae, ubi Caesaris statuam consecraverant, palma per eos dies inter coagmenta lapidum ex pavimento exstitisse ostendebatur.

3:106. After a few days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompey had been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he had directed his course into Egypt, on account of his connection with that kingdom, set out for Alexandria with two legions (one of which he ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other he called in from Achaia, from Fufius, the lieutenant general), and with eight hundred horse, ten ships of war from Rhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to three thousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received in various battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could not follow him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits, did not hesitate to set forward with a feeble force, and thought that he would be secure in any place. At Alexandria he was informed of the death of Pompey: and at his landing there, heard a cry among the soldiers whom the king had left to garrison the town, and saw a crowd gathering toward him, because the fasces were carried before him; for this the whole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity. Though this tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for several days successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of his soldiers were killed in all parts of the city.

Caesar paucos dies in Asia moratus, cum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum in Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines regni reliquasque eius loci opportunitates cum legione una, quam se ex Thessalia sequi iusserat, et altera, quam ex Achaia a Q. Fufio legato evocaverat, equitibusque DCCC et navibus longis Rhodiis X et Asiaticis paucis Alexandriam pervenit. In his erant legionibus hominum milia tria CC; reliqui vulneribus ex proeliis et labore ac magnitudine itineris confecti consequi non potuerant. Sed Caesar confisus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non

dubitaverat, aequae omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimans. Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit atque ibi primum e nave egrediens clamorem militum audit, quos rex in oppido praesidii causa reliquerat, et concursum ad se fieri videt, quod fasces anteferrentur. In hoc omnis multitudo maiestatem regiam minui praedicabat. Hoc sedato tumultu crebrae continuis diebus ex concursu multitudinis concitationes fiebant, compluresque milites huius urbis omnibus partibus interficiebantur.

3:107. Having observed this, he ordered other legions to be brought to him from Asia, which he had made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he was himself detained against his will, by the etesian winds, which are totally unfavorable to persons on a voyage from Alexandria. In the mean time, considering that the disputes of the princes belonged to the jurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and that it was a duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league had been made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law and a decree of the senate, he signified that it was his pleasure that king Ptolemy, and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, and decide their disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by the sword.

Quibus rebus animadversis legiones sibi alias ex Asia adduci iussit, quas ex Pompeianis militibus confecerat. Ipse enim necessario etesiis tenebatur, qui navigantibus Alexandria flant adversissimi venti. Interim controversias regum ad populum Romanum et ad se, quod esset consul, pertinere existimans atque eo magis officio suo convenire, quod superiore consulatu cum patre Ptolomaeo et lege et senatusconsulto societas erat facta, ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram exercitus, quos

haberent, dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.

3:108. A eunuch named Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of the kingdom on account of his youthfulness. He at first began to complain among his friends, and to express his indignation, that the king should be summoned to plead his cause: but afterward, having prevailed on some of those whom he had made acquainted with his views to join him he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to Alexandria, and appointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of the forces. Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and the king's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how he should act. By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons and the more advanced in years of his two daughters were declared his heirs, and for the more effectual performance of his intention, in the same will he conjured the Roman people by all the gods, and by the league which he had entered into at Rome, to see his will executed. One of the copies of his will was conveyed to Rome by his ambassadors to be deposited in the treasury, but the public troubles preventing it, it was lodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up, and kept at Alexandria.

Erat in procuratione regni propter aetatem pueri nutricius eius, eunuchus nomine Pothinus. Is primum inter suos queri atque indignari coepit regem ad causam dicendam evocari; deinde adiutores quosdam consilii sui nactus ex regis amicis exercitum a Pelusio clam Alexandriam evocavit atque eundem Achillam, cuius supra meminimus, omnibus copiis praefecit. Hunc incitatum suis et regis inflatum pollicitationibus, quae fieri vellet, litteris nuntiisque edocuit. In testamento Ptolomaei patris heredes erant scripti ex

duobus filiis maior et ex duabus filiabus ea, quae aetate antecedeat. Haec uti fierent, per omnes deos perque foedera, quae Romae fecisset, eodem testamento Ptolomaeus populum Romanum obtestabatur. Tabulae testamenti unae per legatos eius Romam erant allatae, ut in aerario ponerentur (hic cum propter publicas occupationes poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositae), alterae eodem exemplo relictæ atque obsignatae Alexandriae proferebantur.

3:109. While these things were debated before Caesar, and he was very anxious to settle the royal disputes as a common friend and arbitrator; news was brought on a sudden that the king's army and all his cavalry, were on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means so strong that he could trust to them, if he had occasion to hazard a battle without the town. His only resource was to keep within the town in the most convenient places, and get information of Achillas's designs. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their arms; and advised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatest influence, as deputies to Achillas, and to signify his royal pleasure. Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both been ambassadors at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy the father, went to Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence, without hearing them, or learning the occasion of their coming, he ordered them to be seized and put to death. One of them, after receiving a wound, was taken up and carried off by his attendants as dead: the other was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar took care to secure the king's person, both supposing that the king's name would have a great influence with his subjects, and to give the war the appearance of the scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by the king's

consent.

De his rebus cum ageretur apud Caesarem, isque maxime vellet pro communi amico atque arbitro controversias regum componere, subito exercitus regius equitatusque omnis venire Alexandriam nuntiatur. Caesaris copiae nequaquam erant tantae, ut eis, extra oppidum si esset dimicandum, confideret. Relinquebatur, ut se suis locis oppido teneret consiliumque Achillae cognosceret. Milites tamen omnes in armis esse iussit regemque hortatus est, ut ex suis necessariis, quos haberet maximae auctoritatis, legatos ad Achillam mitteret et, quid esset suae voluntatis, ostenderet. A quo missi Dioscorides et Serapion, qui ambo legati Romae fuerant magnamque apud patrem Ptolomaeum auctoritatem habuerant, ad Achillam pervenerunt. Quos ille, cum in conspectum eius venissent, priusquam audiret aut, cuius rei causa missi essent, cognosceret, corripere atque interficere iussit; quorum alter accepto vulnere occupatus per suos pro occiso sublatus, alter interfectus est. Quo facto regem ut in sua potestate haberet, Caesar efficit, magnam regum nomen apud suos auctoritatem habere existimans et ut potius privato paucorum et latronum quam regio consilio susceptum bellum videretur.

3:110. The forces under Achilles did not seem despicable, either for number, spirit, or military experience; for he had twenty thousand men under arms. They consisted partly of Gabinus's soldiers, who were now become habituated to the licentious mode of living at Alexandria, and had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had married wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had children. To these was added a collection of highwaymen, and freebooters, from Syria, and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides several convicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all our runaway slaves were sure of

finding protection for their persons on the condition that they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers: and if any of them was apprehended by his master, he was rescued by a crowd of his fellow soldiers, who being involved in the same guilt, repelled, at the hazard of their lives, every violence offered to any of their body. These by a prescriptive privilege of the Alexandrian army, used to demand the king's favorites to be put to death, pillage the properties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the king's palace, banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile. Besides these, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill of veterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restored Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; and had been engaged in war with the Egyptians; such was their experience in military affairs.

Erant cum Achilla eae copiae, ut neque numero neque genere hominum neque usu rei militaris contemnendae viderentur. Milia enim XX in armis habebat. Haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant. Huc accedebant collecti ex praedonibus latronibusque Syriae Ciliciaeque provinciae finitimarumque regionum. Multi praeterea capitis damnati exulesque convenerant; fugitivis omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus certaue vitae condicio, ut dato nomine militum essent numero; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu militum eripiebatur, qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant. Hi regum amicos ad mortem deposcere, hi bona locupletum diripere, stipendii augendi causa regis domum obsidere, regno expellere alios, alios arcessere vetere quodam Alexandrini exercitus instituto consueverant. Erant praeterea

equitum milia duo. Inveteraverant hi omnes compluribus Alexandriae bellis; Ptolomaeum patrem in regnum reducerant, Bibuli filios duos interfecerant, bella cum Aegyptiis gesserant. Hunc usum rei militaris habebant.

3:111. Full of confidence in his troops, and despising the small number of Caesar's soldiers, Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part of the town which Caesar occupied with his troops. At first he attempted to force the palace; but Caesar had disposed his cohorts through the streets, and repelled his attack. At the same time there was an action at the port: where the contest was maintained with the greatest obstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained in several streets at once, and the enemy endeavored to seize with a strong party the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey's assistance, but after the battle in Thessaly, had returned home. They were all of either three or five banks of oars, well equipped and appointed with every necessary for a voyage. Besides these, there were twenty-two vessels with decks, which were usually kept at Alexandria, to guard the port. If they made themselves masters of these, Caesar being deprived of his fleet, they would have the command of the port and whole sea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and auxiliaries. Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed when the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the other their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all those ships, and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guard so many places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed some troops to the Pharos by his ships.

His copiis fidens Achillas paucitatemque militum Caesaris despiciens

occupabat Alexandriam praeter eam oppidi partem, quam Caesar cum militibus tenebat, primo impetu domum eius irrumpere conatus; sed Caesar dispositis per vias cohortibus impetum eius sustinuit. Eodemque tempore pugnatum est ad portum, ac longe maximam ea res attulit dimicationem. Simul enim diductis copiis pluribus viis pugnabatur, et magna multitudine naves longas occupare hostes conabantur; quarum erant L auxilio missae ad Pompeium proelioque in Thessalia facto domum redierant, quadriremes omnes et quinquereemes aptae instructaeque omnibus rebus ad navigandum, praeter has XXII, quae praesidii causa Alexandriae esse consuerant, constratae omnes; quas si occupavissent, classe Caesari erepta portum ac mare totum in sua potestate haberent, commeatu auxiliisque Caesarem prohiberent. Itaque tanta esta contentione actum, quanta agi debuit, cum illi celerem in ea re victoriam, hi salutem suam consistere viderent. Sed rem obtinuit Caesar omnesque eas naves et reliquas, quae erant in navalibus, incendit, quod tam late tueri parva manu non poterat, confestimque ad Pharum navibus milites euit.

3:112. The Pharos is a tower on an island, of prodigious height, built with amazing works, and takes its name from the island. This island lying over against Alexandria, forms a harbor; but on the upper side it is connected with the town by a narrow way eight hundred paces in length, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge. In this island some of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a town; and whatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel, or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast, they constantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who are masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbor, on account of its narrowness. Caesar being greatly

alarmed on this account, while the enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he gained this point, that he could be supplied without danger with corn, and auxiliaries; for he sent to all the neighboring countries, to demand supplies. In other parts of the town, they fought so obstinately, that they quitted the field with equal advantage, and neither were beaten (in consequence of the narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed on both sides, Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in the night. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, in which Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theater adjoining the house which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to the ports and other docks. These fortifications he increased during the succeeding days, that he might have them before him as a rampart, and not be obliged to fight against his will. In the mean time Ptolemy's younger daughter, hoping the throne would become vacant, made her escape from the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in prosecuting the war. But they soon quarreled about the command, which circumstance enlarged the presents to the soldiers, for each endeavored by great sacrifices to secure their affection. While the enemy was thus employed, Pothinus, tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in Caesar's part of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not to desist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but his messengers being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death by Caesar. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war.

Pharus est in insula turris magna altitudine, mirificis operibus exstructae; quae nomen ab insula accepit. Haec insula obiecta Alexandriae portum efficit; sed a superioribus regibus in

longitudinem passuum a DCCC in mare iactis molibus angusto itinere ut ponte cum oppido coniungitur. In hac sunt insula domicilia Aegyptiorum et vicus oppidi magnitudine; quaeque ibi naves imprudentia aut tempestate paulum suo cursu decesserunt, has more praedonum diripere consuerunt. Eis autem invitis, a quibus Pharus tenetur, non potest esse propter angustias navibus introitus in portum. Hoc tum veritus Caesar, hostibus in pugna occupatis, militibus eitis Pharumprehendit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Quibus est rebus effectum, uti tuto frumentum auxiliaque navibus ad eum supportari possent. Dimisit enim circum omnes propinquas provincias atque inde auxilia evocavit. Reliquis oppidi partibus sic est pugnatum, ut aequo proelio discederetur et neutri pellerentur (id efficiebant angustiae loci), paucisque utrimque interfectis Caesar loca maxime necessaria complexus noctu praemuniit. In eo tractu oppidi pars erat regiae exigua, in quam ipse habitandi causa initio erat inductus, et theatrum coniunctum domui quod arcis tenebat locum aditusque habebat ad portum et ad reliqua navalia. Has munitiones insequentibus auxit diebus, ut pro muro obiectas haberet ne dimicare invitus cogeretur. Interim filia minor Ptolomaei regis vacuum possessionem regni sperans ad Achillam sese ex regia traiecit unaque bellum administrare coepit. Sed celeriter est inter eos de principatu controversia orta; quae res apud milites largitiones auxit; magnis enim iacturis sibi quisque eorum animos conciliabat. Haec dum apud hostes geruntur, Pothinus, nutricius pueri et procurator regni in parte Caesaris, cum ad Achillam nuntios mitteret hortareturque, ne negotio desisteret neve animo deficeret, indicatis deprehensusque internuntiis a Caesare est interfectus. Haec initia belli Alexandrini fuerunt.

THE ALEXANDRINE WAR

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1. When the war broke out at Alexandria, Caesar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for all his fleet; and summoned archers from Crete, and cavalry from Malchus, king of the Nabatheans. He likewise ordered military engines to be provided, corn to be brought, and forces dispatched to him. Meanwhile he daily strengthened his fortifications by new works; and such parts of the town as appeared less tenable were strengthened with testudos and mantelets. Openings were made in the walls, through which the battering-rams might play; and the fortifications were extended over whatever space was covered with ruins, or taken by force. For Alexandria is in a manner secure from fire, because the houses are all built without joists or wood, and are all vaulted, and roofed with tile or pavement. Caesar's principal aim was, to inclose with works the smallest part of the town, separated from the rest by a morass toward the south: with these views, first, that as the city was divided into two parts, the army should be commanded by one general and one council; in the second place, that he might be able to succor his troops when hard pressed, and carry aid from the other part of the city. Above all, he by this means made sure of water and forage, as he was but ill provided with the one, and wholly destitute of the other. The morass, on the contrary, served abundantly to supply him with both.

Bello Alexandrino conflato Caesar Rhodo atque ex Syria Ciliciaque omnem classem arcessit; Creta sagittarios, equites ab rege Nabataeorum Malcho evocat; tormenta undique conquiri et frumentum mitti, auxilia adduci iubet. Interim munitiones cotidie operibus augentur atque omnes oppidi partes, quae minus esse firmae

videntur, testudinibus ac musculis aptantur; ex aedificiis autem per foramina in proxima aedificia arietes immittuntur, quantumque aut ruinis deicitur aut per vim recipitur loci, in tantum munitiones proferuntur. Nam incendio fere tuta est Alexandria, quod sine contignatione ac materia sunt aedificia et structuris ac fornicibus continentur tectaque sunt rudere aut pavimentis. Caesar maxime studebat ut, quam angustissimam partem oppidi palus a meridie interiecta efficiebat, hanc operibus vineisque agendis ab reliqua parte urbis excluderet, illud spectans primum ut, cum in duas partis esset urbis divisa acies, uno consilio atque imperio administraretur, deinde ut laborantibus succurri atque ex altera oppidi parte auxilium ferri posset, in primis vero ut aqua pabuloque abundaret, quarum alterius rei copiam exiguam, alterius nullam omnino facultatem habebat; quod utrumque large palus praebere poterat.

2. Nor were the Alexandrians remiss on their side, or less active in the conduct of their affairs. For they had sent deputies and commissioners into all parts, where the powers and territories of Egypt extend, to levy troops. They had carried vast quantities of darts and engines into the town, and drawn together an innumerable multitude of soldiers. Nevertheless workshops were established in every part of the city, for the making of arms. They enlisted all the slaves that were of age; and the richer citizens supplied them with food and pay. By a judicious disposition of this multitude, they guarded the fortifications in the remoter parts of the town; while they quartered the veteran cohorts, which were exempted from all other service, in the squares and open places; that on whatever side an attack should be made, they might be at hand to give relief, and march fresh to the charge. They shut up all the avenues and passes by a triple wall built of square stones, and carried to the height of forty

feet. They defended the lower parts of the town by very high towers of ten stories: besides which, they had likewise contrived a kind of moving towers, which consisted of the same number of stories, and which being fitted with ropes and wheels, could, by means of horses, as the streets of Alexandria were quite even and level, be conveyed wherever their service was necessary.

Neque vero Alexandrinis in gerendis negotiis cunctatio ulla aut mora inferebatur. Nam in omnis partis, per quas fines Aegypti regnumque pertinet, legatos conquisitoresque dilectus habendi causa miserant magnumque numerum in oppidum telorum atque tormentorum convexerant et innumerabilem multitudinem adduxerant. Nec minus in urbe maximae armorum erant institutae officinae. Servos praeterea puberes armaverant; quibus domini locupletiores victum cotidianum stipendiumque praebebant. Hac multitudine disposita munitiones semotarum partium tuebantur; veteranas cohortis vacuas in celeberrimis urbis locis habebant, ut quacumque regione pugnaretur integris viribus ad auxilium ferendum opponi possent. Omnibus viis atque angiportis triplicem vallum obduxerant — erat autem quadrato exstructus saxo neque minus XL pedes altitudinis habebat — quaeque partes urbis inferiores erant, has altissimis turribus denorum tabulorum munierant. Praeterea alias ambulatorias totidem tabulorum confixerant subiectisque eas rotis funibus iumentisque obiectis directis plateis in quamcumque erat visum partem movebant.

3. The city abounding in every thing, and being very rich, furnished ample materials for these several works: and as the people were extremely ingenious, and quick of apprehension, they so well copied what they saw done by us that our men seemed rather to imitate their

works. They even invented many things themselves, and attacked our works, at the same time that they defended their own. Their chiefs every where represented: “That the people of Rome were endeavoring by degrees to assume the possession of Egypt; that a few years before Gabinius had come thither with an army; that Pompey had retreated to the same place in his flight; that Caesar was now among them with a considerable body of troops, nor had they gained any thing by Pompey’s death; that Caesar should not prolong his stay; that if they did not find means to expel him, the kingdom would be reduced to a Roman province: and that they ought to do it at once, for he, blockaded by the storms on account of the season of the year, could receive no supplies from beyond the sea.”

Urbs fertilissima et copiosissima omnium rerum apparatus suggerebat. Ipsi homines ingeniosi atque acutissimi quae a nobis fieri viderant ea sollertia efficiebant ut nostri illorum opera imitati viderentur, et sua sponte multa reperiebant unoque tempore et nostras munitiones infestabant et suas defendebant. Atque haec principes in consiliis contionibusque agitabant: populum Romanum paulatim in consuetudinem eius regni occupandi venire. Paucis annis ante A. Gabinium cum exercitu fuisse in Aegypto; Pompeium se ex fuga eodem recepisse; Caesarem venisse cum copiis, neque morte Pompei quicquam profectum quo minus apud se Caesar commoraretur. Quem si non expulissent, futuram ex regno provinciam; idque agendum mature: namque eum interclusum tempestatibus propter anni tempus recipere transmarina auxilia non posse.

4. Meanwhile, a division arising between Achilles, who commanded the veteran army, and Arsinoe, the youngest daughter of king Ptolemy, as has been mentioned above, while they mutually

endeavored to supplant one another, each striving to engross the supreme authority, Arsinoe, by the assistance of the eunuch Ganymed, her governor, at length prevailed, and slew Achilles. After his death, she possessed the whole power without a rival, and raised Ganymed to the command of the army; who, on his entrance upon that high office, augmented the largesses of the troops, and with equal diligence discharged all other parts of his duty.

Interim dissensione orta inter Achillan, qui veterano exercitui praeerat, et Arsinoen, regis Ptolomaei minorem filiam, ut supra demonstratum est, cum uterque utrique insidiaretur et summam imperi ipse obtinere vellet, praeoccupat Arsinoe per Ganymeden eunuchum, nutricium suum, atque Achillan interficit. Hoc occiso sine ullo socio et custode ipsa omne imperium obtinebat; exercitus Ganymedi traditur. Is suscepto officio largitionem in militem auget; reliqua pari diligentia administrat.

5. Alexandria is almost quite hollow underneath, occasioned by the many aqueducts to the Nile, that furnish the private houses with water; where being received in cisterns, it settles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. The master and his family are accustomed to use this: for the water of the Nile being extremely thick and muddy, is apt to breed many distempers. The common people, however, are forced to be contented with the latter, because there is not a single spring in the whole city. The river was in that part of the town which was in the possession of the Alexandrians. By which circumstance Ganymed was reminded that our men might be deprived of water; because being distributed into several streets, for the more easy defense of the works, they made use of that which was preserved in the aqueducts and the cisterns of private houses.

Alexandrea est fere tota suffossa specusque habet a Nilo pertinentis, quibus aqua in privatas domos inducitur, quae paulatim spatio temporis liquescit ac subsidit. Hac uti domini aedificiorum atque eorum familiae consuerunt: nam quae flumine Nilo fertur adeo est limosa ac turbida ut multos variosque morbos efficiat; sed ea plebes ac multitudo contenta est necessario, quod fons urbe tota nullus est. Hoc tamen flumen in ea parte erat urbis quae ab Alexandrinis tenebatur. Quo facto est admonitus Ganymedes posse nostros aqua intercludi; qui distributi munitionum tuendarum causa vicatim ex privatis aedificiis specubus ac puteis extracta aqua utebantur.

6. With this view he began a great and difficult work; for having stopped up all the canals by which his own cisterns were supplied, he drew vast quantities of water out of the sea, by the help of wheels and other engines, pouring it continually into the canals of Caesar's quarter. The cisterns in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter than ordinary, and occasioned great wonder among the men, who could not think from what cause it proceeded. They were even ready to disbelieve their senses when those who were quartered a little lower in the town assured them that they found the water the same as before. This put them upon comparing the cisterns one with another, and by trial they easily perceived the difference. But in a little time the water in the nearest houses became quite unfit for use, and that lower down grew daily more tainted and brackish.

Hoc probato consilio magnum ac difficile opus aggreditur. Intersaeptis enim specubus atque omnibus urbis partibus exclusis quae ab ipso tenebantur, aquae magnam vim ex mari rotis ac machinationibus exprimere contendit: hanc locis superioribus fundere in partem Caesaris non intermittebat. Quam ob causam

salsior paulo praeter consuetudinem aqua trahebatur ex proximis aedificiis magnamque hominibus admirationem praebebat, quam ob rem id accidisset; nec satis sibi ipsi credebant, cum se inferiores eiusdem generis ac saporis aqua dicerent uti atque ante consuissent, vulgoque inter se conferebant et degustando quantum inter se differrent aquae cognoscebant. Parvo vero temporis spatio haec propior bibi omnino non poterat, illa inferior corruptior iam salsiorque reperiiebatur.

7. All doubt being removed by this circumstance, such a terror ensued among the troops that they fancied themselves reduced to the last extremity. Some complained of Caesar's delay, that he did not order them immediately to repair to their ships. Others dreaded a yet greater misfortune, as it would be impossible to conceal their design of retreating from the Alexandrians, who were so near them; and no less so to embark in the face of a vigorous and pursuing enemy. There were besides a great number of the townsmen in Caesar's quarter, whom he had not thought proper to force from their houses, because they openly pretended to be in his interest, and to have quitted the party of their follow-citizens. But to offer here a defense either of the sincerity or conduct of these Alexandrians, would be only labor in vain, since all who know the genius and temper of the people must be satisfied that they are the fittest instruments in the world for treason.

Quo facto dubitatione sublata tantus incessit timor ut ad extremum [casum] periculi omnes deducti viderentur atque alii morari Caesarem dicerent quin navis conscendere iuberent, alii multo gravius extimescerent, quod neque celari Alexandrini possent in apparanda fuga, cum tam parvo spatio distarent ab ipsis, neque illis

imminentibus atque insequentibus ullus in navis receptus daretur. Erat autem magna multitudo oppidanorum in parte Caesaris, quam domiciliis ipsorum non moverat, quod ea se fidelem palam nostris esse simulabat et descivisse a suis videbatur: at mihi *si* defendendi essent Alexandrini neque fallaces esse neque temerarii, multa oratio frustra absumeretur; cum vero uno tempore et natio eorum et natura cognoscatur, aptissimum esse hoc genus ad proditionem dubitare nemo potest.

8. Caesar labored to remove his soldiers' fears by encouraging and reasoning with them. For he affirmed "that they might easily find fresh water by digging wells, as all sea coasts naturally abounded with fresh springs: that if Egypt was singular in this respect, and differed from every other soil, yet still, as the sea was open, and the enemy without a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their fetching it at pleasure in their ships, either from Paraetonium on the left, or from the island on the right; and as their two voyages were in different directions, they could not be prevented by adverse winds at the same time; that a retreat was on no account to be thought of, not only by those that had a concern for their honor, but even by such as regarded nothing but life; that it was with the utmost difficulty they could defend themselves behind their works; but if they once quitted that advantage, neither in number or situation would they be a match for the enemy: that to embark would require much time, and be attended with great danger, especially where it must be managed by little boats: that the Alexandrians, on the contrary, were nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted with the streets and buildings; that, moreover, when flushed with victory, they would not fail to run before, seize all the advantageous posts, possess themselves of the tops of the houses, and by annoying them in their retreat, effectually

prevent their getting on board; that they must therefore think no more of retreating, but place all their hopes of safety in victory.”

Caesar suorum timorem consolatione et ratione minuebat. Nam puteis fossis aquam dulcem reperiri posse adfirmabat: omnia enim litora naturaliter aquae dulcis venas habere. Quod si alia esset litoris Aegypti natura atque omnium reliquorum, tamen, quoniam mare libere tenerent, neque hostes classem haberent, prohiberi sese non posse quo minus cotidie navibus aquam peterent vel a sinistra parte a Paraetonio vel a dextra ab insula, quae diversae navigationes numquam uno tempore adversis ventis praeccluderentur. Fugae vero nullum esse consilium non solum eis qui primam dignitatem haberent, sed ne eis quidem qui nihil praeterquam de vita cogitarent. Magno negotio impetus hostium adversos ex munitionibus sustinere; quibus relictis nec loco nec numero pares esse posse. Magnam autem moram et difficultatem ascensum in navis habere, praesertim ex scaphis; summam esse contra in Alexandrinis velocitatem locorumque et aedificiorum notitiam. Hos praecipue in victoria insolentis praecursuros et loca excelsiora atque aedificia occupaturos: ita fuga navibusque nostros prohibituos. Proinde eius consili obliviscerentur atque omni ratione esse vincendum cogitarent.

9. Having by this speech reassured his men, he ordered the centurions to lay aside all other works, and apply themselves day and night to the digging of wells. The work once begun, and the minds of all aroused to exertion, they exerted themselves so vigorously that in the very first night abundance of fresh water was found. Thus, with no great labor on our side, the mighty projects and painful attempts of the Alexandrians were entirely frustrated. Within these two days the thirty-seventh legion, composed of Pompey's veterans that had

surrendered to Caesar, embarking by order of Domitius Calvinus, with arms, darts, provisions, and military engines, arrived upon the coast of Africa, a little above Alexandria. These ships were hindered from gaining the port by an easterly wind, which continued to blow for several days; but all along that coast it is very safe to ride at anchor. Being detained, however, longer than they expected, and distressed by want of water, they gave notice of it to Caesar, by a dispatch sloop.

Hac oratione apud suos habita atque omnium mentibus excitatis dat centurionibus negotium ut reliquis operibus intermissis ad fodiendos puteos animum conferant neve quam partem nocturni temporis intermittant. Quo suscepto negotio atque omnium animis ad laborem incitatis magna una nocte vis aquae dulcis inventa est. Ita operosis Alexandrinorum machinationibus maximisque conatibus non longi temporis labore occursum est. Eo biduo legio XXXVII ex dediticiis Pompeianis militibus cum frumento, armis, telis, tormentis imposita in navis a Domitio Calvino ad litora Africae paulo supra Alexandream delata est. Hae naves Euro, qui multos dies continenter flabat, portum capere prohibebantur; sed loca sunt egregia omni illa regione ad tenendas ancoras. Hi cum diu retinerentur atque aquae inopia premerentur, navigio actuario Caesarem faciunt certiore.

10. Caesar, that he might himself be able to determine what was best to be done, went on board one of the ships in the harbor, and ordered the whole fleet to follow. He took none of the land forces with him, because he was unwilling to leave the works unguarded during his absence. Being arrived at that part of the coast known by the name of Chersonesus, he sent some mariners on shore to fetch water. Some of these venturing too far into the country for the sake of plunder, were

intercepted by the enemy's horse. From them the Egyptians learned that Caesar himself was on board, without any soldiers. Upon this information, they thought fortune had thrown in their way a good opportunity of attempting something with success. They therefore manned all the ships that they had ready for sea, and met Caesar on his return. He declined fighting that day, for two reasons, first, because he had no soldiers on board, and secondly, because it was past four in the afternoon. The night, he was sensible, must be highly advantageous to his enemies, who depended on their knowledge of the coast, while he would be deprived of the benefit of encouraging his men, which could not be done with any effect in the dark, where courage and cowardice must remain equally unknown. Caesar, therefore, drew all his ships toward the shore, where he imagined the enemy would not follow him.

Caesar, ut per se consilium caperet quid faciendum videretur, navem conscendit atque omnem classem se sequi iussit nullis nostris militibus impositis, quod, cum longius paulo discederet, munitiones nudare nolebat. Cumque ad eum locum accessissent, qui appellatur Chersonensus, aquandique causa remiges in terram euissent, non nulli ex eo numero, cum longius a navibus praedatum processissent, ab equitibus hostium sunt excepti. Ex his cognoverunt Caesarem ipsum in classe venisse nec ullos milites in navibus habere. Qua re comperta magnam sibi facultatem fortunam obtulisse bene gerendae rei crediderunt. Itaque navis omnis quas paratas habuerant ad navigandum propugnatoribus instruxerunt Caesarique redeunti cum classe occurrerunt. Qui duabus de causis eo die dimicare nolebat, quod et nullos milites in navibus habebat et post horam X diei res agebatur, nox autem allatura videbatur maiorem fiduciam illis, qui locorum notitia confidebant; sibi etiam hortandi suos auxilium

defuturum, quod nulla satis idonea esset hortatio quae neque virtutem posset notare neque inertiam. Quibus de causis navis quas potuit Caesar ad terram detrahit, quem in locum illos successuros non existimabat.

11. There was one Rhodian galley in Caesar's right wing, considerably distant from the rest. The enemy observing this, could not restrain themselves, but came forward with four-decked ships, and several open barks, to attack her. Caesar was obliged to advance to her relief, that he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one of his galleys sunk before his eyes though, had he left her to perish, he judged that she deserved it for her rashness. The attack was sustained with great courage by the Rhodians, who, though at all times distinguished by their valor and experience in engagements at sea yet exerted themselves in a particular manner on this occasion, that they might not draw upon themselves the charge of having occasioned a misfortune to the fleet. Accordingly they obtained a complete victory, took one four-banked galley, sunk another, disabled a third, and slew all that were on board, besides a great number of the combatants belonging to the other ships. Nay, had not night interposed, Caesar would have made himself master of their whole fleet. During the consternation that followed upon this defeat, Caesar, finding the contrary winds to abate, took the transports in tow, and advanced with the victorious fleet to Alexandria.

Erat una navis Rhodia in dextro Caesaris cornu longe ab reliquis collocata. Hanc conspicati hostes non tenuerunt sese, magnoque impetu IIII ad eam constrictae naves et complures apertae contenderunt. Cui coactus est Caesar ferre subsidium, ne turpem in conspectu hostium contumeliam acciperet, quamquam, si quid

gravius illis accidisset, merito casurum iudicabat. Proelium commissum est magna contentione Rhodiorum; qui cum in omnibus dimicationibus et scientia et virtute praestitissent, tum maxime illo tempore totum onus sustinere non recusabant, ne quod suorum culpa detrimentum acceptum videretur. Ita proelium secundissimum est factum. Capta est una hostium quadriremis, depressa est altera, duae omnibus epihatis nudatae; magna praeterea multitudo in reliquis navibus propugnatorum est interfecta. Quod nisi nox proelium diremisset, tota classe hostium Caesar potitus esset. Hac calamitate perterritis hostibus adverso vento leniter flante navis onerarias Caesar remulco victricibus suis navibus Alexandream deducit.

12. The Alexandrians, disheartened at this loss, since they found themselves now worsted, not by the superior valor of the soldiers, but by the skill and ability of the mariners, retired to the tops of their houses, and blocked up the entrances of their streets, as if they feared our fleet might attack them even by land. But soon after, Ganymed assuring them in council, that he would not only restore the vessels they had lost, but even increase their number, they began to repair their old ships with great expectation and confidence, and resolved to apply more than ever to the putting their fleet in a good condition. And although they had lost above a hundred and ten ships in the port and arsenal, yet they did not relinquish the idea of repairing their fleet; because, by making themselves masters of the sea, they saw they would have it in their power to hinder Caesar's receiving any reinforcements or supplies. Besides, being mariners, born upon the sea- coast, and exercised from their infancy in naval affairs, they were desirous to return to that wherein their true and proper strength lay, remembering the advantages they had formerly gained, even with their little ships. They therefore applied themselves with all

diligence to the equipping a fleet.

Eo detrimento adeo sunt fracti Alexandrini, cum iam non virtute propugnatorum, sed scientia classiariorum se victos viderent, quibus et superioribus locis sublevabantur, ut ex aedificiis defendi possent et materiam cunctam obicerent, quod nostrae classis oppugnationem etiam ad terram verebantur. Idem, postea quam Ganymedes in concilio confirmavit sese et eas quae essent amissae restitutum et numerum adaucturum, magna spe et fiducia veteres reficere navis accuratiusque huic rei studere atque inservire instituerunt. Ac tametsi amplius CX navibus longis in portu navalibusque amiserant, non tamen reparandae classis cogitationem deposuerunt. Videbant enim non auxilia Caesari, non commeatus supportari posse, si classe ipsi valerent; praeterea nautici homines urbis et regionis maritimae cotidianoque usu a pueris exercitati ad naturale ac domesticum bonum refugere cupiebant et quantum parvulis navigiis profecissent sentiebant; itaque omni studio ad parandam classem incubuerunt.

13. Vessels were stationed at all the mouths of the Nile; for receiving and gathering in the customs. Several old ships were likewise lodged in the king's private arsenals which had not put to sea for many years. These last they refitted, and recalled the former to Alexandria. Oars were wanting; they uncovered the porticos, academies, and public buildings, and made use of the planks they furnished for oars. Their natural ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to be met with in the city, supplied every want. In fine, they had no long navigation to provide for, and were only solicitous about present exigences, foreseeing they would have no occasion to fight but in the port. In a few days, therefore, contrary to all expectation, they had fitted out twenty-two quadriremes, and five quinqueremes. To these

they added a great number of small open barks; and after testing the efficiency of each in the harbor, put a sufficient number of soldiers on board, and prepared every thing necessary for an engagement. Caesar had nine Rhodian galleys (for of the ten which were sent, one was shipwrecked on the coast of Egypt), eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from Asia. Of these, ten were quadriremes, and five quinqueremes; the rest were smaller, and for the most part without decks. Yet, trusting to the valor of his soldiers, and being acquainted with the strength of the enemy, he prepared for an engagement.

Erant omnibus ostiis Nili custodiae exigendi portorii causa dispositae; naves veteres erant in occultis regiae navalibus, quibus multis annis ad navigandum non erant usi: has reficiebant, illas Alexandream revocabant. Deerant remi: porticus, gymnasia, publica aedificia detegebant, asses remorum usum obtinebant; aliud naturalis sollertia, aliud urbis copia sumministrabat. Postremo non longam navigationem parabant, sed praesentis temporis necessitati serviebant et in ipso portu confligendum videbant. Itaque paucis diebus contra omnium opinionem quadriremis XXII, quinqueremis V confecerunt; ad has minores apertasque compluris adiecerunt et in portu periclitati remigio quid quaeque earum efficere posset idoneos milites imposuerunt seque ad confligendum omnibus rebus paraverunt. Caesar Rhodias navis VIII habebat — nam decem missis una in cursu litore Aegyptio defecerat — , Ponticas VIII, Lycias V, ex Asia XII. Ex his erant quinqueremes et quadriremes decem, reliquae infra hanc magnitudinem et pleraeque apertae. Tamen virtute militum confisus cognitis hostium copiis se ad dimicandum parabat.

14. When both sides were come to have sufficient confidence in their own strength, Caesar sailed round Pharos, and formed in line of battle opposite to the enemy. He placed the Rhodian galleys on his right wing, and those of Pontus on his left. Between these he left a space of four hundred paces, to allow for extending and working the vessels. This disposition being made, he drew up the rest of the fleet as a reserve, giving them the necessary orders, and distributing them in such a manner that every ship followed that to which she was appointed to give succor. The Alexandrians brought out their fleet with great confidence, and drew it up, placing their twenty-two quadriremes in front, and disposing the rest behind them in a second line, by way of reserve. They had besides a great number of boats and smaller vessels, which carried fire and combustibles, with the intention of intimidating us by their number, cries, and flaming darts. Between the two fleets were certain flats, separated by very narrow channels, and which are said to be on the African coast, as being in that division of Alexandria which belongs to Africa. Both sides waited which should first pass these shallows, because whoever entered the narrow channels between them, in case of any misfortune, would be impeded both in retreating and working their ships to advantage.

Postquam eo ventum est ut sibi uterque eorum confideret, Caesar Pharon classe circumvehitur adversasque navis hostibus constituit: in dextro cornu Rhodias collocat, in sinistro Ponticas. Inter has spatium CCCC passuum relinquit, quod satis esse ad explicandas navis videbatur. Post hunc ordinem reliquas navis subsidio distribuit; quae quamque earum sequatur et cui subveniat constituit atque imperat. Non dubitanter Alexandrini classem producunt atque instruunt: in fronte collocant XXII, reliquas subsidiarias in secundo ordine

constituunt. Magnum praeterea numerum minorum navigiorum et scapharum producunt cum malleolis ignibusque, si quid ipsa multitudo et clamor et flamma nostris terroris adferre possent. Erant inter duas classis vada transitu angusto, quae pertinent ad regionem Africae — sic enim praedicant, partem esse Alexandriae dimidiam Africae — satisque diu inter ipsos est expectatum ab utris transeundi fieret initium, propterea quod ei qui intrassent et ad explicandam classem et ad receptum, si durior accidisset casus, impeditiores fore videbantur.

15. Euphranor commanded the Rhodian fleet, who for valor and greatness of mind deserved to be ranked among our own men rather than the Grecians. The Rhodians had raised him to the post of admiral, on account of his known courage and experience. He, perceiving Caesar's design, addressed him to this effect: "You seem afraid of passing the shallow first, lest you should be thereby forced to come to an engagement, before you can bring up the rest of the fleet. Leave the matter to us; we will sustain the fight (and we will not disappoint your expectations), until the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It is both dishonorable and afflicting that they should so long continue in our sight with an air of triumph." Caesar, encouraging him in his design, and bestowing many praises upon him, gave the signal for engaging. Four Rhodian ships having passed the shallows, the Alexandrians gathered round and attacked them. They maintained the fight with great courage, disengaging themselves by their art and address, and working their ships with so much skill, that notwithstanding the inequality of number, none of the enemy were suffered to run alongside, or break their oars. Meantime the rest of the fleet came up; when, on account of the narrowness of the place, art became useless, and the contest

depended entirely upon valor. Nor was there at Alexandria a single Roman or citizen who remained engaged in the attack or defense, but mounted the tops of the houses and all the eminences that would give a view of the fight, addressing the gods by vows and prayers for victory.

Rhodiis navibus praeerat Euphranor, animi magnitudine ac virtute magis cum nostris hominibus quam cum Graecis comparandus. Hic ob notissimam scientiam atque animi magnitudinem delectus est ab Rhodiis qui imperium classis obtineret. Qui ubi Caesaris animum advertit, ‘Videris, mihi,’ inquit, ‘Caesar, vereri, si haec vada primis navibus intraris, ne prius dimicare cogaris quam reliquam classem potueris explicare. Nobis rem committe: nos proelium sustinebimus — neque tuum iudicium fallemus — dum reliqui subsequantur. Hos quidem diutius in nostro conspectu gloriari magno nobis et dedecori et dolori est.’ Caesar illum adhortatus atque omnibus laudibus prosecutus dat signum pugnae. Progressas ultra vadum IIII Rhodias navis circumsistunt Alexandrini atque in eas impetum faciunt. Sustinent illi atque arte sollertiaque se explicant; ac tantum doctrina potuit ut in dispari numero nulla transversa hosti obiceretur, nullius remi detergerentur, sed semper venientibus adversae occurrerent. Interim sunt reliquae subsecutae. Tum necessario discessum ab arte est propter angustias loci, atque omne certamen in virtute constitit. Neque vero Alexandriae fuit quisquam aut nostrorum aut oppidanorum, qui aut in opere aut in pugna occupatum animum haberent, quin altissima tecta peteret atque ex omni prospectu locum spectaculo caperet precibusque et votis victoriam suis ab dis immortalibus eceret.

16. The event of the battle was by no means equal; a defeat would

have deprived us of all resources either by land or sea; and even if we were victorious, the future would be uncertain. The Alexandrians, on the contrary, by a victory gained every thing; and if defeated, might yet again have recourse to fortune. It was likewise a matter of the highest concern to see the safety of all depend upon a few, of whom, if any were deficient in resolution and energy, they would expose their whole party to destruction. This Caesar had often represented to his troops during the preceding days, that they might be thereby induced to fight with the more resolution, when they knew the common safety to depend upon their bravery. Every man said the same to his comrade, companion, and friend, beseeching him not to disappoint the expectation of those who had chosen him in preference to others for the defense of the common interest. Accordingly, they fought with so much resolution, that neither the art nor address of the Egyptians, a maritime and seafaring people, could avail them, nor the multitude of their ships be of service to them; nor the valor of those selected for this engagement be compared to the determined courage of the Romans. In this action a quinquereme was taken, and a bireme, with all the soldiers and mariners on board, besides three sunk, without any loss on our side. The rest fled toward the town, and protecting their ships under the mole and forts, prevented us from approaching.

Minime autem par erat proeli certamen. Nostris enim pulsus neque terra neque mari effugium dabatur victis, omniaque victoribus erant futura in incerto; [cum] illi, si superassent navibus, omnia tenerent, si inferiores fuissent, reliquam tamen fortunam periclitarentur. Simul illud grave ac miserum videbatur, perpauca de summa rerum ac de salute omnium decertare; quorum si qui aut animo aut virtute cessisset, reliquis etiam esset cavendum, quibus pro se pugnandi

facultas non fuisset. Haec superioribus diebus saepenumero Caesar suis euerat, ut hoc maiore animo contenderent, quod omnium salutem sibi commendatam viderent. Eadem suum quisque contubernalem, amicum, notum prosequens erat obtestatus, ne suam atque omnium falleret opinionem, quorum iudicio delectus ad pugnam proficisceretur. Itaque hoc animo est decertatum, ut neque maritimis nauticisque sollertia atque ars praesidium ferret, neque numero navium praestantibus multitudo prodesset, neque electi ad virtutem e tanta multitudine viri virtuti nostrorum possent adaequare. Capitur hoc proelio quinquereimis una et biremis cum defensoribus remigibusque, et deprimuntur tres, nostris incolumibus omnibus. Reliquae propinquam fugam ad oppidum capiunt; quas protexerunt ex molibus atque aedificiis imminetibus et nostros adire propius prohibuerunt.

17. To deprive the enemy of this resource for the future, Caesar thought it by all means necessary to render himself master of the mole and island; for having already in a great measure completed his works within the town, he was in hopes of being able to defend himself both in the island and city. This resolution being taken, he put into boats and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic cavalry as he thought fittest for his purpose, and sent them against the island; while, at the same time, to create a diversion, he attacked it on the other with his fleet, promising great rewards to those who should first render themselves masters of it. At first, the enemy firmly withstood the impetuosity of our men; for they both annoyed them from the tops of the houses, and gallantly maintained their ground along the shore; to which being steep and craggy, our men could find no way of approach; the more accessible avenues being skillfully defended by small boats,

and five galleys, prudently stationed for that purpose. But when after examining the approaches, and sounding the shallows, a few of our men got a footing upon the shore, and were followed by others, who pushed the islanders, without intermission; the Pharians at last betook themselves to flight. On their defeat, the rest abandoning the defense of the port, quitted their ships, and retired into the town, to provide for the security of their houses

Hoc ne sibi saepius accidere posset, omni ratione Caesar contendendum existimavit ut insulam molemque ad insulam pertinentem in suam redigeret potestatem. Perfectis enim magna ex parte munitionibus in oppido et insulam et urbem uno tempore temptari posse confidebat. Quo capto consilio cohortis X et levis armaturae electos, quosque idoneos ex equitibus Gallis arbitrabatur, in navigia minora scaphasque imponit; [in] alteram insulae partem destinandae manus causa constratis navibus aggreditur, praemiis magnis propositis qui primus insulam cepisset. Ac primo impetum nostrorum pariter sustinuerunt: uno enim tempore et ex tectis aedificiorum propugnabant et litora armati defendebant, quo propter asperitatem loci non facilis nostris aditus dabatur, et scaphis navibusque longis quinque mobiliter et scienter angustias loci tuebantur. Sed ubi primurn locis cognitis vadisque pertemptatis pauci nostri in litore constiterunt atque hos sunt alii subsecuti constanterque in eos qui in litore aequo institerant impetum fecerunt, omnes Phariae terga verterunt. His pulsus custodia portus relicta navis ad litora et vicum applicarunt seque ex navibus ad tuenda aedificia eiecerunt.

18. But they could not long maintain their ground there: though, to compare small things with great, their buildings were not unlike

those of Alexandria, and their towers were high, and joined together so as to form a kind of wall; and our men had not come prepared with ladders, fascines, or any weapons for assault. But fear often deprives men of intellect and counsel, and weakens their strength, as happened upon this occasion. Those who had ventured to oppose us on even ground, terrified by the loss of a few men, and the general rout, durst not face us from a height of thirty feet; but throwing themselves from the mole into the sea, endeavored to gain the town, though above eight hundred paces distant. Many however were slain, and about six hundred taken.

Neque vero diutius ea munitione se continere potuerunt, etsi erat non dissimile atque Alexandriae genus aedificiorum, ut minora maloribus conferantur, turresque editae et coniunctae muri locum obtinebant, neque nostri aut scalis aut cratibus aut reliquis rebus parati venerant ad oppugnandum. Sed terror hominibus mentem consiliumque eripit et membra debilitat; ut tum accidit. Qui se in aequo loco ac plano pares esse confidebant, idem perterriti fuga suorum et caede paucorum XXX pedum altitudine in aedificiis consistere ausi non sunt seque per molem in mare praecipitaverunt et DCCC passuum intervallum ad oppidum enataverunt. Multi tamen ex his capti interfectique sunt; sed numerus captivorum omnino fuit sex milium.

19. Caesar, giving up the plunder to the soldiers, ordered the houses to be demolished, but fortified the castle at the end of the bridge next the island, and placed a garrison in it. This the Pharians had abandoned; but the other, toward the town, which was considerably stronger, was still held by the Alexandrians. Caesar attacked it next day; because by getting possession of these two forts, he would be entirely master of the port, and prevent sudden excursions and

piracies. Already he had, by means of his arrows and engines, forced the garrison to abandon the place, and retire toward the town. He had also landed three cohorts which was all the place would contain; the rest of his troops were stationed in their ships. This being done, he orders them to fortify the bridge against the enemy, and to fill with stones and block up the arch on which the bridge was built, through which there was egress for the ships. When one of these works was accomplished so effectually, that no boat could pass out at all, and when the other was commenced, the Alexandrians sallied, in crowds from the town, and drew up in an open place, over against the intrenchment we had cast up at the head of the bridge. At the same time they stationed at the mole the vessels which they had been wont to make pass under the bridge, to set fire to our ships of burden. Our men fought from the bridge and the mole; the enemy from the space, opposite to the bridge, and from their ships, by the side of the mole.

Caesar praeda militibus concessa aedificia diripi iussit castellumque ad pontem, qui propior erat Pharo, communivit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Hunc fuga Pharitae reliquerant; artiore illum propioremque oppido Alexandrini tuebantur. Sed eum postero die simili ratione aggreditur, quod his obtentis duobus omnem navigiorum excursus et repentina latrocinia sublatum iri videbatur. Iamque eos qui praesidio eum locum tenebant tormentis ex navibus sagittisque depulerat atque in oppidum redegerat et cohortium trium instar in terram euerat — non enim pluris consistere angustiae loci patiebantur — ; reliquae copiae in navibus stationem obtinebant. Quo facto imperat pontem adversus hostem praevallari et, qua exitus navibus erat fornice exstructo, quo pons sustinebatur, lapidibus oppleri atque obstrui. Quorum altero opere effecto, ut nulla omnino scapha egredi posset, altero instituto omnes Alexandrinorum copiae ex oppido se eiecerunt

et contra munitiones pontis latiore loco constiterunt, eodemque tempore quae consueverant navigia per pontis ad incendia onerariarum emittere ad molem constituerunt. Pugnabatur a nobis ex ponte, ex mole; ab illis ex area, quae erat adversus pontem, et ex navibus contra molem.

20. While Caesar was engaged in these things, and in exhorting his troops, a number of rowers and mariners, quitting their ships, threw themselves upon the mole, partly out of curiosity, partly to have a share in the action. At first, with stones and slings, they forced the enemy's ships from the mole; and seemed to do still greater execution with their darts. But when, some time after, a few Alexandrians found means to land, and attack them in flank, as they had left their ships without order or discipline, so they soon began to flee, with precipitation. The Alexandrians, encouraged by this success, landed in great numbers, and vigorously pressed upon our men, who were, by this time, in great confusion. Those that remained in the galleys perceiving this, drew up the ladders and put off from the shore, to prevent the enemy's boarding them. Our soldiers who belonged to the three cohorts, which were at the head of the mole to guard the bridge, astonished at this disorder, the cries they heard behind them, and the general rout of their party, unable besides to bear up against the great number of darts which came pouring upon them, and fearing to be surrounded, and have their retreat cut off, by the departure of their ships, abandoned the fortifications which they had commenced at the bridge, and ran, with all the speed they could, toward the galleys: some getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded and sank them: part, resisting the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians. Others, more fortunate, got to the ships that rode at anchor; and a few,

supported by their bucklers, making a determined struggle, swam to the nearest vessels.

In his rebus occupato Caesare militesque hortante remigum magnus numerus et classiariorum ex longis navibus nostris in molem se eiecit. Pars eorum studio spectandi ferebatur, pars etiam cupiditate pugnandi. Hi primum navigia hostium lapidibus ac fundis a mole repellebant ac multum proficere multitudine telorum videbantur. Sed postquam ultra eum locum ab latere eorum aperto ausi sunt egredi ex navibus Alexandrini pauci, ut sine signis certisque ordinibus, sine ratione prodierant, sic temere in navis refugere coeperunt. Quorum fuga incitati Alexandrini plures ex navibus egrediebantur nostrosque acrius perturbatos insequiebantur. Simul qui in navibus longis remanserant scalas rapere navisque a terra repellere properabant, ne hostes navibus potirentur. Quibus omnibus rebus perturbati milites nostri cohortium trium quae in ponte ac prima mole constiterant, cum post se clamorem exaudirent, fugam suorum viderent, magnam vim telorum adversi sustinerent, veriti ne ab tergo circumvenirentur et discessu navium omnino reditu intercluderentur munitionem in ponte institutam reliquerunt et magno cursu incitati ad navis contenderunt. Quorum pars proximas nacta navis multitudine hominum atque onere depressa est, pars resistens et dubitans quid esset capiendum consili ab Alexandrinis interfecta est; non nulli feliciore exitu expeditas ad ancoram navis consecuti incolumes discesserunt, pauci allevatis scutis et animo ad conandum nisi ad proxima navigia adnatarunt.

21. Caesar, endeavoring to re- animate his men, and lead them back to the defense of the works, was exposed to the same danger as the rest; when, finding them universally to give ground, he retreated to his own galley, whither such a multitude followed and crowded after

him, that it was impossible either to work or put her off. Foreseeing what must happen, he flung himself into the sea, and swam to the ships that lay at some distance. Hence dispatching boats to succor his men, he, by that means, preserved a small number. His own ship, being sunk by the multitude that crowded into her, went down with all that were on board. About four hundred legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that number of sailors and rowers, were lost in this action. The Alexandrians secured the fort by strong works, and a great number of engines; and having cleared away the stones with which Caesar had blocked up the port, enjoyed henceforward a free and open navigation.

Caesar quoad potuit cohortando suos ad pontem ac munitiones continere, eodem in periculo versatus est; postquam universos cedere animadvertit, in suum navigium se recepit. Quo multitudo hominum insecuta cum irrumperet neque administrandi neque repellendi a terra facultas daretur, fore quod accidit suspicatus sese ex navigio eiecit atque ad eas quae longius constiterant navis adnatavit. Hinc suis laborantibus subsidio scaphas mittens non nullos conservavit. Navigium quidem eius multitudine depressum militum una cum hominibus interiit. Hoc proelio desiderati sunt ex numero legionariorum militum circiter CCCC et Paulo [ultra] eum numerum classarii et remiges. Alexandrini eo loco castellum magnis munitionibus multisque tormentis confirmarunt atque egestis ex mari lapidibus libere sunt usi postea ad mittenda navigia.

22. Our men were so far from being disheartened at this loss, that they seemed rather roused and animated by it. They made continual sallies upon the enemy, to destroy or check the progress of their works; fell upon them as often as they had an opportunity; and never failed to

intercept them, when they ventured to advance beyond their fortifications. In short, the legions were so bent upon fighting, that they even exceeded the orders and exhortations of Caesar. They were inconsolable for their late disgrace, and impatient to come to blows with the enemy; insomuch, that he found it necessary rather to restrain and check their ardor, than incite them to action.

Hoc detrimento milites nostri tantum afuerunt ut perturbarentur, ut incensi atque incitati magnas accessiones fecerint in operibus hostium expugnandis. In proeliis cotidianis, quandocumque fors obtulerat, procurrentibus et erumpentibus Alexandrinis, manum comprehendi multum operibus et ardentibus studiis militum; nec divulgata Caesaris hortatio subsequi legionum aut laborem aut pugnandi poterat cupiditatem, ut magis deterrendi et continendi a periculosissimis essent dimicationibus quam incitandi ad pugnandum.

23. The Alexandrians, perceiving that success confirmed the Romans, and that adverse fortune only animated them the more, as they knew of no medium between these on which to ground any further hopes, resolved, as far as we can conjecture, either by the advice of the friends of their king who were in Caesar's quarter, or of their own previous design, intimated to the king by secret emissaries, to send ambassadors to Caesar to request him, "To dismiss their king and suffer him to rejoin his subjects; that the people, weary of subjection to a woman, of living under a precarious government, and submitting to the cruel laws of the tyrant Ganymed, were ready to execute the orders of the king: and if by his sanction they should embrace the alliance and protection of Caesar, the multitude would not be deterred from surrendering by the fear of danger."

Alexandrini cum Romanos et secundis rebus confirmari et adversis incitari viderent neque ullum belli tertium casum nossent quo possent esse firmiores, ut coniectura consequi possumus, aut admoniti a regis amicis qui in Caesaris erant praesidiis, aut suo priore consilio per occultos nuntios regi probato legatos ad Caesarem miserunt, ut dimitteret regem transireque ad suos pateretur: paratam enim omnem multitudinem esse, confectam taedio puellae, fiduciario regno, dominatione crudelissima Ganymedis, facere id quod rex imperasset; quo si auctore in Caesaris fidem amicitiamque venturi essent, nullius periculi timorem multitudini fore impedimento quo minus se dederent.

24. Though Caesar knew the nation to be false and perfidious, seldom speaking as they really thought, yet he judged it best to comply with their desire. He even flattered himself, that his condescension in sending back their king at their request, would prevail on them to be faithful; or, as was more agreeable to their character, if they only wanted the king to head their army, at least it would be more for his honor and credit to have to do with a monarch than with a band of slaves and fugitives. Accordingly, he exhorted the king, "To take the government into his own hands, and consult the welfare of so fair and illustrious a kingdom, defaced by hideous ruins and conflagrations. To make his subjects sensible of their duty, preserve them from the destruction that threatened them, and act with fidelity toward himself and the Romans, who put so much confidence in him, as to send him among armed enemies." Then taking him by the hand, he dismissed the young prince who was fast approaching manhood. But his mind being thoroughly versed in the art of dissimulation, and no way degenerating from the character of his nation, he entreated Caesar with tears not to send him back; for that his company was to

him preferable to a kingdom. Caesar, moved at his concern, dried up his tears; and telling him, if these were his real sentiments, they would soon meet again, dismissed him. The king, like a wild beast escaped out of confinement, carried on the war with such acrimony against Caesar, that the tears he shed at parting seemed to have been tears of joy. Caesar's lieutenants, friends, centurions, and soldiers, were delighted that this had happened; because his easiness of temper had been imposed upon by a child: as if in truth Caesar's behavior on this occasion had been the effect of easiness of temper, and not of the most consummate prudence.

Caesar etsi fallacem gentem semperque alia cogitantem, alia simulantem bene cognitam habebat, tamen petentibus dare veniam utile esse statuit, quod, si quo pacto sentirent ea quae postularent, mansurum in fide dimissum regem credebat, sin, id quod magis illorum naturae conveniebat, ducem ad bellum gerendum regem habere vellent, splendidius atque honestius se contra regem quam contra convenarum ac fugitivorum manum bellum esse gesturum. Itaque regem cohortatus ut consuleret regno paterno, parceret praeclarissimae patriae, quae turpibus incendiis et ruinis esset deformata, civis suos primum ad sanitatem revocaret, deinde conservaret, fidem populo Romano sibi praearet, cum ipse tantum ei crederet ut ad hostis armatos eum mitteret, dextra dextram tenens dimittere coepit adulta iam aetate puerum. At regius animus disciplinis fallacissimis eruditus, ne a gentis suae moribus degeneraret, flens orare contra Caesarem coepit ne se dimitteret: non enim sibi regnum ipsum conspectu Caesaris esse iucundius. Compressis pueri lacrimis Caesar ipse commotus celeriter, si illa sentiret, fore eum secum adfirmans ad suos dimisit. Ille, ut ex carceribus in liberum cursum emissus, adeo contra Caesarem acriter

bellum gerere coepit ut lacrimas quas in colloquio proiecerat gaudio videretur profudisse. Accidisse hoc complures Caesaris legati, amici, centuriones militesque laetabantur, quod nimia bonitas eius fallaciis pueri elusa esset. Quasi vero id Caesar bonitate tantum adductus ac non prudentissimo consilio fecisset.

25. When the Alexandrians found that on the recovery of their king, neither had they become stronger, nor the Romans weaker; that the troops despised the youth and weakness of their king; and that their affairs were in no way bettered by his presence: they were greatly discouraged; and a report ran that a large body of troops was marching by land from Syria and Cilicia to Caesar's assistance (of which he had not as yet himself received information); still they determined to intercept the convoys that came to him by sea. To this end, having equipped some ships, they ordered them to cruise before the Canopic branch of the Nile, by which they thought it most likely our supplies would arrive. Caesar, who was informed of it, ordered his fleet to get ready, and gave the command of it to Tiberius Nero. The Rhodian galleys made part of this squadron, headed by Euphranor their admiral, without whom there never was a successful engagement fought. But fortune, which often reserves the heaviest disasters for those who have been loaded with her highest favors, encountered Euphranor upon this occasion, with an aspect very different from what she had hitherto worn. For when our ships were arrived at Canopus, and the fleets drawn up on each side had begun the engagement, Euphranor, according to custom, having made the first attack, and pierced and sunk one of the enemy's ships; as he pursued the next a considerable way, without being sufficiently supported by those that followed him, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. None of the fleet advanced to his relief, either out of

fear for their own safety, or because they imagined he would easily be able to extricate himself by his courage and good fortune. Accordingly he alone behaved well in this action, and perished with his victorious galley.

Cum duce assumpto Alexandrini nihilo se firmiores factos aut languidiores Romanos animadverterent eludentibusque militibus regis aetatem atque infirmitatem magnum dolorem acciperent neque se quicquam proficere viderent, rumoresque exsisterent magna Caesari praesidia terrestri itinere [ex] Syria Ciliciaque adduci, quod nondum auditum Caesari erat, commeatum, qui mari nostris supportabatur, intercipere statuerunt. Itaque expeditis navigiis locis idoneis ad Canopum in statione dispositis navibus insidiabantur nostris commeatuque. Quod ubi Caesari nuntiatum est, universam classem iubet expediri atque instrui. Praeficit huic Tiberium Neronem. Proficiscuntur in ea classe Rhodiae naves atque in his Euphranor, sine quo nulla umquam dimicatio maritima, nulla etiam parum feliciter confecta erat. At fortuna, quae plerumque eos quos plurimis beneficiis ornavit ad duriores casus reservat, superiorum temporum dissimilis Euphranorem prosequabatur. Nam cum ad Canopum ventum esset instructaque utrimque classis conflisset et sua consuetudine Euphranor primus proelium commisisset et quadriremem hostium perforasset ac demersisset, proximam longius insecutus parum celeriter insequentibus reliquis circumventus est ab Alexandrinis. Cui subsidium nemo tulit, sive quod in ipso satis praesidi pro virtute ac felicitate eius putarent esse, sive quod ipsi sibi timebant. Ita, qui unus ex omnibus eo proelio bene rem gessit, solus cum sua quadriremi victrice perit.

26. About the same time Mithridates of Pergamus, a man of illustrious

descent, distinguished for his bravery and knowledge of the art of war, and who held a very high place in the friendship and confidence of Caesar, having been sent in the beginning of the Alexandrian war, to raise succors in Syria and Cilicia, arrived by land at the head of a great body of troops, which his diligence, and the affection of these two provinces, had enabled him to draw together in a very short time. He conducted them first to Pelusium, where Egypt joins Syria. Achilles, who was perfectly well acquainted with its importance, had seized and put a strong garrison into it. For Egypt is considered as defended on all sides by strong barriers; on the side of the sea by the Pharos, and on the side of Syria by Pelusium, which are accounted the two keys of that kingdom. He attacked it so briskly with a large body of troops, fresh men continually succeeding in the place of those that were fatigued, and urged the assault with so much firmness and perseverance, that he carried it the same day on which he attacked it, and placed a garrison in it. Thence he pursued his march to Alexandria, reducing all the provinces through which he passed, and conciliating them to Caesar, by that authority which always accompanies the conqueror.

Sub idem tempus Mithridates Pergamenus, magnae nobilitatis domi scientiaeque in bello et virtutis, fidei dignitatisque in amicitia Caesaris, missus in Syriam Ciliciamque initio belli Alexandrini ad auxilia arcessenda, cum magnis copiis, quas celeriter et propensissima civitatum voluntate et sua diligentia confecerat, itinere pedestri, quo coniungitur Aegyptus Syriae, Pelusium adducit: idque oppidum firmo praesidio occupatum Achillae propter opportunitatem loci — namque tota Aegyptus maritimo accessu Pharo, pedestri Pelusio velut claustris munita existimatur — , repente magnis circumdatum copiis multiplici praesidio pertinaciter

propugnantibus et copiarum magnitudine, quas integras vulneratis defessisque subiciebat, et perseverantia constantiaque oppugnandi quo die est aggressus in suam redegit potestatem praesidiumque ibi suum collocavit. Inde re bene gesta Alexandream ad Caesarem contendit omnisque eas regiones per quas iter faciebat auctoritate ea quae plerumque adest victori pacarat atque in amicitiam Caesaris redegerat.

27. Not far from Alexandria lies Delta, the most celebrated province of Egypt, which derives its name from the Greek letter so called. For the Nile, dividing into two channels, which gradually diverge as they approach the sea, into which they at last discharge themselves, at a considerable distance from one another, leaves an intermediate space in form of a triangle. The king understanding that Mithridates was approaching this place, and knowing he must pass the river, sent a large body of troops against him, sufficient, as he thought, if not to overwhelm and crush him, at least to stop his march, for though he earnestly desired to see him defeated, yet he thought it a great point gained, to hinder his junction with Caesar. The troops that first passed the river, and came up with Mithridates, attacked him immediately, hastening to snatch the honor of victory from the troops that were marching to their aid. Mithridates at first confined himself to the defense of his camp, which he had with great prudence fortified according to the custom of the Romans: but observing that they advanced insolently and without caution, he sallied upon them from all parts, and put a great number of them to the sword; insomuch that, but for their knowledge of the ground, and the neighborhood of the vessels in which they had passed the river, they must have been all destroyed. But recovering by degrees from their terror, and joining the troops that followed them, they again prepared

to attack Mithridates.

Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandria, qui nominatur Delta; quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit: nam pars quaedam fluminis Nili derivata [inter se] duobus itineribus paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diversissimo ad litus intervallo mari coniungitur. Cui loco cum appropinquare Mithridaten rex cognovisset et transeundum ei flumen sciret, magnas adversus eum copias misit, quibus vel superari delerique Mithridaten vel sine dubio retineri posse credebat. Quem ad modum autem optabat eum vinci, sic satis habebat interclusum a Caesare a se retineri. Quae primae copiae flumen a Delta transire et Mithridati occurrere potuerunt, proelium commiserunt festinantes praeripere subsequenter victoriae societatem. Quorum impetum Mithridates magna cum prudentia [constantiaque virtutum et Alexandrinorum imprudentia] consuetudine nostra castris vallatis sustinuit; cum vero incaute atque insolenter succedere eos munitionibus videret, eruptione undique facta magnum numerum eorum interfecit. Quod risi locorum notitia reliqui se texissent partimque in navis quibus flumen transierant recepissent, funditus deleti essent. Qui ut paulum ab illo timore se recrearunt, adiuncti eis qui subsequebantur rursus oppugnare Mithridaten coeperunt.

28. A messenger was sent by Mithridates to Caesar, to inform him of what had happened. The king learns from his followers that the action had taken place. Thus, much about the same time, Ptolemy set out to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king made use of the more expeditious conveyance of the Nile, where he had a large fleet in readiness. Caesar declined the navigation of the river, that he might not be obliged to engage the enemy's fleet; and

coasting along the African shore, found means to join the victorious troops of Mithridates, before Ptolemy could attack him. The king had encamped in a place fortified by nature, being an eminence surrounded on all sides by a plain. Three of its sides were secured by various defenses. One was washed by the river Nile, the other was steep and inaccessible, and the third was defended by a morass.

Mittitur a Mithridate nuntius Caesari qui rem gestam perferret. Cognoscit ex suis eadem haec accidisse rex. Ita paene sub idem tempus et rex ad opprimendum Mithridaten proficiscitur et Caesar ad recipiendum. Celeriore fluminis Nili navigatione rex est usus, in quo magnam et paratam classem habebat. Caesar eodem itinere uti noluit, ne navibus in flumine dimicaret, sed circuivectus est eo mari, quod Africae partis esse dicitur, sicuti supra demonstravimus; prius tamen regis copiis occurrit, quam is Mithridaten aggredi posset, eumque ad se victorem incolumi exercitu recepit. Consederat cum copiis rex loco natura munito, quod erat ipse excelsior planitie ex omnibus partibus subiecta; tribus autem ex lateribus variis genere munitionibus tegebatur: unum latus erat adiectum flumini Nilo, alterum editissimo loco ductum, ut partem castrorum obtineret, tertium palude cingebatur.

29. Between Ptolemy's camp and Caesar's route lay a narrow river with very steep banks, which discharged itself into the Nile. This river was about seven miles from the king's camp; who, understanding that Caesar was directing his march that way, sent all his cavalry, with a choice body of light-armed foot, to prevent Caesar from crossing, and maintain an unequal fight from the banks, where courage had no opportunity to exert itself, and cowardice ran no hazard. Our men, both horse and foot, were extremely mortified, that

the Alexandrians should so long maintain their ground against them. Wherefore, some of the German cavalry, dispersing in quest of a ford, found means to swim the river where the banks were lowest; and the legionaries at the same time cutting down several large trees, that reached from one bank to another, and constructing suddenly a mound, by their help got to the other side. The enemy were so much in dread of their attack, that they betook themselves to flight; but in vain: for very few returned to the king, almost all being cut to pieces in the pursuit.

Inter castra et Caesaris iter flumen intercedebat angustum altissimis ripis, quod in Nilum influebat, aberat autem ab regis castris milia passuum circiter VII. Rex cum hoc itinere venire Caesarem comperisset, equitatum omnem expeditosque delectos pedites ad id flumen misit qui transitu Caesarem prohiberent et eminens ex ripis proelium impar inirent: nullum enim processum virtus habebat aut periculum ignavia subibat. Quae res incendit dolore milites equitesque nostros, quod tam diu pari proelio cum Alexandrinis certaretur. Itaque eodem tempore equites Germani dispersi vada fluminis quaerentes partim demissioribus ripis flumen transierunt, et legionarii magnis arboribus excisis, quae longitudine utramque ripam contingerent, proiectis [eis] repentinoque aggere iniecto flumen transierunt. Quorum impetum adeo pertimuerunt hostes ut in fuga spem salutis collocarent; sed id frustra: namque ex ea fuga pauci ad regem refugerunt paene omni reliqua multitudo interfecta.

30. Caesar, upon this success, judging that his sudden approach must strike great terror into the Alexandrians, advanced toward their camp with his victorious army. But finding it well intrenched, strongly fortified by nature, and the ramparts covered with armed soldiers, he

did not think proper that his troops, who were very much fatigued both by their march and the late battle, should attack it; and therefore encamped at a small distance from the enemy. Next day he attacked a fort, in a village not far off, which the king had fortified and joined to his camp by a line of communication, with a view to keep possession of the village. He attacked it with his whole army, and took it by storm; not because it would have been difficult to carry it with a few forces; but with the design of falling immediately upon the enemy's camp, during the alarm which the loss of this fort must give them. Accordingly, the Romans, in continuing the pursuit of those that fled from the fort, arrived at last before the Alexandrian camp, and commenced a most furious action at a distance. There were two approaches by which it might be attacked; one by the plain, of which we have spoken before, the other by a narrow pass, between their camp and the Nile. The first, which was much the easiest, was defended by a numerous body of their best troops; and the access on the side of the Nile gave the enemy great advantage in distressing and wounding our men; for they were exposed to a double shower of darts: in front from the rampart, behind from the river; where the enemy had stationed a great number of ships, furnished with archers and slingers, that kept up a continual discharge.

Caesar re praeclarissime gesta, cum subitum adventum suum iudicaret magnum terrorem Alexandrinis iniecturum, protinus victor ad castra regis pertendit. Haec cum et opere magno vallata et loci natura munita animadverteret confertamque armatorum multitudinem collocatam in vallo videret, lassos itinere ac proeliando milites ad oppugnanda castra succedere noluit. Itaque non magno intervallo relicto ab hoste castra posuit. Postero die castellum, quod rex in proximo vico non longe a suis castris munierat bracchiisque cum

opere castrorum coniunxerat vici obtinendi causa, Caesar aggressus omnibus copiis expugnat, non quo id minore numero militum consequi difficile factu putaret, sed ut ab ea victoria perterritis Alexandrinis protinus castra regis oppugnaret. Itaque eo cursu, quo refugientis Alexandrinos ex castello in castra sunt milites insecuti, munitionibus successerunt acerrimeque eminus proeliari coeperunt. Duabus ex partibus aditus oppugnationis nostris dabatur: una, quam liberum accessum habere demonstravi, altera, quae mediocre intervallum inter castra et flumen Nilum habebat. Maxima et electissima multitudo Alexandrinorum defendebat eam partem, quae facillimum aditum habebat; plurimum proficiebant in repellendis vulnerandisque nostris, qui regione fluminis Nili propugnabant: diversis enim telis nostri figebantur, adversi ex vallo castrorum, aversi ex flumine, in quo multae naves instructae funditoribus et sagittariis nostros impugnabant.

31. Caesar, observing that his troops fought with the utmost ardor, and yet made no great progress, on account of the disadvantage of the ground; and perceiving they had left the highest part of their camp unguarded, because, it being sufficiently fortified by nature, they had all crowded to the other attacks, partly to have a share in the action, partly to be spectators of the issue; he ordered some cohorts to wheel round the camp, and gain that ascent: appointing Carfulenus to command them, a man distinguished for bravery and acquaintance with the service. When they had reached the place, as there were but very few to defend it, our men attacked them so briskly that the Alexandrians, terrified by the cries they heard behind them, and seeing themselves attacked both in front and rear, fled in the utmost consternation on all sides. Our men, animated by the confusion of the enemy, entered the camp in several places at the same time, and

running down from the higher ground, put a great number of them to the sword. The Alexandrians, endeavoring to escape, threw themselves in crowds over the rampart in the quarter next the river. The foremost tumbling into the ditch, where they were crushed to death, furnished an easy passage for those that followed. It is ascertained that the king escaped from the camp, and was received on board a ship; but by the crowd that followed him, the ship in which he fled was overloaded and sunk.

Caesar cum videret milites acrius proeliari non posse nec tamen multum profici propter locorum difficultatem, cumque animum adverteret excelsissimum locum castrorum relictum esse ab Alexandrinis, quod et per se munitus esset et studio partim pugnandi partim spectandi decurrissent in eum locum in quo pugnabatur, cohortis illo circumire castra et summum locum aggredi iussit eisque Carfulenum praefecit, et animi magnitudine et rei militaris scientia virum praestantem. Quo ut ventum est, paucis defendentibus munitionem, nostris contra militibus acerrime pugnantibus, diverso clamore et proelio perterriti Alexandrini trepidantes in omnis partis castrorum discurrere coeperunt. Quorum perturbatione nostrorum animi adeo sunt incitati ut paene eodem tempore ex omnibus partibus, primi tamen editissimum castrorum locum caperent; ex quo decurrentes magnam multitudinem hostium in castris interfecerunt. Quod periculum plerique Alexandrini fugientes acervatim se de vallo praecipitarunt in eam partem quae flumini erat adiuncta. Horum primis in ipsa fossa munitionis magna ruina oppressis ceteri faciliorem fugam habuerunt. Constat fugisse ex castris regem ipsum receptumque in navem multitudine eorum qui ad proximas navis adnabant demerso navigio perisse.

32. After this speedy and successful action, Caesar, in consequence of so great a victory, marched the nearest way by land to Alexandria with his cavalry, and entered triumphant into that part of the town which was possessed by the enemy's guards. He was not mistaken in thinking that the Alexandrians, upon hearing of the issue of the battle, would give over all thoughts of war. Accordingly, as soon as he arrived, he reaped the just fruit of his valor and magnanimity. For all the multitude of the inhabitants, throwing down their arms, abandoning their works, and assuming the habit of suppliants, preceded by all those sacred symbols of religion with which they were wont to mollify their offended kings, met Caesar on his arrival and surrendered. Caesar, accepting their submission, and encouraging them, advanced through the enemy's works into his own quarter of the town, where he was received with the universal congratulations of his party, who were no less overjoyed at his arrival and presence, than at the happy issue of the war.

Re felicissime celerrimeque gesta Caesar magnae victoriae fiducia proximo terrestri itinere Alexandream cum equitibus contendit atque ea parte oppidi victor introiit quae praesidio hostium tenebatur. Neque eum consilium suum fefellit quin hostes eo proelio audito nihil iam de bello essent cogitaturi. Dignum adveniens fructum virtutis et animi magnitudinis tulit: omnis enim multitudo oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionibusque suis relictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis deprecari consuerunt, sacrisque omnibus prolatis quorum religione precari offensos iratosque animos regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt seque ei dediderunt. Caesar in fidem receptos consolatus per hostium munitiones in suam partem oppidi magna gratulatione venit suorum, qui non tantum bellum ipsum ac dimicationem sed etiam talem

adventum eius felicem fuisse laetabantur.

33. Caesar, having thus made himself master of Alexandria and Egypt, lodged the government in the hands of those to whom Ptolemy had bequeathed it by will, conjuring the Roman people not to permit any change. For the eldest of Ptolemy's two sons being dead, Caesar settled the kingdom upon the youngest, in conjunction with Cleopatra, the elder of the two sisters, who had always continued under his protection and guardianship. The younger, Arsinoe, in whose name Ganymed, as we have seen, tyrannically reigned for some time he thought proper to banish the kingdom, that she might not raise any new disturbance, through the agency of seditious men, before the king's authority should be firmly established. Taking the sixth veteran legion with him into Syria, he left the rest in Egypt to support the authority of the king and queen, neither of whom stood well in the affections of their subjects, on account of their attachment to Caesar, nor could be supposed to have given any fixed foundation to their power, in an administration of only a few days' continuance. It was also for the honor and interest of the republic that if they continued faithful our forces should protect them; but if ungrateful that they should be restrained by the same power. Having thus settled the kingdom, he marched by land into Syria.

Caesar Aegypto atque Alexandria potitus reges constituit quos Ptolomaeus testamento scripserat atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum ne mutarentur. Nam maiore ex duobus pueris, rege, amisso minori tradidit regnum maiorique ex duabus filiis, Cleopatrae, quae manserat in fide praesidiisque eius; minorem, Arsinoen, cuius nomine diu regnasse impotenter Ganymeden docuimus, deducere ex

regno statuit, ne qua rursus nova dissensio, prius quam diuturnitate confirmarentur regibus imperia, per homines seditiosos nasceretur. Legiones ibi veterana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit, quo firmitus esset eorum regum imperium, qui neque amorem suorum habere poterant, quod fideliter permanserant in Caesaris amicitia, neque vetustatis auctoritatem, paucis diebus reges constituti. Simul ad imperi nostri dignitatem utilitatemque publicam pertinere existimabat, si permanerent in fide reges, praesidiis eos nostris esse tutos; si essent ingrati, posse isdem praesidiis coerceri. Sic rebus omnibus confectis et collocatis ipse [itinere terrestri] profectus est in Syriam.

34. While these things passed in Egypt, king Deiotarus applied to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had intrusted the government of Asia and the neighboring provinces, beseeching him “not to suffer the Lesser Armenia which was his kingdom, or Cappadocia, which belonged to Ariobarzanes, to be seized and laid waste by Pharnaces, because, unless they were delivered from these insults, it would be impossible for them to execute Caesar’s orders, or raise the money they stood engaged to pay.” Domitius, who was not only sensible of the necessity of money to defray the expenses of the war, but likewise thought it dishonorable to the people of Rome and the victorious Caesar, as well as infamous to himself, to suffer the dominions of allies and friends to be usurped by a foreign prince, sent ambassadors to Pharnaces, to acquaint him, “That he must withdraw immediately from Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer insult the majesty and right of the Roman people, while engaged in a civil war.” But believing that his deputation would have greater weight, if he was ready to second it himself at the head of an army; he repaired to the legions which were then in Asia, ordering two of

them into Egypt, at Caesar's desire, and carrying the thirty-sixth: along with him. To the thirty-sixth legion Deiotarus added two more, which he had trained up for several years, according to our discipline; and a hundred horse. The like number of horse were furnished by Ariobarzanes. At the same time, he sent P. Sextius to C. Plaetorius the questor, for the legion which had been lately levied in Pontus; and Quinctius Partisius into Cilicia, to draw thence a body of auxiliary troops. All these forces speedily assembled at Comana, by orders of Domitius.

Dum haec in Aegypto geruntur, rex Deiotarus ad Domitium Calvinum, cui Caesar Asiam finitimasque provincias administrandas tradiderat, venit oratum ne Armeniam minorem, regnum suum, neve Cappadociam, regnum Ariobarzanis, possideri vastarique pateretur a Pharnace; quo malo nisi liberarentur, imperata se facere pecuniamque promissam Caesari non posse persolvere. Domitius, non tantum ad explicandos sumptus rei militaris cum pecuniam necessariam esse iudicaret, sed etiam turpe populo Romano et C. Caesari victori sibi infame esse statueret regna sociorum atque amicorum ab externo rege occupari, nuntios confestim ad Pharnacem misit, Armenia Cappadociaque decederet neve occupatione belli civilis populi Romani ius maiestatemque temptaret. Hanc denuntiationem cum maiorem vim habituram existimaret, si propius eas regiones cum exercitu accessisset, ad legiones profectus unam ex tribus, XXXVI, secum ducit, duas in Aegyptum ad Caesarem mittit litteris eius evocatas; quarum altera bello Alexandrino non occurrit, quod itinere terrestri per Syriam erat missa. Adiungit Cn. Domitius legioni XXXVI duas ab Deiotaro, quas ille disciplina atque armatura nostra compluris annos constitutas habebat, equitesque C, totidemque ab Ariobarzane sumit. Mittit P. Sestium ad C. Plaetorium

quaestorem, ut legionem adduceret quae ex tumultuariis militibus in Ponto confecta erat, Quintumque Patisium in Ciliciam ad auxilia arcessenda. Quae copiae celeriter omnes iussu Domiti Comana convenerunt.

35. Meanwhile his ambassadors bring back the following answer from Pharnaces: "That he had quitted Cappadocia; but kept possession of the Lesser Armenia, as his own, by right of inheritance: that he was willing, however, to submit every thing to the decision of Caesar, to whose commands he would pay immediate obedience." C. Domitius, sensible that he had quitted Cappadocia, not voluntarily, but out of necessity; because he could more easily defend Armenia, which lay contiguous to his own kingdom, than Cappadocia, which was more remote: and because believing, at first, that Domitius had brought all the three legions along with him, upon hearing that two were gone to Caesar, he seemed more determined to keep possession; and insisted "upon his quitting Armenia likewise, as the same right existed in both cases; nor was it just to demand that the matter should be postponed till Caesar's return, unless things were put in the condition in which they were at first." Having returned this answer, he advanced toward Armenia, with the forces above-mentioned, directing his march along the hills; for from Pontus, by way of Comana, runs a woody ridge of hills, that extends as far as Lesser Armenia, dividing it from Cappadocia. The advantages he had in view, by such a march, were, that he would thereby effectually prevent all surprises, and be plentifully supplied with provisions from Cappadocia.

Interim legati a Pharnace responsa referunt: Cappadocia se decessisse, Armeniam minorem recepisse, quam paterno nomine iure

obtinere deberet. Denique eius regni causa integra Caesari servaretur: paratum enim se facere quod is statuisset. Cn. Domitius cum animadverteret eum Cappadocia decessisse non voluntate adductum sed necessitate, quod facilius Armeniam defendere posset subiectam suo regno quam Cappadociam longius remotam, quodque omnis tris legiones adducturum Domitium putasset, ex quibus cum duas ad Caesarem missas audisset, audacius in Armenia substitisse, perseverare coepit, ut eo quoque regno decederet; neque enim aliud ius esse Cappadociae atque Armeniae, nec iuste eum postulare ut in Caesaris adventum res integra differretur; id enim esse integrum quod ita esset ut fuisset. His responsis datis cum eis copiis quas supra scripsi profectus est in Armeniam locisque superioribus iter facere instituit: nam ex Ponto a Comanis iugum editum silvestre est, pertinens in Armeniam minorem, quo Cappadocia finitur ab Armenia; cuius itineris has esse certas opportunitates [vidit], quod in locis superioribus nullus impetus repentinus accidere hostium poterat, et quod Cappadocia his iugis subiecta magnam commeatus copiam erat sumministratura.

36. Meantime Pharnaces sends several embassies to Domitius to treat of peace, bearing royal gifts. All these he firmly rejected, telling the deputies: "That nothing was more sacred with him, than the majesty of the Roman people, and recovering the rights of their allies." After long and continued marches, he reached Nicopolis (which is a city of Lesser Armenia, situated in a plain, having mountains, however, on its two sides, at a considerable distance), and encamped about seven miles from the town. Between his camp and Nicopolis, lay a difficult and narrow pass, where Pharnaces placed a chosen body of foot, and all his horse, in ambushade. He ordered a great number of cattle to be dispersed in the pass, and the townsmen and peasants to show

themselves, that if Domitius entered the defile as a friend, he might have no suspicion of an ambushade, when he saw the men and flocks dispersed, without apprehension, in the fields; or if he should come as an enemy, that the soldiers, quitting their ranks to pillage, might be cut to pieces when dispersed.

Compluris interim legationes Pharnaces ad Domitium mittit quae de pace agerent regiaque munera Domitio ferrent. Ea constanter omnia aspernabatur nec sibi quicquam fore antiquius quam dignitatem populi Romani et regna sociorum recipere legatis respondebat. Magnis et continuis itineribus confectis cum adventaret ad Nicopolim, quod oppidum positum in Armenia minore est plano ipso loco, montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis satis magno intervallo ab oppido remotis, castra posuit longe a Nicopoli circiter milia passuum VII. Quibus ex castris cum locus angustus atque impeditus esset transeundus, Pharnaces in insidiis delectos pedites omnisque paene disposuit equites, magnam autem multitudinem pecoris intra eas fauces dissipari iussit paganosque et oppidanos in his locis obversari, ut sive amicus Domitius eas angustias transiret, nihil de insidiis suspicaretur, cum in agris et pecora et homines animum adverteret versari tamquam amicorum adventu, sive inimicus ut in hostium finis veniret, praeda diripienda milites dissiparentur dispersique caederentur.

37. While this design was going forward, he never ceased sending ambassadors to Domitius, with proposals of peace and amity, fancying, by this means, the more easy to ensnare him. The expectation of peace kept Domitius in his camp; so that Pharnaces, having missed the opportunity, and fearing the ambushade might be discovered, drew off his troops. Next day Domitius approached

Nicopolis, and encamped near the town. While our men were working at the trenches, Pharnaces drew up his army in order of battle, forming his front into one line, according to the custom of the country, and securing his wings with a triple body of reserves. In the same manner, the center was formed in single files, and two intervals were left on the right and left. Domitius, ordering part of the troops to continue under arms before the rampart, completed the fortifications of his camp.

Haec cum administraret, numquam tamen intermittebat legatos de pace atque amicitia mittere ad Domitium, cum hoc ipso crederet facilius eum decipi posse. At contra spes pacis Domitio in isdem castris morandi attulit causam. Ita Pharnaces, amissa proximi temporis occasione cum vereretur ne cognoscerentur insidiae, suos in castra revocavit. Domitius postero die propius Nicopolim accessit castraque oppido contulit. Quae dum muniunt nostri, Pharnaces aciem instruxit suo more atque instituto. In fronte enim simplici directa acie cornua trinis firmabantur subsidiis; eadem ratione haec media collocabantur acie duobus dextra sinistraque intervallis simplicibus ordinibus instructis. Perfecit inceptum castrorum opus Domitius parte copiarum pro vallo constituta.

38. Next night, Pharnaces, having intercepted the couriers who brought Domitius an account of the posture of affairs at Alexandria, understood that Caesar was in great danger, and requested Domitius to send him succors speedily, and come himself to Alexandria by the way of Syria. Pharnaces, upon this intelligence, imagined that protracting the time would be equivalent to a victory, because Domitius, he supposed, must very soon depart. He therefore dug two ditches, four feet deep, at a moderate distance from each other, on

that side where lay the easiest access to the town and our forces might, most advantageously, attack him; resolving not to advance beyond them. Between these, he constantly drew up his army, placing all his cavalry upon the wings without them, which greatly exceeded ours in number, and would otherwise have been useless.

Proxima nocte Pharnaces interceptis tabellariis, qui de Alexandrinis rebus litteras ad Domitium ferebant, cognoscit Caesarem magno in periculo versari flagitareque ab Domitio ut quam primum Caesari subsidia mitteret propiusque ipse Alexandream per Syriam accederet. Qua cognita re Pharnaces victoriae loco ducebat, si trahere tempus posset, cum discedendum Domitio celeriter putaret. Itaque ab oppido, qua facillimum accessum et aequissimum ad dimicandum nostris videbat, fossas duas directas non ita magno medio intervallo relicto IIII pedum altitudinis in eum locum deduxit quo longius constituerat suam non producere aciem. Inter has fossas aciem semper instruebat, equitatum autem omnem ab lateribus extra fossam collocabat; qui neque aliter utilis esse poterat et multum numero anteibat nostrum equitatum.

39. Domitius, more concerned at Caesar's danger than his own, and believing he could not retire with safety, should he now desire the conditions he had rejected, or march away without any apparent cause, drew his forces out of the camp, and ranged them in order of battle. He placed the thirty-sixth legion on the right, that of Pontus on the left, and those of Deiotarus in the main body; drawing them up with a very narrow front, and posting the rest of the cohorts to sustain the wings. The armies being thus drawn up on each side, they advanced to the battle.

Domitius autem, cum Caesaris magis periculo quam suo

commoveretur neque se tuto discessurum arbitraretur, si condiciones quas reiecerat rursus appeteret aut sine causa discederet, ex propinquis castris in aciem exercitum eduxit; XXXVI legionem in dextro cornu collocavit, Ponticam in sinistro, Deiotari legiones in mediam aciem contulit, quibus tamen angustissimum intervallum frontis reliquit reliquis cohortibus in subsidiis collocatis. Sic utrimque acie instructa processum est ad dimicandum.

40. The signal being given at the same time by both parties, they engage. The conflict was sharp and various, for the thirty- sixth legion falling upon the king's cavalry, that was drawn up without the ditch, charged them so successfully, that they drove them to the very walls of the town, passed the ditch, and attacked their infantry in the rear. But on the other side, the legion of Pontus having given way, the second line, which advanced to sustain them, making a circuit round the ditch, in order to attack the enemy in flank, was overwhelmed and borne down by a shower of darts, in endeavoring to pass it. The legions of Deiotarus made scarcely any resistance; thus the victorious forces of the king turned their right wing and main body against the thirty-sixth legion, which yet made a brave stand; and though surrounded by the forces of the enemy, formed themselves into a circle, with wonderful presence of mind, and retired to the foot of a mountain, whither Pharnaces did not think fit to pursue them, on account of the disadvantage of the place. Thus the legion of Pontus being almost wholly cut off, with great part of those of Deiotarus, the thirty-sixth legion retreated to an eminence, with the loss of about two hundred and fifty men. Several Roman knights, of illustrious rank, fell in this battle. Domitius, after this defeat, rallied the remains of his broken army, and retreated, by safe ways, through Cappadocia, into Asia.

Signo sub idem tempus ab utroque dato concurritur: acriter varieque pugnatur. Nam XXXVI legio, cum extra fossam in equites regis impetum fecisset, adeo secundum proelium fecit ut moenibus oppidi succederet fossamque transiret aversosque hostis aggrediretur. At Pontica ex altera parte legio, cum paulum aversa hostibus cessisset, fossam autem circumire acies secundo conata esset, ut aperto latere aggrediretur hostem, in ipso transitu fossae confixa et oppressa est. Deiotari vero legiones vix impetum sustinuerunt. Ita victrices regiae copiae cornu suo dextro mediaque acie converterunt se ad XXXVI legionem. Quae tamen fortiter vincentium impetum sustinuit, magnis copiis hostium circumdata praesentissimo animo pugnans in orbem se recepit ad radices montium; quo Pharnaces insequi propter iniquitatem loci noluit. Ita Pontica legione paene tota amissa, magna parte Deiotari militum interfecta XXXVI legio in loca se superiora contulit non amplius CCL desideratis. Ceciderunt eo proelio splendidi atque inlustres viri non nulli, equites Romani. Quo tamen incommodo Domitius accepto reliquias exercitus dissipati collegit itineribusque tutis per Cappadociam se in Asiam recepit.

41. Pharnaces, elated with this success, as he expected that Caesar's difficulties would terminate as he [Pharnaces] wished, entered Pontus with all his forces. There, acting as conqueror and a most cruel king, and promising himself a happier destiny than his father, he stormed many towns, and seized the effects of the Roman and Pontic citizens, inflicted punishments, worse than death, upon such as were distinguished by their age or beauty, and having made himself master of all Pontus, as there was no one to oppose his progress, boasted that he had recovered his father's kingdom.

Pharnaces rebus secundis elatus, cum de Caesare ea quae optabat

speraret, Pontum omnibus copiis occupavit ibique et victor et crudelissimus rex, cum sibi fortunam paternam feliciore eventu destinaret, multa oppida expugnavit, bona civium Romanorum Ponticorumque diripuit, supplicia constituit in eos qui aliquam formae atque aetatis commendationem habebant ea quae morte essent miseriora, Pontumque nullo defendente paternum regnum glorians se recepisse obtinebat.

42. About the same time, we received a considerable check in Illyricum; which province, had been defended the preceding months, not only without insult, but even with honor. For Caesar's quaestor, Q. Cornificius, had been sent there as propraetor, the summer before, with two legions; and though it was of itself little able to support an army, and at that time in particular was almost totally ruined by the war in the vicinity, and the civil dissensions; yet, by his prudence, and vigilance, being very careful not to undertake any rash expedition, he defended and kept possession of it. For he made himself master of several forts, built on eminences, whose advantageous situation tempted the inhabitants to make descents and inroads upon the country; and gave the plunder of them to his soldiers (and although this was but inconsiderable, yet as they were no strangers to the distress and ill condition of the province, they did not cease to be grateful; the rather as it was the fruit of their own valor). And when, after the battle of Pharsalia, Octavius had retreated to that coast with a large fleet; Cornificius, with some vessels of the inhabitants of Jadia, who had always continued faithful to the commonwealth, made himself master of the greatest part of his ships, which, joined to those of his allies, rendered him capable of sustaining even a naval engagement. And while Caesar, victorious, was pursuing Pompey to the remotest parts of the earth; when he

[Cornificius] heard that the enemy had, for the most part, retired into Illyricum, on account of its neighborhood to Macedonia, and were there collecting such as survived the defeat [at Pharsalia], he wrote to Gabinius, "To repair directly thither, with the new raised legions, and join Cornificius, that if any danger should assail the province, he might ward it off, but if less forces sufficed, to march into Macedonia, which he foresaw would never be free from commotions, so long as Pompey lived."

Sub idem tempus in Illyrico est incommodum acceptum, quae provincia superioribus mensibus retenta non tantum sine ignominia sed etiam cum laude erat. Namque eo missus aestate cum duabus legionibus Q. Cornificius, Caesaris quaestor, pro praetore, quamquam erat provincia minime copiosa ad exercitus alendos et finitimo bello ac dissensionibus confecta et vastata, tamen prudentia ac diligentia sua. quod magnam curam suscipiebat ne quo temere progrediretur, et recepit et defendit. Namque et castella complura locis editis posita, quorum opportunitas castellanos impellebat ad decursiones faciendas et bellum inferendum, expugnavit eaque praeda milites donavit, quae etsi erat tenuis, tamen in tanta provinciae desperatione erat grata, praesertim virtute parta, et cum Octavius ex fuga Pharsalici proeli magna classe in illum se sinum contulisset, paucis navibus Iadertinorum, quorum semper in rem publicam singulare constiterat officium, dispersis Octavianis navibus erat potitus, ut vel classe dimicare posset adiunctis captivis navibus sociorum. Cum diversissima parte orbis terrarum Cn. Pompeium Caesar victor sequeretur complurisque adversarios in Illyricum propter Macedoniae propinquitatem se reliquiis ex fuga collectis contulisse audiret, litteras ad Gabinium mittit, uti cum legionibus tironum, quae nuper erant conscriptae, proficisceretur in Illyricum

coniunctisque copiis cum Q. Cornificio, si quod periculum provinciae inferretur, depelleret; sin ea non magnis copiis tuta esse posset, in Macedoniam legiones adduceret. Omnem enim illam partem regionemque vivo Cn. Pompeio bellum instauraturam esse credebat.

43. Gabinius, whether he imagined the province better provided than it really was, or depended much upon the auspicious fortune of Caesar, or confided in his own valor and abilities, he having often terminated with success difficult and dangerous wars, marched into Illyricum, in the middle of winter, and the most difficult season of the year; where, not finding sufficient subsistence in the province, which was partly exhausted, partly disaffected, and having no supplies by sea, because the season of the year had put a stop to navigation, he found himself compelled to carry on the war, not according to his own inclination, but as necessity allowed. As he was therefore obliged to lay siege to forts and castles, in a very rude season, he received many checks, and fell under such contempt with the barbarians, that while retiring to Salona, a maritime city, inhabited by a set of brave and faithful Romans, he was compelled to come to an engagement on his march; and after the loss of two thousand soldiers, thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes, got to Salona with the rest; where his wants continually increasing, he died a few days after. His misfortunes and sudden death gave Octavius great hopes of reducing the province. But fortune, whose influence is so great in matters of war, joined to the diligence of Cornificius, and the valor of Vatinius, soon put an end to his triumphs.

Gabinius ut in Illyricum venit hiberno tempore anni ac difficili sive copiosorem provinciam existimans sive multum fortunae victoris

Caesaris tribuens sive virtute et scientia sua confisus, qua saepe in bellis periclitatus magnas res et secundas ductu ausuque suo gesserat, neque provinciae facultatibus sublevabatur, quae partim erat exinanita partim infidelis, neque navibus intercluso mari tempestatibus commeatus supportari poterat; magnisque difficultatibus coactus non ut volebat sed ut necesse erat bellum gerebat. Ita cum durissimis tempestatibus propter inopiam castella aut oppida expugnare cogeretur, crebro incommoda accipiebat adeoque est a barbaris contemptus ut Salonam se recipiens in oppidum maritimum, quod cives Romani fortissimi fidelissimique incolebant, in agmine dimicare sit coactus. Quo proelio duobus milibus militum amplius amissis, centurionibus XXXVIII, tribunis IIII, cum reliquis copiis Salonam se recepit summaque ibi difficultate rerum omnium pressus paucis mensibus morbo periit. Cuius et infelicitas vivi et subita mors in magnam spem Octavium adduxit provinciae potiendae; quem tamen diutius in rebus secundis et fortuna, quae plurimum in bellis potest, diligentiaque Cornifici et virtus Vatini versari passa non est.

44. Vatinius, who was then at Brundisium, having intelligence of what passed in Illyricum, by letters from Cornificius, who pressed him to come to the assistance of the province, and informed him, that Octavius had leagued with the barbarians, and in several places attacked our garrisons, partly by sea with his fleet, partly by land with the troops of the barbarians; Vatinius, I say, upon notice of these things, though extremely weakened by sickness, insomuch that his strength of body no way answered his resolution and greatness of mind; yet, by his valor, surmounted all opposition, the force of his distemper, the rigor of the winter and the difficulties of a sudden preparation. For having himself but a very few galleys, he wrote to

Q. Kalenus, in Achaia, to furnish him with a squadron of ships. But these not coming with that dispatch which the danger our army was in required, because Octavius pressed hard upon them, he fastened beaks to all the barks and vessels that lay in the port, whose number was considerable enough, though they were not sufficiently large for an engagement. Joining these to what galleys he had, and putting on board the veteran soldiers, of whom he had a great number, belonging to all the legions, who had been left sick at Brundisium, when the army went over to Greece, he sailed for Illyricum; where, having subjected several maritime states that had declared for Octavius, and neglecting such as continued obstinate in their revolt, because he would suffer nothing to retard his design of meeting the enemy, he came up with Octavius before Epidaurus; and obliging him to raise the siege, which he was carrying on with vigor, by sea and land, joined the garrison to his own forces.

Vatinius Brundisi cum esset, cognitis rebus quae gestae erant in Illyrico, cum crebris litteris Cornifici ad auxilium provinciae ferendum evocaretur et M. Octavium audiret cum barbaris foedera percussisse compluribusque locis nostrorum militum oppugnare praesidia partim classe per se partim pedestribus copiis per barbaros, etsi gravi valetudine adfectus vix corporis viribus animum sequebatur, tamen virtute vicit incommodum naturae difficultatesque et hiemis et subitae praeparationis. Nam cum ipse paucas in portu navis longas haberet, litteras in Achaiam ad Q. Calenum misit, uti sibi classem mitteret. Quod cum tardius fieret quam periculum nostrorum flagitabat, qui sustinere impetum Octavi non poterant, navibus actuariis, quarum numerus erat satis magnus, magnitudo nequaquam satis iusta ad proeliandum, rostra imposuit. His adiunctis navibus longis et numero classis aucto militibus veteranis impositis,

quorum magnam copiam habebat ex omnibus legionibus, qui numero aegrorum relictis erant Brundisi, cum exercitus in Graeciam transportaretur, profectus est in Illyricum maritimasque non nullas civitates, quae defecerant Octavioque se tradiderant, partim recipiebat, partim remanentis in suo consilio praetervehebatur nec sibi ullius rei moram necessitatemque iniungebat quin quam celerrime posset ipsum Octavium persequeretur. Hunc oppugnantem Epidaurum terra marique, ubi nostrum erat praesidium, adventu suo discedere ab oppugnatione coegit praesidiumque nostrum recepit.

45. Octavius, understanding that Vatinius's fleet consisted mostly of small barks, and confiding in the strength of his own, stopped at the Isle of Tauris. Vatinius followed him thither, not imagining he would halt at that place, but being determined to pursue him wherever he went. Vatinius, who had no suspicion of an enemy, and whose ships were moreover dispersed by a tempest, perceived, as he approached the isle, a vessel filled with soldiers that advanced toward him, in full sail. Upon this he gave orders for furling the sails, lowering the sail-yards, and arming the soldiers; and hoisting a flag, as a signal for battle, intimated to the ships that followed to do the same. Vatinius's men prepared themselves in the best manner their sudden surprise would allow, while Octavius advanced in good order, from the port. The two fleets drew up; Octavius had the advantage in arrangement, and Vatinius in the bravery of his troops.

Octavius cum Vatinius classem magna ex parte confectam ex naviculis actuariis habere cognosset, confisus sua classe substitit ad insulam Tauridem; qua regione Vatinius insequens navigabat, non quo Octavium ibi restitisse sciret, sed quod eum longius progressum insequi decreverat. Cum propius Tauridem accessisset distensis suis

navibus, quod et tempestas erat turbulenta et nulla suspicio hostis, repente adversam ad se venientem navem antemnis ad medium malum demissis instructam propugnatoribus animum advertit. Quod ubi conspexit, celeriter vela subduci demittique antemnas iubet et milites armari et vexillo sublato, quo pugnandi dabat signum, quae primae naves subsequebantur idem ut facerent significabat. Parabant se Vatiniani repente oppressi; parati deinceps Octaviani ex portu procedebant. Instruitur utrimque acies, ordine disposita magis Octaviana, paratior militum animis Vatiniana.

46. Vatinius, finding himself inferior to the enemy, both in the number and largeness of his ships, resolved to commit the affair to fortune, and therefore in his own quinquereme, attacked Octavius in his four-banked galley. This he did with such violence, and the shock was so great, that the beak of Octavius's galley was broken. The battle raged with great fury likewise in other places, but chiefly around the two admirals; for as the ships on each side advanced to sustain those that fought, a close and furious conflict ensued in a very narrow sea, where the nearer the vessels approached the more had Vatinius's soldiers the advantage. For, with admirable courage, they leaped into the enemy's ships, and forcing them by this means to an equal combat, soon mastered them by their superior valor. Octavius's galley was sunk, and many others were taken or suffered the same fate; the soldiers were partly slain in the ships, partly thrown overboard into the sea. Octavius got into a boat, which sinking under the multitude that crowded after him, he himself, though wounded, swam to his brigantine; where, being taken up, and night having put an end to the battle, as the wind blew very strong, he spread all his sails and fled. A few of his ships, that had the good fortune to escape, followed him.

Vatinius cum animum adverteret neque navium se magnitudine neque numero parem esse fortuitae dimicationi, fortunae rem committere maluit. Itaque primus sua quinqueremi in quadriremem ipsius Octavi impetum fecit. Celerrime fortissimeque contra illo remigante naves adversae rostris concurrerunt adeo vehementer ut navis Octaviana rostro discusso ligno contineretur. Committitur acriter reliquis locis proelium concurreturque ad duces maxime: nam cum suo quisque auxilium ferret, magnum comminus in angusto mari proelium factum est. Quantoque coniunctis magis navibus confligendi potestas dabatur, tanto superiores erant Vatiniani; qui admiranda virtute ex suis navibus in hostium navis transilire non dubitabant et dimicatione aequata longe superiores virtute rem feliciter gerebant. Deprimitur ipsius Octavi quadriremis, multae praeterea capiuntur aut rostris pefforatae merguntur; propugnatores Octaviani partim in navibus iugulantur, partim in mare praecipitantur. Ipse Octavius se in scapham confert; in quam plures cum confugerent, depressa scapha vulneratus tamen adnatat ad suum myoparonem. Eo receptus, cum proelium nox dirimeret, tempestate magna velis profugit. Sequuntur hunc suae naves non nullae, quas casus ab illo periculo vindicarat.

47. But Vatinius, after his success, sounded a retreat, and entered victorious the port whence Octavius had sailed to fight him, without the loss of a single vessel. He took, in this battle, one quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-banked galleys, and a great number of rowers. The next day was employed in repairing his own fleet, and the ships he had taken from the enemy: after which, he sailed for the island of Issa, imagining Octavius had retired thither after his defeat. In this island was a flourishing city, well affected to Octavius, which however, surrendered to Vatinius, upon the first summons. Here he

understood that Octavius, attended by a few small barks, had sailed, with a fair wind, for Greece, whence he intended to pass on to Sicily, and afterward to Africa. Vatinius, having in so short a space successfully terminated the affair, restored the province, in a peaceable condition, to Cornificius, and driven the enemy's fleet out of those seas, returned victorious to Brundisium, with his army and fleet in good condition.

At Vatinius re bene gesta receptui cecinit suisque omnibus incolumibus in eum se portum victor recepit, quo ex portu classis Octavi ad dimicandum processerat. Capit ex eo pcelio penterem unam, triremis duas, dicrotas VIII complurisque remiges Octavianos posteroque ibi die, dum suas captivasque navis reficeret, consumpto post diem tertium contendit in insulam Issam, quod eo se recepisse ex fuga credebat Octavium. Erat in eum nobilissimum regionum earum oppidum coniunctissimumque Octavio. Quo ut venit, oppidani supplices se Vatinio dediderunt, comperitque ipsum Octavium parvis paucisque navigiis vento secundo regionem Graeciae petisse, inde ut Siciliam, deinde Africam caperet. Ita brevi spatio re praeclarissime gesta, provincia recepta et Cornificio reddita, classe adversariorum ex illo toto sinu expulsa victor se Brundisium incolumi exercitu et classe recepit.

48. But during the time that Caesar besieged Pompey at Dyrrachium, triumphed at Old Pharsalia, and carried on the war, with so much danger, at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had been left in Spain as propraetor of the further province, either through his natural disposition, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the province, on account of a wound he had treacherously received there when quaestor, drew upon himself the general dislike of the people. He

discerned this temper among them, partly from a consciousness that he deserved it, partly from the manifest indications they gave of their discontent. To secure himself against their disaffection, he endeavored to gain the love of the soldiers; and having, for this purpose, assembled them together, promised them a hundred sesterces each. Soon after, having made himself master of Medobriga, a town in Lusitania, and of Mount Herminius, whither the Medobrigians had retired, and being upon that occasion saluted imperator by the army, he gave them another hundred sesterces each. These, accompanied by other considerable largesses, in great number, seemed, for the present, to increase the good-will of the army, but tended gradually and imperceptibly to the relaxation of military discipline.

Eis autem temporibus quibus Caesar ad Dyrrachium Pompeium obsidebat et Palaepharsali rem feliciter gerebat Alexandriaeque cum periculo magno tum etiam maiore periculi fama dimicabat, Q. Cassius Longinus, in Hispania pro praetore provinciae ulterioris obtinendae causa relictus, sive consuetudine naturae suae sive odio quod in illam provinciam susceperat quaestor ex insidiis ibi vulneratus, magnas odi sui fecerat accessiones, quod vel ex conscientia sua, cum de se mutuo sentire provinciam crederet, vel multis signis et testimoniis eorum qui difficulter odia dissimulabant animum advertere poterat, et compensare offensionem provinciae exercitus amore cupiebat. Itaque, cum primum in unum locum exercitum conduxit, sestertios centenos militibus est pollicitus, nec multo post, cum in Lusitania Medobregam oppidum montemque Herminium expugnasset, quo Medobregenses confugerant, ibique imperator esset appellatus, sestertiis centenis milites donavit. Multa praeterea et magna praemia singulis concedebat; quae speciosum

reddebant praesentem exercitus amorem, paulatim tamen et occulte militarem disciplinam severitatemque minuebant.

49. Cassius, having sent his army into winter quarters, fixed his residence at Corduba, for the administration of justice. Being greatly in debt, he resolved to pay it by laying heavy burdens upon the province: and, according to the custom of prodigals, made his liberalities a pretense to justify the most exorbitant demands. He taxed the rich at discretion, and compelled them to pay, without the least regard to their remonstrances; frequently making light and trifling offenses the handle for all manner of extortions. All methods of gain were pursued, whether great and reputable, or mean and sordid. None that had any thing to lose could escape accusation; insomuch, that the plunder of their private fortunes was aggravated by the dangers they were exposed to from pretended crimes.

Cassius legionibus in hiberna dispositis ad ius dicendum Cordubam se recepit contractumque in ea aes alienum gravissimis oneribus provinciae constituit exsolvere; et ut largitionis postulat consuetudo, per causam liberalitatis speciosam plura largitori quaerebantur. Pecuniae locupletibus imperabantur, quas Longinus sibi expensas ferri non tantum patiebatur sed etiam cogebat, in gregem locupletium simultatium causa tenues coiciebantur, neque ullum genus quaestus aut magni et evidentis aut minimi et sordidi praetermittebatur quo domus et tribunal imperatoris vacaret. Nemo erat, qui modo aliquam iacturam facere posset, quin aut vadimonio teneretur aut in reos referretur. Ita magna etiam sollicitudo periculorum ad iacturas et detrimenta rei familiaris adiungebatur.

50. For which reasons it happened that when Longinus as proconsul did those same things which he had done as quaestor, the provincials

formed similar conspiracies against his life. Even his own dependents concurred in the general hatred; who, though the ministers of his rapine, yet hated the man by whose authority they committed those crimes. The odium still increased upon his raising a fifth legion, which added to the expense and burdens of the province. The cavalry was augmented to three thousand, with costly ornaments and equipage: nor was any respite given to the province.

Quibus de causis accidit ut, cum Longinus imperator eadem faceret quae fecerat quaestor, similia rursus de morte eius provinciales consilia inirent. Horum odium confirmabant non nulli familiares eius qui, cum in illa societate versarentur rapinarum, nihilo minus oderant eum cuius nomine peccabant, sibi quod rapuerant acceptum referebant, quod interciderat aut erat interpellatum Cassio assignabant. Quintam legionem novam conscribit. Augetur odium et ex ipso dilectu et sumptu additae legionis. Complentur equitum III milia maximisque ornantur impensis: nec provinciae datur ulla requies.

51. Meanwhile he received orders from Caesar, to transport his army into Africa and march through Mauritania, toward Numidia, because king Juba had sent considerable succors to Pompey, and was thought likely to send more. These letters filled him with an insolent joy, by the opportunity they offered him of pillaging new provinces, and a wealthy kingdom. He therefore hastened into Lusitania, to assemble his legions, and draw together a body of auxiliaries; appointing certain persons to provide corn, ships, and money, that nothing might retard him at his return; which was much sooner than expected: for when interest called, Cassius wanted neither industry nor vigilance.

Interim litteras accepit a Caesare, ut in Africam exercitum traiceret

perque Mauretaniam ad finis Numidia perveniret, quod magna Cn. Pompeio Iuba miserat auxilia maioraque missurus existimabatur. Quibus litteris acceptis insolenti voluptate efferebatur, quod sibi novarum provinciarum et fertilissimi regni tanta oblata esset facultas. Itaque ipse in Lusitaniam proficiscitur ad legiones arcessendas auxiliaque adducenda; certis hominibus dat negotium ut frumentum navesque C praepararentur pecuniaeque describerentur atque imperarentur, ne qua res cum redisset moraretur. Reditus eius fuit celerior omnium opinione: non enim labor aut vigilantia cupienti praesertim aliquid Cassio deerat.

52. Having got his army together, and encamped near Corduba, he made a speech to the soldiers, wherein he acquainted them with the orders he had received from Caesar and promised them a hundred sesterces each, when they should arrive in Mauritania: the fifth legion, he told them, was to remain in Spain. Having ended his speech, he returned to Corduba. The same day, about noon, as he went to the hall of justice, one Minutius Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented him with a paper, in a soldier's habit, as if he had some request to make. Then retiring behind Racilius (who walked beside Cassius), as if waiting for an answer, he gradually drew near, and a favorable opportunity offering, seized Cassius with his left hand, and wounded him twice with a dagger in his right. A shout was then raised and an attack made on him by the rest of the conspirators, who all rushed upon him in a body. Munatius Plancus killed the lictor, that was next Longinus; and wounded Q. Cassius his lieutenant. T. Vasius and L. Mergilio seconded their countryman Plancus; for they were all natives of Italica. L. Licinius Squillus flew upon Longinus himself, and gave him several slight wounds as he lay upon the ground.

Exercitu coacto in unum locum castris ad Cordubam positis pro contione militibus exponit quas res Caesaris iussu gerere deberet, polliceturque eis, cum in Mauretaniam traiecisset, sestertios [centenos] se daturum; quintam fore in Hispania legionem. Ex contione se Cordubam recepit eoque ipso die tempore postmeridiano, cum in basilicam iret, quidam Minucius Silo cliens L. Racili libellum, quasi aliquid ab eo postulare, ut miles ei tradit, deinde post Racilium — nam is latus Cassi tegebat — , quasi responsum peteret, celeriter dato loco cum se insinuasset, sinistra corripit aversum dextraque bis ferit pugione. Clamore sublato fit a coniuratis impetus universis. Munatius Flaccus proximum gladio traicit lictorem; hoc interfecto Q. Cassium legatum vulnerat. Ibi T. Vasius et L. Mercello simili confidentia Flaccum, municipem suum, adiuvant: erant enim omnes Italicenses. Ad ipsum Longinum L. Licinius Squillus involat iacentemque levibus sauciat plagis.

53. By this time, his guards came up to his assistance (for he always had several beronians and veterans, armed with darts, to attend him), and surrounded the rest of the conspirators, who were advancing to complete the assassination. Of this number were Calphurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tuscus. Cassius was carried home; and Minutius Silo, stumbling upon a stone, as he endeavored to make his escape, was taken, and brought to him. Racilius retired to the neighboring house of a friend, till he should have certain information of the fate of Cassius. L. Laterensis, not doubting but he was dispatched, ran in a transport of joy to the camp, to congratulate the second and the new-raised legions upon it, who, he knew, bore a particular hatred to Cassius; and who, immediately upon this intelligence, placed him on the tribunal, and proclaimed him praetor. For there was not a native of the province, nor a soldier of the newly-

raised legion, nor a person who by long residence was naturalized in the province, of which class the second legion consisted, who did not join in the general hatred of Cassius.

Concurritur ad Cassium defendendum: semper enim Berones complurisque evocatos cum telis secum habere consueverat. A quibus ceteri intercluduntur qui ad caedem faciendam subsequerentur; quo in numero fuit Calpurnius Salvianus et Manilius Tuscus. Minucius inter saxa quae iacebant in itinere fugiens opprimitur et relato domum Cassio ad eum deducitur. Racilius in proximam se domum familiaris sui confert, dum certum cognosceret confectusne Cassius esset. L. Laterensis, cum id non dubitaret, accurrit laetus in castra militibusque vernaculis et secundae legionis, quibus odio sciebat praecipue Cassium esse, gratulatur; tollitur a multitudine in tribunal, praetor appellatur. Nemo enim aut in provincia natus, ut vernaculae legionis milites, aut diuturnitate iam factus provincialis, quo in numero erat secunda legio, non cum omni provincia consenserat in odio Cassi: nam legionem XXX et XXI paucis mensibus in Italia scriptas Caesar attribuerat Longino, quinta legio nuper ibi erat confecta.

54. Meantime Laterensis was informed that Cassius was still alive; at which, being rather grieved than disconcerted, he immediately so far recovered himself, as to go and wait upon him. By this time, the thirtieth legion having notice of what had passed, had marched to Corduba, to the assistance of their general. The twenty-first and fifth followed their example. As only two legions remained in the camp, the second, fearing they should be left alone, and their sentiments should be consequently manifested, did the same. But the new-raised legion continued firm, nor could be induced by any motives of fear to

stir from its place.

Interim nuntiatur Laterensi vivere Cassium. Quo nuntio dolore magis permotus quam animo perturbatus reficit se celeriter et ad Cassium visendum proficiscitur. Re cognita XXX legio signa Cordubam infert ad auxilium ferendum imperatori suo. Facit hoc idem XXI. Subsequitur has V. Cum duae legiones reliquae essent in castris, secundani, veriti ne soli relinquerentur atque ex eo quid sensissent iudicaretur, secuti sunt factum superiorum. Permansit in sententia legio vernacula nec ullo timore de gradu deiecta est.

55. Cassius ordered all the accomplices of the conspiracy to be seized, and sent back the fifth legion to the camp, retaining the other three. By the confession of Minutius, he learned, that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and Annius Scapula, man of great authority and credit in the province, and equally in his confidence with Laterensis and Racilius, were concerned in the plot: nor did he long defer his revenge, but ordered them to be put to death. He delivered Minutius to be racked by his freed-men; likewise Calphurnius Salvianus; who, turning evidence, increased the number of the conspirators; justly, as some think; but others pretend that he was forced. L. Mergilio was likewise put to the torture. Squillus impeached many others, who were all condemned to die, except such as redeemed their lives by a fine; for he pardoned Calphurnius for ten, and Q. Sextius for fifty thousand sesterces, who, though deeply guilty, yet having, in this manner, escaped death, showed Cassius to be no less covetous than cruel.

Cassius eos qui nominati erant conscii caedis iubet comprehendi; legiones V in castra remittit cohortibus XXX retentis. Indicio Minuci cognoscit L. Racilium et L. Laterensem et Annium Scapulam,

maximae dignitatis et gratiae provincialem hominem sibi tam familiarem quam Laterensem et Racilium, in eadem fuisse coniuratione, nec diu moratur dolorem suum quin eos interfici iubeat. Minucium libertis tradit excruciantum, item Calpurnium Salvianum, qui profitetur indicium coniuratorumque numerum auget, vere, ut quidam existimant, ut non nulli queruntur, coactus. Isdem cruciatibus adfectus L. Mercello... Squillus nominat pluris; quos Cassius interfici iubet exceptis eis qui se pecunia redemerunt. Nam palam HS LX cum Calpurnio paciscitur et cum Q. Sestio L. Qui si maxime nocentes sunt multati, tamen periculum vitae dolorque vulnerum pecuniae remissus crudelitatem cum avaritia certasse significabat.

56. Some days after, he received letters from Caesar, by which he learned that Pompey was defeated, and had fled with the loss of all his troops, which news equally affected him with joy and sorrow. Caesar's success gave him pleasure; but the conclusion of the war would put an end to his rapines: insomuch, that he was uncertain which to wish for, victory or an unbounded licentiousness. When he was cured of his wounds, he sent to all who were indebted to him, in any sums, and insisted upon immediate payment. Such as were taxed too low, had orders to furnish larger sums. He likewise instituted a levy of Roman citizens, and as they were enrolled from all the corporations and colonies, and were terrified by service beyond the sea, he called upon them to redeem themselves from the military oath. This brought in vast revenue, but greatly increased the general hatred. He afterward reviewed the army, sent the legions and auxiliaries, designed for Africa, toward the straits of Gibraltar, and went himself to Seville, to examine the condition of the fleet. He staid there some time, in consequence of an edict he had published, ordering all who had not paid the sums in which they were amerced,

to repair to him thither; which created a universal murmuring and discontent.

Aliquot post diebus litteras a Caesare missas accipit, quibus cognoscit Pompeium in acie victum amissis copiis fugisse. Qua re cognita mixtam dolore voluptatem capiebat: victoriae nuntius laetitiam exprimebat, confectum bellum licentiam temporum intercludebat. Sic erat dubius animus utrum nihil timere an omnia licere mallet. Sanatis vulneribus arcessit omnis qui sibi pecunias expensas tulerant, acceptasque eas iubet referri; quibus parum videbatur imposuisse oneris, ampliorem pecunam imperat. Equitum autem Romanorum dilectum instituit; quos ex omnibus conventibus coloniisque conscriptos transmarina militia perterritos ad sacramenti redemptionem vocabat. Magnum hoc fuit vectigal, maius tamen creabat odium. His rebus confectis totum exercitum lustrat; legiones quas in Africam ducturus erat et auxilia mittit ad traiectum. Ipse classem quam parabat ut inspiceret, Hispalim accedit ibique moratur, propterea quod edictum tota provincia proposuerat, quibus pecunias imperasset neque contulissent, se adirent. Quae evocatio vehementer omnis turbavit.

57. In the mean time, L. Titius, a military tribune of the native legion, sent him notice of a report that the thirteenth legion, which Q. Cassius his lieutenant was taking with him, when it was encamped at Ilurgis, had mutinied and killed some of the centurions that opposed them, and were gone over to the second legion, who marched another way toward the Straits. Upon this intelligence he set out by night with five cohorts of the twenty-first legion, and came up with them in the morning. He staid there that day to consult what was proper to be done, and then went to Carmona, where he found the thirtieth and

twenty-first legions, with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the cavalry assembled. Here he learned that the new-raised legion had surprised four cohorts, near Obucula, and forced them along with them to the second legion, where all joining, they had chosen T. Thorius, a native of Italica, for their general. Having instantly called a council, he sent Marcellus to Corduba to secure that town, and Q. Cassius, his lieutenant, to Seville. A few days after, news was brought that the Roman citizens at Corduba had revolted, and that Marcellus, either voluntarily or through force (for the reports were various), had joined them; as likewise the two cohorts of the fifth legion that were in garrison there. Cassius, provoked at these mutinies, decamped, and the next day came to Segovia, upon the river Xenil. There, summoning an assembly, to sound the disposition of the troops, he found that it was not out of any regard to him, but to Caesar, though absent, that they continued faithful, and were ready to undergo any danger for the recovery of the province.

Interim L. Titius, qui eo tempore tribunus militum in legione vernacula fuerat, nuntiat eam a legione XXX, quam Q. Cassius legatus simul ducebat, cum ad oppidum Ilipam castra haberet, seditione facta centurionibus aliquot occisis qui signa tolli non patiebantur, discessisse et ad secundam legionem contendisse, quae ad fretum alio itinere ducebatur. Cognita re noctu cum V cohortibus unetvicesimanorum egreditur, mane pervenit noctu. Ibi eum diem, ut quid ageretur perspiceret, moratus Carmonem contendit. Hic, cum legio XXX et XXI et cohortes IIII ex V legione totusque convenisset equitatus, audit IIII cohortis a vernaculis oppressas ad Obuculam cum his ad secundam pervenisse legionem omnisque ibi se coniunxisse et T. Thorium Italicensem ducem delegisse. Celeriter habito consilio M. Marcellum quaestorem Cordubam, ut eam in

potesate retineret, Q. Cassium legatum Hispalim mittit. Paucis ei diebus affertur conventum Cordubensem ab eo defecisse Marcellumque aut voluntate aut necessitate adductum — namque id varie nuntiabatur — consentire cum Cordubensibus; duas cohortis legionis V, quae fuerant Cordubae in praesidio, idem facere. Cassius his rebus incensus movet castra et postero die Segoviam ad flumen Singiliense venit. Ibi habita contione militum temptat animos; quos cognoscit non sua sed Caesaris absentis causa sibi fidissimos esse nullumque periculum deprecaturus, dum per eos Caesari provincia restitueretur.

58. Meantime Thorius marched the veteran legions to Corduba; and, that the revolt might not appear to spring from a seditious inclination in him or the soldiers, as likewise to oppose an equal authority to that of Q. Cassius, who was drawing together a great force in Caesar's name; he publicly gave out that his design was to recover the province for Pompey; and perhaps he did this through hatred of Caesar, and love of Pompey, whose name was very powerful among those legions which M. Varro had commanded. Be this as it will, Thorius at least made it his pretense; and the soldiers were so infatuated with the thought, that they had Pompey's name inscribed upon their bucklers. The citizens of Corduba, men, women, and children, came out to meet the legions, begging "they would not enter Corduba as enemies, seeing they joined with them in their aversion to Cassius, and only desired they might not be obliged to act against Caesar."

Interim Thorius ad Cordubam veteres legiones adducit ac, ne dissensionis initium natum seditiosa militum suaque natura videretur, simul ut contra Q. Cassium, qui Caesaris nomine maioribus viribus

uti videbatur, aequè potentem opponeret dignitatem, Cn. Pompeio se provinciam recipere velle palam dictitabat. Et forsitan etiam hoc fecerit odio Caesaris et amore Pompei, cuius nomen multum poterat apud eas legiones quas M. Varro obtinuerat. Sed id qua mente, communis erat coniectura: certe hoc prae se Thorius ferebat; milites adeo fatebantur, ut Cn. Pompei nomen in scutis inscriptum haberent. Frequens legionibus conventus obviam prodit, neque tantum virorum sed etiam matrum familias ac praetextatorum, deprecaturque ne hostili adventu Cordubam diriperent: nam se contra Cassium consentire cum omnibus; contra Caesarem ne facere cogentur orare.

59. The soldiers, moved by the prayers and tears of so great a multitude, and seeing they stood in no need of Pompey's name and memory to spirit up a revolt against Cassius, and that he was as much hated by Caesar's followers as Pompey's; neither being able to prevail with Marcellus or the people of Corduba to declare against Caesar, they erased Pompey's name from their bucklers, chose Marcellus their commander, called him praetor, joined the citizens of Corduba, and encamped near the town. Two days after, Cassius encamped on an eminence, on this side the Guadalquivir, about four miles from Corduba, and within view of the town; whence he sent letters to Bogud, in Mauritania, and M. Lepidus, proconsul of Hither Spain, to come to his assistance as soon as possible, for Caesar's sake. Meanwhile he ravaged the country, and set fire to the buildings around Corduba.

Tantae multitudinis precibus et lacrimis exercitus commotus cum videret ad Cassium persequendum nihil opus esse Cn. Pompei nomine et memoria tamque omnibus Caesarianis quam Pompeianis

Longinum esse in odio neque se conventum neque M. Marcellum contra Caesaris causam posse perducere, nomen Pompei ex scutis detraxerunt, Marcellum, qui se Caesaris causam defensurum profitebatur, ducem asciverunt praetoremque appellarunt et conventum sibi adiunxerunt castraque ad Cordubam posuerunt. Cassius eo biduo circiter IIII milia passuum a Corduba citra flumen Baetim in oppidi conspectu loco excelso facit castra; litteras ad regem Bogudem in Mauretanium et [ad] M. Lepidum proconsulem in Hispaniam citeriorem mittit, subsidio sibi provinciaeque Caesaris causa quam primum veniret. Ipse hostili modo Cordubensium agros vastat, aedificia incendit.

60. The legions under Marcellus, provoked at this indignity, ran to him, and begged to be led against the enemy, that they might have an opportunity of engaging with them before they could have time to destroy with fire and sword the rich and noble possessions of the inhabitants of Corduba. Marcellus, though averse to a battle, which, whoever was victorious, must turn to Caesar's detriment, yet unable to restrain the legions, led them across the Guadalquivir, and drew them up. Cassius did the same upon a rising ground, but as he would not quit his advantageous post, Marcellus persuaded his men to return to their camp. He had already begun to retire when Cassius, knowing himself to be stronger in cavalry, fell upon the legionaries with his horse, and made a considerable slaughter in their rear upon the banks of the river. When it was evident from this loss, that crossing the river was an error and attended with great loss, Marcellus removed his camp to the other side of the Guadalquivir, where both armies frequently drew up, but did not engage, on account of the inequality of the ground.

Cuius rei deformitate atque indignitate legiones quae Marcellum sibi ducem ceperant ad eum concurrerunt, ut in aciem educerentur orant, priusque configendi sibi potestas fieret quam cum tanta contumelia nobilissimae carissimaeque possessiones Cordubensium in conspectu suo rapinis, ferro flammaque consumerentur. Marcellus cum configere miserrimum putaret, quod et victoris et victi detrimentum ad eundem Caesarem esset redundaturum neque suae potestatis esset, legiones Baetim traducit aciemque instruit. Cum Cassium contra pro suis castris aciem instruxisse loco superiore videret, causa interposita, quod is in aequum non descenderet, Marcellus militibus persuadet ut se recipiant in castra. Itaque copias reducere coepit. Cassius, quo bono valebat Marcellumque infirmum esse sciebat, aggressus equitatu legionarios se recipientis compluris novissimos in fluminis ripis interfecit. Cum hoc detrimento quid transitus fluminis viti difficultatisque haberet cognitum esset, Marcellus castra Baetim transfert, crebroque uterque legiones in aciem educit; neque tamen configitur propter locorum difficultates.

61. Marcellus was stronger in foot, for he commanded veteran soldiers of great experience in war. Cassius depended more on the fidelity than the courage of his troops. The two camps being very near each other, Marcellus seized a spot of ground, where he built a fort, very convenient for depriving the enemy of water. Longinus, apprehending he should be besieged in a country where all were against him, quitted his camp silently in the night, and, by a quick march, reached Ulia, a town on which he thought he could rely. There he encamped so near the walls, that both by the situation of the place (for Ulia stands on an eminence), and the defenses of the town, he was on all sides secure from an attack. Marcellus followed him and encamped as near the town as possible. Having taken a view of

the place he found himself reduced, by necessity, to do what was most agreeable to his own inclination; namely, neither to engage Cassius, which the ardor of his soldiers would have forced him to, had it been possible, nor to suffer him, by his excursions, to infest the territories of other states, as he had done those of Corduba. He therefore raised redoubts in proper places, and continued his works quite round the town, inclosing both Uliam and Cassius within his lines. But before they were finished, Cassius sent out all his cavalry, who he imagined might do him great service by cutting off Marcellus's provisions and forage, and could only be a useless encumbrance to him, by consuming his provisions if he was shut up in his camp.

Erat copiis pedestribus multo firmior Marcellus; habebat enim veteranas nultisque proeliis expertas legiones. Cassius fidei magis quam virtuti legionum confidebat. Itaque, cum castra castris collata essent et Marcellus locum idoneum castello cepisset quo prohibere aqua Cassianos posset, Longinus, veritus ne genere quodam obsidionis clauderetur in regionibus alienis sibi infestis, noctu silentio ex castris proficiscitur celerique itinere Uliam contendit, quod sibi fidele esse oppidum credebat. Ibi adeo coniuncta ponit moenibus castra ut et loci natura — namque Uliam in edito monte posita est — et ipsa munitione urbis undique ab oppugnatione tutus esset. Hunc Marcellus insequitur et quam proxime potest Uliam castra castris confert locorumque cognita natura, quo maxime rem deducere volebat, necessitate est deductus ut neque configeret — cuius si rei facultas esset, resistere incitatis militibus non poterat — neque vagari Cassium latius pateretur, ne plures civitates ea paterentur quae passi erant Cordubenses. Castellis idoneis locis collocatis operibusque in circuitu oppidi continuatis Uliam

Cassiumque munitionibus clausit. Quae prius quam perficerentur, Longinus omnem suum equitatum emisit; quem magno sibi usu fore credebat, si pabulari frumentarique Marcellum non pateretur, magno autem fore impedimento, si clausus obsidione et inutilis necessarium consumeret frumentum.

62. A few days after, king Bogud, having received Cassius's letters, came and joined him with all his forces, consisting of one legion, and several auxiliary cohorts. For as commonly happens in civil dissensions, some of the states of Spain at that time favored Cassius, but a yet greater number, Marcellus. Bogud came up to the advanced works of Marcellus, where many sharp skirmishes happened with various success: however, Marcellus still kept possession of his works.

Paucis diebus Q. Cassi litteris acceptis rex Bogus cum copiis venit adiungitque ei legioni quam secum adduxerat compluris cohortis auxilias Hispanorum. Namque ut in civilibus dissensionibus accidere consuevit, ita temporibus illis in Hispania non nullae civitates rebus Cassi studebant, plures Marcellum fovebant. Accedit cum copiis Bogus ad exteriores Marcelli munitiones. Pugnatur utrimque acriter, crebroque id accidit fortuna saepe ad utrumque victoriam transferente; nec tamen umquam ab operibus depellitur Marcellus.

63. Meanwhile Lepidus came to Ulia, from the hither province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, and a great body of horse and auxiliaries, with the intention of adjusting the differences between Cassius and Marcellus. Marcellus submitted without hesitation: but Cassius kept within his works, either because he thought his cause the justest, or from an apprehension that his adversary's submission

had prepossessed Lepidus in his favor. Lepidus encamped at Uliā, and forming a complete junction with Marcellus, prevented a battle, invited Cassius into his camp, and pledged his honor to act without prejudice. Cassius hesitated long, but at last desired that the circumvallation should be leveled, and free egress given him. The truce was not only concluded, but the works demolished, and the guards drawn off; when king Bogud attacked one of Marcellus's forts, that lay nearest to his camp, unknown to any (except perhaps Longinus, who was not exempt from suspicion on this occasion), and slew a great number of his men. And had not Lepidus interposed, much mischief would have been done.

Interim Lepidus ex citiore provincia cum cohortibus legionariis XXXV magnoque numero equitum et reliquorum auxiliorum venit ea mente Uliam, ut sine ullo studio contentiones Cassi Marcellique componeret. Huic venienti sine dubitatione Marcellus se credit atque offert; Cassius contra suis se tenet praesidiis, sive eo quod plus sibi iuris deberi quam Marcello existimabat, sive eo quod ne praeoccupatus animus Lepidi esset obsequio adversarii verebatur. Ponit ad Uliam castra Lepidus neque habet a Marcello quicquam divisi. Ne pugnetur interdicat; ad exeundum Cassium invitat fidemque suam in re omni interponit. Cum diu dubitasset Cassius quid sibi faciendum quidve Lepido esset credendum, neque ullum exitum consilii sui reperiret si permaneret in sententia, postulat uti munitiones disicerentur sibi que liber exitus daretur. Non tantum indutiis factis sed prope iam [pace] constituta opera [cum] complanarent custodiaeque munitionum essent deductae, auxilia regis in id castellum Marcelli quod proximum erat regis castris, neque opinantibus omnibus — si tamen in omnibus fuit Cassius: nam de huius conscientia dubitabatur — , impetum fecerunt complurisque

ibi milites oppresserunt. Quod nisi celeriter indignatione et auxilio Lepidi proelium esset diremptum, maior calamitas esset accepta.

64. A free passage being made for Cassius, Marcellus joined camps with Lepidus; and both together marched for Corduba, while Cassius retired with his followers to Carmona. At the same time, Trebonius, the proconsul, came to take possession of the province. Cassius having notice of his arrival, sent his legions and cavalry into winter quarters, and hastened, with all his effects, to Melaca, where he embarked immediately, though it was the winter season, that he might not, as he pretended, intrust his safety to Marcellus, Lepidus, and Trebonius; as his friends gave out, to avoid passing through a province, great part of which had revolted from him; but as was more generally believed, to secure the money he had amassed by his numberless extortions. The wind favoring him as far as could be expected at that season of the year, he put into the Ebro, to avoid sailing in the night: and thence continuing his voyage, which he thought he might do with safety, though the wind blew considerably fresher, he was encountered by such a storm, at the mouth of the river, that being neither able to return on account of the stream, nor stem the fury of the waves, the ship sank, and he perished.

Cum iter Cassio patefactum esset, castra Marcellus cum Lepido coniungit. Lepidus eodem tempore Marcellusque Cordubam cum suis, Cassius proficiscitur Carmonem. Sub idem tempus Trebonius proconsul ad provinciam obtinendam venit. De cuius adventu ut cognovit Cassius, legiones quas secum habuerat equitatumque in hiberna distribuit; ipse omnibus suis rebus celeriter correptis Malacam contendit ibique adverso tempore navigandi navis conscendit, ut ipse praedicabat, ne se Lepido et Trebonio et Marcello

committeret, ut amici eius dictitabant, ne per eam provinciam minore cum dignitate iter faceret cuius magna pars ab eo defecerat, ut ceteri existimabant, ne pecunia illa ex infinitis rapinis confecta in potestatem cuiusquam veniret. Progressus secunda ut hiberna tempestate cum in Hiberum flumen noctis vitandae causa se contulisset, inde paulo vehementiore tempestate, nihilo periculosius se navigaturum credens, profectus, adversis fluctibus occurrentibus ostio fluminis, in ipsis faucibus, cum neque flectere navem propter vim fluminis neque directam tantis fluctibus tenere posset, demersa nave periit.

65. When Caesar arrived in Syria, from Egypt, and understood from those who attended him there from Rome, and the letters he received at the same time, that the government at Rome was badly and injudiciously conducted, and all the affairs of the commonwealth managed indiscreetly; that the contests of the tribunes were producing perpetual seditions, and that, by the ambition and indulgence of the military tribunes, many things were done contrary to military usage, which tend to destroy all order and discipline, all which required his speedy presence to redress them; thought it was yet first incumbent upon him to settle the state of the provinces through which he passed; that, freeing them from domestic contentions, and the fear of a foreign enemy, they might become amenable to law and order. This he hoped soon to effect in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia, because these provinces were not involved in war. In Bithynia and Pontus indeed he expected more trouble, because he understood Pharnaces still continued in the latter, and was not likely to quit it easily, being flushed with the victory he had obtained over Domitius Calvinus. He made a short stay in most states of note, distributing rewards both publicly and privately to such as deserved

them, settling old controversies, and receiving into his protection the kings, princes, and potentates, as well of the provinces as of the neighboring countries. And having settled the necessary regulations for the defense and protection of the country, he dismissed them, with most friendly feelings to himself and the republic.

Cum in Syriam Caesar ex Aegypto venisset atque ab eis qui Roma venerant ad eum cognosceret litterisque urbanis animadverteret multa Romae male et inutiliter administrari neque ullam partem rei publicae satis commode geri, quod et contentionibus tribuniciis perniciosae seditiones orirentur et ambitione atque indulgentia tribunorum militum et qui legionibus praeerant multa contra morem consuetudinemque militarem fierent, quae dissolvendae disciplinae severitatisque essent, eaque omnia flagitare adventum suum videret, tamen praeferendum existimabat, quas in provincias regionesque venisset, eas ita relinquere constitutas ut domesticis dissensionibus liberarentur, iura legesque acciperent, externorum hostium metum deponerent. Haec in Syria, Cilicia, Asia celeriter se confecturum sperabat, quod hae provinciae nullo bello premebantur; in Bithynia ac Ponto plus oneris videbat sibi impendere. Non excessisse enim Ponto Pharnacen audiebat neque excessurum putabat, cum secundo proelio vehementer esset inflatus quod contra Domitium Calvinum fecerat. Commoratus fere in omnibus civitatibus quae maiore sunt dignitate, praemia bene meritis et viritim et publice tribuit, de controversiis veteribus cognoscit ac statuit; reges, tyrannos, dynastas provinciae finitimos, qui omnes ad eum concurrerant, receptos in fidem condicionibus impositis provinciae tuendae ac defendendae dimittit et sibi et populo Romano amicissimos.

66. After a stay of some days in these parts, he named Sextus Caesar,

his friend and relation, to the command of Syria and the legions appointed to guard it; and sailed himself for Cilicia, with the fleet he had brought from Egypt. He summoned the states to assemble at Tarsus, the strongest and finest city of the province; where, having settled everything that regarded either that province or the neighboring countries, through his eagerness to march to carry on the war he delayed no longer, but advancing through Cappadocia with the utmost expedition, where he stopped two days at Mazaca, he arrived at Comana, renowned for the ancient and sacred temple of Bellona, where she is worshiped with so much veneration, that her priest is accounted next in power and dignity to the king. He conferred this dignity on Lycomedes of Bithynia, who was descended from the ancient kings of Cappadocia, and who demanded it in right of inheritance; his ancestors having lost it upon occasion of the scepter being transferred to another line. As for Ariobarzanes, and his brother Ariarates, who had both deserved well of the commonwealth, he confirmed the first in his kingdom, and put the other under his protection; after which, he pursued his march with the same dispatch.

Paucis diebus in ea provincia consumptis Sextum Caesarem, amicum et necessarium suum, legionibus Syriaeque praeficit; ipse eadem classe qua venerat proficiscitur in Ciliciam. Cuius provinciae civitates omnis evocat Tarsum, quod oppidum fere totius Ciliciae nobilissimum fortissimumque est. Ibi rebus omnibus provinciae et finitimarum civitatum constitutis cupiditate proficiscendi ad bellum gerendum non diutius moratur, magnisque itineribus per Cappadociam confectis biduum Mazacae commoratus Comana venit, vetustissimum et sanctissimum in Cappadocia Bellonae templum, quod tanta religione colitur ut sacerdos eius deae maiestate, imperio,

potentia secundus a rege consensu gentis illius habeatur. Id homini nobilissimo Lycomedi Bithyno adiudicavit, qui regio Cappadocum genere ortus iure minime dubio, vetustate tamen propter adversam fortunam maiorum suorum mutationemque generis intermisso sacerdotium id repetebat. Fratri autem Ariobarzanis Ariarathi, cum bene meritis uterque eorum de re publica esset, ne aut regni hereditas Ariarathen sollicitaret aut heres regni terreret Ariobarzani attribuit qui sub eius imperio ac ditione esset. Ipse iter inceptum simili velocitate conficere coepit.

67. Upon his approaching Pontus, and the frontiers of Gallograecia, Deiotarus, tetrarch of that province (whose title, however, was disputed by the neighboring tetrarchs) and king of Lesser Armenia, laying aside the regal ornaments, and assuming the habit not only of a private person, but even of a criminal, came in a suppliant manner to Caesar, to beg forgiveness for assisting Pompey with his army, and obeying his commands, at a time when Caesar could afford him no protection: urging, that it was his business to obey the governors who were present, without pretending to judge of the disputes of the people of Rome.

Cum propius Pontum finisque Gallograeciae accessisset, Deiotarus, tetrarches Gallograeciae tum quidem paene totius, quod ei neque legibus neque moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contendebant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab senatu appellatus, depositis regiis insignibus neque tantum privato vestitu sed etiam reorum habitu supplex ad Caesarem venit oratum ut sibi ignosceret, quod in ea parte positus terrarum quae nulla praesidia Caesaris habuisset exercitibus imperiisque [coactus] in Cn. Pompei castris fuisset: neque enim se debuisse iudicem esse controversiarum

populi Romani, sed parere praesentibus imperiis.

68. Caesar, after reminding him “of the many services he had done him, and the decrees he had procured in his favor when consul; that his defection could claim no excuse for want of information, because one of his industry and prudence could not but know who was master of Italy and Rome, where the senate, the people, and the majesty of the republic resided; who, in fine, was consul after Marcellus and Lentulus; told him, that he would notwithstanding forgive his present fault in consideration of his past services, the former friendship that had subsisted between them, the respect due to his age, and the solicitation of those connected with him by hospitality, and his friends who interceded in his behalf: adding, that he would defer the controversy relating to the tetrarchate to another time.” He restored him the royal habit, and commanded him to join him with all his cavalry, and the legion he had trained up after the Roman manner.

Contra quem Caesar, cum plurima sua commemorasset officia quae consul ei decretis publicis tribuisset, cumque defensionem eius nullam posse excusationem eius imprudentiae recipere coarguisset, quod homo tantae prudentiae ac diligentiae scire potuisset quis urbem Italiamque teneret, ubi senatus populusque Romanus, ubi res publica esset, quis denique post L. Lentulum, C. Marcellum consul esset, tamen se concedere id factum superioribus suis beneficiis, veteri hospitio atque amicitiae, dignitati aetatique hominis, precibus eorum qui frequentes concurrissent hospites atque amici Deiotari ad deprecandum, de controversiis tetrarcharum postea se cogniturum esse dixit, regium vestitum ei restituit. Legionem autem eam quam ex genere civium suorum Deiotarus armatura disciplinaque nostra constitutam habebat equitatumque omnem ad bellum gerendum

adducere iussit.

69. When he was arrived in Pontus, and had drawn all his forces together, which were not very considerable either for their number or discipline (for except the sixth legion, composed of veteran soldiers, which he had brought with him from Alexandria, and which, by its many labors and dangers, the length of its marches and voyages, and the frequent wars in which it had been engaged, was reduced to less than a thousand men, he had only the legion of Deiotarus, and two more that had been in the late battle between Domitius and Pharnaces) ambassadors arrived from Pharnaces, “to entreat that Caesar would not come as an enemy, for he would submit to all his commands.” They represented particularly that “Pharnaces had granted no aid to Pompey, as Deiotarus had done, whom he had nevertheless pardoned.”

Cum in Pontum venisset copiasque omnis in unum locum coegisset, quae numero atque exercitatione bellorum mediocres erant — excepta enim legione sexta, quam secum abduxerat Alexandria veteranam multis laboribus periculisque functam multisque militibus partim difficultate itinerum ac navigationum partim crebritate bellorum adeo deminutam, ut minus mille hominibus in ea esset, reliquae erant tres legiones, una Deiotari, duae quae in eo proelio quod Cn. Domitium fecisse cum Pharnace scripsimus fuerant — , legati a Pharnace missi Caesarem adeunt atque imprimis deprecantur ne eius adventus hostilis esset: facturum enim omnia Pharnacen quae imperata essent. Maximeque commemorabant nulla Pharnacen auxilia contra Caesarem Pompeio dare voluisse, cum Deiotarus, qui dedisset, tamen ei satisfecisset.

70. Caesar replied, “That Pharnaces should meet with the utmost

justice, if he performed his promises: but at the same time he admonished the ambassadors, in gentle terms, to forbear mentioning Deiotarus, and not to overrate the having refused aid to Pompey. He told them that he never did any thing with greater pleasure than pardon a suppliant, but that he would never look upon private services to himself as an atonement for public injuries done the province; that the refusal of Pharnaces to aid Pompey had turned chiefly to his own advantage, as he had thereby avoided all share in the disaster of Pharsalia; that he was however willing to forgive the injuries done to the Roman citizens in Pontus, because it was now too late to think of redressing them; as he could neither restore life to the dead, nor manhood to those he had deprived of it, by a punishment more intolerable to the Romans than death itself. But that he must quit Pontus immediately, send back the farmers of the revenues, and restore to the Romans and their allies what he unjustly detained from them. If he should do this, he might then send the presents which successful generals were wont to receive from their friends” (for Pharnaces had sent him a golden crown). With this answer he dismissed the ambassadors.

Caesar respondit se fore aequissimum Pharnaci, si quae polliceretur repraesentaturus esset. Monuit autem, ut solebat, mitibus verbis legatos, ne aut Deiotarum sibi obicerent aut nimis eo gloriarentur beneficio, quod auxilia Pompeio non misissent. Nam se neque libentius facere quicquam quam supplicibus ignoscere neque provinciarum publicas iniurias condonare eis posse qui [non] fuissent in se officiosi. Quin id ipsum quod commemorarent officium fuisse utilius Pharnaci, qui providisset ne vinceretur, quam sibi, cui di immortales victoriam tribuissent. Itaque se magnas et gravis iniurias civium Romanorum qui in Ponto negotiati essent, quoniam in

integrum restituere non posset, concedere Pharnaci. Nam neque interfectis amissam vitam neque exsectis virilitatem restituere posse; quod quidem supplicium gravius morte cives Romani subissent. Ponto vero decederet confestim familiasque publicanorum remitteret ceteraque restitueret sociis civibusque Romanis quae penes eum essent. Si fecisset, iam tune sibi mitteret munera ac dona quae bene rebus gestis imperatores ab amicis accipere consueissent. Miserat enim [ei] Pharnaces coronam auream. His responsis datis legatos remisit.

71. Pharnaces promised every thing: but hoping that Caesar, who was in haste to be gone, would readily give credit to whatever he said, that he might the sooner set out upon more urgent affairs (for every body knew that his presence was much wanted at Rome), he performed but slowly, wanted to protract the day of his departure, demanded other conditions, and in fine endeavored to elude his engagements. Caesar, perceiving his drift, did now, out of necessity, what he was usually wont to do through inclination, and resolved to decide the affair as soon as possible by a battle.

At Pharnaces liberaliter omnia pollicitus, cum festinantem ac praecurrentem Caesarem speraret libentius etiam crediturum suis promissis quam res pateretur, quo celerius honestiusque ad res magis necessarias proficisceretur — nemini enim erat ignotum plurimis de causis ad urbem Caesarem revocar — , lentius agere, decedendi diem postulare longiorem, pactiones interponere, in summa frustrari coepit. Caesar cognita calliditate hominis, quod aliis temporibus natura facere consueverat tunc necessitate fecit adductus, ut celerius omnium opinione manum consereret.

72. Zela is a town of Pontus, well fortified, though situated in a plain;

for a natural eminence, as if raised by art, sustains the walls on all sides. All around is a great number of large mountains, intersected by valleys. The highest of these, which is celebrated for the victory of Mithridates, the defeat of Triarius, and the destruction of our army, is not above three miles from Zela, and has a ridge that almost extends to the town. Here Pharnaces encamped, with all his forces, repairing the fortifications of a position which had proved so fortunate to his father.

Zela est oppidum in Ponto positum, ipsum ut in plano loco satis munitum: tumulus enim naturalis, velut manu factus, excelsiore undique fastigio sustinet murum. Circumpositi sunt huic oppido magni multique intercisi vallibus colles; quorum editissimus unus, qui propter victoriam Mithridatis et infelicitatem Triari detrimentumque exercitus nostri magnam in illis partibus habet nobilitatem, superioribus locis atque itineribus paene coniunctus [est] oppido nec multo longius milibus passuum III abest ab Zela. Hunc locum Pharnaces veteribus paternorum felicium castrorum reffectis operibus copiis suis omnibus occupavit.

73. Caesar having encamped about five miles from the enemy, and observing that the valleys which defended the king's camp would likewise defend his own, at the same distance, if the enemy, who were much nearer, did not seize them before him; ordered a great quantity of fascines to be brought within the intrenchments. This being quickly performed, next night, at the fourth watch, leaving the baggage in the camp, he set out with the legions; and arriving at daybreak unsuspected by the enemy, possessed himself of the same post where Mithridates had defeated Triarius. Hither he commended all the fascines to be brought, employing the servants of the army for

that purpose, that the soldiers might not be called off from the works; because the valley, which divided the eminence, where he was intrenching himself from the enemy, was not above a mile wide.

Caesar cum ab hoste milia passuum V castra posuisset videretque eas vallis quibus regia castra munirentur eodem intervallo sua castra munituras, si modo ea loca hostes priores non cepissent quae multo erant propiora regis castris, aggerem comportari iubet intra munitiones. Quo celeriter collato proxima nocte vigilia quarta legionibus omnibus expeditis impedimentisque in castris relictis prima luce neque opinantibus hostibus eum ipsum locum cepit, in quo Mithridates secundum proelium adversus Triarium fecerat. Huc omnem comportatum aggerem ex castris servitia agerentur iussit, ne quis ab opere miles discederet, cum spatio non amplius passuum mille intercisa vallis castra hostium divideret ab opere incepto Caesaris castrorum.

74. Pharnaces perceiving this, next morning ranged all his troops in order of battle before his camp. Caesar, on account of the disadvantage of the ground, believed that he was reviewing them according to military discipline; or with a view to retard his works, by keeping a great number of his men under arms; or through the confidence of the king, that he might not seem to defend his position by his fortifications rather than by force. Therefore, keeping only his first line in order of battle, he commanded the rest of the army to go on with their works. But Pharnaces, either prompted by the place itself, which had been so fortunate to his father; or induced by favorable omens, as we were afterward told; or discovering the small number of our men that were in arms (for he took all that were employed in carrying materials to the works to be soldiers); or

confiding in his veteran army, who valued themselves upon having defeated the twenty- second legion; and at the same time, despising our troops, whom he knew he had worsted, under Domitius; was determined upon a battle, and to that end began to cross the valley. Caesar, at first, laughed at his ostentation, in crowding his army into so narrow a place, where no enemy, in his right senses, would have ventured: while, in the mean time, Pharnaces continued his march, and began to ascend the steep hill on which Caesar was posted.

Pharnaces, cum id repente prima luce animadvertisset, copias suas omnis pro castris instruxit. Quas interposita tanta locorum iniquitate consuetudine magis pervulgata militari credebat instrui Caesar vel ad opus suum tardandum, quo plures in armis tenerentur, vel ad ostentationem regiae fiducia, ne munitione magis quam manu defendere locum Pharnaces videretur. Itaque deterritus non est quo minus prima acie pro vallo instructa reliqua pars exercitus opus faceret. At Pharnaces impulsus sive loci felicitate sive auspiciis et religionibus inductus, quibus obtemperasse eum postea audiebamus, sive paucitate nostrorum qui in armis erant comperta, cum more operis cotidiani magnam illam servorum multitudinem quae aggerem portabat militum esse credidisset, sive etiam fiducia veterani exercitus sui, quem bis et vicies in acie conflixisse et vicisse legati eius gloriabantur, simul contemptu exercitus nostri, quem pulsum a se Domitio duce sciebat, inito consilio dimicandi descendere praeupta valle coepit. Cuius aliquamdiu Caesar irridebat inanem ostentationem et eo loco militum coartationem, quem in locum nemo sanus hostis subiturus esset: cum interim Pharnaces eodem gradu quo in praeruptam descenderat vallem ascendere adversus arduum collem instructis copiis coepit.

75. Caesar, astonished at his incredible rashness and confidence, and finding himself suddenly and unexpectedly attacked, called off his soldiers from the works, ordered them to arms, opposed the legions to the enemy, and ranged his troops in order of battle. The suddenness of the thing occasioned some terror at first; and our ranks not being yet formed, the scythed chariots disordered and confused the soldiers: however, the multitude of darts discharged against them, soon put a stop to their career. The enemy's army followed them close, and began the battle with a shout. Our advantageous situation, but especially the assistance of the gods, who preside over all the events of war, and more particularly those where human conduct can be of no service, favored us greatly on this occasion.

Caesar incredibili eius vel temeritate vel fiducia commotus neque opinans imparatusque oppressus eodem tempore milites ab opere revocat, arma capere iubet, legiones opponit aciemque instruit; cuius rei subita trepidatio magnum terrorem attulit nostris. Nondum ordinibus instructis falcatae regiae quadrigae permixtos milites perturbant; quae tamen celeriter multitudine telorum opprimuntur. Insequitur has acies hostium, et clamore sublato confligitur multum adiuvante natura loci, plurimum deorum immortalium benignitate; qui cum omnibus casibus bellicis intersunt, tum praecipue eis quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.

76. After a sharp and obstinate conflict, victory began to declare for us on the right wing, where the sixth legion was posted. The enemy there were totally overthrown, but, in the center and left, the battle was long and doubtful; however, with the assistance of the gods, we at last prevailed there also, and drove them with the utmost precipitation down the hill which they had so easily ascended before.

Great numbers being slain, and many crushed by the flight of their own troops, such as had the good fortune to escape were nevertheless obliged to throw away their arms; so that having crossed, and got upon the opposite ascent, they could not, being unarmed, derive any benefit from the advantage of the ground. Our men flushed with victory, did not hesitate to advance up the disadvantageous ground, and attack their fortifications, which they soon forced, notwithstanding the resistance made by the cohorts left by Pharnaces to guard it. Almost the whole army was cut to pieces or made prisoners. Pharnaces himself escaped, with a few horse; and had not the attack on the camp given him an opportunity of fleeing without pursuit, he must certainly have fallen alive into Caesar's hands.

Magno atque acri proelio comminus facto dextro cornu, quo veterana legio sexta erat collocata, initium victoriae natum est. Ab ea parte cum in proclive detruderentur hostes, multo tardius, sed tamen isdem dis adiuvantibus sinistro cornu mediaque acie totae profligantur copiae regis. Quae quam facile subierant iniquum locum, tam celeriter gradu pulsae premebantur loci iniquitate. Itaque multis militibus partim interfectis partim suorum ruina oppressis, qui velocitate effugere poterant, armis tamen proiectis vallem transgressi nihil ex loco superiore inermi proficere poterant. At nostri victoria elati subire iniquum locum munitionesque aggredi non dubitarunt. Defendentibus autem eis cohortibus castra quas Pharnaces praesidio reliquerat, celeriter castris hostium sunt potiti. Interfecta multitudo omni suorum aut capta Pharnaces cum paucis equitibus profugit; cui nisi castrorum oppugnatio facultatem attulisset liberius profugiendi, vivus in Caesaris potestatem adductus esset.

77. Though Caesar was accustomed to victory, yet he felt incredible

joy at the present success; because he had so speedily put an end to a very great war. The remembrance, too, of the danger to which he had been exposed, enhanced the pleasure, as he had obtained an easy victory in a very difficult conjuncture. Having thus recovered Pontus, and abandoned the plunder of the enemy's camp to the soldiers, he set out next day with some light horse. He ordered the sixth legion to return to Italy to receive the honors and rewards they had merited; and sent home the auxiliary troops of Deiotarus, and left two legions with Caelius Vincianus to protect the kingdom of Pontus.

Tali victoria totiens victor Caesar incredibili est laetitia adfectus, quod maximum bellum tanta celeritate confecerat, quodque subiti periculi recordatione laetior quod victoria facilis ex difficillimis rebus acciderat. Ponto recepto praeda omni regia militibus condonata postero die cum expeditis equitibus ipse proficiscitur, legionem sextam decedere ad praemia atque honores accipiendos in Italiam iubet, auxilia Deiotari domum remittit, duas legiones cum Caelio Viniciano in Ponto relinquit.

78. Through Gallograecia and Bithynia he marched into Asia, and examined and decided all the controversies of the provinces as he passed, and established the limits and jurisdictions of the several kings, states, and tetrarchs. Mithridates of Pergamus, who had so actively and successfully served him in Egypt, as we have related above, a man of royal descent and education (for Mithridates, king of all Asia, out of regard to his birth, had carried him along with him when very young, and kept him in his camp several years), was appointed king of Bosphorus, which had been under the command of Pharnaces. And thus he guarded the provinces of the Roman people against the attempts of barbarous and hostile kings, by the

interposition of a prince firmly attached to the interests of the republic. He bestowed on him likewise the tetrarchy of Gallograecia, which was his by the law of nations and family claims, though it had been possessed for some years by Deiotarus. Thus Caesar, staying nowhere longer than the necessity of the seditions in the city required, and having settled all things relating to the provinces with the utmost success and dispatch, returned to Italy much sooner than was generally expected.

Ita per Gallograeciam Bithyniamque in Asiam iter facit omniumque earum provinciarum de controversiis cognoscit et statuit; iura in tetrarchas, reges, civitates distribuit. Mithridaten Pergamenum, a quo rem feliciter celeriterque gestam in Aegypto supra scripsimus, regio genere ortum, disciplinis etiam regiis educatum — nam eum Mithridates, rex Asiae totius, propter nobilitatem Pergamo parvulum secum asportaverat in castra multosque retinuerat annos — regem Bosphori constituit, quod sub imperio Pharnacis fuerat, provinciasque populi Romani a barbaris atque inimicis regibus interposito amicissimo rege munivit. Eidem tetrarchian [legibus] Gallograecorum iure gentis et cognationis adiudicavit occupatam et possessam paucis ante annis a Deiotaro. Neque tamen usquam diutius moratus est quam necessitas urbanarum seditionum pati videbatur. Rebus felicissime celerrimeque confectis in Italiam celerius omnium opinione venit.

THE AFRICAN WARS

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1. Caesar, advancing by moderate journeys, and continuing his march without intermission, arrived at Lilybaeum, on the 14th day before the calends of January. Designing to embark immediately, though he had only one legion of new levies, and not quite six hundred horse, he ordered his tent to be pitched so near the sea-side that the waves lashed the very foot of it. This he did with a view that none should think he had time to delay, and that his men might be kept in readiness at a day or an hour's warning. Though the wind at that time was contrary, he nevertheless detained the soldiers and mariners on board, that he might lose no opportunity of sailing; the rather, because the forces of the enemy were announced by the inhabitants of the province, to consist of innumerable cavalry not to be numbered; four legions headed by Juba, together with a great body of light- armed troops; ten legions under the command of Scipio; a hundred and twenty elephants, and fleets in abundance. Yet he was not alarmed, nor lost his confident hopes and spirits. Meantime the number of galleys and transports increased daily; the new-levied legions flocked in to him from all parts; among the rest the fifth, a veteran legion, and about two thousand horse.

Caesar itineribus iustis confectis nullo die intermisso a. d. XIII Kal. Ian. Lilybaeum pervenit statimque ostendit sese naves velle conscendere, cum non amplius legionem tironum haberet unam, equites vix DC. Tabernaculum secundum litus ipsum constituit, ut prope fluctus verberaret. Hoc eo consilio fecit nequis sibi morae quicquam fore speraret et ut omnes in dies horasque parati essent. Incidit per id tempus ut tempestates ad navigandum idoneas non

haberet. Nihilo tamen minus in navibus remiges militesque continere et nullam praetermittere occasionem profectionis, cum praesertim ab incolis eius provinciae nuntiarentur adversariorum copiae: equitatus infinitus, legiones regiae IIII, levis armaturae magna vis, Scipionis legiones X, elephanti CXX classesque esse complures. Tamen non deterrebatur animoque et spe confidebat. Interim in dies et naves longae adaugeri et onerariae complures eodem concurrere et legiones tironum convenire IIII, veterana legio quinta, equitum ad II milia.

2. Having got together six legions and about two thousand horse, he embarked the legions as fast as they arrived, in the galleys, and the cavalry in the transports. Then sending the greatest part of the fleet before, with orders to sail for the island of Aponiana, not far from Lilybaeum; he himself continued a little longer in Sicily, and exposed to public sale some confiscated estates. Leaving all other affairs to the care of Allienus the praetor, who then commanded in the island; and strictly charging him to use the utmost expedition in embarking the remainder of the troops; he set sail the sixth day before the calends of January, and soon came up with the rest of the fleet. As the wind was favorable, and afforded a quick passage, he arrived the fourth day within sight of Africa, attended by a few galleys: for the transports, being mostly dispersed and scattered by the winds, with the exception of a few were driven different ways. Passing Clupea and Neapolis with the fleet, he continued for some time to coast along the shore, leaving many towns and castles behind him.

Legionibus collectis VI et equitum II milibus, ut quaeque prima legio venerat, in naves longas imponebatur, equites autem in onerarias. Ita maiorem partem navium antecedere iussit et insulam petere

Aponianam quae est a Lilybaeo... commoratus bona paucorum publice vendit, deinde Allieno praetori qui Siciliam obtinebat, de omnibus rebus praecipit et de reliquo exercitu celeriter imponendo. Datis mandatis ipse navem conscendit a. d. VI Kal. Ian. et reliquas naves statim est consecutus. Ita vento certo celerique navigio vectus post diem quartum cum longis paucis navibus in conspectum Africae venit. Namque onerariae reliquae praeter paucas vento dispersae atque errabundae diversa loca petierunt. Clupeam classe praetervehitur, dein Neapolim; complura praeterea castella et oppida non longe a mari relinquit.

3. After he came before Adrumetum, where the enemy had a garrison, commanded by C. Considius, and where Cn. Piso appeared upon the shore toward Clupea, with the cavalry of Adrumetum, and about three thousand Moors, he stopped awhile, facing the port, till the rest of the fleet should come up, and then landed his men, though their number at that time did not exceed three thousand foot and a hundred and fifty horse. There, encamping before the town, he continued quiet, without offering any act of hostility, and restrained all from plunder. Meantime the inhabitants manned the walls, and assembled in great numbers before the gate, to defend themselves, their garrison within amounting to two legions. Caesar, having ridden round the town, and thoroughly examined its situation, returned to his camp. Some blamed his conduct on this occasion, and charged him with a considerable oversight, in not appointing a place of meeting to the pilots and captains of the fleet, or delivering them sealed instructions, according to his usual custom; which being opened at a certain time, might have directed them to assemble at a specified place. But in this Caesar acted not without design; for as he knew of no port in Africa that was clear of the enemy's forces, and

where the fleet might rendezvous in security, he chose to rely entirely upon fortune, and land where occasion offered.

Postquam Hadrumetum accessit, ubi praesidium erat adversariorum cui praeerat C. Considius, et a Clupeis secundum oram maritimam cum equitatu Hadrumetum Cn. Piso cum Maurorum circiter tribus milibus apparuit, ibi paulipser Caesar ante portum commoratus dum reliquae naves convenirent, exponit exercitum, cuius numerus in praesentia fuit peditum III milia, equites CL, castrisque ante oppidum positus sine iniuria cuiusquam consedit cohibetque omnes a praeda. Oppidani interim muros armatis complent, ante portam frequentes considunt ad se defendendum; quorum numerus duarum legionum instar erat. Caesar circum oppidum vectus natura loci perspecta rediit in castra. Non nemo culpa eius imprudentiaeque adsignabat quod neque circum loca gubernatoribus praefectisque quid peterent praeceperat, neque ut more ipsius consuetudo superioribus temporibus fuerat, tabellas signatas dederat, ut in tempore his perlectis locum certum peterent universi. Quod minime Caesarem fefellerat; namque nullum portum terrae Africae quo classes decurrerent, pro certo tutum ab hostium praesidio fore suspicabatur, sed fortuitu oblatam occasionem egressus aucupabatur.

4. In the mean time, L. Plancus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, desired leave to treat with Considius, and try, if possible, to bring him to reason. Leave being granted accordingly, he wrote him a letter, and sent it into the town by a captive. When the captive arrived, and presented the letter, Considius, before he received it, demanded whence it came, and being told from Caesar, the Roman general, answered, "That he knew no general of the Roman forces but Scipio." Then, commending the messenger to be immediately slain

in his presence, he delivered the letter, unread and unopened, to a trusty partisan, with orders to carry it directly to Scipio.

L. Plancus interim legatus petit a Caesare, uti sibi daret potestatem cum Considio agendi, si posset aliqua ratione perducere ad sanitatem. Itaque data facultate litteras conscribit et eas captivo dat perferendas in oppidum ad Considium. Quo simulatque captivus cum pervenisset litterasque, ut erat mandatum, Considio porrigere coepisset, priusquam acciperet ille, ‘Unde’ inquit ‘istas?’ Tum captivus: ‘Imperatore a Caesare.’ Tum Considius, ‘Unus est’ inquit ‘Scipio imperator hoc tempore populi Romani’; deinde in conspectu suo statim captivum interfici iubet litterasque nondum perlectas, sicut erant signatae, dat homini certo ad Scipionem perferendas.

5. Caesar had now continued a day and a night before the town, without receiving any answer from Considius; the rest of the forces were not yet arrived; his cavalry was not considerable; he had not sufficient troops with him to invest the place, and these were new levies: neither did he think it advisable, upon his first landing, to expose the army to wounds and fatigue; more especially, as the town was strongly fortified, and extremely difficult of access, and a great body of horse was said to be upon the point of arrival to succor the inhabitants; he therefore thought it advisable not to remain and besiege the town, lest while he pursued that design, the enemy’s cavalry should come behind and surround him.

Postquam una nocte et die ad oppidum consumpta neque responsum ullum a Considio dabatur neque ei reliquae copiae succurrebant neque equitatu abundabat et ad oppidum oppugnandum non satis copiarum habebat et eas tironum neque primo adventu convulnerari exercitum volebat et oppidi egregia munitio et difficilis ad

oppugnandum erat accessus et nuntiabatur auxilia magna equitatus oppidanis suppetias venire, non est visa ratio ad oppugnandum oppidum commorandi, ne dum in ea re Caesar esset occupatus, circumventus a tergo ab equitatu hostium laboraret.

6. But as he was drawing off his men, the garrison made a sudden sally; and the cavalry which had been sent by Juba to receive their pay, happening just then to come up, they took possession of the camp Caesar had left, and began to harass his rear. This being perceived, the legionaries immediately halted; and the cavalry, though few in number, boldly charged the vast multitude of the enemy. An incredible event occurred, that less than thirty Gallic horse repulsed two thousand Moors, and drove them into the town. Having thus repulsed the enemy and compelled them to retire behind their walls, Caesar resumed his intended march: but observing that they often repeated their sallies, renewing the pursuit from time to time, and again fleeing when attacked by the horse, he posted a few of the veteran cohorts which he had with him, with part of the cavalry, in the rear, and so proceeded slowly on his march. The further he advanced from the town, the less eager were the Numidians to pursue. Meantime, deputies arrived from the several towns and castles on the road, offering to furnish him with corn, and to perform whatever he might command. Toward the evening of that day, which was the calends of January, he fixed his camp at Ruspina.

Itaque castra cum movere vellet, subito ex oppido erupit multitudo atque equitatus subsidio uno tempore eis casu succurrit qui erat missus a Iuba ad stipendium accipiendum, castraque unde Caesar egressus et iter facere coeperat, occupant et eius agmen extremum insequi coeperunt. Quae res cum animadversa esset, subito legionarii

consistunt, et equites quamquam erant pauci, tamen contra tantam multitudinem audacissime concurrunt. Accidit res incredibilis, ut equites minus XXX Galli Maurorum equitum II milia loco pellerent fugarentque in oppidum. Postquam repulsi et coniecti erant intra munitiones, Caesar iter constitutum ire contendit. Quod cum saepius facerent et modo insequerentur, modo rursus ab equitibus in oppidum repellerentur, cohortibus paucis, ex veteranis quas secum habebat, in extremo agmine collocatis et parte equitatus iter leniter cum reliquis facere coepit. Ita quanto longius ab oppido discedebatur, tanto tardiores ad insequendum erant Numidae. Interim in itinere ex oppidis et castellis legationes venire et pollicere frumentum paratosque esse quae imperasset facere. Itaque eo die castra posuit ad oppidum Ruspina.

7. Thence he removed and came before Leptis, a free city and governed by its own laws. Here he was met by deputies from the town, who, in the name of the inhabitants, offered their free submission. Whereupon, placing centurions and a guard before the gates, to prevent the soldiers from entering, or offering violence to any of the inhabitants, he himself encamped toward the shore, not far distant from the town. Hither by accident arrived some of the galleys and transports; by whom he was informed that the rest of the fleet, uncertain what course to pursue, had been steering for Utica. In the mean time Caesar could not depart from the sea, nor seek the inland provinces, on account of the error committed by the fleet. He likewise sent the cavalry back to their ships, probably to hinder the country from being plundered, and ordered fresh water to be carried to them on board. Meanwhile the Moorish horse rose suddenly, Caesar's party not expecting it, on the rowers who had been employed in carrying water, as they came out of the ships, and

wounded many with their darts and killed some. For the manner of these barbarians is, to lie in ambush with their horses among the valleys, and suddenly launch upon an enemy; they seldom choosing to engage hand to hand in a plain.

Kal. Ianuariis inde movit et pervenit ad oppidum Leptim liberam civitatem et immunem. Legati ex oppido obviam veniunt, libenter se omnia facturos quae vellet pollicentur. Itaque centurionibus ad portas oppidi et custodiis impositis, nequis miles in oppidum introiret aut iniuriam faceret cuipiam incolae, non longe ab oppido secundum litus facit castra. Eodemque naves onerariae et longae nonnullae casu advenerunt; reliquae, ut est ei nuntiatum, incertae locorum Uticam versus petere visae sunt. Interim Caesar a mari non digredi neque mediterranea petere propter navium errorem equitatumque in navibus omnem continere, ut arbitror ne agri vastarentur; aquam in naves iubet comportari. Remiges interim qui aequatum e navibus exierant, subito equites Mauri neque opinantibus Caesarianis adorti multos iaculis convulnerarunt, nonnullos interfecerunt. Latent enim in insidiis cum equis inter convalles et subito existunt, non ut in campo comminus depugnent .

8. In the mean time, Caesar dispatched letters and messengers into Sardinia and the neighboring provinces, with orders, as soon as they read the letters, to send supplies of men, corn, and warlike stores; and having unloaded part of the fleet, detached it, with Rabirius Posthumus, into Sicily, to bring over the second embarkation. At the same time he ordered out ten galleys, to get intelligence of the transports that had missed their way, and to maintain the freedom of the sea. He also ordered C. Sallustius Prispus, the praetor, at the head of a squadron, to sail to Percina, then in the hands of the enemy,

because he heard there was great quantity of corn in that island: he gave these orders and instructions in such a manner as to leave no room for excuse or delay. Meanwhile, having informed himself, from the deserters and natives, of the condition of Scipio and his followers; and understanding that they were at the whole charge of maintaining Juba's cavalry; he could not but pity the infatuation of men, who thus chose to be tributaries to the king of Numidia, rather than securely enjoy their fortunes at home with their fellow-citizens.

Caesar interim in Sardiniam nuntios cum litteris et in reliquas provincias finitimas dimisit, ut sibi auxilia commeatus frumentum, simulatque litteras legissent, mittenda curarent, exoneratisque partim navibus longis Rabirium Postumum in Siciliam ad secundum commeatum arcessendum mittit. Interim cum X navibus longis ad reliquas naves onerarias conquirendas quae deerrassent, et simul mare tuendum ab hostibus iubet proficisci. Item C. Sallustium Crispum praetorem ad Cercinam insulam versus quam adversarii tenebant, cum parte navium ire iubet, quod ibi magnum numerum frumenti esse audiebat. Haec ita imperabat unicuique, ita praecipiebat ut si fieri posset necne, locum excusatio nullum haberet nec moram tergiversatio. Ipse interea ex perfugis et incolis cognitis condicionibus Scipionis et qui cum eo bellum contra se gerebant, mirari — regium enim equitatum Scipio ex provincia Africa alebat — tanta homines esse dementia ut malint regis esse vectigales quam cum civibus in patria in suis fortunis esse incolumes.

9. Caesar moved his camp on the third day before the nones of January; and leaving six cohorts at Leptis, under the command of Saserna, returned with the rest of the forces to Ruspina, whence he had come the day before. Here he deposited the baggage of the army;

and marching out with a light body of troops to forage, ordered the inhabitants to follow with their horses and carriages. Having by this means got together a great quantity of corn, he came back to Ruspina. I think that he acted with this intention, that by keeping possession of the maritime cities, and providing them with garrisons, he might secure a retreat for his fleet.

Caesar a. d. IIII Non. Ian. castra movet; Lepti sex cohortium praesidio cum Saserna relicto ipse rursus unde pridie venerat, Ruspina cum reliquis copiis convertit ibique sarcinis exercitus relictis ipse cum expedita manu proficiscitur circum villas frumentatum oppidanisque imperat ut plostra iumentaue omnia sequantur. Itaque magno numero frumenti invento Ruspina redit. Hoc eum idcirco existimo recepisse ut maritima oppida post se ne vacua relinqueret praesidioque firmata ad classis receptacula muniret.

10. Leaving therefore P. Saserna, the brother of him who commanded at Leptis, to take charge of the town, with one legion, he orders all the wood that could be found to be carried into the place; and set out in person from Ruspina, with seven cohorts, part of the veteran legions who had behaved so well in the fleet under Sulpicius and Vatinius; and marching directly for the port, which lies at about two miles' distance, embarked with them in the evening, without imparting his intentions to the army, who were extremely inquisitive concerning the general's design. His departure occasioned the utmost sadness and consternation among the troops; for being few in number, mostly new levies, and those not all suffered to land, they saw themselves exposed, upon a foreign coast, to the mighty forces of a crafty nation, supported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor had they any resource in their present circumstances, or expectation of

safety in their own conduct; but derived all their hope from the alacrity, vigor, and wonderful cheerfulness that appeared in their general's countenance; for he was of an intrepid spirit, and behaved with undaunted resolution and confidence. On his conduct, therefore, they entirely relied, and hoped to a man, that by his skill and talents, all difficulties would vanish before them.

Itaque ibi relicto P. Saserna fratre eius quem Lepti proximo oppido reliquerat, cum legione iubet comportari ligna in oppidum quam plurima. Ipse cum cohortibus vii quae ex veteranis legionibus in classe cum Sulpicio et Vatinio rem gesserant, ex oppido Ruspina egressus proficiscitur ad portum qui abest ab oppido milia passuum duo, ibique classem sub vesperum cum ea copia conscendit. Omnibus in exercitu insciis et requirentibus imperatoris consilium, magno metu ac tristimonia sollicitabantur. Parva enim cum copia et ea tironum neque omni eita in Africa contra magnas copias et insidiosae nationis equitatum[que] innumerabilem se eitos videbant neque quicquam solacium in praesentia neque auxilium in suorum consilio animum advertebant, nisi in ipsius imperatoris vultu vigore mirabilique hilaritate; animum enim altum et erectum prae se gerebat. Huic adquiescebant homines et in eius scientia et consilio omnia sibi proclivia omnes fore sperabant.

11. Caesar, having continued the whole night on board, prepared to set sail about day-break; when, all on a sudden, the part of the fleet that had caused so much anxiety, appeared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore, ordering his men to quit their ships immediately, and receive the rest of the troops in arms upon the shore, he made the new fleet enter the port with the utmost diligence; and landing all the forces, horse and foot, returned again to Ruspina. Here he established

his camp; and taking with him thirty cohorts, without baggage, advanced into the country to forage. Thus was Caesar's purpose at length discovered: that he meant, unknown to the enemy, to have sailed to the assistance of the transports that had missed their way, lest they should unexpectedly fall in with the African fleet. And he did not wish his own soldiers who were left behind in garrison to know this, lest they should be intimidated by the smallness of their numbers, and the multitude of the enemy.

Caesar una nocte in navibus consumpta iam caelo albente cum proficisci conaretur, subito navium pars de qua timebat, ex errore eodem conferebatur. Hac re cognita Caesar celeriter de navibus imperat omnes egredi atque in litore armatos reliquos advenientes milites expectare. Itaque sine mora navibus eis in portum receptis et advectis militum equitumque copiis rursus ad oppidum Ruspinae redit atque ibi castris constitutis ipse cum cohortibus expeditis XXX frumentatum est profectus. Ex eo est cognitum Caesaris consilium, illum cum classe navibus onerariis quae deerrassent, subsidio ire clam hostibus voluisse, ne casu imprudentes suae naves in classem adversariorum inciderent, neque eam rem eos voluisse scire qui in praesidiis relictis sui milites fuissent, uti nihil propter suorum paucitatem et hostium multitudinem metu deficerent.

12. Caesar had not marched above three miles from his camp, when he was informed by his scouts, and some advanced parties of horse, that the enemy's forces were in view. As soon as this announcement was made, a great cloud of dust began to appear. Upon this intelligence, Caesar ordered all his horse, of which he had at that time but a very small number, to advance, as likewise his archers, only a few of whom had followed him from the camp; and the

legions to march quietly after him in order of battle; while he went forward at the head of a small party. Soon after, having discovered the enemy at some distance, he commanded the soldiers to repair to their arms, and prepare for battle. Their number in all did not exceed thirty cohorts, with four hundred horse, and one hundred and fifty archers.

Interim cum iam Caesar progressus esset a castris circiter milia passuum III, per speculatores et antecessores equites nuntiatur ei copias hostium haud longe ab sese visas. Et hercule cum eo nuntio pulvis ingens conspici coeptus est. Hac re cognita Caesar celeriter iubet equitatum universum cuius copiam habuit in praesentia non magnam, et sagittarios quorum parvus numerus, ex castris arcessi, atque ordinatim signa se leniter consequi; ipse antecedere cum paucis armatis. Iamque cum procul hostis conspici posset, milites in campo iubet galeari et ad [eam] pugnam parari; quorum omnino numerus fuit XXX cohortium cum equitibus CCCC, sagittariis CL.

13. Meanwhile the enemy, under the command of Labienus, and the two Pacidii, drew up, with a very large front, consisting not so much of foot as of horse, whom they intermixed with light- armed Numidians and archers; forming themselves in such close order, that Caesar's army, at a distance, mistook them all for infantry; and strengthening their right and left with many squadrons of horse. Caesar drew up his army in a single line, being obliged to do so by the smallness of his numbers; covering his front with his archers, and placing his cavalry on the right and left wings, with particular instructions not to suffer themselves to be surrounded by the enemy's numerous horse; for he imagined that he would have to fight only with infantry.

Hostes interim quorum dux erat Labienus et duo Pacidei, aciem derigunt mirabili longitudine non peditum, sed equitum confertam, et inter eos levis armaturae Numidas et sagittarios pedites interposuerant et ita condensaverant ut procul Caesariani pedestres copias arbitrarentur; dextrum ac sinistrum cornu magnis equitum copiis firmaverant. Interim Caesar aciem derigit simplicem ut poterat propter paucitatem; sagittarios ante aciem constituit, equites dextro sinistroque cornu opponit et ita praecipit ut providerent ne multitudine equitatus hostium circumvenirentur: existimabat enim se acie instructa cum pedestribus copiis dimicaturum.

14. As both sides stood in expectation of the signal, and Caesar would not stir from his post, as he saw that with such few troops against so great a force he must depend more on stratagem than strength, on a sudden the enemy's horse began to extend themselves, and move in a lateral direction, so as to encompass the hills and weaken Caesar's horse, and at the same time to surround them. The latter could scarcely keep their ground against their numbers. Meanwhile, both the main bodies advancing to engage, the enemy's cavalry, intermixed with some light- armed Numidians, suddenly sprang forward, from their crowded troops, and attacked the legions with a shower of darts. Our men, preparing to return the charge, their horse retreated a little, while the foot continued to maintain their ground, till the others, having rallied, came on again, with fresh vigor, to sustain them.

Cum utrimque exspectatio fieret neque Caesar sese moveret et cum suorum paucitate contra magnam vim hostium artificio magis quam viribus decernendum videret, subito adversariorum equitatus sese extendere et in latitudinem promovere collesque complecti et

Caesaris equitatum extenuare simulque ad circumeundum comparare se coeperunt. Caesariani equites eorum multitudinem aegre sustinebant. Acies interim mediae cum concurrere conarentur, subito ex condensis turmis pedites Numidae levis armaturae cum equitibus procurrunt et inter legionarios pedites iacula coniciunt. Hic cum Caesariani in eos impetum fecissent, illorum equites refugiebant. Pedites interim resistebant, dum equites rursus cursu renovato peditibus suis succurrerent.

15. Caesar perceived that his ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, for our foot, in pursuing the enemy's horse, having advanced a considerable way beyond their colors, were wounded in the flank by the nearest Numidian darts, while the enemy's horse easily escaped our infantry's javelins by flight; he therefore gave express orders that no soldier should advance above four feet beyond the ensigns. Meanwhile, Labienus's cavalry, confiding in their numbers endeavored to surround those of Caesar: who being few in number, and overpowered by the multitude of the enemy, were forced to give ground a little, their horses being much wounded. The enemy pressed on more and more; so that in an instant, the legions, being surrounded on all sides by the enemy's cavalry, were obliged to form themselves into a circle, and fight, as if inclosed with barriers.

Caesar novo genere pugnae oblato cum animum adverteret ordines suorum in procurrendo turbari — pedites enim, dum equites longius ab signis persequuntur, latere nudato a proximis Numidis iaculis vulnerabantur, equites autem hostium pilum militis cursu facile vitabant — edicit per ordines nequis miles ab signis IIII pedes longius procederet. Equitatus interim Labieni suorum multitudine

confisus Caesaris paucitatem circuire conatur: qui equites Iuliani pauci multitudine hostium defessi equis convulneratis paulatim cedere, hostis magis magisque instare. Ita puncto temporis omnibus legionariis ab hostium equitatu circumventis Caesarisque copiis in orbem compulsis intra cancellos omnes coniecti pugnare cgebantur.

16. Labienus, with his head uncovered, advanced on horseback to the front of the battle, sometimes encouraging his own men, sometimes addressing Caesar's legions thus: "So ho! you raw soldiers there!" says he, "why so fierce? Has he infatuated you too with his words? Truly he has brought you into a fine condition! I pity you sincerely." Upon this, one of the soldiers said: "I am none of your raw warriors, Labienus, but a veteran of the tenth legion." "Where's your standard?" replied Labienus. "I'll soon make you sensible who I am," answered the soldier. Then pulling off his helmet, to discover himself, he threw a javelin, with all his strength at Labienus, which wounding his horse severely in the breast—"Know, Labienus," says he, "that this dart was thrown by a soldier of the tenth legion." However, the whole army was not a little daunted, especially the new levies; and began to cast their eyes upon Caesar, minding nothing, for the present, but to defend themselves from the enemy's darts.

Labienus in equo capite nudo versari in prima acie, simul suos cohortari, nonnumquam legionarios Caesaris ita appellare: 'Quid tu' inquit 'miles tiro, tam feroculus es? Vos quoque iste verbis infatuavit? In magnum mehercule vos periculum impulit. Misereor vestri.' Tum miles, 'Non sum' inquit 'tiro Labiene, sed de legione X veteranus.' Tum Labienus, 'Non agnosco' inquit 'signa decumanorum.' Tum ait miles: 'Iam me quis sim intelleges'; simul cassidem de capite deiecit ut cognosci ab eo posset, atque ita pilum

viribus contortum, dum in Labienum mittere contendit, equi graviter adverso pectori adfixit et ait: 'Labiene, decumanum militem qui te petit scito esse.' Omnium tamen animi in terrorem coniecti, et maxime tironum: circumspicere enim Caesarem neque amplius facere nisi hostium iacula vitare.

17. Caesar meanwhile, perceiving the enemy's design, endeavored to extend his line of battle, as much as possible, directing the cohorts to face about alternately to the right and left. By this means, he broke the enemy's circle with his right and left wings; and attacking one part of them, thus separated from the other, with his horse and foot, at last put them to flight. He pursued them but a little way, fearing an ambuscade, and returned again to his own men. The same was done by the other division of Caesar's horse and foot, so that the enemy being driven back, and severely wounded on all sides, he retreated toward his camp, in order of battle.

Caesar interim consilio hostium cognito iubet aciem in longitudinem quam maximam porrigi et alternis conversis cohortibus ut una post, altera ante signa tenderet, ita coronam hostium dextro sinistroque cornu mediam dividit et unam partem ab altera exclusam equitibus intrinsecus adortus cum peditatu telis coniectis in fugam vertit neque longius progressus veritus insidias se ad suos recipit. Idem altera pars equitum peditumque Caesaris fecit. His rebus gestis ac procul hostibus repulsis convulneratisque ad sua praesidia sese, sicut erat instructus, recipere coepit.

18. Meantime M. Petreius, and Cn. Piso, with eleven hundred select Numidian horse, and a considerable body of foot, arrived to the assistance of the enemy; who, recovering from their terror, upon this reinforcement, and again resuming courage, fell upon the rear of the

legions, as they retreated, and endeavored to hinder them from reaching their camp. Caesar, perceiving this, ordered his men to wheel about, and renew the battle in the middle of the plain. As the enemy still pursued their former plan, and avoided a closing engagement, and the horses of Caesar's cavalry had not yet recovered the fatigue of their late voyage, and were besides weakened with thirst, weariness, wounds, and of course unfit for a vigorous and long pursuit, which even the time of the day would not allow, he ordered both horse and foot to fall at once briskly upon the enemy, and not slacken the pursuit till they had driven them quite beyond the furthest hills, and taken possession of them themselves. Accordingly, upon a signal being given, when the enemy were throwing their javelins in a faint and careless manner, he suddenly charged them with his horse and foot; who in a moment driving them from the field, and over the adjoining hill, kept possession of that post for some time, and then retired slowly, in order of battle, to their camp. The enemy, who, in this last attack, had been very roughly handled, then at length retreated to their fortifications.

Interim M. Petreius et Cn. Piso cum equitibus Numidis MC electis peditatuque eiusdem generis satis grandi ex itinere recta subsidio suis occurrunt. Atque hostes suis ex terrore firmatis rursusque renovatis animis legionarios conversis equitibus recipientes novissimos adoriri et impedire coeperunt quominus se in castra reciperent. Hac re animadversa Caesar iubet signa converti et medio campo redintegrari proelium. Cum ab hostibus eodem modo pugnaretur nec comminus ad manus rediretur Caesarisque equites iumenta ex nausea recenti siti languore paucitate vulneribus defatigata ad insequendum hostem perseverandumque cursum tardiora haberent dieique pars exigua esset iam reliqua, cohortibus equitibusque circumitis cohortatus ut

uno ictu contenderent neque remitterent, donec ultra ultimos colles hostes reppulissent atque eorum essent potiti. Itaque signo dato cum iam hoste languide tela neglegenterque mittente, subito immittit cohortes turmasque suorum; atque puncto temporis hostibus nullo negotio campo pulsus, post colle deiectis nacti locum atque ibi paulisper commorati, ita uti erant instructi, leniter se ad suas recipiunt munitiones. Itemque adversarii male accepti tum demum se ad sua praesidia contulerunt.

19. Meanwhile the action being over, a great number of deserters, of all kinds, flocked to Caesar's camp, besides multitudes of horse and foot that were made prisoners. From them we learned that it was the design of the enemy to have astonished our raw troops, with their new and uncommon manner of fighting; and after surrounding them with their cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as they had done Curio; and that they had marched against us expressly with that intention. Labienus had even said, in the council of war, that he would lead such a numerous body of auxiliaries against his adversaries, as should fatigue us with the very slaughter, and defeat us even in the bosom of victory; for he relied more on the number than the valor of his troops. He had heard of the mutiny of the veteran legions at Rome, and their refusal to go into Africa; and was likewise well assured of the fidelity of his troops, who had served three years under him in Africa. He had a great number of Numidian cavalry and light-armed troops, besides the Gallic and German horse, whom he had drawn together out of the remains of Pompey's army, and carried over with him from Brundisium: he had likewise the freed men raised in the country, and trained to use bridled horses; and also the immense number of Juba's forces, his hundred and twenty elephants, his innumerable cavalry and legionaries,

amounting to above twelve thousand. Emboldened by the hope such mighty forces raised in him, on the day before the nones of January, three days after Caesar's arrival, he came against him, with sixteen hundred Gallic and German horse, nine hundred under Petreius, eight thousand Numidians, four times that number of light-armed foot, with a multitude of archers and slingers. The battle lasted from the fifth hour till sunset, during which time Petreius, receiving a dangerous wound, was obliged to quit the field.

Interim ea re gesta et proelio dirempto ex adversariis perfugae plures ex omni genere hominum, et praeterea intercepti hostium complures equites peditesque. Ex quibus cognitum est consilium hostium, eos hac mente et conatu venisse, ut novo atque inusitato genere proelii tirones legionarii paucique perturbati Curionis exemplo ab equitatu circumventi opprimerentur, et ita Iubam dixisse pro contione, tantam se multitudinem auxiliorum adversariis Caesaris subministraturum, ut etiam caedendo in ipsa victoria defatigati vincerentur atque a suis superarentur, quippe quis in illorum sibi confideret, primum quod audierat Romae legiones veteranas dissentire neque in Africam velle transire; deinde quod triennio in Africa suos milites consuetudine retentos fideles sibi iam effecisset, maxima autem auxilia haberet Numidarum equitum levisque armaturae, praeterea ex fuga proelioque Pompeiano Labienus quos secum a Brundisio transportaverat equites Germanos Gallosque ibique postea ex hybridis libertinis servisque conscripserat, armaverat equoque uti frenato condocerant, praeterea regia auxilia, elephantis CXX equitatusque innumerabilis, deinde legiones conscriptas ex cuiusquemodi generis amplius XII milibus. Hac spe atque ea audacia inflammatus Labienus cum equitibus Gallis Germanisque MDC, Numidarum sine frenis VIII milibus, praeterea Petreiano auxilio

adhibito equitibus MDC, peditum ac levis armaturae quater tanto, sagittariis ac funditoribus hippotoxotisque compluribus: his copiis prid. Non. Ian., post diem VI quam Africam [Caesar] attigit, in campis planissimis purissimisque ab hora diei quinta usque ad solis occasum est decertatum. In eo proelio Petreius graviter ictus ex acie recessit.

20. Meantime Caesar fortified his camp with much greater care, reinforced the guards, and threw up two intrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his camp to the sea likewise, to secure the communication, and receive supplies without danger. He landed a great number darts and military engines, armed part of the mariners, Gauls, Rhodians, and others, that after the example of the enemy he might have a number of light-armed troops to intermix with his cavalry. He likewise strengthened his army with a great number of Syrian and Iturean archers whom he drew from the fleet into his camp: for he understood that within three days Scipio was expected to unite his forces to Labienus and Petreius, and his army was said to consist of eight legions and three thousand horse. At the same time he established workshops, made a great number of darts and arrows, provided himself with leaden bullets and palisades, wrote to Sicily for hurdles and wood to make rams, because he had none in Africa, and likewise gave orders for sending corn; for the harvest in that country was like to be inconsiderable, the enemy having taken all the laborers into their service the year before, and stored up the grain in a few fortified towns, after demolishing the rest, forcing the inhabitants into the garrisoned places, and exhausting the whole country.

Caesar interim castra munire diligentius, praesidia firmare copiis

maioribus vallumque ab oppido Ruspina usque ad mare ducere et a castris alterum eodem, quo tutius ultro citroque commeare auxiliaque sine periculo sibi succurrere possent, tela tormenta ex navibus in castra comportare, remigum partem ex classe Gallorum Rhodiorum epibatarumque armare et in castra evocare, uti si posset eadem ratione qua adversarii, levis armatura interiecta inter equites suos interponeretur, sagittariisque ex omnibus navibus Ityraeis Syris et cuiusque generis ductis in castra compluribus frequentabat suas copias — audiebat enim Scipionem post diem tertium eius diei quo proelium factum erat adpropinquare, copias suas cum Labieno et Petreio coniungere; cuius copiae legionum VIII et equitum III milium esse nuntiabantur — officinas ferrarias instruere, sagittas telaque uti fierent complura curare, glandes fundere, sudes comparare, litteras in Siciliam nuntiosque mittere ut sibi crates materiemque congererent ad arietes, cuius inopia in Africa esset, praeterea ferrum plumbum mitteretur. Etiam animum advertebat frumento se in Africa nisi importatio uti non posse: priore anno enim propter adversariorum dilectus, quod stipendiarii aratores milites essent facti, messem non esse factam; praeterea ex omni Africa frumentum adversarios in pauca oppida et bene munita comportasse omnemque regionem Africae exinanisse frumento, oppida praeter ea pauca quae ipsi suis praesidiis tueri poterant, reliqua dirui ac deseri, et eorum incolas intra sua praesidia coegisse commigrare, agros desertos ac vastatos esse.

21. In this necessity, by paying court to private individuals, he obtained a small supply, and husbanded it with care. In the mean time he went round the works in person daily, and kept about four cohorts constantly on duty, on account of the multitude of the enemy. Labienus sent his sick and wounded, of which the number was very

considerable, in wagons to Adrumetum. Meanwhile Caesar's transports, unacquainted with the coast, or where their general had landed wandered up and down in great uncertainty; and being, attacked, one after another, by the enemy's coasters, were, for the most part, either taken or burned. Caesar, being informed of this, stationed his fleet along the coast and islands for the security of his convoys.

Hac necessitate Caesar coactus privatos ambiendo et blande appellando aliquantum numerum frumenti in sua praesidia congesserat. Eo parce utebantur. Opera interim ipse cotidie circuire et alteras cohortes in statione habere propter hostium multitudinem. Labienus saucios suos, quorum maximus numerus fuit, iubet in plostris delegatos Hadrumentum deportari. Naves interim Caesaris onerariae errabundae male vagabantur incertae locorum atque castrorum suorum. Quas singulas scaphae adversariorum complures adortae incendebant atque expugnabant. Hac re nuntiata Caesari classes circum insulas portusque disposuit, quo tutius commeatus subportari posset.

22. Meanwhile M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, never ceased urging and exhorting young Pompey, in words to this effect: "Your father, when he was at your age, and observed the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and daring men, and the party of order either slain or driven into banishment from their country and relations, incited by the greatness of his mind and the love of glory, though then very young, and only a private man, had yet the courage to rally the remains of his father's army, and assert the freedom of Italy and Rome, which was almost crushed forever. He also recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia, Mauritania, with amazing dispatch, and by that

means gained an illustrious and extensive reputation among all nations, and triumphed while very young and only a Roman knight. Nor did he enter upon the administration of public affairs, distinguished by the shining exploits of his father, or the fame and reputation of his ancestors, or the honors and dignities of the state. Will you, on the contrary, possessed of these honors, and the reputation acquired by your father, sufficiently distinguished by your own industry and greatness of mind, not bestir yourself, join your father's friends, and give the earnestly required assistance to yourself, the republic, and every man of worth?"

M. Cato interim qui Uticae praeerat, Cn. Pompeium filium multis verbis assidueque obiurgare non desistebat. 'tuus' inquit 'pater istuc aetatis cum esset et animadvertisset rem publicam ab nefariis sceleratisque civibus oppressam bonosque aut interfectos aut exilio multatos patria civitateque carere, gloria et animi magnitudine elatus privatus atque adulescentulus paterni exercitus reliquiis collectis paene oppressam funditus et deletam Italiam urbemque Romanum in libertatem vindicavit, idemque Siciliam Africam Numidiam Mauretaniam mirabili celeritate armis recepit. Quibus ex rebus sibi eam dignitatem quae est per gentes clarissima notissimaque, conciliavit adulescentulusque atque eques Romanus triumphavit. Atque ille non ita amplis rebus patris gestis neque tam excellenti dignitate maiorum parta neque tantis clientelis nominisque claritate praeditus in rem publicam est ingressus. Tu contra et patris nobilitate et dignitate et per te ipse satis animi magnitudine diligentiaque praeditus nonne eniteris et proficisceris ad paternas clientelas auxilium tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique efflagitatum?'

23. The youth, roused by the remonstrances of that grave and worthy

senator, got together about thirty sail, of all sorts, of which some few were ships of war, and sailing from Utica to Mauritania, invaded the kingdom of Bogud. And leaving his baggage behind him, with an army of two thousand men, partly freedmen, partly slaves, some armed, some not, approached the town of Ascurum, in which the king had a garrison. On the arrival of Pompey, the inhabitants suffered him to advance to the very walls and gates; when, suddenly sallying out, they drove back his troops in confusion and dismay to the sea and their ships. This ill-success determined him to leave that coast, nor did he afterward land in any place, but steered directly for the Balearean Isles.

His verbis hominis gravissimi incitatus adulescentulus cum naviculis cuiusquemodi generis XXX, inibi paucis rostratis, profectus ab Utica in Mauretaniam regnumque Bogudis est ingressus expeditoque exercitu numero servorum liberorum II milium, cuius partem inermem, partem habuerat armatam, ad oppidum Ascurum accedere coepit. In quo oppido praesidium fuit regium. Pompeio adveniente oppidani usque eo passi propius accedere, donec ad ipsas portas ac murum adpropinquaret, subito eruptione facta prostratos perterritosque Pompeianos in mare navesque passim compulerunt. Ita re male gesta Cn. Pompeius filius naves inde avertit neque postea litus adtiguit classemque ad insulas Baleares versus convertit.

24. Meantime Scipio, leaving a strong garrison at Utica, began his march, with the forces we have described above, and encamped first at Adrumetum; and then, after a stay of a few days, setting out in the night, he joined Petreius and Labienus, lodging all the forces in one camp, about three miles distant from Caesar's. Their cavalry made continual excursions to our very works, and intercepted those who

ventured too far in quest of wood or water, and obliged us to keep within our intrenchments. This soon occasioned a great scarcity of provision among Caesar's men, because no supplies had yet arrived from Sicily and Sardinia. The season, too, was dangerous for navigation, and he did not possess above six miles in each direction, in Africa, and was moreover greatly distressed for want of forage. The veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had been engaged in many wars both by sea and land, and often struggled with wants and misfortunes of this kind, gathering sea-weed, and washing it in fresh water, by that means subsisted their horses and cattle.

Scipio interim cum his copiis quas paulo ante demonstravimus, Uticae grandi praesidio relicto profectus primum Hadrumeti castra ponit, deinde ibi paucos dies commoratus noctu itinere facto cum Labieni et Petrei copiis coniungit, atque unis castris factis III milia passuum longe considunt. Equitatus interim eorum circum Caesaris munitiones vagari atque eos qui pabulandi atque aquandi gratia extra vallum progressi essent, excipere. Ita omnes adversarios intra munitiones continere. Quare Caesariani gravi annona sunt conflictati, ideo quod nondum neque ab Sicilia neque ab Sardinia commeatus subportatus erat, neque per anni tempus in mari classes sine periculo vagari poterant. Neque amplius milia passuum VI terrae Africae quoque versus tenebant pabulique inopia premebantur. Qua necessitate coacti veterani milites equitesque qui multa terra marique bella confecissent et periculis inopiaque tali saepe essent conflictati, alga e litore collecta et aqua dulci elota et ita iumentis esurientibus data vitam eorum producebant.

25. While things were in this situation, king Juba, being informed of Caesar's difficulties, and the few troops he had with him, resolved

not to allow him time to remedy his wants or increase his forces. Accordingly he left his kingdom, at the head of a large body of horse and foot, and marched to join his allies. Meantime P. Sittius, and king Bogud, having intelligence of Juba's march, joined their forces, entered Numidia, and laying siege to Cirta, the most opulent city in the county, carried it in a few days, with two others belonging to the Getulians. They had offered the inhabitants leave to depart in safety, if they would peaceably deliver up the town; but these conditions being rejected, they were taken by storm, and the citizens all put to the sword. They continued to advance, and incessantly harassed the cities and country; of which Juba having intelligence, though he was upon the point of joining Scipio and the other chiefs, determined that it was better to march to the relief of his own kingdom, than run the hazard of being driven from it while he was assisting others, and, perhaps, after all, miscarry too in his designs against Caesar. He therefore retired, with his troops, leaving only thirty elephants behind him, and marched to the relief of his own cities and territories.

Dum haec ita fierent, rex Iuba cognitis Caesaris difficultatibus copiarumque paucitate non est visum dari spatium convalescendi augendarumque eius opum. Itaque comparatis equitum magnis peditumque copiis subsidio sociis egressus e regno ire contendit. P. Sittius interim et rex Bocchus coniunctis suis copiis cognito regis Iubae egressu propius eius regnum copias suas admovere, Cirtamque oppidum opulentissimum eius regni adortus paucis diebus pugnando capit et praeterea duo oppida Gaetulorum. Quibus cum condicionem ferret ut oppido excederent idque sibi vacuum traderent, condicionemque repudiassent, postea ab eo capti interfectique sunt omnes. Inde progressus agros oppidaque vexare non destitit. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba cum iam non longe ab Scipione atque eius

ducibus abesset, capit consilium satius esse sibi suoque regno subsidio ire, quam dum alios adiuturus proficisceretur, ipse suo regno expulsus forsitan utraque re expelleretur. Itaque rursus recipere atque auxilia etiam ab Scipione abduxit sibi suisque rebus timens elephantisque XXX relictis suis finibus oppidisque suppetias profectus est.

26. Meanwhile Caesar, as there was a doubt in the province concerning his arrival, and no one believed that he had come in person, but that some of his lieutenants had come over with the forces lately sent, dispatched letters to all the several states, to inform them of his presence. Upon this, many persons of rank fled to his camp, complaining of the barbarity and cruelty of the enemy. Caesar deeply touched by their tears and complaints, although before he had remained inactive, resolved to take the field as soon as the weather would permit, and he could draw his troops together. He immediately dispatched letters into Sicily, to Allienus and Rabirius Posthumus the praetors [to tell them] that without delay or excuse, either of the winter or the winds, they must send over the rest of the troops, to save Africa from utter ruin; because, without some speedy remedy, not a single house would be left standing, nor any thing escape the fury and ravages of the enemy. And he himself was so anxious and impatient, that from the day the letters were sent, he complained without ceasing of the delay of the fleet, and had his eyes night and day turned toward the sea. Nor was it wonderful; for he saw the villages burned, the country laid waste, the cattle destroyed, the towns plundered, the principal citizens either slain or put in chains, and their children dragged into servitude under the name of hostages; nor could he, amid all this scene of misery, afford any relief to those who implored his protection, on account of the small number of his

forces. In the mean time he kept the soldiers incessantly at work upon the intrenchments, built forts and redoubts, and carried on his lines quite to the sea.

Caesar interim, cum de suo adventu dubitatio in provincia esset neque quisquam crederet ipsum, sed aliquem legatum in Africam cum copiis venisse, conscriptis litteris circum provinciam omnes civitates facit de suo adventu certiores. Interim nobiles homines ex suis oppidis profugere et in castra Caesaris devenire et de adversariorum eius crudelitate acerbitateque commemorare coeperunt. Quorum lacrimis querelisque Caesar commotus, cum antea constituisset stativis castris aestate inita cunctis copiis auxiliisque accitis bellum cum suis adversariis gerere,... instituit litteris[que] celeriter in Siciliam ad Allienum et Rabirium Postumum conscriptis et per catascopum missis, ut sine mora ac nulla excusatione hiemis ventorumque quam celerrime exercitus sibi transportaretur: Africam [provinciam] perire funditusque everti ab suis inimicis; quod nisi celeriter sociis foret subventum, praeter ipsam Africam terram nihil, ne tectum quidem quo se reciperent, ab illorum scelere insidiisque reliquum futurum. Atque ipse erat in tanta festinatione et exspectatione ut postero die quam misisset litteras nuntiumque in Siciliam, classem exercitumque morari diceret, dies noctesque oculos mentemque ad mare depositos directosque haberet. Nec mirum: animum advertebat enim villas exuri, agros vastari, pecus diripi, trucidari, oppida castellaque dirui deserique, principesque civitatum aut interfici aut in catenis teneri, liberos eorum obsidum nomine in servitutem abripi; eis se [in] miseris suamque fidem implorantibus auxilio propter copiarum paucitatem esse non posse. Milites interim in opere exercere atque castra munire, turre castella facere molesque iacere in mare non intermittere.

27. Meanwhile Scipio made use of the following contrivance for training and disciplining his elephants. He drew up two parties in order of battle; one of slingers, who were to act as enemies, and discharge small stones against the elephants: and fronting them, the elephants themselves, in one line, and his whole army behind him in battle- array; that when the enemy, by their discharge of stones, had frightened the elephants, and forced them to turn upon their own men, they might again be made to face the enemy, by the volleys of stones from the army behind them. The work however, went on but slowly, because these animals, after many years' training, are dangerous to both parties when brought into the field.

Scipio interim elefantos hoc modo condocere facere instituit. Duas instruxit acies, unam funditorum contra elefantos quae quasi adversariorum locum obtineret et contra eorum frontem adversam lapillos minutos mitteret; deinde in ordine elefantos constituit, post illos autem suam aciem instruxit, ut cum ab adversariis lapides mitti coepissent et elephanti perterriti se ad suos convertissent, rursus ab sua acie lapidibus missis eos converterent adversus hostem. Quod aegre tardeque fiebat; rudes enim elephanti multorum annorum doctrina usuque vetusto vix edocti tamen communi periculo in aciem producuntur.

28. While the two generals were thus employed near Ruspina, C. Virgilius, a man of praetorian rank, who commanded in Thapsus, a maritime city, observing some of Caesar's transports that had missed their way, uncertain where Caesar had landed or held his camp; and thinking that a fair opportunity offered of destroying them, manned a galley that was in the port with soldiers and archers, and joining with it a few armed barks, began to pursue Caesar's ships. Though he was

repulsed on several occasions he still pursued his design, and at last fell in with one, on board of which were two young Spaniards, of the name of Titius, who were tribunes of the fifth legion, and whose father had been made a senator by Caesar. There was with them a centurion of the same legion, T. Salienus by name, who had invested the house of M. Messala, Caesar's lieutenant, at Messana, and made use of very seditious language; nay, had even seized the money and ornaments destined for Caesar's triumph, and for that reason dreaded his resentment. He, conscious of his demerits, persuaded the young men to surrender themselves to Virgilius, by whom they were sent under a strong guard to Scipio, and three days after put to death. It is said, that the elder Titius begged of the centurions who were charged with the execution, that he might be first put to death; which being easily granted, they both suffered according to their sentence.

Dum haec ad Ruspinam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, C. Vergilius praetorius qui Thapsi oppido maritimo praeerat, cum animum advertisset naves singulas cum exercitu Caesaris incertas locorum atque castrorum suorum vagari, occasionem nactus navem quam ibi habuit actuariam complet militibus et sagittariis et eidem scaphas de navibus adiungit ac singulas naves Caesarianas consecrari coepit. Et cum plures adortus esset, pulsus fugatusque inde discessisset nec tamen desisteret periclitari, forte incidit in navem in qua erant duo Titi Hispani adolescentes, tribuni legionis V quorum patrem Caesar in senatum legerat, et cum his T. Salienus centurio legionis eiusdem qui M. Messalam legatum obsederat Messanae [et] seditiosissima oratione apud eum usus idemque pecuniam et ornamenta triumphii Caesaris retinenda et custodienda curarat et ob has causas sibi timebat. Hic propter conscientiam peccatorum suorum persuasit adolescentibus, ne repugnarent seseque Vergilio

traderent. Itaque deducti a Vergilio ad Scipionem custodibus traditi et post diem tertium sunt interfecti. Qui cum ducerentur ad necem, petisse dicitur maior Titius a centurionibus uti se priorem quam fratrem interficerent, idque ab eis facile impetrasse, atque ita esse interfectos.

29. The cavalry that mounted guard in the two camps were continually skirmishing with one another. Sometimes too the German and Gallic cavalry of Labienus entered into discourse with those of Caesar, after promising not to injure one another. Meantime Labienus, with a party of horse, endeavored to surprise the town of Leptis, which Saserna guarded with three cohorts; but was easily repulsed, because the town was strongly fortified, and well provided with warlike engines; he however renewed the attempt several times. One day, as a strong squadron of the enemy had posted themselves before the gate, their officer being slain by an arrow discharged from a cross-bow, and pinned to his own shield, the rest were terrified and took to flight; by which means the town was delivered from any further attempts.

Turmae interim equitum quae pro vallo in stationibus esse solebant [ab utrisque ducibus], cotidie minutis proeliis inter se depugnare non intermittunt. Nonnumquam etiam Germani Gallicque Labieniani cum Caesaris equitibus fide data inter se colloquebantur. Labienus interim cum parte equitatus Leptim oppi dum cui praeerat Saserna cum cohortibus VI, oppugnare ac vi inrumpere conabatur. Quod ab defensoribus propter egregiam munitionem oppidi et multitudinem tormentorum facile et sine periculo defendebatur. Quod ubi saepius eius equitatus facere non intermittebat, et cum forte ante portam turma densa adstitisset, scorpione accuratius misso atque eorum

decurione percusso et ad eum adfixo, reliqui perterriti fuga se in castra recipiunt. Quo facto postea sunt deterriti oppidum temptare.

30. At the same time Scipio daily drew up his troops in order of battle, about three hundred paces from his camp; and after continuing in arms the greatest part of the day, retreated again to his camp in the evening. This he did several times, no one mean while offering to stir out of Caesar's camp, or approach his forces; which forbearance and tranquillity gave him such a contempt of Caesar and his army, that drawing out all his forces, and his thirty elephants, with towers on their backs, and extending his horse and foot as wide as possible, he approached quite up to Caesar's intrenchments.

Scipio interim fere cotidie non longe a suis castris passus CCC instruere aciem ac maiore parte diei consumpta rursus in castra se recipere. Quod cum saepius fieret, neque ex Caesaris castris quisquam prodiret neque propius eius copias accederet, despecta patientia Caesaris exercitusque eius, [Iuba] universis copiis productis elephantisque turritis XXX ante aciem instructis quam latissime potuit porrecta equitum peditumque multitudine uno tempore progressus haud ita longe a Caesaris castris constitit in campo.

31. Upon perceiving this, Caesar, quietly, and without noise or confusion, recalled to his camp all that were gone out either in quest of forage, wood, or to work upon the fortifications: he likewise ordered the cavalry that were upon guard not to quit their post until the enemy were within reach of dart; and if they then persisted in advancing, to retire in good order within the intrenchments. He ordered the rest of the cavalry to be ready and armed, each in his own place. These orders were not given by himself in person, or after viewing the disposition of the enemy from the rampart; but such was

his consummate knowledge of the art of war, that he gave all the necessary directions by his officers, he himself sitting in his tent, and informing himself of the motions of the enemy by his scouts. He very well knew, that, whatever confidence the enemy might have in their numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the camp of a general who had so often repulsed, terrified, and put them to flight; who had frequently pardoned and granted them their lives; and whose very name had weight and authority enough to intimidate their army. He was besides well intrenched with a high rampart and deep ditch, the approaches to which were rendered so difficult by the sharp spikes which he had disposed in a very skillful manner, that they were even sufficient of themselves to keep off the enemy. He had also a large supply of cross-bows, engines, and all sorts of weapons necessary for a vigorous defense, which he had prepared on account of the fewness of his troops, and the inexperience of his new levies. It was not owing to being influenced by the fear of the enemy or their numerical strength, that he allowed himself to appear daunted in their estimation. And it was not owing to his having any doubts of gaining the victory that he did not lead his troops to action, although they were raw and few, but he thought that it was a matter of great importance, what sort the victory should be: for he thought that it would disgrace him, if after so many noble exploits, and defeating such powerful armies, and after gaining so many glorious victories, he should appear to have gained a bloody victory over the remnants who had rallied after their flight. He determined, in consequence of this, to endure the pride and exultation of his enemies, until some portion of his veteran legion should arrive in the second embarkation.

Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar iubet milites qui extra munitiones

processerant [quique] pabulandi lignandique aut etiam muniendi gratia quique vallum petierant quaeque ad eam rem opus erant, omnes intra munitiones minutatim modesteque sine tumultu aut terrore se recipere atque in opere consistere. Equitibus autem qui in statione fuerant, praecipit ut usque eo locum optinerent in quo paulo ante constitissent, donec ab hoste telum missum ad se perveniret. Quodsi propius accederetur, quam honestissime se intra munitiones reciperent. Alii quoque equitatu edicit uti suo quisque loco paratus armatusque praesto esset. Atque haec non ipse per se coram, cum de vallo prospectaretur, sed mirabili peritus scientia bellandi in praetorio sedens per speculatores et nuntios imperabat quae fieri volebat. Animadvertibat enim quamquam magnis essent copiis adversarii freti, tamen saepe a se fugatis pulsus perterritisque et concessam vitam et ignota peccata; quibus rebus numquam tanta suppeteret ex ipsorum inertia conscientiaque animi victoriae fiducia ut castra sua adoriri auderent. Praeterea ipsius nomen auctoritasque magna ex parte eorum exercitus minuebat audaciam. Tum egregiae munitiones castrorum atque valli fossarumque altitudo et extra vallum stili caeci mirabilem in modum consiti vel sine defensoribus aditum adversariis prohibebant: scorpionum catapultarum ceterorumque telorum quae ad defendendum solent parari, magnam copiam habebat. Atque haec propter exercitus sui praesentis paucitatem et tirocinium praeparaverat, non hostium vi et metu commotus patientem se timidumque hostium opinioni praebebat. Neque idcirco copias quamquam erant paucae tironumque, non educebat in aciem quod victoriae suorum diffideret, sed referre arbitrabatur cuiusmodi victoria esset futura; turpe enim sibi existimabat tot rebus gestis tantisque exercitibus devictis, tot tam claris victoriis partis, ab reliquis copiis adversariorum suorum ex

fuga collectis se cruentam adeptum existimari victoriam. Itaque constituerat gloriam exsultationemque eorum pati, donec sibi veteranarum legionum pars aliqua in secundo commeatu occurrisset.

32. Scipio, after a short stay before the intrenchments, as if in contempt of Caesar, withdrew slowly to his camp: and having called the soldiers together, enlarged upon the terror and despair of the enemy, when encouraging his men, he assured them of a complete victory in a short time. Caesar made his soldiers again return to the works, and under pretense of fortifying his camp, inured the new levies to labor and fatigue. Meantime the Numidians and Getulians deserted daily from Scipio's camp. Part returned home; part came over to Caesar, because they understood he was related to C. Marius, from whom their ancestors had received considerable favors. Of these he selected some of distinguished rank, and sent them home, with letters to their countrymen, exhorting them to levy troops for their own defense, and not to listen to the suggestions of his enemies.

Scipio interim paulisper ut antea dixi in eo loco commoratus, ut quasi despexisse Caesarem videretur, paulatim reducit suas copias in castra et contione advocata de terrore suo desperationeque exercitus Caesaris facit verba et cohortatus suos victoriam propriam se eis brevi daturum pollicetur. Caesar iubet milites rursus ad opus redire et per causam munitionum tirones in labore defatigare non intermittit. Interim Numidae Gaetuli[que] diffugere cotidie ex castris Scipionis et partim in regnum se conferre, partim quod ipsi maioresque eorum beneficio C. Marii usi fuissent Caesaremque eius adfinem esse audiebant, in eius castra perfugere catervatim non intermittunt. Quorum ex numero electis hominibus inlustrioribus [Gaetulos] et litteris ad suos cives datis cohortatus uti manu facta se suosque

defenderent, ne suis inimicis adversariisque dicto audientes essent, mittit.

33. While these things were passing near Ruspina, deputies from Acilla, a free town, and all the neighboring towns, arrived in Caesar's camp, and promised "to be ready to execute Caesar's commands, and to do so withal, and that they only begged and requested of him to give them garrisons, that they might do so in safety and without danger to themselves, that they would furnish them with corn and whatever supplies they had, to secure the common safety. Caesar readily complied with their demands, and having assigned a garrison, sent C. Messius, who had been aedile, to command in Acilla. Upon intelligence of this, Considius Longus, who was at Adrumetum with two legions and seven hundred horse, leaving a garrison in that city, hastened to Acilla at the head of eight cohorts: but Messius, having accomplished his march with great expedition, arrived there before him. When Considius, therefore, approached, and found Caesar's garrison in possession of the town, not daring to make any attempt, he returned again to Adrumetum. But some days after, Labienus having sent him a reinforcement of horse, he began to besiege the town.

Dum haec ad Ruspinam fiunt, legati ex Acylla civitate libera et immunique, ad Caesarem veniunt seque paratos quaecumque imperasset, et libenti animo facturos pollicentur; tantum orare et petere ab eo uti sibi praesidium daret, quo tutius id et sine periculo facere possent; se et frumentum et quaecumque res eis suppeteret, communis salutis gratia subministraturos. Quibus rebus facile a Caesare impetratis praesidioque dato, C. Messium aedilicia functum potestate Acyllam iubet proficisci. Quibus rebus cognitis Considius

Longus qui Hadrumeti cum duabus legionibus et equitibus DCC praeerat, celeriter ibi parte praesidii relictā cum VIII cohortibus ad Acyllam ire contendit. Messius celerius itinere confecto prior Acyllam cum cohortibus pervenit. Considius interim cum ad urbem cum copiis accessisset et animadvertisset praesidium Caesaris ibi esse, non ausus periculum suorum facere nulla re gesta pro multitudine hominum rursus se Hadrumetum recepit; deinde paucis post diebus equestribus copiis a Labieno adductis rursus Acyllitanos castris positīs obsidere coepit.

34. Much about the same time, C. Sallustius Crispus, who, as we have seen, had been sent a few days before to Cercina with a fleet, arrived in that island. Upon his arrival, C. Decimus the quaestor, who, with a strong party of his own domestics, had charge of the magazines erected there, went on board a small vessel and fled. Sallustius meanwhile was well received by the Cercinates, and finding great store of corn in the island, loaded all the ships then in the port, whose number was very considerable, and dispatched them to Caesar's camp. At the same time Allienus, the proconsul, put on board of the transports at Lilybaeum the thirteenth and fourteenth legions, with eight hundred Gallic horse and a thousand archers and slingers, and sent the second embarkation to Africa, to Caesar. This fleet meeting with a favorable wind, arrived in four days at Ruspina, where Caesar had his camp. Thus he experienced a double pleasure on this occasion, receiving at one and the same time, both a supply of provisions and a reinforcement of troops, which animated the soldiers, and delivered them from the apprehensions of want. Having landed the legions and cavalry, he allowed them some time to recover from the fatigue and sickness of their voyage, and then distributed them into the forts, and along the works.

Per id tempus C. Sallustius Crispus quem paucis ante diebus missum a Caesare cum classe demonstravimus, Cercinam pervenit. Cuius adventu C. Decimius quaestorius qui ibi cum grandi familiae suae praesidio praeerat commeatui, parvulum navigium nactus conscendit ac se fugae commendat. Sallustius interim praetor a Cercinitanis receptus magno numero frumenti invento naves onerarias quarum ibi satis magna copia fuit, complet atque in castra ad Caesarem mittit. Allienus interim pro consule Lilybaeo in navis onerarias imponit legionem XIII et XIII et equites Gallos DCCC, funditorum sagittariorumque mille ac secundum commeatum in Africam mittit ad Caesarem. Quae naves ventum secundum nactae quarto die in portum ad Ruspina, ubi Caesar castra habuerat, incolumes pervenerunt. Ita Caesar duplici laetitia ac voluptate uno tempore auctus, frumento auxiliisque, tandem suis hilaratis annonae levata sollicitudinem deponit, legiones equitesque ex navibus egressos iubet ex languore nauseaque reficere, dimissos in castella munitionesque disponit.

35. Scipio and the other generals were greatly surprised at this conduct, and could not conceive why Caesar, who had always been forward and active in war, should all of a sudden change his measures; which they therefore suspected must proceed from some very powerful reasons. Uneasy and disturbed to see him so patient, they made choice of two Getulians, on whose fidelity they thought they could rely; and promising them great rewards, sent them, under the name of deserters, to get intelligence of Caesar's designs. When they were brought before him, they begged they might have leave to speak without personal danger, which being granted, "It is now a long time, great general," said they, "since many of us Getulians, clients of C. Marius, and almost all Roman citizens of the fourth and

sixth legions, have wished for an opportunity to come over to you; but have hitherto been prevented by the guards of Numidian horse, from doing it without great risk. Now we gladly embrace the occasion, being sent by Scipio under the name of deserters, to discover what ditches and traps you have prepared for his elephants, how you intended to oppose these animals, and what dispositions you are making for battle.” They were praised by Caesar, and liberally rewarded, and sent to the other deserters. We had soon a proof of the truth of what they had advanced; for the next day a great many soldiers of these legions, mentioned by the Getulians, deserted to Caesar’s camp.

Quibus rebus Scipio quique cum eo essent comites mirari et requirere: C. Caesarem qui ultro consuisset bellum inferre ac lacescere proelio, subito commutatum non sine magno consilio suspicabantur. Itaque ex eius patientia in magnum timorem coniecti ex Gaetulis duos quos arbitrabantur suis rebus amicissimos, magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque propositis pro perfugis speculandi gratia in castra Caesaris mittunt. Qui simul ad eum sunt deducti, petierunt ut sibi liceret vera sine periculo proloqui. Potestate facta ‘saepenumero’ inquiunt ‘imperator, complures Gaetuli qui sumus clientes C. Marii et propemodum omnes cives Romani, qui sunt in legione IIII et VI, ad te volumus in tuaque praesidia confugere. Sed custodiis equitum Numidarum quo id sine periculo minus faceremus impediabamur. Nunc data facultate pro speculatoribus missi ab Scipione ad te cupidissime venimus ut perspiceremus, numquae fossae aut insidiae elephantis ante castra portasque valli factae essent, simulque consilia vestra contra easdem bestias comparisonemque pugnae cognosceremus atque eis renuntiarem.’ qui collaudati a Caesare stipendioque donati ad reliquos perfugas

deducuntur. Quorum orationem celeriter veritas comprobavit: namque postero die ex legionibus his quas Gaetuli nominarunt, milites legionarii complures ab Scipione in castra Caesaris perfugerunt.

36. While affairs were in this posture at Ruspina, M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, was daily enlisting freed- men, Africans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear arms, and sending them without intermission to Scipio's camp. Meanwhile deputies from the town of Tisdra came to Caesar to inform him, that some Italian merchants had brought three hundred thousand bushels of corn into that city, and to demand a garrison as well for their own defense as to secure the corn. Caesar thanked the deputies, promised to send the garrison they desired, and having encouraged them, sent them back to their fellow-citizens. Meantime P. Sittius entered Numidia with his troops, and took by storm a castle situated on a mountain, where Juba had laid up a great quantity of provisions, and other things necessary for carrying on the war.

Dum haec ad Ruspina geruntur, M. Cato qui Uticae praeerat, dilectus cotidie libertinorum Afrorum, servorum denique et cuiusquemodi generis hominum qui modo per aetatem arma ferre poterant, habere atque sub manum Scipioni in castra submittere non intermittit. Legati interim ex oppido Thysdrae, in quod tritici modium milia CCC comportata fuerant a negotiatoribus Italicis aratoribusque, ad Caesarem venire, quantaque copia frumenti apud se sit docent, simulque orant ut sibi praesidium mittat, quo facilius et frumentum et copiae suae conserventur. Quibus Caesar in praesentia gratias egit praesidiumque brevi tempore se missurum dixit cohortatusque ad suos cives iubet proficisci. P. Sittius interim cum

copiis Numidiaae fines ingressus castellum in montis loco munito locatum, in quod Iuba belli gerendi gratia et frumentum et res ceteras quae ad bellum usui solent esse comportaverat, vi expugnando est potitus.

37. Caesar, having increased his forces with two veteran legions, and all the cavalry and light-armed troops that had arrived in the second embarkation, detached six transports to Lilybaeum, to bring over the rest of the army. He himself on the sixth day before the calends of February, ordering the scouts and lictors to attend him at six in the evening, drew out all the legions at midnight, and directed his march toward Ruspina, where he had a garrison, and which had first declared in his favor, no one knowing or having the least suspicion of his design. Thence he continued his route, by the left of the camp, along the sea, and passed a little declivity, which opened into a fine plain, extending fifteen miles, and bordering upon a chain of mountains of moderate height, that formed a kind of theater. In this ridge were some hills that rose higher than the rest, on which forts and watchtowers had formerly been erected, and at the furthest of which, Scipio's guards and out-posts were stationed.

Caesar postquam legionibus veteranis duabus equitatu levique armatura copias suas ex secundo commeatu auxerat, naves exoneratas statim iubet Lilybaeum ad reliquum exercitum transportandum proficisci; ipse VI Kal. Febr. circiter vigilia prima imperat, speculatores apparitoresque omnes ut sibi praesto essent. Itaque omnibus insciis neque suspicantibus vigilia tertia iubet omnes legiones extra castra educi atque se consequi ad oppidum Ruspinae versus, in quo ipse praesidium habuit et quod primum ad amicitiam eius accessit. Inde parvulam proclivitatem degressus sinistra parte

campi propter mare legiones ducit. Hic campus mirabili planitie patet milia passuum XV; quem iugum cingens a mari ortum neque ita praealtum velut theatri efficit speciem. In hoc iugo colles sunt excelsi pauci, in quibus singulae turres speculaeque singulae perveteres erant collocatae, quarum apud ultimam praesidium et statio fuit Scipionis.

38. After Caesar gained the ridge, which I have just mentioned, and began to raise redoubts upon the several eminences (which he executed in less than half an hour), and when he was not very far from the last, which bordered on the enemy's camp, and where, as we have said, Scipio had his out-guard of Numidians, he stopped a moment; and having taken a view of the ground, and posted his cavalry in the most commodious situation, he ordered the legions to throw up an intrenchment along the middle of the ridge, from the place at which he was arrived to that whence he set out. When Scipio and Labienus observed this, they drew all their cavalry out of the camp, formed them in order of battle, and advancing about a mile, posted their infantry by way of a second line, somewhat less than half a mile from their camp.

Postquam Caesar ad iugum de quo docui, ascendit atque in unumquemque collem turrem castellaque facere coepit atque ea minus semihora effecit, et postquam non ita longe ab ultimo colle turrique fuit, quae proxima fuit castris adversariorum, in qua docui esse praesidium stationemque Numidarum, paulisper commoratus perspectaque natura loci equitatu in statione disposito legionibus opus adtribuit brachiumque medio iugo ab eo loco ad quem pervenerat, usque ad eum unde egressus erat, iubet derigi ac muniri. Quod postquam Scipio Labienusque animadverterant, equitatu omni ex castris educto acieque equestri instructa a suis munitionibus

circiter passus mille progrediuntur pedestremque copiam in secunda acie minus passus CCCC a suis castris constituunt.

39. Caesar was unmoved by the appearance of the enemy's forces, and encouraged his men to go on with the work. But when he perceived that they were within fifteen hundred paces of the intrenchment, and saw that the enemy were coming nearer to interrupt and disturb the soldiers and oblige him to draw off the legions from the work, he ordered a squadron of Spanish cavalry, supported by some light-armed infantry, to attack the Numidian guard upon the nearest eminence, and drive them from that post. They accordingly, advancing rapidly, attacked the Numidian cavalry: they took some of them alive, severely wounded several in their flight, and made themselves masters of the place. This being observed by Labienus, he wheeled off almost the whole right wing of the horse, that he might the more effectually succor the fugitives. Caesar waited till he was at a considerable distance from his own men, and then detached his left wing to intercept the enemy.

Caesar in opere milites adhortari neque adversariorum copiis moveri. Iam cum non amplius passus md inter hostium aciem suasque munitiones esse animadvertisset intellexissetque ad impediendos milites suos et ab opere depellendos hostem propius accedere et necesse haberet legiones a munitionibus deducere, imperat turmae Hispanorum ut ad proximum collem propere accurrerent praesidiumque inde deturbarent locumque caperent, eodemque iubet levis armaturae paucos consequi subsidio. Qui missi celeriter Numidas adorti partim vivos capiunt, nonnullos equites fugientes convulneraverunt locumque sunt potiti. Postquam id Labienus animadvertit, quo celerius iis auxilium ferret, ex acie instructa

equitatus sui prope totum dextrum cornu avertit atque suis fugientibus suppetias ire contendit. Quod ubi Caesar conspexit, Labienum ab suis copiis longius iam abscessisse, equitatus sui alam sinistram ad intercludendos hostes immisit.

40. In the plain where this happened was a large villa, with four turrets, which prevented Labienus from seeing that he was intercepted by Caesar's cavalry. He had therefore no apprehension of the approach of Caesar's horse till he found himself charged in the rear; which struck such a sudden terror into the Numidian cavalry that they immediately betook themselves to flight. The Gauls and Germans who stood their ground, being surrounded on all sides, were entirely cut off. This being perceived by Scipio's legions, who were drawn up in order of battle before the camp, they fled in the utmost terror and confusion. Scipio and his forces being driven from the plain and the hills, Caesar sounded a retreat, and ordered all the cavalry to retire behind the works. When the field was cleared, he could not forbear admiring the huge bodies of the Gauls and Germans, who had been partly induced by the authority of Labienus to follow him out of Gaul, and partly drawn over by promises and rewards. Some being made prisoners in the battle with Curio, and having their lives granted them, continued faithful out of gratitude. Their bodies, of surprising symmetry and size, lay scattered all over the plain.

Erat in eo campo ubi ea res gerebatur, villa permagna turribus IIII exstructa. Quae Labieni prospectum impendebat ne posset animum advertere ab equitatu Caesaris se intercludi. Itaque non prius vidit turmas Iulianas quam suos caedi a tergo sentit. Ex qua re subito in terrorem converso equitatu Numidarum recta in castra fugere

contendit. Galli Germanique qui restiterant, ex superiore loco et post tergum circumventi fortiterque resistentes conciduntur universi. Quod ubi legiones Scipionis quae pro castris erant instructae animum adverterunt, metu ac terrore obcaecatae omnibus portis in sua castra fugere coeperunt. Postquam Scipione eiusque copiis campo collibusque exturbatis atque in castra compulsis cum receptui Caesar cani iussisset equitatumque omnem intra suas munitiones recepisset, campo purgato animadvertit mirifica corpora Gallorum Germanorumque qui partim eius auctoritatem erant ex Gallia secuti, partim pretio pollicitationibus adducti ad eum se contulerant, nonnulli qui ex Curionis proelio capti conservatique parem gratiam in fide praebenda praestare voluerant. Horum corpora mirifica specie amplitudineque caesa toto campo ac prostrata diverse iacebant.

41. Next day, Caesar drew all his forces together, and formed them in order of battle upon the plain. Scipio, discouraged by so unexpected a check, and the number of his wounded and slain, kept within his lines. Caesar, with his army in battle array, marched along the roots of the hills, and gradually approached his trenches. Caesar's legions were, by this time, not more than a mile from Uzita, a town possessed by Scipio, when the latter, fearing lest he should lose the town, whence he procured water and other conveniences for his army, resolved therefore to preserve it, at all hazards, and brought forth his whole army, and drew them up in four lines, forming the first of cavalry, supported by elephants with castles on their backs. Caesar believing that Scipio approached with the intention of giving battle, continued where he was posted, not far from the town. Scipio meanwhile, having the town in the center of his front, extended his two wings, where were his elephants, in full view of our army.

His rebus gestis Caesar postero die ex omnibus praesidiis cohortes eduxit atque omnes suas copias in campo instruxit. Scipio suis male acceptis occisis convulneratisque intra suas continere se munitiones coepit. Caesar instructa acie secundum infimas iugi radices propius munitiones leniter accessit. Iamque minus mille passus ab oppido Uzitta quod Scipio tenebat aberant legiones Iulianae, cum Scipio veritus ne oppidum amitteret, unde aquari reliquisque rebus sublevari eius exercitus consuerat, eductis omnibus copiis quadruplici acie instructa, ex instituto suo prima equestri turmatim directa elephantisque turritis interpositis armatisque, suppetias ire contendit. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, arbitratus Scipionem ad dimicandum paratum ad se certo animo venire, in eo loco quo paulo ante commemoravi, ante oppidum constitit suamque aciem mediam eo oppido textit, dextrum sinistrumque cornu, ubi elephantum erant, in conspectu patenti adversariorum constituit.

42. When Caesar had waited till sunset, without finding that Scipio stirred from his post, who seemed rather disposed to defend himself by his advantageous situation, than hazard a battle in the open field, he did not think proper to advance further that day, because the enemy had a strong garrison of Numidians in the town, which besides covered the center of their front: and he foresaw great difficulty in forming, at the same time, an attack upon the town, and opposing their right and left, with the advantage of the ground; especially as the soldiers had continued under arms and fasted since morning. Having therefore led back his troops to their camp, he resolved next day to extend his lines nearer the town.

Cum iam prope solis occasum Caesar expectavisset neque ex eo loco quo constiterat Scipionem progredi propius se animadvertisset

locoque se magis defendere, si res coegisset, quam in campo comminus consistere audere, non est visa ratio propius accedendi eo die ad oppidum, quoniam ibi praesidium grande Numidarum esse cognoverat, hostesque mediam aciem suam oppido texisse et sibi difficile factu esse intellexit simul et oppidum uno tempore oppugnare et in acie in cornu dextro ac sinistro ex iniquiore loco pugnare, praesertim cum milites a mane diei ieiuni sub armis stetissent defatigati. Itaque reductis suis copiis in castra postero die propius eorum aciem instituit exporrigere munitiones.

43. Meantime Considius, who was besieging eight mercenary cohorts of Numidians and Getulians in Acilla, where P. Messius commanded, after continuing long before the place, and seeing all his works burned and destroyed by the enemy, upon the report of the late battle of the cavalry, set fire to his corn, destroyed his wine, oil, and other stores, which were necessary for the maintenance of his army; and abandoning the siege of Acilla, divided his forces with Scipio, and retired through the kingdom of Juba, to Adrumetum.

Interim Considius qui Acyllam et VIII cohortibus stipendiariis Numidis Gaetulisque obsidebat, ubi C. Messius qui cohortibus praeerat, diu multumque expertus magnisque operibus saepe admotis et his ab oppidanis incensis cum proficeret nihil, subito nuntio de equestri proelio adlato commotus, frumento cuius in castris copiam habuerat incenso, vino oleo ceterisque rebus quae ad victum parari solent corruptis Acyllam quam obsidebat deseruit atque itinere per regnum Iubae facto copias cum Scipione partitus Hadrumetum se recepit.

44. Meanwhile one of the transports, belonging to the second embarkation, which Allienus had sent from Sicily, in which were Q.

Cominius, and L. Ticida, a Roman knight, being separated from the rest of the fleet, in a storm, and driven to Thapsus, was taken by Virgilius, and all the persons on board sent to Scipio. A three-banked galley likewise, belonging to the same fleet, being forced by the winds to Aegimurum, was intercepted by the squadron under Varus and M. Octavius. In this vessel were some veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few new levies, whom Varus treated without insult, and sent under a guard to Scipio. When they came into his presence, and appeared before his tribunal: "I am satisfied," said he, "it is not by your own inclination, but at the instigation of your wicked general, that you impiously wage war on your fellow-citizens, and every man of worth. If, therefore, now that fortune has put you in our power, you will take this opportunity to unite with the good citizens, in the defense of the commonwealth, I am determined to give you life and money: therefore speak openly your sentiments."

Interea ex secundo commeatu quem a Sicilia miserat Alienus, navis una, in qua fuerat Q. Cominius et L. Ticida, eques Romanus, ab residua classe cum erravisset delataque esset vento ad Thapson, a Vergilio scaphis naviculisque actuariis excepta est et ad Scipionem adducta. Item altera navis trieris ex eadem classe errabunda ac tempestate delata ad Aegimurum a classe Vari et M. Octavi est capta, in quo milites veterani cum uno centurione et nonnulli tirones fuerunt; quos Varus adservatos sine contumelia deducendos curavit ad Scipionem. Qui postquam ad eum pervenerunt et ante suggestum eius constiterunt, 'non vestra' inquit 'sponte vos certo scio, sed illius scelerati vestri imperatoris impulsu et imperio coactos cives et optimum quemque nefarie consecrari. Quos quoniam fortuna in nostram detulit potestatem, si, id quod facere debetis, rem publicam cum optimo quoque defendetis, certum est vobis vitam et pecuniam

donare. Quapropter quid sentiatis proloquimini.’

45. Scipio having ended his speech, and expecting a thankful return to so gracious an offer, permitted them to reply; one of their number, a centurion of the fourteenth legion, thus addressed him: “Scipio,” says he (“for I can not give you the appellation of general), I return you my hearty thanks for the good treatment you are willing to show to prisoners of war; and perhaps I might accept of your kindness were it not to be purchased at the expense of a horrible crime. What! shall I carry arms, and fight against Caesar, my general, under whom I have served as centurion; and against his victorious army, to whose renown I have for more than thirty-six years endeavored to contribute by my valor? It is what I will never do, and even advise you not to push the war any further. You know not what troops you have to deal with, nor the difference betwixt them and yours: of which, if you please, I will give you an indisputable instance. Do you pick out the best cohort you have in your army, and give me only ten of my comrades, who are now your prisoners, to engage them: you shall see by the success, what you are to expect from your soldiers.”

Hac habita oratione Scipio cum existimasset pro suo beneficio sine dubio ab his gratias sibi actum iri, potestatem eis dicundi fecit. Ex eis centurio legionis xiv ‘pro tuo’ inquit ‘summo beneficio Scipio, tibi gratias ago — non enim imperatorem te appello — quod mihi vitam incolumitatemque belli iure capto polliceris, et forsan isto uterer beneficio, si non ei summum scelus adiungeretur. Egone contra Caesarem imperatorem meum apud quem ordinem duxi, eiusque exercitum pro cuius dignitate victoriaque amplius XXXVI annos depugnavi, adversus armatusque consistam? Neque ego istud facturus sum et te magnopere ut de negotio desistas adhortor. Contra

cuius enim copias contendas, si minus antea expertus es, licet nunc cognoscas. Elige ex tuis cohortem unam quam putas esse firmissimam, et constitue contra me; ego autem ex meis commilitonibus quos nunc in tua tenes potestate, non amplius X sumam. Tunc ex virtute nostra intelleges, quid ex tuis copiis sperare debeas.’

46. When the centurion had courageously made this reply, Scipio, incensed at his boldness, and resenting the affront, made a sign to some of his officers to kill him on the spot, which was immediately put in execution. At the same time, ordering the other veteran soldiers to be separated from the new levies, “Carry away.” said he, “these men, contaminated by the pollution of crime, and pampered with the blood of their fellow- citizens.” Accordingly they were conducted without the rampart, and cruelly massacred. The new-raised soldiers were distributed among his legions, and Cominius and Ticida forbade to appear in his presence. Caesar, concerned for his misfortune, broke, with ignominy, the officers whose instructions were to secure the coast, and advance to a certain distance into the main sea, to protect and facilitate the approach of the transports, but who had neglected their duty on that important station.

Postquam haec centurio praesenti animo adversus opinionem eius est locutus, ira percitus Scipio atque animi dolore incensus annuit centurionibus quid fieri vellet, atque ante pedes centurionem interficit reliquosque veteranos a tironibus iubet secerni. ‘ab ducite istos’ inquit ‘nefario scelere contaminatos et caede civium saginatos.’ sic extra vallum deducti sunt et cruciabiliter interfecti. Tirones autem iubet inter legiones dispertiri et Cominium cum Ticida in conspectum suum prohibet adduci. Qua ex re Caesar commotus eos

quos in stationibus cum longis navibus apud Thapsum custodiae causa in salo esse iusserat, ut suis onerariis longisque navibus praesidio essent, ob negligentiam ignominiae causa dimittendos ab exercitu gravissimumque in eos edictum proponendum curavit.

47. About this time a most incredible accident befell Caesar's army; for the Pleiades being set, about the second watch of the night, a terrible storm arose, attended by hail of an uncommon size. But what contributed to render this misfortune the greater was, that Caesar had not, like other generals, put his troops into winter quarters, but was every three or four days changing his camp, to gain ground on the enemy; which keeping the soldiers continually employed they were utterly unprovided with any conveniences to protect them from the inclemency of the weather. Besides, he had brought over his army from Sicily with such strictness, that neither officer nor soldier had been permitted to take their equipages or utensils with them, nor so much as a vessel or a single slave; and so far had they been from acquiring or providing themselves with any thing in Africa, that, on account of the great scarcity of provisions, they had even consumed their former stores. Impoverished by these accidents, very few of them had tents; the rest had made themselves a kind of covering, either by spreading their clothes, or with mats and rushes. But these being soon penetrated by the storm and hail, the soldiers had no resource left, but wandered up and down the camp, covering their heads with their bucklers to shelter them from the violence of the weather. In a short time the whole camp was under water, the fires extinguished, and all their provisions washed away or spoiled. The same night the shafts of the javelins belonging to the fifth legion, of their own accord, took fire.

Per id tempus fere Caesaris exercitui res accidit incredibilis auditu. Namque vergiliarum signo confecto circiter vigilia secunda noctis nimbus cum saxeae grandine subito est exortus ingens. Ad hoc autem incommodum accesserat quod Caesar non more superiorum temporum in hibernis exercitum continebat, sed in tertio quartoque die procedendo propiusque hostem accedendo castra communibat, opereque faciendo milites se circumspiciendi non habebant facultatem. Praeterea ita ex Sicilia exercitum transportabat ut praeter ipsum militem et arma nec vas nec mancipium neque ullam rem quae usu militi esse consuevit in naves imponi pateretur. In Africa autem non modo sibi quicquam non adquisierant aut paraverant, sed etiam propter annonae caritatem ante parta consumpserant. Quibus rebus attenuati oppido perquam pauci sub pellibus adquiescebant; reliqui ex vestimentis tentoriolis factis atque harundinibus storiisque contextis permanebant. Itaque subito imbre grandineque consecuta gravatis pondere tentoriis aquarumque vi subrutis deiectisque, nocte intempesta ignibus extinctis, rebus quae ad victum pertinent omnibus corruptis per castra passim vagabantur scutisque capita contegebant. Eadem nocte V legionis pilorum acumina sua sponte arserunt.

48. In the mean time, king Juba, having been informed of the cavalry actions with Scipio, and being earnestly solicited, by letters from that general, to come to his assistance, left Sabura at home with part of the army, to carry on the war against Sitius, and that he might add the weight of his authority to free Scipio's troops from the dread they had of Caesar, began his march, with three legions, eight hundred regular horse, a body of Numidian cavalry, great numbers of light-armed infantry, and thirty elephants. When he arrived he lodged himself, with those forces which I have described, in a separate

camp, at no great distance from that of Scipio. (Great alarm had prevailed for some time previously in Caesar's camp, and the report of his approach had increased and produced a general suspense and expectation among the troops. But his arrival, and the appearance of his camp, soon dispelled all these apprehensions; and they despised the king of Mauritania, now that he was present, as much as they had feared him when at a distance.) After this junction, any one might easily perceive that Scipio's courage and confidence were increased by the arrival of the king. For next day, drawing out all his own and the royal forces, with sixty elephants, he ranged them, in order of battle, with great ostentation advancing a little beyond his intrenchments, and, after a short stay, retreated to his camp.

Rex interim Iuba de equestri proelio Scipionis certior factus evocatusque ab eodem litteris praefecto Saburra cum parte exercitus contra Sittium relicto, ut secum ipse aliquid auctoritatis adderet exercitu Scipionis ac terrorem Caesaris, cum tribus legionibus equitibusque frenatis DCCC, Numidis sine frenis peditibusque levis armaturae grandi numero, elephantis XXX egressus e regno ad Scipionem est profectus. Postquam ad eum pervenit, castris regiis seorsum positis cum eis copiis quas commemoravi haud ita longe ab Scipione consedit. — erat in castris Caesaris superiore tempore magnus terror, et exspectatione copiarum regiarum exercitus eius magis suspensiore animo ante adventum Iubae commovebatur. Postquam vero castra castris contulit, despectis eius copiis omnem timorem deponit. Ita quam antea absens habuerat auctoritatem, eam omnem praesens dimiserat. — Quo facto cuivis facile fuit intellectu Scipioni additum animum fiduciamque regis adventu. Nam postero die universas suas regisque copias cum elephantis LX productas in aciem quam speciosissime potuit instruxit ac paulo longius

progressus ab suis munitionibus haud ita diu commoratus se recepit in castra.

49. Caesar, knowing that Scipio had received all the supplies he expected, and judging he would no longer decline coming to an engagement, began to advance along the ridge with his forces, extend his lines, secure them with redoubts, and possess himself of the eminences between him and Scipio. The enemy, confiding in their numbers, seized a neighboring hill, and thereby prevented the progress of our works. Labienus had formed the design of securing this post, and as it lay nearest his quarters, soon got thither.

Caesar postquam animadvertit Scipioni auxilia fere quae exspectasset omnia convenisse neque moram pugnandi ullam fore, per iugum summum cum copiis progredi coepit et brachia protinus ducere et castella munire propiusque Scipionem capiendo loca excelsa occupare contendit. Adversarii magnitudine copiarum confisi proximum collem occupaverant atque ita longius sibi progrediendi eripuerunt facultatem. Eiusdem collis occupandi [gratia] Labienus consilium ceperat et quo propiore loco fuerat, eo celerius occurrerat.

50. There was a broad and deep valley, of rugged descent, broken with caves, which Caesar had to pass before he could come to the hill which he wished to occupy, and beyond which was a thick grove of old olives. Labienus, perceiving that Caesar must march this way, and having a perfect knowledge of the country, placed himself in ambush, with the light- armed foot and part of the cavalry. At the same time he disposed some horse behind the hills, that when he should fall unexpectedly upon Caesar's foot, they might suddenly advance from behind the mountain. And thus Caesar and his army being attacked in front and rear, surrounded with danger on all sides,

and unable either to retreat or advance, would, he imagined, fall an easy prey to his victorious troops. Caesar, who had no suspicion of the ambushade, sent his cavalry before; and arriving at the place, Labienus's men, either forgetting or neglecting the orders of their general, or fearing to be trampled to death in the ditch by our cavalry, began to issue in small parties from the rock, and ascend the hill. Caesar's horse pursuing them, slew some, and took others prisoners; then making toward the hill drove thence Labienus's detachment and immediately took possession. Labienus, with a small party of horse, escaped with great difficulty by flight.

Erat convallis satis magna latitudine, altitudine praerupta, crebris locis speluncae in modum subrutis, quae erat transgredienda Caesari antequam ad eum collem quem capere volebat perveniretur. ultraque eam convallem olivetum vetus crebris arboribus condensum. Hic cum Labienus animadvertisset Caesarem si vellet eum locum occupare, prius necesse [esse] convallem olivetumque transgredi, eorum locorum peritus in insidiis cum parte equitatus levique armatura consedit et praeterea post montem collesque [Caesari se subito ostenderet] equites in occulto collocaverat, ut cum ipse ex improvviso legionarios adortus esset, ex colle se equitatus ostenderet, ut re duplici perturbatus Caesar eiusque exercitus neque retro regrediundi neque ultra procedendi oblata facultate circumventus concideretur. Caesar postquam equitatu ante praemisso inscius insidiarum cum ad eum locum venisset, adversarii sive obliti praeceptorum Labieni sive veriti ne in fossa ab equitibus opprimerentur, rari ac singuli de rupe prodire et summa petere collis. Quos Caesaris equites consecuti partim interfecerunt, partim vivorum sunt potiti. Deinde protinus collem petere contenderunt atque eum decusso Labieni praesidio celeriter occupaverunt. Labienus cum

parte equitum vix fuga sibi peperit salutem.

51. The cavalry having thus cleared the mountain, Caesar resolved to intrench himself there, and distributed the work to the legions. He then ordered two lines of communication to be drawn from the greater camp, across the plain on the side of Uzita, which stood between him and the enemy, and was garrisoned by a detachment of Scipio's army, and place them in such a manner as to meet at the right and left angles of the town. His design in this work was, that when he approached the town with his troops, and began to attack it, these lines might secure his flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from surrounding him, and compelling him to abandon the siege. It likewise gave his men more frequent opportunities of conversing with the enemy, and facilitated the means of desertion to such as favored his cause; many of whom had already come over, though not without great danger to themselves. He wanted also, by drawing nearer the enemy, to see if they really intended to come to an action, and in addition to all these reasons, that the place itself being very low, he might there sink some wells; whereas before he had a long and troublesome way to send for water. While the legions were employed in these works, part of the army stood ready drawn up before the trenches, and had frequent skirmishes with the Numidian horse and light-armed foot

Hac re per equites gesta Caesar legionibus opera distribuit atque in eo colle quo erat potitus castra munivit. Deinde ab suis maximis castris per medium campum e regione oppidi Uzittae, quod inter sua castra et Scipionis in planitie positum erat tenebaturque a Scipione, duo brachia instituit ducere et ita derigere ut ad angulum dextrum sinistrumque eius oppidi convenirent. Id hac ratione opus instruebat,

ut cum propius oppidum copias admovisset oppugnareque coepisset, tecta latera suis munitionibus haberet, ne ab equitatus multitudine circumventus ab oppugnatione deterreretur, praeterea quo facilius colloquia fieri possent, et siqui perfugere vellent, id quod antea saepe accidebat magno cum eorum periculo, tum facile et sine periculo fieret. Voluit etiam experiri, cum propius hostem accessisset, haberetne in animo dimicare. Accedebat etiam ad reliquas causas quod is locus depressus erat puteique ibi non nulli fieri [complures] poterant: aquatione enim longa et angusta utebantur. Dum haec opera quae ante dixi fiebant a legionibus, interim pars acie ante opus instructa sub hoste stabat; equites barbari levisque armaturae proeliis minutis comminus dimicabant.

52. A little before evening, when Caesar was drawing off his legions from the works, Juba, Scipio, and Labienus, at the head of all their horse and light-armed foot, fell furiously upon his cavalry; who, being overwhelmed by the sudden and general attack of so great a multitude, were forced to give ground a little. But the event was very different from what the enemy expected; for Caesar, leading back his legions to the assistance of his cavalry, they immediately rallied, turned upon the Numidians, and charging them vigorously while they were dispersed and disordered with the pursuit, drove them with great loss to the king's camp, and slew several of them. And had not night intervened, and the dust raised by the wind obstructed the prospect, Juba and Labienus would both have fallen into Caesar's hands, and their whole cavalry and light-armed infantry have been cut off. Meanwhile Scipio's men, of the fourth and sixth legions, left him in crowds, some deserting to Caesar's camp, others fleeing to such places as were most convenient for them. Curio's horse likewise, distrusting Scipio and his troops, followed the same

counsel.

Caesar ab eo opere cum iam sub vesperum copias in castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu levique armatura Iuba Scipio Labienus in legionarios impetum fecerunt. Equites Caesariani vi universae subitaque hostium multitudinis pulsus parumper cesserunt. Quae res aliter adversariis cecidit: namque Caesar ex medio itinere copiis reductis equitibus suis auxilium tulit; equites autem adventu legionum animo addito conversis equis in Numidas cupide insequentes dispersosque impetum fecerunt atque eos convulneratos usque in castra regia reppulerunt multosque ex his interfecerunt. Quodni in noctem proelium esset coniectum pulvisque vento elatus omnium prospectu offecisset, Iuba cum Labieno capti in potestatem Caesaris venissent, equitatusque cum levi armatura funditus ad internecionem deletus esset. Interim incredibiliter ex legione IIII et VI Scipionis milites diffugere partim in castra Caesaris, partim in quas quisque poterat regiones pervenire. Itemque equites Curioniani diffisi Scipioni eiusque copiis complures se eodem conferebant.

53. While these things were being carried on by Caesar and his opponents around Uzita, two legions, the ninth and tenth, sailing in transports from Sicily, when they came before Ruspina, observing Caesar's ships that lay at anchor about Thapsus, and fearing it might be the enemy's fleet stationed there to intercept them, imprudently stood out to sea; and after being long tossed by the winds, and harassed by thirst and famine, at last arrived at Caesar's camp.

Dum haec circum Uzittam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, legiones duae, X et VIII, ex Sicilia navibus onerariis profectae, cum iam non longe a portu Ruspinae abessent, conspicati naves Caesarianas quae in statione apud Thapsum stabant, veriti ne in

adversariorum ut insidiandi gratia ibi commorantium classem inciderent imprudentes, vela in altum dederunt ac diu multumque iactati tandem multis post diebus siti inopiaque confecti ad Caesarem perveniunt.

54. Soon after these legions were landed, Caesar, calling to mind their former licentious behaviour in Italy, and the rapines of some of their officers, seized the slight pretext furnished by C. Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, who, when he set out for Sicily, filled a ship entirely with his own slaves and horses, without taking on board one single soldier. Wherefore, summoning all the military tribunes and centurions to appear before his tribunal next day, he addressed them in these terms, "I could have wished that those, whose insolence and former licentious character have given me cause of complaint, had been capable of amendment, and of making a good use of my mildness, patience, and moderation. But since they know not how to confine themselves within due bounds, I intend to make an example of them, according to the law of arms, in order that others may be taught a better conduct. Because you, C. Avienus, when you were in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the Roman people to revolt from the republic and have been guilty of rapines and plunders in the municipal towns; and because you have never been of any real service, either to the commonwealth or to your general, and in lieu of soldiers, have crowded the transports with your slaves and equipage; so that, through your fault, the republic is in want of soldiers, who at this time are not only useful, but necessary; for all these causes, I break you with ignominy, and order you to leave Africa this very day. In like manner I break you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved yourself as a seditious officer, and as a bad citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusinus, have attained the

rank of centurions through my indulgence, and not through your own merit; and since you have been invested with that rank, have neither shown bravery in war, nor good conduct in peace, and have been more zealous in raising seditions, and exciting the soldiers against your general than in observing forbearance and moderation. I therefore think you unworthy of continuing centurions in my army: I break you, and order you to quit Africa as soon as possible.” Having concluded this speech, he delivered them over to some centurions, with orders to confine them separately on board a ship, allowing each of them a single slave to wait on him.

Quibus legionibus eitis memor in Italia pristinae licentiae militaris ac rapinarum certorum hominum parvulam modo causulam nactus, quod C. Avienus tribunus militum X legionis navem [ex] commeatu familia sua atque iumentis occupavisset neque militem unum ab Sicilia sustulisset, postero die de suggestu convocatis omnium legionum tribunis centurionibusque ‘Maxime vellem’ inquit ‘homines suae petulantiae nimiaeque libertatis aliquando finem fecissent meaeque lenitatis modestiae patientiaeque rationem habuissent. Sed quoniam ipsi sibi neque modum neque terminum constituunt, quo ceteri dissimiliter se gerant, egomet ipse documentum more militari constituam. C. Aviene, quod in Italia milites populi Romani contra rem publicam instigasti rapinasque per municipia fecisti quodque mihi reique publicae inutilis fuisti et pro militibus tuam familiam iumentaue in naves imposuisti tuaque opera militibus tempore necessario res publica caret, ob eas res ignominiae causa ab exercitu meo te removeo hodieque ex Africa abesse et quantum pote proficisci iubeo. Itemque te Aule Fonteii, quod tribunus militum seditiosus malusque civis fuisti, te ab exercitu dimitto. Tite Saliene M. Tiro C. Clusinas, cum ordines in meo

exercitu beneficio, non virtute [sit] consecuti ita vos gesseritis ut neque bello fortes neque pace boni aut utiles fueritis et magis in seditione concitandisque militibus adversum vestrum imperatorem quam pudoris modestiaeque fueritis studiosiores, indignos vos esse arbitror qui in meo exercitu ordines ducatis, missosque facio et quantum pote abesse ex Africa iubeo.’ Itaque traditos centurionibus et singulis non amplius singulos additos servos in navem imponendos separatim curavit.

55. Meantime the Getulian deserters, whom Caesar had sent home with letters and instructions, as we related above, arrived among their countrymen: who, partly swayed by their authority, partly by the name and reputation of Caesar, revolted from Juba; and speedily and unanimously taking up arms, scrupled not to act in opposition to their king. Juba, having thus three wars to sustain, was compelled to detach six cohorts from the army destined to act against Caesar, and send them to defend the frontiers of his kingdom against the Getulians.

Gaetuli interim perfugae quos cum litteris mandatisque a Caesare missos supra docuimus, ad suos cives perveniunt. Quorum auctoritate facile adducti Caesarisque nomine persuasi a rege Iuba desciscunt celeriterque cuncti arma capiunt contraque regem facere non dubitant. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba distentus triplici bello necessitateque coactus de suis copiis quas contra Caesarem adduxerat, sex cohortes in fines regni sui mittit quae essent praesidio contra Gaetulos.

56. Caesar, having finished his lines of communication, and pushed them so near the town, as to be just out of reach of dart, intrenched himself there. He caused warlike engines in great numbers to be

placed in the front of his works, wherewith he played perpetually against the town; and to increase the enemy's apprehensions, drew five legions out of his other camp. When this opportunity was presented, several persons of eminence and distinction earnestly requested an interview with their friends, and held frequent conferences, which Caesar foresaw would turn to his advantage. For the chief officers of the Getulian horse, with other illustrious men of that nation (whose fathers had served under C. Marius, and from his bounty obtained considerable estates in their country, but after Sylla's victory had been made tributaries to king Hiempsal), taking advantage of the night, when the fires were lighted, came over to Caesar's camp near Uzita, with their horses and servants, to the number of about a thousand.

Caesar brachiis perfectis promotisque usque eo ut telum ex oppido adigi non posset, castra munit, ballistis scorpionibusque crebris ante frontem castrorum contra oppidum collocatis defensores muri detertere non intermittit eoque quinque legiones ex superioribus castris deducit. Qua facultate oblata inlustriores notissimique conspectum amicorum propinquorumque efflagitabant atque inter se colloquebantur. Quae res quid utilitatis haberet, Caesarem non fallebat. Namque Gaetuli ex equitatu regio nobiliores equitumque praefecti quorum patres cum Mario ante meruerant eiusque beneficio agris finibusque donati post Sullae victoriam sub Hiempsalis regis erant dati potestatem, occasione capta nocte iam luminibus accensis cum equis calonibusque suis circiter mille perfugiunt in Caesaris castra quae erant in campo proxime locum Uzittae locata.

57. When Scipio and his party learned this, and were much annoyed at the disaster, they perceived, much about the same time, M.

Aquinius in discourse with C. Saserna. Scipio sent him word that he did not do well to correspond with the enemy. Aquinius, however, paid no attention to this reprimand, but pursued his discourse. Soon after, one of Juba's guards came to him and told him, in the hearing of Saserna, "The king forbids you to continue this conversation." He, being terrified by this order, immediately retired, and obeyed the command of the king. One can not wonder enough at this step in a Roman citizen, who had already attained to considerable honors in the commonwealth; that though neither banished his country, nor stripped of his possessions, he should pay a more ready obedience to the orders of a foreign prince than those of Scipio; and choose rather to behold the destruction of his party than return into the bosom of his country. And still greater insolence was shown by Juba, not to M. Aquinius, a man of no family, and an inconsiderable senator, but even to Scipio himself, a man of illustrious birth, distinguished honors, and high dignity in the state. For as Scipio, before the king's arrival, always wore a purple coat of mail, Juba is reported to have told him, that he ought not to wear the same habit as he did. Accordingly, Scipio changed his purple robe for a white one, submitting to Juba, a most haughty and insolent monarch.

Quod postquam Scipio quique cum eo erant cognoverunt, cum commoti ex tali incommodo essent, fere per id tempus M. Aquinium cum C. Saserna colloquentem viderunt. Scipio mittit ad Aquinium, nihil adtinere eum cum adversariis colloqui. Cum nihilo minus eius sermonem nuntius ad Scipionem referret sed restaret ut reliqua quae sibi vellet perageret, viator praeterea ab Iuba ad eum est missus qui diceret audiente Saserna 'vetat te rex colloqui'. Quo nuntio perterritus discessit et dicto audiens fuit regi. Usu venisse hoc civi Romano et ei qui ab populo Romano honores accepisset, incolumi

patria fortunisque omnibus Iubae barbaro potius oboedientem fuisse quam aut Scipionis obtemperasse nuntio aut caesis eiusdem partis civibus incolumem reverti malle! Atque etiam [et] superbius Iubae factum non in M. Aquinium hominem novum parvumque senatorem, sed in Scipionem hominem illa familia dignitate honoribus praestantem. Namque cum Scipio sagulo purpureo ante regis adventum uti solitus esset, dicitur Iuba cum eo egisse, non oportere illum eodem [uti] vestitu atque ipse uteretur. Itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese vestitum transferret et Iubae homini superbissimo ineptissimoque obtemperaret.

58. Next day they drew out all their forces from both camps; and forming them on an eminence not far from Caesar's camp, continued thus in order of battle. Caesar likewise drew out his men, and disposed them in battle array before his lines; not doubting but the enemy, who exceeded him in number of troops, and had been so considerably reinforced by the arrival of king Juba, would advance to attack him. Wherefore, having ridden through the ranks, encouraged his men, and gave them the signal of battle, he stayed, expecting the enemy's charge. For he did not think it advisable to remove far from his lines: because the enemy having a strong garrison in Uzita, which was opposite to his right wing, he could not advance beyond that place without exposing his flank to a sally from the town. He was also deterred by the following reason, because the ground before Scipio's army was very rough, and he thought it likely to disorder his men in the charge.

Postero die universas omnium copias de castris omnibus educunt et supercilium quoddam excelsum nacti non longe a Caesaris castris aciem constituunt atque ibi consistunt. Caesar item producit copias

celeriterque eis instructis ante suas munitiones quae erant in campo consistit, sine dubio existimans ultro adversarios, cum tam magnis copiis auxiliisque regis essent praediti promptiusque prosiluissent, acie secum concursuros propiusque se accessuros. Equo circumvectus legionesque cohortatus signo dato accessum hostium aucupabatur. Ipse enim a suis munitionibus longius non sine ratione [non] procedebat, quod in oppido Uzittae quod Scipio tenebat, hostium erant cohortes armatae; eidem autem oppido ad dextrum latus eius cornu erat oppositum, verebaturque ne si praetergressus esset, ex oppido eruptione facta ab latere eum adorti conciderent. Praeterea haec quoque eum causa tardavit, quod erat locus quidam perimpeditus ante aciem Scipionis quem suis impedimento ad ultro occurrendum fore existimabat.

59. And I think that I ought not to omit to describe the order of battle of both armies. Scipio drew up his troops in the following manner: he posted his own legions and those of Juba in the front; behind them the Numidians, as a body of reserve: but in so very thin ranks, and so far extended in length, that to see them at a distance you would have taken the main body for a simple line of legionaries, which was doubled only upon the wings. He placed elephants at equal distances on the right and left, and supported them by the light-armed troops and auxiliary Numidians. All the regular cavalry were on the right; for the left was covered by the town of Uzita, nor had the cavalry room to extend themselves on that side. Accordingly, he stationed the Numidian horse, with an incredible multitude of light-armed foot, about a thousand paces from his right, toward the foot of a mountain, considerably removed from his own and the enemy's troops. He did so with this intention, that, when the two armies should engage, his cavalry at the commencement of the action should take a longer

sweep, inclose Caesar's army and throw them into confusion by their darts. Such was Scipio's disposition.

Non arbitror esse praetermittendum quemadmodum exercitus utriusque fuerint in aciem instructi. Scipio hoc modo aciem derexit: collocarat in fronte suas et Iubae legiones, post eas autem Numidas in subsidiaria acie ita extenuatos et in longitudinem directos ut procul simplex esse acies media ab legionariis militibus videretur [in cornibus autem duplex esse existimabatur]. Elephantos dextro sinistroque cornu collocaverat aequalibus inter eos intervallis interiectis, post autem elephantos armaturas leves Numidasque auxiliares substituerat. Equitatum frenatum universum in suo dextro cornu disposuerat: sinistrum enim cornu oppido Uzitta claudebatur, neque erat spatium equitatus explicandi. Praeterea Numidas levisque armaturae infinitam multitudinem ad dextram partem suae aciei opposuerat fere interiecto non minus mille passum spatio et ad collis radices magis adpulerat longiusque ab adversariorum suisque copiis promovebat, id hoc consilio ut cum acies duae inter se concurrissent, initio certaminis paulo longius eius equitatus circumvectus ex improvviso clauderet multitudine sua exercitum Caesaris atque perturbatum iaculis configeret. Haec fuit ratio Scipionis eo die proeliandi.

60. Caesar's order of battle, to describe it from left to right, was arranged in the following manner: the ninth and eighth legions formed the left wing; the thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and twenty-sixth, the main body; and the thirtieth and twenty-eighth the right. His second line on the right consisted partly of the cohorts of those legions we have already mentioned, partly of the new levies. His third line was posted to the left, extending as far as the middle

legion of the main body, and so disposed, that the left wing formed a triple order of battle. The reason of this disposition was, because his right wing being defended by the works, it behooved him to make his left stronger, that they might be a match for the numerous cavalry of the enemy; for which reason he had placed all his horse there, intermixed with light-armed foot; and as he could not rely much upon them, had detached the fifth legion to sustain them. He placed archers up and down the field, but principally in the two wings.

Caesaris autem acies hoc modo fuit collocata: ut ab sinistro eius cornu ordiar et ad dextrum perveniam, habuit legionem X et VIII in sinistro cornu, XXV XXVIII XIII XIV XXVIII XXVI in media acie. Fere ipsum dextrum cornu secundam autem aciem fere in earum legionum parte cohortium collocaverat, praeterea ex tironum adiecerat paucas. Tertiam autem aciem in sinistrum suum cornu contulerat et usque ad aciei suae mediam legionem porrexerat et ita collocaverat uti sinistrum suum cornu esset triplex. Id eo consilio fecerat quod suum dextrum latus munitionibus adiuwabatur, sinistrum autem equitatus hostium multitudini uti resistere posset laborabat, eodemque suum omnem equitatum contulerat, et quod ei parum confidebat, praesidio his equitibus legionem V praemiserat levemque armaturam inter equites interposuerat. Sagittarios varie passimque locis certis maximeque in cornibus collocaverat.

61. The two armies thus facing one another in order of battle, with a space of no more than three hundred paces between, continued so posted from morning till night without fighting, of which perhaps there was never an instance before. But when Caesar began to retreat within his lines, suddenly all the Numidian and Getulian horse without bridles, who were posted behind the enemy's army, made a

motion to the right, and began to approach Caesar's camp on the mountain; while the regular cavalry under Labienus continued in their post to keep our legions in check. Upon this, part of Caesar's cavalry, with the light-armed foot, advancing hastily, and without orders, against the Getulians, and venturing to pass the morass, found themselves unable to deal with the superior multitude of the enemy; and being abandoned by the light-armed troops, were forced to retreat in great disorder, after the loss of one trooper, twenty-six light-armed foot, and many of their horses wounded. Scipio, overjoyed at this success, returned toward night to his camp. But fortune determined not to give such unalloyed joy to those engaged in war, for the day after, a party of horse, sent by Caesar to Leptis in quest of provisions, falling in unexpectedly with some Numidian and Getulian stragglers, killed or made prisoners about a hundred of them. Caesar, meanwhile, omitted not every day to draw out his men and labor at the works; carrying a ditch and rampart quite across the plain, to prevent the incursions of the enemy. Scipio likewise drew lines opposite to Caesar's, and used great exertions lest Caesar should cut off his communication with the mountain. Thus both generals were busied about their intrenchments, yet a day seldom passed, without some skirmish between the cavalry.

Sic utrorumque exercitus instructi non plus passum CCC interiecto spatio, quod forsitan ante id tempus acciderit numquam quin dimicaretur, a mane usque ad horam X die perstiterunt. Itemque Caesar dum exercitum intra munitiones suas reducere coepisset, subito universus equitatus ulterior Numidarum Gaetulorumque sine frenis ad dextram partem se movere propiusque Caesaris castra quae erant in colle se conferre coepit, frenatus autem Labieni eques in loco permanere legionesque distinere: cum subito pars equitatus Caesaris

cum levi armatura contra Gaetulos iniussu ac temere longius progressi paludemque transgressi multitudinem hostium pauci sustinere non potuerunt levique armatura deserta [ac] convulneratique uno equite amisso, multis equis sauciis, levis armaturae XXVII occisis ad suos refugerunt. Quo secundo equestri proelio facto Scipio laetus in castra nocte copias reduxit. Quod proprium gaudium bellantibus Fortuna tribuere non decrevit. Namque postero die Caesar cum partem equitatus sui frumentandi gratia Leptim misisset, in itinere praedatores equites Numidas Gaetulosque ex improvise adorti circiter centum partim occiderunt, partim vivorum potiti sunt. Caesar interim cotidie legiones in campum deducere atque opus facere vallumque et fossam per medium campum ducere adversariorumque excursionibus [iter] officere non intermittit. Scipio item munitiones contra facere et ne iugo a Caesare excluderetur adproperare, ita ut duces utrique et in operibus occupati essent, et nihilo minus equestribus proeliis inter se cotidie dimicabant.

62. In the mean time, Varus, upon notice that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed from Sicily, speedily equipped the fleet he had brought to winter at Utica; and manning it with Getulian rowers and mariners, went out a cruising and came before Adrumetum with fifty-five ships. Caesar, ignorant of his arrival, sent L. Cispus, with a squadron of twenty-seven sail toward Thapsus, to anchor there for the security of his convoys; and likewise dispatched Q. Aquila to Adrumetum, with thirteen galleys, upon the same errand. Cispus soon reached the station appointed to him: but Aquila being attacked by a storm could not double the cape, which obliged him to put into a creek at some distance, that afforded convenient shelter. The rest of the fleet which remained at sea before Leptis, where the mariners

having landed and wandered here and there upon the shore, some having gone into the town for the purpose of purchasing provisions, was left quite defenseless. Varus, having notice of this from a deserter, and resolving to take advantage of the enemy's negligence, left Adrumetum in Cothon at the commencement of the second watch, and arriving early next morning with his whole fleet before Leptis, burned all the transports that were out at sea, and took without opposition two five-benched galleys, in which were none to defend them.

Interim Varus classem quam antea Uticae hiemis gratia subduxerat, cognito legionis VII et VIII ex Sicilia adventu celeriter deducit ibique Gaetulis remigibus epibatisque complet insidiandique gratia ab Utica progressus Hadrumetum cum IV navibus pervenit. Cuius adventus inscius Caesar Lucium Cispium cum classe XXVII navium ad Thapsum versus in stationem praesidii gratia commeatus sui mittit itemque Quintum Aquilam cum XIII navibus longis Hadrumetum eadem de causa praemittit. Cispium quo erat missus celeriter pervenit, Aquila tempestate iactatus promunturium superare non potuit atque angulum quendam tutum a tempestate nactus cum classe se longius a prospectu removit. Reliqua classis in salo ad Leptim egressis remigibus passimque in litore vagantibus, partim in oppidum victus sui mercandi gratia progressis vacua a defensoribus stabat. Quibus rebus Varus ex perfugis cognitis occasionem nactus vigilia secunda Hadrumeto ex cothone egressus primo mane Leptim cum universa classe vectus naves onerarias quae longius a portu in salo stabant vacuas a defensoribus incendit et penteres duas nullo repugnante cepit.

63. Caesar had an account brought him of this unlucky accident, as

he was inspecting the works of his camp. Whereupon he immediately took horse, and leaving every thing else, went full speed to Leptis, which was but two leagues distant, and going on board a brigantine, ordered all the ships to follow him. He soon came up with Aquila, whom he found dismayed and terrified at the number of ships he had to oppose; and continuing his course, began to pursue the enemy's fleet. Meantime Varus, astonished at Caesar's boldness and dispatch, tacked about with his whole fleet, and made the best of his way for Adrumetum. But Caesar, after four miles' sail, recovered one of his galleys, with the crew and a hundred and thirty of the enemy's men left to guard her; and took a three benched galley belonging to the enemy which had fallen astern during the engagement, with all the soldiers and mariners on board. The rest of the fleet doubled the cape, and made the port of Adrumetum in Cothon. Caesar could not double the cape with the same wind, but keeping the sea at anchor all night, appeared early next morning before Adrumetum. He set fire to all the transports without Cothon, and took what galleys he found there, or forced them into the harbor; and having waited some time to offer the enemy battle, returned again to his camp.

Caesar interim celeriter per nuntios in castris, cum opera circumiret, certior factus, quae aberant a portu milia passuum vi, equo admisso omissis omnibus rebus celeriter pervenit Leptim ibique hortatur omnes ut se naves consequerentur; [postea] ipse parvulum navigiolum conscendit, in cursu Aquilam multitudine navium perterritum atque trepidantem nactus hostium classem sequi coepit. Interim Varus celeritate Caesaris audaciaque commotus cum universa classe conversis navibus Hadrumetum versus fugere contendit. Quem Caesar in milibus passuum IIII consecutus recuperata quinqueremi cum suis omnibus epibatis atque etiam

hostium custodibus CXXX in ea nave captis triremem hostium proximam quae in repugnando erat commorata, onustam remigum epibatarumque cepit. Reliquae naves hostium promunturium superarunt atque Hadrumetum in cothonem se universae contulerunt. Caesar eodem vento promunturium superare non potuit atque in salo in ancoris ea nocte commoratus prima luce Hadrumetum accedit ibique navibus onerariis quae erant extra cothonem incensis omnibusque reliquis ab eis aut subductis aut in cothonem compulsis paulisper commoratus, si forte vellent classe dimicare, rursus se recepit in castra.

64. On board the ship he had taken was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius, who had served in Spain under Afranius, the same who had prosecuted the war against him in Spain, and who, instead of acknowledging the conqueror's generosity, in granting him his liberty, had joined Pompey in Greece; and after the battle of Pharsalia, had gone into Africa, to Varus, there to continue in the service of the same cause. Caesar, to punish his perfidy and breach of oath, gave immediate orders for his execution. But he pardoned P. Vestrius, because his brother had paid his ransom at Rome, and because he himself proved, that being taken in Nasidius's fleet, and condemned to die, he had been saved by the kindness of Varus, since which no opportunity had offered of making his escape.

In ea nave captus est P. Vestrius eques Romanus et P. Ligarius Afranianus quem Caesar in Hispania cum reliquis dimiserat, et postea se ad Pompeium contulerat, inde ex proelio effugerat in Africamque ad Varum venerat; quem ob periurium perfidiamque Caesar iussit necari. P. Vestrio autem quod eius frater Romae pecuniam imperatam numeraverat, et quod ipse suam causam

probaverat Caesari, se a Nasidi classe captum, cum ad necem duceretur, beneficio Vari esse servatum, postea sibi facultatem nullam datam transeundi, ignovit.

65. It is the custom of the people of Africa to deposit their corn privately in vaults, under ground, to secure it in time of war, and guard it from the sudden incursions of an enemy. Caesar, having intelligence of this from a spy, drew out two legions, with a party of cavalry, at midnight, and sent them about ten miles off; whence they returned, loaded with corn to the camp. Labienus, being informed of it, marched about seven miles, through the mountains Caesar had passed the day before, and there encamped with two legions; where expecting that Caesar would often come the same way in quest of corn, he daily lay in ambush with a great body of horse and light-armed foot.

Est in Africa consuetudo incolarum, ut in agris et in omnibus fere villis sub terra specus frumenti condendi gratia clam habeant, atque id propter bella maxime hostiumque subitum adventum praeparant. Qua de re Caesar per indicem certior factus tertia vigilia legiones duas cum equitatu mittit a castris suis milia passuum X atque inde magno numero frumenti onustos recipit in castra. Quibus rebus cognitis Labienus progressus a suis castris milia passuum VII per iugum et collem per quem Caesar pridie iter fecerat, ibi castra duarum legionum facit atque ipse cotidie existimans Caesarem eadem saepe frumentandi gratia commeaturum cum magno equitatu levique armatura insidiaturus locis idoneis considit.

66. Caesar, being informed of the ambushade of Labienus by deserters, delayed there a few days, till the enemy, by repeating the practice often, had abated a little of their circumspection. Then

suddenly, one morning ordering eight veteran legions with part of the cavalry to follow him by the Decuman gate, he sent forward the rest of the cavalry; who, coming suddenly upon the enemy's light-armed foot, that lay in ambush among the valleys, slew about five hundred, and put the rest to flight. Meantime Labienus advanced, with all his cavalry, to support the fugitives, and was on the point of overpowering our small party with his numbers, when suddenly Caesar appeared with the legions, in order of battle. This sight checked the ardor of Labienus, who thought proper to sound a retreat. The day after, Juba ordered all the Numidians who had deserted their post and fled to their camp to be crucified.

Caesar interim de insidiis Labieni ex perfugis certior factus paucos dies ibi commoratus, dum hostes cotidiano instituto saepe idem faciendo in neglegentiam adducerentur, subito mane imperat porta decumana legiones se VIII veteranas cum parte equitatus sequi atque equitibus praemissis neque opinantes insidiatores subito in convallibus latentes [ex] levi armatura concidit circiter D, reliquos in fugam turpissimam coniecit. Interim Labienus cum universo equitatu fugientibus suis suppetias occurrit. Cuius vim multitudinis cum equites pauci Caesariani iam sustinere non possent, Caesar instructas legiones hostium copiis ostendit. Quo facto perterrito Labieno ac retardato suos equites recepit incolumes. Postero die Iuba Numidas eos qui loco amisso fuga se receperant in castra, in cruce omnes suffixit.

67. Meanwhile Caesar, being distressed by want of corn, recalled all his forces to the camp; and having left garrisons at Leptis, Ruspina, and Acilla, ordered Cispus and Aquila to blockade with their fleets, the one Adrumetum, the other Thapsus, and setting fire to his camp

at Uzita, he set out, in order of battle, at the fourth watch, disposed his baggage on the left, and came to Agar, which had been often vigorously attacked by the Getulians, and as valiantly defended by the inhabitants. There encamping in the plain before the town, he went with part of his army round the country in quest of provisions; and having found a large store of barley, oil, wine, and figs, with a small quantity of wheat, after allowing the troops some time to refresh themselves, he returned to his camp. Scipio meanwhile hearing of Caesar's departure, followed him along the hills, with all his forces, and posted himself about six miles off; in three different camps.

Caesar interim quoniam inopia frumenti premebatur, copias omnes in castra conduit atque praesidio Lepti Ruspinae Acyllae relicto, Cispio Aquilaeque classe tradita, ut alter Hadrumetum, alter Thapsum mari obsiderent, ipse castris incensis quarta noctis vigilia acie instructa impedimentis in sinistra parte collocatis ex eo loco proficiscitur et pervenit ad oppidum Aggar, quod a Gaetulis saepe antea oppugnatum summaque vi per ipsos oppidanos erat defensum. Ibi in campo castris unis positus ipse frumentatum circum villas cum parte exercitus profectus magno invento hordei olei vini fici numero, pauco tritici, atque recreato exercitu redit in castra. Scipio interim cognito Caesaris discessu cum universis copiis per iugum Caesarem subsequi coepit atque ab eius castris milia passuum VI longe trinis castris dispertitis copiis consedit.

68. The town of Zeta, lying on Scipio's side of the country, was not above ten miles from his camp, but might be about eighteen from that of Caesar. Scipio had sent two legions thither to forage; which Caesar having intelligence of from a deserter, removed his camp

from the plain to a hill, for the greater security; and leaving a garrison there, marched at three in the morning with the rest of his forces, passed the enemy's camp, and possessed himself of the town. He found that Scipio's legions were gone further into the country to forage: against whom, setting out immediately, he found that the whole army had come up to their assistance, which obliged him to give over the pursuit. He took, on this occasion, C. Mutius Reginus, a Roman knight, Scipio's intimate friend, and governor of the town; also P. Atrius, a Roman knight, of the province of Utica, with twenty- two camels, belonging to king Juba. Then leaving a garrison in the place, under the command of Oppius, his lieutenant, he returned to his own camp.

Oppidum erat Zeta quod aberat a Scipione milia passuum X, ad eius regionem et partem castrorum collocatum, a Caesare autem diversum ac remotum, quod erat ab eo longe milia passuum XIII. Huc Scipio legiones duas frumentandi gratia misit. Quod postquam Caesar ex perfuga cognovit, castris ex campo in collem ac tutiora loca collatis atque ibi praesidio relicto ipse quarta vigilia egressus praeter hostium castra proficiscitur cum copiis et oppidum potitur. Legiones Scipionis comperit longius in agris frumentari, et cum eo contendere conaretur, animadvertit copias hostium his legionibus occurrere suppetias. Quae res eius impetum retardavit. Itaque capto C. ~biocio Regino equite Romano Scipionis familiarissimo qui ei oppido praeerat, et P. Atrio equite Romano de conventu Uticensi, et camelis XXII regis abductis, praesidio ibi cum Oppio legato relicto ipse se recipere coepit ad castra.

69. As he drew near Scipio's camp, by which he was obliged to pass, Labienus and Afranius, who lay in ambushade among the nearest

hills, with all their cavalry and light-armed infantry, started up and attacked his rear. When Caesar perceived this, he detached his cavalry to receive their charge, ordered the legions to throw all their baggage into a heap, and face about upon the enemy. No sooner was this order executed than, upon the first charge of the legions, the enemy's horse and light-armed foot began to give way, and were with incredible ease driven from the higher ground. But when Caesar, supposing them sufficiently deterred from any further attempts, began to pursue his march, they again issued from the hills; and the Numidians, with the light armed infantry, who are wonderfully nimble, and accustom themselves to fight intermixed with the horse, with whom they keep an equal pace, either in advancing or retiring, fell a second time upon our foot. As they repeated this often, pressing upon our troops when we marched, and retiring when we endeavored to engage, always keeping at a certain distance, and with singular care avoiding a close fight, and considering it enough to wound us with their darts, Caesar plainly saw that their whole aim was to oblige him to encamp in that place, where no water was to be had; that his soldiers, who had tasted nothing from three in the morning till four in the afternoon, might perish with hunger, and the cattle with thirst.

Cum iam non longe a castris Scipionis abesset, quae eum necesse erat praetergredi, Labienus Afraniusque cum omni equitatu levique armatura ex insidiis adorti agmini eius extremo se offerunt atque ex collibus proximis exsistunt. Quod postquam Caesar animum advertit, equitibus suis hostium vi oppositis sarcinas legionarios in acervum iubet comportare atque celeriter signa hostibus inferre. Quod postquam coeptum est fieri, primo impetu legionum equitatus et levis armatura hostium nullo negotio loco pulsa et deiecta est de colle.

Cum iam Caesar existimasset hostes pulsos deterritosque finem lacesse facturos et iter coeptum pergere coepisset, iterum celeriter ex proximis collibus erumpunt atque eadem ratione qua ante dixi in Caesaris legionarios impetum faciunt Numidae levisque armaturae mirabili velocitate praediti, qui inter equites pugnabant et una pariterque cum equitibus accurrere et refugere consueverant. Cum hoc saepius facerent et proficiscentes Iulianos insequerentur, refugerent instantes, propius non accederent et singulari genere pugnae uterentur eosque iaculis convulnerare satis esse existimarent, Caesar intellexit nihil aliud eos conari nisi ut se cogerent castra eo loco ponere, ubi omnino aquae nihil esset, ut exercitus ieunus, qui a quarta vigilia usque ad horam X diei nihil gustasset, ac iumenta siti perirent.

70. When sunset now approached, and Caesar found he had not gained a hundred paces in four hours, and that by keeping his cavalry in the rear he lost many horse, he ordered the legions to fall behind, and close the march. Proceeding thus with a slow and gentle pace, he found the legions fitter to sustain the enemy's charge. Meantime the Numidian horse, wheeling round the hills, to the right and left, threatened to inclose Caesar's forces with their numbers, while part continued to harass his rear: and if but three or four veteran soldiers faced about, and darted their javelins at the enemy, no less than two thousand of them would tale to flight: but suddenly rallying, returned to the fight, and charged the legionaries with their darts. Thus Caesar, at one time marching forward, at another halting, and going on but slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven that evening, having only ten men wounded. Labienus too retreated to his camp, after having thoroughly fatigued his troops with the pursuit: in which, besides a great number wounded, his loss amounted to about three hundred

men. And Scipio withdrew his legions and elephants, whom, for the greater terror, he had ranged before his camp within view of Caesar's army.

Cum iam ad solis occasum esset, et non totos C passus in horis IIII esset progressus, equitatu suo propter equorum interitum extremo agmine remoto legiones in vicem ad extremum agmen evocabat. Ita vim hostium placide leniterque procedens per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. Interim equitum Numidarum copiae dextra sinistraque per colles praecurrere coronaeque in modum cingere multitudine sua Caesaris copias, pars agmen extremum insequi. Caesaris interim non amplius III aut IIII milites veterani si se convertissent et pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duum milium numero ad unum terga vertebant ac rursus ad aciem passim conversis equis se colligebant atque in spatio consequebantur et iacula in legionarios coiciebant. Ita Caesar modo procedendo modo resistendo tardius itinere confecto noctis hora prima omnes suos ad unum in castra incolumes sauciis X factis reduxit. Labienus circiter CCC amissis, multis vulneratis ac defessis, instando omnibus ad suos se recepit. Scipio interim legiones productas cum elephantis quos ante castra in acie terroris gratia in conspectu Caesaris collocaverat, reducit in castra.

71. Caesar, to meet enemies of this sort, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, not like a general of a veteran army which had been victorious in so many battles, but like a fencing master training up his gladiators, with what foot they must advance or retire; when they were to oppose and make good their ground; when to counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner to launch their javelins. For the enemy's light-armed troops gave wonderful trouble and

annoyance to our army; because they not only deterred the cavalry from the encounter, by killing their horses with their javelins, but likewise wearied out the legionary soldiers by their swiftness: for as often as these heavy-armed troops advanced to attack them, they evaded the danger by a quick retreat.

Caesar contra eiusmodi hostium genera copias suas non ut imperator exercitum veteranum victoremque maximis rebus gestis, sed ut lanista tirones gladiatores condocere: quot pedes se reciperent ab hoste et quemadmodum obversi adversariis et in quantulo spatio resisterent, modo procurrerent modo recederent comminarenturque impetum, ac prope quo loco et quemadmodum tela mitterent praecipere. Mirifice enim hostium levis armatura anxium exercitum nostrum atque sollicitum habebat, quia et equites deterrebat proelium inire propter equorum interitum, quod eos iaculis interficiebat, et legionarium militem defatigabat propter velocitatem: gravis enim armaturae miles simulatque ab eis insectatus constiterat in eosque impetum fecerat, illi veloci cursu periculum facile vitabant.

72. Caesar was rendered very anxious by these occurrences; because as often as he engaged with his cavalry, without being supported by the infantry, he found himself by no means a match for the enemy's horse, supported by their light-armed foot: and as he had no experience of the strength of their legions, he foresaw still greater difficulties when these should be united, as the shock must then be overwhelming. In addition to this, the number and size of the elephants greatly increased the terror of the soldiers; for which, however, he found a remedy, in causing some of those animals to be brought over from Italy, that his men might be accustomed to the sight of them, know their strength and courage, and in what part of

the body they were most vulnerable. For as the elephants are covered with trappings and ornaments, it was necessary to inform them what parts of the body remained naked, that they might direct their darts thither. It was likewise needful to familiarize his horses to the cry, smell, and figure of these animals; in all of which he succeeded to a wonder; for the soldiers quickly came to touch them with their hands, and to be sensible of their tardiness; and the cavalry attacked them with blunted darts, and, by degrees, brought their horses to endure their presence.

Quibus ex rebus Caesar vehementer commovebatur, quod quotienscumque proelium erat commissum, equitatu suo sine legionario milite hostium equitatu levique armaturae eorum nullo modo par esse poterat. Sollicitabatur autem his rebus, quod nondum legiones hostium cognoverat, et quonam modo sustinere se posset ab eorum equitatu levique armatura, quae erant mirifica, si legiones quoque accessissent. Accedebat etiam haec causa quod elephantorum magnitudo multitudoque militum animos detinebat in terrore. Cui uni rei tamen invenerat remedium. Namque elephantos ex Italia transportari iusserat, quos et miles nosset speciemque et virtutem bestiae cognosceret, et cui parti corporis eius telum facile adigi posset, ornatusque ac loricatus cum esset elephans, quae pars corporis eius sine tegmine nuda relinqueretur, ut eo tela conicerentur; praeterea ut iumenta bestiarum odorem stridorem speciem consuetudine capta earum non reformidarent. Quibus ex rebus largiter erat consecutus. Nam et milites bestias manibus pertractabant earumque tarditatem cognoscebant, equitesque in eos pila praepilata coiciebant, atque in consuetudinem equos patientia bestiarum adduxerat.

73. For these reasons already mentioned, Caesar was very anxious, and proceeded with more slowness and circumspection than usual, abating considerably in his wonted expedition and celerity. Nor ought we to wonder; for in Gaul he had under him troops accustomed to fight in a champaign country, against an open undesigning enemy, who despised artifice, and valued themselves only on their bravery. But now he was to habituate his soldiers to the arts and contrivances of a crafty enemy, and teach them what to pursue, and what to avoid. The sooner therefore to instruct them in these matters, he took care not to confine his legions to one place, but under pretense of foraging, engaged them in frequent marches, and counter-marches; because he thought that the enemy's troops would not lose his track. Three days after, he drew up his forces with great skill, and marching past Scipio's camp, waited for him in an open plain; but seeing that he still declined a battle, he retreated to his camp a little before evening.

Ob has causas quas supra commemoravi solli citabatur Caesar tardiorque et consideratio erat factus et ex pristina bellandi consuetudine celeritateque excesserat. Neque mirum: copias enim habebat in Gallia bellare consuetas locis campestribus et contra Gallos homines apertos minimeque insidiosos, qui per virtutem, non per dolum dimicare consueverunt; tum autem erat ei laborandum ut consuefaceret milites hostium dolos insidias artificia cognoscere, et quid sequi, quid vitare conveniret. Itaque quo haec celerius conciperent, dabat operam ut legiones non in uno loco contineret, sed per causam frumentandi huc atque illuc rapsaret, ideo quod hostium copias ab se suisque vestigium non discessuras existimabat. Atque post diem tertium productis accuratius suis copiis sicut instruxerat, propter hostium castra praetergressus aequo loco invitat ad

dimicandum. Postquam eos abhorrere videt, reducit sub vesperum legiones in castra.

74. Meantime ambassadors arrived from the town of Vacca, bordering upon Zeta, of which we have observed Caesar had possessed himself. They requested and entreated that he would send them a garrison, promising to furnish many of the necessities of war. At the same time, by the will of the gods, and their kindness to Caesar, a deserter informed him, that Juba had, by a quick march, before Caesar's troops could arrive, reached the town and surrounded it, and after taking possession of it, massacred the inhabitants, and abandoned the place itself to the plunder of his soldiers.

Legati interim ex oppido Vaga quod finitimum fuit Zetae, cuius Caesarem potitum esse demonstravimus, veniunt. Petunt obsecrant ut sibi praesidium mittat: se res complures quae utiles bello sint administraturos. Per id tempus deorum voluntate studioque erga Caesarem transfuga suos cives facit certiores Iubam regem celeriter cum copiis suis, antequam Caesaris praesidium eo perveniret, ad oppidum adcurrisse atque advenientem multitudine circumdata eo potitum omnibusque eius oppidi incolis ad unum interfectis dedisse oppidum diripiendum delendumque militibus.

75. Caesar, having reviewed his army the twelfth day before the calends of April, advanced next day, with all his forces, five miles beyond his camp, and remained a considerable time in order of battle, two miles from Scipio's. When he saw distinctly that the enemy, though frequently and for a long time challenged to a battle, declined it, he led back his troops. Next day he decamped, and directed his march toward Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians, and a magazine of corn. Labienus being informed of this

motion, began to harass his rear with the cavalry and light- armed troops: and having made himself master of part of the baggage, was encouraged to attack the legions themselves, believing they would fall an easy prey, under the load and encumbrance of a march. However, this circumstance had not escaped Caesar's attention, for he had ordered three hundred men out of each legion to hold themselves in readiness for action. These being sent against Labienus, he was so terrified at their approach, that he shamefully took to flight, great numbers of his men being killed or wounded. The legionaries returned to their standards, and pursued their march. Labienus continued to follow us at a distance along the summit of the mountains on our right.

Caesar interim lustrato exercitu a. d. XII Kal. April. postero die productis universis copiis processus ab suis castris milia passuum V, a Scipionis circiter duum milium interiecto spatio, in acie constitit. Postquam satis diu adversarios ab se ad dimicandum invitatos supersedere pugnae animadvertit, reducit copias posteroque die castra movet atque iter ad oppidum Sassuram, ubi Scipio Numidarum habuerat praesidium frumentumque comportaverat, ire contendit. Quod ubi Labienus animadvertit, cum equitatu levique armatura agmen eius extremum carpere coepit atque ita lixarum mercatorumque qui plostris merces portabant, sarcinis interceptis addito animo propius audaciusque accedit ad legiones, quod existimabat milites sub onere ac sub sarcinis defatigatos pugnare non posse. Quae res Caesarem non fefellerat: namque expeditos ex singulis legionibus trecenos milites esse iusserat. Itaque eos in equitatum Labieni immissos turmis suorum suppetias mittit. Tum Labienus conversis equis signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime fugere contendit. Multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis milites

legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signa atque iter inceptum ire coeperunt. Labienus per iugum summum collis dextrorsus procul subsequi non destitit.

76. Caesar, arriving before Sarsura, took it in presence of the enemy, who durst not advance to its relief; and put to the sword the garrison which had been left there by Scipio, under the command of P. Cornelius, one of Scipio's veterans, who, after a vigorous defense, was surrounded slain. Having given all the corn in the place to the army, he marched next day to Tisdra, where Considius was, with a strong garrison and his cohort of gladiators. Caesar, having taken a view of the town, and being deterred from besieging it by want of corn, set out immediately, and after a march of four miles, encamped near a river. He marched from it on the fourth day, and then returned to his former camp at Agar. Scipio did the same, and retreated to his old quarters.

Postquam Caesar ad oppidum Sassuram venit, inspectantibus adversariis interfecto praesidio Scipionis, cum suis auxilium ferre non auderent, fortiter repugnante P. Cornelio evocato Scipionis qui ibi praeerat atque a multitudine circumvento interfectoque oppido potitur atque ibi frumento exercitui dato postero die ad oppidum Thysdram pervenit. In quo Considius per id tempus fuerat cum grandi praesidio cohorteque sua gladiatorum. Caesar oppidi natura perspecta aquae inopia ab oppugnatione eius deterritus protinus profectus circiter milia passuum IIII ad aquam facit castra atque inde quarta vigilia egressus redit rursus ad ea castra quae ad Aggar habuerat. Idem facit Scipio atque in antiqua castra copias reducit.

77. Meantime the inhabitants of Thabena, a nation situated on the extreme confines of Juba's kingdom, along the seacoast, and who

had been accustomed to live in subjection to that monarch, having massacred the garrison left there by the king, sent deputies to Caesar to inform him of what they had done, and to beg he would take under his protection a city which deserved so well of the Roman people. Caesar, approving their conduct, sent M. Crispus the tribune, with a cohort, a party of archers, and a great number of engines of war, to charge himself with the defense of Thabena. At the same time the legionary soldiers, who, either on account of sickness or for other reasons, had not been able to come over into Africa with the rest, to the number of four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers, reached Caesar by one embarkation. With these and his former troops, he advanced into a plain eight miles distant from his own camp, and four from that of Scipio, where he awaited the enemy in order of battle.

Thabenenses interim qui sub dicione et potestate Iubae esse consuessent in extrema eius regni regione maritima locati, interfecto regio praesidio legatos ad Caesarem mittunt, rem [male] gestam docent, petunt orantque ut suis fortunis populus Romanus quod bene meriti essent, auxilium ferret. Caesar eorum consilio probato Marcium Crispum tribus cum cohortibus et sagittariis tormentisque compluribus praesidio Thabenam mittit. Eodem tempore ex legionibus omnibus milites qui aut morbo impediti aut commeatu dato cum signis non potuerant ante transire in Africam, ad milia IIII, equites CCCC, funditores sagittariiue mille uno commeatu Caesari occurrerunt. Itaque cum his copiis et omnibus legionibus eductis, sicut erat instructus, V[III] milibus passuum ab suis castris, ab Scipionis vero II passuum longe constitit in campo.

78. There was a town below Scipio's camp, of the name of Tegea,

where he had a garrison of four hundred horse. These he drew up on the right and left of the town; and bringing forth his legions, formed them in order of battle upon a hill somewhat lower than his camp, and which was about a thousand paces distant from it. After he had continued a considerable time in one place, without offering to make any attempt, Caesar sent some squadrons of horse, supported by his light-armed infantry, archers, and slingers, to charge the enemy's cavalry, who were on duty before the town. After Caesar's troops advanced and came to the charge with their horses at a gallop, Placidius began to extend his front, that he might at once surround us and give us a warm reception. Upon this Caesar detached three hundred legionaries to our assistance, while at the same time Labienus was continually sending fresh reinforcements, to replace those that were wounded or fatigued. Our cavalry, who were only four hundred in number, not being able to sustain the charge of four thousand, and being besides greatly harassed by the light-armed Numidians, began at last to give ground: which Caesar observing, detached the other wing to their assistance: who, joining those that were like to be overpowered, fell in a body upon the enemy, put them to flight, slew or wounded great numbers, pursued them three miles quite to the mountains, and then returned to their own men. Caesar continued in order of battle till four in the afternoon, and then retreated to his camp without the loss of a man. In this action Placidius received a dangerous wound in the head, and had many of his best officers either killed or wounded.

Erat oppidum infra castra Scipionis nomine Tegea, ubi praesidium equestre circiter II milium numero habere consuevit. Eo equitatu dextra sinistra directo ab oppidi lateribus ipse legiones ex castris eductas atque in iugo inferiore instructas non longius fere mille

passus ab suis munitionibus progressus in acie constituit. Postquam diutius in uno loco Scipio commorabatur et tempus diei in otio consumebatur, Caesar equitum turmas suorum iubet in hostium equitatum qui ad oppidum in statione erant, facere impressionem levemque armaturam sagittarios funditoresque eodem submittit. Quod ubi coeptum est fieri et equis concitatis Iuliani impetum fecissent, Pacideius suos equites exporrigere coepit in longitudinem, ut haberent facultatem turmas Iulianas circumeundi, et nihilo minus fortissime acerrimeque pugnare. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, CCC quos ex legionibus habere expeditos consuerat, ex legione quae proxima ei proelio in acie constiterat, iubet equitatu succurrere. Labienus interim suis equitibus auxilia equestria submittere sauciisque ac defatigatis integros recentioribusque viribus equites subministrare. Postquam equites Iuliani CCCC vim hostium ad III milia numero sustinere non poterant et ab levi armatura Numidarum vulnerabantur minutatimque cedebant, Caesar alteram alam mittit qui satagentibus celeriter occurrerent. Quo facto sui sublatis universi in hostes impressione facta in fugam adversarios dederunt; multis occisis, compluribus vulneratis insecuti per III milia passuum usque ad collem hostibus adactis se ad suos recipiunt. Caesar in horam X commoratus, sicut erat instructus, se ad sua castra recepit omnibus incolumibus. In quo proelio Pacideius graviter pilo per cassidem caput ictus compluresque duces ac fortissimus quisque interfecti vulneratique sunt.

79. After he found that he could not by any means induce the enemy to come down to the plain and make trial of the legions, and that he could not encamp nearer them for want of water, in consideration of which alone, and not from any confidence in their numbers, the Africans had dared to despise him; he decamped the day before the

nones of April at midnight, marched sixteen miles beyond Agar to Thapsus, where Virgilius commanded with a strong garrison, and there fixed his camp, and began to surround the town the very day on which he arrived, and raised redoubts in proper places, as well for his own security, as to prevent any succors from entering the town. In the mean time, Scipio, on learning Caesar's designs, was reduced to the necessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of abandoning Virgilius and the Thapsitani, who had all along remained firm to his party; and therefore, following Caesar without delay, he posted himself in two camps eight miles from Thapsus.

Postquam nulla condicione cogere adversarios poterat, ut in aequum locum descenderent legionumque periculum facerent, neque ipse propius hostem castra ponere propter aquae penuriam se posse animadvertibat, adversarios non virtute eorum confidere, sed aquarum inopia fretos despicere se intellexit, II Non. Apr. tertia vigilia egressus, ab Aggar XVI milia nocte progressus, ad Thapsum ubi Vergilius cum grandi praesidio praeerat, castra ponit oppidumque eo die circummunire coepit locaque idonea opportunaque complura praesidiis occupare, hostes ne intrare ad se ac loca interiora capere possent. Scipio interim cognitis Caesaris consiliis ad necessitatem adductus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus fidissimos suis rebus Thapsitanos et Vergilium amitteret, confestim Caesarem per superiora loca consecutus milia passuum VIII a Thapso binis castris consedit.

80. Now there were some salt- pits, between which and the sea was a narrow pass of about fifteen hundred paces, by which Scipio endeavored to penetrate and carry succors to the inhabitants of Thapsus. But Caesar anticipating that this might happen, had the day

before raised a very strong fort at the entrance of it, in which he left a triple garrison; and encamping with the rest of his troops in the form of a half moon, carried his works round the town. Scipio, disappointed in his design, passed the day and night following a little above the morass; but early next morning advanced within a small distance of the last mentioned camp and fort, where he began to intrench himself about fifteen hundred paces from the sea. Caesar being informed of this, drew off his men from the works; and leaving Asprenas the proconsul, with two legions, at the camp, marched all the rest of his forces with the utmost expedition to that place. He left part of the fleet before Thapsus, and ordered the rest to make as near the shore as possible toward the enemy's rear, observing the signal he should give them, upon which they were to raise a sudden shout, that the enemy, alarmed and disturbed by the noise behind them, might be forced to face about.

Erat stagnum salinarum inter quod et mare angustiae quaedam non amplius mille et D passus intererant; quas Scipio intrare et Thapsitanis auxilium ferre conabatur. Quod futurum Caesarem non fefellerat. Namque pridie in eo loco castello munito ibique III... praesidio relicto ipse cum reliquis copiis lunatis castris Thapsum operibus circummunivit. Scipio interim exclusus ab incepto itinere supra stagnum postero die et nocte confecta caelo albente non longe a castris praesidioque quod supra commemoravi md passibus ad mare versus consedit et castra munire coepit. Quod postquam Caesari nuntiatum est, milite ab opere deducto, castris praesidio Asprenate pro consule cum legionibus duabus relicto ipse cum expedita copia in eum locum citatim contendit, classisque parte ad Thapsum relicta reliquas naves iubet post hostium tergum quam maxime ad litus adpelli signumque suum observare, quo signo dato subito clamore

facto ex improvise hostibus aversis incuterent terrorem, ut perturbati ac perterriti respicere post terga cogerentur.

81. When Caesar came to the place, he found Scipio's army in order of battle before the intrenchments, the elephants posted on the right and left wings, and part of the soldiers busily employed in fortifying the camp. Upon sight of this disposition, he drew up his army in three lines, placed the tenth and second legions on the right wing, the eighth and ninth on the left, five legions in the center, covered his flanks with five cohorts, posted opposite the elephants, disposed the archers and slingers in the two wings, and intermingled the light-armed troops with his cavalry. He himself on foot went from rank to rank, to rouse the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their former victories, and animating them by his kind expressions. He exhorted the new levies who had never yet been in battle to emulate the bravery of the veterans, and endeavor by a victory to attain the same degree of fame, glory, and renown.

Quo postquam Caesar pervenit et animadvertit aciem pro vallo Scipionis [contra] elephantis dextro sinistroque cornu collocatis, et nihilo minus partem militum castra non ignaviter munire, ipse acie triplici collocata, legione X secundaque dextro cornu, VIII et VIII sinistro oppositis, quinque legiones in quarta acie ad ipsa cornua quinque cohortibus contra bestias collocatis, sagittariis funditoribus in utrisque cornibus dispositis, levique armatura inter equites interiecta, ipse pedibus circum milites concursans virtutesque veteranorum proeliaque superiora commemorans blandeque appellans animos eorum excitabat. Tirones autem qui numquam in acie dimicassent, hortabatur ut veteranorum virtutem aemularentur eorumque famam locum nomen victoria parta cuperent possidere.

82. As he ran from rank to rank, he observed the enemy about the camp very uneasy, hurrying from place to place, at one time retiring behind the rampart, another coming out again in great tumult and confusion. As many others in the army began to observe this, his lieutenants and volunteers begged him to give the signal for battle, as the immortal gods promised him a decisive victory. While he hesitated and strove to repress their eagerness and desires, exclaiming that it was not his wish to commence the battle by a sudden sally, at the same time keeping back his army, on a sudden a trumpeter in the right wing, without Caesar's leave, but compelled by the soldiers, sounded a charge. Upon this all the cohorts began to rush toward the enemy, in spite of the endeavors of the centurions, who strove to restrain them by force, lest they should charge withal the general's order, but to no purpose.

Itaque in circumeundo exercitu animadvertit hostes circa vallum trepidare atque ultro citroque pavidos concursare et modo se intra portas recipere, modo inconstanter immoderateque prodire. Cum idem a pluribus animadverti coeptum esset, subito legati evocatique obsecrare Caesarem ne dubitaret signum dare: victoriam sibi propriam a dis immortalibus portendi. Dubitante Caesare atque eorum studio cupiditatieque resistente sibique eruptione pugnari non placere clamitante, etiam atque etiam aciem sustentante, subito dextro cornu iniussu Caesaris tubicen a militibus coactus canere coepit. Quo facto ab universis cohortibus signa in hostem coepere inferri, cum centuriones pectore adverso resisterent vique continerent milites ne iniussu imperatoris concurrerent, nec quicquam proficerent.

83. Caesar perceiving that the ardor of his soldiers would admit of no

restraint, giving “good fortune” for the word, spurred on his horse, and charged the enemy’s front. On the right wing the archers and slingers poured their eager javelins without intermission upon the elephants, and by the noise of their slings and stones, so terrified these animals, that turning upon their own men, they trod them down in heaps, and rushed through the half-finished gates of the camp. At the same time the Mauritanian horse, who were in the same wing with the elephants, seeing themselves deprived of their assistance, betook themselves to flight. Whereupon the legions wheeling round the elephants, soon possessed themselves of the enemy’s intrenchments, and some few that made great resistance being slain, the rest fled with all expedition to the camp they had quitted the day before.

Quod postquam Caesar intellexit incitatis militum animis resisti nullo modo posse, signo Felicitatis dato equo admisso in hostem inter principes ire contendit. A dextro interim cornu funditores sagittariiue concita tela in elephantos frequenter iniciunt. Quo facto bestiae stridore fundarum, lapidum plumbique itata perterritae sese convertere et suos post se frequentes stipatosque proterere et in portas valli semifactas ruere contendunt. Item Mauri equites qui in eodem cornu elephantis erant praesidio, deserti praecipites fugiunt. Ita celeriter bestiis circumitis legiones vallo hostium sunt potitae, et paucis acriter repugnantibus interfectisque reliqui concitati in castra, unde pridie erant egressi, confugiunt.

84. And here we must not omit to notice the bravery of a veteran soldier of the fifth legion. For when an elephant which had been wounded in the left wing, and, roused to fury by the pain, ran against an unarmed sutler, threw him under his feet, and kneeling on him

with his whole weight, and brandishing his uplifted trunk, with hideous cries, crushed him to death, the soldier could not refrain from attacking the animal. The elephant, seeing him advance with his javelin in his hand, quitted the dead body of the sutler, and seizing him with his trunk, wheeled him round in the air. But he, amid all the danger, preserving his presence of mind, ceased not with his sword to strike at the elephant's trunk, which enclasped him, and the animal, at last overcome with the pain, quitted the soldier, and fled to the rest with hideous cries,

Non videtur esse praetermittendum de virtute militis veterani V legionis. Nam cum in sinistro cornu elephans vulnere ictus et dolore concitatus in lixam inermem impetum fecisset eumque sub pede subditum dein genu innixus pondere suo proboscide erecta vibrantique stridore maximo premeret atque enecaret, miles hic non potuit pati quin se armatus bestiae offerret. Quem postquam elephans ad se telo infesto venire animadvertit, relicto cadavere militem proboscide circumdat atque in sublime extollit. Armatus qui in eiusmodi periculo constanter agendum sibi videret, gladio proboscidem qua erat circumdatus, caedere quantum viribus poterat non destitit. Quo dolore adductus elephans milite abiecto maximo cum stridore cursuque conversus ad reliquas bestias se recepit.

85. Meanwhile the garrison of Thapsus, either designing to assist their friends, or abandoning the town to seek safety by flight, sallied out by the gate next the sea, and wading navel deep in the water; endeavored to reach the land. But the servants and attendants of the camp, attacking them with darts and stones, obliged them to return to the town. Scipio's forces meanwhile being beaten, and his men fleeing on all sides, the legions instantly began the pursuit, that they

might have no time to rally. When they arrived at the camp to which they fled, and where, having repaired it, they hoped to defend themselves they began to think of choosing a commander, to whose authority and orders they might submit; but finding none on whom they could rely, they threw down their arms, and fled to the king's quarter. Finding this, on their arrival, occupied by Caesar's forces, they retired to a hill, where, despairing of safety, they cast down their arms, and saluted them in a military manner. But this stood them in little stead, for the veterans, transported with rage and anger, not only could not be induced to spare the enemy, but even killed or wounded several citizens of distinction in their own army, whom they upbraided as authors of the war. Of this number was Tullius Rufus the quaestor, whom a soldier designedly ran through with a javelin; and Pompeius Rufus, who was wounded with a sword in the arm, and would doubtless have been slain, had he not speedily fled to Caesar for protection. This made several Roman knights and senators retire from the battle, lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory assumed an unbounded license, should be induced by the hopes of impunity to wreck their fury on them likewise. In short all Scipio's soldiers, though they implored the protection of Caesar, were in the very sight of that general, and in spite of his entreaties to his men to spare them, without exception put to the sword.

Interim Thapso qui erant praesidio, ex oppido eruptionem porta maritima faciunt, et sive ut suis subsidio occurrerent, sive ut oppido deserto fuga salutem sibi parerent, egrediuntur, atque ita per mare umbilici fine ingressi terram petebant. Qui a servitiis puerisque qui in castris erant, lapidibus pilisque prohibiti terram attingere rursus se in oppidum receperunt. Interim Scipionis copiis prostratis passimque toto campo fugientibus confestim Caesaris legiones consequi

spatiumque se non dare colligendi. Qui postquam ad ea castra quae petebant perfugerunt, ut refecti castris rursus sese defenderent ducemque aliquem requirerent quem respicerent, cuius auctoritate imperioque rem gererent: — qui postquam animadverterunt neminem ibi esse praesidio, protinus armis abiectis in regia castra fugere contendunt. Quo postquam pervenerunt, ea quoque ab Iulianis teneri vident. Desperata salute in quodam colle consistunt atque armis demissis salutationem more militari faciunt. Quibus miseris ea res parvo praesidio fuit. Namque milites veterani ira et dolore incensi non modo ut parcerent hosti non poterant adduci sed etiam ex suo exercitu inlustres urbanos quos auctores appellabant, compluris aut vulnerarunt aut interfecerunt; in quo numero fuit Tullius Rufus quaestorius qui pilo traiectus consulto a milite interiit; item Pompeius Rufus brachium gladio percussus, nisi celeriter ad Caesarem accucurrisset, interfectus esset. Quo facto complures equites Romani senatoresque perterriti ex proelio se receperunt, ne [a] militibus qui ex tanta victoria licentiam sibi adsumpsissent immoderate peccandi impunitatis spe propter maximas res gestas, ipsi quoque interficerentur. Itaque ii omnes Scipionis milites cum fidem Caesaris implorarent, inspectante ipse Caesare et a militibus deprecante uti eis parcerent, ad unum sunt interfecti.

86. Caesar, having made himself master of the enemy's three camps, killed ten thousand, and putting the rest to flight, retreated to his own quarters with the loss of not more than fifty men and a few wounded. In his way he appeared before the town of Thapsus, and ranged all the elephants he had taken in the battle, amounting to sixty- four, with their ornaments, trappings, and castles, in full view of the place. This he did in hopes that possibly Virgilius and those that were besieged with him might give over the idea of resistance on learning

the defeat of their friends. He even called and invited him to submit, reminding him of his clemency and mildness; but no answer being given, he retired from before the town. Next day, after returning thanks to the gods, he assembled his army before Thapsus, praised his soldiers in presence of the inhabitants, rewarded the victorious, and from his tribunal extended his bounty to every one, according to their merit and services. Setting out thence immediately he left the proconsul C. Rebellius, with three legions, to continue the siege, and sent Cn. Domitius with two to invest Tisdra, where Considius commanded. Then ordering M. Messala to go before with the cavalry, he began his march to Utica.

Caesar trinis castris potitus occisisque hostium X milibus fugatisque compluribus se recepit L militibus amissis, paucis sauciis in castra, ac statim ex itinere ante oppidum Thapsum constitit elephantosque LXIII ornatos armatosque cum turribus ornamentisque capit, captos ante oppidum instructos constituit. Id hoc consilio, si posset Vergilius quique cum eo obsidebantur, rei male gestae suorum indicio a pertinacia deduci. Deinde ipse Vergilium appellavit invitavitque ad deditionem suamque lenitatem et clementiam commemoravit. Quem postquam animadvertit responsum sibi non dare, ab oppido discessit. Postero die divina re facta contione advocata in conspectu oppidanorum milites collaudat totumque exercitum veteranum donavit, praemia fortissimo cuique ac bene merenti pro suggestu tribuit, ac statim inde digressus Rebilo proconsule cum III ad Thapsum legionibus et Cn. Domitio cum duabus Thysdrae ubi Considius praeerat ad obsidendum relictis, M. Messala Uticam ante praemisso cum equitatu, ipse eodem iter facere contendit.

87. Scipio's cavalry, who had escaped out of the battle, taking the road to Utica, arrived at Parada; but being refused admittance by the inhabitants, who heard of Caesar's victory, they forced the gates, lighted a great fire in the middle of the forum, and threw all the inhabitants into it, without distinction of age or sex, with their effects; avenging in this manner, by an unheard of cruelty, the affront they had received. Thence they marched directly to Utica. M. Cato, some time before, distrusting the inhabitants of that city, on account of the privileges granted them by the Julian law, had disarmed and expelled the populace, obliging them to dwell without the Warlike gate, in a small camp surrounded by a slight intrenchment, around which he had planted guards, while at the same time he put the senators under arrest. The cavalry attacked their camp, knowing them to be favorers of Caesar, and intending to wipe out by their destruction, the disgrace of their own defeat. But the people, animated by Caesar's victory, repulsed them with stones and clubs. They therefore threw themselves into the town, killed many of the inhabitants, and pillaged their houses. Cato, unable to prevail with them to abstain from rapine and slaughter, and undertake the defense of the town, as he was not ignorant of what they aimed at, gave each a hundred sesterces to make them quiet. Sylla Faustus did the same out of his own money; and marching with them from Utica, advanced into the kingdom.

Equites interim Scipionis qui ex proelio fugerant, cum Uticam versus iter facerent, perveniunt ad oppidum Paradae. ubi cum ab incolis non reciperentur, ideo quod fama de victoria Caesaris praecucurrisset, vi oppido potiti in medio foro lignis coacervatis omnibusque rebus eorum congestis ignem subiciunt atque eius oppidi incolas cuiusque generis aetatisque vivos constrictosque in flammam coiciunt atque ita

acerbissimo adficiunt supplicio. Deinde protinus Uticam perveniunt. Superiore tempore M. Cato, quod in Uticensibus propter beneficium legis Iuliae parum suis partibus praesidii esse existimaverat, plebem inermem oppido eiecerat et ante portam Belicam castris fossaque parvula dumtaxat muniverat ibique custodiis circumdatis habitare coegerat; senatum autem oppidi custodia tenebat. Eorum castra ei equites adorti expugnare coeperunt, ideo quod eos Caesaris partibus favisse sciebant, ut eis interfectis eorum pernicie dolorem suum ulciscerentur. Uticenses animo addito ex Caesaris victoria lapidibus fustibusque equites reppulerunt. Itaque posteaquam castra non potuerant potiri, Uticam se in oppidum coniecerunt atque ibi multos Uticenses interfecerunt domosque eorum expugnaverunt ac diripuerunt. Quibus cum Cato persuadere nulla ratione quiret, ut secum oppidum defenderent et caede rapinisque desisterent, et quid sibi vellent sciret, sedandae eorum importunitatis gratia singulis C divisit. Idem Sulla Faustus fecit ac de sua pecunia largitus est unaque cum his ab Utica proficiscitur atque in regnum ire intendit.

88. A great many others that had escaped out of the battle, fled to Utica. These Cato assembled, with three hundred more who had furnished Scipio with money for carrying on the war, and exhorted them to set their slaves free, and in conjunction with them defend the town. But finding that though part assembled, the rest were terrified and determined to flee, he gave over the attempt, and furnished them with ships to facilitate their escape. He himself, having settled all his affairs with the utmost care, and commended his children to L. Caesar his quaestor, without the least indication which might give cause of suspicion, or any change in his countenance and behavior, privately carried a sword into his chamber when he retired to rest, and stabbed himself with it. When the wound not proving mortal, he

fell heavily to the ground, his physician and friends suspecting what was going on, burst into the room and began to stanch and bind up his wound, he himself most resolutely tore it open, and met death with the greatest determination. The Uticans, though they hated his party, yet in consideration of his singular integrity, his behavior so different from that of the other chiefs, and because he had strengthened their town with wonderful fortifications, and increased the towers, interred him honorably. L. Caesar, that he might procure some advantage by his death, assembled the people, and after haranguing them, exhorted them to open their gates, and throw themselves upon Caesar's clemency, from which they had the greatest reason to hope the best. This advice being followed, he came forth to meet Caesar. Messala having reached Utica, according to his orders, placed guards at the gates.

Complures interim ex fuga Uticam perveniunt. Quos omnes Cato convocatos una cum CCC, qui pecuniam Scipioni ad bellum faciendum contulerant, hortatus ut servitia manu mitterent oppidumque defenderent. Quorum cum partem adsentire, partem animum mentemque perterritam atque in fugam destinatam habere intellexisset, amplius de ea re agere destitit navesque his attribuit, ut in quas quisque partes vellet proficisceretur. Ipse omnibus rebus diligentissime constitutis, liberis suis L. Caesari qui tum ei pro quaestore fuerat commendatis, et sine suspicione, vultu atque sermone quo superiore tempore usus fuerat dum dormitum isset, ferrum intro clam in cubiculum tulit atque ita se traiecit. Qui cum anima nondum expirata concidisset, [et] impetu facto in cubiculum ex suspicione medicus familiaresque continere atque vulnus obligare coepissent, ipse suis manibus vulnus crudelissime divellit atque animo praesenti se interemit. Quem Uticenses quamquam oderant

partium gratia, tamen propter eius singularem integritatem et quod dissimillimus reliquorum ducum fuerat quodque Uticam mirificis operibus munierat turribusque auxerat, sepultura adficiunt. Quo interfecto L. Caesar ut aliquid sibi ex ea re auxilii pararet convocato populo contione habita cohortatus omnes ut portae aperirentur: se in C. Caesaris clementia magnam spem habere. Itaque portis patefactis Utica egressus Caesari imperatori obviam proficiscitur. Messala, ut erat imperatum, Uticam pervenit omnibusque portis custodias ponit.

89. Meanwhile Caesar, leaving Thapsus came to Usceta, where Scipio had laid up a great store of corn, arms, darts, and other warlike provisions, under a small guard. He soon made himself master of the place, and marched directly to Adrumetum, which he entered without opposition. He took an account of the arms, provisions, and money in the town; pardoned Q. Ligarius, and C. Considius; and leaving Livineius Regulus there with one legion, set out the same day for Utica. L. Caesar, meeting him by the way, threw himself at his feet, and only begged for his life. Caesar, according to his wonted clemency, easily pardoned him, as he did likewise Caecina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. Cella, father and son, M. Eppius, M. Aquinius, Cato's son, and the children of Damasippus. He arrived at Utica in the evening by torch-light, and continued all that night without the town.

Caesar interim ab Thapso progressus Ussetam pervenit, ubi Scipio magnum frumenti numerum armorum telorum ceterarumque rerum cum parvo praesidio habuerat. Id adveniens potitur, deinde Hadrumetum pervenit. Quo cum sine mora introisset, armis frumento pecuniaque considerata Q. Ligario C. Considio filio qui tum ibi fuerant vitam concessit. Deinde eodem die Hadrumeto egressus

Livineio Regulo cum legione ibi relicto Uticam ire contendit. Cui in itinere fit obvius L. Caesar subitoque se ad genua proiecit vitamque sibi neque amplius quicquam deprecatur. Cui Caesar facile et pro natura sua et instituto concessit, item Caecinae, C. Ateio, P. Atrio, L. Cellae patri et filio, M. Eppio, M. Aquinio, Catonis filio Damasippique liberis ex sua consuetudine tribuit circiterque luminibus accensis Uticam pervenit atque extra oppidum ea nocte mansit.

90. Early on the morning of the following day he entered the place, summoned an assembly of the people, and thanked them for the affection they had shown to his cause. At the same time he censured severely, and enlarged upon the crime of the Roman citizens and merchants, and the rest of the three hundred, who had furnished Scipio and Varus with money; but concluded with telling them, that they might show themselves without fear, as he was resolved to grant them their lives, and content himself with exposing their effects to sale; but that he would give them notice when their goods were to be sold, and the liberty of redeeming them upon payment of a certain fine. The merchants, half dead with fear, and conscious that they merited death, hearing upon what terms life was offered them, greedily accepted the condition, and entreated Caesar that he would impose a certain sum in gross upon all the three hundred. Accordingly, he amerced them in two hundred thousand sesterces, to be paid to the republic, at six equal payments, within the space of three years. They all accepted the condition, and considering that day as a second nativity, joyfully returned thanks to Caesar.

Postero die mane in oppidum introit contioneque advocata Uticenses incolas cohortatus gratias pro eorum erga se studio agit, cives autem

Romanos negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC, pecunias contulerant Varo et Scipioni multis verbis accusat et de eorum sceleribus longiore habita oratione ad extremum ut sine metu prodirent edicit: se eis dumtaxat vitam concessurum; bona quidem eorum se venditurum, ita tamen qui eorum ipse sua bona redemisset, se bonorum venditionem inducturum et pecuniam multae nomine relaturum, ut incolumitatem retinere posset. Quibus metu exsanguibus de vitaeque ex suo promerito desperantibus subito oblata salute libentes cupidique condicionem acceperunt petieruntque a Caesare ut universis CCC uno nomine pecuniam imperaret. Itaque bis miliens sestertio his imposito, ut per triennium sex pensionibus populo Romano solverent, nullo eorum recusante ac se eo demum die natos praedicantes laeti gratias agunt Caesari.

91. Meanwhile, king Juba, who had escaped from the battle with Petreius, hiding himself all day in the villages, and traveling only by night, arrived at last in Numidia. When he came to Zama, his ordinary place of residence, where were his wives and children, with all his treasures, and whatever he held most valuable, and which he had strongly fortified at the beginning of the war; the inhabitants, having heard of Caesar's victory, refused him admission, because, upon declaring war against the Romans, he had raised a mighty pile of wood in the middle of the forum, designing, if unsuccessful, to massacre all the citizens, fling their bodies and effects upon the pile, then setting fire to the mass, and throwing himself upon it, destroy all without exception, wives, children, citizens, and treasures, in one general conflagration. After continuing a considerable time before the gates, finding that neither threats nor entreaties would avail, he at last desired them to deliver up his wives and children, that he might carry them along with him. But receiving no answer, and seeing

them determined to grant him nothing, he quitted the place, and retired to one of his country- seats with Petreius and a few horse.

Rex interim Iuba ut ex proelio fugerat, una cum Petreio interdum in villis latitando tandem nocturnis itineribus confectis in regnum pervenit atque ad oppidum Zamam, ubi ipse domicilium coniuges liberosque habebat, quo ex cuncto regno omnem pecuniam carissimasque res comportaverat quodque inito bello operibus maximis muniverat, accedit. Quem antea oppidani rumore exoptato de Caesaris victoria audito ob has causas oppido prohibuerunt quod bello contra populum Romanum suscepto in oppido Zamae lignis congestis maximam in medio foro pyram construxerat, ut si forte bello foret superatus, omnibus rebus eo coacervatis, dein civibus cunctis interfectis eodemque proiectis igne subiecto tum demum se ipse insuper interficeret atque una cum liberis coniugibus civibus cunctaque gaza regia cremaretur. Postquam Iuba ante portas diu multumque primo minis pro imperio egisset cum Zamensibus, dein cum se parum proficere intellexisset, precibus orasset uti se ad suos deos penates admitterent, ubi eos perstare in sententia animadvertit nec minis nec precibus suis moveri quo magis se reciperent, tertio petit ab eis, ut sibi coniuges liberosque redderent ut secum eos asportaret. Postquam sibi nihil omnino oppidanos responsum reddere animadvertit, nulla re ab his impetrata ab Zama discedit atque ad villam suam cum M. Petreio paucisque equitibus confert se.

92. Meantime the Zamians sent ambassadors to Caesar at Utica, to inform him of what they had done, and to request “that he should send them aid before the king could collect an army and besiege them; that they were determined to defend the town for him as long as life remained.” Caesar commended the ambassadors, and sent

them back to acquaint their fellow-citizens that he was coming himself to their relief. Accordingly, setting out the next day from Utica with his cavalry, he directed his march toward the kingdom. Many of the king's generals met him on the way, and sued for pardon; to all of whom a favorable hearing was given, and they attended him to Zama. The report of his clemency and mildness spreading into all parts, the whole Numidian cavalry flocked to him at Zama, and were there relieved from their fears.

Zamenses interim legatos de his rebus ad Caesarem Uticam mittunt, petuntque ab eo uti antequam rex manum colligeret seseque oppugnaret, sibi auxilium mitteret: se tamen paratos esse, sibi quoad vita suppeteret, oppidum seque ei reservare. Legatos collaudatos Caesar domum iubet antecedere ac suum adventum praenuntiare. Ipse postero die Utica egressus cum equitatu in regnum ire contendit. Interim in itinere ex regiis copiis duces complures ad Caesarem veniunt orantque ut sibi ignoscat. Quibus supplicibus venia data Zamam perveniunt. Rumore interim perlato de eius lenitate clementiaque propemodum omnes regni equites Zamam perveniunt ad Caesarem ab eoque sunt metu periculoque liberati.

93. During these transactions, Considius, who commanded at Tisdra, with his own retinue, a garrison of Getulians, and a company of gladiators, hearing of the defeat of his party, and terrified at the arrival of Domitius and his legions, abandoned the town; and privately withdrawing, with a few of the barbarians, and all his money, fled hastily toward the kingdom. The Getulians, to render themselves masters of his treasure, murdered him by the way, and fled every man where he could, Meantime, C. Virgilius, seeing himself shut up by sea and land, without the power of making a

defense; his followers all slain or put to flight; M. Cato dead by his own hands at Utica; Juba despised and deserted by his own subjects; Sabura and his forces defeated by Sittius; Caesar received without opposition at Utica; and that of so vast an army, nothing remained capable of screening him or his children; thought it his most prudent course, to surrender himself and the city to the proconsul Caninius, by whom he was besieged.

Dum haec utrobique geruntur, Considius qui Thysdrae cum familia sua gladiatoria manu Gaetulisque praeerat, cognita caede suorum Domitiique et legionum adventu perterritus desperata salute oppidum deserit seque clam cum paucis barbaris pecunia onustus subducit atque in regnum fugere contendit. Quem Gaetuli sui comites in itinere praedae cupidi concidunt seque in quascumque potuere partes conferunt. C. Interim Vergilius postquam terra marique clausus se nihil proficere intellexit suosque interfectos aut fugatos, M. Catonem Uticae sibi ipsum manus attulisse, regem vagum ab suisque desertum ab omnibus aspernari, Saburram eiusque copias ab Sittio esse deletas, Uticae Caesarem sine mora receptum, de tanto exercitu reliquias esse nullas, ipse sibi suisque liberis a C. Caninio proconsule qui eum obsidebat, fide accepta seque et sua omnia et oppidum proconsuli tradit.

94. At the same time king Juba, seeing himself excluded from all the cities of his kingdom, and that there remained no hopes of safety; having supped with Petreius, proposed an engagement, sword in hand, that they might die honorably. Juba, as being the stronger, easily got the better of his adversary, and laid him dead at his feet: but endeavoring afterward to run himself through the body, and wanting strength to accomplish it, he was obliged to have recourse to

one of his slaves, and, by entreaties, prevailed upon him to put him to death.

Rex interim ab omnibus civitatibus exclusus desperata salute, cum iam cenatus esset, cum Petreio, ut cum virtute interfecti esse viderentur, ferro inter se depugnant, atque firmior imbecillioem Iubam Petreius facile ferro consumpsit. Deinde ipse sibi cum conaretur gladio traicere pectus nec posset, precibus a servo suo impetravit ut se interficeret, idque obtinuit.

95. In the mean time, P. Sittius, having defeated the army of Sabura, Juba's lieutenant, and slain the general, and marching with a few troops through Mauritania, to join Caesar, chanced to fall in with Faustus and Afranius, who were at the head of the party that had plundered Utica, amounting in all to about fifteen hundred men, and designing to make the best of their way to Spain. Having expeditiously placed himself in ambuscade during the night, and attacking them by day-break, he either killed or made them all prisoners, except a few that escaped from the van. Afranius and Faustus were taken among the rest, with their wives and children: but some few days after, a mutiny arising among the soldiers, Faustus and Afranius were slain. Caesar pardoned Pompeia, the wife of Faustus, with her children, and permitted her the free enjoyment of all her effects.

P. Sittius interim pulso exercitu Saburrae praefecti Iubae ipsoque interfecto cum iter cum paucis per Mauretanium ad Caesarem faceret, forte incidit in Faustum Afraniumque qui eam manum habebant qua Uticam diripuerant, iterque in Hispaniam intendebant et erant numero circiter mille. Itaque celeriter nocturno tempore insidiis dispositis eos prima luce adortus praeter paucos equites qui

ex primo agmine fugerant, reliquos aut interfecit aut in deditionem accepit, Afranium et Faustum cum coniuge et liberis vivos capit. Paucis post diebus dissensione in exercitu orta Faustus et Afranius interficiuntur; Pompeiae cum Fausti liberis Caesar incolumitatem suaque omnia concessit.

96. Meanwhile Scipio, with Damasippus and Torquatus, and Plaetorius Rustianus, having embarked on board some galleys, with the intention of making for the coast of Spain; and being long and severely tossed by contrary winds, were at last obliged to put into the port of Hippo, where the fleet commanded by P. Sittius chanced at that time to be. Scipio's vessels, which were but small, and few in number, were easily surrounded and sunk, by the larger and more numerous ships of Sittius; on which occasion Scipio, and all those whom we have mentioned above, as having embarked with him, perished.

Scipio interim cum Damasippo et Torquato et Plaetorio Rustiano navibus longis diu multumque iactati cum Hispaniam peterent, ad Hipponem Regium deferuntur, ubi classis P. Sitti ad id tempus erat. A qua pauciora ab amplioribus circumventa navigia deprimuntur, ibique Scipio cum quos paulo ante nominavi interiit.

97. Meanwhile Caesar, having exposed the king's effects to public sale at Zama, and confiscated the estates of those who, though Roman citizens, had borne arms against the republic; after conferring rewards upon such of the Zamians as had adopted the design of excluding the king, he abolished all the royal tribunes, converted the kingdom into a province; and appointing Crispus Sallustius to take charge of it, with the title of proconsul, returned to Utica. There he sold the estates of the officers who had served under Juba and

Petreius, fined the people of Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, and the company of Roman merchants there thirty thousand; he likewise fined the inhabitants of Adrumetum in thirty thousand, and their company fifty thousand; but preserved the cities and their territories from insult and plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had pillaged some time before, and who, upon complaint made to the senate by their deputies, had obtained arbitrators and restitution, were enjoined to pay yearly three hundred thousand pounds of oil; because from the beginning of the war, in consequence of a dissension among their chiefs, they had made an alliance with the king of Numidia, and supplied him with arms, soldiers, and money. The people of Tisdra, on account of their extreme poverty, were only condemned to pay annually a certain quantity of corn.

Caesar interim Zamae auctione regia facta bonisque eorum venditis qui cives Romani contra populum Romanum arma tulerant, praemiisque Zamensibus qui de rege excludendo consilium ceperant tributis, vectigalibusque regiis irrogatis ex regnoque provincia facta atque ibique Sallustio pro consule cum imperio relicto ipse Zama egressus Uticam se recepit. Ibi bonis venditis eorum qui sub Iuba Petreioque ordines duxerant, Thapsitanis HS XX, conventui eorum HS XXX, itemque Hadrumetinis HS XXX, conventui eorum HS L multae nomine imponit; civitates bonaque eorum ab omni iniuria rapinisque defendit. Leptitanos quorum superioribus annis bona Iuba diripuerat, et ad senatum questi per legatos atque arbitris a senatu datis sua receperant, XXX centenis milibus pondo olei in annos singulos multat, ideo quod initio per dissensionem principum societatem cum Iuba inierant eumque armis militibus pecunia iuverant. Thysdritanos propter humilitatem civitatis certo numero frumenti multat.

98. These things being settled, he embarked at Utica on the ides of June, and three days after arrived at Carales in Sardinia. Here he condemned the Sulcitani in a fine of one hundred thousand sesterces, for receiving and aiding Nasidius's fleet; and instead of a tenth which was their former assessment, ordered them now to pay an eighth to the public treasury. He likewise confiscated the estates of some who had been more active than the rest, and weighing from Carales on the third day before the calends of July, coasted along the shore, and after a voyage of twenty-eight days, during which he was several times obliged by contrary winds to put into port, arrived safe at Rome.

His rebus gestis Idibus Iun. Uticae classem conscendit et post diem tertium Caralis in Sardiniam pervenit. Ibi Sulcitanos quod Nasidium eiusque classem receperant copiisque iuverant, HS C multat et pro decumis octavas pendere iubet bonaque paucorum vendit et ante diem IIII Kal. Quint. navis conscendit et a Caralibus secundum terram provectus duodetricensimo die, ideo quod tempestatibus in portibus cohibebatur, ad urbem Romam venit.

THE HISPANIC WAR

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1. On the defeat of Pharnaces and reduction of Africa, those who escaped from those battles fled to young Cn. Pompey, who had taken possession of Further Spain, while Caesar was detained in Italy in exhibiting games. Pompey began to throw himself on the protection of every state, in order the more readily to establish the means of defense against him. Accordingly, with a considerable force which had been collected, partly by entreaty, partly by force, he began to lay waste the province. Under these circumstances some states voluntarily sent him supplies, others shut the gates of their towns against him. If any of these chanced to fall into his hands by assault, although some citizen in it had deserved well of Cn. Pompey (his father), yet some cause was alleged against him on account of the greatness of his wealth, so that, he being dispatched, his fortune might become the reward of the soldiers. Thus the enemy, being encouraged by a few advantages, their forces increased much, wherefore those states which were opposed to Pompey, by continual messages dispatched to Italy, sought protection for themselves.

Pharnace superato, Africa recepta, qui ex his proeliis cum adulescente Cn. Pompeio profugissent, cum... et ulterioris Hispaniae potitus esset, dum Caesar muneribus dandis in Italia detinetur,... quo facilius praesidia contra compararet, Pompeius in fidem uniuscuiusque civitatis confugere coepit. Ita partim precibus partim vi bene magna comparata manu provinciam vastare. Quibus in rebus non nullae civitates sua sponte auxilia mittebant, item non nullae portas contra cludebant. Ex quibus si qua oppida vi ceperat, cum

aliquis ex ea civitate optime de Cn. Pompeio meritis civis esset, propter pecuniae magnitudinem alia qua ei inferebatur causa, ut eo de medio sublato ex eius pecunia latronum largitio fieret. Ita pacis commoda hoste hortato maiores augebantur copiae. Hoc crebris nuntiis in Italiam missis civitates contrariae Pompeio auxilia sibi depostulabant.

2. When Caesar, now a third time dictator, and elected a fourth time, having already proceeded many marches into Spain with prompt dispatch, was coming to finish the war, he was met on the way by ambassadors from Corduba, who had deserted Cn. Pompey; these informed him that it would be an easy matter to make himself master of the town by night, because the enemy as yet knew nothing of his arrival in the province, as the scouts sent out by Cn. Pompey to inform him of Caesar's approach had been all made prisoners. They alleged besides many other very plausible reasons. He, therefore, immediately sent intelligence of his arrival to Q. Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus his lieutenants, to whom he had left the command of the troops in the province, ordering them to send him all the cavalry they had been able to raise. He came up with them much sooner than they expected, and had not the protection of the cavalry, according to his desire.

C. Caesar dictator tertio, designatus dictator quarto multis iterante diebus coniectis cum celeri festinatione ad bellum conficiendum in Hispaniam cum venisset, legatique Cordubenses, qui a Cn. Pompelo discessissent, Caesari obviam venissent, a quibus nuntiabatur nocturno tempore oppidum Cordubam capi posse, quod nec opinantibus adversariis eius provinciae potitus esset, simulque quod tabellariis, qui a Cn. Pompeio dispositi omnibus locis essent, qui

certiorem Cn. Pompeium de Caesaris adventu facerent... multa praeterea veri similia proponebant. Quibus rebus adductus quos legatos ante exercitui praefecerat Q. Pedium et Q. Fabium Maximum de suo adventu facit certiorem, utque sibi equitatus qui ex provincia fuisset praesidio esset. Ad quos celerius quam ipsi opinati sunt appropinquavit neque, ut ipse voluit, equitatum sibi praesidio habuit.

3. Sextus Pompey, the brother of Cneius, commanded at this time at Corduba, which was accounted the capital of the province. Young Cneius Pompey himself was employed in the siege of Ulia, which had now lasted some months. Notice of Caesar's arrival having been received, messengers having passed Pompey's guards came to him from that town and besought him to send them relief as soon as possible. Caesar, knowing that this people had deserved very well of the Romans, detached, about nine o'clock, at night eleven cohorts, with a like number of horse, under the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a man known in that province, and also well acquainted with it. When he arrived at Pompey's quarter, a dreadful tempest arising, attended with a violent wind, so great a darkness ensued that you could scarcely have distinguished even the person next you. This accident proved of great advantage to Paciecus: for being arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the cavalry to advance two by two, and march directly through the enemy's quarters to the town; one of their guards calling to know who passed, one of our troopers bade him be silent, for they were just then endeavoring by stealth to approach the wall, in order to get possession of the town; and partly by this answer, partly by favor of the tempest, the sentinels were prevented from examining things diligently. When they reached the gates, upon a signal being given, they were admitted; and both horse and foot raising a loud shout, after leaving some troops to guard the town,

sallied in a body upon the enemy's camp. This came upon them so unexpectedly that the greater number of the men in the camps thought that they were captured.

Erat idem temporis Sex. Pompeius frater qui cum praesidio Cordubam tenebat, quod eius provinciae caput esse existimabatur; ipse autem Cn. Pompeius adulescens Uliam oppidum oppugnabat et fere iam aliquot mensibus ibi detinebatur. Quo ex oppido cognito Caesaris adventu legati clam praesidia Cn. Pompei Caesarem cum adissent, petere coeperunt uti sibi primo quoque tempore subsidium mitteret. Caesar — eam civitatem omni tempore optime de populo Romano meritam esse — celeriter sex cohortis secunda vigilia iubet proficisci, pari equites numero. Quibus praefecit hominem eius provinciae notum et non parum scientem, L. Vibiurn Paciaecum. Qui cum ad Cn. P praesidia venisset, incidit idem temporis ut tempestate adversa vehementique vento adflectaretur; aditusque vis tempestatis ita obscurabat ut vix proximum agnoscere possent. Cuius incommodum summam utilitatem ipsis praebebat. Ita cum ad eum locum venerunt, iubet binos equites conscendere, et recta per adversariorum praesidia ad oppidum contendunt. Mediisque eorum praesidiis cum essent, cum quaereretur qui essent unus ex nostris respondit, ut sileat verbum facere: nam id temporis conari ad murum accedere, ut oppidum capiant; et partim tempestate impediti vigiles non poterant diligentiam praestare, partim illo responso deterrebantur. Cum ad portam appropinquassent, signo dato ab oppidanis sunt recepti, et pedites dispositi partim ibi remanserunt, equites clamore facto eruptionem in adversariorum castra fecerunt. Sic in illo facto, cum inscientibus accidisset, existimabant prope magna pars hominum qui in his castris fuissent se prope captos esse.

4. Ullia being relieved, Caesar, to draw Pompey from the siege, marched toward Corduba; sending the cavalry before, with a select body of heavy-armed foot; who, as soon as they came within sight of the place, got up behind the troopers. By this stratagem they could not possibly be perceived by those of Corduba. Upon their approach to the walls, the enemy sallied in great numbers to attack our cavalry; when the infantry, whom we have mentioned above, leaping down, fell upon them with such fury that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, very few returned to the town. This so alarmed Sextus Pompey that he immediately sent letters to his brother, requesting him to come speedily to his relief, lest Caesar should make himself master of Corduba before his arrival. Thus Cn. Pompey, moved by his brother's letters, quitted the siege of Ullia, which was upon the point of surrendering, and set out toward Corduba.

Hoc misso ad Ulliam praesidio Caesar, ut Pompeium ab ea oppugnatione deduceret, ad Cordubam contendit, ex quo itinere loricatorum viros fortis cum equitatu ante praemisit. Qui simul in conspectum oppidi se dederunt, cum equis recipiuntur. Hoc a Cordubensibus nequaquam poterat animadverti. Appropinquantibus ex oppido bene magna multitudo ad equitatum concidendum cum exissent, loricati, ut supra scripsimus, ex equis descenderunt et magnum proelium fecerunt, sic uti ex infinita hominum multitudine pauci in oppidum se reciperent. Hoc timore adductus Sex. Pompeius litteras fratri misit ut celeriter sibi subsidio veniret, ne prius Caesar Cordubam caperet quam ipse illo venisset. Itaque Cn. Pompeius Ullia prope capta litteris fratris excitus cum copulis ad Cordubam iter facere coepit.

5. Caesar, arriving at the river Guadalquivir, which he found too deep

to be forded, sank several baskets of stones in it. Thus having formed a bridge, he transported his troops in three bodies to the camps. As I have just mentioned, the beams of the bridge stretched over against the tower in two rows. Pompey, arriving soon after with his troops, encamped directly over against him. Caesar, to cut off his provisions and communication with the town, ran a line from his camp to the bridge. Pompey did the same; so that a struggle arose between the two generals, which should first get possession of the bridge; and this daily brought on skirmishes, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other party had the better. When these merged into a serious engagement, both sides fought hand to hand; in the heat of the struggle for this position, owing to the narrowness of the bridge, they were pressed together, and in their efforts to extend themselves toward the river-side, many fell headlong. Thus the loss was pretty equal; for on either side lay heaps of slain, and Caesar for many days used all possible endeavors to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible.

Caesar, cum ad flumen Bacetim venisset neque propter altitudinem fluminis transire posset, lapidibus corbis plenos demisit: insuper ponit trabes; ita ponte facto copias ad castra tripertito traduxit. Tendebat adversum oppidum e regione pontis, ut supra scripsimus, tripertito. Huc cum Pompeius cum suis copiis venisset, ex adverso pari ratione castra ponit. Caesar, ut eum ab oppido comineatuque excluderet, brachium ad pontem ducere coepit: pari idem condicione Pompeius facit. Hic inter duces duos fit contentio uter prius pontem occuparet; ex qua contentione cotidiana minuta proelia fiebant, ut modo hi, non numquam illi superiores discederent. Quae res cum ad maiorem contentionem venisset, ab utrisque comminus

pugna inita, dum cupidius locum student tenere, propter pontem coagulabantur, fluminis ripas appropinquantes coangustati praecipitabantur. Hic alternis non solum morti mortem exaggerabant, sed tumulos tumulis exaequabant. Ita diebus compluribus [consumptis] cupiebat Caesar, si qua condicione posset, adversarios in aequum locum deducere et primo quoque tempore de bello decernere.

6. But finding that they carefully avoided a battle, with a view to which chiefly he had quitted the route of Ulia; he caused great fires to be lighted in the night, repassed the river with all his forces, and marched toward Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. Pompey, being informed of this by the deserters, on the same day brought back many carriages and machines by narrow paths, and betook himself to Corduba. Caesar began his attack upon Ategua, and carried lines quite round the town. Pompey, having intelligence of this, set out upon his march the same day. In order to guard against his arrival, Caesar possessed himself of many forts; partly to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of infantry for the defense of his camp. Pompey's arrival happened at a time when the mist was very thick, so that he found means, with some cohorts and troops of cavalry, to hem in a party of Caesar's horse, and fell upon them in such manner that very few escaped slaughter.

Id cum animadverteret adversarios minime velle, quos quoniam a via retraxerat, ut in aequum deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu iubet ignis fieri magnos: ita firmissimum eius praesidium Ateguam proficiscitur. Id cum Pompeius ex perfugis rescisset, qua die facultatem... et angustias, carra complura multosque lanistas retraxit et ad Cordubam se recepit. Caesar munitionibus Ateguam

oppugnare et brachia circumducere coepit. Cui de Pompeio cum nuntius esset allatus eo die proficisci, cuius in adventum praesidi causa Caesar complura castella occupasset, partim ubi equitatus, partim ubi pedestres copiae in statione et in excubitu castris praesidio esse possent, hic in adventu Pompei incidit ut matutino tempore nebula esset crassissima. Ita illa obscuracione cum aliquot cohortibus et equitum turmis circumcludunt Caesaris equites et concidunt, sic ut vix in ea caede pauci effugerent.

7. The following night Pompey set fire to his camp, passed the river Rio Salado, and, marching through the valleys, encamped on a rising ground, between the two towns of Ategua and Ucubis. Caesar cast up a mound and brought forward his machines, with other preparations which were necessary for storming the town. The country all around is mountainous, and seems formed for war, being separated from the plain by the river Rio Salado, ascending on the side toward Ategua, about two miles from the river. Pompey's camp was upon these mountains, within view of both towns; he could, however, send no relief to his friends. He had the emblems and standards of thirteen legions, but of those on whom he trusted for support two were natives which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed out of the Roman colonies in those parts; and a fourth, belonging to Afranius, he had brought with him from Africa; the rest were for the most part made up of fugitives and deserters; in light-armed foot and cavalry we far exceeded him in both courage and numbers.

Insequenti nocte castra sua incendit Pompeius et trans flumen Salsum per convallis castra inter duo oppida Ateguam et Ucubim in monte constituit. Caesar in munitionibus ceterisque quae ad oppidum opus fuerunt aggerem vineasque agere instituit. Haec loca sunt montuosa

et natura impedita ad rem militarem; quae planitie dividuntur, Salso flumine, proxime tamen Ateguam ut flumen sit circiter passus duo milia. Ex ea regione oppidi in montibus castra habuit posita Pompeius in conspectu utrorumque oppidorum, neque suis ausus est subsidio venire. Aquilas et signa habuit XIII legionum; sed ex quibus aliquid firmamenti se existimabat habere duae fuerunt vernaculae, quae a Trebonio transfugerant; una facta ex coloniis quae fuerunt in his regionibus; quarta fuit Afraniana ex Africa quam secum adduxerat; reliquae ex fugitivis auxiliares consistebant: nam de levi armatura et equitatu longe et virtute et numero nostri erant superiores.

8. Another reason why Pompey was enabled to protract the war was that the country was full of mountains and extremely well adapted to encampments. For almost the whole province of Further Spain, though of an extremely fertile soil, and abounding in springs, is nevertheless very difficult of access. Here too, on account of the frequent incursions of the natives, all the places remote from great towns, are fortified with towers and castles, covered as in Africa, not with tiles but with earth, on these they place sentinels, and their high situation commands an extensive view of the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest part of the towns of this province are built on mountains, and places exceedingly strong by nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus sieges are rare and hazardous in Spain, since it is not easy to reduce their towns by force; as happened in the present war. For Pompey having established his camp between Ategua and Ucubis, as related above, and within view of both towns, Caesar possessed himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about four miles from his own camp, on which he built a fortress.

Accedebat hoc ut longius duceret bellum Pompeius, quod loca sunt edita et ad castrorum munitiones non parum idonea. nam fere totius ulterioris Hispaniae regio propter terrae fecunditatem inopem difficilemque habet oppugnationem et non nimis copiosam aquationem. Hic etiam propter barbarorum crebras excursiones omnia loca quae sunt ab oppidis remota, turribus et munitionibus retinentur, sicut in Africa; rudere, non tegulis teguntur. simulque in his habent speculas et propter altitudinem late longeque prospiciunt. Item oppidorum magna pars eius provinciae montibus fere munita et natura excellentibus locis est constituta, ut simul aditus ascensusque habeat difficiles. Ita ab oppugnationibus natura loci distinentur ut civitates Hispaniae non facile ab hoste capiantur. Id quod in hoc contigit bello. Nam cum inter Ateguam et Ucubim, quae oppida supra sunt scripta, Pompeius ut habuit castra constituta in conspectu duorum oppidorum, ab suis castris circiter milia passuum IIII grumus est excellens natura qui appellatur Castra Postumiana. Ibi praesidii causa castellum Caesar habuit constitutum.

9. Pompey, who, from the nature of the ground, was covered by the same eminence, which was besides at a sufficient distance from Caesar's quarters, became sensible of the importance of this post; and as Caesar was separated from it by the river Rio Salado, he imagined that the difficulty of sending relief would prevent his attempting any thing of that kind in its defense. Influenced by this belief, he set out about midnight and attacked the fort, that he might bring assistance to the besieged. Our troops, upon their approach, setting up a shout, discharged their javelins in great numbers, and wounded multitudes of men. After this, when those in the camp began to resist, and when tidings of it was conveyed to the great camps to Caesar, he set out with three legions, and when he

approached them, many were killed, owing to their trepidation and flight, and a great number made prisoners. Among these two * * *; and many others, having thrown down their arms escaped, so that fourscore shields were found.

Quod Pompeius quod eodem iugo tegebatur loci natura et remotum erat a castris Caesaris, animadvertibat loci difficultatem et quia flumine Salso intercludebatur, non esse commissurum Caesarem ut in tanta loci difficultate ad subsidium [com]mittendum se [de]mitteret. Ita fretus opinione tertia vigilia profectus castellum oppugnare coepit [ut laborantibus succurreret nostri]. Cum adpropinquassent, clamore repentino telorumque multitudine iactus facere coeperunt, uti magnam partem hominum vulneribus adficerent. Quo facto cum ex castello repugnare coepissent maioribusque castris Caesaris nuntius esset adlatus, cum III legionibus est profectus, [ut laborantibus succurreret nostris]. Et cum ad eos adpropinquasset, fuga perterriti multi sunt interfecti, complures capti, in quibus duo [centuriones]. Multi praeterea armis exuti fugerunt, quorum scuta sunt relata LXXX.

10. The next day Arguetius arrived from Italy with the cavalry, and five standards taken from the Saguntines; but was forced to quit his post by Asprenas, who likewise brought a reinforcement from Italy to Caesar. The same night Pompey set fire to his camp, and drew toward Corduba. A king, named Indus, who was bringing some troops to Caesar with a party of cavalry, following the pursuit of the enemy too briskly, was made prisoner, and slain by the Spanish legionaries.

Insequenti luce Arguetius ex Italia cum equitatu venit. is signa Saguntinorum rettulit quinque quae ab oppidanis cepit. Suo loco

praeteritumst quod equites ex Italia cum Asprenate ad Caesarem venissent. ea nocte Pompeius castra sua incendit et ad Cordubam versus iter facere coepit. Rex nomine Indo qui cum equitatu suas copias adduxerat, dum cupidius agmen adversariorum insequitur, a vernaculis legionariis exceptus est et interfectus.

11. On the next day, our cavalry pursued those who were employed in carrying provisions from the town to Pompey's camp, almost to the very walls of Corduba, and took fifty prisoners besides horses. On the same day, Q. Marcius, a military tribune in Pompey's army, deserted to us. At midnight, a keen encounter took place in the town, and they hurled fire and every means was resorted to by which fire could be cast. When the attack was ended, C. Fundanius, a Roman knight, quitted the enemy, and came over to us.

Postero die equites nostri longius ad Cordubam versus prosecuti sunt eos qui commeatus ad castra Pompei ex oppido portabant. Ex his capti l cum iumentis ad nostra adducti sunt castra. eo die Q. Marcius, tribunus militum qui fuisset Pompei, ad nos transfugit, et noctis tertia vigilia in oppido acerrime pugnatum est, ignemque multum miserunt, sic ut omne genus [telorum consumeretur] quibus ignis per iactus solitus est mitti. Hoc praeterito tempore C. Fundanius eques Romanus ex castris adversariorum ad nos transfugit.

12. On the next day, two Spanish legionaries, who pretended to be slaves, were made prisoners by a party of our horse; but being brought to the camp, they were known by the soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius and Pedeijs, and deserted from Trebonius. No pardon was extended to them, and they were slaughtered by our troops. At the same time, some couriers, sent from Corduba to Pompey, entering our camp by mistake, were

seized, had their hands cut off, and then were dismissed. About nine at night, the besieged, according to custom, spent a considerable time in casting fire and darts upon our soldiers, and wounded a great number of men. At day-break they sallied upon the sixth legion, while we were busy at the works, and began a sharp contest, in which, however, our men got the better, though the besieged had the advantage of the higher ground. Those who had begun the attack, being vigorously opposed on our side, notwithstanding all the inconveniences we fought under, were at length obliged to retire into the town, with many wounds.

Postero die ex legione vernacula milites sunt capti ab equitibus nostris duo qui dixerunt se servos esse. Cum venirent, cogniti sunt a militibus qui antea cum Fabio et Pedio fuerant... et [a] Trebonio transfugerant. Eis ad ignoscendum nulla facultas est data et a militibus nostris interfecti sunt. Idem temporis capti tabellarii qui a Corduba ad Pompeium missi erant perperamque ad nostra castra pervenerant, praecisis manibus missi sunt facti. Pari consuetudine vigilia secunda ex oppido ignem multum telorumque multitudinem iactando bene magnum tempus consumpserunt compluresque vulneribus adfecerunt. Praeterito noctis tempore eruptionem ad legionem vi fecerunt, cum in opere nostri distenti essent, acriterque pugnare coeperunt. Quorum vis repressa a nostris, etsi oppidani superiore loco defendebantur. Hi cum eruptionem facere coepissent, tamen virtute militum nostrorum qui etsi inferiore loco premebantur, tamen repulsi adversarii bene multis vulneribus adfecti in oppidum se contulerunt.

13. On the next day Pompey began a line from the camp to the river Rio Salado; and a small party of our horse, being attacked by a much

larger body of the enemy, were driven from their post, and three of their number slain. On the same day, A. Valgius, the son of a senator, whose brother was in Pompey's camp, mounted his horse and went over to the enemy, leaving all his baggage behind him. A spy, belonging to Pompey's second legion, was taken and slain. At the same time, a bullet was shot into the town, with this inscription: "That he should set up a shield on whatever day they advanced to storm the town." This encouraging some to hope that they might scale the walls, and possess themselves of the town without danger, they fell the next day to sapping them, and threw down a considerable part of the outward wall. * * In this action, being captured and protected by the townsmen, as if they had been of their own party, they requested Caesar to dismiss in armor even those who were appointed over the city by Pompey to guard it. To this Caesar answered, "That it was his custom to give, not accept of conditions:" which being reported to the garrison, they set up a shout, and began to pour their darts upon our men from the whole circuit of the wall; which gave reason to believe that the garrison intended that day to make a vigorous sally. Wherefore, surrounding the town with our troops, the conflict was for some time maintained with great violence, and one of our engines threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, in which were five of their men, and a boy, whose office it was to observe the engine.

Postero die Pompeius ex castris suis brachium coepit ad flumen Salsum; et cum nostri equites pauci in statione fuissent a pluribus reperti, de statione sunt deiecti et occisi tres. Eo die A. Valgius senatoris filius, cuius frater in castris Pompei fuisset, omnibus suis rebus relictis equum conscendit et fugit. Speculator de legione II Pompeiana captus a militibus et interfectus. Idemque temporis glans

missa est inscripta: quo die ad oppidum capiundum accederent, se scutum esse positurum. Qua spe nonnulli dum sine periculo murum ascendere et oppido potiri posse se sperant, postero die ad murum opus facere coeperunt, et bene magna prioris muri parte deiecta [in oppidum intraverunt]. Quo facto ab oppidanis ac si suarum partium essent, conservati... missos facere loricatedos qui praesidii causa praepositi oppido a Pompeio essent orabant. Quibus respondit Caesar se condiciones dare, non accipere consuevisse. Qui cum in oppidum revertissent, relato responso clamore sublato, omni genere telorum misso pugnare pro muro toto coeperunt. Propter quod fere magna pars hominum qui in castris nostris essent, non dubitarunt quia eruptionem eo die essent facturi. Ita corona circumdata pugnatum est aliquamdiu vehementissime, simulque balista missa a nostris turrem deiecit, qua adversariorum qui in ea turre fuerant, quinque deiecti sunt et puer qui balistam solitus erat observare.

14. After this Pompey erected a fort on the other side of the Rio Salado, in which he met with no interruption from our men, and exulted not a little in the idea of having possessed himself of a post so near us. Also the following day, extending himself in like manner still further, he came up with our out-post of cavalry; and charging them briskly, obliged several squadrons and the light-armed foot to give ground: many of whom, owing to the smallness of their numbers and their light armor, were trodden down by the enemy's horse. This passed within view of both camps, and not a little animated the Pompeians, to see our men pushed so far: but the latter, being afterward reinforced by a party from our camp, faced about with the intention of renewing the fight.

Eius praeteriti temporis Pompeius trans flumen Salsum castellum

constituit neque a nostris prohibitus falsaue illa opinione gloriatus est quod prope in nostris partibus locum tenuisset. Item insequenti die eadem consuetudine dum longius prosequitur, quo loco equites nostri stationem habuerant, aliquot turmae cum levi armatura impetu facto loco sunt deiecti et propter paucitatem nostrorum equitum simul cum levi armatura inter turmas adversariorum protriti. Hoc in conspectu utrorumque castrorum gerebatur, et maiore Pompeiani exultabant gloria [quod...] longiusque cedentibus nostris prosequi coepissent. Qui cum aequo loco a nostris recepti essent, ut consuissent, ex simili virtute clamore facto, aversati sunt proelium facere.

15. It invariably happens in encounters of cavalry that when the troopers dismount to charge the infantry, the match proves unequal, as happened on the present occasion. For a select body of the enemy's light-armed foot, coming unexpectedly upon our horse, they alighted to sustain the charge. Thus in a very little time, from a cavalry it became an infantry engagement, and again from an infantry changed to a cavalry engagement, in which our men were driven back to their very lines; but being there reinforced, about a hundred and twenty-three of the enemy were slain, several forced to throw down their arms, many wounded, and the rest pursued quite to their camp. On our side, three were slain, besides twelve foot-soldiers and five troopers wounded. Toward the evening of the same day, the fight, as usual, was renewed before the walls: and the enemy having thrown many darts, and a great quantity of fire from the battlements, proceeded afterward to an action of unexampled cruelty and barbarity: for in the very sight of our troops they fell to murdering the citizens, and tumbling them headlong from the walls, as is usual among barbarians: no parallel to this is to be found in the

memory of man.

Fere apud exercitus haec est equestris proelii consuetudo: cum eques ad dimicandum dimisso equo cum pedite concreditur, nequaquam par habetur. Id quod accidit in hoc proelio. Cum pedites levi armatura electi ad pugnam equitibus nostris necopinantibus venissent, idque in proelio animadversum esset, complures ex equis descenderunt. Ita exiguo tempore eques pedestre, pedes equestre proelium facere coepit, usque eo ut caedem proxime a vallo fecerint. In quo proelio adversariorum ceciderunt CXXIII, compluresque armis exuti, multi vulneribus adfecti in castra sunt redacti. Nostri ceciderunt III, saucii XII pedites et equites V. Eius diei insequenti tempore pristina consuetudine pro muro pugnari coeptum est. Cum bene magnam multitudinem telorum ignemque nostris defendentibus inieciissent, nefandum crudelissimumque facinus sunt adgressi in conspectuque nostro hospites qui in oppido erant, iugulare et de muro praecipites mittere coeperunt, sicuti apud barbaros, quod post hominum memoriam numquam est factum.

16. When night came on, Pompey sent a messenger unknown to us, to exhort the garrison to set fire to our towers and mound, and make a sally at midnight. Accordingly, having poured upon us a great quantity of darts and fire, and destroyed a considerable part of the rampart, they opened the gate which lay over against and within view of Pompey's camp, and sallied out with all their forces, carrying with them fascines to fill up the ditch; hooks and fire to destroy and reduce to ashes the barracks, which the soldiers had built mostly of reeds to defend them from the winter; and some silver and rich apparel to scatter among the tents, that while our men should be employed in securing the plunder, they might fight their way through

and escape to Pompey; who, in expectation that they would be able to effect their design, had crossed the Rio Salado with his army, where he continued all night in order of battle, to favor their retreat. But though our men had no apprehension of this design, their valor enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and repulse the enemy with many wounds. They even made themselves masters of the spoil, their arms, and some prisoners, who were put to death next day. At the same time, a deserter from the town informed us that Junius, who was employed in the mine when the citizens were massacred, exclaimed that it was a cruel and barbarous action-”that they had never deserved such treatment at their hands-for that they had received them in their temples and their homes-that it was in violation of all hospitality.” He added many things besides, which made such an impression upon the garrison that they desisted from the massacre.

Huius diei extremo tempore a Pompeianis clam nostros ad [oppidum] tabellarius est missus, ut ea nocte tures aggeremque incenderent et tertia vigilia eruptionem facerent. Ita igne telorumque multitudine iacta cum bene magnam partem operum consumpsissent, portam quae e regione et in conspectu Pompei castrorum fuerat aperuerunt, copiaeque totae eruptionem fecerunt secumque extulerunt virgulta crates ad fossas complendas et harpagones ad casas quae stramenticiae ab nostris hibernorum causa aedificatae erant, diruendas et incendendas, praeterea argentum vestimenta, ut dum nostri in praeda detinentur, illi caede facta ad praesidia Pompei se reciperent. Nam quod existimabat eos posse conata efficere, nocta tota ultra stabat flumen Salsum in acie. Quod factum licet necopinantibus nostris esset gestum, tamen virtute freti repulsos multisque vulneribus adfectos oppido represserunt, praedam armaque

eorum sunt potiti vivosque aliquos ceperunt; qui postero die sunt interfecti. Eodemque tempore transfuga nuntiavit ex oppido Iunium qui in cuniculo fuisset, iugulatione oppidanorum facta clamasse facinus se nefandum et scelus fecisse; nam eos nihil meruisse quare tali poena adficerentur, qui eos ad aras et focos suos recepissent, eosque hospitium scelere contaminasse; multa praeterea dixisse; qua oratione deterritos amplius iugulationem non fecisse.

17. The next day, Tullius, a lieutenant-general, accompanied by C. Antonius of Lusitania, came to Caesar, and addressed him to this effect: "Would to Heaven I had been one of your soldiers rather than a follower of C. Pompey, and given those proofs of valor and constancy in obtaining victories for you, rather than in suffering for him. The only advantage we reap from following his banners are wretched applauses; being reduced to the condition of indigent citizens, and by the melancholy fate of our country ranked among its enemies; we, who having never shared with Pompey his good fortune, yet find ourselves involved in his disgrace; and after sustaining the attack of so many armed legions, employing ourselves day and night in the works of defense, exposed to the darts and swords of our fellow-citizens; vanquished, deserted by Pompey, and compelled to give way to the superior valor of your troops, find ourselves at last obliged to have recourse to your clemency, and implore that you will not show yourselves less placable to fellow-citizens, than you have so often been to foreign nations." "I shall," said Caesar, "prove myself the same to fellow-citizens, as I have been to conquered nations."

Ita postero die Tullius legatus cum Catone Lusitano venit et apud Caesarem verba fecit: 'Utinam quidem di immortales fecissent ut tuus

potius miles quam Cn. Pompei factus essem et hanc virtutis constantiam in tua victoria, non in illius calamitate praestarem! Cuius funestae laudes quoniam ad hanc fortunam reciderunt ut cives Romani indigentes praesidii, et propter patriae luctuosam perniciem ducimur hostium numero qui neque in illius prospera acie primam fortunam neque in adversa secundam obtinuimus, vix tuarum legionum tot impetus sustentantes, nocturnis diurnisque operibus gladiatorum ictus telorumque missus exceptantes, relictis et desertis a Pompeio, tua virtute superati salutem a tua clementia deposcimus petimusque ut [vitam nobis concedas]. Quibus Caesar respondit: 'qualem gentibus me praestiti, similem in civium deditione praestabo.'

18. The ambassadors being dismissed, when Tiberius Tullius arrived at the gate of the town, and C. Antony did not follow him, he returned to the gate and laid hold of him, upon which drawing a poniard from his breast, he wounded him in the hand, and in this condition they both fled to Caesar. At the same time the standard-bearer of the first legion came over to our camp, and reported that the day when the skirmish happened between the horse, no less than thirty-five of his company fell; but it was not allowed to mention it in Pompey's camp, or so much as own the loss of one man. A slave, whose master was in Caesar's camp, and who had left his wife and son in the city, cut his master's throat, and deceiving the guards, escaped privately to Pompey's camp; whence by means of a bullet, on which he inscribed his intelligence, Caesar was informed of the preparations made for the defense of the place. When we had read the inscription, those who were employed to throw the bullet returning to the city, two Lusitanian brothers deserted, and informed us that Pompey in a speech made to his soldiers, had said: "That as

he found it impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved to withdraw in the night from the sight of the enemy, and retire toward the sea;" to which one answered "that it was better to hazard a battle than take refuge in flight," but he who said so was instantly put to death. At the same time some of his couriers were intercepted, who were endeavoring to get into the town. Caesar sent the letters to the inhabitants, and ordered one of the messengers begging his life, to set fire to the townsmen's wooden turret, promising that if he did this he would grant him all. The enterprise was not without difficulty: he undertook it, however, but was slain in the attempt. The same night a deserter informed us that Pompey and Labienus were greatly offended at the massacre of the citizens.

Remissis legatis, cum ad portam venissent, [constitit] Ti. Tullius, et cum introeuntem Catonem insecutus non esset, revertit ad portam et hominem adprehendit. Quod Tiberius cum fieri animadvertit, simul pugionem eduxit et manum eius incidit. Ita refugerunt ad Caesarem. Eodemque tempore signifer de legione prima transfugit, et innotuit quo die equestre proelium factum esset, suo signo perisse homines XXXV, neque licere castris Cn. Pompei nuntiare neque dicere perisse quemquam. Servos cuius dominus in Caesaris castris fuisset — uxorem et filios in oppido reliquerat — dominum iugulavit et ita clam a Caesaris praesidiis in Pompei castra discessit... Et indicium glande scriptum misit, per quod certior fieret Caesar, quae in oppido ad defendendum compararentur. Ita litteris acceptis cum in oppidum revertisset, qui mittere glandem inscriptam solebat... Insequenti tempore duo Lusitani fratres transfugenuntiaruntque Pompeium contionem habuisse: quoniam oppido subsidio non posset venire, noctu ex adversariorum conspectu se deducerent ad mare versum; unum respondisse, ut potius ad dimicandum descenderet quam

signum fugae ostenderet; eum qui ita locutus esset iugulatum. Eodem tempore tabellarii eius deprehensi qui ad oppidum veniebant. Quorum litteras Caesar oppidanis obiecit et qui vitam sibi peteret, iussit turrem ligneam oppidanorum incendere; id si fecisset, ei se promisit omnia concessurum. Quod difficile erat factu ut eam turrem sine periculo quis incenderet. Ita fine [diei] turrem ligneam cum propius accessisset, ab oppidanis est occisus. Eadem nocte transfuga nuntiavit Pompeium et Labienum de iugulatione oppidanorum indignatos esse.

19. About nine at night, one of our wooden towers, which had been severely battered by the enemy's engines, gave way as far as the third story. A sharp encounter ensued under the walls, and the besieged, assisted by a favorable wind, burned the remaining part of that tower and another. Next morning a matron threw herself from the wall, and came over to the camp, reporting, "that the rest of her family had intended the same, but were apprehended and put to death;" likewise, a letter was thrown over, in which was written" L. Minatius to Caesar; Pompey has abandoned me; if you will grant me my life, I promise to serve you with the same fidelity and attachment I have hitherto manifested toward him." At the same time deputies who had been sent before to Caesar by the garrison, now waited on him a second time, offering to deliver up the town next day, upon a bare grant of their lives: to which he replied, "That he was Caesar, and would perform his word." Thus, having made himself master of the place, on the nineteenth of February he was saluted imperator.

Vigilia secunda propter multitudinem telorum turris lignea quae nostra fuisset, ab imo vitium fecit usque ad tabulatum secundum et tertium. Eodem tempore pro muro pugnarunt acerrime et turrim

nostram ut superiorem incenderunt, idcirco quod ventum oppidani secundum habuerunt. Insequenti luce materfamilias de muro se deiecit et ad nos transsiliit dixitque se cum familia constitutum habuisse ut una transfugerent ad Caesarem, illam oppressam et iugulatam. Hoc praeterito tempore tabellae de muro sunt deiectae in quibus scriptum est inventum: 'L. Munatius Caesari. Si mihi vitam tribues, quoniam ab Cn. Pompeio sum desertus, qualem me illi praestiti, tali virtute et constantia futurum me in te esse praestabo'. Eodem tempore oppidani legati qui antea exierant, Caesarem adierunt: si sibi vitam concederet, sese insequenti luce oppidum esse dedituros. Quibus respondit se Caesarem esse fidemque praestaturum. Ita ante diem XI Kalendas Martias oppido potitus imperator est appellatus.

20. Pompey, being informed by some deserters that the town had surrendered, removed his camp toward Ucubis, where he began to build redoubts, and secure himself with lines. Caesar also decamped and drew near him. At the same time a Spanish legionary soldier deserting to our camp, informed us that Pompey had assembled the people of Ucubis, and given them instructions to inquire diligently who favored his party, who that of the enemy. Some time after in the town which was taken, the slave, who, as we have related above, had murdered his master, was apprehended in a mine and burned alive. About the same time eight Spanish centurions came over to Caesar, and in a skirmish between our cavalry and that of the enemy, we were repulsed, and some of our light-armed foot wounded. The same night we took of the enemy's spies, three slaves and one Spanish soldier. The slaves were crucified, and the soldier was beheaded.

Quod Pompeius ex perfugis cum deditionem oppidi factam esse

scisset, castra movit Ucubim versus et circum ea loca castella disposuit et munitionibus se continere coepit. Caesar movit et propius castra castris contulit. Eodem tempore mane loricatorum unus ex legione vernacula ad nos transfugit et nuntiavit Pompeium oppidanos Ucubenses convocasse eisque ita imperavisse ut diligentia adhibita perquirent qui essent suarum partium itemque adversariorum victoriae fautores. Hoc praeterito tempore in oppido quod fuit captum, servus est pressus in cuniculo quem supra demonstravimus dominum iugulasse; is vivus est combustus. Idemque temporis centuriones loricatorum VIII ad Caesarem transfugerunt ex legione vernacula, et equites nostri cum adversariorum equitibus congressi sunt, et saucii aliquot occiderunt levi armatura. Ea nocte speculatores pressi servi III et unus ex legione vernacula. Servi sunt in crucem sublatis, militi cervices abscisae.

21. The day following, some of the enemy's cavalry and light-armed infantry deserted to us; and about eleven of their horse falling upon a party of our men that were sent to fetch water, killed some and took others prisoners; among which last were eight troopers. On the next day Pompey beheaded seventy-four persons supposed to be favorers of Caesar's cause, ordering the rest who lay under the same suspicion to be carried back to the town, of whom a hundred and twenty escaped to Caesar.

Postero die equites cum levi armatura ex adversariorum castris ad nos transfugerunt. Et eo tempore circiter XL equites ad aquatores nostros excucurrerunt, nonnullos interfecerunt, item alios vivos abduxerunt; e quibus capti sunt equites VIII. Insequenti die Pompeius securi percussit homines LXXIII qui dicebantur esse

fautores Caesaris victoriae, reliquos versum oppidum iussit deduci. Ex quibus effugerunt CXX et ad Caesarem venerunt.

22. Some time after, the deputies from Bursavola (whom Caesar had taken prisoners at Ategua, and sent along with his own ambassadors to their city, to inform them of the massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had to apprehend from Pompey, who suffered his soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all manner of crimes with impunity), arriving in the town, none of our deputies, except such as were natives of the place, durst enter the city, though they were all Roman knights and senators. But after many messages backward and forward, when the deputies were upon their return, the garrison pursued and put them all to the sword, except two who escaped to Caesar, and informed him of what had happened. Some time after, the inhabitants of Bursavola, sending spies to Ategua to know the truth of what had happened, and finding the report of our deputies confirmed, were for stoning to death him who had been the cause of the murder of the deputies, and were with difficulty restrained from laying violent hands upon him, which in the end proved the occasion of their own destruction. For having obtained leave of the inhabitants to go in person to Caesar and justify himself, he privately drew together some troops, and when he thought himself strong enough, returned in the night, and was treacherously admitted into the town, where he made a dreadful massacre of the inhabitants, slew all the leaders of the opposite party, and reduced the place to subjection. Soon after, some slaves who had deserted informed us that he had sold all the goods of the citizens, and that Pompey suffered none of his soldiers to quit the camp but unarmed, because, since the taking of Ategua, many despairing of success fled into Baeturia, having given over all expectation of victory; and that if any deserted from

our camp, they were put among the light-armed infantry, whose pay was only sixteen asses a day.

Hoc praeterito tempore qui in oppido Ategua Bursavonenses capti sunt, legati profecti sunt cum nostris, uti rem gestam Bursavonensibus referrent; quid sperarent de Cn. Pompeio, cum viderent hospites iugulari; praeterea multa scelera ab iis fieri qui praesidii causa ab iis reciperentur. Qui ad oppidum [cum] venissent, nostri qui fuissent equites Romani et senatores, non sunt ausi introire in oppidum, praeterquam qui eius civitatis fuissent. Quorum responsis ultro citroque acceptis et redditis cum ad nostros se reciperent qui extra oppidum fuissent illi praesidio insecuti ex Bursavone legatos iugularunt. Duo reliqui [ex] eis fugerunt et Caesari rem gestam detulerunt... Et speculatores ad oppidum Ateguam miserunt. Qui cum certum conperissent, legatorum responsa ita esse gesta quemadmodum illi rettulissent, ab oppidanis concursu facto, eum qui legatos iugulasset, lapidare et ei manus intentare coeperunt: illius opera se perisse. Ita vix periculo liberatus petiit ab oppidanis ut ei liceret legatum ad Caesarem proficisci: illi se satis facturum. Potestate data cum inde esset profectus, praesidio comparato, cum bene magnam manum fecisset et nocturno tempore per fallaciam in oppidum esset receptus, iugulationem magnam facit principibusque qui sibi contrarii fuissent interfectis oppidum in suam potestatem recepit. Hoc praeterito tempore servi transfugae nuntiaverunt oppidanorum bona vendere [edictumque] ne cui extra vallum liceret exire nisi discinctum, idcirco quod ex quo die oppidum Ategua esset captum, metu conterritos complures profugere Baeturiam; neque sibi ullam spem victoriae propositam habere, et siqui ex nostris transfugerent, in levem armaturam conici eumque non amplius XVII accipere.

23. The day following Caesar removed his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to draw a line to the river Salado. While our men were employed in the work, some of the enemy fell upon us from the higher ground, and as we were in no condition to make resistance, wounded great numbers. Here, as Ennius says, "our men retreated a little." This occurrence, so contrary to our usual custom, being perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion passed the river, and restored the battle; when, pressing upon the enemy with astonishing bravery, one of them fell overwhelmed by the multitude of darts discharged from above. The other continued the combat for some time, but seeing himself in danger of being surrounded, endeavored to make good his retreat, but stumbled and fell. His death being known, the enemy crowded together in still greater numbers, upon which our cavalry passed the river, and drove them back to their intrenchments; so that, while they too eagerly desired to slay them within their lines, they were surrounded by the cavalry and light-armed troops. Many of these would have been captured alive, had not their valor been pre-eminent, for they were so confined by the space included in the fortress, that the cavalry could not well defend itself. Many of our men were wounded in these two encounters, and among the rest Clodius Aquitius, but as the fight was carried on mostly from a distance, none of our men fell, except the two centurions who sacrificed themselves in the cause of glory.

Insequenti tempore Caesar castris castra contulit et brachium ad flumen Salsum ducere coepit. Hic dum in opere nostri distenti essent, complures ex superiori loco adversariorum decucurrerunt nec detinentibus nostros multis telis iniectis complures vulneribus adfecere. Hic tum, ut ait Ennius, nostri 'cessere parumper'. Itaque praeter consuetudinem cum a nostris animadversum esset cedere,

centuriones ex legione v flumen transgressi duo restituerunt aciem, acriterque eximia virtute plures cum agerent, ex superiore loco multitudine telorum alter eorum concidit. Ita cum eius compar proelium facere coepisset, cum undique se circumveniri animum advertisset, in[teger re]gressus pedem offendit. Huius concidentis temporis aquari fortis insignia cum conplures adversariorum concursum facerent, equites nostri transgressi inferiori loco adversarios ad vallum agere coeperunt. Ita cupidius dum intra praesidia illorum student caedem facere, a turmis et levi armatura sunt interclusi. Quorum nisi summa virtus fuisset, vivi capti essent. Nam et munitione praesidii ita coangustabantur, ut eques spatio intercluso vix se defendere posset. Ex utroque genere pugnae conplures sunt vulneribus adfecti, in quis etiam Clodius Arquiteus. Inter quos ita comminus est pugnatum ut ex nostris praeter duos centuriones sit nemo desideratus gloria se efferentes.

24. Next day both parties withdrawing from Soricaria, we continued our works. But Pompey, observing that our fort had cut off his communication with Asparia, which is about five miles distant from Ucria, judged it necessary to come to a battle. Yet he did not offer it upon equal terms, but chose to draw up his men upon a hill, that he might have the advantage of the higher ground. In this respect, when both parties were seeking the superior position, our men anticipating them, drove them into the plain, which gave us the advantage. The enemy yielded on all hands, and we made immense havoc among them. The mountain and not their valor protected them; of which advantage, and of all relief, our men, though few in number, would have deprived them had not night intervened. Three hundred and twenty- four light-armed foot, and about a hundred and thirty-eight legionary soldiers of their number fell, besides those whose armor

and spoils we carried off. Thus the death of the two centurions, which happened the day before, was fully revenged.

Postero die ad Soricariam utrorumque convenere copiae. Nostri brachia ducere coeperunt. Pompeius cum animadverteret castello se excludi Aspavia, quod est ab Ucubi milia passuum V, haec res necessario devocabat ut ad dimicandum descenderet. Neque tamen aequo loco sui potestatem faciebat, sed ex grumo... Excelsum tumulum capiebant, usque eo ut necessario cogeretur iniquum locum subire. Quo de facto cum utrorumque copiae tumulum excellentem petissent, prohibiti a nostris sunt deiecti planitie. Quae res secundum nostris efficiebat proelium. undique cedentibus adversariis non parum magna in caede versabantur. Quibus mons, non virtus saluti fuit. Quo sub sidio [paulum modo restiterunt, sic] ut nisi advesperasset, a paucioribus nostris omni auxilio privati essent. Nam ceciderunt ex levi armatura CCCXXIII, ex legionariis CXXXVIII, praeterquam quorum arma et spolia sunt ablata. Ita pridie duorum centurionum interitio hac adversariorum poena est litata.

25. The day after, Pompey's cavalry advanced, according to their usual custom, to our lines; for they only dared venture to draw up on equal ground. They therefore began to skirmish with our men who were at work, the legionaries calling out to us at the same time to choose our field of battle, with a view to make us believe that they desired nothing so much as to come to blows; upon this our men quitted the eminence where they were encamped, and advanced a great way into the plain. But none of the enemy had the boldness to present themselves, excepting Antistius Turpio; who, presuming on his strength, and fancying no one on our side a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon this, as is recorded of Memnon and

Achilles, Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, advanced from our ranks to the encounter. The fierce air of Antistius having engaged the attention of all, the two armies drew up to be spectators of the issue of this challenge, and expressed as much impatience as if the whole fortune of the war had depended upon it. The wishes on both sides for success were equal to the anxiety and concern each felt for his own combatant. They advanced into the plain with great courage, having each a resplendent buckler of curious workmanship. And doubtless the combat would have been soon decided, had not some light-armed foot drawn up near the lines, to serve as a guard to the camp because of the approach of the enemy's horse, which we have before alluded to. * * * Our horse, in retreating to their camp, being warmly pursued by the enemy, suddenly faced about with great cries; which so terrified the Pompeians, that they immediately betook themselves to flight, and retreated to their camp with the loss of many of their men.

Insequenti die pari consuetudine cum ad eundem locum eius praesidium venisset, pristino illo suo utebantur instituto; nam praeter equites nullo loco aequo se committere audebant. Cum nostri in opere essent, equitum copiae concursus facere coeperunt, simulque vociferantibus legionariis, cum locum efflagitarent ex consuetudine insequendi, existimare posses paratissimos esse ad dimicandum. Nostri ex humili convalle bene longe sunt egressi et planitie in aequiori loco constiterunt. Illi tamen procul dubio ad congregiendum in aequum locum non sunt ausi descendere praeter unum Antistium Turpionem. Qui fidens viribus ex adversariis sibi parem esse neminem agitare coepit. Hic, ut fertur Achillis Memnonisque congressus, Q. Pompeius Niger eques Romanus Italicensis ex acie nostra ad congregiendum progressus. Quoniam ferocitas Antistii

omnium mentes converterat ab opere ad spectandum, acies sunt dispositae. Nam inter bellatores principesque dubia erat posita victoria, ut prope videretur finem bellandi duorum dirimere pugna. Ita avidi cupidique suarum quisque ex partium virorum fautorumque voluntate habebatur. Quorum virtute alacri, cum ad dimicandum in planitiem se contulissent, laudis insignia scutorumque praeifulgens opus caelatum... quorum [certamine] pugna esset [prope] profecto dirempta, nisi propter equitum concessum, ut supra demonstravimus... levem armaturam praesidii causa non longe ab opere [castra] constituit. Ut, nostri equites in receptu dum ad castra redeunt, adversarii cupidius sunt insecuti, universi clamore facto impetum dederunt. Ita metu peterriti, cum in fuga essent multis amissis in castra se recipiunt.

26. Caesar, to reward the valor of the Cassian troop, presented them with thirteen thousand sesterces, distributed ten thousand more among the light-armed foot, and gave to the commander of the cavalry five golden collars. The same day, A. Bebius, C. Flavius, and A. Trebellius, Roman knights of Asta, with their horses richly caparisoned and adorned with silver, came over to Caesar, and informed him, that all the rest of the Roman knights in Pompey's camp, had like them conspired to come and join him, that, on the information of a slave they had all been seized and cast into custody; that out of this number they only had escaped. The same day letters were intercepted, sent by Pompey to Ursao, with the usual greeting, and stating, "That hitherto he had all the success against the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner than was expected, could he have brought them to engage him upon equal terms; that he did not think it advisable to venture new-levied troops on a plain; that the enemy, depending on our supplies, as yet protract

the war for they storm city after city, thence supplying themselves with provisions: that he would therefore endeavor to protect the towns of his party, and bring the war to as speedy an issue as possible: that he would send them a reinforcement of some cohorts, and that having deprived them of provisions he would necessitate the enemy to come to an engagement.

Caesar ob virtutem turmae Cassianae donavit milia XIII et praefecto torques aureos V et levi armaturae milia XII. Hoc die A. Baebius et C. Flavius et A. Trebellius equites Romani Hastenses argento prope tecti [equites] ad Caesarem transfugerunt. Qui nuntiaverunt equites Romanos coniurasse omnis qui in castris Pompei essent, ut transitionem facerent; servi indicio omnes in custodiam esse coniectos; e quibus occasione capta se transfugisse. Item hoc die litterae sunt deprensae quas mittebat Ursaonem Cn. Pompeius: ‘S. V. G. E. V. Etsi prout nostra felicitas, ex sententia adversarios propulsos... Qui si aequo loco sui potestatem facerent, celerius quam vostra opinio fert. bellum confecissem. Sed exercitum tironem non audent in campum deducere nostrisque adhuc freti praesidiis bellum ducunt. Nam singulas civitates circumsederunt ut inde sibi commeatus capiant. Quare et civi tates nostrarum partium conservabo et bellum primo quoque tempore conficiam. Cohortes [... in] animo habeo ad vos mittere. Profecto nostro commeatu privati necessario ad dimicandum descendent.’

27. Some time after, as our men were carelessly dispersed about the works, a few horse were killed, who had gone to a grove of olives to fetch wood. Several slave deserted at this time, and informed us that ever since the action at Soritia on the 7th of March, the enemy had been under continual alarms, and appointed Attius Varus to guard the

lines. The same day Pompey decamped, and posted himself in an olive-wood over against Hispalis. Caesar, before he removed, waited till midnight, when the moon began to appear. At his departure he ordered them to set fire to the fort of Ucubis, which Pompey had abandoned, and to assemble in the greater camp. He afterward laid siege to Ventisponde, which surrendered; and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the city, because the garrison refused to open the gates to him. A soldier who had murdered his brother in the camp, being intercepted by our men, was scourged to death. Caesar, still pursuing his march, arrived in the plains of Munda, and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey.

Insequenti tempore cum nostri in opere distenti essent, equites in oliveto dum lignantur, interfecti sunt aliquot. Servi transfugerunt qui nuntiaverunt a. d. III Non. Mart. proelium ad Soricariam quod factum est, ex eo tempore metum esse magnum et Attium Varum circum castella praeesse. Eo die Pompeius castra movit et contra Spalim in oliveto constituit. Caesar priusquam eodem est profectus, luna hora circiter sexta visa est. Ita castris motis Ucubim Pompeius praesidium quod reliquit, iussit incendere, ut deusto oppido in castra maiora se reciperent. Insequenti tempore Ventiponem oppidum cum oppugnare coepisset, deditione facta iter fecit in Carrucam, contra Pompeium castra posuit. Pompeius oppidum quod contra sua praesidia portas clausisset incendit; milesque qui fratrem suum in castris iugulasset, interceptus est a nostris et fusti percussus. Hinc itinere facto in campum Mundensem cum esset ventum, castra contra Pompeium constituit.

28. Next day as Caesar was preparing to set out with the army, notice was sent him by his spies, that Pompey had been in order of battle

ever since midnight. Upon this intelligence he ordered the standard to be raised. Pompey had taken this resolution in consequence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao, who were his firm adherents, in which he told them that Caesar refused to come down into the plain, because his army consisted mostly of new-levied troops. This had greatly confirmed the city in its allegiance. Thus relying on this opinion, he thought that he could effect the whole, for he was defended by the nature of his situation, and by the position for defense of the town, where he had his camp: for, as we observed before, this country is full of hills which run in a continued chain, without any plains intervening.

Sequentique die cum iter facere Caesar cum copiis vellet, renuntiatum est a speculatoribus Pompeium de tertia vigilia in acie stetisse. Hoc nuntio adlato vexillum proposuit. Idcirco enim copias eduxerat quod Ursaonensium civitati [qui sui] fuissent fautores, antea litteras miserat Caesarem nolle in convallem descendere, quod maiorem partem exercitus tironem haberet. Hae litterae vehementer confirmabant mentes oppidanorum. Ita hac opinione fretus tuto se facere posse existimabat. Etenim et natura loci defendebantur et ipsius oppido munitione ubi castra habuit constituta. Namque ut superius demonstravimus, loca excellentia tumultis contineri, interim nulla planitie edividit; id quod eo incidit tempore.

29. But we must by no means omit to mention an accident which happened about this time. The two camps were divided from one another by a plain about five miles in extent, so that Pompey, in consequence of the town's elevated position, and the nature of the country, enjoyed a double defense. Across this valley ran a rivulet, which rendered the approach to the mountain extremely difficult,

because it formed a deep morass on the right. Caesar had no doubt that the enemy would descend into the plain and come to a battle, when he saw them in array. This appeared evident to all; the rather because the plain would give their cavalry full room to act, and the day was so serene and clear that the gods seemed to have sent it on purpose to favor the engagement. Our men rejoiced at the favorable opportunity: some however were not altogether exempt from fear when they considered that their all was at stake, with the uncertainty of what might be their fate an hour after. He advanced however to the field of battle, fully persuaded that the enemy would do the same; but they durst not venture above a mile from the town, being determined to shelter themselves under its walls. Our men still continued before them in order of battle; but although the equality of the ground sometimes tempted them to come and dispute the victory, they nevertheless still kept their post on the mountain, in the neighborhood of the town. We doubled our speed to reach the rivulet, without their stirring from the place where they stood.

Planities inter utraque castra intercedebat circiter milia passuum V, ut auxilia Pompei duabus defenderentur rebus, oppido et excelsi loci natura. Hinc derigens proxima planities aequabatur. Cuius decursum antecedeat rivus qui ad eorum accessum summam efficiebat loci iniquitatem. Nam palustri et voraginoso solo currens erat ad dextrum. Id quod Caesar cum aciem directam vidisset, non habuit dubium quin mediae planitie in aequum ad dimicandum adversarii procederent. Hoc erat in omnium conspectu. Hoc accedebat ut locus illa planitie aequitate ornaretur, et diei solisque serenitate ut mirificum, ut optandum tempus prope ab diis immortalibus illud tributum esset ad proelium committendum. Nostri laetari, nonnulli etiam timere, quod in eum locum res fortunaeque omnium

deducerentur ut quicquid post horam casus tribuisset, in dubio poneretur. Itaque nostri ad dimicandum procedunt, id quod adversarios existimabamus esse facturos. Qui tamen a munitione oppidi longius non audebant procedere, in quo sibi prope murum adversarii constituebant. Itaque nostri procedunt. Interdum aequitas loci adversarios efflagitabat ut tali contenderent condicione ad victoriam. Neque tamen illi a sua consuetudine discedebant, ut aut ab excelso loco aut oppido discederent. Nostri pede presso propius rivum cum adpropinquassent, adversarii patrocinari loco iniquo non desinunt.

30. Their army consisted of thirteen legions; the cavalry was drawn up upon the wings, with six thousand light-armed infantry and about the same number of auxiliaries. We had only eighty heavy-armed cohorts, and eight thousand horse. When we reached the extremity of the plain, the real seat of disadvantage, the enemy were awaiting us above, so that it would have been exceedingly dangerous to proceed. When Caesar perceived this, he pointed out the locality, lest any disagreeable occurrence should result from the temerity of his troops. The army murmured greatly, as if they had been kept back from a certain victory, when this was told them. The delay, however, served to enliven the enemy, thinking that Caesar's troops shrank from an encounter through fear: they therefore had the boldness to advance a little way, yet without quitting the advantage of their post, the approach to which was extremely dangerous. The tenth legion, as usual, was on the right, the third and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary troops and cavalry. The battle began with a shout.

Erat acies XIII aquilis constituta, quae lateribus equitatu tegebatur, cum levi armatura milibus sex; praeterea auxiliares accedebant prope

alterum tantum. Nostra praesidia LXXX cohortibus, octo milibus equitum. Ita cum in extrema planitie iniquum in locum nostri adpropinquassent, paratus hostis erat superior, ut transeundum superius iter vehementer esset periculosum. Quod cum a Caesare esset animadversum, nequid temere culpa secus admitteretur, eum locum definire coepit. Quod cum hominum auribus esset obiectum, moleste et acerbe accipiebant se inpediri quominus proelium conficere possent. Haec mora adversarios alacriores efficiebat: Caesaris copias timore inpediri ad committendum proelium. Ita se efferentes iniquo loco sui potestatem faciebant, ut magno tamen periculo accessus eorum haberetur. Hic decumani suum locum, cornum dextrum, tenebant, sinistrum III et V, itemque et cetera [auxilia equitatus]. Proelium clamore facto committitur.

31. But though our men were superior to the enemy in courage, the latter nevertheless defended themselves so well by the advantage of the higher ground, and the shouts were so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides so great, that we almost began to despair of victory. For the first onset and shout, by which an enemy is most apt to be dismayed, were pretty equal in the present encounter. All fought with equal valor; the place was covered with arrows and darts, and great numbers of the enemy fell. We have already observed that the tenth legion was on the right, which, though not considerable for the number of men, was nevertheless formidable for its courage; and so pressed the enemy on that side that they were obliged to draw a legion from the right wing to reinforce the left, lest we should come upon their flank; but they fought so bravely that the reinforcement could not find an opportunity of entering the ranks. Upon this motion, our cavalry on the left fell upon Pompey's right wing. Meanwhile the clashing of armor mingled with the shouts of

combatants, and the groans of the dying and the wounded, terrified the new-raised soldiers. On this occasion, as Ennius says, “they fought hand to hand, foot to foot, and shield to shield;” but though the enemy fought with the utmost vigor, they were obliged to give ground, and retire toward the town. The battle was fought on the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were entirely routed and put to flight; insomuch that not a man could have escaped, had they not sheltered themselves in the place whence they advanced to the charge. The enemy lost on this occasion upward of thirty thousand men, and among the rest Labienus and Attius Varus, whose funeral obsequies were performed upon the field of battle. They had likewise three thousand Roman knights killed, partly Italian, partly provincial. About a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, partly horse; and five hundred wounded. We gained thirteen eagles, and several standards, and emblems of authority, and made seventeen officers prisoners. Such was the issue of this action.

Hic etsi virtute nostri antecedeabant, adversarii loco superiore se defendebant acerrime, et vehemens fiebat ab utrisque clamor telorumque missu concursus, sic ut nostri prope diffiderent victoriae. Congressus enim et clamor, quibus rebus maxime hostis conterretur, in conlatu pari erat condicione. Ita ex utroque genere cum parem virtutem ad bellandum contulissent, pilorum missu fixa cumulatur et concidit adversariorum multitudo. Dextrum ut demonstravimus decumanos cornum tenuisse. Qui etsi erant pauci, tamen propter virtutem magno adversarios timore eorum opera adficiebant, quod a suo loco hostes vehementer premere coeperunt, ut ad subsidium, ne ab latere nostri occuparent, legio adversariorum traduci coepta sit ad dextrum. Quae simul est mota, equitatus Caesaris sinistrum cornum premere coepit, ita uti eximia virtute proelium facere possent ut locus

in aciem ad subsidium veniundi non daretur. Ita cum clamor esset intermixtus gemitu gladiatorumque crepitus auribus oblatus, inperitorum mentes timore praepediebat. Hic, ut ait Ennius, pes pede premitur, armis teruntur arma, adversariosque vehementissime pugnantes nostri agere coeperunt. Quibus oppidum fuit subsidio. Ita ipsis Liberalibus fusi fugatique non superfuissent, nisi in eum locum confugissent, ex quo erant egressi. In quo proelio ceciderunt milia hominum circiter XXX et siquid amplius, praeterea Labienus, Attius Varus, quibus occisis utrisque funus est factum, itemque equites Romani partim ex urbe, partim ex provincia ad milia III. Nostri desiderati ad hominum mille partim peditum, partim equitum, saucii ad D adversariorum aquilae sunt ablatae XIII et signa... et fasces... praeterea hos habuit...

32. The remains of Pompey's army retreating to Munda, with the intention of defending themselves in that town, it became necessary to invest it. The dead bodies of the enemy, heaped together, served as a rampart, and their javelins and darts were fixed up by way of palisades. Upon these we hung their bucklers to supply the place of a breastwork, and fixing the heads of the deceased upon swords and lances, planted them all around the works, to strike the greater terror into the besieged, and keep awake in them a sense of our prowess. Amid these mournful objects did they find themselves shut in, when our men began the attack, which was conducted chiefly by the Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped to Corduba with some horse, informed Sextus Pompey of what had happened; who, upon receipt of the mournful news, distributing what money he had about him to the troopers, left the town about nine at night, under pretense of going to find out Caesar, to treat of an accommodation. On the other side, Cn. Pompey, attended by a few horse and foot, took the road to

Carteia, where his fleet lay, and which was about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Corduba. When he was arrived within eight miles of the place, he sent P. Calvitiuſ his camp-maſhal before, to procure a litter to carry him to the town, as he found himſelf unwell. The litter came, and when he entered the town, thoſe of his party waited on him privately, to receive his orders about the management of the war. As they aſſembled round the place in great crowds, Pompey quitting his litter put himſelf under their protection.

...ex fuga hac qui oppidum Mundam ſibi conſtituiſſent praefidium, noſtrique cogebantur neceſſario eos circumvallare. Ex hoſtium armis pro caespite cadavera conlocabantur, ſcuta et pila pro vallo. Insuper occiſorum in gladiorum mucronibus capita hominum ordinata ad oppidum converſa. Univerſa hoſtium timorem... virtutiſque inſignia propoſita viderent, et vallo circumcluderentur adverſarii. Ita Galli tragulis iaculiſque oppidum [quod vallo facto] ex hoſtium cadaveribus ſunt circumplexi, oppugnare coeperunt. Ex hoc proelio Valeriuſ aduſcens Cordubam cum paucis equitibus fugit, Sex. Pompeio qui Cordubae fuiſſet, rem geſtam refert. Cognito hoc negotio, quos equites ſecum habuit, quod pecuniae ſecum habuit eiſ diſtribuit et oppidanis dixit ſe de pace ad Caefarem proficiſci et ſecunda vigilia ab oppido diſceſſit. Cn. Pompeiuſ cum equitibus paucis nonnulliſque peditibus ad navale praefidium Carteiam contendit, quod oppidum abeſt ab Corduba milia paſſuum CLXX. Quo cum ad octavum miliarium veniſſet, P. Cauciliuſ qui caſtris antea Pompei praepoſituſ eſſet, eiſ verbis nuntiuſ mittit, eum minus belle habere, ut mitterent lecticam qua in oppidum deferri poſſet. litteriſ miſſiſ Pompeiuſ Carteiam defertur. Qui illarum partiuſ fautores eſſent, conveniunt in domum quo erat delatuſ, qui arbitrati ſunt clanculum veniſſe, ut ab eo quae vellent de bello

requirerent. Cum frequentia convenisset, de lectica Pompeius in eorum fidem confugit.

33. After the encounter, Caesar seeing the circumvallation of Munda completed, marched to Corduba. Those of the enemy who had escaped the slaughter, possessing themselves of a bridge, upon the approach of our men, called out to them with an air of derision- "What! we who are no more than a handful of men escaped from the battle, shall we be allowed no place of retreat?" They immediately prepared to defend the bridge. Caesar passed the river and encamped. Scapula, who had stirred up the freedmen to a revolt, escaping after the battle to Corduba, when he found himself besieged, assembled all his followers, ordered a funeral pile to be erected and a magnificent supper served up; when, putting on his richest dress, he distributed his plate and money among his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed himself several times, and, last of all, ordered one of his freedmen to dispatch him, and another to set fire to the pile.

Caesar ex proelio [Munda] munitione circumdata Cordubam venit. Qui ex caede eo refugerunt, pontem occuparunt. Cum eo ventum esset, conviciare coeperunt, nos ex proelio paucos superesse; quo fugeremus? Ita pugnare coeperunt de ponte. Caesar flumen traiecit et castra posuit. Scapula totius seditionis [familiae ac libertinorum] caput ex proelio Cordubam cum venisset, familiam et liberos convocavit, pyram sibi extruxit, cenam adferri quam optimam imperavit, item optimis insternendum vestimentis; pecuniam et argentum in praesentia familiae donavit. Ipse de tempore cenare, resinam et nardum identidem sibi infundit. Ita novissimo tempore servum iussit et libertum qui fuisset eius concubinus, alterum se iugulare, alterum pyram incendere.

34. Caesar had no sooner encamped before the place than a division arose among the inhabitants, between the parties of Caesar and Pompey, till the dispute almost reached to our camps. During the contest, some legions, composed partly of deserters, partly of slaves made free by Pompey, came and surrendered themselves to Caesar. But the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the town, and with that view possessed themselves of the walls and some towers, in spite of all opposition, which obliged the other party to send deputies to Caesar for aid. Upon this those who had escaped out of the battle set fire to the place, and our men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them, besides those who were slain without the walls; thus Caesar obtained the town. While he was employed in this siege, those who, as we have said, were blockaded at Munda made a sally, but were driven back into the town with considerable loss.

Oppidani autem, simul Caesar castra contra ad oppidum posuit, discordare coeperunt, usque eo ut clamor in castra nostra perveniret, [rixa orta] fere inter Caesarianos et inter Pompeianos. Erant hic legiones, quae ex perfugis conscriptae, partim oppidanorum servi qui erant a Pompeio Sexto manumissi. Qui in Caesaris adventum descendere coeperunt. legio XIII oppidum defendere coepit, nostri cum iam depugnarent, turres ex parte et murum occuparunt. Denuo legatos ad Caesarem mittunt ut sibi legiones subsidio intromitteret. Hoc cum animadverterent homines fugitivi, oppidum incendere coeperunt. Qui superati a nostris sunt interfecti hominum milia XXII, praeterquam extra murum qui perierunt. Ita Caesar oppido potitus. Dum hic detinetur, ex proelio quos circummunitos superius demonstravimus, eruptionem fecerunt et bene multi interfecti; in oppidum sunt redacti.

35. Thence Caesar marched to Hispalis, which sent deputies to sue for pardon. Though the citizens assured him that they were able to defend the town, he sent Caninius his lieutenant thither with some troops, and encamped before the place. There was in the town a strong party of Pompeians, who, displeased to see Caesar's troops received within the walls, secretly deputed one Philo, a zealous partisan of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to beg assistance of Cecilius Niger, one of the barbarians, who lay encamped near Lenius, with a strong army of Lusitanians. He is received into the town of Hispalis by night, surprises the sentinels and garrison, shuts the gates, and begins to defend the place.

Caesar Hispali[m] cum contendisset, legati de precatum venerunt. Ita cum ad oppidum esset ventum, Caninium cum praesidio legatum intromittit, ipse castra ad oppidum ponit. Erat bene magna manus intra Pompeianarum partium quae praesidium receptum indignaretur clam quendam Philonem, illum qui Pompeianarum partium fuisset defensor acerrimus. Is tota Lusitania notissimus erat. Hic clam praesidia Lusitaniam proficiscitur et Caecilium Nigrum hominem barbarum ad Lennium convenit, qui bene magnam manum Lusitanorum haberet. rursus Hispalim oppidum denuo noctu per murum recipitur. Praesidium, vigiles iugulant, portas praecludunt, de integro pugnare coeperunt.

36. During these transactions deputies arrived from Carteia, with accounts of their having secured Pompey; hoping by this service to atone for their former fault of shutting their gates against Caesar. Meantime, the Lusitanians in Hispalis plundered the town, which, though known to Caesar, did not yet determine him to press it too hard, lest they should in despair set fire to it, and destroy the walls. It

was resolved in council to suffer the Lusitanians to escape in the night by a sally, yet so that the thing might not appear designed. In this sally, they set fire to the ships that were in the river Guadalquivir, and while our men were employed in extinguishing the flames, endeavored to get off; but being overtaken by the cavalry, were mostly cut to pieces. Thence Caesar marched to Asta, which submitted. Munda having been now a long while besieged, many of those who had escaped out of the battle, despairing of safety, surrendered to us; and being formed into a legion, conspired among themselves, that upon a signal being given, the garrison should sally out in the night, while they at the same time should begin a massacre in the camp. But the plot being discovered, they were next night, at the changing of the third watch, all put to death outside the rampart.

Dum haec geruntur, legati Carteienses renuntiaverunt quod Pompeium in potestatem haberent. Quod ante Caesari portas praeclusissent, illo beneficio suum maleficio existimabant se lucrificare. Lusitani Hispali pugnare nullo tempore desistebant. Quod Caesar cum animum adverteret, si oppidum capere contenderet, timuit ne homines perditī incenderent et moenia delerent. Ita consilio habito noctu patitur Lusitanos eruptionem facere; id quod consulto non existimabant fieri. Ita erumpendo navis quae ad Baetim flumen fuissent, incendunt. Nostri dum incendio detinentur, illi profugiunt et ab equitibus conciduntur. Quo facto oppido recuperato Hastam iter facere coepit. Ex qua civitate legati ad deditionem venerunt. Mundenses qui ex proelio in oppidum confugerant, cum diutius circumsiderentur, bene multi deditionem faciunt, et cum essent in legionem distributi, coniurant inter sese ut noctu signo dato qui in oppido fuissent eruptionem facerent, illi caedem in castris administrarent. Hac re cognita insequenti nocte vigilia tertia tessera

data extra vallum omnes sunt concisi.

37. The Carteians, while Caesar was employed in reducing the other towns upon his route, began to disagree about young Pompey. One party had sent the deputies to Caesar, and another was in the Pompeian interest. These last prevailing, seized the gates, and made a dreadful slaughter of their adversaries. Pompey himself was wounded in the fray, but escaping to his ships, fled with about twenty galleys. Didius, who was at Gades with Caesar's fleet, hearing of what had happened, immediately sailed in pursuit of them; stationing at the same time some cavalry and infantry along the coast, to prevent his escaping by land. Pompey had left Carteia with so much precipitation, that he took no time to furnish himself with water, and this circumstance obliging him to stop by the way, Didius came up with him after four days' sailing, took some of his ships, and burned the rest.

Carteenses, dum Caesar in itinere reliqua oppida oppugnat, propter Pompeium dissentire coeperunt. Pars erat quae legatos ad Caesarem miserat, pars erat quae Pompeianarum partium fautores essent. Seditione concitata portas occupant. Caedes fit magna; saucius Pompeius naves viginti occupat longas et profugit. Didius qui [ad] Gadis classi praeuisset... ad quem simul nuntius adlatus est, confestim sequi coepit. Partim pedibus et equitatu ad persequendum celeriter iter faciebant, item confestim consequentes. Quarto die navigationis quod imparati a Carteia profecti sine aqua fuissent, ad terram adplicant. Dum aquantur, Didius classe accurrit, navis incendit, nonnullas capit.

38. With a few friends, Pompey escaped to a place strongly fortified by nature; of which the troops sent in pursuit of him having certain

intelligence by their scouts, followed day and night. He was wounded in the shoulder and left leg, and had besides sprained his ankle, all which greatly retarded his flight, and obliged him to make use of a litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the place of his retreat, he was quickly surrounded by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing himself betrayed, he took refuge in a post fortified by nature, and which could easily be defended by a few men, the approach to it being extremely difficult. We attempted to storm it, but were repulsed, and pursued by the enemy; and meeting with no better success after several trials, we at length resolved to lay siege to the place, it seeming too hazardous to force it. Accordingly, a terrace was raised, and lines drawn round the place; which the enemy perceiving, thought it best to betake themselves to flight.

Pompeius cum paucis profugit et locum quendam munitum natura occupat. Equites et cohortes quae ad persequendum missi essent, speculatoribus ante missis certiores fiunt, diem et noctem iter faciunt. Pompeius umero et sinistro crure vehementer erat saucius. Hoc accedebat ut etiam talum intorsisset; quae res maxime inpediebat. Ita lectica ad turrem quen[dam cum] esset ablat[us], in ea ferebatur Lusitanis more militari. Cum Caesaris praesidio fuisset conspectus, celeriter equitatu cohortibusque circumcluditur. Erat accessus loci difficultas. Nam idcirco [propter suo praesidio fuisset conspectus celeriter ad] munitum locum natura ceperat sibi Pompeius, quamvis magna multitudine adduct[a ut pauc]i homines ex superiore loco defendere possent. Subeunt in adventu nostri depellunturque telis. Quibus cedentibus cupidius insequabantur adversarii et confestim tardabant ab accessu. Hoc saepius facto animum advertebatur nostro magno id fieri periculo. opere circummunire instituit. Pari autem [cupiditate] ex celeri festinatione circumm[un]itiones iugo derigunt,

ut aequo pede cum adversariis congregi possent. a quibus cum animadversum esset, fuga sibi praesidium capiunt.

39. Pompey as we have observed above being lame and wounded, was in no condition to make a speedy retreat; and the rather, because the place was such that he could use neither horse nor litter. Slaughter was dealt on all hands by our troops, his fortress having been stormed, and his resources cut off. In this extremity he fled to a cave, where he could not easily be discovered, unless by the information of the captives. Here he was slain, his head was brought to Hispalis on the day before the ides of April, and exhibited before the people when Caesar was at Gades.

Pompeius, ut supra demonstravimus, saucius et intorto talo idcirco tardabatur ad fugiendum, itemque propter loci difficultatem neque equo neque vehiculo saluti suae praesidium parare poterat. Caedes a nostris undique administrabatur. Exclusus a munitione amissisque auxiliis ad convallem exesumque locum in speluncam Pompeius se occultare coepit, ut a nostris non facile inveniretur nisi captivorum indicio. Ita ibi interficitur. Cum Caesar Gadibus fuisset, Hispalim pridie Idus Apriles caput adlatum et populo datum est in conspectum.

40. After the death of young Pompey, Didius, proud of his success, retired to the nearest fortress and hauled some of his vessels on shore to be refitted. The Lusitanians, who had escaped from the battle, rallying in great bodies, advanced to Didius. Though the preservation of the fleet principally engaged his attention, he was obliged to leave his fort in order to restrain the frequent sallies of the enemy. These daily skirmishes gave them an opportunity of projecting an ambushade; for which purpose they divided their troops into three bodies. Some were prepared to set fire to the fleet, and in the mean

time others were to come to their relief. These were so arranged that they could advance to the battle without any one seeing them. Didius sallied out according to custom; when upon a signal being given, one of the parties advanced to set fire to the fleet; and another, counterfeiting a retreat, drew him insensibly into the ambuscade, where he was surrounded and slain with most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some escaped in boats which they found upon the coast; others endeavored to reach the galleys by swimming; and, weighing anchor, stood out to sea. A great many saved themselves in this manner, but the Lusitanians got all the baggage. Caesar meanwhile returned from Gades to Hispalis.

Interfecto Cn. Pompeio adolescente Didius quem supra demonstravimus, illa adfectus laetitia proximo se recepit castello nonnullasque naves ad reficiendum subduxit et quodvis essent... brachium ex utrisque partibus... Lusitani qui ex pugna superfuerunt, ad signum se receperunt et bene magna manu comparata ad Didium se reportant. Huic etsi non aberat diligentia ad naves tuendas, tamen nonnumquam ex castello propter eorum crebras excursiones eliciebatur et prope cotidianis pugnis [cum Lusitanis conflagrabat. tum illi] insidias ponunt et tripertito signa distribuunt. Erant parati qui naves incenderent, incensisque qui subsidium repellerent; hi sic dispositi erant ut a nullo [conspici possent. reliqui in] conspectu omnium ad pugnam contendunt. Ita cum ex castello Didius ad propellendum processisset cum copiis, signum a Lusitanis tollitur, naves incenduntur, simulque qui in castello ad pugnam processerant, eodem signo fugientes latrones dum persequuntur, a tergo insidiae clamore sublato circumveniunt. Didius magna cum virtute cum compluribus interficitur. Nonnullique ea pugna scaphas quae ad litus fuerant occupant, item complures naves ad naves quae in salo

fuerunt, se recipiunt, ancoris sublati pelagus remis petere coeperunt. Quae res eorum vitae fuit subsidio. Lusitani praeda potiuntur. Caesar Gadibus rursus ad Hispalim recurrit.

41. Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to continue the siege of Munda, conducted it with great zeal; so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut up on all sides, sallied out, but were repulsed with great loss. Our men seized this opportunity to get possession of the town, and took the rest prisoners, in number about fourteen thousand. Thence they retreated toward Ursao, a town exceedingly strong both by nature and art, and capable of resisting an enemy. Besides, there is not, within eight miles of the place any spring but that which supplies the town, which was a decided advantage to the besieged. In addition to all this, the wood necessary for building towers and other machines had to be fetched from a distance of six miles. And Pompey, to render the siege more difficult, had cut down all the timber round the place, and collected it within the walls, which obliged our men to bring all the materials for carrying on the siege from Munda, the nearest town which they had subdued.

Fabius Maximus quem ad Mundam praesidium oppugnandum reliquerat, operibus adsiduis [diurnis et noc]turnis circumsevit. Interclusi inter se decernere; facta bene magna... faciunt. Nostri ad oppidum recuperandum occasionem non praetermittunt et reliquos vivos capiunt, XIII milia. Ursanem proficiscuntur. Quod oppidum magna munitione continebatur, sic ut ipse locus non solum opere, sed etiam natura adiutus ad oppugnandum hostem impediret. Hoc accedebat ut aqua praeterquam in ipso oppido unam circumcirca nusquam reperiretur propius milia passuum VIII. Quae res magno erat adiumento oppidanis. tum praeterea accedebat ut aggerem...

materiesque unde soliti sunt turris agi, propius milia passuum vi non reperiabatur. Hoc Pompeius ut oppidi oppugnationem tutiorem efficeret, omnem materiem circum oppidum succisam intro congegavit. Ita necessario deducebantur nostri, ut a Munda quod proxime ceperant, materiem illo deportarent.


42. During these transactions at Munda and Ursao, Caesar, who had returned from Gades to Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and made the following speech: "That when he was advanced to the quaestorship, he had chosen their province in preference to all others, and during his continuance in that office, had done them every service in his power; that during his praetorship he had obtained for them from the senate the abolition of the taxes imposed by Metellus, declared himself their patron, procured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and made himself many enemies by undertaking the defense both of their private and public rights. In fine, that when he was consul, he had, though absent, rendered the province all the services in his power; that instead of making a suitable return for so many favors, they had always discovered the utmost ingratitude both toward him and the people of Rome; as well in this last war as the preceding. "You," says he, "though no strangers to the law of nations and the rights of Roman citizens, have yet like barbarians often violated the sacred persons of Roman magistrates. You attempted in open day, in the public square, to assassinate Cassius. You have been always such enemies to peace that the senate could never suffer the province to be without legions. You take favors for offenses, and insults for benefits, are insolent and restless in peace, and cowardly and effeminate in war. Young Pompey, though only a private citizen, nay a fugitive, was yet received among you, and suffered to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After putting many citizens to death, you

still furnished him with forces, and even urged him to lay waste the country and province. Against whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be ignorant that even if I should be destroyed, the people of Rome have still ten legions, capable not only of opposing you, but even of pulling down heaven? With whose praises and virtues... (NOTE: The end of the book is lost.)

Dum haec ad Mundam geruntur et Ursaonem, Caesar ad Hispalim cum Gadibus se recepisset, insequenti die contione advocata: Initio quaesturae suae eam provinciam ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse. Insequente praetura ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus inposuisset, a senatu petisse et eius pecuniae provinciam liberasse simulque patrocínio suscepto multis legationibus ab se in senatum inductis simul publicis privatisque causis multorum inimiciis susceptis defendisse. Suo item consulatu absentem quae potuisset commoda provinciae tribuisse. Eorum omnium commodorum et immemores et ingratos in se et in populum Romanum hoc bello et praeterito tempore cognosse. ‘Vos iure gentium et civiumque Romanorum institutis cognitis more barbarorum populi Romani magistratibus sacrosanctis manus [semel] et saepius attulistis et luce clara Cassium in medio foro nefarie interficere voluistis. Vos ita pacem semper odistis ut nullo tempore legiones desitae populi Romani in hac provincia haberi. Apud vos beneficia pro maleficiis et maleficia pro beneficiis habentur. Ita neque in otio concordiam neque in bello virtutem ullo tempore retinere potuistis. Privatus ex fuga Cn. Pompeius adulescens a vobis receptus fascēs imperium[que] sibi arripuit, multis interfectis civibus auxilia contra populum Romanum comparavit, agros provinciamque vestro impulsu depopulavit. In quo vos victores extabatis? An me deletō non animum advertebatis

decem habere legiones populum Romanum quae non solum vobis
obsistere, sed etiam caelum diruere possent? Quarum laudibus est
virtute...

The Biographies



The Theatre of Pompey, Rome. Caesar was assassinated following a conspiracy by approximately 60 Roman senators, who called themselves the Liberators. Led by Gaius Cassius Longinus and Marcus Junius Brutus, they stabbed Julius Caesar to death in a location adjacent to the theatre on the Ides of March (March 15), 44 BC.



Reconstruction of the site of the assassination



The site today



'The Death of Julius Caesar' by Vincenzo Camuccini, 1798

THE LIFE OF JULIUS CAESAR by Suetonius



Translated by Alexander Thomson

De Vita Caesarum is a set of twelve biographies, concerning the lives of the dictator Julius Caesar and the first eleven Emperors of the Roman Empire. They were written by Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (c. 69 – c. 122), a Roman historian belonging to the equestrian order, of whom we know very little. Suetonius was the Emperor Hadrian's personal secretary and completed writing the biographies in AD 121, dedicating the work to his friend, the Praetorian prefect Gaius Septicius Clarus. *De Vita Caesarum* is a significant ancient text and remains a primary source on Roman history and the lives of the first emperors, analysing the critical period of the Principate from the end of the Republic to the reign of Domitian.

Suetonius used the imperial archives to research eyewitness accounts, information and other evidence to produce the biographies. The writing offers entertaining anecdotes, 'court gossip', dramatic accounts of battles and amusing reflections. Suetonius usually takes the side of the Senate in conflicts against the Emperors, resulting with biased viewpoints, which he has been criticised for by critics. Interestingly, Suetonius was refused access to the official archives shortly after beginning his work, and so was forced to rely on second-hand accounts when it came to Claudius, being unable to directly quote the emperor.

The collection of biographies provide valuable information on the

heritage, personal habits, physical appearance, lives and political careers of the first Roman Emperors, with many details being referred to that are not found in other sources. Suetonius is regarded as the main source on the lives of Caligula, Claudius and Vespasian, due to the loss of critical works by Tacitus.



A bust of the Emperor Hadrian, whom Suetonius served as personal secretary



Suetonius
Complete Works

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CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR.

I. Julius Caesar, the Divine , lost his father when he was in the sixteenth year of his age ; and the year following, being nominated to the office of high-priest of Jupiter , he repudiated Cossutia, who was very wealthy, although her family belonged only to the equestrian order, and to whom he had been contracted when he was a mere boy. He then married (2) Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, who was four times consul; and had by her, shortly afterwards, a daughter named Julia. Resisting all the efforts of the dictator Sylla to induce him to divorce Cornelia, he suffered the penalty of being stripped of his sacerdotal office, his wife's dowry, and his own patrimonial estates; and, being identified with the adverse faction , was compelled to withdraw from Rome. After changing his place of concealment nearly every night , although he was suffering from a quartan ague, and having effected his release by bribing the officers who had tracked his footsteps, he at length obtained a pardon through the intercession of the vestal virgins, and of Mamercus Aemilius and Aurelius Cotta, his near relatives. We are assured that when Sylla, having withstood for a while the entreaties of his own best friends, persons of distinguished rank, at last yielded to their importunity, he exclaimed — either by a divine impulse, or from a shrewd conjecture: “Your suit is granted, and you may take him among you; but know,” he added, “that this man, for whose safety you are so extremely anxious, will, some day or other, be the ruin of the party of the nobles, in defence of which you are leagued with me; for in this one Caesar, you will find many a Marius.”

II. His first campaign was served in Asia, on the staff of the praetor, M. Thermus; and being dispatched into Bithynia , to bring

thence a fleet, he loitered so long at the court of Nicomedes, as to give occasion to reports of a criminal intercourse between him and that prince; which received additional credit from his hasty return to Bithynia, under the pretext of recovering a debt due to a freed-man, his client. The rest of his service was more favourable to his reputation; and (3) when Mitylene was taken by storm, he was presented by Thermus with the civic crown.

III. He served also in Cilicia , under Servilius Isauricus, but only for a short time; as upon receiving intelligence of Sylla's death, he returned with all speed to Rome, in expectation of what might follow from a fresh agitation set on foot by Marcus Lepidus. Distrusting, however, the abilities of this leader, and finding the times less favourable for the execution of this project than he had at first imagined, he abandoned all thoughts of joining Lepidus, although he received the most tempting offers.

IV. Soon after this civil discord was composed, he preferred a charge of extortion against Cornelius Dolabella, a man of consular dignity, who had obtained the honour of a triumph. On the acquittal of the accused, he resolved to retire to Rhodes , with the view not only of avoiding the public odium (4) which he had incurred, but of prosecuting his studies with leisure and tranquillity, under Apollonius, the son of Molon, at that time the most celebrated master of rhetoric. While on his voyage thither, in the winter season, he was taken by pirates near the island of Pharmacusa , and detained by them, burning with indignation, for nearly forty days; his only attendants being a physician and two chamberlains. For he had instantly dispatched his other servants and the friends who accompanied him, to raise money for his ransom . Fifty talents having been paid down, he was landed on the coast, when, having

collected some ships , he lost no time in putting to sea in pursuit of the pirates, and having captured them, inflicted upon them the punishment with which he had often threatened them in jest. At that time Mithridates was ravaging the neighbouring districts, and on Caesar's arrival at Rhodes, that he might not appear to lie idle while danger threatened the allies of Rome, he passed over into Asia, and having collected some auxiliary forces, and driven the king's governor out of the province, retained in their allegiance the cities which were wavering, and ready to revolt.

V. Having been elected military tribune, the first honour he received from the suffrages of the people after his return to Rome, he zealously assisted those who took measures for restoring the tribunitian authority, which had been greatly diminished during the usurpation of Sylla. He likewise, by an act, which Plotius at his suggestion propounded to the people, obtained the recall of Lucius Cinna, his wife's brother, and others with him, who having been the adherents of Lepidus in the civil disturbances, had after that consul's death fled to Sertorius ; which law he supported by a speech.

VI. During his quaestorship he pronounced funeral orations from the rostra, according to custom, in praise of his aunt (5) Julia, and his wife Cornelia. In the panegyric on his aunt, he gives the following account of her own and his father's genealogy, on both sides: "My aunt Julia derived her descent, by the mother, from a race of kings, and by her father, from the Immortal Gods. For the Marcii Reges , her mother's family, deduce their pedigree from Ancus Marcius, and the Julii, her father's, from Venus; of which stock we are a branch. We therefore unite in our descent the sacred majesty of kings, the chiefest among men, and the divine majesty of Gods, to whom kings themselves are subject." To supply the place of Cornelia, he married

Pompeia, the daughter of Quintus Pompeius, and grand-daughter of Lucius Sylla; but he afterwards divorced her, upon suspicion of her having been debauched by Publius Clodius. For so current was the report, that Clodius had found access to her disguised as a woman, during the celebration of a religious solemnity, that the senate instituted an enquiry respecting the profanation of the sacred rites.

VII. Farther-Spain fell to his lot as quaestor; when there, as he was going the circuit of the province, by commission from the praetor, for the administration of justice, and had reached Gades, seeing a statue of Alexander the Great in the temple of Hercules, he sighed deeply, as if weary of his sluggish life, for having performed no memorable actions at an age at which Alexander had already conquered the world. He, therefore, immediately sued for his discharge, with the view of embracing the first opportunity, which might present itself in The City, of entering upon a more exalted career. In the stillness of the night following, he dreamt that he lay with his own mother; but his confusion was relieved, and his hopes were raised to the highest pitch, by the interpreters of his dream, who expounded it as an omen that he should possess universal empire; for (6) that the mother who in his sleep he had found submissive to his embraces, was no other than the earth, the common parent of all mankind.

VIII. Quitting therefore the province before the expiration of the usual term, he betook himself to the Latin colonies, which were then eagerly agitating the design of obtaining the freedom of Rome; and he would have stirred them up to some bold attempt, had not the consuls, to prevent any commotion, detained for some time the legions which had been raised for service in Cilicia. But this did not deter him from making, soon afterwards, a still greater effort within

the precincts of the city itself.

IX. For, only a few days before he entered upon the aedileship, he incurred a suspicion of having engaged in a conspiracy with Marcus Crassus, a man of consular rank; to whom were joined Publius Sylla and Lucius Autronius, who, after they had been chosen consuls, were convicted of bribery. The plan of the conspirators was to fall upon the senate at the opening of the new year, and murder as many of them as should be thought necessary; upon which, Crassus was to assume the office of dictator, and appoint Caesar his master of the horse . When the commonwealth had been thus ordered according to their pleasure, the consulship was to have been restored to Sylla and Autronius. Mention is made of this plot by Tanusius Geminus in his history, by Marcus Bibulus in his edicts , and by Curio, the father, in his orations . Cicero likewise seems to hint at this in a letter to Axius, where he says, that Caesar (7) had in his consulship secured to himself that arbitrary power to which he had aspired when he was edile. Tanusius adds, that Crassus, from remorse or fear, did not appear upon the day appointed for the massacre of the senate; for which reason Caesar omitted to give the signal, which, according to the plan concerted between them, he was to have made. The agreement, Curio says, was that he should shake off the toga from his shoulder. We have the authority of the same Curio, and of M. Actorius Naso, for his having been likewise concerned in another conspiracy with young Cneius Piso; to whom, upon a suspicion of some mischief being meditated in the city, the province of Spain was decreed out of the regular course . It is said to have been agreed between them, that Piso should head a revolt in the provinces, whilst the other should attempt to stir up an insurrection at Rome, using as their instruments the Lambrani, and the tribes beyond the Po. But the

execution of this design was frustrated in both quarters by the death of Piso.

X. In his aedileship, he not only embellished the Comitium, and the rest of the Forum , with the adjoining halls , but adorned the Capitol also, with temporary piazzas, constructed for the purpose of displaying some part of the superabundant collections (8) he had made for the amusement of the people . He entertained them with the hunting of wild beasts, and with games, both alone and in conjunction with his colleague. On this account, he obtained the whole credit of the expense to which they had jointly contributed; insomuch that his colleague, Marcus Bibulus, could not forbear remarking, that he was served in the manner of Pollux. For as the temple erected in the Forum to the two brothers, went by the name of Castor alone, so his and Caesar's joint munificence was imputed to the latter only. To the other public spectacles exhibited to the people, Caesar added a fight of gladiators, but with fewer pairs of combatants than he had intended. For he had collected from all parts so great a company of them, that his enemies became alarmed; and a decree was made, restricting the number of gladiators which any one was allowed to retain at Rome.

XI. Having thus conciliated popular favour, he endeavoured, through his interest with some of the tribunes, to get Egypt assigned to him as a province, by an act of the people. The pretext alleged for the creation of this extraordinary government, was, that the Alexandrians had violently expelled their king , whom the senate had complimented with the title of an ally and friend of the Roman people. This was generally resented; but, notwithstanding, there was so much opposition from the faction of the nobles, that he could not carry his point. In order, therefore, to diminish their influence by

every means in his power, he restored the trophies erected in honour of Caius Marius, on account of his victories over Jugurtha, the Cimbri, and the Teutoni, which had been demolished by Sylla; and when sitting in judgment upon murderers, he treated those as assassins, who, in the late proscription, had received money from the treasury, for bringing in the heads of Roman citizens, although they were expressly excepted in the Cornelian laws.

XII. He likewise suborned some one to prefer an impeachment (9) for treason against Caius Rabirius, by whose especial assistance the senate had, a few years before, put down Lucius Saturninus, the seditious tribune; and being drawn by lot a judge on the trial, he condemned him with so much animosity, that upon his appealing to the people, no circumstance availed him so much as the extraordinary bitterness of his judge.

XIII. Having renounced all hope of obtaining Egypt for his province, he stood candidate for the office of chief pontiff, to secure which, he had recourse to the most profuse bribery. Calculating, on this occasion, the enormous amount of the debts he had contracted, he is reported to have said to his mother, when she kissed him at his going out in the morning to the assembly of the people, "I will never return home unless I am elected pontiff." In effect, he left so far behind him two most powerful competitors, who were much his superiors both in age and rank, that he had more votes in their own tribes, than they both had in all the tribes together.

XIV. After he was chosen praetor, the conspiracy of Catiline was discovered; and while every other member of the senate voted for inflicting capital punishment on the accomplices in that crime, he alone proposed that the delinquents should be distributed for safe custody among the towns of Italy, their property being confiscated.

He even struck such terror into those who were advocates for greater severity, by representing to them what universal odium would be attached to their memories by the Roman people, that Decius Silanus, consul elect, did not hesitate to qualify his proposal, it not being very honourable to change it, by a lenient interpretation; as if it had been understood in a harsher sense than he intended, and Caesar would certainly have carried his point, having brought over to his side a great number of the senators, among whom was Cicero, the consul's brother, had not a speech by Marcus Cato infused new vigour into the resolutions of the senate. He persisted, however, in obstructing the measure, until a body of the Roman knights, who stood under arms as a guard, threatened him with instant death, if he continued his determined opposition. They even thrust at him with their drawn swords, so that those who sat next him moved away; (10) and a few friends, with no small difficulty, protected him, by throwing their arms round him, and covering him with their togas. At last, deterred by this violence, he not only gave way, but absented himself from the senate-house during the remainder of that year.

XV. Upon the first day of his praetorship, he summoned Quintus Catulus to render an account to the people respecting the repairs of the Capitol ; proposing a decree for transferring the office of curator to another person . But being unable to withstand the strong opposition made by the aristocratical party, whom he perceived quitting, in great numbers, their attendance upon the new consuls , and fully resolved to resist his proposal, he dropped the design.

XVI. He afterwards approved himself a most resolute supporter of Caecilius Metellus, tribune of the people, who, in spite of all opposition from his colleagues, had proposed some laws of a violent tendency , until they were both dismissed from office by a vote of the

senate. He ventured, notwithstanding, to retain his post and continue in the administration of justice; but finding that preparations were made to obstruct him by force of arms, he dismissed the lictors, threw off his gown, and betook himself privately to his own house, with the resolution of being quiet, in a time so unfavourable to his interests. He likewise pacified the mob, which two days afterwards flocked about him, and in a riotous manner made a voluntary tender of their assistance in the vindication of his (11) honour. This happening contrary to expectation, the senate, who met in haste, on account of the tumult, gave him their thanks by some of the leading members of the house, and sending for him, after high commendation of his conduct, cancelled their former vote, and restored him to his office.

XVII. But he soon got into fresh trouble, being named amongst the accomplices of Catiline, both before Novius Niger the quaestor, by Lucius Vettius the informer, and in the senate by Quintus Curius; to whom a reward had been voted, for having first discovered the designs of the conspirators. Curius affirmed that he had received his information from Catiline. Vettius even engaged to produce in evidence against him his own hand-writing, given to Catiline. Caesar, feeling that this treatment was not to be borne, appealed to Cicero himself, whether he had not voluntarily made a discovery to him of some particulars of the conspiracy; and so baulked Curius of his expected reward. He, therefore, obliged Vettius to give pledges for his behaviour, seized his goods, and after heavily fining him, and seeing him almost torn in pieces before the rostra, threw him into prison; to which he likewise sent Novius the quaestor, for having presumed to take an information against a magistrate of superior authority.

XVIII. At the expiration of his praetorship he obtained by lot the Farther-Spain , and pacified his creditors, who were for detaining him, by finding sureties for his debts . Contrary, however, to both law and custom, he took his departure before the usual equipage and outfit were prepared. It is uncertain whether this precipitancy arose from the apprehension of an impeachment, with which he was threatened on the expiration of his former office, or from his anxiety to lose no time in relieving the allies, who implored him to come to their aid. He had no (12) sooner established tranquillity in the province, than, without waiting for the arrival of his successor, he returned to Rome, with equal haste, to sue for a triumph , and the consulship. The day of election, however, being already fixed by proclamation, he could not legally be admitted a candidate, unless he entered the city as a private person . On this emergency he solicited a suspension of the laws in his favour; but such an indulgence being strongly opposed, he found himself under the necessity of abandoning all thoughts of a triumph, lest he should be disappointed of the consulship.

XIX. Of the two other competitors for the consulship, Lucius Luceius and Marcus Bibulus, he joined with the former, upon condition that Luceius, being a man of less interest but greater affluence, should promise money to the electors, in their joint names. Upon which the party of the nobles, dreading how far he might carry matters in that high office, with a colleague disposed to concur in and second his measures, advised Bibulus to promise the voters as much as the other; and most of them contributed towards the expense, Cato himself admitting that bribery; under such circumstances, was for the public good . He was accordingly elected consul jointly with Bibulus. Actuated still by the same motives, the prevailing party took

care to assign provinces of small importance to the new consuls, such as the care of the woods and roads. Caesar, incensed at this indignity, endeavoured by the most assiduous and flattering attentions to gain to his side Cneius Pompey, at that time dissatisfied with the senate for the backwardness they shewed to confirm his acts, after his victories over Mithridates. He likewise brought about a reconciliation between Pompey and Marcus Crassus, who had been at variance from (13) the time of their joint consulship, in which office they were continually clashing; and he entered into an agreement with both, that nothing should be transacted in the government, which was displeasing to any of the three.

XX. Having entered upon his office, he introduced a new regulation, that the daily acts both of the senate and people should be committed to writing, and published. He also revived an old custom, that an officer should precede him, and his lictors follow him, on the alternate months when the fasces were not carried before him. Upon preferring a bill to the people for the division of some public lands, he was opposed by his colleague, whom he violently drove out of the forum. Next day the insulted consul made a complaint in the senate of this treatment; but such was the consternation, that no one having the courage to bring the matter forward or move a censure, which had been often done under outrages of less importance, he was so much dispirited, that until the expiration of his office he never stirred from home, and did nothing but issue edicts to obstruct his colleague's proceedings. From that time, therefore, Caesar had the sole management of public affairs; insomuch that some wags, when they signed any instrument as witnesses, did not add "in the consulship of Caesar and Bibulus," but, "of Julius and Caesar;" putting the same person down twice, under his name and surname.

The following verses likewise were currently repeated on this occasion:

Non Bibulo quidquam nuper, sed Caesare factum est;

Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini.

Nothing was done in Bibulus's year:

No; Caesar only then was consul here.

(14) The land of Stellas, consecrated by our ancestors to the gods, with some other lands in Campania left subject to tribute, for the support of the expenses of the government, he divided, but not by lot, among upwards of twenty thousand freemen, who had each of them three or more children. He eased the publicans, upon their petition, of a third part of the sum which they had engaged to pay into the public treasury; and openly admonished them not to bid so extravagantly upon the next occasion. He made various profuse grants to meet the wishes of others, no one opposing him; or if any such attempt was made, it was soon suppressed. Marcus Cato, who interrupted him in his proceedings, he ordered to be dragged out of the senate-house by a lictor, and carried to prison. Lucius Lucullus, likewise, for opposing him with some warmth, he so terrified with the apprehension of being criminated, that, to deprecate the consul's resentment, he fell on his knees. And upon Cicero's lamenting in some trial the miserable condition of the times, he the very same day, by nine o'clock, transferred his enemy, Publius Clodius, from a patrician to a plebeian family; a change which he had long solicited in vain. At last, effectually to intimidate all those of the opposite party, he by great rewards prevailed upon Vettius to declare, that he had been solicited by certain persons to assassinate Pompey; and

when he was brought before the rostra to name those who had been concerted between them, after naming one or two to no purpose, not without great suspicion of subornation, Caesar, despairing of success in this rash stratagem, is supposed to have taken off his informer by poison.

XXI. About the same time he married Calpurnia, the daughter of Lucius Piso, who was to succeed him in the consulship, and gave his own daughter Julia to Cneius Pompey; rejecting Servilius Caepio, to whom she had been contracted, and by whose means chiefly he had but a little before baffled Bibulus. After this new alliance, he began, upon any debates in the senate, to ask Pompey's opinion first, whereas he used before to give that distinction to Marcus Crassus; and it was (15) the usual practice for the consul to observe throughout the year the method of consulting the senate which he had adopted on the calends (the first) of January.

XXII. Being, therefore, now supported by the interest of his father-in-law and son-in-law, of all the provinces he made choice of Gaul, as most likely to furnish him with matter and occasion for triumphs. At first indeed he received only Cisalpine-Gaul, with the addition of Illyricum, by a decree proposed by Vatinius to the people; but soon afterwards obtained from the senate Gallia-Comata also, the senators being apprehensive, that if they should refuse it him, that province, also, would be granted him by the people. Elated now with his success, he could not refrain from boasting, a few days afterwards, in a full senate-house, that he had, in spite of his enemies, and to their great mortification, obtained all he desired, and that for the future he would make them, to their shame, submissive to his pleasure. One of the senators observing, sarcastically: "That will not be very easy for a woman to do," he jocosely replied, "Semiramis

formerly reigned in Assyria, and the Amazons possessed great part of Asia.”

XXIII. When the term of his consulship had expired, upon a motion being made in the senate by Caius Memmius and Lucius Domitius, the praetors, respecting the transactions of the year past, he offered to refer himself to the house; but (16) they declining the business, after three days spent in vain altercation, he set out for his province. Immediately, however, his quaestor was charged with several misdemeanors, for the purpose of implicating Caesar himself. Indeed, an accusation was soon after preferred against him by Lucius Antistius, tribune of the people; but by making an appeal to the tribune’s colleagues, he succeeded in having the prosecution suspended during his absence in the service of the state. To secure himself, therefore, for the time to come, he was particularly careful to secure the good-will of the magistrates at the annual elections, assisting none of the candidates with his interest, nor suffering any persons to be advanced to any office, who would not positively undertake to defend him in his absence for which purpose he made no scruple to require of some of them an oath, and even a written obligation.

XXIV. But when Lucius Domitius became a candidate for the consulship, and openly threatened that, upon his being elected consul, he would effect that which he could not accomplish when he was praetor, and divest him of the command of the armies, he sent for Crassus and Pompey to Lucca, a city in his province, and pressed them, for the purpose of disappointing Domitius, to sue again for the consulship, and to continue him in his command for five years longer; with both which requisitions they complied. Presumptuous now from his success, he added, at his own private charge, more

legions to those which he had received from the republic; among the former of which was one levied in Transalpine Gaul, and called by a Gallic name, Alauda , which he trained and armed in the Roman fashion, and afterwards conferred on it the freedom of the city. From this period he declined no occasion of war, however unjust and dangerous; attacking, without any provocation, as well the allies of Rome as the barbarous nations which were its enemies: insomuch, that the senate passed a decree for sending commissioners to examine into the condition of Gaul; and some members even proposed that he should be delivered up to the enemy. But so great had been the success of his enterprises, that he had the honour of obtaining more days (17) of supplication, and those more frequently, than had ever before been decreed to any commander.

XXV. During nine years in which he held the government of the province, his achievements were as follows: he reduced all Gaul, bounded by the Pyrenean forest, the Alps, mount Gebenna, and the two rivers, the Rhine and the Rhone, and being about three thousand two hundred miles in compass, into the form of a province, excepting only the nations in alliance with the republic, and such as had merited his favour; imposing upon this new acquisition an annual tribute of forty millions of sesterces. He was the first of the Romans who, crossing the Rhine by a bridge, attacked the Germanic tribes inhabiting the country beyond that river, whom he defeated in several engagements. He also invaded the Britons, a people formerly unknown, and having vanquished them, exacted from them contributions and hostages. Amidst such a series of successes, he experienced thrice only any signal disaster; once in Britain, when his fleet was nearly wrecked in a storm; in Gaul, at Gergovia, where one of his legions was put to the rout; and in the territory of the Germans,

his lieutenants Titurius and Aurunculeius were cut off by an ambuscade.

XXVI. During this period he lost his mother , whose death was followed by that of his daughter , and, not long afterwards, of his granddaughter. Meanwhile, the republic being in consternation at the murder of Publius Clodius, and the senate passing a vote that only one consul, namely, Cneius Pompeius, should be chosen for the ensuing year, he prevailed with the tribunes of the people, who intended joining him in nomination with Pompey, to propose to the people a bill, enabling him, though absent, to become a candidate for his second consulship, when the term of his command should be near expiring, that he might not be obliged on that account to quit his province too soon, and before the conclusion of the war. Having attained this object, carrying his views still higher, and animated with the hopes of success, he omitted no (18) opportunity of gaining universal favour, by acts of liberality and kindness to individuals, both in public and private. With money raised from the spoils of the war, he began to construct a new forum, the ground-plot of which cost him above a hundred millions of sesterces . He promised the people a public entertainment of gladiators, and a feast in memory of his daughter, such as no one before him had ever given. The more to raise their expectations on this occasion, although he had agreed with victuallers of all denominations for his feast, he made yet farther preparations in private houses. He issued an order, that the most celebrated gladiators, if at any time during the combat they incurred the displeasure of the public, should be immediately carried off by force, and reserved for some future occasion. Young gladiators he trained up, not in the school, and by the masters, of defence, but in the houses of Roman knights, and even senators, skilled in the use of

arms, earnestly requesting them, as appears from his letters, to undertake the discipline of those novitiates, and to give them the word during their exercises. He doubled the pay of the legions in perpetuity; allowing them likewise corn, when it was in plenty, without any restriction; and sometimes distributing to every soldier in his army a slave, and a portion of land.

XXVII. To maintain his alliance and good understanding with Pompey, he offered him in marriage his sister's grand-daughter Octavia, who had been married to Caius Marcellus; and requested for himself his daughter, lately contracted to Faustus Sylla. Every person about him, and a great part likewise of the senate, he secured by loans of money at low interest, or none at all; and to all others who came to wait upon him, either by invitation or of their own accord, he made liberal presents; not neglecting even the freed-men and slaves, who were favourites with their masters and patrons. He offered also singular and ready aid to all who were under prosecution, or in debt, and to prodigal youths; excluding from (19) his bounty those only who were so deeply plunged in guilt, poverty, or luxury, that it was impossible effectually to relieve them. These, he openly declared, could derive no benefit from any other means than a civil war.

XXVIII. He endeavoured with equal assiduity to engage in his interest princes and provinces in every part of the world; presenting some with thousands of captives, and sending to others the assistance of troops, at whatever time and place they desired, without any authority from either the senate or people of Rome. He likewise embellished with magnificent public buildings the most powerful cities not only of Italy, Gaul, and Spain, but of Greece and Asia; until all people being now astonished, and speculating on the obvious

tendency of these proceedings, Claudius Marcellus, the consul, declaring first by proclamation, that he intended to propose a measure of the utmost importance to the state, made a motion in the senate that some person should be appointed to succeed Caesar in his province, before the term of his command was expired; because the war being brought to a conclusion, peace was restored, and the victorious army ought to be disbanded. He further moved, that Caesar being absent, his claims to be a candidate at the next election of consuls should not be admitted, as Pompey himself had afterwards abrogated that privilege by a decree of the people. The fact was, that Pompey, in his law relating to the choice of chief magistrates, had forgot to except Caesar, in the article in which he declared all such as were not present incapable of being candidates for any office; but soon afterwards, when the law was inscribed on brass, and deposited in the treasury, he corrected his mistake. Marcellus, not content with depriving Caesar of his provinces, and the privilege intended him by Pompey, likewise moved the senate, that the freedom of the city should be taken from those colonists whom, by the Vatinian law, he had settled at New Como ; because it had been conferred upon them with ambitious views, and by a stretch of the laws.

(20) XXIX. Roused by these proceedings, and thinking, as he was often heard to say, that it would be a more difficult enterprise to reduce him, now that he was the chief man in the state, from the first rank of citizens to the second, than from the second to the lowest of all, Caesar made a vigorous opposition to the measure, partly by means of the tribunes, who interposed in his behalf, and partly through Servius Sulpicius, the other consul. The following year likewise, when Caius Marcellus, who succeeded his cousin Marcus in the consulship, pursued the same course, Caesar, by means of an

immense bribe, engaged in his defence Aemilius Paulus, the other consul, and Caius Curio, the most violent of the tribunes. But finding the opposition obstinately bent against him, and that the consuls-elect were also of that party, he wrote a letter to the senate, requesting that they would not deprive him of the privilege kindly granted him by the people; or else that the other generals should resign the command of their armies as well as himself; fully persuaded, as it is thought, that he could more easily collect his veteran soldiers, whenever he pleased, than Pompey could his new-raised troops. At the same time, he made his adversaries an offer to disband eight of his legions and give up Transalpine-Gaul, upon condition that he might retain two legions, with the Cisalpine province, or but one legion with Illyricum, until he should be elected consul.

XXX. But as the senate declined to interpose in the business, and his enemies declared that they would enter into no compromise where the safety of the republic was at stake, he advanced into Hither-Gaul, and, having gone the circuit for the administration of justice, made a halt at Ravenna, resolved to have recourse to arms if the senate should proceed to extremity against the tribunes of the people who had espoused his cause. This was indeed his pretext for the civil war; but it is supposed that there were other motives for his conduct. Cneius Pompey used frequently to say, that he sought to throw every thing into confusion, because he was unable, with all his private wealth, to complete the works he had begun, and answer, at his return, the vast expectations which he had excited in the people. Others pretend that he was apprehensive of being (21) called to account for what he had done in his first consulship, contrary to the auspices, laws, and the protests of the tribunes; Marcus Cato having sometimes declared, and that, too, with an oath, that he would prefer

an impeachment against him, as soon as he disbanded his army. A report likewise prevailed, that if he returned as a private person, he would, like Milo, have to plead his cause before the judges, surrounded by armed men. This conjecture is rendered highly probable by Asinius Pollio, who informs us that Caesar, upon viewing the vanquished and slaughtered enemy in the field of Pharsalia, expressed himself in these very words: "This was their intention: I, Caius Caesar, after all the great achievements I had performed, must have been condemned, had I not summoned the army to my aid!" Some think, that having contracted from long habit an extraordinary love of power, and having weighed his own and his enemies' strength, he embraced that occasion of usurping the supreme power; which indeed he had coveted from the time of his youth. This seems to have been the opinion entertained by Cicero, who tells us, in the third book of his *Offices*, that Caesar used to have frequently in his mouth two verses of Euripides, which he thus translates:

Nam si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia

Violandum est: aliis rebus pietatem colas.

Be just, unless a kingdom tempts to break the laws,

For sovereign power alone can justify the cause.

XXXI. When intelligence, therefore, was received, that the interposition of the tribunes in his favour had been utterly rejected, and that they themselves had fled from the city, he immediately sent forward some cohorts, but privately, to prevent any suspicion of his design; and, to keep up appearances, attended at a public spectacle, examined the model of a fencing-school which he proposed to build,

and, as usual, sat down to table with a numerous party of his friends. But after sun-set, mules being put to his carriage from a neighbouring mill, he set forward on his journey with all possible privacy, and a small retinue. The lights going out, he lost his way, and (22) wandered about a long time, until at length, by the help of a guide, whom he found towards day-break, he proceeded on foot through some narrow paths, and again reached the road. Coming up with his troops on the banks of the Rubicon, which was the boundary of his province, he halted for a while, and, revolving in his mind the importance of the step he was on the point of taking, he turned to those about him, and said: "We may still retreat; but if we pass this little bridge, nothing is left for us but to fight it out in arms."

XXXII. While he was thus hesitating, the following incident occurred. A person remarkable for his noble mien and graceful aspect, appeared close at hand, sitting and playing upon a pipe. When, not only the shepherds, but a number of soldiers also flocked from their posts to listen to him, and some trumpeters among them, he snatched a trumpet from one of them, ran to the river with it, and sounding the advance with a piercing blast, crossed to the other side. Upon this, Caesar exclaimed, "Let us go whither the omens of the Gods and the iniquity of our enemies call us. The die is now cast."

XXXIII. Accordingly, having marched his army over the river, he shewed them the tribunes of the people, who, upon their being driven from the city, had come to meet him; and, in the presence of that assembly, called upon the troops to pledge him their fidelity, with tears in his eyes, and his garment rent from his bosom. It has been supposed, that upon this occasion he promised to every soldier a knight's estate; but that opinion is founded on a mistake. For when, in his harangue to them, he frequently held out a finger of his left

hand, and declared, that to recompense those who should support him in the defence of his honour, he would willingly part even with his ring; the soldiers at a distance, who could more easily see than hear him while he spoke, formed their conception of what he said, by the eye, not by the ear; and accordingly gave out, that he had promised to each of them the privilege (23) of wearing the gold ring, and an estate of four hundred thousand sesterces.

XXXIV. Of his subsequent proceedings I shall give a cursory detail, in the order in which they occurred . He took possession of Picenum, Umbria, and Etruria; and having obliged Lucius Domitius, who had been tumultuously nominated his successor, and held Corsinium with a garrison, to surrender, and dismissed him, he marched along the coast of the Upper Sea, to Brundisium, to which place the consuls and Pompey were fled with the intention of crossing the sea as soon as possible. After vain attempts, by all the obstacles he could oppose, to prevent their leaving the harbour, he turned his steps towards Rome, where he appealed to the senate on the present state of public affairs; and then set out for Spain, in which province Pompey had a numerous army, under the command of three lieutenants, Marcus Petreius, Lucius Afranius, and Marcus Varro; declaring amongst his friends, before he set forward, “That he was going against an army without a general, and should return thence against a general without an army.” Though his progress was retarded both by the siege of Marseilles, which shut her gates against him, and a very great scarcity of corn, yet in a short time he bore down all before him.

XXXV. Thence he returned to Rome, and crossing the sea to Macedonia, blocked up Pompey during almost four months, within a line of ramparts of prodigious extent; and at last defeated him in the

battle of Pharsalia. Pursuing him in his flight to Alexandria, where he was informed of his murder, he presently found himself also engaged, under all the disadvantages of time and place, in a very dangerous war, with king Ptolemy, who, he saw, had treacherous designs upon his life. It was winter, and he, within the walls of a well-provided and subtle enemy, was destitute of every thing, and wholly unprepared (24) for such a conflict. He succeeded, however, in his enterprise, and put the kingdom of Egypt into the hands of Cleopatra and her younger brother; being afraid to make it a province, lest, under an aspiring prefect, it might become the centre of revolt. From Alexandria he went into Syria, and thence to Pontus, induced by intelligence which he had received respecting Pharnaces. This prince, who was son of the great Mithridates, had seized the opportunity which the distraction of the times offered for making war upon his neighbours, and his insolence and fierceness had grown with his success. Caesar, however, within five days after entering his country, and four hours after coming in sight of him, overthrew him in one decisive battle. Upon which, he frequently remarked to those about him the good fortune of Pompey, who had obtained his military reputation, chiefly, by victory over so feeble an enemy. He afterwards defeated Scipio and Juba, who were rallying the remains of the party in Africa, and Pompey's sons in Spain.

XXXVI. During the whole course of the civil war, he never once suffered any defeat, except in the case of his lieutenants; of whom Caius Curio fell in Africa, Caius Antonius was made prisoner in Illyricum, Publius Dolabella lost a fleet in the same Illyricum, and Cneius Domitius Culvinus, an army in Pontus. In every encounter with the enemy where he himself commanded, he came off with complete success; nor was the issue ever doubtful, except on two

occasions: once at Dyrrachium, when, being obliged to give ground, and Pompey not pursuing his advantage, he said that "Pompey knew not how to conquer;" the other instance occurred in his last battle in Spain, when, despairing of the event, he even had thoughts of killing himself.

XXXVII. For the victories obtained in the several wars, he triumphed five different times; after the defeat of Scipio: four times in one month, each triumph succeeding the former by an interval of a few days; and once again after the conquest of Pompey's sons. His first and most glorious triumph was for the victories he gained in Gaul; the next for that of Alexandria, the third for the reduction of Pontus, the fourth for his African victory, and the last for that in Spain; and (25) they all differed from each other in their varied pomp and pageantry. On the day of the Gallic triumph, as he was proceeding along the street called Velabrum, after narrowly escaping a fall from his chariot by the breaking of the axle-tree, he ascended the Capitol by torch-light, forty elephants carrying torches on his right and left. Amongst the pageantry of the Pontic triumph, a tablet with this inscription was carried before him: I CAME, I SAW, I CONQUERED ; not signifying, as other mottos on the like occasion, what was done, so much as the dispatch with which it was done.

XXXVIII. To every foot-soldier in his veteran legions, besides the two thousand sesterces paid him in the beginning of the civil war, he gave twenty thousand more, in the shape of prize-money. He likewise allotted them lands, but not in contiguity, that the former owners might not be entirely dispossessed. To the people of Rome, besides ten modii of corn, and as many pounds of oil, he gave three hundred sesterces a man, which he had formerly promised them, and a hundred more to each for the delay in fulfilling his engagement. He

likewise remitted a year's rent due to the treasury, for such houses in Rome as did not pay above two thousand sesterces a year; and through the rest of Italy, for all such as did not exceed in yearly rent five hundred sesterces. To all this he added a public entertainment, and a distribution of meat, and, after his Spanish victory, two public dinners. For, considering the first he had given as too sparing, and unsuited to his profuse liberality, he, five days afterwards, added another, which was most plentiful.

XXXIX. The spectacles he exhibited to the people were of various kinds; namely, a combat of gladiators, and stage-plays in the several wards of the city, and in different languages; likewise Circensian games, wrestlers, and the representation of a sea-fight. In the conflict of gladiators presented in the Forum, Furius Leptinus, a man of praetorian family, entered the lists as a combatant, as did also Quintus Calpenus, formerly a senator, and a pleader of causes. The Pyrrhic dance was performed by some youths, who were sons to persons of the first distinction in Asia and Bithynia. In the plays, Decimus Laberius, who had been a Roman knight, acted in his own piece; and being presented on the spot with five hundred thousand sesterces, and a gold ring, he went from the stage, through the orchestra, and resumed his place in the seats (27) allotted for the equestrian order. In the Circensian games; the circus being enlarged at each end, and a canal sunk round it, several of the young nobility drove chariots, drawn, some by four, and others by two horses, and likewise rode races on single horses. The Trojan game was acted by two distinct companies of boys, one differing from the other in age and rank. The hunting of wild beasts was presented for five days successively; and on the last day a battle was fought by five hundred foot, twenty elephants, and thirty horse on each side. To afford room

for this engagement, the goals were removed, and in their space two camps were pitched, directly opposite to each other. Wrestlers likewise performed for three days successively, in a stadium provided for the purpose in the Campus Martius. A lake having been dug in the little Codeta , ships of the Tyrian and Egyptian fleets, containing two, three, and four banks of oars, with a number of men on board, afforded an animated representation of a sea-fight. To these various diversions there flocked such crowds of spectators from all parts, that most of the strangers were obliged to lodge in tents erected in the streets, or along the roads near the city. Several in the throng were squeezed to death, amongst whom were two senators.

XL. Turning afterwards his attention to the regulation of the commonwealth, he corrected the calendar , which had for (28) some time become extremely confused, through the unwarrantable liberty which the pontiffs had taken in the article of intercalation. To such a height had this abuse proceeded, that neither the festivals designed for the harvest fell in summer, nor those for the vintage in autumn. He accommodated the year to the course of the sun, ordaining that in future it should consist of three hundred and sixty-five days without any intercalary month; and that every fourth year an intercalary day should be inserted. That the year might thenceforth commence regularly with the calends, or first of January, he inserted two months between November and December; so that the year in which this regulation was made consisted of fifteen months, including the month of intercalation, which, according to the division of time then in use, happened that year.

XLI. He filled up the vacancies in the senate, by advancing several plebeians to the rank of patricians, and also increased the number of praetors, aediles, quaestors, and inferior magistrates;

restoring, at the same time, such as had been degraded by the censors, or convicted of bribery at elections. The choice of magistrates he so divided with the people, that, excepting only the candidates for the consulship, they nominated one half of them, and he the other. The method which he practised in those cases was, to recommend such persons as he had pitched upon, by bills dispersed through the several tribes to this effect: "Caesar the dictator to such a tribe (naming it). I recommend to you (naming likewise the persons), that by the favour of your votes they may attain to the honours for which they sue." He likewise admitted to offices the sons of those who had been proscribed. The trial of causes he restricted to two orders of judges, the equestrian and senatorial; excluding the tribunes of the treasury who had before made a third class. The revised census of the people he ordered to be taken neither in the usual manner or place, but street by street, by the principal inhabitants of the several quarters of the city; and he reduced the number of those who received corn at the public cost, from three hundred and twenty, to a hundred and fifty, thousand. To prevent any tumults on account of the census, he ordered that the praetor should every year fill up by lot the vacancies occasioned by death, from those who were not enrolled for the receipt of corn.

(29) XLII. Eighty thousand citizens having been distributed into foreign colonies, he enacted, in order to stop the drain on the population, that no freeman of the city above twenty, and under forty, years of age, who was not in the military service, should absent himself from Italy for more than three years at a time; that no senator's son should go abroad, unless in the retinue of some high officer; and as to those whose pursuit was tending flocks and herds, that no less than a third of the number of their shepherds free-born

should be youths. He likewise made all those who practised physic in Rome, and all teachers of the liberal arts, free of the city, in order to fix them in it, and induce others to settle there. With respect to debts, he disappointed the expectation which was generally entertained, that they would be totally cancelled; and ordered that the debtors should satisfy their creditors, according to the valuation of their estates, at the rate at which they were purchased before the commencement of the civil war; deducting from the debt what had been paid for interest either in money or by bonds; by virtue of which provision about a fourth part of the debt was lost. He dissolved all the guilds, except such as were of ancient foundation. Crimes were punished with greater severity; and the rich being more easily induced to commit them because they were only liable to banishment, without the forfeiture of their property, he stripped murderers, as Cicero observes, of their whole estates, and other offenders of one half.

XLIII. He was extremely assiduous and strict in the administration of justice. He expelled from the senate such members as were convicted of bribery; and he dissolved the marriage of a man of pretorian rank, who had married a lady two days after her divorce from a former husband, although there was no suspicion that they had been guilty of any illicit connection. He imposed duties on the importation of foreign goods. The use of litters for travelling, purple robes, and jewels, he permitted only to persons of a certain age and station, and on particular days. He enforced a rigid execution of the sumptuary laws; placing officers about the markets, to seize upon all meats exposed to sale contrary to the rules, and bring them to him; sometimes sending his lictors and soldiers to (30) carry away such victuals as had escaped the notice of the officers, even when they were upon the table.

XLIV. His thoughts were now fully employed from day to day on a variety of great projects for the embellishment and improvement of the city, as well as for guarding and extending the bounds of the empire. In the first place, he meditated the construction of a temple to Mars, which should exceed in grandeur every thing of that kind in the world. For this purpose, he intended to fill up the lake on which he had entertained the people with the spectacle of a sea-fight. He also projected a most spacious theatre adjacent to the Tarpeian mount; and also proposed to reduce the civil law to a reasonable compass, and out of that immense and undigested mass of statutes to extract the best and most necessary parts into a few books; to make as large a collection as possible of works in the Greek and Latin languages, for the public use; the province of providing and putting them in proper order being assigned to Marcus Varro. He intended likewise to drain the Pomptine marshes, to cut a channel for the discharge of the waters of the lake Fucinus, to form a road from the Upper Sea through the ridge of the Appenine to the Tiber; to make a cut through the isthmus of Corinth, to reduce the Dacians, who had over-run Pontus and Thrace, within their proper limits, and then to make war upon the Parthians, through the Lesser Armenia, but not to risk a general engagement with them, until he had made some trial of their prowess in war. But in the midst of all his undertakings and projects, he was carried off by death; before I speak of which, it may not be improper to give an account of his person, dress, and manners; together with what relates to his pursuits, both civil and military.

XLV. It is said that he was tall, of a fair complexion, round limbed, rather full faced, with eyes black and piercing; and that he enjoyed excellent health, except towards the close of his life, when he was subject to sudden fainting-fits, and disturbance in his sleep.

He was likewise twice seized with the falling sickness while engaged in active service. He was so nice in the care of his person, that he not only kept the hair of his head closely cut and had his face smoothly shaved, but (31) even caused the hair on other parts of the body to be plucked out by the roots, a practice for which some persons rallied him. His baldness gave him much uneasiness, having often found himself upon that account exposed to the jibes of his enemies. He therefore used to bring forward the hair from the crown of his head; and of all the honours conferred upon him by the senate and people, there was none which he either accepted or used with greater pleasure, than the right of wearing constantly a laurel crown. It is said that he was particular in his dress. For he used the *Latus Clavus* with fringes about the wrists, and always had it girded about him, but rather loosely. This circumstance gave origin to the expression of Sylla, who often advised the nobles to beware of “the ill-girt boy.”

XLVI. He first inhabited a small house in the *Suburra* , but after his advancement to the pontificate, he occupied a palace belonging to the state in the *Via Sacra*. Many writers say that he liked his residence to be elegant, and his entertainments sumptuous; and that he entirely took down a villa near the grove of *Aricia*, which he had built from the foundation and finished at a vast expense, because it did not exactly suit his taste, although he had at that time but slender means, and was in debt; and that he carried about in his expeditions tessellated and marble slabs for the floor of his tent.

XLVII. They likewise report that he invaded Britain in hopes of finding pearls , the size of which he would compare together, and ascertain the weight by poising them in his hand; that he would purchase, at any cost, gems, carved works, statues, and pictures, executed by the eminent masters of antiquity; and that he would give

for young and handy slaves a price so extravagant, that he forbad its being entered in the diary of his expenses.

XLVIII. We are also told, that in the provinces he constantly maintained two tables, one for the officers of the army, and the gentry of the country, and the other for Romans of the highest rank, and provincials of the first distinction. He was so very exact in the management of his domestic affairs, both little and great, that he once threw a baker into prison, for serving him with a finer sort of bread than his guests; and put to death a freed-man, who was a particular favourite, for debauching the lady of a Roman knight, although no complaint had been made to him of the affair.

XLIX. The only stain upon his chastity was his having cohabited with Nicomedes; and that indeed stuck to him all the days of his life, and exposed him to much bitter raillery. I will not dwell upon those well-known verses of Calvus Licinius:

Whate'er Bithynia and her lord possess'd,
Her lord who Caesar in his lust caress'd.

I pass over the speeches of Dolabella, and Curio, the father, in which the former calls him "the queen's rival, and the inner-side of the royal couch," and the latter, "the brothel of Nicomedes, and the Bithynian stew." I would likewise say nothing of the edicts of Bibulus, in which he proclaimed his colleague under the name of "the queen of Bithynia;" adding, that "he had formerly been in love with a king, but now coveted a kingdom." At which time, as Marcus Brutus relates, one Octavius, a man of a crazy brain, and therefore the more free in his raillery, after he had in a crowded assembly saluted Pompey by the title of king, addressed Caesar by that of

queen. Caius Memmius likewise upbraided him with serving the king at table, among the rest of his catamites, in the presence of a large company, in which were some merchants from Rome, the names of whom he mentions. But Cicero was not content with writing in some of his letters, that he was conducted by the royal attendants into the king's bed-chamber, lay upon a bed of gold with a covering of purple, and that the youthful bloom of this scion of Venus had been tainted in Bithynia — but upon Caesar's pleading the cause of Nysa, the daughter of (32) Nicomedes before the senate, and recounting the king's kindnesses to him, replied, "Pray tell us no more of that; for it is well known what he gave you, and you gave him." To conclude, his soldiers in the Gallic triumph, amongst other verses, such as they jocularly sung on those occasions, following the general's chariot, recited these, which since that time have become extremely common:

The Gauls to Caesar yield, Caesar to Nicomede,
Lo! Caesar triumphs for his glorious deed,
But Caesar's conqueror gains no victor's meed.

L. It is admitted by all that he was much addicted to women, as well as very expensive in his intrigues with them, and that he debauched many ladies of the highest quality; among whom were Posthumia, the wife of Servius Sulpicius; Lollia, the wife of Aulus Gabinius; Tertulla, the wife of Marcus Crassus; and Mucia, the wife of Cneius Pompey. For it is certain that the Curios, both father and son, and many others, made it a reproach to Pompey, "That to gratify his ambition, he married the daughter of a man, upon whose account he had divorced his wife, after having had three children by her; and whom he used, with a deep sigh, to call Aegisthus." But the mistress

he most loved, was Servilia, the mother of Marcus Brutus, for whom he purchased, in his first consulship after the commencement of their intrigue, a pearl which cost him six millions of sesterces; and in the civil war, besides other presents, assigned to her, for a trifling consideration, some valuable farms when they were exposed to public auction. Many persons expressing their surprise at the lowness of the price, Cicero wittily remarked, "To let you know the real value of the purchase, between ourselves, Tertia was deducted:" for Servilia was supposed to have prostituted her daughter Tertia to Caesar.

(34) LI. That he had intrigues likewise with married women in the provinces, appears from this distich, which was as much repeated in the Gallic Triumph as the former::

Watch well your wives, ye cits, we bring a blade,
A bald-pate master of the wenching trade.
Thy gold was spent on many a Gallic w — e;
Exhausted now, thou com'st to borrow more.

LII. In the number of his mistresses were also some queens; such as Eunoe, a Moor, the wife of Bogudes, to whom and her husband he made, as Naso reports, many large presents. But his greatest favourite was Cleopatra, with whom he often revelled all night until the dawn of day, and would have gone with her through Egypt in dalliance, as far as Aethiopia, in her luxurious yacht, had not the army refused to follow him. He afterwards invited her to Rome, whence he sent her back loaded with honours and presents, and gave her permission to call by his name a son, who, according to the testimony of some Greek historians, resembled Caesar both in person

and gait. Mark Antony declared in the senate, that Caesar had acknowledged the child as his own; and that Caius Matias, Caius Oppius, and the rest of Caesar's friends knew it to be true. On which occasion, Oppius, as if it had been an imputation which he was called upon to refute, published a book to shew, "that the child which Cleopatra fathered upon Caesar, was not his." Helvius Cinna, tribune of the people, admitted to several persons the fact, that he had a bill ready drawn, which Caesar had ordered him to get enacted in his absence, allowing him, with the hope of leaving issue, to take any wife he chose, and as many of them as he pleased; and to leave no room for doubt of his infamous character for unnatural lewdness and adultery, Curio, the father, says, in one of his speeches, "He was every woman's man, and every man's woman."

LIII. It is acknowledged even by his enemies, that in regard to wine, he was abstemious. A remark is ascribed to Marcus Cato, "that Caesar was the only sober man amongst all those who were engaged in the design to subvert (35) the government." In the matter of diet, Caius Oppius informs us, "that he was so indifferent, that when a person in whose house he was entertained, had served him with stale, instead of fresh, oil, and the rest of the company would not touch it, he alone ate very heartily of it, that he might not seem to tax the master of the house with rusticity or want of attention."

LIV. But his abstinence did not extend to pecuniary advantages, either in his military commands, or civil offices; for we have the testimony of some writers, that he took money from the proconsul, who was his predecessor in Spain, and from the Roman allies in that quarter, for the discharge of his debts; and plundered at the point of the sword some towns of the Lusitanians, notwithstanding they attempted no resistance, and opened their gates to him upon his

arrival before them. In Gaul, he rifled the chapels and temples of the gods, which were filled with rich offerings, and demolished cities oftener for the sake of their spoil, than for any ill they had done. By this means gold became so plentiful with him, that he exchanged it through Italy and the provinces of the empire for three thousand sesterces the pound. In his first consulship he purloined from the Capitol three thousand pounds' weight of gold, and substituted for it the same quantity of gilt brass. He bartered likewise to foreign nations and princes, for gold, the titles of allies and kings; and squeezed out of Ptolemy alone near six thousand talents, in the name of himself and Pompey. He afterwards supported the expense of the civil wars, and of his triumphs and public spectacles, by the most flagrant rapine and sacrilege.

LV. In eloquence and warlike achievements, he equalled at least, if he did not surpass, the greatest of men. After his prosecution of Dolabella, he was indisputably reckoned one of the most distinguished advocates. Cicero, in recounting to Brutus the famous orators, declares, "that he does not see that Caesar was inferior to any one of them;" and says, "that he (36) had an elegant, splendid, noble, and magnificent vein of eloquence." And in a letter to Cornelius Nepos, he writes of him in the following terms: "What! Of all the orators, who, during the whole course of their lives, have done nothing else, which can you prefer to him? Which of them is more pointed or terse in his periods, or employs more polished and elegant language?" In his youth, he seems to have chosen Strabo Caesar for his model; from whose oration in behalf of the Sardinians he has transcribed some passages literally into his *Divination*. In his delivery he is said to have had a shrill voice, and his action was animated, but not ungraceful. He has left behind him some speeches,

among which are ranked a few that are not genuine, such as that on behalf of Quintus Metellus. These Augustus supposes, with reason, to be rather the production of blundering short-hand writers, who were not able to keep pace with him in the delivery, than publications of his own. For I find in some copies that the title is not "For Metellus," but "What he wrote to Metellus;" whereas the speech is delivered in the name of Caesar, vindicating Metellus and himself from the aspersions cast upon them by their common defamers. The speech addressed "To his soldiers in Spain," Augustus considers likewise as spurious. We meet with two under this title; one made, as is pretended, in the first battle, and the other in the last; at which time, Asinius Pollio says, he had not leisure to address the soldiers, on account of the suddenness of the enemy's attack.

LVI. He has likewise left Commentaries of his own actions both in the war in Gaul, and in the civil war with Pompey; for the author of the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish wars is not known with any certainty. Some think they are the production of Oppius, and some of Hirtius; the latter of whom composed the last book, which is imperfect, of the Gallic war. Of Caesar's Commentaries, Cicero, in his Brutus, speaks thus: "He wrote his Commentaries in a manner deserving of great approbation: they are plain, precise, and elegant, without any affectation of rhetorical ornament. In having thus prepared materials for others who might be inclined to write his history, he may perhaps have encouraged some silly creatures to enter upon such a work, who will needs be dressing up his actions in all the extravagance a (37) bombast; but he has discouraged wise men from ever attempting the subject." Hirtius delivers his opinion of these Commentaries in the following terms: "So great is the approbation with which they are universally perused, that, instead of

rousing, he seems to have precluded, the efforts of any future historian. Yet, with respect to this work, we have more reason to admire him than others; for they only know how well and correctly he has written, but we know, likewise, how easily and quickly he did it." Pollio Asinius thinks that they were not drawn up with much care, or with a due regard to truth; for he insinuates that Caesar was too hasty of belief in regard to what was performed by others under his orders; and that, he has not given a very faithful account of his own acts, either by design, or through defect of memory; expressing at the same time an opinion that Caesar intended a new and more correct edition. He has left behind him likewise two books on Analogy, with the same number under the title of Anti-Cato, and a poem entitled The Itinerary. Of these books, he composed the first two in his passage over the Alps, as he was returning to the army after making his circuit in Hither-Gaul; the second work about the time of the battle of Munda; and the last during the four-and-twenty days he employed in his journey from Rome to Farther-Spain. There are extant some letters of his to the senate, written in a manner never practised by any before him; for they are distinguished into pages in the form of a memorandum book whereas the consuls and commanders till then, used constantly in their letters to continue the line quite across the sheet, without any folding or distinction of pages. There are extant likewise some letters from him to Cicero, and others to his friends, concerning his domestic affairs; in which, if there was occasion for secrecy, he wrote in cyphers; that is, he used the alphabet in such a manner, that not a single word could be made out. The way to decipher those epistles was to substitute the fourth for the first letter, as d for a, and so for the other letters respectively. Some things likewise pass under his name, said to have been written

by him when a boy, or a very young man; as the *Encomium of Hercules*, a tragedy entitled *Oedipus*, and a collection of *Apophthegms*; all which Augustus forbid to be published, in a short and plain letter to Pompeius Macer, who was employed by him in the arrangement of his libraries.

(38) LVII. He was perfect in the use of arms, an accomplished rider, and able to endure fatigue beyond all belief. On a march, he used to go at the head of his troops, sometimes on horseback, but oftener on foot, with his head bare in all kinds of weather. He would travel post in a light carriage without baggage, at the rate of a hundred miles a day; and if he was stopped by floods in the rivers, he swam across, or floated on skins inflated with wind, so that he often anticipated intelligence of his movements.

LVIII. In his expeditions, it is difficult to say whether his caution or his daring was most conspicuous. He never marched his army by roads which were exposed to ambuscades, without having previously examined the nature of the ground by his scouts. Nor did he cross over to Britain, before he had carefully examined, in person, the navigation, the harbours, and the most convenient point of landing in the island. When intelligence was brought to him of the siege of his camp in Germany, he made his way to his troops, through the enemy's stations, in a Gaulish dress. He crossed the sea from Brundisium and Dyrrachium, in the winter, through the midst of the enemy's fleets; and the troops, under orders to join him, being slow in their movements, notwithstanding repeated messages to hurry them, but to no purpose, he at last went privately, and alone, aboard a small vessel in the night time, with his head muffled up; nor did he make himself known, or suffer the master to put about, although the wind blew strong against them, until they were ready to sink.

LIX. He was never deterred from any enterprise, nor retarded in the prosecution of it, by superstition . When a victim, which he was about to offer in sacrifice, made its (39) escape, he did not therefore defer his expedition against Scipio and Juba. And happening to fall, upon stepping out of the ship, he gave a lucky turn to the omen, by exclaiming, “I hold thee fast, Africa.” To chide the prophecies which were spread abroad, that the name of the Scipios was, by the decrees of fate, fortunate and invincible in that province, he retained in the camp a profligate wretch, of the family of the Cornelii, who, on account of his scandalous life, was surnamed Salutio.

LX. He not only fought pitched battles, but made sudden attacks when an opportunity offered; often at the end of a march, and sometimes during the most violent storms, when nobody could imagine he would stir. Nor was he ever backward in fighting, until towards the end of his life. He then was of opinion, that the oftener he had been crowned with success, the less he ought to expose himself to new hazards; and that nothing he could gain by a victory would compensate for what he might lose by a miscarriage. He never defeated the enemy without driving them from their camp; and giving them no time to rally their forces. When the issue of a battle was doubtful, he sent away all the horses, and his own first, that having no means of flight, they might be under the greater necessity of standing their ground.

LXI. He rode a very remarkable horse, with feet almost like those of a man, the hoofs being divided in such a manner as to have some resemblance to toes. This horse he had bred himself, and the soothsayers having interpreted these circumstances into an omen that its owner would be master of the world, he brought him up with particular care, and broke him in himself, as the horse would suffer

no one else to mount him. A statue of this horse was afterwards erected by Caesar's order before the temple of Venus Genitrix.

LXII. He often rallied his troops, when they were giving way, by his personal efforts; stopping those who fled, keeping others in their ranks, and seizing them by their throat turned them towards the enemy; although numbers were so terrified, that an eagle-bearer, thus stopped, made a thrust at him with (40) the spear-head; and another, upon a similar occasion, left the standard in his hand.

LXIII. The following instances of his resolution are equally, and even more remarkable. After the battle of Pharsalia, having sent his troops before him into Asia, as he was passing the straits of the Hellespont in a ferry-boat, he met with Lucius Cassius, one of the opposite party, with ten ships of war; and so far from endeavouring to escape, he went alongside his ship, and calling upon him to surrender, Cassius humbly gave him his submission.

LXIV. At Alexandria, in the attack of a bridge, being forced by a sudden sally of the enemy into a boat, and several others hurrying in with him, he leaped into the sea, and saved himself by swimming to the next ship, which lay at the distance of two hundred paces; holding up his left hand out of the water, for fear of wetting some papers which he held in it; and pulling his general's cloak after him with his teeth, lest it should fall into the hands of the enemy.

LXV. He never valued a soldier for his moral conduct or his means, but for his courage only; and treated his troops with a mixture of severity and indulgence; for he did not always keep a strict hand over them, but only when the enemy was near. Then indeed he was so strict a disciplinarian, that he would give no notice of a march or a battle until the moment of action, in order that the troops might hold themselves in readiness for any sudden movement; and he would

frequently draw them out of the camp without any necessity for it, especially in rainy weather, and upon holy-days. Sometimes, giving them orders not to lose sight of him, he would suddenly depart by day or by night, and lengthen the marches in order to tire them out, as they followed him at a distance.

LXVI. When at any time his troops were dispirited by reports of the great force of the enemy, he rallied their courage; not by denying the truth of what was said, or by diminishing the facts, but, on the contrary, by exaggerating every particular. (41) Accordingly, when his troops were in great alarm at the expected arrival of king Juba, he called them together, and said, "I have to inform you that in a very few days the king will be here, with ten legions, thirty thousand horse, a hundred thousand light-armed foot, and three hundred elephants. Let none of you, therefore, presume to make further enquiry, or indulge in conjectures, but take my word for what I tell you, which I have from undoubted intelligence; otherwise I shall put them aboard an old crazy vessel, and leave them exposed to the mercy of the winds, to be transported to some other country."

LXVII. He neither noticed all their transgressions, nor punished them according to strict rule. But for deserters and mutineers he made the most diligent enquiry, and their punishment was most severe: other delinquencies he would connive at. Sometimes, after a great battle ending in victory, he would grant them a relaxation from all kinds of duty, and leave them to revel at pleasure; being used to boast, "that his soldiers fought nothing the worse for being well oiled." In his speeches, he never addressed them by the title of "Soldiers," but by the kinder phrase of "Fellow-soldiers;" and kept them in such splendid order, that their arms were ornamented with silver and gold, not merely for parade, but to render the soldiers more

resolute to save them in battle, and fearful of losing them. He loved his troops to such a degree, that when he heard of the defeat of those under Titurius, he neither cut his hair nor shaved his beard, until he had revenged it upon the enemy; by which means he engaged their devoted affection, and raised their valour to the highest pitch.

LXVIII. Upon his entering on the civil war, the centurions of every legion offered, each of them, to maintain a horseman at his own expense, and the whole army agreed to serve gratis, without either corn or pay; those amongst them who were rich, charging themselves with the maintenance of the poor. No one of them, during the whole course of the war, deserted to the enemy; and many of those who were made prisoners, though they were offered their lives, upon condition of bearing arms against him, refused to accept the terms. They endured want, and other hardships, not only (42) when they were besieged themselves, but when they besieged others, to such a degree, that Pompey, when blocked up in the neighbourhood of Dyrrachium, upon seeing a sort of bread made of an herb, which they lived upon, said, "I have to do with wild beasts," and ordered it immediately to be taken away; because, if his troops should see it, their spirit might be broken by perceiving the endurance and determined resolution of the enemy. With what bravery they fought, one instance affords sufficient proof; which is, that after an unsuccessful engagement at Dyrrachium, they called for punishment; insomuch that their general found it more necessary to comfort than to punish them. In other battles, in different quarters, they defeated with ease immense armies of the enemy, although they were much inferior to them in number. In short, one cohort of the sixth legion held out a fort against four legions belonging to Pompey, during several hours; being almost every one of them wounded by the vast

number of arrows discharged against them, and of which there were found within the ramparts a hundred and thirty thousand. This is no way surprising, when we consider the conduct of some individuals amongst them; such as that of Cassius Scaeva, a centurion, or Caius Acilius, a common soldier, not to speak of others. Scaeva, after having an eye struck out, being run through the thigh and the shoulder, and having his shield pierced in an hundred and twenty places, maintained obstinately the guard of the gate of a fort, with the command of which he was intrusted. Acilius, in the sea-fight at Marseilles, having seized a ship of the enemy's with his right hand, and that being cut off, in imitation of that memorable instance of resolution in Cynaegirus amongst the Greeks, boarded the enemy's ship, bearing down all before him with the boss of his shield.

LXIX. They never once mutinied during all the ten years of the Gallic war, but were sometimes refractory in the course of the civil war. However, they always returned quickly to their duty, and that not through the indulgence, but in submission to the authority, of their general; for he never yielded to them when they were insubordinate, but constantly resisted their demands. He disbanded the whole ninth legion with ignominy at Placentia, although Pompey was still in arms, and would (43) not receive them again into his service, until they had not only made repeated and humble entreaties, but until the ringleaders in the mutiny were punished.

LXX. When the soldiers of the tenth legion at Rome demanded their discharge and rewards for their service, with violent threats and no small danger to the city, although the war was then raging in Africa, he did not hesitate, contrary to the advice of his friends, to meet the legion, and disband it. But addressing them by the title of "Quirites," instead of "Soldiers," he by this single word so

thoroughly brought them round and changed their determination, that they immediately cried out, they were his “soldiers,” and followed him to Africa, although he had refused their service. He nevertheless punished the most mutinous among them, with the loss of a third of their share in the plunder, and the land destined for them.

LXXI. In the service of his clients, while yet a young man, he evinced great zeal and fidelity. He defended the cause of a noble youth, Masintha, against king Hiempsal, so strenuously, that in a scuffle which took place upon the occasion, he seized by the beard the son of king Juba; and upon Masintha’s being declared tributary to Hiempsal, while the friends of the adverse party were violently carrying him off, he immediately rescued him by force, kept him concealed in his house a long time, and when, at the expiration of his praetorship, he went to Spain, he took him away in his litter, in the midst of his lictors bearing the fasces, and others who had come to attend and take leave of him.

LXXII. He always treated his friends with such kindness and good-nature, that when Caius Oppius, in travelling with him through a forest, was suddenly taken ill, he resigned to him the only place there was to shelter them at night, and lay upon the ground in the open air. When he had placed himself at the head of affairs, he advanced some of his faithful adherents, though of mean extraction, to the highest offices; and when he was censured for this partiality, he openly said, “Had I been assisted by robbers and cut-throats in the defence of my honour, I should have made them the same recompense.”

(44) LXXIII. The resentment he entertained against any one was never so implacable that he did not very willingly renounce it when opportunity offered. Although Caius Memmius had published some

extremely virulent speeches against him, and he had answered him with equal acrimony, yet he afterwards assisted him with his vote and interest, when he stood candidate for the consulship. When C. Calvus, after publishing some scandalous epigrams upon him, endeavoured to effect a reconciliation by the intercession of friends, he wrote to him, of his own accord, the first letter. And when Valerius Catullus, who had, as he himself observed, fixed such a stain upon his character in his verses upon Mamurra as never could be obliterated, he begged his pardon, invited him to supper the same day; and continued to take up his lodging with his father occasionally, as he had been accustomed to do.

LXXIV. His temper was also naturally averse to severity in retaliation. After he had captured the pirates, by whom he had been taken, having sworn that he would crucify them, he did so indeed; but he first ordered their throats to be cut . He could never bear the thought of doing any harm to Cornelius Phagitas, who had dogged him in the night when he was sick and a fugitive, with the design of carrying him to Sylla, and from whose hands he had escaped with some difficulty by giving him a bribe. Philemon, his amanuensis, who had promised his enemies to poison him, he put to death without torture. When he was summoned as a witness against Publicus Clodius, his wife Pompeia's gallant, who was prosecuted for the profanation of religious ceremonies, he declared he knew nothing of the affair, although his mother Aurelia, and his sister Julia, gave the court an exact and full account of the circumstances. And being asked why then he had divorced his wife? "Because," he said, "my family should not only be free from guilt, but even from the suspicion of it."

LXXV. Both in his administration and his conduct towards the

vanquished party in the civil war, he showed a wonderful moderation and clemency. For while Pompey declared that he would consider those as enemies who did not take arms in defence of the republic, he desired it to be understood, that he (45) should regard those who remained neuter as his friends. With regard to all those to whom he had, on Pompey's recommendation, given any command in the army, he left them at perfect liberty to go over to him, if they pleased. When some proposals were made at Ileria for a surrender, which gave rise to a free communication between the two camps, and Afranius and Petreius, upon a sudden change of resolution, had put to the sword all Caesar's men who were found in the camp, he scorned to imitate the base treachery which they had practised against himself. On the field of Pharsalia, he called out to the soldiers "to spare their fellow-citizens," and afterwards gave permission to every man in his army to save an enemy. None of them, so far as appears, lost their lives but in battle, excepting only Afranius, Faustus, and young Lucius Caesar; and it is thought that even they were put to death without his consent. Afranius and Faustus had borne arms against him, after obtaining their pardon; and Lucius Caesar had not only in the most cruel manner destroyed with fire and sword his freed-men and slaves, but cut to pieces the wild beasts which he had prepared for the entertainment of the people. And finally, a little before his death, he permitted all whom he had not before pardoned, to return into Italy, and to bear offices both civil and military. He even replaced the statues of Sylla and Pompey, which had been thrown down by the populace. And after this, whatever was devised or uttered, he chose rather to check than to punish it. Accordingly, having detected certain conspiracies and nocturnal assemblies, he went no farther than to intimate by a

proclamation that he knew of them; and as to those who indulged themselves in the liberty of reflecting severely upon him, he only warned them in a public speech not to persist in their offence. He bore with great moderation a virulent libel written against him by Aulus Caecinna, and the abusive lampoons of Pitholaus, most highly reflecting on his reputation.

LXXVI. His other words and actions, however, so far outweigh all his good qualities, that it is thought he abused his power, and was justly cut off. For he not only obtained excessive honours, such as the consulship every year, the dictatorship for life, and the censorship, but also the title of emperor , (46) and the surname of FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY , besides having his statue amongst the kings , and a lofty couch in the theatre. He even suffered some honours to be decreed to him, which were unbecoming the most exalted of mankind; such as a gilded chair of state in the senate-house and on his tribunal, a consecrated chariot, and banners in the Circensian procession, temples, altars, statues among the gods, a bed of state in the temples, a priest, and a college of priests dedicated to himself, like those of Pan; and that one of the months should be called by his name. There were, indeed, no honours which he did not either assume himself, or grant to others, at his will and pleasure. In his third and fourth consulship, he used only the title of the office, being content with the power of dictator, which was conferred upon him with the consulship; and in both years he substituted other consuls in his room, during the three last months; so that in the intervals he held no assemblies of the people, for the election of magistrates, excepting only tribunes and ediles of the people; and appointed officers, under the name of praefects, instead of the praetors, to administer the affairs of the city during his absence. The office of consul having

become vacant, by the sudden death of one of the consuls the day before the calends of January [the 1st Jan.], he conferred it on a person who requested it of him, for a few hours. Assuming the same licence, and regardless of the customs of his country, he appointed magistrates to hold their offices for terms of years. He granted the insignia of the consular dignity to ten persons of pretorian rank. He admitted into the senate some men who had been made free of the city, and even natives of Gaul, who were semi-barbarians. (47) He likewise appointed to the management of the mint, and the public revenue of the state, some servants of his own household; and entrusted the command of three legions, which he left at Alexandria, to an old catamite of his, the son of his freed-man Rufinus.

LXXVII. He was guilty of the same extravagance in the language he publicly used, as Titus Ampius informs us; according to whom he said, "The republic is nothing but a name, without substance or reality. Sylla was an ignorant fellow to abdicate the dictatorship. Men ought to consider what is becoming when they talk with me, and look upon what I say as a law." To such a pitch of arrogance did he proceed, that when a soothsayer announced to him the unfavourable omen, that the entrails of a victim offered for sacrifice were without a heart, he said, "The entrails will be more favourable when I please; and it ought not to be regarded as a prodigy that a beast should be found wanting a heart."

LXXVIII. But what brought upon him the greatest odium, and was thought an unpardonable insult, was his receiving the whole body of the conscript fathers sitting, before the temple of Venus Genitrix, when they waited upon him with a number of decrees, conferring on him the highest dignities. Some say that, on his attempting to rise, he was held down by Cornelius Balbus; others,

that he did not attempt to rise at all, but frowned on Caius Trebatius, who suggested to him that he should stand up to receive the senate. This behaviour appeared the more intolerable in him, because, when one of the tribunes of the people, Pontius Aquila, would not rise up to him, as he passed by the tribunes' seat during his triumph, he was so much offended, that he cried out, "Well then, you tribune, Aquila, oust me from the government." And for some days afterwards, he never promised a favour to any person, without this proviso, "if Pontus Aquila will give me leave."

LXXIX. To this extraordinary mark of contempt for the senate, he added another affront still more outrageous. For when, after the sacred rites of the Latin festival, he was returning home, amidst the immoderate and unusual acclamations (48) of the people, a man in the crowd put a laurel crown, encircled with a white fillet, on one of his statues; upon which, the tribunes of the people, Epidius Marullus, and Caesetius Flavus, ordered the fillet to be removed from the crown, and the man to be taken to prison. Caesar, being much concerned either that the idea of royalty had been suggested to so little purpose, or, as was said, that he was thus deprived of the merit of refusing it, reprimanded the tribunes very severely, and dismissed them from their office. From that day forward, he was never able to wipe off the scandal of affecting the name of king, although he replied to the populace, when they saluted him by that title, "I am Caesar, and no king." And at the feast of the Lupercalia, when the consul Antony placed a crown upon his head in the rostra several times, he as often put it away, and sent it to the Capitol for Jupiter, the Best and the Greatest. A report was very current, that he had a design of withdrawing to Alexandria or Ilium, whither he proposed to transfer the imperial power, to drain Italy by new levies, and to

leave the government of the city to be administered by his friends. To this report it was added, that in the next meeting of the senate, Lucius Cotta, one of the fifteen, would make a motion, that as there was in the Sibylline books a prophecy, that the Parthians would never be subdued but by a king, Caesar should have that title conferred upon him.

LXXX. For this reason the conspirators precipitated the execution of their design, that they might not be obliged to give their assent to the proposal. Instead, therefore, of caballing any longer separately, in small parties, they now united their counsels; the people themselves being dissatisfied with the present state of affairs, both privately and publicly (49) condemning the tyranny under which they lived, and calling on patriots to assert their cause against the usurper. Upon the admission of foreigners into the senate, a hand-bill was posted up in these words: "A good deed! let no one shew a new senator the way to the house." These verses were likewise currently repeated:

The Gauls he dragged in triumph through the town,
Caesar has brought into the senate-house,
And changed their plaids for the patrician gown.

Gallos Caesar in triumphum ducit: iidem in curiam
Galli braccas deposuerunt, latum clavum sumpserunt.

When Quintus Maximus, who had been his deputy in the consulship for the last three months, entered the theatre, and the lictor, according to custom, bid the people take notice who was coming, they all cried out, "He is no consul." After the removal of Caesetius and Marullus from their office, they were found to have a

great many votes at the next election of consuls. Some one wrote under the statue of Lucius Brutus, "Would you were now alive!" and under the statue of Caesar himself these lines:

Because he drove from Rome the royal race,
Brutus was first made consul in their place.
This man, because he put the consuls down,
Has been rewarded with a royal crown.
Brutus, quia reges ejecit, consul primus factus est:
Hic, quia consules ejecit, rex postremo factus est.

About sixty persons were engaged in the conspiracy against him, of whom Caius Cassius, and Marcus and Decimus Brutus were the chief. It was at first debated amongst them, whether they should attack him in the Campus Martius when he was taking the votes of the tribes, and some of them should throw him off the bridge, whilst others should be ready to stab him upon his fall; or else in the Via Sacra, or at the entrance of the theatre. But after public notice had been given by proclamation for the senate to assemble upon the ides of March [15th March], in the senate-house built by Pompey, they approved both of the time and place, as most fitting for their purpose.

LXXXI. Caesar had warning given him of his fate by indubitable (50) omens. A few months before, when the colonists settled at Capua, by virtue of the Julian law, were demolishing some old sepulchres, in building country-houses, and were the more eager at the work, because they discovered certain vessels of antique workmanship, a tablet of brass was found in a tomb, in which Capys, the founder of Capua, was said to have been buried, with an inscription in the Greek language to this effect "Whenever the bones

of Capys come to be discovered, a descendant of Iulus will be slain by the hands of his kinsmen, and his death revenged by fearful disasters throughout Italy.” Lest any person should regard this anecdote as a fabulous or silly invention, it was circulated upon the authority of Caius Balbus, an intimate friend of Caesar’s. A few days likewise before his death, he was informed that the horses, which, upon his crossing the Rubicon, he had consecrated, and turned loose to graze without a keeper, abstained entirely from eating, and shed floods of tears. The soothsayer Spurinna, observing certain ominous appearances in a sacrifice which he was offering, advised him to beware of some danger, which threatened to befall him before the ides of March were past. The day before the ides, birds of various kinds from a neighbouring grove, pursuing a wren which flew into Pompey’s senate-house, with a sprig of laurel in its beak, tore it in pieces. Also, in the night on which the day of his murder dawned, he dreamt at one time that he was soaring above the clouds, and, at another, that he had joined hands with Jupiter. His wife Calpurnia fancied in her sleep that the pediment of the house was falling down, and her husband stabbed on her bosom; immediately upon which the chamber doors flew open. On account of these omens, as well as his infirm health, he was in some doubt whether he should not remain at home, and defer to some other opportunity the business which he intended to propose to the senate; but Decimus Brutus advising him not to disappoint the senators, who were numerously assembled, and waited his coming, he was prevailed upon to go, and accordingly (51) set forward about the fifth hour. In his way, some person having thrust into his hand a paper, warning him against the plot, he mixed it with some other documents which he held in his left hand, intending to read it at leisure. Victim after victim was slain, without any

favourable appearances in the entrails; but still, disregarding all omens, he entered the senate-house, laughing at Spurinna as a false prophet, because the ides of March were come, without any mischief having befallen him. To which the soothsayer replied, "They are come, indeed, but not past."

LXXXII. When he had taken his seat, the conspirators stood round him, under colour of paying their compliments; and immediately Tullius Cimber, who had engaged to commence the assault, advancing nearer than the rest, as if he had some favour to request, Caesar made signs that he should defer his petition to some other time. Tullius immediately seized him by the toga, on both shoulders; at which Caesar crying out, "Violence is meant!" one of the Cassii wounded him a little below the throat. Caesar seized him by the arm, and ran it through with his style ; and endeavouring to rush forward was stopped by another wound. Finding himself now attacked on all hands with naked poniards, he wrapped the toga about his head, and at the same moment drew the skirt round his legs with his left hand, that he might fall more decently with the lower part of his body covered. He was stabbed with three and twenty wounds, uttering a groan only, but no cry, at the first wound; although some authors relate, that when Marcus Brutus fell upon him, he exclaimed, "What! art thou, too, one of them? Thou, my son!" The whole assembly instantly (52) dispersing, he lay for some time after he expired, until three of his slaves laid the body on a litter, and carried it home, with one arm hanging down over the side. Among so many wounds, there was none that was mortal, in the opinion of the surgeon Antistius, except the second, which he received in the breast. The conspirators meant to drag his body into the Tiber as soon as they had killed him; to confiscate his estate, and

rescind all his enactments; but they were deterred by fear of Mark Antony, and Lepidus, Caesar's master of the horse, and abandoned their intentions.

LXXXIII. At the instance of Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, his will was opened and read in Mark Antony's house. He had made it on the ides of the preceding September, at his Lavican villa, and committed it to the custody of the chief of the Vestal Virgins. Quintus Tubero informs us, that in all the wills he had signed, from the time of his first consulship to the breaking out of the civil war, Cneius Pompey was appointed his heir, and that this had been publicly notified to the army. But in his last will, he named three heirs, the grandsons of his sisters; namely, Caius Octavius for three fourths of his estate, and Lucius Pinarius and Quintus Pedius for the remaining fourth. Other heirs [in remainder] were named at the close of the will, in which he also adopted Caius Octavius, who was to assume his name, into his family; and nominated most of those who were concerned in his death among the guardians of his son, if he should have any; as well as Decimus Brutus amongst his heirs of the second order. He bequeathed to the Roman people his gardens near the Tiber, and three hundred sesterces each man.

LXXXIV. Notice of his funeral having been solemnly proclaimed, a pile was erected in the Campus Martius, near the tomb of his daughter Julia; and before the Rostra was placed a gilded tabernacle, on the model of the temple of Venus Genitrix; within which was an ivory bed, covered with purple and cloth of gold. At the head was a trophy, with the [bloodstained] robe in which he was slain. It being considered that the whole day would not suffice for carrying the funeral oblations in solemn procession before the corpse, directions were given for every one, without regard to order, to carry them from

the city into the Campus Martius, by what way they pleased. To raise pity and indignation for his murder, in the plays acted at the funeral, a passage was sung from Pacuvius's tragedy, entitled, "The Trial for Arms:"

That ever I, unhappy man, should save

Wretches, who thus have brought me to the grave!

And some lines also from Attilius's tragedy of "Electra," to the same effect. Instead of a funeral panegyric, the consul Antony ordered a herald to proclaim to the people the decree of the senate, in which they had bestowed upon him all honours, divine and human; with the oath by which they had engaged themselves for the defence of his person; and to these he added only a few words of his own. The magistrates and others who had formerly filled the highest offices, carried the bier from the Rostra into the Forum. While some proposed that the body should be burnt in the sanctuary of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and others in Pompey's senate-house; on a sudden, two men, with swords by their sides, and spears in their hands, set fire to the bier with lighted torches. The throng around immediately heaped upon it dry faggots, the tribunals and benches of the adjoining courts, and whatever else came to hand. Then the musicians and players stripped off the dresses they wore on the present occasion, taken from the wardrobe of his triumph at spectacles, rent them, and threw them into the flames. The legionaries, also, of his (54) veteran bands, cast in their armour, which they had put on in honour of his funeral. Most of the ladies did the same by their ornaments, with the bullae, and mantles of their children. In this public mourning there joined a multitude of foreigners, expressing their sorrow according to the fashion of their respective countries; but especially the Jews, who for several nights

together frequented the spot where the body was burnt.

LXXXV. The populace ran from the funeral, with torches in their hands, to the houses of Brutus and Cassius, and were repelled with difficulty. Going in quest of Cornelius Cinna, who had in a speech, the day before, reflected severely upon Caesar, and mistaking for him Helvius Cinna, who happened to fall into their hands, they murdered the latter, and carried his head about the city on the point of a spear. They afterwards erected in the Forum a column of Numidian marble, formed of one stone nearly twenty feet high, and inscribed upon it these words, TO THE FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY. At this column they continued for a long time to offer sacrifices, make vows, and decide controversies, in which they swore by Caesar.

LXXXVI. Some of Caesar's friends entertained a suspicion, that he neither desired nor cared to live any longer, on account of his declining health; and for that reason slighted all the omens of religion, and the warnings of his friends. Others are of opinion, that thinking himself secure in the late decree of the senate, and their oaths, he dismissed his Spanish guards who attended him with drawn swords. Others again suppose, that he chose rather to face at once the dangers which threatened him on all sides, than to be for ever on the watch against them. Some tell us that he used to say, the commonwealth was more interested in the safety of his person than himself: for that he had for some time been satiated with power and glory; but that the commonwealth, if any thing should befall him, would have no rest, and, involved in another civil war, would be in a worse state than before.

(55) LXXXVII. This, however, was generally admitted, that his death was in many respects such as he would have chosen. For, upon reading the account delivered by Xenophon, how Cyrus in his last

illness gave instructions respecting his funeral, Caesar deprecated a lingering death, and wished that his own might be sudden and speedy. And the day before he died, the conversation at supper, in the house of Marcus Lepidus, turning upon what was the most eligible way of dying, he gave his opinion in favour of a death that is sudden and unexpected.

LXXXVIII. He died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, and was ranked amongst the Gods, not only by a formal decree, but in the belief of the vulgar. For during the first games which Augustus, his heir, consecrated to his memory, a comet blazed for seven days together, rising always about eleven o'clock; and it was supposed to be the soul of Caesar, now received into heaven: for which reason, likewise, he is represented on his statue with a star on his brow. The senate-house in which he was slain, was ordered to be shut up, and a decree made that the ides of March should be called parricidal, and the senate should never more assemble on that day.

LXXXIX. Scarcely any of those who were accessory to his murder, survived him more than three years, or died a natural death. They were all condemned by the senate: some were taken off by one accident, some by another. Part of them perished at sea, others fell in battle; and some slew themselves with the same poniard with which they had stabbed Caesar.

(56) The termination of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey forms a new epoch in the Roman History, at which a Republic, which had subsisted with unrivalled glory during a period of about four hundred and sixty years, relapsed into a state of despotism, whence it never more could emerge. So sudden a transition from prosperity to the ruin of public freedom, without the intervention of any foreign enemy, excites a reasonable conjecture,

that the constitution in which it could take place, however vigorous in appearance, must have lost that soundness of political health which had enabled it to endure through so many ages. A short view of its preceding state, and of that in which it was at the time of the revolution now mentioned, will best ascertain the foundation of such a conjecture.

Though the Romans, upon the expulsion of Tarquin, made an essential change in the political form of the state, they did not carry their detestation of regal authority so far as to abolish the religious institutions of Numa Pompilius, the second of their kings, according to which, the priesthood, with all the influence annexed to that order, was placed in the hands of the aristocracy. By this wise policy a restraint was put upon the fickleness and violence of the people in matters of government, and a decided superiority given to the Senate both in the deliberative and executive parts of administration. This advantage was afterwards indeed diminished by the creation of Tribunes of the people; a set of men whose ambition often embroiled the Republic in civil dissensions, and who at last abused their authority to such a degree, that they became instruments of aggrandizement to any leading men in the state who could purchase their friendship. In general, however, the majority of the Tribunes being actuated by views which comprehended the interests of the multitude, rather than those of individuals, they did not so much endanger the liberty, as they interrupted the tranquillity, of the public; and when the occasional commotions subsided, there remained no permanent ground for the establishment of personal usurpation.

In every government, an object of the last importance to the peace and welfare of society is the morals of the people; and in proportion

as a community is enlarged by propagation, or the accession of a multitude of new members, a more strict attention is requisite to guard against that dissolution of manners to which a crowded and extensive capital has a natural tendency. Of this (57) the Romans became sensible in the growing state of the Republic. In the year of the City 312, two magistrates were first created for taking an account of the number of the people, and the value of their estates; and soon after, they were invested with the authority not only of inspecting the morals of individuals, but of inflicting public censure for any licentiousness of conduct, or violation of decency. Thus both the civil and religious institutions concurred to restrain the people within the bounds of good order and obedience to the laws; at the same time that the frugal life of the ancient Romans proved a strong security against those vices which operate most effectually towards sapping the foundations of a state.

But in the time of Julius Caesar the barriers of public liberty were become too weak to restrain the audacious efforts of ambitious and desperate men. The veneration for the constitution, usually a powerful check to treasonable designs, had been lately violated by the usurpations of Marius and Sylla. The salutary terrors of religion no longer predominated over the consciences of men. The shame of public censure was extinguished in general depravity. An eminent historian, who lived at that time, informs us, that venality universally prevailed amongst the Romans; and a writer who flourished soon after, observes, that luxury and dissipation had encumbered almost all so much with debt, that they beheld with a degree of complacency the prospect of civil war and confusion.

The extreme degree of profligacy at which the Romans were now arrived is in nothing more evident, than that this age gave birth to the

most horrible conspiracy which occurs in the annals of humankind, viz. that of Catiline. This was not the project of a few desperate and abandoned individuals, but of a number of men of the most illustrious rank in the state; and it appears beyond doubt, that Julius Caesar was accessory to the design, which was no less than to extirpate the Senate, divide amongst themselves both the public and private treasures, and set Rome on fire. The causes which prompted to this tremendous project, it is generally admitted, were luxury, prodigality, irreligion, a total corruption of manners, and above all, as the immediate cause, the pressing necessity in which the conspirators were involved by their extreme dissipation.

The enormous debt in which Caesar himself was early involved, countenances an opinion that his anxiety to procure the province of Gaul proceeded chiefly from this cause. But during nine years in which he held that province, he acquired such riches as must have rendered him, without competition, the most opulent person in the state. If nothing more, therefore, than a (58) splendid establishment had been the object of his pursuit, he had attained to the summit of his wishes. But when we find him persevering in a plan of aggrandizement beyond this period of his fortunes, we can ascribe his conduct to no other motive than that of outrageous ambition. He projected the building of a new Forum at Rome, for the ground only of which he was to pay 800,000 pounds; he raised legions in Gaul at his own charges: he promised such entertainments to the people as had never been known at Rome from the foundation of the city. All these circumstances evince some latent design of procuring such a popularity as might give him an uncontrolled influence in the management of public affairs. Pompey, we are told, was wont to say, that Caesar not being able, with all his riches, to fulfil the promises

which he had made, wished to throw everything into confusion. There may have been some foundation for this remark: but the opinion of Cicero is more probable, that Caesar's mind was seduced with the temptations of chimerical glory. It is observable that neither Cicero nor Pompey intimates any suspicion that Caesar was apprehensive of being impeached for his conduct, had he returned to Rome in a private station. Yet, that there was reason for such an apprehension, the positive declaration of L. Domitius leaves little room to doubt: especially when we consider the number of enemies that Caesar had in the Senate, and the coolness of his former friend Pompey ever after the death of Julia. The proposed impeachment was founded upon a notorious charge of prosecuting measures destructive of the interests of the commonwealth, and tending ultimately to an object incompatible with public freedom. Indeed, considering the extreme corruption which prevailed amongst the Romans at this time, it is more than probable that Caesar would have been acquitted of the charge, but at such an expense as must have stripped him of all his riches, and placed him again in a situation ready to attempt a disturbance of the public tranquillity. For it is said, that he purchased the friendship of Curio, at the commencement of the civil war, with a bribe little short of half a million sterling.

Whatever Caesar's private motive may have been for taking arms against his country, he embarked in an enterprise of a nature the most dangerous: and had Pompey conducted himself in any degree suitable to the reputation which he had formerly acquired, the contest would in all probability have terminated in favour of public freedom. But by dilatory measures in the beginning, by imprudently withdrawing his army from Italy into a distant province, and by not pursuing the advantage he had gained by the vigorous repulse of

Caesar's troops in their attack upon his camp, this commander lost every opportunity of extinguishing a war which was to determine the fate, and even the existence, of the Republic. It was accordingly determined on the plains of Pharsalia, where Caesar obtained a victory which was not more decisive than unexpected. He was now no longer amenable either to the tribunal of the Senate or the power of the laws, but triumphed at once over his enemies and the constitution of his country.

It is to the honour of Caesar, that when he had obtained the supreme power, he exercised it with a degree of moderation beyond what was generally expected by those who had fought on the side of the Republic. Of his private life either before or after this period, little is transmitted in history. Henceforth, however, he seems to have lived chiefly at Rome, near which he had a small villa, upon an eminence, commanding a beautiful prospect. His time was almost entirely occupied with public affairs, in the management of which, though he employed many agents, he appears to have had none in the character of actual minister. He was in general easy of access: but Cicero, in a letter to a friend, complains of having been treated with the indignity of waiting a considerable time amongst a crowd in an anti-chamber, before he could have an audience. The elevation of Caesar placed him not above discharging reciprocally the social duties in the intercourse of life. He returned the visits of those who waited upon him, and would sup at their houses. At table, and in the use of wine, he was habitually temperate. Upon the whole, he added nothing to his own happiness by all the dangers, the fatigues, and the perpetual anxiety which he had incurred in the pursuit of unlimited power. His health was greatly impaired: his former cheerfulness of temper, though not his magnanimity, appears to have forsaken him;

and we behold in his fate a memorable example of illustrious talents rendered, by inordinate ambition, destructive to himself, and irretrievably pernicious to his country.

From beholding the ruin of the Roman Republic, after intestine divisions, and the distractions of civil war, it will afford some relief to take a view of the progress of literature, which flourished even during those calamities.

The commencement of literature in Rome is to be dated from the reduction of the Grecian States, when the conquerors imported into their own country the valuable productions of the Greek language, and the first essay of Roman genius was in dramatic composition. Livius Andronicus, who flourished about 240 years before the Christian aera, formed the Fescennine verses into a kind of regular drama, upon the model of the Greeks. He was followed some time after by Ennius, who, besides dramatic and other compositions, (60) wrote the annals of the Roman Republic in heroic verse. His style, like that of Andronicus, was rough and unpolished, in conformity to the language of those times; but for grandeur of sentiment and energy of expression, he was admired by the greatest poets in the subsequent ages. Other writers of distinguished reputation in the dramatic department were Naevius, Pacuvius, Plautus, Afranius, Caecilius, Terence, Accius, etc. Accius and Pacuvius are mentioned by Quintilian as writers of extraordinary merit. Of twenty-five comedies written by Plautus, the number transmitted to posterity is nineteen; and of a hundred and eight which Terence is said to have translated from Menander, there now remain only six. Excepting a few inconsiderable fragments, the writings of all the other authors have perished. The early period of Roman literature was distinguished for the introduction of satire by Lucilius, an author celebrated for writing

with remarkable ease, but whose compositions, in the opinion of Horace, though Quintilian thinks otherwise, were debased with a mixture of feculency. Whatever may have been their merit, they also have perished, with the works of a number of orators, who adorned the advancing state of letters in the Roman Republic. It is observable, that during this whole period, of near two centuries and a half, there appeared not one historian of eminence sufficient to preserve his name from oblivion.

Julius Caesar himself is one of the most eminent writers of the age in which he lived. His commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars are written with a purity, precision, and perspicuity, which command approbation. They are elegant without affectation, and beautiful without ornament. Of the two books which he composed on Analogy, and those under the title of Anti-Cato, scarcely any fragment is preserved; but we may be assured of the justness of the observations on language, which were made by an author so much distinguished by the excellence of his own compositions. His poem entitled *The Journey*, which was probably an entertaining narrative, is likewise totally lost.

The most illustrious prose writer of this or any other age is M. Tullius Cicero; and as his life is copiously related in biographical works, it will be sufficient to mention his writings. From his earliest years, he applied himself with unremitting assiduity to the cultivation of literature, and, whilst he was yet a boy, wrote a poem, called *Glaucus Pontius*, which was extant in Plutarch's time. Amongst his juvenile productions was a translation into Latin verse, of Aratus on the *Phaenomena* of the Heavens; of which many fragments are still extant. He also published a poem of the heroic kind, in honour of his countryman C. Marius, who was born at Arpinum, the birth-place of

Cicero. (61) This production was greatly admired by Atticus; and old Scaevola was so much pleased with it, that in an epigram written on the subject, he declares that it would live as long as the Roman name and learning subsisted. From a little specimen which remains of it, describing a memorable omen given to Marina from an oak at Arpinum, there is reason to believe that his poetical genius was scarcely inferior to his oratorical, had it been cultivated with equal industry. He published another poem called Limon, of which Donatus has preserved four lines in the life of Terence, in praise of the elegance and purity of that poet's style. He composed in the Greek language, and in the style and manner of Isocrates, a Commentary or Memoirs of the Transactions of his Consulship. This he sent to Atticus, with a desire, if he approved it, to publish it in Athens and the cities of Greece. He sent a copy of it likewise to Posidonius of Rhodes, and requested of him to undertake the same subject in a more elegant and masterly manner. But the latter returned for answer, that, instead of being encouraged to write by the perusal of his tract, he was quite deterred from attempting it.

Upon the plan of those Memoirs, he afterwards composed a Latin poem in three books, in which he carried down the history to the end of his exile, but did not publish it for several years, from motives of delicacy. The three books were severally inscribed to the three Muses; but of this work there now remain only a few fragments, scattered in different parts of his other writings. He published, about the same time, a collection of the principal speeches which he had made in his consulship, under the title of his Consular Orations. They consisted originally of twelve; but four are entirely lost, and some of the rest are imperfect. He now published also, in Latin verse, a translation of the Prognostics of Aratus, of which work no more than

two or three small fragments now remain. A few years after, he put the last hand to his Dialogues upon the Character and Idea of the perfect Orator. This admirable work remains entire; a monument both of the astonishing industry and transcendent abilities of its author. At his Cuman villa, he next began a Treatise on Politics, or on the best State of a City, and the Duties of a Citizen. He calls it a great and a laborious work, yet worthy of his pains, if he could succeed in it. This likewise was written in the form of a dialogue, in which the speakers were Scipio, Laelius, Philus, Manilius, and other great persons in the former times of the Republic. It was comprised in six books, and survived him for several ages, though it is now unfortunately lost. From the fragments which remain, it appears to have been a masterly production, in which all the important questions in politics and morality were discussed with elegance and accuracy.

(62) Amidst all the anxiety for the interests of the Republic, which occupied the thoughts of this celebrated personage, he yet found leisure to write several philosophical tracts, which still subsist, to the gratification of the literary world. He composed a treatise on the Nature of the Gods, in three books, containing a comprehensive view of religion, faith, oaths, ceremonies, etc. In elucidating this important subject, he not only delivers the opinions of all the philosophers who had written anything concerning it, but weighs and compares attentively all the arguments with each other; forming upon the whole such a rational and perfect system of natural religion, as never before was presented to the consideration of mankind, and approaching nearly to revelation. He now likewise composed in two books, a discourse on Divination, in which he discusses at large all the arguments that may be advanced for and against the actual

existence of such a species of knowledge. Like the preceding works, it is written in the form of dialogue, and in which the chief speaker is Laelius. The same period gave birth to his treatise on Old Age, called *Cato Major*; and to that on Friendship, written also in dialogue, and in which the chief speaker is Laelius. This book, considered merely as an essay, is one of the most entertaining productions of ancient times; but, beheld as a picture drawn from life, exhibiting the real characters and sentiments of men of the first distinction for virtue and wisdom in the Roman Republic, it becomes doubly interesting to every reader of observation and taste. Cicero now also wrote his discourse on Fate, which was the subject of a conversation with Hirtius, in his villa near Puteoli; and he executed about the same time a translation of Plato's celebrated Dialogue, called *Timaeus*, on the nature and origin of the universe. He was employing himself also on a history of his own times, or rather of his own conduct; full of free and severe reflections on those who had abused their power to the oppression of the Republic. Dion Cassius says, that he delivered this book sealed up to his son, with strict orders not to read or publish it till after his death; but from this time he never saw his son, and it is probable that he left the work unfinished. Afterwards, however, some copies of it were circulated; from which his commentator, Asconius, has quoted several particulars.

During a voyage which he undertook to Sicily, he wrote his treatise on Topics, or the Art of finding Arguments on any Question. This was an abstract from Aristotle's treatise on the same subject; and though he had neither Aristotle nor any other book to assist him, he drew it up from his memory, and finished it as he sailed along the coast of Calabria. The last (63) work composed by Cicero appears to have been his *Offices*, written for the use of his son, to whom it is

addressed. This treatise contains a system of moral conduct, founded upon the noblest principles of human action, and recommended by arguments drawn from the purest sources of philosophy.

Such are the literary productions of this extraordinary man, whose comprehensive understanding enabled him to conduct with superior ability the most abstruse disquisitions into moral and metaphysical science. Born in an age posterior to Socrates and Plato, he could not anticipate the principles inculcated by those divine philosophers, but he is justly entitled to the praise, not only of having prosecuted with unerring judgment the steps which they trod before him, but of carrying his researches to greater extent into the most difficult regions of philosophy. This too he had the merit to perform, neither in the station of a private citizen, nor in the leisure of academic retirement, but in the bustle of public life, amidst the almost constant exertions of the bar, the employment of the magistrate, the duty of the senator, and the incessant cares of the statesman; through a period likewise chequered with domestic afflictions and fatal commotions in the Republic. As a philosopher, his mind appears to have been clear, capacious, penetrating, and insatiable of knowledge. As a writer, he was endowed with every talent that could captivate either the judgment or taste. His researches were continually employed on subjects of the greatest utility to mankind, and those often such as extended beyond the narrow bounds of temporal existence. The being of a God, the immortality of the soul, a future state of rewards and punishments, and the eternal distinction of good and evil; these were in general the great objects of his philosophical enquiries, and he has placed them in a more convincing point of view than they ever were before exhibited to the pagan world. The variety and force of the arguments which he advances, the splendour of his

diction, and the zeal with which he endeavours to excite the love and admiration of virtue, all conspire to place his character, as a philosophical writer, including likewise his incomparable eloquence, on the summit of human celebrity.

The form of dialogue, so much used by Cicero, he doubtless adopted in imitation of Plato, who probably took the hint of it from the colloquial method of instruction practised by Socrates. In the early stage of philosophical enquiry, this mode of composition was well adapted, if not to the discovery, at least to the confirmation of moral truth; especially as the practice was then not uncommon, for speculative men to converse together on important subjects, for mutual information. In treating of any subject respecting which the different sects of philosophers differed (64) from each other in point of sentiment, no kind of composition could be more happily suited than dialogue, as it gave alternately full scope to the arguments of the various disputants. It required, however, that the writer should exert his understanding with equal impartiality and acuteness on the different sides of the question; as otherwise he might betray a cause under the appearance of defending it. In all the dialogues of Cicero, he manages the arguments of the several disputants in a manner not only the most fair and interesting, but also such as leads to the most probable and rational conclusion.

After enumerating the various tracts composed and published by Cicero, we have now to mention his Letters, which, though not written for publication, deserve to be ranked among the most interesting remains of Roman literature. The number of such as are addressed to different correspondents is considerable, but those to Atticus alone, his confidential friend, amount to upwards of four hundred; among which are many of great length. They are all written

in the genuine spirit of the most approved epistolary composition; uniting familiarity with elevation, and ease with elegance. They display in a beautiful light the author's character in the social relations of life; as a warm friend, a zealous patron, a tender husband, an affectionate brother, an indulgent father, and a kind master. Beholding them in a more extensive view, they exhibit an ardent love of liberty and the constitution of his country: they discover a mind strongly actuated with the principles of virtue and reason; and while they abound in sentiments the most judicious and philosophical, they are occasionally blended with the charms of wit, and agreeable effusions of pleasantry. What is likewise no small addition to their merit, they contain much interesting description of private life, with a variety of information relative to public transactions and characters of that age. It appears from Cicero's correspondence, that there was at that time such a number of illustrious Romans, as never before existed in any one period of the Republic. If ever, therefore, the authority of men the most respectable for virtue, rank, and abilities, could have availed to overawe the first attempts at a violation of public liberty, it must have been at this period; for the dignity of the Roman senate was now in the zenith of its splendour.

Cicero has been accused of excessive vanity, and of arrogating to himself an invidious superiority, from his extraordinary talents but whoever peruses his letters to Atticus, must readily acknowledge, that this imputation appears to be destitute of truth. In those excellent productions, though he adduces the strongest arguments for and against any object of consideration, that the (65) most penetrating understanding can suggest, weighs them with each other, and draws from them the most rational conclusions, he yet discovers such a diffidence in his own opinion, that he resigns himself implicitly to the

judgment and direction of his friend; a modesty not very compatible with the disposition of the arrogant, who are commonly tenacious of their own opinion, particularly in what relates to any decision of the understanding.

It is difficult to say, whether Cicero appears in his letters more great or amiable: but that he was regarded by his contemporaries in both these lights, and that too in the highest degree, is sufficiently evident. We may thence infer, that the great poets in the subsequent age must have done violence to their own liberality and discernment, when, in compliment to Augustus, whose sensibility would have been wounded by the praises of Cicero, and even by the mention of his name, they have so industriously avoided the subject, as not to afford the most distant intimation that this immortal orator and philosopher had ever existed. Livy however, there is reason to think, did some justice to his memory: but it was not until the race of the Caesars had become extinct, that he received the free and unanimous applause of impartial posterity. Such was the admiration which Quintilian entertained of his writings, that he considered the circumstance or being delighted with them, as an indubitable proof of judgment and taste in literature. *Ille se profecisse sciat, cui Cicero valde placebit.*

In this period is likewise to be placed M. Terentius Varro, the celebrated Roman grammarian, and the Nestor of ancient learning. The first mention made of him is, that he was lieutenant to Pompey in his piratical wars, and obtained in that service a naval crown. In the civil wars he joined the side of the Republic, and was taken by Caesar; by whom he was likewise proscribed, but obtained a remission of the sentence. Of all the ancients, he has acquired the greatest fame for his extensive erudition; and we may add, that he

displayed the same industry in communicating, as he had done in collecting it. His works originally amounted to no less than five hundred volumes, which have all perished, except a treatise *De Lingua Latina*, and one *De Re Rustica*. Of the former of these, which is addressed to Cicero, three books at the beginning are also lost. It appears from the introduction of the fourth book, that they all related to etymology. The first contained such observations as might be made against it; the second, such as might be made in its favour; and the third, observations upon it. He next proceeds to investigate the origin of (66) Latin words. In the fourth book, he traces those which relate to place; in the fifth, those connected with the idea of time; and in the sixth, the origin of both these classes, as they appear in the writings of the poets. The seventh book is employed on declension; in which the author enters upon a minute and extensive enquiry, comprehending a variety of acute and profound observations on the formation of Latin nouns, and their respective natural declinations from the nominative case. In the eighth, he examines the nature and limits of usage and analogy in language; and in the ninth and last book on the subject, takes a general view of what is the reverse of analogy, viz. anomaly. The precision and perspicuity which Varro displays in this work merit the highest encomiums, and justify the character given him in his own time, of being the most learned of the Latin grammarians. To the loss of the first three books, are to be added several chasms in the others; but fortunately they happen in such places as not to affect the coherency of the author's doctrine, though they interrupt the illustration of it. It is observable that this great grammarian makes use of *quom* for *quum*, *heis* for *his*, and generally *queis* for *quibus*. This practice having become rather obsolete at the time in which he wrote, we must impute his

continuance of it to his opinion of its propriety, upon its established principles of grammar, and not to any prejudice of education, or an affectation of singularity. As Varro makes no mention of Caesar's treatise on Analogy, and had commenced author long before him, it is probable that Caesar's production was of a much later date; and thence we may infer, that those two writers differed from each other, at least with respect to some particulars on that subject.

This author's treatise *De Re Rustica* was undertaken at the desire of a friend, who, having purchased some lands, requested of Varro the favour of his instructions relative to farming, and the economy of a country life, in its various departments. Though Varro was at this time in his eightieth year, he writes with all the vivacity, though without the levity, of youth, and sets out with invoking, not the Muses, like Homer and Ennius, as he observes, but the twelve deities supposed to be chiefly concerned in the operations of agriculture. It appears from the account which he gives, that upwards of fifty Greek authors had treated of this subject in prose, besides Hesiod and Menecrates the Ephesian, who both wrote in verse; exclusive likewise of many Roman writers, and of Mago the Carthaginian, who wrote in the Punic language. Varro's work is divided into three books, the first of which treats of agriculture; the second, of rearing of cattle; and the third, of feeding animals for the use of the table. (67) In the last of these, we meet with a remarkable instance of the prevalence of habit and fashion over human sentiment, where the author delivers instructions relative to the best method of fattening rats.

We find from Quintilian, that Varro likewise composed satires in various kinds of verse. It is impossible to behold the numerous fragments of this venerable author without feeling the strongest

regret for the loss of that vast collection of information which he had compiled, and of judicious observations which he had made on a variety of subjects, during a life of eighty-eight years, almost entirely devoted to literature. The remark of St. Augustine is well founded, That it is astonishing how Varro, who read such a number of books, could find time to compose so many volumes; and how he who composed so many volumes, could be at leisure to peruse such a variety of books, and to gain so much literary information.

Catullus is said to have been born at Verona, of respectable parents; his father and himself being in the habit of intimacy with Julius Caesar. He was brought to Rome by Mallius, to whom several of his epigrams are addressed. The gentleness of his manners, and his application to study, we are told, recommended him to general esteem; and he had the good fortune to obtain the patronage of Cicero. When he came to be known as a poet, all these circumstances would naturally contribute to increase his reputation for ingenuity; and accordingly we find his genius applauded by several of his contemporaries. It appears that his works are not transmitted entire to posterity; but there remain sufficient specimens by which we may be enabled to appreciate his poetical talents.

Quintilian, and Diomed the grammarian, have ranked Catullus amongst the iambic writers, while others have placed him amongst the lyric. He has properly a claim to each of these stations; but his versification being chiefly iambic, the former of the arrangements seems to be the most suitable. The principal merit of Catullus's Iambics consists in a simplicity of thought and expression. The thoughts, however, are often frivolous, and, what is yet more reprehensible, the author gives way to gross obscenity: in vindication of which, he produces the following couplet, declaring that a good

poet ought to be chaste in his own person, but that his verses need not be so.

Nam castum esse decet pium poetam

Ipsum: versiculos nihil necesse est.

This sentiment has been frequently cited by those who were inclined to follow the example of Catullus; but if such a practice be in any case admissible, it is only where the poet personates (68) a profligate character; and the instances in which it is adopted by Catullus are not of that description. It had perhaps been a better apology, to have pleaded the manners of the times; for even Horace, who wrote only a few years after, has suffered his compositions to be occasionally debased by the same kind of blemish.

Much has been said of this poet's invective against Caesar, which produced no other effect than an invitation to sup at the dictator's house. It was indeed scarcely entitled to the honour of the smallest resentment. If any could be shewn, it must have been for the freedom used by the author, and not for any novelty in his lampoon. There are two poems on this subject, viz. the twenty-ninth and fifty-seventh, in each of which Caesar is joined with Mamurra, a Roman knight, who had acquired great riches in the Gallic war. For the honour of Catullus's gratitude, we should suppose that the latter is the one to which historians allude: but, as poetical compositions, they are equally unworthy of regard. The fifty seventh is nothing more than a broad repetition of the raillery, whether well or ill founded, with which Caesar was attacked on various occasions, and even in the senate, after his return from Bithynia. Caesar had been taunted with this subject for upwards of thirty years; and after so long a familiarity with reproach, his sensibility to the scandalous imputation must now have been much diminished, if not entirely extinguished. The other

poem is partly in the same strain, but extended to greater length, by a mixture of common jocular ribaldry of the Roman soldiers, expressed nearly in the same terms which Caesar's legions, though strongly attached to his person, scrupled not to sport publicly in the streets of Rome, against their general, during the celebration of his triumph. In a word, it deserves to be regarded as an effusion of Saturnalian licentiousness, rather than of poetry. With respect to the Iambics of Catullus, we may observe in general, that the sarcasm is indebted for its force, not so much to ingenuity of sentiment, as to the indelicate nature of the subject, or coarseness of expression.

The descriptive poems of Catullus are superior to the others, and discover a lively imagination. Amongst the best of his productions, is a translation of the celebrated ode of Sappho:

Ille mi par esse Deo videtur,
me, etc.

This ode is executed both with spirit and elegance; it is, however, imperfect; and the last stanza seems to be spurious. Catullus's epigrams are entitled to little praise, with regard either to sentiment or point; and on the whole, his merit, as a poet, appears to have been magnified beyond its real extent. He is said to have died about the thirtieth year of his age.

(69) Lucretius is the author of a celebrated poem, in six books, *De Rerum Natura*; a subject which had been treated many ages before by Empedocles, a philosopher and poet of Agrigentum. Lucretius was a zealous partizan of Democritus, and the sect of Epicurus, whose principles concerning the eternity of matter, the materiality of the soul, and the non-existence of a future state of rewards and punishments, he affects to maintain with a certainty equal to that of

mathematical demonstration. Strongly prepossessed with the hypothetical doctrines of his master, and ignorant of the physical system of the universe, he endeavours to deduce from the phenomena of the material world conclusions not only unsupported by legitimate theory, but repugnant to the principles of the highest authority in metaphysical disquisition. But while we condemn his speculative notions as degrading to human nature, and subversive of the most important interests of mankind, we must admit that he has prosecuted his visionary hypothesis with uncommon ingenuity. Abstracting from it the rhapsodical nature of this production, and its obscurity in some parts, it has great merit as a poem. The style is elevated, and the versification in general harmonious. By the mixture of obsolete words, it possesses an air of solemnity well adapted to abstruse researches; at the same time that by the frequent resolution of diphthongs, it instils into the Latin the sonorous and melodious powers of the Greek language.

While Lucretius was engaged in this work, he fell into a state of insanity, occasioned, as is supposed, by a philtre, or love-potion, given him by his wife Lucilia. The complaint, however, having lucid intervals, he employed them in the execution of his plan, and, soon after it was finished, laid violent hands upon himself, in the forty-third year of his age. This fatal termination of his life, which perhaps proceeded from insanity, was ascribed by his friends and admirers to his concern for the banishment of one Memmius, with whom he was intimately connected, and for the distracted state of the republic. It was, however, a catastrophe which the principles of Epicurus, equally erroneous and irreconcilable to resignation and fortitude, authorized in particular circumstances. Even Atticus, the celebrated correspondent of Cicero, a few years after this period, had recourse

to the same desperate expedient, by refusing all sustenance, while he laboured under a lingering disease.

It is said that Cicero revised the poem of Lucretius after the death of the author, and this circumstance is urged by the abettors of atheism, as a proof that the principles contained in the work had the sanction of his authority. But no inference in favour of Lucretius's doctrine can justly be drawn from this circumstance. (70) Cicero, though already sufficiently acquainted with the principles of the Epicurean sect, might not be averse to the perusal of a production, which collected and enforced them in a nervous strain of poetry; especially as the work was likely to prove interesting to his friend Atticus, and would perhaps afford subject for some letters or conversation between them. It can have been only with reference to composition that the poem was submitted to Cicero's revisal: for had he been required to exercise his judgment upon its principles, he must undoubtedly have so much mutilated the work, as to destroy the coherency of the system. He might be gratified with the shew of elaborate research, and confident declamation, which it exhibited, but he must have utterly disapproved of the conclusions which the author endeavoured to establish. According to the best information, Lucretius died in the year from the building of Rome 701, when Pompey was the third time consul. Cicero lived several years beyond this period, and in the two last years of his life, he composed those valuable works which contain sentiments diametrically repugnant to the visionary system of Epicurus. The argument, therefore, drawn from Cicero's revisal, so far from confirming the principle of Lucretius, affords the strongest tacit declaration against their validity; because a period sufficient for mature consideration had elapsed, before Cicero published his own admirable system of philosophy.

The poem of Lucretius, nevertheless, has been regarded as the bulwark of atheism — of atheism, which, while it impiously arrogates the support of reason, both reason and nature disclaim.

Many more writers flourished in this period, but their works have totally perished. Sallust was now engaged in historical productions; but as they were not yet completed, they will be noticed in the next division of the review.

CAESAR by Plutarch



Translated by Bernadotte Perrin

11 The wife of Caesar was Cornelia, the daughter of the Cinna who had once held the sole power at Rome, and when Sulla became master of affairs, he could not, either by promises or threats, induce Caesar to put her away, and therefore confiscated her dowry. 2 Now, the reason for Caesar's hatred of Sulla was Caesar's relationship to Marius. For Julia, a sister of Caesar's father, was the wife of Marius the Elder, and the mother of Marius the Younger, who was therefore Caesar's cousin. 3 Moreover, Caesar was not satisfied to be overlooked at first by Sulla, who was busy with a multitude of proscriptions, but he came before the people as candidate for the priesthood, although he was not yet much more than a stripling. 4 To this candidacy Sulla secretly opposed himself, and took measures to make Caesar fail in it, and when he was deliberating about putting him to death and some said there was no reason for killing a mere boy like him, he declared that they had no sense if they did not see in this boy many Mariuses. 5 When this speech was reported to Caesar, he hid himself for some time, wandering about in the country of the Sabines. 6 Then, as he was changing his abode by night on account of sickness, he fell in with soldiers of Sulla who were searching those regions and arresting the men in hiding there. 7 Caesar gave their leader, Cornelius, two talents to set him free, and at once went down to the sea and sailed to King Nicomedes in Bithynia. 8 With him he tarried a short time, and then, on his voyage back, was captured, near

the island Pharmacusa, by pirates, who already at that time controlled the sea with large armaments and countless small vessels.

2¹ To begin with, then, when the pirates demanded twenty talents for his ransom, he laughed at them for not knowing who their captive was, and of his own accord agreed to give them fifty. 2 In the next place, after he had sent various followers to various cities to procure the money and was left with one friend and two attendants among Cilicians, most murderous of men, he held them in such disdain that whenever he lay down to sleep he would send and order them to stop talking. 3 For eight and thirty days, as if the men were not his watchers, but his royal body-guard, he shared in their sports and exercises with great unconcern. 4 He also wrote poems and sundry speeches which he read aloud to them, and those who did not admire these he would call to their faces illiterate Barbarians, and often laughingly threatened to hang them all. The pirates were delighted at this, and attributed his boldness of speech to a certain simplicity and boyish mirth. 5 But after his ransom had come from Miletus and he had paid it and was set free, he immediately manned vessels and put to sea from the harbour of Miletus against the robbers. He caught them, too, still lying at anchor off the island, and got most of them into his power. 6 Their money he made his booty, but the men themselves he lodged in the prison at Pergamum, and then went in person to Junius, the governor of Asia, on the ground that it belonged to him, as praetor of the province, to punish the captives. 7 But since the praetor cast longing eyes on their money, which was no small sum, and kept saying that he would consider the case of the captives at his leisure, Caesar left him to his own devices, went to Pergamum, took the robbers out of prison, and crucified them all, just as he had often warned them on the island that he would do, when they thought

he was joking.

3 1 After this, Sulla's power being now on the wane, and Caesar's friends at home inviting him to return, Caesar sailed to Rhodes to study under Apollonius the son of Molon, an illustrious rhetorician with the reputation of a worthy character, of whom Cicero also was a pupil. 2 It is said, too, that Caesar had the greatest natural talent for political oratory, and cultivated his talent most ambitiously, so that he had an undisputed second rank; 3 the first rank, however, he renounced, because he devoted his efforts to being first as a statesman and commander rather, and did not achieve that effectiveness in oratory to which his natural talent directed him, in consequence of his campaigns and of his political activities, by means of which he acquired the supremacy. 4 And so it was that, at a later time, in his reply to Cicero's "Cato," he himself deprecated comparison between the diction of a soldier and the eloquence of an orator who was gifted by nature and had plenty of leisure to pursue his studies.

4 1 After his return to Rome he impeached Dolabella for maladministration of his province, and many of the cities of Greece supplied him with testimony. 2 Dolabella, it is true, was acquitted, but Caesar, in return for the zealous efforts of the Greeks in his behalf, served as their advocate when they prosecuted Publius Antonius for corruption before Marcus Lucullus, the praetor of Macedonia. 3 And he was so effective that Antonius appealed to the tribunes at Rome, alleging that he could not have a fair trial in Greece against Greeks. 4 At Rome, moreover, Caesar won a great and brilliant popularity by his eloquence as an advocate, and much good will from the common people for the friendliness of his manners in intercourse with them, since he was ingratiating beyond his years. 5 He had also a large and

gradually increasing political influence in consequence of his lavish hospitality and the general splendour of his mode of life. ⁶ At first his enemies thought this influence would quickly vanish when his expenditures ceased, and therefore suffered it to thrive among the common people; ⁷ but later on when it had become great and hard to subvert, and aimed directly at a complete revolution in the state, they perceived that no beginnings should be considered too small to be quickly made great by continuance, after contempt of them has left them unobstructed. ⁸ At all events, the man who is thought to have been the first to see beneath the surface of Caesar's public policy and to fear it, as one might fear the smiling surface of the sea, and who comprehended the powerful character hidden beneath his kindly and cheerful exterior, namely Cicero, said that in most of Caesar's political plans and projects he saw a tyrannical purpose; ⁹ "On the other hand," said he, "when I look at his hair, which is arranged with so much nicety, and see him scratching his head with one finger, I cannot think that this man would ever conceive of so great a crime as the overthrow of the Roman constitution." This, it is true, belongs to a later period.

⁵ ¹ The first proof of the people's good will towards him he received when he competed against Caius Popilius for a military tribuneship and was elected over him; ² a second and more conspicuous proof he received when, as nephew of Julia the deceased wife of Marius, he pronounced a splendid encomium upon her in the forum, and in her funeral procession ventured to display images of Marius, which were then seen for the first time since the administration of Sulla, because Marius and his friends had been pronounced public enemies. ³ When, namely, some cried out against Caesar for this procedure, the people answered them with loud

shouts, received Caesar with applause, and admired him for bringing back after so long a time, as it were from Hades, the honours of Marius into the city. ⁴ Now, in the case of elderly women, it was ancient Roman usage to pronounce funeral orations over them; but it was not customary in the case of young women, and Caesar was the first to do so when his own wife died. ⁵ This also brought him much favour, and worked upon the sympathies of the multitude, so that they were fond of him, as a man who was gentle and full of feeling.

⁶ After the funeral of his wife, he went out to Spain as quaestor under Vetus, one of the praetors, whom he never ceased to hold in high esteem, and whose son, in turn, when he himself was praetor, he made his quaestor. ⁷ After he had served in this office, he married for his third wife Pompeia, having already by Cornelia a daughter who was afterwards married to Pompey the Great. ⁸ He was unsparing in his outlays of money, and was thought to be purchasing a transient and short-lived fame at a great price, though in reality he was buying things of the highest value at a small price. We are told, accordingly, that before he entered upon any public office he was thirteen hundred talents in debt. ⁹ Again, being appointed curator of the Appian Way, he expended upon it vast sums of his own money; and again, during his aedileship, he furnished three hundred and twenty pairs of gladiators, and by lavish provision besides for theatrical performances, processions, and public banquets, he washed away all memory of the ambitious efforts of his predecessors in the office. By these means he put the people in such a humour that every man of them was seeking out new offices and new honours with which to requite him.

^{6 1} There were two parties in the city, that of Sulla, which had been all powerful since his day, and that of Marius, which at that

time was in an altogether lowly state, being cowed and scattered. This party Caesar wished to revive and attach to himself, and therefore, when the ambitious efforts of his aedileship were at their height, he had images of Marius secretly made, together with trophy-bearing Victories, and these he ordered to be carried by night and set up on the Capitol. ² At day-break those who beheld all these objects glittering with gold and fashioned with the most exquisite art (and they bore inscriptions setting forth the Cimbrian successes of Marius) were amazed at the daring of the man who had set them up (for it was evident who had done it), and the report of it quickly spreading brought everybody together for the sight. ³ But some cried out that Caesar was scheming to usurp sole power in the state when he thus revived honours which had been buried by laws and decrees, and that this proceeding was a test of the people, whose feelings towards him he had previously softened, to see whether they had been made docile by his ambitious displays and would permit him to amuse himself with such innovations. ⁴ The partisans of Marius, however, encouraged one another and showed themselves on a sudden in amazing numbers, and filled the Capitol with their applause. ⁵ Many, too, were moved to tears of joy when they beheld the features of Marius, and Caesar was highly extolled by them, and regarded as above all others worthy of his kinship with Marius. ⁶ But when the senate met to discuss these matters, Catulus Lutatius, a man of the highest repute at that time in Rome, rose up and denounced Caesar, uttering the memorable words: "No longer, indeed, by sapping and mining, Caesar, but with engines of war art thou capturing the government." ⁷ Caesar, however, defended himself against this charge and convinced the senate, whereupon his admirers were still more elated and exhorted him not to lower his pretensions

for any man, since the people would be glad to have him triumph over all opposition and be the first man in the state.

7 1 At this time, too, Metellus, the pontifex maximus, or high priest, died, and though Isauricus and Catulus were candidates for the priesthood, which was an object of great ambition, and though they were most illustrious men and of the greatest influence in the senate Caesar would not give way to them, but presented himself to the people as a rival candidate. 2 The favour of the electors appeared to be about equally divided, and therefore Catulus, who, as the worthier of Caesar's competitors, dreaded more the uncertainty of the issue, sent and tried to induce Caesar to desist from his ambitious project, offering him large sums of money. But Caesar declared that he would carry the contest through even though he had to borrow still larger sums.

3 The day for the election came, and as Caesar's mother accompanied him to the door in tears, he kissed her and said: "Mother, to day thou shalt see thy son either pontifex maximus or an exile." 4 The contest was sharp, but when the vote was taken Caesar prevailed, and thereby made the senate and nobles afraid that he would lead the people on to every extreme of recklessness. 5 Therefore Piso and Catulus blamed Cicero for having spared Caesar when, in the affair of Catiline, he gave his enemies a hold upon him. 6 Catiline, namely, had purposed not only to subvert the constitution, but to destroy the whole government and throw everything into confusion. He himself, however, was expelled from the city, having been overwhelmed by proofs of lesser iniquities before his most far reaching plans were discovered; but he left Lentulus and Cethegus behind him in the city to promote the conspiracy in his place. 7 Now, whether or not Caesar secretly gave these men any countenance and

help, is uncertain; but after they had been overwhelmingly convicted in the senate, and Cicero the consul asked each senator to give his opinion on the manner of their punishment, the rest, down to Caesar, urged that they be put to death, ⁸ but Caesar rose in his place and delivered a long and studied speech against this. He pleaded that to put to death without legal trial men of high rank and brilliant lineage was not, in his opinion, traditional or just, except under extremest necessity; ⁹ but that if they should be bound and kept in custody, in such cities of Italy as Cicero himself might elect, until the war against Catiline had been brought to a successful end, the senate could afterwards, in a time of peace and at their leisure, vote upon the case of each one of them.

^{8 1} This opinion seemed so humane, and the speech in support of it was made with such power, that not only those who rose to speak after Caesar sided with him, but many also of those who had preceded him took back the opinions which they had expressed and went over to his, until the question came round to Cato and Catulus. ² These warmly opposed Caesar's proposal, and Cato even helped to raise suspicion against Caesar by what he said. As a result, the men were handed over to the executioner, and many of the young men who at that time formed a body-guard for Cicero ran together with drawn swords and threatened Caesar as he was leaving the senate. ³ But Curio, as we are told, threw his toga round Caesar and got him away, while Cicero himself, when the young men looked to him for a sign, shook his head, either through fear of the people, or because he thought the murder would be wholly contrary to law and justice.

⁴ Now, if this is true, I do not see why Cicero did not mention it in the treatise on his consulship; however, he was afterwards blamed for not having improved that best of all opportunities for removing

Caesar. Instead, he showed a cowardly fear of the people, who were extravagantly attached to Caesar; ⁵ in fact, a few days afterward, when Caesar came into the senate and tried to defend himself in the matters wherein suspicion had been fixed upon him, and met with a tumult of disapproval, the people, seeing that the session of the senate was lasting a longer time than usual, came up with loud cries and surrounded the senate-house, demanding Caesar, and ordering the senate to let him go. ⁶ It was for this reason, too, that Cato, fearing above all things a revolutionary movement set on foot by the poorer classes, who were setting the whole multitude on fire with the hopes which they fixed upon Caesar, persuaded the senate to assign them a monthly allowance of grain, ⁷ in consequence of which an annual outlay of seven million five hundred thousand drachmas was added to the other expenditures of the state. However, the great fear which prevailed at the time was manifestly quenched by this measure, and the greatest part of Caesar's power was broken down and dissipated in the nick of time, since he was praetor elect, and would be more formidable on account of his office.

⁹ ¹ However, there were no disturbances in consequence of Caesar's praetorship, but an unpleasant incident happened in his family. ² Publius Clodius was a man of patrician birth, and conspicuous for wealth and eloquence, but in insolence and effrontery he surpassed all the notorious scoundrels of his time. ³ This man was in love with Pompeia the wife of Caesar, and she was not unwilling. But close watch was kept upon the women's apartments, and Aurelia, Caesar's mother, a woman of discretion, would never let the young wife out of her sight, and made it difficult and dangerous for the lovers to have an interview.

⁴ Now, the Romans have a goddess whom they call Bona,

corresponding to the Greek Gynaecæia. The Phrygians claim this goddess as their own, and say that she was the mother of King Midas; the Romans say she was a Dryad nymph and the wife of Faunus; the Greeks that she was the unnameable one among the mothers of Dionysus. ⁵ And this is the reason why the women cover their booths with vine-branches when they celebrate her festival, and why a sacred serpent is enthroned beside the goddess in conformity with the myth. ⁶ It is not lawful for a man to attend the sacred ceremonies, nor even to be in the house when they are celebrated; but the women, apart by themselves, are said to perform many rites during their sacred service which are Orphic in their character. ⁷ Accordingly, when the time for the festival is at hand, the consul or praetor at whose house it is to be held goes away, and every male with him, while his wife takes possession of the premises and puts them in due array. ⁸ The most important rites are celebrated by night, when mirth attends the revels, and much music, too, is heard.

¹⁰ ¹ At the time of which I speak, Pompeia was celebrating this festival, and Clodius, who was still beardless and on this account thought to pass unnoticed, assumed the dress and implements of a lute-girl and went to the house, looking like a young woman. ² He found the door open, and was brought in safely by the maid-servant there, who was in the secret; but after she had run on ahead to tell Pompeia and some time had elapsed, Clodius had not the patience to wait where he had been left, and so, as he was wandering about in the house (a large one) and trying to avoid the lights, an attendant of Aurelia came upon him and asked him to play with her, as one woman would another, and when he refused, she dragged him forward and asked who he was and whence he came. ³ Clodius answered that he was waiting for Pompeia's Abra (this was the very

name by which the maid was called), and his voice betrayed him. The attendant of Aurelia at once sprang away with a scream to the lights and the throng, crying out that she had caught a man. The women were panic-stricken, and Aurelia put a stop to the mystic rites of the goddess and covered up the emblems. Then she ordered the doors to be closed and went about the house with torches, searching for Clodius. ⁴ He was found where he had taken refuge, in the chamber of the girl who had let him into the house; and when they saw who he was, the women drove him out of doors. ⁵ Then at once, and in the night, they went off and told the matter to their husbands, and when day came a report spread through the city that Clodius had committed sacrilege and owed satisfaction, not only to those whom he had insulted, but also to the city and to the gods. ⁶ Accordingly, one of the tribunes of the people indicted Clodius for sacrilege, and the most influential senators leagued themselves together and bore witness against him that, among other shocking abominations, he had committed adultery with his sister, who was the wife of Lucullus. ⁷ But against the eager efforts of these men the people arrayed themselves in defence of Clodius, and were of great assistance to him with the jurors in the case, who were terror-stricken and afraid of the multitude. ⁸ Caesar divorced Pompeia at once, but when he was summoned to testify at the trial, he said he knew nothing about the matters with which Clodius was charged. ⁹ His statement appeared strange, and the prosecutor therefore asked, "Why, then, didst thou divorce thy wife?" "Because," said Caesar, "I thought my wife ought not even to be under suspicion."

¹⁰ Some say that Caesar made this deposition honestly; but according to others it was made to gratify the people, who were determined to rescue Clodius. ¹¹ At any rate, Clodius was acquitted

of the charge, the majority of the jurors giving their verdicts in illegible writing, in order that they might neither risk their lives with the populace by condemning him, nor get a bad name among the nobility by acquitting him.

¹¹ Immediately after his praetorship Caesar received Spain as his province, and since he found it hard to arrange matters with his creditors, who obstructed his departure and were clamorous, he had recourse to Crassus, the richest of the Romans, who had need of Caesar's vigour and fire for his political campaign against Pompey. ² And it was only after Crassus had met the demands of the most importunate and inexorable of these creditors and given surety for eight hundred and thirty talents, that Caesar could go out to his province.

³ We are told that, as he was crossing the Alps and passing by a barbarian village which had very few inhabitants and was a sorry sight, his companions asked with mirth and laughter, "Can it be that here too there are ambitious strifes for office, struggles for primacy, and mutual jealousies of powerful men?" ⁴ Whereupon Caesar said to them in all seriousness, "I would rather be first here than second at Rome." ⁵ In like manner we are told again that, in Spain, when he was at leisure and was reading from the history of Alexander, he was lost in thought for a long time, and then burst into tears. ⁶ His friends were astonished, and asked the reason for his tears. "Do you not think," said he, "it is matter for sorrow that while Alexander, at my age, was already king of so many peoples, I have as yet achieved no brilliant success?"

¹² ¹ At any rate, as soon as he reached Spain he set himself to work, and in a few days raised ten cohorts in addition to the twenty which were there before. Then he led his army against the Callaici

and Lusitani, overpowered them, and marched on as far as the outer sea, subduing their tribes which before were not obedient to Rome. ² After bringing the war to a successful close, he was equally happy in adjusting the problems of peace, by establishing concord between the cities, and particularly by healing the dissensions between debtors and creditors. ³ For he ordained that the creditor should annually take two thirds of his debtor's income, and that the owner of the property should use the rest, and so on until the debt was cancelled. ⁴ In high repute for this administration he retired from the province; he had become wealthy himself, had enriched his soldiers from their campaigns, and had been saluted by them as Imperator.

¹³¹ Now, since those who sued for the privilege of a triumph must remain outside the city, while those who were candidates for the consulship must be present in the city, Caesar was in a great dilemma, and because he had reached home at the very time for the consular elections, he sent a request to the senate that he might be permitted to offer himself for the consulship *in absentia*, through the agency of his friends. ² But since Cato began by insisting upon the law in opposition to Caesar's request, and then, when he saw that many senators had been won over by Caesar's attentions, staved the matter off by consuming the day in speaking, Caesar decided to give up the triumph and try for the consulship. ³ So as soon as he entered the city he assumed a policy which deceived everyone except Cato. This policy was to reconcile Pompey and Crassus, the most influential men in the city. ⁴ These men Caesar brought together in friendship after their quarrel, and by concentrating their united strength upon himself, succeeded, before men were aware of it, and by an act which could be called one of kindness, in changing the form of government. ⁵ For it was not, as most men supposed, the

quarrel between Caesar and Pompey that brought on the civil wars, but rather their friendship, since they worked together for the overthrow of the aristocracy in the first place, and then, when this had been accomplished, they quarrelled with one another. ⁶ And Cato, who often foretold what was to come of their alliance, got the reputation of a morose and troublesome fellow at the time, but afterwards that of a wise, though unfortunate, counsellor.

¹⁴¹ Caesar, however, encompassed and protected by the friendship of Crassus and Pompey, entered the canvass for the consulship; ² and as soon as he had been triumphantly elected, along with Calpurnius Bibulus, and had entered upon his office, he proposed laws which were becoming, not for a consul, but for a most radical tribune of the people; for to gratify the multitude he introduced sundry allotments and distributions of land. ³ In the senate the opposition of men of the better sort gave him the pretext which he had long desired, and crying with loud adjurations that he was driven forth into the popular assembly against his wishes, and was compelled to court its favour by the insolence and obstinacy of the senate, he hastened before it, ⁴ and stationing Crassus on one side of him and Pompey on the other, he asked them if they approved his laws. They declared that they did approve them, whereupon he urged them to give him their aid against those who threatened to oppose him with swords. ⁵ They promised him such aid, and Pompey actually added that he would come up against swords with sword and buckler too. ⁶ At this impulsive and mad speech, unworthy of the high esteem in which Pompey stood and unbecoming to the respect which was due to the senate, the nobility were distressed but the populace were delighted.

⁷ Moreover, Caesar tried to avail himself still more of the influence of Pompey. He had a daughter, Julia, who was betrothed to

Servilius Caepio. This daughter he betrothed to Pompey, and said he would give Pompey's daughter in marriage to Servilius, although she too was not unbetrothed, but had been promised to Faustus, the son of Sulla. ⁸ And a little while afterwards Caesar took Calpurnia to wife, a daughter of Piso, and got Piso made consul for the coming year, although here too Cato vehemently protested, and cried out that it was intolerable to have the supreme power prostituted by marriage alliances and to see men helping one another to powers and armies and provinces by means of women.

⁹ As for Caesar's colleague, Bibulus, since he availed nothing by obstructing Caesar's laws, but often ran the risk with Cato of being killed in the forum, he shut himself up at home for the remainder of his term of office. ¹⁰ Pompey, however, immediately after his marriage, filled the forum with armed men and helped the people to enact Caesar's laws and give him as his consular province Gaul on both sides of the Alps for five years, together with Illyricum and four legions. ¹¹ Cato, of course, tried to speak against these measures, but Caesar had him led off to prison, supposing that he would appeal to the popular tribunes; ¹² but when Cato walked off without a word and Caesar saw not only that the most influential men were displeased, but also that the populace, out of respect for Cato's virtue, were following him in silence and with downcast looks, he himself secretly asked one of the tribunes to take Cato out of arrest.

¹³ Of the other senators, only a very few used to go with Caesar to the senate; the rest, in displeasure, stayed away. ¹⁴ Considius, a very aged senator, once told Caesar that his colleagues did not come together because they were afraid of the armed soldiers. "Why, then," said Caesar, "dost thou too not stay at home out of the same fear?" ¹⁵ To this Considius replied: "Because my old age makes me

fearless; for the short span of life that is still left me does not require much anxious thought.”¹⁶ But the most disgraceful public measure of the time was thought to be the election to the tribuneship, during Caesar’s consulate, of the notorious Clodius, who had trespassed upon his rights as a husband, and upon the secret nocturnal vigils.¹⁷ He was elected, however, for the overthrow of Cicero; and Caesar did not go forth upon his campaign until, with the help of Clodius, he had raised a successful faction against Cicero and driven him out of Italy.

¹⁵ ¹ Such, then, is said to have been the course of Caesar’s life before his Gallic campaigns. ² But the period of the wars which he afterwards fought, and of the campaigns by which he subjugated Gaul, as if he had made another beginning and entered upon a different path of life and one of new achievements, proved him to be inferior as soldier and commander to no one soever of those who have won most admiration for leadership and shown themselves greatest therein. ³ Nay, if one compare him with such men as Fabius and Scipio and Metellus, and with the men of his own time or a little before him, like Sulla, Marius, the two Luculli, or even Pompey himself, whose fame for every sort of military excellence was at this time flowering out and reaching to the skies, ⁴ Caesar will be found to surpass them all in his achievements. One he surpassed in the difficulty of the regions where he waged his wars; another in the great extent of country which he acquired; ⁵ another in the multitude and might of the enemies over whom he was victorious; another in the savage manners and perfidious dispositions of the people whom he conciliated; another in his reasonableness and mildness towards his captives; another still in the gifts and favours which he bestowed upon his soldiers; and all in the fact that he fought the most battles

and killed the most enemies. For although it was not full ten years that he waged war in Gaul, he took by storm more than eight hundred cities, subdued three hundred nations, and fought pitched battles at different times with three million men, of whom he slew one million in hand to hand fighting and took as many more prisoners.

161 His soldiers showed such good will and zeal in his service that those who in their previous campaigns had been in no way superior to others were invincible and irresistible in confronting every danger to enhance Caesar's fame. 2 Such a man, for instance, was Acilius, who, in the sea-fight at Massalia, boarded a hostile ship and had his right hand cut off with a sword, but clung with the other hand to his shield, and dashing it into the faces of his foes, routed them all and got possession of the vessel. 3 Such a man, again, was Cassius Scaeva, who, in the battle at Dyrrhachium, had his eye struck out with an arrow, his shoulder transfixd with one javelin and his thigh with another, and received on his shield the blows of one hundred and thirty missiles. 4 In this plight, he called the enemy to him as though he would surrender. Two of them, accordingly, coming up, he lopped off the shoulder of one with his sword, smote the other in the face and put him to flight, and came off safely himself with the aid of his comrades. 5 Again, in Britain, when the enemy had fallen upon the foremost centurions, who had plunged into a watery marsh, a soldier, while Caesar in person was watching the battle, dashed into the midst of the fight, displayed many conspicuous deeds of daring, and rescued the centurions, after the Barbarians had been routed. 6 Then he himself, making his way with difficulty after all the rest, plunged into the muddy current, and at last, without his shield, partly swimming and partly wading, got across. 7 Caesar and his company were amazed and came to meet the soldier with cries of joy; but he,

in great dejection, and with a burst of tears, cast himself at Caesar's feet, begging pardon for the loss of his shield. ⁸ Again, in Africa, Scipio captured a ship of Caesar's in which Granius Petro, who had been appointed quaestor, was sailing. Of the rest of the passengers Scipio made booty, but told the quaestor that he offered him his life. ⁹ Granius, however, remarking that it was the custom with Caesar's soldiers not to receive but to offer mercy, killed himself with a blow of his sword.

¹⁷ ¹ Such spirit and ambition Caesar himself created and cultivated in his men, in the first place, because he showed, by his unsparing bestowal of rewards and honours, that he was not amassing wealth from his wars for his own luxury or for any life of ease, but that he treasured it up carefully as a common prize for deeds of valour, and had no greater share in the wealth than he offered to the deserving among his soldiers; and in the second place, by willingly undergoing every danger and refusing no toil. ² Now, at his love of danger his men were not astonished, knowing his ambition; but that he should undergo toils beyond his body's apparent powers of endurance amazed them, because he was of a spare habit, had a soft and white skin, suffered from distemper in the head, and was subject to epileptic fits, a trouble which first attacked him, we are told, in Corduba. ³ Nevertheless, he did not make his feeble health an excuse for soft living, but rather his military service a cure for his feeble health, since by wearisome journeys, simple diet, continuously sleeping in the open air, and enduring hardships, he fought off his trouble and kept his body strong against its attacks. ⁴ Most of his sleep, at least, he got in cars or litters, making his rest conduce to action, and in the day-time he would have himself conveyed to garrisons, cities, or camps, one slave who was accustomed to write

from dictation as he travelled sitting by his side, and one soldier standing behind him with a sword. ⁵ And he drove so rapidly that, on his first journey from Rome to Gaul, he reached the Rhone in seven days.

⁶ Horsemanship, moreover, had been easy for him from boyhood; for he was wont to put his hands behind his back and, holding them closely there, to ride his horse at full speed. ⁷ And in the Gallic campaigns he practised dictating letters on horseback and keeping two scribes at once busy, or, as Oppius says, even more. ⁸ We are told, moreover, that Caesar was the first to devise intercourse with his friends by letter, since he could not wait for personal interviews on urgent matters owing to the multitude of his occupations and the great size of the city. ⁹ Of his indifference in regard to his diet the following circumstance also is brought in proof. When the host who was entertaining him in Mediolanum, Valerius Leo, served up asparagus dressed with myrrh instead of olive oil, Caesar ate of it without ado, and rebuked his friends when they showed displeasure. ¹⁰ "Surely," said he, "it were enough not to eat what you don't like; but he who finds fault with ill-breeding like this is ill-bred himself." ¹¹ Once, too, upon a journey, he and his followers were driven by a storm into a poor man's hut, and when he found that it consisted of one room only, and that one barely able to accommodate a single person, he said to his friends that honours must be yielded to the strongest, but necessities to the weakest, and bade Oppius lie down there, while he himself with the rest of his company slept in the porch.

^{18 1} But to resume, the first of his Gallic wars was against the Helvetii and Tigurini, who had set fire to their twelve cities and four hundred villages and were advancing through that part of Gaul which

was subject to the Romans, as once the Cimbri and Teutones had done. To these they were thought to be not inferior in courage and of equal numbers, being three hundred thousand in all, of whom one hundred and ninety thousand were fighting men. ² The Tigurini were crushed at the river Arar, not by Caesar himself, but by Labienus, his deputy; the Helvetii, however, unexpectedly attacked Caesar himself on the march, as he was leading his forces towards a friendly city, but he succeeded in reaching a strong place of refuge. ³ Here, after he had collected and arrayed his forces, a horse was brought to him. "This horse," said he, "I will use for the pursuit after my victory; but now let us go against the enemy," and accordingly led the charge on foot. ⁴ After a long and hard struggle he routed the enemy's fighting men, but had the most trouble at their rampart of waggons, where not only did the men themselves make a stand and fight, but also their wives and children defended themselves to the death and were cut to pieces with the men. The battle was hardly over by midnight. ⁵ To the noble work of victory Caesar added a nobler still, that of settling those of the Barbarians who had escaped alive from the battle (there were more than one hundred thousand of them), and compelling them to resume the territory which they had abandoned and the cities which they had destroyed. ⁶ He did this because he feared that if the territory became vacant the Germans would cross the Rhine and occupy it.

¹⁹ ¹ His second war, directly in defence of the Gauls, was against the Germans, although previously, in Rome, he had made their king Ariovistus an ally. ² But they were intolerable neighbours of Caesar's subjects, and if an opportunity presented itself it was thought that they would not remain quietly in their present homes, but would encroach upon and occupy Gaul. ³ Seeing that his officers were

inclined to be afraid, and particularly all the young men of high rank who had come out intending to make the campaign with Caesar an opportunity for high living and money-making, he called them together and bade them be off, since they were so unmanly and effeminate, and not force themselves to face danger; ⁴ as for himself, he said he would take the tenth legion alone and march against the Barbarians; the enemy would be no better fighters than the Cimbri, and he himself was no worse a general than Marius. ⁵ Upon this the tenth legion sent a deputation to him, expressing their gratitude, while the other legions reviled their own commanders, and all the army, now full of impetuous eagerness, followed Caesar on a march of many days, and at last encamped within two hundred furlongs of the enemy.

⁶ Now, the very approach of Caesar somewhat shattered the purpose of Ariovistus. ⁷ For he did not expect that the Romans would attack the Germans, whose onset he thought they could not withstand, and he was amazed at the boldness of Caesar; besides, he saw that his own army was disturbed. ⁸ Still more, too, was the spirit of the Germans blunted by the prophecies of their holy women, who used to foretell the future by observing the eddies in the rivers and by finding signs in the whirlings and splashings of the waters, and now forbade joining battle before a new moon gave its light. ⁹ When Caesar learned this, and saw that the Germans kept quiet, he decided that it was a good plan to engage them while they were out of heart, rather than to sit still and wait for their time. ¹⁰ So, by attacking their entrenchments and the hills on which they were encamped, he irritated them and incited them to come down in anger and fight the issue out. ¹¹ They were signally routed, and Caesar pursued them a distance of four hundred furlongs, as far as the Rhine, and filled all

the intervening plain with dead bodies and spoils. ¹² Ariovistus, with a few followers, succeeded in crossing the Rhine; his dead are said to have been eighty thousand in number.

²⁰ ¹ After this achievement, Caesar left his forces among the Sequani to spend the winter, while he himself, desirous of giving attention to matters at Rome, came down to Gaul along the Po, which was a part of the province assigned to him; for the river called Rubicon separates the rest of Italy from Cisalpine Gaul. ² Here he fixed his quarters and carried on his political schemes. Many came to see him, and he gave each one what he wanted, and sent all away in actual possession of some of his favours and hoping for more. ³ And during all the rest of the time of his campaigns in Gaul, unnoticed by Pompey, he was alternately subduing the enemy with the arms of the citizens, or capturing and subduing the citizens with the money which he got from the enemy.

⁴ But when he heard that the Belgae, who were the most powerful of the Gauls and occupied the third part of all their country, had revolted, and had assembled unknown myriads of armed men, he turned back at once and marched thither with great speed. ⁵ He fell upon the enemy as they were plundering the Gauls that were in alliance with Rome, and so routed and destroyed the least scattered and most numerous of them, after a disgraceful struggle on their part, that the Romans could cross lakes and deep rivers for the multitude of dead bodies in them. ⁶ All the rebels who dwelt along the ocean submitted without a battle; against the Nervii, however, the most savage and warlike of the people in these parts, Caesar led his forces. ⁷ The Nervii, who dwelt in dense woods, and had placed their families and possessions in a recess of the forest at farthest remove from the enemy, at a time when Caesar was fortifying a camp and

did not expect the battle, fell upon him suddenly, sixty thousand strong. They routed his cavalry, and surrounded the seventh and twelfth legions and slew all their centurions, ⁸ and had not Caesar snatched a shield, made his way through the combatants in front of him, and hurled himself upon the Barbarians; and had not the tenth legion, at sight of his peril, run down from the heights and cut the ranks of the enemy to pieces, not a Roman, it is thought, would have survived. ⁹ As it was, however, owing to Caesar's daring, they fought beyond their powers, as the saying is, and even then did not rout the Nervii, but cut them down as they defended themselves; ¹⁰ for out of sixty thousand only five hundred are said to have come off alive, and only three of their senators out of four hundred.

²¹ ¹ The Roman senate, on learning of these successes, decreed sacrifices to the gods and cessation from business, with festival, for fifteen days, a greater number than for any victory before. ² For the danger was seen to have been great when so many nations at once had broken out in revolt, and because Caesar was the victor, the good will of the multitude towards him made his victory more splendid. ³ Caesar himself, after settling matters in Gaul, again spent the winter in the regions along the Po, carrying out his plans at Rome. ⁴ For not only did the candidates for office there enjoy his assistance, and win their elections by corrupting the people with money from him, and do everything which was likely to enhance his power, ⁵ but also most of the men of highest rank and greatest influence came to see him at Luca, including Pompey, Crassus, Appius the governor of Sardinia, and Nepos the proconsul of Spain, so that there were a hundred and twenty lictors in the place and more than two hundred senators.

⁶ They held a council and settled matters on the following basis. Pompey and Crassus were to be elected consuls for the ensuing year,

and Caesar was to have money voted him, besides another five years in his provincial command. ⁷ This seemed very strange to men of understanding. For those who were getting so much money from Caesar urged the senate to give him money as if he had none, nay rather, they forced it to do so, though it groaned over its own decrees. ⁸ Cato, indeed, was not there, for he had purposely been sent out of the way on a mission to Cyprus, and Favonius, who was an ardent follower of Cato, finding himself unable to accomplish anything by his opposition, bounded out of doors and clamoured to the populace. ⁹ But no one gave heed to him, for some were in awe of Pompey and Crassus, and most wanted to please Caesar, lived in hopes of his favours, and so kept quiet.

²² ¹ On returning to his forces in Gaul, Caesar found a considerable war in the country, since two great German nations had just crossed the Rhine to possess the land, one called the Usipes, the other the Tenteritae. ² Concerning the battle which was fought with them Caesar says in his "Commentaries" that the Barbarians, while treating with him under a truce, attacked on their march and there routed his five thousand cavalry with their eight hundred, since his men were taken off their guard; ³ that they then sent other envoys to him who tried to deceive him again, but he held them fast and led his army against the Barbarians, considering that good faith towards such faithless breakers of truces was folly. ⁴ But Tanusius says that when the senate voted sacrifices of rejoicing over the victory, Cato pronounced the opinion that they ought to deliver up Caesar to the Barbarians, thus purging away the violation of the truce in behalf of the city, and turning the curse therefor on the guilty man.

⁵ Of those who had crossed the Rhine into Gaul four hundred thousand were cut to pieces, and the few who succeeded in making

their way back were received by the Sugambri, a German nation. ⁶ This action Caesar made a ground of complaint against the Sugambri, and besides, he coveted the fame of being the first man to cross the Rhine with an army. He therefore began to bridge the river, although it was very broad, and at this point in its course especially swollen, rough, and impetuous, and with the trunks and branches of trees which it bore down stream kept smiting and tearing away the supports of his bridge. ⁷ But Caesar caught up these trunks and branches with bulwarks of great timbers planted across the stream, and having thus bridled and yoked the dashing current, he brought his bridge — sight beyond all credence — to completion in ten days.

²³ ¹ He now threw his forces across the river. No one ventured to oppose him, but even the Suevi, who were the foremost nation of the Germans, bestowed themselves and their belongings in deep and woody defiles. Caesar ravaged the country of the enemy with fire, gave encouragement to the constant friends of Rome, and then retired again into Gaul, having spent eighteen days in Germany.

² His expedition against the Britanni was celebrated for its daring. For he was the first to launch a fleet upon the western ocean and to sail through the Atlantic sea carrying an army to wage war. ³ The island was of incredible magnitude, and furnished much matter of dispute to multitudes of writers, some of whom averred that its name and story had been fabricated, since it never had existed and did not then exist; and in his attempt to occupy it he carried the Roman supremacy beyond the confines of the inhabited world. ⁴ After twice crossing to the island from the opposite coast of Gaul and in many battles damaging the enemy rather than enriching his own men — for there was nothing worth taking from men who lived in poverty and wretchedness — he brought the war to an end which was not to his

liking, it is true; still, he took hostages from the king, imposed tributes, and then sailed away from the island.

5 In Gaul he found letters which were about to be sent across to him. They were from his friends in Rome, and advised him of his daughter's death; she died in child-birth at Pompey's house. 6 Great was the grief of Pompey, and great the grief of Caesar, and their friends were greatly troubled too; they felt that the relationship which alone kept the distempered state in harmony and concord was now dissolved. For the babe also died presently, after surviving its mother a few days. 7 Now Julia, in spite of the tribunes, was carried by the people to the Campus Martius, where her funeral rites were held, and where she lies buried.

24 1 Caesar's forces were now so large that he was forced to distribute them in many winter-quarters, while he himself, as his custom was, turned his steps towards Italy. Then all Gaul once more broke out in revolt, and great armies went about attacking the entrenchments and trying to destroy the winter-quarters of the Romans. 2 The most numerous and powerful of the rebels, under Abriorix, utterly destroyed Titurius and Cotta, together with their army, 3 while the legion under Cicero was surrounded and besieged by sixty thousand of them, and narrowly escaped having its camp taken by storm, although all were wounded and went beyond their powers in the ardour of their defence.

4 When tidings of these things reached Caesar, who was far on his journey, he turned back quickly, got seven thousand men in all, and hurried on to extricate Cicero from the siege. 5 But the besiegers became aware of his approach, and went to meet him with the purpose of cutting his forces off at once, despising their small numbers. 6 Caesar deceived them by avoiding battle continually, and

when he had found a place suitable for one who was fighting against many with few, fortified a camp, where he kept his men altogether from fighting and forced them to increase the height of their ramparts and the defences of their gates as though they were afraid. ⁷ His strategy thus led the enemy to despise him, until at last, when their boldness led them to attack in scattered bands, he sallied out, routed them, and destroyed many of them.

²⁵ ¹ The numerous revolts of the Gauls in those parts were quieted by this success, as well as by the fact that Caesar himself, during the winter, went about in all directions and kept close watch on the disturbers of the peace. For there had come from Italy three legions to replace the men that he had lost, ² Pompey having lent two of those under his command, and one having been newly levied in Gaul about the Po. ³ But in remoter regions the germs of the greatest and most dangerous of the wars waged in those parts began to show themselves. They had for a long time been secretly sown and cultivated by the most influential men among the most warlike tribes, and derived strength from large bodies of young men assembled from all sides in arms, from great riches brought together, from strong cities, and from countries which were hard to invade. ⁴ At that season of winter, too, frozen rivers, forests buried in snow, plains converted into lakes by winter torrents, in some parts paths obliterated by deep snow, and in others the great uncertainty of a march through swamps and streams diverted from their courses, all seemed to make it wholly impossible for Caesar to oppose the plans of the rebels. ⁵ Accordingly, many tribes had revolted, but the head and front of the revolt were the Arverni and Carnuntini, and Vergentorix was chosen to have the entire authority in the war. His father the Gauls had put to death because they thought he was aiming

at a tyranny.

26 ¹ This leader, then, after dividing his forces into many parts and putting many officers in command of them, was winning over all the country round about as far as the water-shed of the Arar. He purposed, now that there was a coalition at Rome against Caesar, at once to rouse all Gaul to war. ² If he had done this a little later, when Caesar was involved in the civil war, Italy would have been a prey to terrors no less acute than those aroused by the Cimbri of old. ³ But as it was, the man endowed by nature to make the best use of all the arts of war, and particularly of its crucial moments, namely Caesar, as soon as he learned of the revolt, set out and marched by the same roads over which he had previously come, and by the vigour and speed of his passage in so severe a winter showed the Barbarians that an unconquered and invincible army was coming against them. ⁴ For where it was incredible that one of his messengers or letter-carriers could make his way in a long time, there he was seen with his whole army, at once ravaging their lands and destroying their strongholds, subduing cities, ⁵ and receiving those who came over to his side, until the nation of the Aedui also entered the war against him. These up to this time had called themselves brethren of the Romans and had been conspicuously honoured, but now, by joining the rebels, they caused great dejection in Caesar's army. ⁶ In consequence of this Caesar removed from these parts and passed across the territory of the Lingones, wishing to reach the country of the Sequani, who were friends, and stood as a bulwark between Italy and the rest of Gaul. ⁷ There the enemy fell upon him and surrounded him with many tens of thousands, so that he essayed to fight a decisive battle. In the main he got the best of the struggle, and after a long time and much slaughter overpowered the Barbarians; but it appears that at first he

met with some reverse, and the Arverni show a short-sword hanging in a temple, which they say was captured from Caesar. ⁸ When Caesar himself saw it, at a later time, he smiled, and though his friends urged him to have it taken down, he would not permit it, considering it sacred.

²⁷ ¹ However, the most of the Barbarians who escaped at that time took refuge with their king in the city of Alesia. ² And while Caesar was besieging this city, which was thought to be impregnable by reason of the great size of its walls and the number of their defenders, there fell upon him from outside the city a peril too great for words to depict. ³ For all that was mightiest among the nations of Gaul assembled and came in arms to Alesia, three hundred thousand strong; ⁴ and the number of fighting men inside the city was not less than a hundred and seventy thousand. Thus Caesar, caught between so large hostile forces and besieged there, was compelled to build two walls for his protection, one looking towards the city, and the other towards those who had come up to relieve it; he felt that if the two forces should unite his cause was wholly lost.

⁵ For many reasons, then, and naturally, Caesar's peril at Alesia was famous, since it produced more deeds of skill and daring than any of his other struggles; but one must be amazed above all that he engaged and conquered so many tens of thousands outside the city without the knowledge of those inside, nay more, without the knowledge even of the Romans who were guarding the wall that faced the city. ⁶ For these did not learn of the victory until the wailing of the men in Alesia and the lamentations of the women were heard, as they beheld in the quarters of the enemy many shields adorned with gold and silver, many corselets smeared with blood, and also drinking cups and tents of Gallic fashion carried by the Romans into

their camp. ⁷ So quickly did so great a force, like a phantom or a dream, disperse and vanish out of sight, the greater part of them having fallen in the battle. ⁸ Those who held Alesia, too, after giving themselves and Caesar no small trouble, finally surrendered. And the leader of the whole war, Vergentorix, after putting on his most beautiful armour and decorating his horse, rode out through the gate. ¹⁰ He made a circuit around Caesar, who remained seated, and then leaped down from his horse, stripped off his suit of armour, and seating himself at Caesar's feet remained motionless, until he was delivered up to be kept in custody for the triumph.

²⁸ ¹ Now, Caesar had long ago decided to put down Pompey, just as, of course, Pompey also had decided to put Caesar down. For now that Crassus, who was only waiting for the issue of their struggle to engage the victor, had perished among the Parthians, it remained for him who would be greatest to put down him who was, and for him who was greatest, if he would not be put down, to take off in time the man he feared. ² This fear had only recently come upon Pompey, who till then despised Caesar, feeling that it was no hard task to put down again the man whom he himself had raised on high. ³ But Caesar had from the outset formed this design, and like an athlete had removed himself to a great distance from his antagonists, and by exercising himself in the Gallic wars had practised his troops and increased his fame, lifting himself by his achievements to a height where he could vie with the successes of Pompey. ⁴ He laid hold of pretexts which were furnished partly by Pompey himself, and partly by the times and the evil state of government at Rome, by reason of which candidates for office set up counting-tables in public and shamelessly bribed the multitudes, while the people went down into the forum under pay, contending in behalf of their paymaster, not

with votes, but with bows and arrows, swords, and slings. ⁵ Often, too, they would defile the rostra with blood and corpses before they separated, leaving the city to anarchy like a ship drifting about without a steersman, so that men of understanding were content if matters issued in nothing worse for them than monarchy, after such madness and so great a tempest. ⁶ And there were many who actually dared to say in public that nothing but monarchy could now cure the diseases of the state, and that this remedy ought to be adopted when offered by the gentlest of physicians, hinting at Pompey. ⁷ And when even Pompey, although in words he affected to decline the honour, in fact did more than any one else to effect his appointment as dictator, Cato saw through his design and persuaded the senate to appoint him sole consul, solacing him with a more legal monarchy that he might not force his way to the dictatorship. ⁸ They also voted him additional time in which to hold his provinces; and he had two, Spain, and all Africa, which he managed by sending legates thither and maintaining armies there, for which he received from the public treasury a thousand talents annually.

²⁹ ¹ Consequently, Caesar canvassed by proxy for a consulship, and likewise for an extension of time in which to hold his own provinces. At first, then, Pompey held his peace, while Marcellus and Lentulus opposed these plans; they hated Caesar on other grounds, and went beyond all bounds in their efforts to bring dishonour and abuse upon him. ² For instance, the inhabitants of Novum Comum, a colony recently established by Caesar in Gaul, were deprived of citizenship by them; and Marcellus, while he was consul, beat with rods a senator of Novum Comum who had come to Rome, telling him besides that he put these marks upon him to prove that he was not a Roman, and bade him go back and show them to Caesar. ³ But

after the consulship of Marcellus, Caesar having now sent his Gallic wealth for all those in public life to draw from in copious streams, and having freed Curio the tribune from many debts, and having given Paulus the consul fifteen hundred talents, out of which he adorned the forum with the Basilica, a famous monument, erected in place of the Fulvia, — 4 under these circumstances Pompey took fright at the coalition, and openly now, by his own efforts and those of his friends, tried to have a successor appointed to Caesar in his government, and sent a demand to him for the return of the soldiers whom he had lent him for his Gallic contests. Caesar sent the soldiers back, after making a present to each man of two hundred and fifty drachmas. 5 But the officers who brought these men to Pompey spread abroad among the multitude stories regarding Caesar which were neither reasonable nor true, and ruined Pompey himself with vain hopes. They told him that Caesar's army yearned for him, and that while he was with difficulty controlling affairs in the city owing to the disease of envy which festered in the body politic, the forces in Gaul were ready to serve him, and had but to cross into Italy when they would at once be on his side; so obnoxious to them had Caesar become by reason of the multitude of his campaigns, and so suspicious of him were they made by their fear of a monarchy. 6 All this fed Pompey's vanity, and he neglected to provide himself with soldiers, as though he had no fears; while with speeches and resolutions of the senate he was carrying the day against Caesar, as he supposed, although he was merely getting measures rejected about which Caesar cared naught. Nay, we are told that one of the centurions sent to Rome by Caesar, as he stood in front of the senate house and learned that the senate would not give Caesar an extension of his term of command, slapped the handle of his sword and said:

“But this will give it.”

³⁰ ¹ However, the demands which came from Caesar certainly had a striking resemblance of fairness. He demanded, namely, that if he himself laid down his arms, Pompey should do the same, and that both, thus become private men, should find what favour they could with their fellow citizens; arguing that if they took away his forces from him, but confirmed Pompey in the possession of his, they would be accusing one of seeking a tyranny and making the other a tyrant. ² When Curio laid these proposals before the people in behalf of Caesar, he was loudly applauded, and some actually cast garlands of flowers upon him as if he were a victorious athlete. ³ Antony, too, who was a tribune, brought before the people a letter of Caesar's on these matters which he had received, and read it aloud, in defiance of the consuls. ⁴ But in the senate, Scipio, the father-in law of Pompey, introduced a motion that if by a fixed day Caesar did not lay down his arms he should be declared a public enemy. ⁵ And when the consuls put the question whether Pompey should dismiss his soldiers, and again whether Caesar should, very few senators voted for the first, and all but a few for the second; but when Antony again demanded that both should give up their commands, all with one accord assented. ⁶ Scipio, however, made violent opposition, and Lentulus the consul cried out that against a robber there was need of arms, not votes; whereupon the senate broke up, and the senators put on the garb of mourning in view of the dissension.

³¹ ¹ But presently letters came from Caesar in which he appeared to take a more moderate position, for he agreed to surrender everything else, but demanded that Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum together with two legions should be given him until he stood for his second consulship. Cicero the orator, too, who had just returned from

Cilicia and was busy with a reconciliation, tried to mollify Pompey, who yielded everything else, but insisted on taking away Caesar's soldiers. ² Cicero also tried to persuade the friends of Caesar to compromise and come to a settlement on the basis of the provinces mentioned and only six thousand soldiers, and Pompey was ready to yield and grant so many. Lentulus the consul, however, would not let him, but actually heaped insults upon Antony and Curio and drove them disgracefully from the senate, ³ thus himself contriving for Caesar the most specious of his pretexts, and the one by means of which he most of all incited his soldiers, showing them men of repute and high office who had fled the city on hired carts and in the garb of slaves. For thus they had arrayed themselves in their fear and stolen out of Rome.

³² ¹ Now, Caesar had with him not more than three hundred horsemen and five thousand legionaries; for the rest of his army had been left beyond the Alps, and was to be brought up by those whom he had sent for the purpose. ² He saw, however, that the beginning of his enterprise and its initial step did not require a large force at present, but must take advantage of the golden moment by showing amazing boldness and speed, since he could strike terror into his enemies by an unexpected blow more easily than he could overwhelm them by an attack in full force. ³ He therefore ordered his centurions and other officers, taking their swords only, and without the rest of their arms, to occupy Ariminum, a large city of Gaul, avoiding commotion and bloodshed as far as possible; and he entrusted this force to Hortensius.

⁴ He himself spent the day in public, attending and watching the exercises of gladiators; but a little before evening he bathed and dressed and went into the banqueting hall. Here he held brief

converse with those who had been invited to supper, and just as it was getting dark and went away, after addressing courteously most of his guests and bidding them await his return. To a few of his friends, however, he had previously given directions to follow him, not all by the same route, but some by one way and some by another. ⁵ He himself mounted one of his hired carts and drove at first along another road, then turned towards Ariminum. When he came to the river which separates Cisalpine Gaul from the rest of Italy (it is called the Rubicon), and began to reflect, now that he drew nearer to the fearful step and was agitated by the magnitude of his ventures, he checked his speed. ⁶ Then, halting in his course, he communed with himself a long time in silence as his resolution wavered back and forth, and his purpose then suffered change after change. ⁷ For a long time, too, he discussed his perplexities with his friends who were present, among whom was Asinius Pollio, estimating the great evils for all mankind which would follow their passage of the river, and the wide fame of it which they would leave to posterity. ⁸ But finally, with a sort of passion, as if abandoning calculation and casting himself upon the future, and uttering the phrase with which men usually prelude their plunge into desperate and daring fortunes, "Let the die be cast," he hastened to cross the river; and going at full speed now for the rest of the time, before daybreak he dashed into Ariminum and took possession of it. ⁹ It is said, moreover, that on the night before he crossed the river he had an unnatural dream; he thought, namely, that he was having incestuous intercourse with his own mother.

³³ ¹ After the seizure of Ariminum, as if the war had opened with broad gates to cover the whole earth and sea alike, and the laws of the state were confounded along with the boundaries of the province,

one would not have thought that men and women, as at other times, were hurrying through Italy in consternation, but that the very cities had risen up in flight and were rushing one through another; ² while Rome herself, deluged as it were by the inhabitants of the surrounding towns who were fleeing from their homes, neither readily obeying a magistrate nor listening to the voice of reason, in the surges of a mighty sea narrowly escaped being overturned by her own internal agitations. ³ For conflicting emotions and violent disturbances prevailed everywhere. Those who rejoiced did not keep quiet, but in many places, as was natural in a great city, encountered those who were in fear and distress, and being filled with confidence as to the future came into strife with them; ⁴ while Pompey himself, who was terror-stricken, was assailed on every side, being taken to task by some for having strengthened Caesar against himself and the supreme power of the state, and denounced by others for having permitted Lentulus to insult Caesar when he was ready to yield and was offering reasonable terms of settlement. ⁵ Favonius bade him stamp on the ground; for once, in a boastful speech to the senate, he told them to take no trouble or anxious thought about preparations for the war, since when it came he had but to stamp upon the earth to fill Italy with armies.

⁶ However, even then Pompey's forces were more numerous than Caesar's; but no one would suffer him to exercise his own judgment; and so, under the influence of many false and terrifying reports, believing that the war was already close at hand and prevailed everywhere, he gave way, was swept along with the universal tide, issued an edict declaring a state of anarchy, and forsook the city, commanding the senate to follow, and forbidding any one to remain who preferred country and freedom to tyranny.

34 1 Accordingly, the consuls fled, without even making the sacrifices usual before departure; most of the senators also fled, after seizing, in a sort of robbery, whatever came to hand of their own possessions, as though it were the property of others. 2 Some, too, who before this had vehemently espoused the cause of Caesar, were now frightened out of their wits, and were carried along, when there was no need of it, by the sweep of the great tide. 3 But most pitiful was the sight of the city, now that so great a tempest was bearing down upon her, carried along like a ship abandoned of her helmsmen to dash against whatever lay in her path. 4 Still, although their removal was so pitiful a thing, for the sake of Pompey men considered exile to be their country, and abandoned Rome with the feeling that it was Caesar's camp. 5 For even Labienus, one of Caesar's greatest friends, who had been his legate and had fought most zealously with him in all his Gallic wars, now ran away from him and came to Pompey.

But Caesar sent to Labienus his money and his baggage; 6 against Domitius, however, who was holding Corfinium with thirty cohorts under his command, he marched, and pitched his camp near by. Domitius, despairing of his enterprise, asked his physician, who was a slave, for a poison; and taking what was given him, drank it, intending to die. 7 But after a little, hearing that Caesar showed most wonderful clemency towards his prisoners, he bewailed his fate, and blamed the rashness of his purpose. 8 Then his physician bade him be of good cheer, since what he had drunk was a sleeping-potion and not deadly; whereupon Domitius rose up overjoyed and went to Caesar, the pledge of whose right hand he received, only to desert him and go back to Pompey. 9 When tidings of these things came to Rome, men were made more cheerful, and some of the fugitives

turned back.

35 ¹ Caesar took over the troops of Domitius, as well as all the other levies of Pompey which he surprised in the various cities. Then, since his forces were already numerous and formidable, he marched against Pompey himself. ² Pompey, however, did not await his approach, but fled to Brundisium, sent the consuls before him with an army to Dyrrhachium, and shortly afterwards, as Caesar drew near, sailed off himself, as shall be set forth circumstantially in his Life. ³ Caesar wished to pursue him at once, but was destitute of ships; so he turned back to Rome, having in sixty days and without bloodshed become master of all Italy.

⁴ He found the city more tranquil than he was expecting, and many senators in it. With these, therefore, he conferred in a gentle and affable manner, inviting them even to send a deputation to Pompey proposing suitable terms of agreement. ⁵ But no one would listen to him, either because they feared Pompey, whom they had abandoned, or because they thought that Caesar did not mean what he said, but was indulging in specious talk. ⁶ When the tribune Metellus tried to prevent Caesar's taking money from the reserve funds of the state, and cited certain laws, Caesar said that arms and laws had not the same season. ⁷ "But if thou art displeased at what is going on, for the present get out of the way, since war has no use for free speech; when, however, I have come to terms and laid down my arms, then thou shalt come before the people with thy harangues. ⁸ And in saying this I waive my own just rights; for thou art mine, thou and all of the faction hostile to me whom I have caught." ⁹ After this speech to Metellus, Caesar walked towards the door of the treasury, and when the keys were not to be found, he sent for smiths and ordered them to break in the door. ¹⁰ Metellus once more opposed

him, and was commended by some for so doing; but Caesar, raising his voice, threatened to kill him if he did not cease his troublesome interference. "And thou surely knowest, young man," said he, "that it is more unpleasant for me to say this than to do it." ¹¹ Then Metellus, in consequence of this speech, went off in a fright, and henceforth everything was speedily and easily furnished to Caesar for the war.

³⁶ ¹ So he made an expedition into Spain, having resolved first to drive out from there Afranius and Varro, Pompey's legates, and bring their forces there and the provinces into his power, and then to march against Pompey, leaving not an enemy in his rear. ² And though his life was often in peril from ambuscades, and his army most of all from hunger, he did not cease from pursuing, challenging, and besieging the men until he had made himself by main force master of their camps and their forces. The leaders, however, made their escape to Pompey.

³⁷ ¹ When Caesar came back to Rome, Piso, his father-in law, urged him to send a deputation to Pompey with proposals for a settlement; but Isauricus, to please Caesar, opposed the project. ² So, having been made dictator by the senate, he brought home exiles, restored to civic rights the children of those who had suffered in the time of Sulla, relieved the burdens of the debtor-class by a certain adjustment of interest, took in hand a few other public measures of like character, and within eleven days abdicated the sole power, had himself declared consul with Servilius Isauricus, and entered upon his campaign.

³ The rest of his forces he passed by in a forced march, and with six hundred picked horsemen and five legions, at the time of the winter solstice, in the early part of January (this month answers nearly to the Athenian Poseideon), put to sea, ⁴ and after crossing the

Ionian gulf took Oricum and Apollonia, and sent his transports back again to Brundisium for the soldiers who had been belated on their march. ⁵ These, as long as they were on the road, since they were now past their physical prime and worn out with their multitudinous wars, murmured against Caesar. ⁶ “Whither, pray, and to what end will this man bring us, hurrying us about and treating us like tireless and lifeless things? Even a sword gets tired out with smiting, and shield and breastplate are spared a little after so long a time of service. ⁷ Will not even our wounds, then, convince Caesar that he commands mortal men, and that we are mortal in the endurance of pain and suffering? Surely the wintry season and the occasion of a storm at sea not even a god can constrain; yet this man takes risks as though he were not pursuing, but flying from, enemies.” ⁸ With such words as these they marched in a leisurely way to Brundisium. But when they got there and found that Caesar had put to sea, they quickly changed their tone and reviled themselves as traitors to the Imperator; they reviled their officers, too, for not having quickened their march. ³ Then, sitting on the cliffs, they looked off towards the open sea and Epirus, watching for the ships which were to carry them across to their commander.

³⁸ ¹ At Apollonia, since the force which he had with him was not a match for the enemy and the delay of his troops on the other side caused him perplexity and distress, Caesar conceived the dangerous plan of embarking in a twelve-oared boat, without any one’s knowledge, and going over to Brundisium, though the sea was encompassed by such large armaments of the enemy. ² At night, accordingly, after disguising himself in the dress of a slave, he went on board, threw himself down as one of no account, and kept quiet. ³ While the river Aoüs was carrying the boat down towards the sea, the

early morning breeze, which at that time usually made the mouth of the river calm by driving back the waves, was quelled by a strong wind which blew from the sea during the night; ⁴ the river therefore chafed against the inflow of the sea and the opposition of its billows, and was rough, being beaten back with a great din and violent eddies, so that it was impossible for the master of the boat to force his way along. He therefore ordered the sailors to come about in order to retrace his course. ⁵ But Caesar, perceiving this, disclosed himself, took the master of the boat by the hand, who was terrified at sight of him, and said: "Come, good man, be bold and fear naught; thou carriest Caesar and Caesar's fortune in thy boat." ⁶ The sailors forgot the storm, and laying to their oars, tried with all alacrity to force their way down the river. But since it was impossible, after taking much water and running great hazard at the mouth of the river, Caesar very reluctantly suffered the captain to put about. ⁷ When he came back, his soldiers met him in throngs, finding much fault and sore displeased with him because he did not believe that even with them alone he was able to conquer, but was troubled, and risked his life for the sake of the absent as though distrusting those who were present.

³⁹ ¹ After this, Antony put in from Brundisium with his forces, and Caesar was emboldened to challenge Pompey to battle. Pompey was well posted and drew ample supplies both from land and sea; while Caesar had no great abundance at first, and afterwards was actually hard pressed for want of provisions. ² But his soldiers dug up a certain root, mixed it with milk, and ate it. Once, too, they made loaves of it, and running up to the enemy's outposts, threw the loaves inside or tossed them to one another, adding by way of comment that as long as the earth produced such roots, they would not stop besieging Pompey. ³ Pompey, however, would not allow either the

loaves or these words to reach the main body of his army. For his soldiers were dejected, fearing the ferocity and hardness of their enemies, who were like wild beasts in their eyes.

4 There were constant skirmishings about the fortifications of Pompey, and in all of them Caesar got the better except one, where there was a great rout of his men and he was in design of losing his camp. 5 For when Pompey attacked not one of Caesar's men stood his ground, but the moats were filled with the slain, and others were falling at their own ramparts and walls, whither they had been driven in headlong flight. 6 And though Caesar met the fugitives and tried to turn them back, he availed nothing, nay, when he tried to lay hold of the standards the bearers threw them away, so that the enemy captured thirty-two of them. Caesar himself, too, narrowly escaped being killed. 7 For as a tall and sturdy man was running away past him, he laid his hand upon him and bade him stay and face about upon the enemy; and the fellow, full of panic at the threatening danger, raised his sword to smite Caesar, but before he could do so Caesar's shield-bearer lopped off his arm at the shoulder. 8 So completely had Caesar given up his cause for lost that, when Pompey, either from excessive caution or by some chance, did not follow up his great success, but withdrew after he had shut up the fugitives within their entrenchments, Caesar said to his friends as he left them: "To day victory had been with the enemy, if they had had a victor in command." 9 Then going by himself to his tent and lying down, he spent that most distressful of all nights in vain reflections, convinced that he had shown bad generalship. For while a fertile country lay waiting for him, and the prosperous cities of Macedonia and Thessaly, he had neglected to carry the war thither, and had posted himself here by the sea, which his enemies controlled with

their fleets, being thus held in siege by lack of provisions rather than besieging with his arms. ¹⁰ Thus his despondent thoughts of the difficulty and perplexity of his situation kept him tossing upon his couch, and in the morning he broke camp, resolved to lead his army into Macedonia against Scipio; ¹¹ for he would either draw Pompey after him to a place where he would give battle without drawing his supplies as he now did from the sea, or Scipio would be left alone and he would overwhelm him.

⁴⁰ ¹ This emboldened the soldiers of Pompey and the leaders by whom he was surrounded to keep close to Caesar, whom they thought defeated and in flight. ² For Pompey himself was cautious about hazarding a battle for so great a stake, and since he was most excellently provided with everything necessary for a long war, he thought it best to wear out and quench the vigour of the enemy, which must be short-lived. ³ For the best fighting men in Caesar's army had experience, it is true, and a daring which was irresistible in combat; but what with their long marches and frequent encampments and siege-warfare and night-watches, they were beginning to give out by reason of age, and were too unwieldy for labour, having lost their ardour from weakness. ⁴ At that time, too, a kind of pestilential disease, occasioned by the strangeness of their diet, was said to be prevalent in Caesar's army. And what was most important of all, since Caesar was neither strong in funds or well supplied with provisions, it was thought that within a short time his army would break up of itself.

⁴¹ ¹ For these reasons Pompey did not wish to fight, but Cato was the only one to commend his course, and this from a desire to spare the lives of his fellow citizens; for when he saw even those of the enemy who had fallen in battle, to the number of a thousand, he burst

into tears, muffled up his head, and went away. ² All the rest, however, reviled Pompey for trying to avoid a battle, and sought to goad him on by calling him Agamemnon and King of Kings, implying that he did not wish to lay aside his sole authority, but plumed himself on having so many commanders dependent on him and coming constantly to his tent. ³ And Favonius, affecting Cato's boldness of speech, complained like a mad man because that year also they would be unable to enjoy the figs of Tusculum because of Pompey's love of command. ⁴ Afranius, too, who had lately come from Spain, where he had shown bad generalship, when accused of betraying his army for a bribe, asked why they did not fight with the merchant who had bought the provinces for him. ⁵ Driven on by all these importunities, Pompey reluctantly sought a battle and pursued Caesar.

⁶ Caesar accomplished most of his march with difficulty, since no one would sell him provisions, and everybody despised him on account of his recent defeat; ⁷ but after he had taken Gomphi, a city of Thessaly, he not only provided food for his soldiers, but also relieved them of their disease unexpectedly. ⁸ For they fell in with plenty of wine, and after drinking freely of it, and then revelling and rioting on their march, by means of their drunkenness they drove away and got rid of their trouble, since they brought their bodies into a different habit.

⁴² ¹ But when both armies entered the plain of Pharsalus and encamped there, Pompey's mind reverted again to its former reasoning, and besides, there befell him unlucky appearances and a vision in his sleep. He dreamed, namely, that he saw himself in his theatre applauded by the Romans, . . . ² Those about him, however, were so confident, and so hopefully anticipated the victory, that

Domitius and Spinther and Scipio disputed earnestly with one another over Caesar's office of Pontifex Maximus, and many sent agents to Rome to hire and take possession of houses suitable for praetors and consuls, assuming that they would immediately hold these offices after the war. ³ And most of all were his cavalry impatient for the battle, since they had a splendid array of shining armour, well-fed horses, and handsome persons, and were in high spirits too on account of their numbers, which were seven thousand to Caesar's one thousand. ⁴ The numbers of the infantry also were unequal, since forty-five thousand were arrayed against twenty-two thousand.

⁴³ ¹ Caesar called his soldiers together, and after telling them that Corfinius was near with two legions for him, and that fifteen cohorts besides under Calenus were stationed at Athens and Megara, asked them whether they wished to wait for these troops, or to hazard the issue by themselves. ² Then the soldiers besought him with loud cries not to wait for the troops, but rather to contrive and manoeuvre to come to close quarters with the enemy as soon as possible. ³ As he was holding a lustration and review of his forces and had sacrificed the first victim, the seer at once told him that within three days there would be a decisive battle with the enemy. ⁴ And when Caesar asked him whether he also saw in the victims any favourable signs of the issue, "Thou thyself," said the seer, "canst better answer this question for thyself. For the gods indicate a great change and revolution of the present status to the opposite. Therefore, if thou thinkest thyself well off as matters stand, expect the worse fortune; if badly off, the better." ⁵ Moreover, one night before the battle, as Caesar was making the round of his sentries about midnight, a fiery torch was seen in the heavens, which seemed to be carried over his camp,

blazing out brightly, and then to fall into Pompey's. ⁶ And during the morning watch it was noticed that there was actually a panic confusion among the enemy. ⁷ However, Caesar did not expect to fight on that day, but began to break camp for a march to Scotussa.

⁴⁴ ¹ But just as the tents had been struck, his scouts rode up to him with tidings that the enemy were coming down into the plain for battle. At this he was overjoyed, and after prayers and vows to the gods, drew up his legionaries in three divisions. ² Over the centre he put Domitius Calvinus, while of the wings Antony had one and he himself the right, where he intended to fight with the tenth legion. ³ But seeing that the enemy's cavalry were arraying themselves over against this point, and fearing their brilliant appearance and their numbers, he ordered six cohorts from the furthestmost lines to come round to him unobserved, and stationed them behind his right wing, teaching them what they were to do when the enemy's horsemen attacked. ⁴ Pompey had one of his wings himself, and Domitius the left, while Scipio, Pompey's father-in law, commanded the centre. ⁵ But his horsemen all crowded to the left wing, intending to encircle the enemy's right and make a complete rout about the commander himself; ⁶ for they thought that no legionary array, however deep, could resist them, but that when so many horsemen made an onset together the enemy would be utterly broken and crushed.

⁷ When both sides were about to sound the charge, Pompey ordered his legionaries to stand with arms at the ready and await in close array the onset of the enemy until they were within javelin cast. ⁸ But Caesar says that here too Pompey made a mistake, not knowing that the initial clash with all the impetus of running adds force to the bows and fires the courage, which everything then conspires to fan. ⁹ As Caesar himself was about to move his lines of legionaries, and

was already going forward into action, he saw first one of his centurions, a man experienced in war and faithful to him, encouraging his men and challenging them to vie with him in prowess. ¹⁰ Him Caesar addressed by name and said: "Caius Crassinius, what are our hopes, and how does our confidence stand?" Then Crassinius, stretching forth his right hand, said with a loud voice: "We shall win a glorious victory, O Caesar, and thou shalt praise me to day, whether I am alive or dead." ¹¹ So saying, he plunged foremost into the enemy at full speed, carrying along with him the one hundred and twenty soldiers under his command. ¹² But after cutting his way through the first rank, and while he was forging onwards with great slaughter, he was beaten back by the thrust of a sword through his mouth, and the point of the sword actually came out at the back of his neck.

⁴⁵ ¹ When the infantry had thus clashed together in the centre and were fighting, Pompey's cavalry rode proudly up from the wing and deployed their squadrons to envelope the enemy's right; ² and before they could attack, the cohorts ran out from where Caesar was posted, not hurling their javelins, as usual, nor yet stabbing the thighs and legs of their enemies with them, but aiming them at their eyes and wounding their faces. ³ They had been instructed to do this by Caesar, who expected that men little conversant with wars or wounds, but young, and pluming themselves on their youthful beauty, would dread such wounds especially, and would not stand their ground, fearing not only their present danger, but also their future disfigurement. ⁴ And this was what actually came to pass; for they could not endure the upward thrust of the javelins, nor did they even venture to look the weapon in the face, but turned their heads away and covered them up to spare their faces. ⁵ And finally, having

thus thrown themselves into confusion, they turned and fled most shamefully, thereby ruining everything. ⁶ For the conquerors of the horsemen at once encircled the infantry, fell upon their rear, and began to cut them to pieces.

⁷ When Pompey, on the other wing, saw his horsemen scattered in flight, he was no longer the same man, nor remembered that he was Pompey the Great, but more like one whom Heaven has robbed of his wits than anything else, he went off without a word to his tent, sat down there, and awaited what was to come, until his forces were all routed and the enemy were assailing his ramparts and fighting with their defenders. ⁸ Then he came to his senses, as it were, and with this one ejaculation, as they say, “What, even to my quarters?” took off his fighting and general’s dress, put on one suitable for a fugitive, and stole away. ⁹ What his subsequent fortunes were, and how he delivered himself into the hands of the Egyptians and was murdered, I shall tell in his Life.

⁴⁶ ¹ But Caesar, when he reached Pompey’s ramparts and saw those of the enemy who were already lying dead there and those who were still falling, said with a groan: “They would have it so; they brought me to such a pass that if I, Caius Caesar, after waging successfully the greatest wars, had dismissed my forces, I should have been condemned in their courts.” ² Asinius Pollio says that these words, which Caesar afterwards wrote down in Greek, were uttered by him in Latin at the time; ³ he also says that most of the slain were servants who were killed at the taking of the camp, and that not more than six thousand soldiers fell. ⁴ Most of those who were taken alive Caesar incorporated in his legions, and to many men of prominence he granted immunity. One of these was Brutus, who afterwards slew him. Caesar was distressed, we are told, when Brutus

was not to be found, but when he was brought into his presence safe and sound, was pleased beyond measure.

⁴⁷ 1 There were many portents of the victory, but the most remarkable one on record is that which was seen at Tralles. 2 In that city's temple of Victory there stood a statue of Caesar, and the ground around it was naturally firm, and was paved with hard stone; yet from this it is said that a palm-tree shot up at the base of the statue. 3 Moreover, at Patavium, Caius Cornelius, a man in repute as a seer, a fellow citizen and acquaintance of Livy the historian, chanced that day to be sitting in the place of augury. 4 And to begin with, according to Livy, he discerned the time of the battle, and said to those present that even then the event was in progress and the men were going into action. 5 And when he looked again and observed the signs, he sprang up in a rapture crying: "Thou art victorious, O Caesar!" 6 The bystanders being amazed, he took the chaplet from his head and declared with an oath that he would not put it on again until the event had borne witness to his art. At any rate, Livy insists that this was so.

⁴⁸ 1 Caesar gave the Thessalians their freedom, to commemorate his victory, and then pursued Pompey; when he reached Asia he made the Cnidians also free, to please Theopompus the collector of fables, and for all the inhabitants of Asia remitted a third of their taxes. 2 Arriving at Alexandria just after Pompey's death, he turned away in horror from Theodotus as he presented the head of Pompey, but he accepted Pompey's seal-ring, and shed tears over it. 3 Moreover, all the companions and intimates of Pompey who had been captured by the king as they wandered over the country, he treated with kindness and attached them to himself. 4 And to his friends in Rome he wrote that this was the greatest and sweetest

pleasure that he derived from his victory, namely, from time to time to save the lives of fellow citizens who had fought against him.

5 As for the war in Egypt, some say that it was not necessary, but due to Caesar's passion for Cleopatra, and that it was inglorious and full of peril for him. But others blame the king's party for it, and especially the eunuch Potheinus, who had most influence at court, and had recently killed Pompey; he had also driven Cleopatra from the country, and was now secretly plotting against Caesar. 6 On this account they say that from this time on Caesar passed whole nights at drinking parties in order to protect himself. But in his open acts also Potheinus was unbearable, since he said and did many things that were invidious and insulting to Caesar. 7 For instance, when the soldiers had the oldest and worst grain measured out to them, he bade them put up with it and be content, since they were eating what belonged to others; and at the state suppers he used wooden and earthen dishes, on the ground that Caesar had taken all the gold and silver ware in payment of a debt. 8 For the father of the present king owed Caesar seventeen million five hundred thousand drachmas, of which Caesar had formerly remitted a part to his children, but now demanded payment of ten millions for the support of his army. 9 When, however, Potheinus bade him go away now and attend to his great affairs, assuring him that later he would get his money with thanks, Caesar replied that he had no need whatever of Egyptians as advisers, and secretly sent for Cleopatra from the country.

49 1 So Cleopatra, taking only Apollodorus the Sicilian from among her friends, embarked in a little skiff and landed at the palace when it was already getting dark; 2 and as it was impossible to escape notice otherwise, she stretched herself at full length inside a bed-sack, while Apollodorus tied the bed-sack up with a cord and carried

it indoors to Caesar. ³ It was by this device of Cleopatra's, it is said, that Caesar was first captivated, for she showed herself to be a bold coquette, and succumbing to the charm of further intercourse with her, he reconciled her to her brother on the basis of a joint share with him in the royal power. ⁴ Then, as everybody was feasting to celebrate the reconciliation, a slave of Caesar's, his barber, who left nothing unscrutinized, owing to a timidity in which he had no equal, but kept his ears open and was here, there, and everywhere, perceived that Achillas the general and Potheinus the eunuch were hatching a plot against Caesar. ⁵ After Caesar had found them out, he set a guard about the banqueting-hall, and put Potheinus to death; Achillas, however, escaped to his camp, and raised about Caesar a war grievous and difficult for one who was defending himself with so few followers against so large a city and army. ⁶ In this war, to begin with, Caesar encountered the peril of being shut off from water, since the canals were dammed up by the enemy; in the second place, when the enemy tried to cut off his fleet, he was forced to repel the danger by using fire, and this spread from the dockyards and destroyed the great library; ⁷ and thirdly, when a battle arose at Pharos, he sprang from the mole into a small boat and tried to go to the aid of his men in their struggle, but the Egyptians sailed up against him from every side, so that he threw himself into the sea and with great difficulty escaped by swimming. ⁸ At this time, too, it is said that he was holding many papers in his hand and would not let them go, though missiles were flying at him and he was immersed in the sea, but held them above water with one hand and swam with the other; his little boat had been sunk at the outset. ⁹ But finally, after the king had gone away to the enemy, he marched against him and conquered him in a battle where many fell and the king himself disappeared. ¹⁰ Then,

leaving Cleopatra on the throne of Egypt (a little later she had a son by him whom the Alexandrians called Caesarion), he set out for Syria.

⁵⁰ ¹ On leaving that country and traversing Asia, he learned that Domitius had been defeated by Pharnaces the son of Mithridates and had fled from Pontus with a few followers; also that Pharnaces, using his victory without stint, and occupying Bithynia and Cappadocia, was aiming to secure the country called Lesser Armenia, and was rousing to revolt all the princes and tetrarchs there. ² At once, therefore, Caesar marched against him with three legions, fought a great battle with him near the city of Zela, drove him in flight out of Pontus, and annihilated his army. ³ In announcing the swiftness and fierceness of this battle to one of his friends at Rome, Amantius, Caesar wrote three words: "Came, saw, conquered." ⁴ In Latin, however, the words have the same inflectional ending, and so a brevity which is most impressive.

⁵¹ ¹ After this, he crossed to Italy and went up to Rome, at the close of the year for which he had a second time been chosen dictator, though that office had never before been for a whole year; then for the following year he was proclaimed consul. ² Men spoke of him because, after his soldiers had mutinied and killed two men of praetorian rank, Galba and Cosconius, he censured them only so far as to call them "citizens" when he addressed them, instead of "soldiers," and then gave each man a thousand drachmas and much allotted land in Italy. ³ He was also calumniated for the madness of Dolabella, the greed of Amantius, the drunkenness of Antony, and for the fact that Corfinius built over and refurnished the house of Pompey on the ground that it was not good enough for him. ⁴ For at all these things the Romans were displeased. But owing to the

political situation, though Caesar was not ignorant of these things and did not like them, he was compelled to make use of such assistants.

52 1 After the battle at Pharsalus, Cato and Scipio made their escape to Africa, and there, with the aid of King Juba, collected considerable forces. Caesar therefore resolved to make an expedition against them. 2 So, about the time of the winter solstice, he crossed into Sicily, and wishing to cut off at once in the minds of his officers all hope of delaying there and wasting time, he pitched his own tent on the sea-beach. When a favouring wind arose, he embarked and put to sea with three thousand infantry and a few horsemen. 3 Then, after landing these unobserved, he put to sea again, being full of fears for the larger part of his force, and meeting them after they were already at sea, he conducted all into camp.

4 On learning that the enemy were emboldened by an ancient oracle to the effect that it was always the prerogative of the family of the Scipios to conquer in Africa, he either flouted in pleasantry the Scipio who commanded the enemy, 5 or else tried in good earnest to appropriate to himself the omen, it is hard to say which. He had under him, namely, a man who otherwise was a contemptible nobody, but belonged to the family of the Africani, and was called Scipio Sallustio.^b This man Caesar put in the forefront of his battles as if commander of the army, being compelled to attack the enemy frequently and to force the fighting. 6 For there was neither sufficient food for his men nor fodder for his beasts of burden, nay, they were forced to feed their horses on sea-weed, which they washed free of its salt and mixed with a little grass to sweeten it. 7 For the Numidians showed themselves everywhere in great numbers and speedy, and controlled the country. Indeed, while Caesar's horsemen

were once off duty (a Libyan was showing them how he could dance and play the flute at the same time in an astonishing manner, and they had committed their horses to the slaves and were sitting delighted on the ground), the enemy suddenly surrounded and attacked them, killed some of them, and followed hard upon the heels of the rest as they were driven headlong into camp. ⁸ And if Caesar himself, and with him Asinius Pollio, had not come from the ramparts to their aid and checked their flight, the war would have been at an end. ⁹ On one occasion, too, in another battle, the enemy got the advantage in the encounter, and here it is said that Caesar seized by the neck the fugitive standard-bearer, faced him about, and said: "Yonder is the enemy."

⁵³ ¹ However, Scipio was encouraged by these advantages to hazard a decisive battle: so, leaving Afranius and Juba encamped separately at a short distance apart, he himself began fortifying a camp beyond a lake near the city of Thapsus, that it might serve the whole army as a place from which to sally out to the battle, and as a place of refuge. ² But while he was busy with the project, Caesar made his way with inconceivable speed through woody regions which afforded unknown access to the spot, outflanked some of the enemy, and attacked others in front. ³ Then, after routing these, he took advantage of the favourable instant and of the impetus of fortune, and thereby captured the camp of Afranius at the first onset, and at the first onset sacked the camp of the Numidians, from which Juba fled. ⁴ Thus in a brief portion of one day he made himself master of three camps and slew fifty thousand of the enemy, without losing as many as fifty of his own men.

⁵ This is the account which some give of the battle; others, however, say that Caesar himself was not in the action, but that, as he

was marshalling and arraying his army, his usual sickness laid hold of him, and he, ⁶ at once aware that it was beginning, before his already wavering senses were altogether confounded and overpowered by the malady, was carried to a neighbouring tower, where he stayed quietly during the battle. ⁷ Of the men of consular and praetorial rank who escaped from the battle, some slew themselves at the moment of their capture, and others were put to death by Caesar after capture.

⁵⁴ ¹ Being eager to take Cato alive, Caesar hastened towards Utica, for Cato was guarding that city, and took no part in the battle. ² But he learned that Cato had made away with himself, and he was clearly annoyed, though for what reason is uncertain. At any rate, he said: "Cato, I begrudge thee thy death; for thou didst begrudge me the preservation of thy life." ³ Now, the treatise which Caesar afterwards wrote against Cato when he was dead, does not seem to prove that he was in a gentle or reconcilable mood. For how could he have spared Cato alive, when he poured out against him after death so great a cup of wrath? ⁴ And yet from his considerate treatment of Cicero and Brutus and thousands more who had fought against him, it is inferred that even this treatise was not composed out of hatred, but from political ambition, for reasons which follow. ⁵ Cicero had written an encomium on Cato which he entitled "Cato"; and the discourse was eagerly read by many, as was natural, since it was composed by the ablest of orators on the noblest of themes. ⁶ This annoyed Caesar, who thought that Cicero's praise of the dead Cato was a denunciation of Caesar himself. Accordingly, he wrote a treatise in which he got together countless charges against Cato; and the work is entitled "Anti-Cato." Both treatises have many eager readers, as well on account of Caesar as of Cato.

55 ¹ But to resume, when Caesar came back to Rome from Africa, to begin with, he made a boastful speech to the people concerning his victory, asserting that he had subdued a country large enough to furnish annually for the public treasury two hundred thousand Attic bushels of grain, and three million pounds of olive oil. ² Next, he celebrated triumphs, an Egyptian, a Pontic, and an African, the last not for his victory over Scipio, but ostensibly over Juba the king. ³ On this occasion, too, Juba, a son of the king, a mere infant, was carried along in the triumphal procession, the most fortunate captive ever taken, since from being a Barbarian and a Numidian, he came to be enrolled among the most learned historians of Hellas. ⁴ After the triumphs, Caesar gave his soldiers large gifts and entertained the people with banquets and spectacles, feasting them all at one time on twenty thousand dining-couches, and furnishing spectacles of gladiatorial and naval combats in honour of his daughter Julia, long since dead.

⁵ After the spectacles, a census of the people was taken, and instead of the three hundred and twenty thousand of the preceding lists there were enrolled only one hundred and fifty thousand. ⁶ So great was the calamity which the civil wars had wrought, and so large a portion of the people of Rome had they consumed away, to say nothing of the misfortunes that possessed the rest of Italy and the provinces.

⁵⁶ ¹ After these matters had been finished and he had been declared consul for the fourth time, Caesar made an expedition into Spain against the sons of Pompey. These were still young, but had collected an army of amazing numbers and displayed a boldness which justified their claims to leadership, so that they beset Caesar with the greatest peril. ² The great battle was joined near the city of

Munda, and here Caesar, seeing his own men hard pressed and making a feeble resistance, asked in a loud voice as he ran through the armed ranks whether they felt no shame to take him and put him in the hands of boys. ³ With difficulty and after much strenuous effort he repulsed the enemy and slew over thirty thousand of them, but he lost one thousand of his own men, and those the very best. ⁴ As he was going away after the battle he said to his friends that he had often striven for victory, but now first for his life. ⁵ He fought this victorious battle on the day of the festival of Bacchus, on which day also it is said that Pompey the Great had gone forth to the war; a period of four years intervened. ⁶ As for Pompey's sons, the younger made his escape, but after a few days the head of the elder was brought in by Deidius.

⁷ This was the last war that Caesar waged; and the triumph that was celebrated for it vexed the Romans as nothing else had done. ⁸ For it commemorated no victory over foreign commanders or barbarian kings, but the utter annihilation of the sons and the family of the mightiest of the Romans, who had fallen upon misfortune; ⁹ and it was not meet for Caesar to celebrate a triumph for the calamities of his country, priding himself upon actions which had no defence before gods or men except that they had been done under necessity, and that too although previously he had sent neither messenger nor letters to announce to the people a victory in the civil wars, but had scrupulously put from him the fame arising therefrom.

⁵⁷¹ However, the Romans gave way before the good fortune of the man and accepted the bit, and regarding the monarchy as a respite from the evils of the civil wars, they appointed him dictator for life. This was confessedly a tyranny, since the monarchy, besides the element of irresponsibility, now took on that of permanence. ² It was

Cicero who proposed the first honours for him in the senate, and their magnitude was, after all, not too great for a man; but others added excessive honours and vied with one another in proposing them, thus rendering Caesar odious and obnoxious even to the mildest citizens because of the pretension and extravagance of what was decreed for him. ³ It is thought, too, that the enemies of Caesar no less than his flatterers helped to force these measures through, in order that they might have as many pretexts as possible against him and might be thought to have the best reasons for attempting his life. ⁴ For in all other ways, at least, after the civil wars were over, he showed himself blameless; and certainly it is thought not inappropriate that the temple of Clemency was decreed as a thank-offering in view of his mildness. ⁵ For he pardoned many of those who had fought against him, and to some he even gave honours and offices besides, as to Brutus and Cassius, both of whom were now praetors. ⁶ The statues of Pompey, which had been thrown down, he would not suffer to remain so, but set them up again, at which Cicero said that in setting up Pompey's statues Caesar firmly fixed his own. ⁷ When his friends thought it best that he should have a body-guard, and many of them volunteered for this service, he would not consent, saying that it was better to die once for all than to be always expecting death. ⁸ And in the effort to surround himself with men's good will as the fairest and at the same time the securest protection, he again courted the people with banquets and distributions of grain, and his soldiers with newly planted colonies, the most conspicuous of which were Carthage and Corinth. The earlier capture of both these cities, as well as their present restoration, chanced to fall at one and the same time.

⁵⁸ ¹ As for the nobles, to some of them he promised consulships and praetorships in the future, others he appeased with sundry other

powers and honours, and in all he implanted hopes, since he ardently desired to rule over willing subjects. ² Therefore, when Maximus the consul died, he appointed Caninius Revilus consul for the one day still remaining of the term of office. ³ To him, as we are told, many were going with congratulations and offers of escort, whereupon Cicero said: "Let us make haste, or else the man's consulship will have expired."

⁴ Caesar's many successes, however, did not divert his natural spirit of enterprise and ambition to the enjoyment of what he had laboriously achieved, but served as fuel and incentive for future achievements, and begat in him plans for greater deeds and a passion for fresh glory, as though he had used up what he already had. ⁵ What he felt was therefore nothing else than emulation of himself, as if he had been another man, and a sort of rivalry between what he had done and what he purposed to do. ⁶ For he planned and prepared to make an expedition against the Parthians; and after subduing these and marching around the Euxine by way of Hyrcania, the Caspian sea, and the Caucasus, to invade Scythia; ⁷ and after overrunning the countries bordering on Germany and Germany itself, to come back by way of Gaul to Italy, and so to complete this circuit of his empire, which would then be bounded on all sides by the ocean. ⁸ During this expedition, moreover, he intended to dig through the isthmus of Corinth, and had already put Anienus in charge of this work; he intended also to divert the Tiber just below the city into a deep channel, give it a bend towards Circeium, and make it empty into the sea at Terracina, thus contriving for merchantmen a safe as well as an easy passage to Rome; ⁹ and besides this, to convert marshes about Pomentinum and Setia into a plain which many thousands of men could cultivate; and further, ¹⁰ to build moles which should barricade

the sea where it was nearest to Rome, to clear away the hidden dangers on the shore of Ostia, and then construct harbours and roadsteads sufficient for the great fleets that would visit them. And all these things were in preparation.

59 ¹ The adjustment of the calendar, however, and the correction of the irregularity in the computation of time, were not only studied scientifically by him, but also brought to completion, and proved to be of the highest utility. ² For not only in very ancient times was the relation of the lunar to the solar year in great confusion among the Romans, so that the sacrificial feasts and festivals, diverging gradually, at last fell in opposite seasons of the year, but also at this time people generally had no way of computing the actual solar year; the priests alone knew the proper time, and would suddenly and to everybody's surprise insert the intercalary month called Mercedonius. ⁴ Numa the king is said to have been the first to intercalate this month, thus devising a slight and short-lived remedy for the error in regard to the sidereal and solar cycles, as I have told in his Life. ⁵ But Caesar laid the problem before the best philosophers and mathematicians, and out of the methods of correction which were already at hand compounded one of his own which was more accurate than any. This the Romans use down to the present time, and are thought to be less in error than other peoples as regards the inequality between the lunar and solar years. ⁶ However, even this furnished occasion for blame to those who envied Caesar and disliked his power. At any rate, Cicero the orator, we are told, when some one remarked that Lyra would rise on the morrow, said: "Yes, by decree," implying that men were compelled to accept even this dispensation.

60 ¹ But the most open and deadly hatred towards him was

produced by his passion for the royal power. For the multitude this was a first cause of hatred, and for those who had long smothered their hate, a most specious pretext for it. ² And yet those who were advocating this honour for Caesar actually spread abroad among the people a report that from the Sibylline books it appeared that Parthia could be taken if the Romans went up against it with a king, but otherwise could not be assailed; ³ and as Caesar was coming down from Alba into the city they ventured to hail him as king. But at this the people were confounded, and Caesar, disturbed in mind, said that his name was not King, but Caesar, and seeing that his words produced an universal silence, he passed on with no very cheerful or contented looks. ⁴ Moreover, after sundry extravagant honours had been voted him in the senate, it chanced that he was sitting above the rostra, and as the praetors and consuls drew near, with the whole senate following them, he did not rise to receive them, but as if he were dealing with mere private persons, replied that his honours needed curtailment rather than enlargement. ⁵ This vexed not only the senate, but also the people, who felt that in the persons of the senators the state was insulted, and in a terrible dejection they went away at once, all who were not obliged to remain, ⁶ so that Caesar too, when he was aware of his mistake, immediately turned to go home, and drawing back his toga from his neck, cried in loud tones to his friends that he was ready to offer his throat to any one who wished to kill him. But afterwards he made his disease an excuse for his behaviour, ⁷ saying that the senses of those who are thus afflicted do not usually remain steady when they address a multitude standing, but are speedily shaken and whirled about, bringing on giddiness and insensibility. ⁸ However, what he said was not true; on the contrary, he was very desirous of rising to receive the senate; but one of his

friends, as they say, or rather one of his flatterers, Cornelius Balbus, restrained him, saying: "Remember that thou art Caesar, and permit thyself to be courted as a superior."

⁶¹ ¹ There was added to these causes of offence his insult to the tribunes. It was, namely, the festival of the Lupercalia, of which many write that it was anciently celebrated by shepherds, and has also some connection with the Arcadian Lycaea. ² At this time many of the noble youths and of the magistrates run up and down through the city naked, for sport and laughter striking those they meet with shaggy thongs. ³ And many women of rank also purposely get in their way, and like children at school present their hands to be struck, believing that the pregnant will thus be helped to an easy delivery, and the barren to pregnancy. ⁴ These ceremonies Caesar was witnessing, seated upon the rostra on a golden throne, arrayed in triumphal attire. ⁵ And Antony was one of the runners in the sacred race; for he was consul. Accordingly, after he had dashed into the forum and the crowd had made way for him, he carried a diadem, round which a wreath of laurel was tied, and held it out to Caesar. Then there was applause, not loud, but slight and preconcerted. ⁶ But when Caesar pushed away the diadem, all the people applauded; and when Antony offered it again, few, and when Caesar declined it again, all, applauded. ⁷ The experiment having thus failed, Caesar rose from his seat, after ordering the wreath to be carried up to the Capitol; ⁸ but then his statues were seen to have been decked with royal diadems. So two of the tribunes, Flavius and Maryllus, went up to them and pulled off the diadems, and after discovering those who had first hailed Caesar as king, led them off to prison. ⁹ Moreover, the people followed the tribunes with applause and called them Brutuses, because Brutus was the man who put an end to the royal succession

and brought the power into the hands of the senate and people instead of a sole ruler. ¹⁰ At this, Caesar was greatly vexed, and deprived Maryllus and Flavius of their office, while in his denunciation of them, although he at the same time insulted the people, he called them repeatedly Brutes and Cymaeans.

⁶² ¹ Under these circumstances the multitude turned their thoughts towards Marcus Brutus, who was thought to be a descendant of the elder Brutus on his father's side, on his mother's side belonged to the Servilii, another illustrious house, and was a son-in law and nephew of Cato. ² The desires which Brutus felt to attempt of his own accord the abolition of the monarchy were blunted by the favours and honours that he had received from Caesar. ³ For not only had his life been spared at Pharsalus after Pompey's flight, and the lives of many of his friends at his entreaty, but also he had great credit with Caesar. ⁴ He had received the most honourable of the praetorships for the current year, and was to be consul three years later, having been preferred to Cassius, who was a rival candidate. ⁵ For Caesar, as we are told, said that Cassius urged the juster claims to the office, but that for his own part he could not pass Brutus by. ⁶ Once, too, when certain persons were actually accusing Brutus to him, the conspiracy being already on foot, Caesar would not heed them, but laying his hand upon his body said to the accusers: "Brutus will wait for this shrivelled skin," implying that Brutus was worthy to rule because of his virtue, but that for the sake of ruling he would not become a thankless villain. ⁷ Those, however, who were eager for the change, and fixed their eyes on Brutus alone, or on him first, did not venture to talk with him directly, but by night they covered his praetorial tribune and chair with writings, most of which were of this sort: "Thou art asleep, Brutus," or, "Thou art not Brutus." ⁸ When Cassius

perceived that the ambition of Brutus was somewhat stirred by these things, he was more urgent with him than before, and pricked him on, having himself also some private grounds for hating Caesar; these I have mentioned in the Life of Brutus. ⁹ Moreover, Caesar actually suspected him, so that he once said to his friends: "What, think ye, doth Cassius want? I like him not over much, for he is much too pale." ¹⁰ And again, we are told that when Antony and Dolabella were accused to him of plotting revolution, Caesar said: "I am not much in fear of these fat, long-haired fellows, but rather of those pale, thin ones," meaning Brutus and Cassius.

⁶³ ¹ But destiny, it would seem, is not so much unexpected as it is unavoidable, since they say that amazing signs and apparitions were seen. ² Now, as for lights in the heavens, crashing sounds borne all about by night, and birds of omen coming down into the forum, it is perhaps not worth while to mention these precursors of so great an event; ³ but Strabo the philosopher says that multitudes of men all on fire were seen rushing up, and a soldier's slave threw from his hand a copious flame and seemed to the spectators to be burning, but when the flame ceased the man was uninjured; ⁴ he says, moreover, that when Caesar himself was sacrificing, the heart of the victim was not to be found, and the prodigy caused fear, since in the course of nature, certainly, an animal without a heart could not exist. ⁵ The following story, too, is told by many. A certain seer warned Caesar to be on his guard against a great peril on the day of the month of March which the Romans call the Ides; ⁶ and when the day had come and Caesar was on his way to the senate-house, he greeted the seer with a jest and said: "Well, the Ides of March are come," and the seer said to him softly: "Ay, they are come, but they are not gone." ⁷ Moreover, on the day before, when Marcus Lepidus was entertaining

him at supper, Caesar chanced to be signing letters, as his custom was, while reclining at table, and the discourse turned suddenly upon the question what sort of death was the best; before any one could answer Caesar cried out: "That which is unexpected." ⁸ After this, while he was sleeping as usual by the side of his wife, all the windows and doors of the chamber flew open at once, and Caesar, confounded by the noise and the light of the moon shining down upon him, noticed that Calpurnia was in a deep slumber, but was uttering indistinct words and inarticulate groans in her sleep; ⁹ for she dreamed, as it proved, that she was holding her murdered husband in her arms and bewailing him.

Some, however, say that this was not the vision which the woman had; but that there was attached to Caesar's house to give it adornment and distinction, by vote of the senate, a gable-ornament, as Livy says, and it was this which Calpurnia in her dreams saw torn down, and therefore, as she thought, wailed and wept. ¹⁰ At all events, when day came, she begged Caesar, if it was possible, not to go out, but to postpone the meeting of the senate; if, however, he had no concern at all for her dreams, she besought him to inquire by other modes of divination and by sacrifices concerning the future. ¹¹ And Caesar also, as it would appear, was in some suspicion and fear. For never before had he perceived in Calpurnia any womanish superstition, but now he saw that she was in great distress. ¹² And when the seers also, after many sacrifices, told him that the omens were unfavourable, he resolved to send Antony and dismiss the senate.

⁶⁴ ¹ But at this juncture Decimus Brutus, surnamed Albinus, who was so trusted by Caesar that he was entered in his will as his second heir, but was partner in the conspiracy of the other Brutus and

Cassius, ² fearing that if Caesar should elude that day, their undertaking would become known, ridiculed the seers and chided Caesar for laying himself open to malicious charges on the part of the senators, who would think themselves mocked at; ³ for they had met at his bidding, and were ready and willing to vote as one man that he should be declared king of the provinces outside of Italy, and might wear a diadem when he went anywhere else by land or sea; ⁴ but if some one should tell them at their session to be gone now, but to come back again when Calpurnia should have better dreams, what speeches would be made by his enemies, or who would listen to his friends when they tried to show that this was not slavery and tyranny? ⁵ But if he was fully resolved (Albinus said) to regard the day as inauspicious, it was better that he should go in person and address the senate, and then postpone its business. ⁶ While saying these things Brutus took Caesar by the hand and began to lead him along. And he had gone but a little way from his door when a slave belonging to some one else, eager to get at Caesar, but unable to do so for the press of numbers about him, forced his way into the house, gave himself into the hands of Calpurnia, and bade her keep him secure until Caesar came back, since he had important matters to report to him.

⁶⁵ ¹ Furthermore, Artemidorus, a Cnidian by birth, a teacher of Greek philosophy, and on this account brought into intimacy with some of the followers of Brutus, so that he also knew most of what they were doing, came bringing to Caesar in a small roll the disclosures which he was going to make; ² but seeing that Caesar took all such rolls and handed them to his attendants, he came quite near, and said: "Read this, Caesar, by thyself, and speedily; for it contains matters of importance and of concern to thee." ³

Accordingly, Caesar took the roll and would have read it, but was prevented by the multitude of people who engaged his attention, although he set out to do so many times, and holding in his hand and retaining that roll alone, he passed on into the senate. ⁴ Some, however, say that another person gave him this roll, and that Artemidorus did not get to him at all, but was crowded away all along the route.

⁶⁶ ¹ So far, perhaps, these things may have happened of their own accord; the place, however, which was the scene of that struggle and murder, and in which the senate was then assembled, since it contained a statue of Pompey and had been dedicated by Pompey as an additional ornament to his theatre, made it wholly clear that it was the work of some heavenly power which was calling and guiding the action thither. ² Indeed, it is also said that Cassius, turning his eyes toward the statue of Pompey before the attack began, invoked it silently, although he was much addicted to the doctrines of Epicurus; ³ but the crisis, as it would seem, when the dreadful attempt was now close at hand, replaced his former cool calculations with divinely inspired emotion.

⁴ Well, then, Antony, who was a friend of Caesar's and a robust man, was detained outside by Brutus Albinus, who purposely engaged him in a lengthy conversation; ⁵ but Caesar went in, and the senate rose in his honour. Some of the partisans of Brutus took their places round the back of Caesar's chair, while others went to meet him, as though they would support the petition which Tullius Cimber presented to Caesar in behalf of his exiled brother, and they joined their entreaties to his and accompanied Caesar up to his chair. ⁶ But when, after taking his seat, Caesar continued to repulse their petitions, and, as they pressed upon him with greater importunity,

began to show anger towards one and another of them, Tullius seized his toga with both hands and pulled it down from his neck. This was the signal for the assault. ⁷ It was Casca who gave him the first blow with his dagger, in the neck, not a mortal wound, nor even a deep one, for which he was too much confused, as was natural at the beginning of a deed of great daring; so that Caesar turned about, grasped the knife, and held it fast. At almost the same instant both cried out, the smitten man in Latin: “Accursed Casca, what does thou?” and the smiter, in Greek, to his brother: “Brother, help!”

⁹ So the affair began, and those who were not privy to the plot were filled with consternation and horror at what was going on; they dared not fly, nor go to Caesar’s help, nay, nor even utter a word. ¹⁰ But those who had prepared themselves for the murder bared each of them his dagger, and Caesar, hemmed in on all sides, whichever way he turned confronting blows of weapons aimed at his face and eyes, driven hither and thither like a wild beast, was entangled in the hands of all; ¹¹ for all had to take part in the sacrifice and taste of the slaughter. Therefore Brutus also gave him one blow in the groin. ¹² And it is said by some writers that although Caesar defended himself against the rest and darted this way and that and cried aloud, when he saw that Brutus had drawn his dagger, he pulled his toga down over his head and sank, either by chance or because pushed there by his murderers, against the pedestal on which the statue of Pompey stood. ¹³ And the pedestal was drenched with his blood, so that one might have thought that Pompey himself was presiding over this vengeance upon his enemy, who now lay prostrate at his feet, quivering from a multitude of wounds. ¹⁴ For it is said that he received twenty-three; and many of the conspirators were wounded by one another, as they struggled to plant all those blows in one body.

67 1 Caesar thus done to death, the senators, although Brutus came forward as if to say something about what had been done, would not wait to hear him, but burst out of doors and fled, thus filling the people with confusion and helpless fear, so that some of them closed their houses, while others left their counters and places of business and ran, first to the place to see what had happened, then away from the place when they had seen. 2 Antony and Lepidus, the chief friends of Caesar, stole away and took refuge in the houses of others. 3 But Brutus and his partisans, just as they were, still warm from the slaughter, displaying their daggers bare, went all in a body out of the senate-house and marched to the Capitol, not like fugitives, but with glad faces and full of confidence, summoning the multitude to freedom, and welcoming into their ranks the most distinguished of those who met them. 4 Some also joined their number and went up with them as though they had shared in the deed, and laid claim to the glory of it, of whom were Caius Octavius and Lentulus Spinther. 5 These men, then, paid the penalty for their imposture later, when they were put to death by Antony and the young Caesar, without even enjoying the fame for the sake of which they died, owing to the disbelief of their fellow men. 6 For even those who punished them did not exact a penalty for what they did, but for what they wished they had done.

7 On the next day Brutus came down and held a discourse, and the people listened to what was said without either expressing resentment at what had been done or appearing to approve of it; they showed, however, by their deep silence, that while they pitied Caesar, they respected Brutus. 8 The senate, too, trying to make a general amnesty and reconciliation, voted to give Caesar divine honours and not to disturb even the most insignificant measure which

he had adopted when in power; 9 while to Brutus and his partisans it distributed provinces and gave suitable honours, so that everybody thought that matters were decided and settled in the best possible manner.

68 1 But when the will of Caesar was opened and it was found that he had given every Roman citizen a considerable gift, and when the multitude saw his body carried through the forum all disfigured with its wounds, they no longer kept themselves within the restraints of order and discipline, but after heaping round the body benches, railings, and tables from the forum they set fire to them and burned it there; 2 then, lifting blazing brands on high, they ran to the houses of the murderers with intent to burn them down, while others went every whither through the city seeking to seize the men themselves and tear them to pieces. Not one of these came in their way, but all were well barricaded. 3 There was a certain Cinna, however, one of the friends of Caesar, who chanced, as they say, to have seen during the previous night a strange vision. He dreamed, that is, that he was invited to supper by Caesar, and that when he excused himself, Caesar led him along by the hand, although he did not wish to go, but resisted. 4 Now, when he heard that they were burning the body of Caesar in the forum, he rose up and went thither out of respect, although he had misgivings arising from his vision, and was at the same time in a fever. 5 At sight of him, one of the multitude told his name to another who asked him what it was, and he to another, and at once word ran through the whole throng that this man was one of the murderers of Caesar. 6 For there was among the conspirators a man who bore this same name of Cinna, and assuming this man was he, the crowd rushed upon him and tore him in pieces among them. 7 This more than anything else made Brutus and Cassius afraid, and

not many days afterwards they withdrew from the city. What they did and suffered before they died, has been told in the Life of Brutus.

69 1 At the time of his death Caesar was fully fifty-six years old, but he had survived Pompey not much more than four years, while of the power and dominion which he had sought all his life at so great risks, and barely achieved at last, of this he had reaped no fruit but the name of it only, and a glory which had awakened envy on the part of his fellow citizens. 2 However, the great guardian-genius of the man, whose help he had enjoyed through life, followed upon him even after death as an avenger of his murder, driving and tracking down his slayers over every land and sea until not one of them was left, but even those who in any way soever either put hand to the deed or took part in the plot were punished.

3 Among events of man's ordering, the most amazing was that which befell Cassius; for after his defeat at Philippi he slew himself with that very dagger which he had used against Caesar; 4 and among events of divine ordering, there was the great comet, which showed itself in great splendour for seven nights after Caesar's murder, and then disappeared; also, the obscuration of the sun's rays. 5 For during all that year its orb rose pale and without radiance, while the heat that came down from it was slight and ineffectual, so that the air in its circulation was dark and heavy owing to the feebleness of the warmth that penetrated it, and the fruits, imperfect and half ripe, withered away and shrivelled up on account of the coldness of the atmosphere. 6 But more than anything else the phantom that appeared to Brutus showed that the murder of Caesar was not pleasing to the gods; and it was on this wise. 7 As he was about to take his army across from Abydos to the other continent, he was lying down at night, as his custom was, in his tent, not sleeping, but thinking of the

future; 8 for it is said that of all generals Brutus was least given to sleep, and that he naturally remained awake a longer time than anybody else. 9 And now he thought he heard a noise at the door, and looking towards the light of the lamp, which was slowly going out, he saw a fearful vision of a man of unnatural size and harsh aspect. 10 At first he was terrified, but when he saw that the visitor neither did nor said anything, but stood in silence by his couch, he asked him who he was. 11 Then the phantom answered him: "I am thy evil genius, Brutus, and thou shalt see me at Philippi." At the time, then, Brutus said courageously: "I shall see thee;" and the heavenly visitor at once went away. 12 Subsequently, however, when arrayed against Antony and Caesar at Philippi, in the first battle he conquered the enemy in his front, routed and scattered them, and sacked the camp of Caesar; 13 but as he was about to fight the second battle, the same phantom visited him again at night, and though it said nothing to him, Brutus understood his fate, and plunged headlong into danger. 14 He did not fall in battle, however, but after the rout retired to a crest of ground, put his naked sword to his breast (while a certain friend, as they say, helped to drive the blow home), and so died.

THE HISTORY OF JULIUS CAESAR by Jacob Abbott



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CHAPTER I. MARIUS AND SYLLA.

There were three great European nations in ancient days, each of which furnished history with a hero: the Greeks, the Carthaginians, and the Romans.

Alexander was the hero of the Greeks. He was King of Macedon, a country lying north of Greece proper. He headed an army of his countrymen, and made an excursion for conquest and glory into Asia. He made himself master of all that quarter of the globe, and reigned over it in Babylon, till he brought himself to an early grave by the excesses into which his boundless prosperity allured him. His fame rests on his triumphant success in building up for himself so vast an empire, and the admiration which his career has always excited among mankind is heightened by the consideration of his youth, and of the noble and generous impulses which strongly marked his character. The Carthaginian hero was Hannibal. We class the Carthaginians among the European nations of antiquity; for, in respect to their origin, their civilization, and all their commercial and political relations, they belonged to the European race, though it is true that their capital was on the African side of the Mediterranean Sea. Hannibal was the great Carthaginian hero. He earned his fame by the energy and implacableness of his hate. The work of his life was to keep a vast empire in a state of continual anxiety and terror for fifty years, so that his claim to greatness and glory rests on the determination, the perseverance, and the success with which he fulfilled his function of being, while he lived, the terror of the world.

The Roman hero was Caesar. He was born just one hundred years before the Christian era. His renown does not depend, like that of Alexander, on foreign conquests, nor, like that of Hannibal, on the

terrible energy of his aggressions upon foreign foes, but upon his protracted and dreadful contests with, and ultimate triumphs over, his rivals and competitors at home. When he appeared upon the stage, the Roman empire already included nearly all of the world that was worth possessing. There were no more conquests to be made. Caesar did, indeed, enlarge, in some degree, the boundaries of the empire; but the main question in his day was, who should possess the power which preceding conquerors had acquired. The Roman empire, as it existed in those days, must not be conceived of by the reader as united together under one compact and consolidated government. It was, on the other hand, a vast congeries of nations, widely dissimilar in every respect from each other, speaking various languages, and having various customs and laws. They were all, however, more or less dependent upon, and connected with, the great central power. Some of these countries were provinces, and were governed by officers appointed and sent out by the authorities at Rome. These governors had to collect the taxes of their provinces, and also to preside over and direct, in many important respects, the administration of justice. They had, accordingly, abundant opportunities to enrich themselves while thus in office, by collecting more money than they paid over to the government at home, and by taking bribes to favor the rich man's cause in court. Thus the more wealthy and prosperous provinces were objects of great competition among aspirants for office at Rome. Leading men would get these appointments, and, after remaining long enough in their provinces to acquire a fortune, would come back to Rome, and expend it in intrigues and maneuvers to obtain higher offices still. Whenever there was any foreign war to be carried on with a distant nation or tribe, there was always a great eagerness among all the military officers of

the state to be appointed to the command. They each felt sure that they should conquer in the contest, and they could enrich themselves still more rapidly by the spoils of victory in war, than by extortion and bribes in the government of a province in peace. Then, besides, a victorious general coming back to Rome always found that his military renown added vastly to his influence and power in the city. He was welcomed with celebrations and triumphs; the people flocked to see him and to shout his praise. He placed his trophies of victory in the temples, and entertained the populace with games and shows, and with combats of gladiators or of wild beasts, which he had brought home with him for this purpose in the train of his army. While he was thus enjoying his triumph, his political enemies would be thrown into the back ground and into the shade; unless, indeed, some one of them might himself be earning the same honors in some other field, to come back in due time, and claim his share of power and celebrity in his turn. In this case, Rome would be sometimes distracted and rent by the conflicts and contentions of military rivals, who had acquired powers too vast for all the civil influences of the Republic to regulate or control.

There had been two such rivals just before the time of Caesar, who had filled the world with their quarrels. They were Marius and Sylla. Their very names have been, in all ages of the world, since their day, the symbols of rivalry and hate. They were the representatives respectively of the two great parties into which the Roman state, like every other community in which the population at large have any voice in governing, always has been, and probably always will be divided, the upper and the lower; or, as they were called in those days, the patrician and the plebeian. Sylla was the patrician; the higher and more aristocratic portions of the community

were on his side. Marius was the favorite of the plebeian masses. In the contests, however, which they waged with each other, they did not trust to the mere influence of votes. They relied much more upon the soldiers they could gather under their respective standards and upon their power of intimidating, by means of them, the Roman assemblies. There was a war to be waged with Mithridates, a very powerful Asiatic monarch, which promised great opportunities for acquiring fame and plunder. Sylla was appointed to the command. While he was absent, however, upon some campaign in Italy, Marius contrived to have the decision reversed, and the command transferred to him. Two officers, called tribunes, were sent to Sylla's camp to inform him of the change. Sylla killed the officers for daring to bring him such a message, and began immediately to march toward Rome. In retaliation for the murder of the tribunes, the party of Marius in the city killed some of Sylla's prominent friends there, and a general alarm spread itself throughout the population. The Senate, which was a sort of House of Lords, embodying mainly the power and influence of the patrician party, and was, of course, on Sylla's side, sent out to him, when he had arrived within a few miles of the city, urging him to come no further. He pretended to comply; he marked out the ground for a camp; but he did not, on that account, materially delay his march. The next morning he was in possession of the city. The friends of Marius attempted to resist him, by throwing stones upon his troops from the roofs of the houses. Sylla ordered every house from which these symptoms of resistance appeared to be set on fire. Thus the whole population of a vast and wealthy city were thrown into a condition of extreme danger and terror, by the conflicts of two great bands of armed men, each claiming to be their friends.

Marius was conquered in this struggle, and fled for his life. Many

of the friends whom he left behind him were killed. The Senate were assembled, and, at Sylla's orders, a decree was passed declaring Marius a public enemy, and offering a reward to any one who would bring his head back to Rome.

Marius fled, friendless and alone, to the southward, hunted every where by men who were eager to get the reward offered for his head. After various romantic adventures and narrow escapes, he succeeded in making his way across the Mediterranean Sea, and found at last a refuge in a hut among the ruins of Carthage. He was an old man, being now over seventy years of age. Of course, Sylla thought that his great rival and enemy was now finally disposed of, and he accordingly began to make preparations for his Asiatic campaign. He raised his army, built and equipped a fleet, and went away. As soon as he was gone, Marius's friends in the city began to come forth, and to take measures for reinstating themselves in power. Marius returned, too, from Africa, and soon gathered about him a large army. Being the friend, as he pretended, of the lower classes of society, he collected vast multitudes of revolted slaves, outlaws, and other desperadoes, and advanced toward Rome. He assumed, himself, the dress, and air, and savage demeanor of his followers. His countenance had been rendered haggard and cadaverous partly by the influence of exposures, hardships, and suffering upon his advanced age, and partly by the stern and moody plans and determinations of revenge which his mind was perpetually revolving. He listened to the deputations which the Roman Senate sent out to him from time to time, as he advanced toward the city, but refused to make any terms. He moved forward with all the outward deliberation and calmness suitable to his years, while all the ferocity of a tiger was burning within.

As soon as he had gained possession of the city, he began his work of destruction. He first beheaded one of the consuls, and ordered his head to be set up, as a public spectacle, in the most conspicuous place in the city. This was the beginning. All the prominent friends of Sylla, men of the highest rank and station, were then killed, wherever they could be found, without sentence, without trial, without any other accusation, even, than the military decision of Marius that they were his enemies, and must die. For those against whom he felt any special animosity, he contrived some special mode of execution. One, whose fate he wished particularly to signalize, was thrown down from the Tarpeian Rock.

The Tarpeian Rock was a precipice about fifty feet high, which is still to be seen in Rome, from which the worst of state criminals were sometimes thrown. They were taken up to the top by a stair, and were then hurled from the summit, to die miserably, writhing in agony after their fall, upon the rocks below. The Tarpeian Rock received its name from the ancient story of Tarpeia. The tale is, that Tarpeia was a Roman girl, who lived at a time in the earliest periods of the Roman history, when the city was besieged by an army from one of the neighboring nations. Besides their shields, the story is that the soldiers had golden bracelets upon their arms. They wished Tarpeia to open the gates and let them in. She promised to do so if they would give her their bracelets; but, as she did not know the name of the shining ornaments, the language she used to designate them was, "Those things you have upon your arms." The soldiers acceded to her terms; she opened the gates, and they, instead of giving her the bracelets, threw their *shields* upon her as they passed, until the poor girl was crushed down with them and destroyed. This was near the Tarpeian Rock, which afterward took her name. The rock is now

found to be perforated by a great many subterranean passages, the remains, probably, of ancient quarries. Some of these galleries are now walled up; others are open; and the people who live around the spot believe, it is said, to this day, that Tarpeia herself sits, enchanted, far in the interior of these caverns, covered with gold and jewels, but that whoever attempts to find her is fated by an irresistible destiny to lose his way, and he never returns. The last story is probably as true as the other.

Marius continued his executions and massacres until the whole of Sylla's party had been slain or put to flight. He made every effort to discover Sylla's wife and child, with a view to destroying them also, but they could not be found. Some friends of Sylla, taking compassion on their innocence and helplessness, concealed them, and thus saved Marius from the commission of one intended crime. Marius was disappointed, too, in some other cases, where men whom he had intended to kill destroyed themselves to baffle his vengeance. One shut himself up in a room with burning charcoal, and was suffocated with the fumes. Another bled himself to death upon a public altar, calling down the judgments of the god to whom he offered this dreadful sacrifice, upon the head of the tyrant whose atrocious cruelty he was thus attempting to evade. By the time that Marius had got fairly established in his new position, and was completely master of Rome, and the city had begun to recover a little from the shock and consternation produced by his executions, he fell sick. He was attacked with an acute disease of great violence. The attack was perhaps produced, and was certainly aggravated by, the great mental excitements through which he had passed during his exile, and in the entire change of fortune which had attended his return. From being a wretched fugitive, hiding for his life among

gloomy and desolate ruins, he found himself suddenly transferred to the mastery of the world. His mind was excited, too, in respect to Sylla, whom he had not yet reached or subdued, but who was still prosecuting his war against Mithridates. Marius had had him pronounced by the Senate an enemy to his country, and was meditating plans to reach him in his distant province, considering his triumph incomplete as long as his great rival was at liberty and alive. The sickness cut short these plans, but it only inflamed to double violence the excitement and the agitations which attended them. As the dying tyrant tossed restlessly upon his bed, it was plain that the delirious ravings which he began soon to utter were excited by the same sentiments of insatiable ambition and ferocious hate whose calmer dictates he had obeyed when well. He imagined that he had succeeded in supplanting Sylla in his command, and that he was himself in Asia at the head of his armies. Impressed with this idea, he stared wildly around; he called aloud the name of Mithridates; he shouted orders to imaginary troops; he struggled to break away from the restraints which the attendants about his bedside imposed, to attack the phantom foes which haunted him in his dreams. This continued for several days, and when at last nature was exhausted by the violence of these paroxysms of phrensy, the vital powers which had been for seventy long years spending their strength in deeds of selfishness, cruelty, and hatred, found their work done, and sunk to revive no more. When Sylla returned to Rome, and took possession of the supreme power there, in looking over the lists of public men, there was one whom he did not know, at first what to do with. It was the young Julius Caesar, the subject of this history. Caesar was, by birth, patrician, having descended from a long line of noble ancestors. There had been, before his day, a great many Caesars who

had held the highest offices of the state, and many of them had been celebrated in history. He naturally, therefore, belonged to Sylla's side, as Sylla was the representative of the patrician interest. But then Caesar had personally been inclined toward the party of Marius. The elder Marius had married his aunt, and, besides, Caesar himself had married the daughter of Cinna, who had been the most efficient and powerful of Marius's coadjutors and friends. Caesar was at this time a very young man, and he was of an ardent and reckless character, though he had, thus far, taken no active part in public affairs. Sylla overlooked him for a time, but at length was about to put his name on the list of the proscribed. Some of the nobles, who were friends both of Sylla and of Caesar too, interceded for the young man; Sylla yielded to their request, or, rather, suspended his decision, and sent orders to Caesar to repudiate his wife, the daughter of Cinna. Her name was Cornelia. Caesar absolutely refused to repudiate his wife. He was influenced in this decision partly by affection for Cornelia, and partly by a sort of stern and indomitable insubmissiveness, which formed, from his earliest years, a prominent trait in his character, and which led him, during all his life, to brave every possible danger rather than allow himself to be controlled. Caesar knew very well that, when this his refusal should be reported to Sylla, the next order would be for his destruction. He accordingly fled. Sylla deprived him of his titles and offices, confiscated his wife's fortune and his own patrimonial estate, and put his name upon the list of the public enemies. Thus Caesar became a fugitive and an exile. The adventures which befell him in his wanderings will be described in the following chapter. Sylla was now in the possession of absolute power. He was master of Rome, and of all the countries over which Rome held sway. Still he was nominally not a magistrate,

but only a general returning victoriously from his Asiatic campaign, and putting to death, somewhat irregularly, it is true, by a sort of martial law persons whom he found, as he said, disturbing the public peace. After having thus effectually disposed of the power of his enemies, he laid aside, ostensibly, the government of the sword, and submitted himself and his future measures to the control of law. He placed himself ostensibly at the disposition of the city. They chose him dictator, which was investing him with absolute and unlimited power. He remained on this, the highest pinnacle of worldly ambition, a short time, and then resigned his power, and devoted the remainder of his days to literary pursuits and pleasures. Monster as he was in the cruelties which he inflicted upon his political foes, he was intellectually of a refined and cultivated mind, and felt an ardent interest in the promotion of literature and the arts.

The quarrel between Marius and Sylla, in respect to every thing which can make such a contest great, stands in the estimation of mankind as the greatest personal quarrel which the history of the world has ever recorded. Its origin was in the simple personal rivalry of two ambitious men. It involved, in its consequences, the peace and happiness of the world. In their reckless struggles, the fierce combatants trampled on every thing that came in their way, and destroyed mercilessly, each in his turn, all that opposed them. Mankind have always execrated their crimes, but have never ceased to admire the frightful and almost superhuman energy with which they committed them.

CHAPTER II. CAESAR'S EARLY YEARS.

Caesar does not seem to have been much disheartened and depressed by his misfortunes. He possessed in his early life more than the usual share of buoyancy and light-heartedness of youth, and he went away from Rome to enter, perhaps, upon years of exile and wandering, with a determination to face boldly and to brave the evils and dangers which surrounded him, and not to succumb to them.

Sometimes they who become great in their maturer years are thoughtful, grave, and sedate when young. It was not so, however, with Caesar. He was of a very gay and lively disposition. He was tall and handsome in his person, fascinating in his manners, and fond of society, as people always are who know or who suppose that they shine in it. He had seemed, in a word, during his residence at Rome, wholly intent upon the pleasures of a gay and joyous life, and upon the personal observation which his rank, his wealth, his agreeable manners and his position in society secured for him. In fact, they who observed and studied his character in these early years, thought that, although his situation was very favorable for acquiring power and renown, he would never feel any strong degree of ambition to avail himself of its advantages. He was too much interested, they thought, in personal pleasures ever to become great, either as a military commander or a statesman. Sylla, however, thought differently. He had penetration enough to perceive, beneath all the gayety and love of pleasure which characterized Caesar's youthful life, the germs of a sterner and more aspiring spirit, which, he was very sorry to see, was likely to expend its future energies in hostility to him. By refusing to submit to Sylla's commands, Caesar had, in effect, thrown himself entirely upon the other party, and would be, of

course, in future identified with them. Sylla consequently looked upon him now as a confirmed and settled enemy. Some friends of Caesar among the patrician families interceded in his behalf with Sylla again, after he had fled from Rome. They wished Sylla to pardon him, saying that he was a mere boy and could do him no harm. Sylla shook his head, saying that, young as he was, he saw in him indications of a future power which he thought was more to be dreaded than that of many Mariuses. One reason which led Sylla to form this opinion of Caesar was, that the young nobleman, with all his love of gayety and pleasure, had not neglected his studies, but had taken great pains to perfect himself in such intellectual pursuits as ambitious men who looked forward to political influence and ascendancy were accustomed to prosecute in those days. He had studied the Greek language, and read the works of Greek historians; and he attended lectures on philosophy and rhetoric, and was obviously interested deeply in acquiring power as a public speaker. To write and speak well gave a public man great influence in those days. Many of the measures of the government were determined by the action of great assemblies of the free citizens, which action was itself, in a great measure, controlled by the harangues of orators who had such powers of voice and such qualities of mind as enabled them to gain the attention and sway the opinions of large bodies of men.

The people of Rome had, of course, no printed books, and yet they were mentally cultivated and refined, and were qualified for a very high appreciation of intellectual pursuits and pleasures. In the absence, therefore, of all facilities for private reading, the Forum became the great central point of attraction. The same kind of interest which, in our day, finds its gratification in reading volumes of printed history quietly at home, or in silently perusing the columns of

newspapers and magazines in libraries and reading-rooms, where a whisper is seldom heard, in Caesar's day brought every body to the Forum, to listen to historical harangues, or political discussions, or forensic arguments in the midst of noisy crowds. Here all tidings centered; here all questions were discussed and all great elections held. Here were waged those ceaseless conflicts of ambition and struggles of power on which the fate of nations, and sometimes the welfare of almost half mankind depended. Of course, every ambitious man who aspired to an ascendancy over his fellow-men, wished to make his voice heard in the Forum. To calm the boisterous tumult there, and to hold, as some of the Roman orators could do, the vast assemblies in silent and breathless attention, was a power as delightful in its exercise as it was glorious in its fame. Caesar had felt this ambition, and had devoted himself very earnestly to the study of oratory. His teacher was Apollonius, a philosopher and rhetorician from Rhodes. Rhodes is a Grecian island, near the southwestern coast of Asia Minor. Apollonius was a teacher of great celebrity, and Caesar became a very able writer and speaker under his instructions. His time and attention were, in fact, strangely divided between the highest and noblest intellectual avocations, and the lowest sensual pleasures of a gay and dissipated life. The coming of Sylla had, however, interrupted all; and, after receiving the dictator's command to give up his wife and abandon the Marian faction, and determining to disobey it, he fled suddenly from Rome, as was stated at the close of the last chapter, at midnight, and in disguise. He was sick, too, at the time, with an intermittent fever. The paroxysm returned once in three or four days, leaving him in tolerable health during the interval. He went first into the country of the Sabines, northeast of Rome, where he wandered up and down, exposed continually to great

dangers from those who knew that he was an object of the great dictator's displeasure, and who were sure of favor and of a reward if they could carry his head to Sylla. He had to change his quarters every day, and to resort to every possible mode of concealment. He was, however, at last discovered, and seized by a centurion. A centurion was a commander of a hundred men; his rank and his position therefore, corresponded somewhat with those of a *captain* in a modern army. Caesar was not much disturbed at this accident. He offered the centurion a bribe sufficient to induce him to give up his prisoner, and so escaped. The two ancient historians, whose records contain nearly all the particulars of the early life of Caesar which are now known, give somewhat contradictory accounts of the adventures which befell him during his subsequent wanderings. They relate, in general, the same incidents, but in such different connections, that the precise chronological order of the events which occurred can not now be ascertained. At all events, Caesar, finding that he was no longer safe in the vicinity of Rome, moved gradually to the eastward, attended by a few followers, until he reached the sea, and there he embarked on board a ship to leave his native land altogether. After various adventures and wanderings, he found himself at length in Asia Minor, and he made his way at last to the kingdom of Bithynia, on the northern shore. The name of the king of Bithynia was Nicomedes. Caesar joined himself to Nicomedes's court, and entered into his service. In the mean time, Sylla had ceased to pursue him, and ultimately granted him a pardon, but whether before or after this time is not now to be ascertained. At all events, Caesar became interested in the scenes and enjoyments of Nicomedes's court, and allowed the time to pass away without forming any plans for returning to Rome. On the opposite side of Asia Minor, that is, on the

southern shore, there was a wild and mountainous region called Cilicia. The great chain of mountains called Taurus approaches here very near to the sea, and the steep conformations of the land, which, in the interior, produce lofty ranges and summits, and dark valleys and ravines, form, along the line of the shore, capes and promontories, bounded by precipitous sides, and with deep bays and harbors between them. The people of Cilicia were accordingly half sailors, half mountaineers. They built swift galleys, and made excursions in great force over the Mediterranean Sea for conquest and plunder. They would capture single ships, and sometimes even whole fleets of merchantmen. They were even strong enough on many occasions to land and take possession of a harbor and a town, and hold it, often, for a considerable time, against all the efforts of the neighboring powers to dislodge them. In case, however, their enemies became at any time too strong for them, they would retreat to their harbors, which were so defended by the fortresses which guarded them, and by the desperate bravery of the garrisons, that the pursuers generally did not dare to attempt to force their way in; and if, in any case, a town or a port was taken, the indomitable savages would continue their retreat to the fastnesses of the mountains, where it was utterly useless to attempt to follow them. But with all their prowess and skill as naval combatants, and their hardihood as mountaineers, the Cilicians lacked one thing which is very essential in every nation to an honorable military fame. They had no poets or historians of their own, so that the story of their deeds had to be told to posterity by their enemies. If they had been able to narrate their own exploits, they would have figured, perhaps, upon the page of history as a small but brave and efficient maritime power, pursuing for many years a glorious career of conquest, and acquiring

imperishable renown by their enterprise and success. As it was, the Romans, their enemies, described their deeds and gave them their designation. They called them robbers and pirates; and robbers and pirates they must forever remain.

And it is, in fact, very likely true that the Cilician commanders did not pursue their conquests and commit their depredations on the rights and the property of others in quite so systematic and methodical a manner as some other conquering states have done. They probably seized private property a little more unceremoniously than is customary; though all belligerent nations, even in these Christian ages of the world, feel at liberty to seize and confiscate private property when they find it afloat at sea, while, by a strange inconsistency, they respect it on the land. The Cilician pirates considered themselves at war with all mankind, and, whatever merchandise they found passing from port to port along the shores of the Mediterranean, they considered lawful spoil. They intercepted the corn which was going from Sicily to Rome, and filled their own granaries with it. They got rich merchandise from the ships of Alexandria, which brought, sometimes, gold, and gems, and costly fabrics from the East; and they obtained, often, large sums of money by seizing men of distinction and wealth, who were continually passing to and fro between Italy and Greece, and holding them for a ransom. They were particularly pleased to get possession in this way of Roman generals and officers of state, who were going out to take the command of armies, or who were returning from their provinces with the wealth which they had accumulated there. Many expeditions were fitted out and many naval commanders were commissioned to suppress and subdue these common enemies of mankind, as the Romans called them. At one time, while a distinguished general,

named Antonius, was in pursuit of them at the head of a fleet, a party of the pirates made a descent upon the Italian coast, south of Rome, at Nicenum, where the ancient patrimonial mansion of this very Antonius was situated, and took away several members of his family as captives, and so compelled him to ransom them by paying a very large sum of money. The pirates grew bolder and bolder in proportion to their success. They finally almost stopped all intercourse between Italy and Greece, neither the merchants daring to expose their merchandise, nor the passengers their persons to such dangers. They then approached nearer and nearer to Rome, and at last actually entered the Tiber, and surprised and carried off a Roman fleet which was anchored there. Caesar himself fell into the hands of these pirates at some time during the period of his wanderings.

The pirates captured the ship in which he was sailing near Pharmacusa, a small island in the northeastern part of the Aegean Sea. He was not at this time in the destitute condition in which he had found himself on leaving Rome, but was traveling with attendants suitable to his rank, and in such a style and manner as at once made it evident to the pirates that he was a man of distinction. They accordingly held him for ransom, and, in the mean time, until he could take measures for raising the money, they kept him a prisoner on board the vessel which had captured him. In this situation, Caesar, though entirely in the power and at the mercy of his lawless captors, assumed such an air of superiority and command in all his intercourse with them as at first awakened their astonishment, then excited their admiration, and ended in almost subjecting them to his will. He asked them what they demanded for his ransom. They said twenty talents, which was quite a large amount, a talent itself being a considerable sum of money. Caesar laughed at this demand, and told

them it was plain that they did not know who he was, He would give them *fifty* talents. He then sent away his attendants to the shore, with orders to proceed to certain cities where he was known, in order to procure the money, retaining only a physician and two servants for himself. While his messengers were gone, he remained on board the ship of his captors, assuming in every respect the air and manner of their master. When he wished to sleep, if they made a noise which disturbed him, he sent them orders to be still. He joined them in their sports and diversions on the deck, surpassing them in their feats, and taking the direction of every thing as if he were their acknowledged leader. He wrote orations and verses which he read to them, and if his wild auditors did not appear to appreciate the literary excellence of his compositions, he told them that they were stupid fools without any taste, adding, by way of apology, that nothing better could be expected of such barbarians.

The pirates asked him one day what he should do to them if he should ever, at any future time, take them prisoners. Caesar said that he would crucify every one of them. The ransom money at length arrived. Caesar paid it to the pirates, and they, faithful to their covenant, sent him in a boat to the land. He was put ashore on the coast of Asia Minor. He proceeded immediately to Miletus, the nearest port, equipped a small fleet there, and put to sea. He sailed at once to the roadstead where the pirates had been lying, and found them still at anchor there, in perfect security. He attacked them, seized their ships, recovered his ransom money, and took the men all prisoners. He conveyed his captives to the land, and there fulfilled his threat that he would crucify them by cutting their throats and nailing their dead bodies to crosses which his men erected for the purpose along the shore.

During his absence from Rome Caesar went to Rhodes, where his former preceptor resided, and he continued to pursue there for some time his former studies. He looked forward still to appearing one day in the Roman Forum. In fact, he began to receive messages from his friends at home that they thought it would be safe for him to return. Sylla had gradually withdrawn from power, and finally had died. The aristocratical party were indeed still in the ascendancy, but the party of Marius had begun to recover a little from the total overthrow with which Sylla's return, and his terrible military vengeance, had overwhelmed them. Caesar himself, therefore, they thought, might, with prudent management, be safe in returning to Rome. Encouraged by his success, and the applauses which he received, and feeling every day a greater and greater consciousness of power, he began to assume more and more openly the character of the leader of the popular party. He devoted himself to public speaking in the Forum, both before popular assemblies and in the courts of justice, where he was employed a great deal as an advocate to defend those who were accused of political crimes. The people, considering him as their rising champion, were predisposed to regard every thing that he did with favor, and there was really a great intellectual power displayed in his orations and harangues. He acquired, in a word, great celebrity by his boldness and energy, and his boldness and energy were themselves increased in their turn as he felt the strength of his position increase with his growing celebrity. A short time after this Caesar had another opportunity for delivering a funeral oration; it was in the case of his own wife, the daughter of Cinna, who had been the colleague and coadjutor of Marius during the days of his power. It was not usual to pronounce such panegyrics upon Roman ladies

unless they had attained to an advanced age. Caesar, however, was disposed to make the case of his own wife an exception to the ordinary rule. He saw in the occasion an opportunity to give a new impulse to the popular cause, and to make further progress in gaining the popular favor. The experiment was successful in this instance too. The people were pleased at the apparent affection which his action evinced; and as Cornelia was the daughter of Cinna, he had opportunity, under pretext of praising the birth and parentage of the deceased, to laud the men whom Sylla's party had outlawed and destroyed. In a word, the patrician party saw with anxiety and dread that Caesar was rapidly consolidating and organizing, and bringing back to its pristine strength and vigor, a party whose restoration to power would of course involve their own political, and perhaps personal ruin. Caesar began soon to receive appointments to public office, and thus rapidly increased his influence and power. Public officers and candidates for office were accustomed in those days to expend great sums of money in shows and spectacles to amuse the people. Caesar went beyond all limits in these expenditures. He brought gladiators from distant provinces, and trained them at great expense, to fight in the enormous amphitheaters of the city, in the midst of vast assemblies of men. Wild beasts were procured also from the forests of Africa, and brought over in great numbers, under his direction, that the people might be entertained by their combats with captives taken in war, who were reserved for this dreadful fate. Caesar gave, also, splendid entertainments, of the most luxurious and costly character, and he mingled with his guests at these entertainments, and with the people at large on other occasions, in so complaisant and courteous a manner as to gain universal favor. He soon, by these means, not only exhausted all his own pecuniary

resources, but plunged himself enormously into debt. It was not difficult for such a man in those days to procure an almost unlimited credit for such purposes as these, for every one knew that, if he finally succeeded in placing himself, by means of the popularity thus acquired, in stations of power, he could soon indemnify himself and all others who had aided him. The peaceful merchants, and artisans, and husbandmen of the distant provinces over which he expected to rule, would yield the revenues necessary to fill the treasuries thus exhausted. Still, Caesar's expenditures were so lavish, and the debts he incurred were so enormous, that those who had not the most unbounded confidence in his capacity and his powers believed him irretrievably ruined.

The particulars, however, of these difficulties, and the manner in which Caesar contrived to extricate himself from them, will be more fully detailed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III. ADVANCEMENT TO THE CONSULSHIP.

From this time, which was about sixty-seven years before the birth of Christ, Caesar remained for nine years generally at Rome, engaged there in a constant struggle for power. He was successful in these efforts, rising all the time from one position of influence and honor to another, until he became altogether the most prominent and powerful man in the city. A great many incidents are recorded, as attending these contests, which illustrate in a very striking manner the strange mixture of rude violence and legal formality by which Rome was in those days governed. This practice seems to us very absurd; and we wonder that the Roman people should tolerate it, since it is evident that the means for defraying these expenses must come, ultimately, in some way or other, from them. And yet, absurd as it seems, this sort of policy is not wholly disused even in our day. The operas and the theaters, and other similar establishments in France, are sustained, in part, by the government; and the liberality and efficiency with which this is done, forms, in some degree, the basis of the popularity of each succeeding administration. The plan is better systematized and regulated in our day, but it is, in its nature, substantially the same.

In fact, furnishing amusements for the people, and also providing supplies for their wants, as well as affording them protection, were considered the legitimate objects of government in those days. It is very different at the present time, and especially in this country. The whole community are now united in the desire to confine the functions of government within the narrowest possible limits, such as to include only the preservation of public order and public safety. The people prefer to supply their own wants and to provide their own

enjoyments, rather than to invest government with the power to do it for them, knowing very well that, on the latter plan, the burdens they will have to bear, though concealed for a time, must be doubled in the end. Thus Rome was a city supported, in a great measure, by the fruits of its conquests, that is, in a certain sense, by plunder. It was a vast community most efficiently and admirably organized for this purpose; and yet it would not be perfectly just to designate the people simply as a band of robbers. They rendered, in some sense, an equivalent for what they took, in establishing and enforcing a certain organization of society throughout the world, and in preserving a sort of public order and peace. They built cities, they constructed aqueducts and roads; they formed harbors, and protected them by piers and by castles; they protected commerce, and cultivated the arts, and encouraged literature, and enforced a general quiet and peace among mankind, allowing of no violence or war except what they themselves created. Thus they *governed* the world, and they felt, as all governors of mankind always do, fully entitled to supply themselves with the comforts and conveniences of life, in consideration of the service which they thus rendered.

Of course, it was to be expected that they would sometimes quarrel among themselves about the spoils. Ambitious men were always arising, eager to obtain opportunities to make fresh conquests, and to bring home new supplies, and those who were most successful in making the results of their conquests available in adding to the wealth and to the public enjoyments of the city, would, of course, be most popular with the voters. Hence extortion in the provinces, and the most profuse and lavish expenditure in the city, became the policy which every great man must pursue to rise to power.

Caesar entered into this policy with his whole soul, founding all his hopes of success upon the favor of the populace. Of course, he had many rivals and opponents among the patrician ranks, and in the Senate, and they often impeded and thwarted his plans and measures for a time, though he always triumphed in the end. His rivals and enemies accused him of various schemes, more or less violent and treasonable in their nature, but how justly it is not now possible to ascertain. They alleged that one of his plans was to join some of the neighboring colonies, whose inhabitants wished to be admitted to the freedom of the city, and, making common cause with them, to raise an armed force and take possession of Rome. It was said that, to prevent the accomplishment of this design, an army which they had raised for the purpose of an expedition against the Cilician pirates was detained from its march, and that Caesar, seeing that the government were on their guard against him, abandoned the plan.

They also charged him with having formed, after this, a plan within the city for assassinating the senators in the senate house, and then usurping, with his fellow-conspirators, the supreme power. Crassus, who was a man of vast wealth and a great friend of Caesar's, was associated with him in this plot, and was to have been made dictator if it had succeeded. But, notwithstanding the brilliant prize with which Caesar attempted to allure Crassus to the enterprise, his courage failed him when the time for action arrived. Courage and enterprise, in fact, ought not to be expected of the rich; they are the virtues of poverty. He was getting, however, by these means, very deeply involved in debt; and, in order partly to retrieve his fortunes in this respect, he made an attempt to have Egypt assigned to him as a province. Egypt was then an immensely rich and fertile country. It had, however, never been a Roman province. It was an independent

kingdom, in alliance with the Romans, and Caesar's proposal that it should be assigned to him as a province appeared very extraordinary. His pretext was, that the people of Egypt had recently deposed and expelled their king, and that, consequently, the Romans might properly take possession of it. The Senate, however, resisted this plan, either from jealousy of Caesar or from a sense of justice to Egypt; and, after a violent contest, Caesar found himself compelled to give up the design. He felt, however, a strong degree of resentment against the patrician party who had thus thwarted his designs. Accordingly, in order to avenge himself upon them, he one night replaced certain statues and trophies of Marius in the Capitol, which had been taken down by order of Sylla when he returned to power. Marius, as will be recollected, had been the great champion of the popular party, and the enemy of the patricians; and, at the time of his down-fall, all the memorials of his power and greatness had been every where removed from Rome, and among them these statues and trophies, which had been erected in the Capitol in commemoration of some former victories, and had remained there until Sylla's triumph, when they were taken down and destroyed. Caesar now ordered new ones to be made, far more magnificent than before. They were made secretly, and put up in the night. His office as aedile gave him the necessary authority. The next morning, when the people saw these splendid monuments of their great favorite restored, the whole city was animated with excitement and joy. The patricians, on the other hand, were filled with vexation and rage. "Here is a single officer," said they, "who is attempting to restore, by his individual authority, what has been formally abolished by a decree of the Senate. He is trying to see how much we will bear. If he finds that we will submit to this, he will attempt bolder measures still." They accordingly

commenced a movement to have the statues and trophies taken down again, but the people rallied in vast numbers in defense of them. They made the Capitol ring with their shouts of applause; and the Senate, finding their power insufficient to cope with so great a force, gave up the point, and Caesar gained the day.

Caesar had married another wife after the death of Cornelia. Her name was Pompeia, He divorced Pompeia about this time, under very extraordinary circumstances. Among the other strange religious ceremonies and celebrations which were observed in those days, was one called the celebration of the mysteries of the Good Goddess. This celebration was held by females alone, every thing masculine being most carefully excluded. Even the pictures of men, if there were any upon the walls of the house where the assembly was held, were covered. The persons engaged spent the night together in music and dancing and various secret ceremonies, half pleasure, half worship, according to the ideas and customs of the time. The mysteries of the Good Goddess were to be celebrated one night at Caesar's house, he himself having, of course, withdrawn. In the middle of the night, the whole company in one of the apartments were thrown into consternation at finding that one of their number was a man. He had a smooth and youthful-looking face, and was very perfectly disguised in the dress of a female. He proved to be a certain Clodius, a very base and dissolute young man, though of great wealth and high connections. He had been admitted by a female slave of Pompeia's, whom he had succeeded in bribing. It was suspected that it was with Pompeia's concurrence. At any rate, Caesar immediately divorced his wife. The Senate ordered an inquiry into the affair, and, after the other members of the household had given their testimony, Caesar himself was called upon, but he had

nothing to say. He knew nothing about it. They asked him, then, why he had divorced Pompeia, unless he had some evidence for believing her guilty, He replied, that a wife of Caesar must not only be without crime, but without suspicion. Clodius was a very desperate and lawless character, and his subsequent history shows, in a striking point of view, the degree of violence and disorder which reigned in those times. He became involved in a bitter contention with another citizen whose name was Milo, and each, gaining as many adherents as he could, at length drew almost the whole city into their quarrel. Whenever they went out, they were attended with armed bands, which were continually in danger of coming into collision. The collision at last came, quite a battle was fought, and Clodius was killed. This made the difficulty worse than it was before. Parties were formed, and violent disputes arose on the question of bringing Milo to trial for the alleged murder. He was brought to trial at last, but so great was the public excitement, that the consuls for the time surrounded and filled the whole Forum with armed men while the trial was proceeding, to ensure the safety of the court. Although Caesar was all this time, on the whole, rising in influence and power, there were still fluctuations in his fortune, and the tide sometimes, for a short period, went strongly against him. He was at one time, when greatly involved in debt, and embarrassed in all his affairs, a candidate for a very high office, that of Pontifex Maximus, or sovereign pontiff. The office of the pontifex was originally that of building and keeping custody of the bridges of the city, the name being derived from the Latin word *pons*, which signifies bridge. To this, however, had afterward been added the care of the temples, and finally the regulation and control of the ceremonies of religion, so that it came in the end to be an office of the highest dignity and

honor. Caesar made the most desperate efforts to secure his election, resorting to such measures, expending such sums, and involving himself in debt to such an extreme, that, if he failed, he would be irretrievably ruined. His mother, sympathizing with him in his anxiety, kissed him when he went away from the house on the morning of the election, and bade him farewell with tears. He told her that he should come home that night the pontiff, or he should never come home at all. He succeeded in gaining the election. After this, Caesar became involved in another difficulty, in consequence of the appearance of some definite and positive evidence that he was connected with Catiline in his famous conspiracy. One of the senators said that Catiline himself had informed him that Caesar was one of the accomplices of the plot. Another witness, named Vettius, laid an information against Caesar before a Roman magistrate, and offered to produce Caesar's handwriting in proof of his participation in the conspirator's designs. Caesar was very much incensed, and his manner of vindicating himself from these serious charges was as singular as many of his other deeds. He arrested Vettius, and sentenced him to pay a heavy fine, and to be imprisoned; and he contrived also to expose him, in the course of the proceedings, to the mob in the Forum, who were always ready to espouse Caesar's cause, and who, on this occasion, beat Vettius so unmercifully, that he barely escaped with his life. The magistrate, too, was thrown into prison for having dared to take an information against a superior officer. At last Caesar became so much involved in debt, through the boundless extravagance of his expenditures, that something must be done to replenish his exhausted finances. He had, however, by this time, risen so high in official influence and power, that he succeeded in having Spain assigned to him as his province, and he began to

make preparations to proceed to it. His creditors, however, interposed, unwilling to let him go without giving them security. In this dilemma, Caesar succeeded in making an arrangement with Crassus, who has already been spoken of as a man of unbounded wealth and great ambition, but not possessed of any considerable degree of intellectual power. Crassus consented to give the necessary security, with an understanding that Caesar was to repay him by exerting his political influence in his favor. So soon as this arrangement was made, Caesar set off in a sudden and private manner, as if he expected that otherwise some new difficulty would intervene.

He went to Spain by land, passing through Switzerland on the way. He stopped with his attendants one night at a very insignificant village of shepherds' huts among the mountains. Struck with the poverty and worthlessness of all they saw in this wretched hamlet, Caesar's friends were wondering whether the jealousy, rivalry, and ambition which reigned among men every where else in the world could find any footing there, when Caesar told them that, for his part, he should rather choose to be first in such a village as that than the second at Rome. The story has been repeated a thousand times, and told to every successive generation now for nearly twenty centuries, as an illustration of the peculiar type and character of the ambition which controls such a soul as that of Caesar.

Caesar was very successful in the administration of his province; that is to say, he returned in a short time with considerable military glory, and with money enough to pay all his debts, and furnish him with means for fresh electioneering. He now felt strong enough to aspire to the office of consul, which was the highest office of the Roman state. When the line of kings had been deposed, the Romans

had vested the supreme magistracy in the hands of two consuls, who were chosen annually in a general election, the formalities of which were all very carefully arranged. The current of popular opinion was, of course, in Caesar's favor, but he had many powerful rivals and enemies among the great, who, however, hated and opposed each other as well as him. There was at that time a very bitter feud between Pompey and Crassus, each of them struggling for power against the efforts of the other. Pompey possessed great influence through his splendid abilities and his military renown. Crassus, as has already been stated, was powerful through his wealth. Caesar, who had some influence with them both, now conceived the bold design of reconciling them, and then of availing himself of their united aid in accomplishing his own particular ends.

He succeeded perfectly well in this management. He represented to them that, by contending against each other, they only exhausted their own powers, and strengthened the arms of their common enemies. He proposed to them to unite with one another and with him, and thus make common cause to promote their common interest and advancement. They willingly acceded to this plan, and a triple league was accordingly formed, in which they each bound themselves to promote, by every means in his power, the political elevation of the others, and not to take any public step or adopt any measures without the concurrence of the three. Caesar faithfully observed the obligations of this league so long as he could use his two associates to promote his own ends, and then he abandoned it.

Having, however, completed this arrangement, he was now prepared to push vigorously his claims to be elected consul. He associated with his own name that of Luceius, who was a man of great wealth, and who agreed to defray the expenses of the election

for the sake of the honor of being consul with Caesar. Caesar's enemies, however, knowing that they probably could not prevent his election, determined to concentrate their strength in the effort to prevent his having the colleague he desired. They made choice, therefore, of a certain Bibulus as their candidate. Bibulus had always been a political opponent of Caesar's, and they thought that, by associating him with Caesar in the supreme magistracy, the pride and ambition of their great adversary might be held somewhat in check. They accordingly made a contribution among themselves to enable Bibulus to expend as much money in bribery as Lucceius, and the canvass went on. It resulted in the election of Caesar and Bibulus. They entered upon the duties of their office; but Caesar, almost entirely disregarding his colleague, began to assume the whole power, and proposed and carried measure after measure of the most extraordinary character, all aiming at the gratification of the populace. He was at first opposed violently both by Bibulus and by many leading members of the Senate, especially by Cato, a stern and inflexible patriot, whom neither fear of danger nor hope of reward could move from what he regarded his duty. But Caesar was now getting strong enough to put down the opposition which he encountered with out much scruple as to the means. He ordered Cato on one occasion to be arrested in the Senate and sent to prison. Another influential member of the Senate rose and was going out with him. Caesar asked him where he was going. He said he was going with Cato. He would rather, he said, be with Cato in prison, than in the Senate with Caesar. Caesar treated Bibulus also with so much neglect, and assumed so entirely the whole control of the consular power, to the utter exclusion of his colleague, that Bibulus at last, completely discouraged and chagrined, abandoned all

pretension to official authority, retired to his house, and shut himself up in perfect seclusion, leaving Caesar to his own way. It was customary among the Romans, in their historical and narrative writings, to designate the successive years, not by a numerical date as with us, but by the names of the consuls who held office in them. Thus, in the time of Caesar's consulship, the phrase would have been, "In the year of Caesar and Bibulus, consuls," according to the ordinary usage; but the wags of the city, in order to make sport of the assumptions of Caesar and the insignificance of Bibulus, used to say, "In the year of Julius and Caesar, consuls," rejecting the name of Bibulus altogether, and taking the two names of Caesar to make out the necessary duality.

CHAPTER IV. THE CONQUEST OF GAUL.

In attaining to the consulship, Caesar had reached the highest point of elevation which it was possible to reach as a mere citizen of Rome. His ambition was, however, of course, not satisfied. The only way to acquire higher distinction and to rise to higher power was to enter upon a career of foreign conquest. Caesar therefore aspired now to be a soldier. He accordingly obtained the command of an army, and entered upon a course of military campaigns in the heart of Europe, which he continued for eight years. These eight years constitute one of the most important and strongly-marked periods of his life. He was triumphantly successful in his military career, and he made, accordingly, a vast accession to his celebrity and power, in his own day, by the results of his campaigns. He also wrote, himself, an account of his adventures during this period, in which the events are recorded in so lucid and in so eloquent a manner, that the narrations have continued to be read by every successive generation of scholars down to the present day, and they have had a great influence in extending and perpetuating his fame. The principal scenes of the exploits which Caesar performed during the period of this his first great military career, were the north of Italy, Switzerland, France, Germany, and England, a great tract of country, nearly all of which he overran and conquered. A large portion of this territory was called Gaul in those days; the part on the Italian side of the Alps being named Cisalpine Gaul, while that which lay beyond was designated as Transalpine. Transalpine Gaul was substantially what is now France. There was a part of Transalpine Gaul which had been already conquered and reduced to a Roman province. It was called The Province then, and has retained the name, with a slight change in

orthography, to the present day. It is now known as Provence. The countries which Caesar went to invade were occupied by various nations and tribes, many of which were well organized and war-like, and some of them were considerably civilized and wealthy. They had extended tracts of cultivated land, the slopes of the hills and the mountain sides being formed into green pasturages, which were covered with flocks of goats, and sheep, and herds of cattle, while the smoother and more level tracts were adorned with smiling vineyards and broadly-extended fields of waving grain. They had cities, forts, ships, and armies. Their manners and customs would be considered somewhat rude by modern nations, and some of their usages of war were half barbarian. For example, in one of the nations which Caesar encountered, he found, as he says in his narrative, a corps of cavalry, as a constituent part of the army, in which, to every horse, there were *two* men, one the rider, and the other a sort of foot soldier and attendant. If the battle went against them, and the squadron were put to their speed in a retreat, these footmen would cling to the manes-of the horses, and then, half running, half flying, they would be borne along over the field, thus keeping always at the side of their comrades, and escaping with them to a place of safety.

But, although the Romans were inclined to consider these nations as only half civilized, still there would be great glory, as Caesar thought, in subduing them, and probably great treasure would be secured in the conquest, both by the plunder and confiscation of governmental property, and by the tribute which would be collected in taxes from the people of the countries subdued. Caesar accordingly placed himself at the head of an army of three Roman legions, which he contrived, by means of a great deal of political maneuvering and management, to have raised and placed under his

command. One of these legions, which was called the tenth legion, was his favorite corps, on account of the bravery and hardihood which they often displayed. At the head of these legions, Caesar set out for Gaul. He was at this time not far from forty years of age.

Caesar had no difficulty in finding pretexts for making war upon any of these various nations that he might desire to subdue. They were, of course, frequently at war with each other, and there were at all times standing topics of controversy and unsettled disputes among them. Caesar had, therefore, only to draw near to the scene of contention, and then to take sides with one party or the other, it mattered little with which, for the affair almost always resulted, in the end, in his making himself master of both. The manner, however, in which this sort of operation was performed, can best be illustrated by an example, and we will take for the purpose the case of Ariovistus. Ariovistus was a German king. He had been nominally a sort of ally of the Romans. He had extended his conquests across the Rhine into Gaul, and he held some nations there as his tributaries. Among these, the Aeduians were a prominent party, and, to simplify the account, we will take their name as the representative of all who were concerned. When Caesar came into the region of the Aeduians, he entered into some negotiations with them, in which they, as he alleges, asked his assistance to enable them to throw off the dominion of their German enemy. It is probable, in fact, that there was some proposition of this kind from them, for Caesar had abundant means of inducing them to make it, if he was disposed, and the receiving of such a communication furnished the most obvious and plausible pretext to authorize and justify his interposition.

Caesar accordingly sent a messenger across the Rhine to Ariovistus, saying that he wished to have an interview with him on

business of importance, and asking him to name a time which would be convenient to him for the interview, and also to appoint some place in Gaul where he would attend.

To this Ariovistus replied, that if he had, himself, any business with Caesar, he would have waited upon him to propose it; and, in the same manner, if Caesar wished to see him, he must come into his own dominions. He said that it would not be safe for him to come into Gaul without an army, and that it was not convenient for him to raise and equip an army for such a purpose at that time.

Caesar sent again to Ariovistus to say, that since he was so unmindful of his obligations to the Roman people as to refuse an interview with him on business of common interest, he would state the particulars that he required of him. The Aeduans, he said, were now his allies, and under his protection; and Ariovistus must send back the hostages which he held from them, and bind himself henceforth not to send any more troops across the Rhine, nor make war upon the Aeduans, or injure them in any way. If he complied with these terms, all would be well. If he did not, Caesar said that he should not himself disregard the just complaints of his allies.

Ariovistus had no fear of Caesar. Caesar had, in fact, thus far, not begun to acquire the military renown to which he afterward attained. Ariovistus had, therefore, no particular cause to dread his power. He sent him back word that he did not understand why Caesar should interfere between him and his conquered province.

“The Aeduans,” said he, “tried the fortune of war with me, and were overcome; and they must abide the issue. The Romans manage their conquered provinces as they judge proper, without holding themselves accountable to any one. I shall do the same with mine. All that I can say is, that so long as the Aeduans submit peaceably to

my authority, and pay their tribute, I shall not molest them; as to your threat that you shall not disregard their complaints, you must know that no one has ever made war upon me but to his own destruction, and, if you wish to see how it will turn out in your case, you may make the experiment whenever you please.”

Both parties immediately prepared for war. Ariovistus, instead of waiting to be attacked, assembled his army, crossed the Rhine, and advanced into the territories from which Caesar had undertaken to exclude him.

As Caesar, however, began to make his arrangements for putting his army in motion to meet his approaching enemy, there began to circulate throughout the camp such extraordinary stories of the terrible strength and courage of the German soldiery as to produce a very general panic. So great, at length, became the anxiety and alarm, that even the officers were wholly dejected and discouraged; and as for the men, they were on the very eve of mutiny.

When Caesar understood this state of things, he called an assembly of the troops, and made an address to them. He told them that he was astonished to learn to what an extent an unworthy despondency and fear had taken possession of their minds, and how little confidence they reposed in him, their general. And then, after some further remarks about the duty of a soldier to be ready to go wherever his commander leads him, and presenting also some considerations in respect to the German troops with which they were going to contend, in order to show them that they had no cause to fear, he ended by saying that he had not been fully decided as to the time of marching, but that now he had concluded to give orders for setting out the next morning at three o'clock, that he might learn, as soon as possible, who were too cowardly to follow him. He would go

himself, he said, if he was attended by the tenth legion alone He was sure that they would not shrink from any undertaking in which he led the way. The soldiers, moved partly by shame, partly by the decisive and commanding tone which their general assumed, and partly reassured by the courage and confidence which he seemed to feel, laid aside their fears, and vied with each other henceforth in energy and ardor. The armies approached each other. Ariovistus sent to Caesar, saying that now, if he wished it, he was ready for an interview. Caesar acceded to the suggestion, and the arrangements for a conference were made, each party, as usual in such cases, taking every precaution to guard against the treachery of the other.

Between the two camps there was a rising ground, in the middle of an open plain, where it was decided that the conference should be held. Ariovistus proposed that neither party should bring any foot soldiers to the place of meeting, but cavalry alone; and that these bodies of cavalry, brought by the respective generals, should remain at the foot of the eminence on either side, while Caesar and Ariovistus themselves, attended each by only ten followers on horseback, should ascend it. This plan was acceded to by Caesar, and a long conference was held in this way between the two generals, as they sat upon their horses, on the summit of the hill. The two generals, in their discussion, only repeated in substance what they had said in their embassages before, and made no progress toward coming to an understanding. At length Caesar closed the conference and withdrew. Some days afterward Ariovistus sent a request to Caesar, asking that he would appoint another interview, or else that he would depute one of his officers to proceed to Ariovistus's camp and receive a communication which he wished to make to him. Caesar concluded not to grant another interview, and he did not think

it prudent to send any one of his principal officers as an ambassador, for fear that he might be treacherously seized and held as a hostage. He accordingly sent an ordinary messenger, accompanied by one or two men. These men were all seized and put in irons as soon as they reached the camp of Ariovistus, and Caesar now prepared in earnest for giving his enemy battle.

He proved himself as skillful and efficient in arranging and managing the combat as he had been sagacious and adroit in the negotiations which preceded it. Several days were spent in maneuvers and movements, by which each party endeavored to gain some advantage over the other in respect to their position in the approaching struggle. When at length the combat came, Caesar and his legions were entirely and triumphantly successful. The Germans were put totally to flight. Their baggage and stores were all seized, and the troops themselves fled in dismay by all the roads which led back to the Rhine; and there those who succeeded in escaping death from the Romans, who pursued them all the way, embarked in boats and upon rafts, and returned to their homes. Ariovistus himself found a small boat, in which, with one or two followers, he succeeded in getting across the stream.

As Caesar, at the head of a body of his troops, was pursuing the enemy in this their flight, he overtook one party who had a prisoner with them confined by iron chains fastened to his limbs, and whom they were hurrying rapidly along. This prisoner proved to be the messenger that Caesar had sent to Ariovistus's camp, and whom he had, as Caesar alleges, treacherously detained. Of course, he was overjoyed to be recaptured and set at liberty. The man said that three times they had drawn lots to see whether they should burn him alive then, or reserve the pleasure for a future occasion, and that every

time the lot had resulted in his favor. The consequence of this victory was, that Caesar's authority was established triumphantly over all that part of Gaul which he had thus freed from Ariovistus's sway. Other parts of the country, too, were pervaded by the fame of his exploits, and the people every where began to consider what action it would be incumbent on them to take, in respect to the new military power which had appeared so suddenly among them. Some nations determined to submit without resistance, and to seek the conqueror's alliance and protection. Others, more bold, or more confident of their strength, began to form combinations and to arrange plans for resisting him. But, whatever they did, the result in the end was the same. Caesar's ascendancy was every where and always gaining ground. Of course, it is impossible in the compass of a single chapter, which is all that can be devoted to the subject in this volume, to give any regular narrative of the events of the eight years of Caesar's military career in Gaul. Marches, negotiations, battles, and victories mingled with and followed each other in a long succession, the particulars of which it would require a volume to detail, every thing resulting most successfully for the increase of Caesar's power and the extension of his fame. After the countries which were the scene of these conquests were pretty well subdued, Caesar established on some of the great routes of travel a system of posts, that is, he stationed supplies of horses at intervals of from ten to twenty miles along the way, so that he himself, or the officers of his army, or any couriers where he might have occasion to send with dispatches could travel with great speed by finding a fresh horse ready at every stage. By this means he sometimes traveled himself a hundred miles in a day. This system, thus adopted for military purposes in Caesar's time, has been continued in almost all countries

of Europe to the present age, and is applied to traveling in carriages as well as on horseback. A family party purchase a carriage, and arranging within it all the comforts and conveniences which they will require on the journey, they set out, taking these post horses, fresh at each village, to draw them to the next. Thus they can go at any rate of speed which they desire, instead of being limited in their movements by the powers of endurance of one set of animals, as they would be compelled to be if they were to travel with their own. This plan has, for some reason, never been introduced into America, and it is now probable that it never will be, as the railway system will doubtless supersede it. One of the most remarkable of the enterprises which Caesar undertook during the period of these campaigns was his excursion into Great Britain. The real motive of this expedition was probably a love of romantic adventure, and a desire to secure for himself at Rome the glory of having penetrated into remote regions which Roman armies had never reached before. The pretext, however, which he made to justify his invading the territories of the Britons was, that the people of the island were accustomed to come across the Channel and aid the Gauls in their wars.

In forming his arrangements for going into England, the first thing was, to obtain all the information which was accessible in Gaul in respect to the country. There were, in those days, great numbers of traveling merchants, who went from one nation to another to purchase and sell, taking with them such goods as were most easy of transportation. These merchants, of course, were generally possessed of a great deal of information in respect to the countries which they had visited, and Caesar called together as many of them as he could find, when he had reached the northern shores of France, to inquire about the modes of crossing the Channel, the harbors on the English

side, the geographical conformation of the country, and the military resources of the people. He found, however, that the merchants could give him very little information. They knew that Britain was an island, but they did not know its extent or its boundaries; and they could tell him very little of the character or customs of the people. They said that they had only been accustomed to land upon the southern shore, and to transact all their business there, without penetrating at all into the interior of the country.

Caesar then, who, though undaunted and bold in emergencies requiring prompt and decisive action, was extremely cautious and wary at all other times, fitted up a single ship, and, putting one of his officers on board with a proper crew, directed him to cross the Channel to the English coast, and then to cruise along the land for some miles in each direction, to observe where were the best harbors and places for landing, and to examine generally the appearance of the shore. This vessel was a galley, manned with numerous oarsmen, well selected and strong, so that it could retreat with great speed from any sudden appearance of danger. The name of the officer who had the command of it was Volusenus. Volusenus set sail, the army watching his vessel with great interest as it moved slowly away from the shore. He was gone five days, and then returned, bringing Caesar an account of his discoveries.

In the mean time, Caesar had collected a large number of sailing vessels from the whole line of the French shore, by means of which he proposed to transport his army across the Channel. He had two legions to take into Britain, the remainder of his forces having been stationed as garrisons in various parts of Gaul. It was necessary, too, to leave a considerable force at his post of debarkation, in order to secure a safe retreat in case of any disaster on the British side. The

number of transport ships provided for the foot soldiers which were to be taken over was eighty. There were, besides these, eighteen more, which were appointed to convey a squadron of horse. This cavalry force was to embark at a separate port, about eighty miles distant from the one from which the infantry were to sail.

At length a suitable day for the embarkation arrived; the troops were put on board the ships, and orders were given to sail. The day could not be fixed beforehand, as the time for attempting to make the passage must necessarily depend upon the state of the wind and weather. Accordingly, when the favorable opportunity arrived, and the main body of the army began to embark it took some time to send the orders to the port where the cavalry had rendezvoused; and there were, besides, other causes of delay which occurred to detain this corps, so that it turned out, as we shall presently see, that the foot soldiers had to act alone in the first attempt at landing on the British shore. It was one o'clock in the morning when the fleet set sail. The Britons had, in the mean time, obtained intelligence of Caesar's threatened invasion, and they had assembled in great force, with troops, and horsemen, and carriages of war, and were all ready to guard the shore. The coast, at the point where Caesar was approaching, consists of a line of chalky cliffs, with valley-like openings here and there between them, communicating with the shore, and sometimes narrow beaches below. When the Roman fleet approached the land, Caesar found the cliffs every where lined with troops of Britons, and every accessible point below carefully guarded. It was now about ten o'clock in the morning, and Caesar, finding the prospect so unfavorable in respect to the practicability of effecting a landing here, brought his fleet to anchor near the shore, but far enough from it to be safe from the missiles of the enemy.

Here he remained for several hours, to give time for all the vessels to join him. Some of them had been delayed in the embarkation, or had made slower progress than the rest in crossing the Channel. He called a council, too, of the superior officers of the army on board his own galley, and explained to them the plan which he now adopted for the landing. About three o'clock in the afternoon he sent these officers back to their respective ships, and gave orders to make sail along the shore. The anchors were raised and the fleet moved on, borne by the united impulse of the wind and the tide. The Britons, perceiving this movement, put themselves in motion on the land, following the motions of the fleet so as to be ready to meet their enemy wherever they might ultimately undertake to land. Their horsemen and carriages went on in advance, and the foot soldiers followed, all pressing eagerly forward to keep up with the motion of the fleet, and to prevent Caesar's army from having time to land before they should arrive at the spot and be ready to oppose them.

Caesar had afterward a great variety of adventures, and many narrow escapes from imminent dangers in Britain, and, though he gained considerable glory by thus penetrating into such remote and unknown regions, there was very little else to be acquired. The glory, however, was itself of great value to Caesar. During the whole period of his campaigns in Gaul, Rome and all Italy in fact, had been filled with the fame of his exploits, and the expedition into Britain added not a little to his renown. The populace of the city were greatly gratified to hear of the continued success of their former favorite. They decreed to him triumph after triumph, and were prepared to welcome him, whenever he should return, with greater honors and more extended and higher powers than he had ever enjoyed before.

Caesar's exploits in these campaigns were, in fact, in a military

point of view, of the most magnificent character. Plutarch, in summing up the results of them, says that he took eight hundred cities, conquered three hundred nations, fought pitched battles at separate times with three millions of men, took one million of prisoners, and killed another million on the field. What a vast work of destruction was this for a man to spend eight years of his life in performing upon his fellow-creatures, merely to gratify his insane love of dominion.

CHAPTER V. POMPEY.

While Caesar had thus been rising to so high an elevation, there was another Roman general who had been, for nearly the same period, engaged, in various other quarters of the world, in acquiring, by very similar means, an almost equal renown. This general was Pompey. He became, in the end, Caesar's great and formidable rival. In order that the reader may understand clearly the nature of the great contest which sprung up at last between these heroes, we must now go back and relate some of the particulars of Pompey's individual history down to the time of the completion of Caesar's conquests in Gaul. Pompey was a few years older than Caesar, having been born in 106 B.C. His father was a Roman general, and the young Pompey was brought up in camp. He was a young man of very handsome figure and countenance, and of very agreeable manners. His hair curled slightly over his forehead, and he had a dark and intelligent eye, full of vivacity and meaning. There was, besides, in the expression of his face, and in his air and address, a certain indescribable charm, which prepossessed every one strongly in his favor, and gave him, from his earliest years, a great personal ascendancy over all who knew him.

Notwithstanding this popularity, however, Pompey did not escape, even in very early life, incurring his share of the dangers which seemed to environ the path of every public man in those distracted times. It will be recollected that, in the contests between Marius and Sylla, Caesar had joined the Marian faction. Pompey's father, on the other hand, had connected himself with that of Sylla. At one time, in the midst of these wars, when Pompey was very young, a conspiracy was formed to assassinate his father by burning

him in his tent, and Pompey's comrade, named Terentius, who slept in the same tent with him, had been bribed to kill Pompey himself at the same time, by stabbing him in his bed. Pompey contrived to discover this plan, but, instead of being at all discomposed by it, he made arrangements for a guard about his father's tent and then went to supper as usual with Terentius, conversing with him all the time in even a more free and friendly manner than usual. That night he arranged his bed so as to make it appear as if he was in it, and then stole away. When the appointed hour arrived, Terentius came into the tent, and, approaching the couch where he supposed Pompey was lying asleep, stabbed it again and again, piercing the coverlets in many places, but doing no harm, of course, to his intended victim. Pompey rose rapidly to higher and higher degrees of distinction, until he obtained the command of an army, which he had, in fact, in a great measure raised and organized himself, and he fought at the head of it with great energy and success against the enemies of Sylla. At length he was hemmed in on the eastern coast of Italy by three separate armies, which were gradually advancing against him, with a certainty, as they thought, of effecting his destruction. Sylla, hearing of Pompey's danger, made great efforts to march to his rescue. Before he reached the place, however, Pompey had met and defeated one after another of the armies of his enemies, so that, when Sylla approached, Pompey marched out to meet him with his army drawn up in magnificent array, trumpets sounding and banners flying, and with large bodies of disarmed troops, the prisoners that he had taken, in the rear. Sylla was struck with surprise and admiration; and when Pompey saluted him with the title of *Imperator*, which was the highest title known to the Roman constitution, and the one which Sylla's lofty rank and unbounded

power might properly claim, Sylla returned the compliment by conferring this great mark of distinction on him. Pompey proceeded to Rome, and the fame of his exploits, the singular fascination of his person and manners, and the great favor with Sylla that he enjoyed, raised him to a high degree of distinction. He was not, however, elated with the pride and vanity which so young a man would be naturally expected to exhibit under such circumstances. He was, on the contrary, modest and unassuming, and he acted in all respects in such a manner as to gain the approbation and the kind regard of all who knew him, as well as to excite their applause. There was an old general at this time in Gaul — for all these events took place long before the time of Caesar's campaigns in that country, and, in fact, before the commencement of his successful career in Rome — whose name was Metellus, and who, either on account of his advancing age, or for some other reason, was very inefficient and unsuccessful in his government. Sylla proposed to supersede him by sending Pompey to take his place. Pompey replied that it was not right to take the command from a man who was so much his superior in age and character, but that, if Metellus wished for his *assistance* in the management of his command, he would proceed to Gaul and render him every service in his power. When this answer was reported to Metellus, he wrote to Pompey to come. Pompey accordingly went to Gaul, where he obtained new victories, and gained new and higher honors than before. Pompey began, it seems, now to experience, in some degree, the usual effects produced upon the human heart by celebrity and praise. He demanded a triumph. A triumph was a great and splendid ceremony, by which victorious generals, who were of advanced age and high civil or military rank, were received into the city when returning from any specially

glorious campaign. There was a grand procession formed on these occasions, in which various emblems and insignia, and trophies of victory, and captives taken by the conqueror, were displayed. This great procession entered the city with bands of music accompanying it, and flags and banners flying, passing under triumphal arches erected along the way. Triumphs were usually decreed by a vote of the Senate, in cases where they were deserved; but, in this case, Sylla's power as dictator was supreme, and Pompey's demand for a triumph seems to have been addressed accordingly to him.

Sylla refused it. Pompey's performances in the African campaign had been, he admitted, very creditable to him, but he had neither the Age nor the rank to justify the granting him a triumph. To bestow such an honor upon one so young and in such a station, would only bring the honor itself, he said, into disrepute, and degrade, also, his dictatorship for suffering it.

To this Pompey replied, speaking, however, in an under tone to those around him in the assembly, that Sylla need not fear that the triumph would be unpopular, for people were much more disposed to worship a rising than a setting sun. Sylla did not hear this remark, but, perceiving by the countenances of the by-standers that Pompey had said something which seemed to please them, he asked what it was. When the remark was repeated to him, he seemed pleased himself with its justness or with its wit, and said, "Let him have his triumph."

The arrangements were accordingly made Pompey ordering every thing necessary to be prepared for a most magnificent procession. He learned that some persons in the city, envious at his early renown, were displeased with his triumph; this only awakened in him a determination to make it still more splendid and imposing. He had

brought some elephants with him from Africa, and he formed a plan for having the car in which he was to ride in the procession drawn by four of these huge beasts as it entered the city; but, on measuring the gate, it was found not wide enough to admit such a team, and the plan was accordingly abandoned. The conqueror's car was drawn by horses in the usual manner, and the elephants followed singly, with the other trophies, to grace the train.

Pompey remained some time after this in Rome, sustaining from time to time various offices of dignity and honor. His services were often called for to plead causes in the Forum, and he performed this duty, whenever he undertook it, with great success. He, however, seemed generally inclined to retire somewhat from intimate intercourse with the mass of the community, knowing very well that if he was engaged often in the discussion of common questions with ordinary men, he should soon descend in public estimation from the high position to which his military renown had raised him. He accordingly accustomed himself to appear but little in public, and, when he did so appear, he was generally accompanied by a large retinue of armed attendants, at the head of which he moved about the city in great state, more like a victorious general in a conquered province than like a peaceful citizen exercising ordinary official functions in a community governed by law. This was a very sagacious course, so far as concerned the attainment of the great objects of future ambition. Pompey knew very well that occasions would probably arise in which he could act far more effectually for the promotion of his own greatness and fame than by mingling in the ordinary municipal contests of the city. At length, in fact, an occasion came. In the year B.C. 67, which was about the time that Caesar commenced his successful career in rising to public office in Rome,

as is described in the third chapter of this volume, the Cilician pirates, of whose desperate character and bold exploits something has already been said, had become so powerful, and were increasing so rapidly in the extent of their depredations, that the Roman people felt compelled to adopt some very vigorous measures for suppressing them. The pirates had increased in numbers during the wars between Marius and Sylla in a very alarming degree. They had built, equipped, and organized whole fleets. They had various fortresses, arsenals, ports, and watch-towers all along the coasts of the Mediterranean. They had also extensive warehouses, built in secure and secluded places, where they stored their plunder. Their fleets were well manned, and provided with skillful pilots, and with ample supplies of every kind; and they were so well constructed, both for speed and safety, that no other ships could be made to surpass them. Many of them, too, were adorned and decorated in the most sumptuous manner, with gilded sterns, purple awnings, and silver-mounted oars. The number of their galleys was said to be a thousand. With this force they made themselves almost complete masters of the sea. They attacked not only separate ships, but whole fleets of merchantmen sailing under convoy; and they increased the difficulty and expense of bringing grain to Rome so much, by intercepting the supplies, as very materially to enhance the price and to threaten a scarcity. They made themselves masters of many islands and of various maritime towns along the coast, until they had four hundred ports and cities in their possession. In fact, they had gone so far toward forming themselves into a regular maritime power, under a systematic and legitimate government, that very respectable young men from other countries began to enter their service, as one opening honorable avenues to wealth and fame. Under these circumstances, it

was obvious that something decisive must be done. A friend of Pompey's brought forward a plan for commissioning some one, he did not say whom, but every one understood that Pompey was intended, to be sent forth against the pirates, with extraordinary powers, such as should be amply sufficient to enable him to bring their dominion to an end. He was to have supreme command upon the sea, and also upon the land for fifty miles from the shore. He was, moreover, to be empowered to raise as large a force, both of ships and men, as he should think required, and to draw from the treasury whatever funds were necessary to defray the enormous expenses which so vast an undertaking would involve. If the law should pass creating this office, and a person be designated to fill it, it is plain that such a commander would be clothed with enormous powers; but then he would incur, on the other hand, a vast and commensurate responsibility, as the Roman people would hold him rigidly accountable for the full and perfect accomplishment of the work he undertook, after they had thus surrendered every possible power necessary to accomplish it so unconditionally into his hands. There was a great deal of maneuvering, management, and debate on the one hand to effect the passage of this law, and, on the other, to defeat it. Caesar, who, though not so prominent yet as Pompey, was now rising rapidly to influence and power, was in favor of the measure, because, as is said, he perceived that the people were pleased with it. It was at length adopted. Pompey was then designated to fill the office which the law created. He accepted the trust, and began to prepare for the vast undertaking. The price of grain fell immediately in Rome, as soon as the appointment of Pompey was made known, as the merchants, who had large supplies in the granaries there, were now eager to sell, even at a reduction, feeling confident that

Pompey's measures would result in bringing in abundant supplies. The people, surprised at this sudden relaxation of the pressure of their burdens, said that the very name of Pompey had put an end to the war.

They were not mistaken in their anticipations of Pompey's success. He freed the Mediterranean from pirates in three months, by one systematic and simple operation, which affords one of the most striking examples of the power of united and organized effort, planned and conducted by one single master mind, which the history of ancient or modern times has recorded. The manner in which this work was effected was this:

Pompey raised and equipped a vast number of galleys, and divided them into separate fleets, putting each one under the command of a lieutenant. He then divided the Mediterranean Sea into thirteen districts, and appointed a lieutenant and his fleet for each one of them as a guard. After sending these detachments forth to their respective stations, he set out from the city himself to take charge of the operations which he was to conduct in person. The people followed him, as he went to the place where he was to embark, in great crowds, and with long and loud acclamations. Beginning at the Straits of Gibraltar, Pompey cruised with a powerful fleet toward the east, driving the pirates before him, the lieutenants, who were stationed along the coast being on the alert to prevent them from finding any places of retreat or refuge. Some of the pirates' ships were surrounded and taken. Others fled, and were followed by Pompey's ships until they had passed beyond the coasts of Sicily, and the seas between the Italian and African shores. The communication was now open again to the grain-growing countries south of Rome, and large supplies of food were immediately poured

into the city. The whole population was, of course, filled with exultation and joy at receiving such welcome proofs that Pompey was successfully accomplishing the work they had assigned him.

The Italian peninsula and the island of Sicily, which are, in fact, a projection from the northern shores of the Mediterranean, with a salient angle of the coast nearly opposite to them on the African side, form a sort of strait which divides this great sea into two separate bodies of water, and the pirates were now driven entirely out of the western division. Pompey sent his principal fleet after them, with orders to pass around the island of Sicily and the southern part of Italy to Brundisium, which was the great port on the western side of Italy. He himself was to cross the peninsula by land, taking Rome in his way, and afterward to join the fleet at Brundisium. The pirates, in the mean time, so far as they had escaped Pompey's cruisers, had retreated to the seas in the neighborhood of Cilicia, and were concentrating their forces there in preparation for the final struggle.

Pompey was received at Rome with the utmost enthusiasm. The people came out in throngs to meet him as he approached the city, and welcomed him with loud acclamations. He did not, however, remain in the city to enjoy these honors. He procured, as soon as possible, what was necessary for the further prosecution of his work, and went on. He found his fleet at Brundisium, and, immediately embarking, he put to sea.

Pompey went on to the completion of his work with the same vigor and decision which he had displayed in the commencement of it. Some of the pirates, finding themselves hemmed in within narrower and narrower limits, gave up the contest, and came and surrendered. Pompey, instead of punishing them severely for their crimes, treated them, and their wives and children, who fell likewise

into his power, with great humanity. This induced many others to follow their example, so that the number that remained resisting to the end was greatly reduced. There were, however, after all these submissions, a body of stern and indomitable desperadoes left, who were incapable of yielding. These retreated, with all the forces which they could retain, to their strong-holds on the Silician shores, sending their wives and children back to still securer retreats among the fastnesses of the mountains. Pompey followed them, hemming them in with the squadrons of armed galleys which he brought up around them, thus cutting off from them all possibility of escape. Here, at length, a great final battle was fought, and the dominion of the pirates was ended forever. Pompey destroyed their ships, dismantled their fortifications, restored the harbors and towns which they had seized to their rightful owners, and sent the pirates themselves, with their wives and children, far into the interior of the country, and established them as agriculturists and herdsmen there, in a territory which he set apart for the purpose, where they might live in peace on the fruits of their own industry, without the possibility of again disturbing the commerce of the seas. Instead of returning to Rome after these exploits, Pompey obtained new powers from the government of the city, and pushed his way into Asia Minor, where he remained several years, pursuing a similar career of conquest to that of Caesar in Gaul. At length he returned to Rome, his entrance into the city being signalized by a most magnificent triumph. The procession for displaying the trophies, the captives, and the other emblems of victory, and for conveying the vast accumulation of treasures and spoils, was two days in passing into the city; and enough was left after all for another triumph. Pompey was, in a word, on the very summit of human grandeur and renown. He found,

however, an old enemy and rival at Rome. This was Crassus, who had been Pompey's opponent in earlier times, and who now renewed his hostility. In the contest that ensued, Pompey relied on his renown, Crassus on his wealth. Pompey attempted to please the people by combats of lions and of elephants which he had brought home from his foreign campaigns; Crassus courted their favor by distributing corn among them, and inviting them to public feasts on great occasions. He spread for them, at one time, it was said, ten thousand tables. All Rome was filled with the feuds of these great political foes. It was at this time that Caesar returned from Spain, and had the adroitness, as has already been explained, to extinguish these feuds, and reconcile these apparently implacable foes. He united them together, and joined them with himself in a triple league, which is celebrated in Roman history as the first *triumvirate*. The rivalry, however, of these great aspirants for power was only suppressed and concealed, without being at all weakened or changed. The death of Crassus soon removed him from the stage. Caesar and Pompey continued afterward, for some time, an ostensible alliance. Caesar attempted to strengthen this bond by giving Pompey his daughter Julia for his wife. Julia, though so young — even her father was six years younger than Pompey — was devotedly attached to her husband, and he was equally fond of her. She formed, in fact, a strong bond of union between the two great conquerors as long as she lived. One day, however, there was a riot at an election, and men were killed so near to Pompey that his robe was covered with blood. He changed it; the servants carried home the bloody garment which he had taken off, and Julia was so terrified at the sight, thinking that her husband had been killed, that she fainted, and her constitution suffered very severely by the shock. She lived some time afterward,

but finally died under circumstances which indicate that this occurrence was the cause. Pompey and Caesar now soon became open enemies. The ambitious aspirations which each of them cherished were so vast, that the world was not wide enough for them both to be satisfied. They had assisted each other up the ascent which they had been so many years in climbing, but now they had reached very near to the summit, and the question was to be decided which of the two should have his station there.

CHAPTER VI. CROSSING THE RUBICON.

There was a little stream in ancient times, in the north of Italy, which flowed westward into the Adriatic Sea, called the Rubicon. This stream has been immortalized by the transactions which we are now about to describe.

The Rubicon was a very important boundary, and yet it was in itself so small and insignificant that it is now impossible to determine which of two or three little brooks here running into the sea is entitled to its name and renown. In history the Rubicon is a grand, permanent, and conspicuous stream, gazed upon with continued interest by all mankind for nearly twenty centuries; in nature it is an uncertain rivulet, for a long time doubtful and undetermined, and finally lost.

The Rubicon originally derived its importance from the fact that it was the boundary between all that part of the north of Italy which is formed by the valley of the Po, one of the richest and most magnificent countries of the world, and the more southern Roman territories. This country of the Po constituted what was in those days called the *hither* Gaul, and was a Roman province. It belonged now to Caesar's jurisdiction, as the commander in Gaul. All south of the Rubicon was territory reserved for the immediate jurisdiction of the city. The Romans, in order to protect themselves from any danger which might threaten their own liberties from the immense armies which they raised for the conquest of foreign nations, had imposed on every side very strict limitations and restrictions in respect to the approach of these armies to the Capitol. The Rubicon was the limit on this northern side. Generals commanding in Gaul were never to pass it. To cross the Rubicon with an army on the way to Rome was

rebellion and treason. Hence the Rubicon became, as it were, the visible sign and symbol of civil restriction to military power. As Caesar found the time of his service in Gaul drawing toward a conclusion, he turned his thoughts more and more toward Rome, endeavoring to strengthen his interest there by every means in his power, and to circumvent and thwart the designs of Pompey. He had and partisans in Rome who acted for him and in his name. He sent immense sums of money to these men, to be employed in such ways as would most tend to secure the favor of the people. He ordered the Forum to be rebuilt with great magnificence. He arranged great celebrations, in which the people were entertained with an endless succession of games, spectacles, and public feasts. When his daughter Julia, Pompey's wife, died, he celebrated her funeral with indescribable splendor. He distributed corn in immense quantities among the people, and he sent a great many captives home, to be trained as gladiators, to fight in the theaters for their amusement. In many cases, too, where he found men of talents and influence among the populace, who had become involved in debt by their dissipations and extravagance, he paid their debts, and thus secured their influence on his side. Men were astounded at the magnitude of these expenditures, and, while the multitude rejoiced thoughtlessly in the pleasures thus provided for them, the more reflecting and considerate trembled at the greatness of the power which was so rapidly rising to overshadow the land. It increased their anxiety to observe that Pompey was gaining the same kind of influence and ascendancy too. He had not the advantage which Caesar enjoyed in the prodigious wealth obtained from the rich countries over which Caesar ruled, but he possessed, instead of it, the advantage of being all the time at Rome, and of securing, by his character and action there, a very wide

personal popularity and influence. Pompey was, in fact, the idol of the people. At one time, when he was absent from Rome, at Naples, he was taken sick. After being for some days in considerable danger, the crisis passed favorably, and he recovered. Some of the people of Naples proposed a public thanksgiving to the gods, to celebrate his restoration to health. The plan was adopted by acclamation, and the example, thus set, extended from city to city, until it had spread throughout Italy, and the whole country was filled with the processions, games, shows, and celebrations, which were instituted every where in honor of the event. And when Pompey returned from Naples to Rome, the towns on the way could not afford room for the crowds that came forth to meet him. The high roads, the villages, the ports, says Plutarch, were filled with sacrifices and entertainments. Many received him with garlands on their heads and torches in their hands, and, as they conducted him along, strewed the way with flowers.

In fact, Pompey considered himself as standing far above Caesar in fame and power, and this general burst of enthusiasm and applause, educed by his recovery from sickness, confirmed him in this idea. He felt no solicitude, he said, in respect to Caesar. He should take no special precautions against any hostile designs which he might entertain on his return from Gaul. It was he himself, he said, that had raised Caesar up to whatever of elevation he had attained, and he could put him down even more easily than he had exalted him.

In the mean time, the period was drawing near in which Caesar's command in the provinces was to expire; and, anticipating the struggle with Pompey which was about to ensue, he conducted several of his legions through the passes of the Alps, and advanced

gradually, as he had a right to do, across the country of the Po toward the Rubicon, revolving in his capacious mind, as he came, the various plans by which he might hope to gain the ascendancy over the power of his mighty rival, and make himself supreme. He concluded that it would be his wisest policy not to attempt to intimidate Pompey by great and open preparations for war, which might tend to arouse him to vigorous measures of resistance, but rather to cover and conceal his designs, and thus throw his enemy off his guard. He advanced, therefore, toward the Rubicon with a small force. He established his headquarters at Ravenna, a city not far from the river, and employed himself in objects of local interest there, in order to avert as much as possible the minds of the people from imagining that he was contemplating any great design. Pompey sent to him to demand the return of a certain legion which he had lent him from his own army at a time when they were friends. Caesar complied with this demand without any hesitation, and sent the legion home. He sent with this legion, also, some other troops which were properly his own, thus evincing a degree of indifference in respect to the amount of the force retained under his command which seemed wholly inconsistent with the idea that he contemplated any resistance to the authority of the government at Rome. In the mean time, the struggle at Rome between the partisans of Caesar and Pompey grew more and more violent and alarming. Caesar through his friends in the city, demanded to be elected consul. The other side insisted that he must first, if that was his wish, resign the command of his army, come to Rome, and present himself as a candidate in the character of a private citizen. This the constitution of the state very properly required. In answer to this requisition, Caesar rejoined, that, if Pompey would lay down his military commands, he would do so

too; if not, it was unjust to require it of him. The services, he added, which he had performed for his country, demanded some recompense, which, moreover, they ought to be willing to award, even if, in order to do it, it were necessary to relax somewhat in his favor the strictness of ordinary rules. To a large part of the people of the city these demands of Caesar appeared reasonable. They were clamorous to have them allowed. The partisans of Pompey, with the stern and inflexible Cato at their head, deemed them wholly inadmissible, and contended with the most determined violence against them. The whole city was filled with the excitement of this struggle, into which all the active and turbulent spirits of the capital plunged with the most furious zeal, while the more considerate and thoughtful of the population, remembering the days of Marius and Sylla, trembled at the impending danger. Pompey himself had no fear. He urged the Senate to resist to the utmost all of Caesar's claims, saying, if Caesar should be so presumptuous as to attempt to march to Rome, he could raise troops enough by stamping with his foot to put him down. While this was the state of things at Rome, Caesar was quietly established at Ravenna; thirty or forty miles from the frontier. He was erecting a building for a fencing school there and his mind seemed to be occupied very busily with the plans and models of the edifice which the architects had formed. Of course, in his intended march to Rome, his reliance was not to be so much on the force which he should take with him, as on the co-operation and support which he expected to find there. It was his policy, therefore, to move as quietly and privately as possible, and with as little display of violence, and to avoid every thing which might indicate his intended march to any spies which might be around him, or to any other person! who might be disposed to report what they observed at

Rome. Accordingly, on the very eve of his departure, he busied himself with his fencing school, and assumed with his officers and soldiers a careless and unconcerned air, which prevented any one from suspecting his design. In the course of the day he privately sent forward some cohorts to the southward, with orders for them to encamp on the banks of the Rubicon. When night came he sat down to supper as usual, and conversed with his friends in his ordinary manner, and went with them afterward to a public entertainment. As soon as it was dark and the streets were still, he set off secretly from the city, accompanied by a very few attendants. Instead of making use of his ordinary equipage, the parading of which would have attracted attention to his movements, he had some mules taken from a neighboring bake-house, and harnessed into his chaise. There were torch-bearers provided to light the way. The cavalcade drove on during the night, finding, however, the hasty preparations which had been made inadequate for the occasion. The torches went out, the guides lost their way, and the future conqueror of the world wandered about bewildered and lost, until, just after break of day, the party met with a peasant who undertook to guide them. Under his direction they made their way to the main road again, and advanced then without further difficulty to the banks of the river, where they found that portion of the army which had been sent forward encamped, and awaiting their arrival.

Caesar stood for some time upon the banks of the stream, musing upon the greatness of the undertaking in which simply passing across it would involve him. His officers stood by his side. "We can retreat *now*" said he, "but once across that river and we must go on." He paused for some time, conscious of the vast importance of the decision, though he thought only, doubtless, of its consequences to

himself. Taking the step which was now before him would necessarily end either in his realizing the loftiest aspirations of his ambition, or in his utter and irreparable ruin. There were vast public interests, too, at stake, of which, however he probably thought but little. It proved, in the end, that the history of the whole Roman world, for several centuries, was depending upon the manner in which the question new in Caesar's mind should turn.

There was a little bridge across the Rubicon at the point where Caesar was surveying it. While he was standing there, the story is, a peasant or shepherd came from the neighboring fields with a shepherd's pipe — a simple musical instrument, made of a reed, and used much by the rustic musicians of those days. The soldiers and some of the officers gathered around him to hear him play. Among the rest came some of Caesar's trumpeters, with their trumpets in their hands. The shepherd took one of these martial instruments from the hands of its possessor, laying aside his own, and began to sound a charge — which is a signal for a rapid advance — and to march at the same time over the bridge "An omen! a prodigy!" said Caesar. "Let us march where we are called by such a divine intimation. *The die is cast.*"

So saying, he pressed forward over the bridge, while the officers, breaking up the encampment, put the columns in motion to follow him.

It was shown abundantly, on many occasions in the course of Caesar's life, that he had no faith in omens. There are equally numerous instances to show that he was always ready to avail himself of the popular belief in them; to awaken his soldiers' ardor or to allay their fears. Whether, therefore, in respect to this story of the shepherd trumpeter, it was an incident that really and accidentally

occurred, or whether Caesar planned and arranged it himself, with reference to its effect, or whether, which is, perhaps, after all, the most probable supposition, the tale was only an embellishment invented out of something or nothing by the story-tellers of those days, to give additional dramatic interest to the narrative of the crossing of the Rubicon, it must be left for each reader to decide. As soon as the bridge was crossed, Caesar called an assembly of his troops, and, with signs of great excitement and agitation, made an address to them on the magnitude of the crisis through which they were passing. He showed them how entirely he was in their power; he urged them, by the most eloquent appeals, to stand by him, faithful and true, promising them the most ample rewards when he should have attained the object at which he aimed. The soldiers responded to this appeal with promises of the most unwavering fidelity.

The first town on the Roman side of the Rubicon was Ariminum. Caesar advanced to this town. The authorities opened its gates to him — very willing, as it appeared, to receive him as their commander. Caesar's force was yet quite small, as he had been accompanied by only a single legion in crossing the river. He had, however, sent orders for the other legions, which had been left in Gaul, to join him without any delay, though any re-enforcement of his troops seemed hardly necessary, as he found no indications of opposition to his progress. He gave his soldiers the strictest injunctions to do no injury to any property, public or private, as they advanced, and not to assume, in any respect, a hostile attitude toward the people of the country. The inhabitants, therefore, welcomed him wherever he came, and all the cities and towns followed the example of Ariminum, surrendering, in fact, faster than he could take possession

of them.

In the confusion of the debates and votes in the Senate at Rome before Caesar crossed the Rubicon, one decree had been passed deposing him from his command of the army, and appointing a successor. The name of the general thus appointed was Domitius. The only real opposition which Caesar encountered in his progress toward Rome was from him. Domitius had crossed the Apennines at the head of an army on his way northward to supersede Caesar in his command, and had reached the town of Corfinium, which was perhaps one third of the way between Rome and the Rubicon. Caesar advanced upon him here and shut him in.

After a brief siege the city was taken, and Domitius and his army were made prisoners. Every body gave them up for lost, expecting that Caesar would wreak terrible vengeance upon them. Instead of this, he received the troops at once into his own service, and let Domitius go free. In the mean time, the tidings of Caesar's having passed the Rubicon, and of the triumphant success which he was meeting with at the commencement of his march toward Rome, reached the Capitol, and added greatly to the prevailing consternation. The reports of the magnitude of his force and of the rapidity of his progress were greatly exaggerated. The party of Pompey and the Senate had done every thing to spread among the people the terror of Caesar's name, in order to arouse them to efforts for opposing his designs; and now, when he had broken through the barriers which had been intended to restrain him, and was advancing toward the city in an unchecked and triumphant career, they were overwhelmed with dismay. Pompey began to be terrified at the danger which was impending. The Senate held meetings without the city — councils of war, as it were, in which they looked to Pompey

in vain for protection from the danger which he had brought upon them. He had said that he could raise an army sufficient to cope with Caesar at any time by stamping with his foot. They told him they thought now that it was high time for him to stamp.

In fact, Pompey found the current setting every where strongly against him. Some recommended that commissioners should be sent to Caesar to make proposals for peace. The leading men, however, knowing that any peace made with him under such circumstances would be their own ruin, resisted and defeated the proposal. Cato abruptly left the city and proceeded to Sicily, which had been assigned him as his province. Others fled in other directions. Pompey himself, uncertain what to do, and not daring to remain, called upon all his partisans to join him, and set off at night, suddenly, and with very little preparation and small supplies, to retreat across the country toward the shores of the Adriatic Sea, His destination was Brundisium, the usual port of embarkation for Macedon and Greece.

Caesar was all this time gradually advancing toward Rome. His soldiers were full of enthusiasm in his cause. As his connection with the government at home was sundered the moment he crossed the Rubicon, all supplies of money and of provisions were cut off in that quarter until he should arrive at the Capitol and take possession of it. The soldiers voted, however, that they would serve him without pay. The officers, too, assembled together, and tendered him the aid of their contributions. He had always observed a very generous policy in his dealings with them, and he was now greatly gratified at receiving their requital of it.

The further he advanced, too, the more he found the people of the country through which he passed disposed to espouse his cause. They were struck with his generosity in releasing Domitius. It is true

that it was a very sagacious policy that prompted him to release him. But then it was generosity too. In fact, there must be something of a generous spirit in the soul to enable a man even to see the policy of generous actions.

Among the letters of Caesar that remain to the present day, there is one written about this time to one of his friends, in which he speaks of this subject. "I am glad," says he, "that you approve of my conduct at Corfinium. I am satisfied that such a course is the best one for us to pursue, as by so doing we shall gain the good will of all parties, and thus secure a permanent victory. Most conquerors have incurred the hatred of mankind by their cruelties, and have all, in consequence of the enmity they have thus awakened, been prevented from long enjoying their power. Sylla was an exception; but his example of successful cruelty I have no disposition to imitate. I will conquer after a new fashion, and fortify myself in the possession of the power I acquire by generosity and mercy."

Domitius had the ingratitude, after this release, to take up arms again, and wage a new war against Caesar. When Caesar heard of it, he said it was all right. "I will act out the principles of my nature," said he, "and he may act out his."

Another instance of Caesar's generosity occurred, which is even more remarkable than this. It seems that among the officers of his army there were some whom he had appointed at the recommendation of Pompey, at the time when he and Pompey were friends. These men would, of course, feel under obligations of gratitude to Pompey, as they owed their military rank to his friendly interposition in their behalf. As soon as the war broke out, Caesar gave them all his free permission to go over to Pompey's side, if they chose to do so.

Caesar acted thus very liberally in all respects. He surpassed Pompey very much in the spirit of generosity and mercy with which he entered upon the great contest before them. Pompey ordered every citizen to join his standard, declaring that he should consider all neutrals as his enemies. Caesar, on the other hand, gave free permission to every one to decline, if he chose, taking any part in the contest, saying that he should consider all who did not act against him as his friends. In the political contests of our day, it is to be observed that the combatants are much more prone to imitate the bigotry of Pompey than the generosity of Caesar, condemning, as they often do, those who choose to stand aloof from electioneering struggles, more than they do their most determined opponents and enemies.

When, at length, Caesar arrived at Brundisium, he found that Pompey had sent a part of his army across the Adriatic into Greece, and was waiting for the transports to return that he might go over himself with the remainder. In the mean time, he had fortified himself strongly in the city. Caesar immediately laid siege to the place, and he commenced some works to block up the mouth of the harbor. He built piers on each side, extending out as far into the sea as the depth of the water would allow them to be built. He then constructed a series of rafts, which he anchored on the deep water, in a line extending from one pier to the other. He built towers upon these rafts, and garrisoned them with soldiers, in hopes by this means to prevent all egress from the fort. He thought that, when this work was completed, Pompey would be entirely shut in, beyond all possibility of escape. The transports, however, returned before the work was completed. Its progress was, of course, slow, as the constructions were the scene of a continued conflict; for Pompey sent

out rafts and galleys against them every day, and the workmen had thus to build in the midst of continual interruptions, sometimes from showers of darts, arrows, and javelins, sometimes from the conflagrations of fireships, and sometimes from the terrible concussions of great vessels of war, impelled with prodigious force against them. The transports returned, therefore, before the defenses were complete, and contrived to get into the harbor. Pompey immediately formed his plan for embarking the remainder of his army. He filled the streets of the city with barricades and pitfalls, excepting two streets which led to the place of embarkation. The object of these obstructions was to embarrass Caesar's progress through the city in case he should force an entrance while his men were getting on board the ships. He then, in order to divert Caesar's attention from his design, doubled the guards stationed upon the walls on the evening of his intended embarkation, and ordered them to make vigorous attacks upon all Caesar's forces outside. He then, when the darkness came on, marched his troops through the two streets which had been left open, to the landing place, and got them as fast as possible on board the transports. Some of the people of the town contrived to make known to Caesar's army what was going on, by means of signals from the walls; the army immediately brought scaling ladders in great numbers, and, mounting the walls with great ardor and impetuosity, they drove all before them, and soon broke open the gates and got possession of the city. But the barricades and pitfalls, together with the darkness, so embarrassed their movements, that Pompey succeeded in completing his embarkation and sailing away.

Caesar had no ships in which to follow. He returned to Rome. He met, of course, with no opposition. He re-established the government

there, organized the Senate anew, and obtained supplies of corn from the public granaries, and of money from the city treasury in the Capitol. In going to the Capitoline Hill after this treasure, he found the officer who had charge of the money stationed there to defend it. He told Caesar that it was contrary to law for him to enter. Caesar said that, for men with swords in their hands, there was no law. The officer still refused to admit him. Caesar then told him to open the doors, or he would kill him on the spot. "And you must understand," he added, "that it will be easier for me to do it than it has been to say it." The officer resisted no longer, and Caesar went in. After this, Caesar spent some time in rigorous campaigns in Italy, Spain, Sicily, and Gaul, wherever there was manifested any opposition to his sway. When this work was accomplished, and all these countries were completely subjected to his dominion, he began to turn his thoughts to the plan of pursuing Pompey across the Adriatic Sea.

CHAPTER VII. THE BATTLE OF PHARSALIA.

Caesar had no ships, for Pompey had cleared the seas of every thing which could aid him in his intended passage. By great efforts, however, he succeeded at length in getting together a sufficient number of galleys to convey over a part of his army, provided he took the men alone, and left all his military stores and baggage behind. He gathered his army together, therefore, and made them an address, representing that they were now drawing toward the end of all their dangers and toils. They were about to meet their great enemy for a final conflict. It was not necessary to take their servants, their baggage, and their stores across the sea, for they were sure of victory, and victory would furnish them with ample supplies from those whom they were about to conquer.

The soldiers eagerly imbibed the spirit of confidence and courage which Caesar himself expressed. A large detachment embarked and put to sea, and, after being tossed all night upon the cold and stormy waters, they approached the shore at some distance to the northward of the place where Pompey's fleets had expected them. It was at a point where the mountains came down near to the sea, rendering the coast rugged and dangerous with shelving rocks and frowning promontories. Here Caesar succeeded in effecting a landing of the first division of his troops, and then sent back the fleet for the remainder. The winter months rolled away, and nothing effectual was done. The forces, alternating and intermingled, as above described, kept each other in a continued state of anxiety and suffering. Caesar became impatient at the delay of that portion of his army that he had left on the Italian shore. The messages of encouragement and of urgency which he sent across to them did not bring them over, and at

length, one dark and stormy night, when he thought that the inclemency of the skies and the heavy surging of the swell in the offing would drive his vigilant enemies into places of shelter, and put them off their guard, he determined to cross the sea himself and bring his hesitating army over. He ordered a galley to be prepared, and went on board of it disguised, and with his head muffled in his mantle, intending that not even the officers or crew of the ship which was to convey him should know of his design. The galley, in obedience to orders, put off from the shore. The mariners endeavored in vain for some time to make head against the violence of the wind and the heavy concussions of the waves, and at length, terrified at the imminence of the danger to which so wild and tumultuous a sea on such a night exposed them, refused to proceed, and the commander gave them orders to return. Caesar then came forward, threw off his mantle, and said to them, "Friends! you have nothing to fear. You are carrying Caesar."

The men were, of course, inspirited anew by this disclosure, but all was in vain. The obstacles to the passage proved insurmountable, and the galley, to avoid certain destruction, was compelled to return.

The army, however, on the Italian side, hearing of Caesar's attempt to return to them, fruitless though it was, and stimulated by the renewed urgency of the orders which he now sent to them, made arrangements at last for an embarkation, and, after encountering great dangers on the way, succeeded in landing in safety. Caesar, thus strengthened, began to plan more decided operations for the coming spring. This slow and undecided mode of warfare between the two vast armies continued for many months without any decisive results. There were skirmishes, struggles, sieges, blockades, and many brief and partial conflicts, but no general and decided battle. Now the

advantage seemed on one side, and now on the other. Pompey so hemmed in Caesar's troops at one period, and so cut off his supplies, that the men were reduced to extreme distress for food. At length they found a kind of root which they dug from the ground, and, after drying and pulverizing it, they made a sort of bread of the powder, which the soldiers were willing to eat rather than either starve or give up the contest. They told Caesar, in fact, that they would live on the bark of trees rather than abandon his cause. Pompey's soldiers, at one time, coming near to the walls of a town which they occupied, taunted and jeered them on account of their wretched destitution of food. Caesar's soldiers threw loaves of this bread at them in return, by way of symbol that they were abundantly supplied. After some time the tide of fortune turned Caesar contrived, by a succession of adroit maneuvers and movements, to escape from his toils, and to circumvent and surround Pompey's forces so as soon to make them suffer destitution and distress in their turn. He cut off all communication between them and the country at large, and turned away the brooks and streams from flowing through the ground they occupied. An army of forty or fifty thousand men, with the immense number of horses and beasts of burden which accompany them, require very large supplies of water, and any destitution or even scarcity of water leads immediately to the most dreadful consequences. Pompey's troops dug wells, but they obtained only very insufficient supplies. Great numbers of beasts of burden died, and their decaying bodies so tainted the air as to produce epidemic diseases, which destroyed many of the troops, and depressed and disheartened those whom they did not destroy. During all these operations there was no decisive general battle. Each one of the great rivals knew very well that his defeat in one general battle would be

his utter and irretrievable ruin. In a war between two independent nations, a single victory, however complete, seldom terminates the struggle, for the defeated party has the resources of a whole realm to fall back upon, which are sometimes called forth with renewed vigor after experiencing such reverses; and then defeat in such cases, even if it be final, does not necessarily involve the ruin of the unsuccessful commander. He may negotiate an honorable peace, and return to his own land in safety; and, if his misfortunes are considered by his countrymen as owing not to any dereliction from his duty as a soldier, but to the influence of adverse circumstances which no human skill or resolution could have controlled, he may spend the remainder of his days in prosperity and honor. The contest, however, between Caesar and Pompey was not of this character. One or the other of them was a traitor and a usurper — an enemy to his country. The result of a battle would decide which of the two was to stand in this attitude. Victory would legitimize and confirm the authority of one, and make it supreme over the whole civilized world. Defeat was to annihilate the power of the other, and make him a fugitive and a vagabond, without friends, without home, without country. It was a desperate stake; and it is not at all surprising that both parties lingered and hesitated, and postponed the throwing of the die.

At length Pompey, rendered desperate by the urgency of the destitution and distress into which Caesar had shut him, made a series of rigorous and successful attacks upon Caesar's lines, by which he broke away in his turn from his enemy's grasp, and the two armies moved slowly back into the interior of the country, hovering in the vicinity of each other, like birds of prey contending in the air, each continually striking at the other, and moving onward at the same time to gain some position of advantage, or to circumvent the

other in such a design. They passed on in this manner over plains, and across rivers, and through mountain passes, until at length they reached the heart of Thessaly. Here at last the armies came to a stand and fought the final battle.

The place was known then as the plain of Pharsalia, and the greatness of the contest which was decided there has immortalized its name. Pompey's forces were far more numerous than those of Caesar, and the advantage in all the partial contests which had taken place for some time had been on his side; he felt, consequently, sure of victory. He drew up his men in a line, one flank resting upon the bank of a river, which protected them from attack on that side. From this point, the long line of legions, drawn up in battle array, extended out upon the plain, and was terminated at the other extremity by strong squadrons of horse, and bodies of slingers and archers, so as to give the force of weapons and the activity of men as great a range as possible there, in order to prevent Caesar's being able to outflank and surround them. There was, however, apparently very little danger of this, for Caesar, according to his own story, had but about half as strong a force as Pompey. The army of the latter, he says, consisted of nearly fifty thousand men, while his own number was between twenty and thirty thousand. Generals, however, are prone to magnify the military grandeur of their exploits by overrating the strength with which they had to contend, and under-estimating their own. We are therefore to receive with some distrust the statements made by Caesar and his partisans; and as for Pompey's story, the total and irreparable ruin in which he himself and all who adhered to him were entirely overwhelmed immediately after the battle, prevented its being ever told. In the rear of the plain where Pompey's lines were extended was the camp from which the army had been drawn out to

prepare for the battle. The camp fires of the preceding night were moldering away, for it was a warm summer morning; the intrenchments were guarded, and the tents, now nearly empty, stood extended in long rows within the inclosure. In the midst of them was the magnificent pavilion of the general, furnished with every imaginable article of luxury and splendor. Attendants were busy here and there, some rearranging what had been left in disorder by the call to arms by which the troops had been summoned from their places of rest, and others providing refreshments-and food for their victorious comrades when they should return from the battle. In Pompey's tent a magnificent entertainment was preparing. The tables were spread with every luxury, the sideboards were loaded with plate, and the whole scene was resplendent with utensils and decorations of silver and gold.

Pompey and all his generals were perfectly certain of victory. In fact, the peace and harmony of their councils in camp had been destroyed for many days by their contentions and disputes about the disposal of the high offices, and the places of profit and power at Rome, which were to come into their hands when Caesar should have been subdued. The subduing of Caesar they considered only a question of time; and, as a question of time, it was now reduced to very narrow limits. A few days more, and they were to be masters of the whole Roman empire, and, impatient and greedy, they disputed in anticipation about the division of the spoils.

To make assurance doubly sure, Pompey gave orders that his troops should not advance to meet the onset of Caesar's troops on the middle ground between the two armies, but that they should wait calmly for the attack, and receive the enemy at the posts where they had themselves been arrayed.

CHAPTER VIII. FLIGHT AND DEATH OF POMPEY.

Caesar pursued the discomfited and flying bodies of Pompey's army to the camp. They made a brief stand upon the ramparts and at the gates in a vain and fruitless struggle against the tide of victory which they soon perceived must fully overwhelm them. They gave way continually here and there along the lines of intrenchment, and column after column of Caesar's followers broke through into the camp. Pompey, hearing from his tent the increasing noise and uproar, was at length aroused from his stupor, and began to summon his faculties to the question what he was to do. At length a party of fugitives, hotly pursued by some of Caesar's soldiers, broke into his tent. "What!" said Pompey, "into my tent too!" He had been for more than thirty years a victorious general, accustomed to all the deference and respect which boundless wealth, extended and absolute power, and the highest military rank could afford. In the encampments which he had made, and in the cities which he had occupied from time to time, he had been the supreme and unquestioned master, and his tent, arranged and furnished, as it had always been, in a style of the utmost magnificence and splendor, had been sacred from all intrusion, and invested with such a dignity that potentates and princes were impressed when they entered, with a feeling of deference and awe. Now, rude soldiers burst wildly into it, and the air without was filled with an uproar and confusion, drawing every moment nearer and nearer, and warning the fallen hero that there was no longer any protection there against the approaching torrent which was coming on to overwhelm him. Pompey aroused himself from his stupor, threw off the military dress which belonged to his rank and station, and assumed a hasty disguise, in which he hoped he might make his

escape from the immediate scene of his calamities. He mounted a horse and rode out of the camp at the easiest place of egress in the rear, in company with bodies of troops and guards who were also flying in confusion, while Caesar and his forces on the other side were carrying the intrenchments and forcing their way in. As soon as he had thus made his escape from the immediate scene of danger, he dismounted and left his horse, that he might assume more completely the appearance of a common soldier, and, with a few attendants who were willing to follow his fallen fortunes, he went on to the eastward, directing his weary steps toward the shores of the Aegean Sea. The country through which he was traveling was Thessaly. Thessaly is a vast amphitheater, surrounded by mountains, from whose sides streams descend, which, after watering many fertile valleys and plains, combine to form one great central river that flows to the eastward, and after various meanderings, finds its way into the Aegean Sea through a romantic gap between two mountains, called the Vale of Tempe — a vale which has been famed in all ages for the extreme picturesqueness of its scenery, and in which, in those days, all the charms both of the most alluring beauty and of the sublimest grandeur seemed to be combined. Pompey followed the roads leading along the banks of this stream, weary in body, and harassed and disconsolate in mind. The news which came to him from time to time, by the flying parties which were moving through the country in all directions, of the entire and overwhelming completeness of Caesar's victory, extinguished all remains of hope, and narrowed down at last the grounds of his solicitude to the single point of his own personal safety. He was well aware that he should be pursued, and, to baffle the efforts which he knew that his enemies would make to follow his track, he avoided large towns, and pressed forward in

by-ways and solitudes, bearing as patiently as he was able his increasing destitution and distress. He reached, at length, the Vale of Tempe, and there, exhausted with hunger, thirst, and fatigue, he sat down upon the bank of the stream to recover by a little rest strength enough for the remainder of his weary way. He wished for a drink, but he had nothing to drink from. And so the mighty potentate, whose tent was full of delicious beverages, and cups and goblets of silver and gold, extended himself down upon the sand at the margin of the river, and drank the warm water directly from the stream.

While Pompey was thus anxiously and toilsomely endeavoring to gain the sea-shore, Caesar was completing his victory over the army which he had left behind him. When Caesar had carried the intrenchments of the camp, and the army found that there was no longer any safety for them there, they continued their retreat under the guidance of such generals as remained. Caesar thus gained undisputed possession of the camp. He found every where the marks of wealth and luxury, and indications of the confident expectation of victory which the discomfited army had entertained. The tents of the generals were crowned with myrtle, the beds were strewn with flowers, and tables every where were spread for feasts, with cups and bowls of wine all ready for the expected revelers. Caesar took possession of the whole, stationed a proper guard to protect the property, and then pressed forward with his army in pursuit of the enemy. Pompey's army made their way to a neighboring rising ground, where they threw up hasty intrenchments to protect themselves for the night. A rivulet ran near the hill, the access to which they endeavored to secure, in order to obtain supplies of water. Caesar and his forces followed them to this spot. The day was gone, and it was too late to attack them. Caesar's soldiers, too, were

exhausted with the intense and protracted excitement and exertions which had now been kept up for many hours in the battle and in the pursuit, and they needed repose. They made, however, one effort more. They seized the avenue of approach to the rivulet, and threw up a temporary intrenchment to secure it which intrenchment they protected with a guard; and then the army retired to rest, leaving their helpless victims to while away the hours of the night, tormented with thirst, and overwhelmed with anxiety and despair. This could not long be endured. They surrendered in the morning, and Caesar found himself in possession of over twenty thousand prisoners.

In the mean time, Pompey passed on through the Vale of Tempe toward the sea, regardless of the beauty and splendor that surrounded him, and thinking only of his fallen fortunes, and revolving despairingly in his mind the various forms in which the final consummation of his ruin might ultimately come. At length he reached the sea-shore, and found refuge for the night in a fisherman's cabin. A small number of attendants remained with him, some of whom were slaves. These he now dismissed, directing them to return and surrender themselves to Caesar, saying that he was a generous foe, and that they had nothing to fear from him. His other attendants he retained, and he made arrangements for a boat to take him the next day along the coast. It was a river boat, and unsuited to the open sea, but it was all that he could obtain. He arose the next morning at break of day, and embarked in the little vessel, with two or three attendants, and the oarsmen began to row away along the shore. They soon came in sight of a merchant ship just ready to sail. The master of this vessel, it happened, had seen Pompey, and knew his countenance, and he had dreamed, as a famous historian of the times relates, on the night before, that Pompey had come to him hi the

guise of a simple soldier and in great distress, and that he had received and rescued him. There was nothing extraordinary in such a dream at such a time, as the contest between Caesar and Pompey, and the approach of the final collision which was to destroy one or the other of them, filled the minds and occupied the conversation of the world. The shipmaster, therefore, having seen and known one of the great rivals in the approaching conflict, would naturally find both his waking and sleeping thoughts dwelling on the subject; and his fancy, in his dreams, might easily picture the scene of his rescuing and saving the fallen hero in the hour of his distress.

However this may be, the shipmaster is said to have been relating his dream to the seamen on the deck of his vessel when the boat which was conveying Pompey came into view. Pompey himself, having escaped from the land, supposed all immediate danger over, not imagining that seafaring men would recognize him in such a situation and in such a disguise. The shipmaster did, however, recognize him. He was overwhelmed with grief at seeing him in such a condition. With a countenance and with gestures expressive of earnest surprise and sorrow, he beckoned to Pompey to come on board. He ordered his own ship's boat to be immediately let down to meet and receive him. Pompey came on board. The ship was given up to his possession, and every possible arrangement was made to supply his wants, to contribute to his comfort, and to do him honor.

The vessel conveyed him to Amphipolis, a city of Macedonia near the sea, and to the northward and eastward of the place where he had embarked. When Pompey arrived at the port he sent proclamations to the shore, calling upon the inhabitants to take arms and join his standard. He did not, however, land, or take any other measures for carrying these arrangements into effect. He only waited in the river

upon which Amphipolis stands long enough to receive a supply of money from some of his friends on the shore, and stores for his voyage, and then get sail again. Whether he learned that Caesar was advancing in that direction with a force too strong for him to encounter, or found that the people were disinclined to espouse his cause, or whether the whole movement was a feint to direct Caesar's attention to Macedon as the field of his operations, in order that he might escape more secretly and safely beyond the sea, can not now be ascertained. Pompey's wife Cornelia was on the island of Lesbos, at Mitylene, near the western coast of Asia Minor. She was a lady of distinguished beauty, and of great intellectual superiority and moral worth. She was extremely well versed in all the learning of the times, and yet was entirely free from those peculiarities and airs which, as her historian says, were often observed in learned ladies in those days. Pompey had married her after the death of Julia, Caesar's daughter. They were strongly devoted to each other. Pompey had provided for her a beautiful retreat on the island of Lesbos, where she was living in elegance and splendor, beloved for her own intrinsic charms, and highly honored on account of the greatness and fame of her husband. Here she had received from time to time glowing accounts of his success all exaggerated as they came to her, through the eager desire of the narrators to give her pleasure. From this high elevation of honor and happiness the ill-fated Cornelia suddenly fell, on the arrival of Pompey's solitary vessel at Mitylene, bringing as it did, at the same time, both the first intelligence of her husband's fall, and himself in person, a ruined and homeless fugitive and wanderer. The meeting was sad and sorrowful. Cornelia was overwhelmed at the suddenness and violence of the shock which it brought her, and Pompey lamented anew the dreadful disaster that he had sustained, at

finding how inevitably it must involve his beloved wife as well as himself in its irreparable ruin.

The pain, however, was not wholly without some mingling of pleasure. A husband finds a strange sense of protection and safety in the presence and sympathy of an affectionate wife in the hour of his calamity. She can, perhaps do nothing, but her mute and sorrowful concern and pity comfort and reassure him. Cornelia, however, was able to render her husband some essential aid. She resolved immediately to accompany him wherever he should go; and, by their joint endeavors, a little fleet was gathered, and such supplies as could be hastily obtained, and such attendants and followers as were willing to share his fate, were taken on board. During all this time Pompey would not go on shore himself, but remained on board, his ship in the harbor. Perhaps he was afraid of some treachery or surprise, or perhaps, in his fallen and hopeless condition, he was unwilling to expose himself to the gaze of those who had so often seen him in all the splendor of his former power. At length, when all was ready, he sailed away. He passed eastward along the Mediterranean, touching at such ports as he supposed most likely to favor his cause. Vague and uncertain, but still alarming rumors that Caesar was advancing in pursuit of him met him every where, and the people of the various provinces were taking sides, some in his favor and some against him, the excitement being every where so great that the utmost caution and circumspection were required in all his movements. Sometimes he was refused permission to land; at others, his friends were too few to afford him protection; and at others still, though the authorities professed friendship, he did not dare to trust them. He obtained, however, some supplies of money and some accessions to the number of ships and men under his

command, until at length he had quite a little fleet in his train. Several men of rank and influence, who had served under him in the days of his prosperity, nobly adhered to him now, and formed a sort of court or council on board his galley, where they held with their great though fallen commander frequent conversations on the plan which it was best to pursue. It was finally decided that it was best to seek refuge in Egypt. There seemed to be, in fact, no alternative. All the rest of the world was evidently going over to Caesar. Pompey had been the means, some years before, of restoring a certain king of Egypt to his throne, and many of his soldiers had been left in the country, and remained there still. It is true that the king himself had died. He had left a daughter named Cleopatra, and also a son, who was at this time very young. The name of this youthful prince was Ptolemy. Ptolemy and Cleopatra had been made by their father joint heirs to the throne. But Ptolemy, or, rather, the ministers and counselors who acted for him and in his name, had expelled Cleopatra, that they might govern alone. Cleopatra had raised an army in Syria, and was on her way to the frontiers of Egypt to regain possession of what she deemed her rights. Ptolemy's ministers had gone forth to meet her at the head of their own troops, 'Ptolemy himself being also with them. They had reached Pelusium, which is the frontier town between Egypt and Syria on the coast of the Mediterranean. Here their armies had assembled in vast encampments upon the land, and their galleys and transports were riding at anchor along the shore of the sea. Pompey and his counselors thought that the government of Ptolemy would receive him as a friend, on account of the services he had rendered to the young prince's father, forgetting that gratitude has never a place on the list of political virtues.

Pompey's little squadron made its way slowly over the waters of the Mediterranean toward Pelusium and the camp of Ptolemy. As they approached the shore, both Pompey himself and Cornelia felt many anxious forebodings. A messenger was sent to the land to inform the young king of Pompey's approach, and to solicit his protection. The government of Ptolemy held a council, and took the subject into consideration.

Various opinions were expressed, and various plans were proposed. The counsel which was finally followed was this. It would be dangerous to receive Pompey, since that would make Caesar their enemy. It would be dangerous to refuse to receive him, as that would make Pompey their enemy, and, though powerless now, he might one day be in a condition to seek vengeance. It was wisest, therefore, to destroy him. They would invite him to the shore, and kill him when he landed. This would please Caesar; and Pompey himself, being dead, could never revenge it. "Dead dogs," as the orator said who made this atrocious proposal, "do not bite."

An Egyptian, named Achillas, was appointed to execute the assassination thus decreed. An invitation was sent to Pompey to land, accompanied with a promise of protection; and, when his fleet had approached near enough to the shore, Achillas took a small party in a boat, and went out to meet his galley. The men in this boat, of course, were armed. The officers and attendants of Pompey watched all these movements from the deck of his galley. They scrutinized every thing that occurred with the closest attention and the greatest anxiety, to see whether the indications denoted an honest friendship or intentions of treachery. The appearances were not favorable. Pompey's friends observed that no preparations were making along the shore for receiving him with the honors due, as they thought, to

his rank and station. The manner, too, in which the Egyptians seemed to expect him to land was ominous of evil. Only a single insignificant boat for a potentate who recently had commanded half the world! Then, besides, the friends of Pompey observed that several of the principal galleys of Ptolemy's fleet were getting up their anchors, and preparing apparently to be ready to move at a sudden call. These and other indications appeared much more like preparations for seizing an enemy than welcoming a friend. Cornelia, who, with her little son, stood upon the deck of Pompey's galley, watching the scene with a peculiar intensity of solicitude which the hardy soldiers around her could not have felt, became soon exceedingly alarmed. She begged her husband to go on shore. But Pompey decided that it was now too late to retreat. He could not escape from the Egyptian galleys if they had received orders to intercept him, nor could he resist violence if violence were intended. To do any thing like that would evince distrust, and to appear like putting himself upon his guard would be to take at once, himself, the position of an enemy, and invite and justify the hostility of the Egyptians in return. As to flight, he could not hope to escape from the Egyptian galleys if they had received orders to prevent it; and, besides, if he were determined on attempting an escape, whither should he fly? The world was against him. His triumphant enemy was on his track in full pursuit, with all the vast powers and resources of the whole Roman empire at his command. There remained for Pompey only the last forlorn hope of a refuge in Egypt, or else, as the sole alternative, a complete and unconditional submission to Caesar. His pride would not consent to this, and he determined, therefore, dark as the indications were, to place himself, without any appearance of distrust, in Ptolemy's hands, and abide the issue.

The boat of Achillas approached the galley. When it touched the side, Achillas and the other officers on board of it hailed Pompey in the most respectful manner, giving him the title of Imperator, the highest title known in the Roman state. Achillas addressed Pompey in Greek. The Greek was the language of educated men in all the Eastern countries in those days. He told him that the water was too shallow for his galley to approach nearer to the shore, and invited him to come on board of his boat, and he would take him to the beach, where, as he said, the king was waiting to receive him. With many anxious forebodings, that were but ill concealed, Pompey made preparations to accept the invitation. He bade his wife farewell, who clung to him as they were about to part with a gloomy presentiment that they should never meet again. Two centurions who were to accompany Pompey, and two servants, descended into the boat. Pompey himself followed, and then the boatmen pushed off from the galley and made toward the shore. The decks of all the vessels in Pompey's little squadron, as well as those of the Egyptian fleet, were crowded with spectators, and lines of soldiery and groups of men, all intently watching the operations of the landing, were scattered along the shore. Among the men whom Achillas had provided to aid him in the assassination was an officer of the Roman army who had formerly served under Pompey. As soon as Pompey was seated in the boat, he recognized the countenance of this man, and addressed him, saying, "I think I remember you as having been in former days my fellow-soldier." The man replied merely by a nod of assent. Feeling somewhat guilty and self-condemned at the thoughts of the treachery which he was about to perpetrate, he was little inclined to renew the recollection of the days when he was Pompey's friend. In fact, the whole company in the boat, filled on the

one part with awe in anticipation of the terrible deed which they were soon to commit, and on the other with a dread suspense and alarm, were little disposed for conversation, and Pompey took out a manuscript of an address in Greek which he had prepared to make to the young king at his approaching interview with him, and occupied himself in reading it over. Thus they advanced in a gloomy and solemn silence, hearing no sound but the dip of the oars in the water, and the gentle dash of the waves along the line of the shore.

At length the boat touched the sand, while Cornelia still stood on the deck of the galley, watching every movement with great solicitude and concern. One of the two servants whom Pompey had taken with him, named Philip, his favorite personal attendant, rose to assist his master in landing. He gave Pompey his hand to aid him in rising from his seat, and at that moment the Roman officer whom Pompey had recognized as his fellow-soldier, advanced behind him and stabbed him in the back. At the same instant Achilles and the others drew their swords. Pompey saw that all was lost. He did not speak, and he uttered no cry of alarm, though Cornelia's dreadful shriek was so loud and piercing that it was heard upon the shore. From the suffering victim himself nothing was heard but an inarticulate groan extorted by his agony. He gathered his mantle over his face, and sank down and died.

CHAPTER IX. CAESAR IN EGYPT.

Caesar surveyed the field of battle after the victory of Pharsalia, not with the feelings of exultation which might have been expected in a victorious general, but with compassion and sorrow for the fallen soldiers whose dead bodies covered the ground. After gazing upon the scene sadly and in silence for a time, he said, "They would have it so," and thus dismissed from his mind all sense of his own responsibility for the consequences which had ensued. He treated the immense body of prisoners which had fallen into his hands with great clemency, partly from the natural impulses of his disposition, which were always generous and noble, and partly from policy, that he might conciliate them all, officers and soldiers, to acquiescence in his future rule. He then sent back a large portion of his force to Italy, and, taking a body of cavalry from the rest, in order that he might advance with the utmost possible rapidity, he set off through Thessaly and Macedon in pursuit of his fugitive foe.

He had no naval force at his command, and he accordingly kept upon the land. Besides, he wished, by moving through the country at the head of an armed force, to make a demonstration which should put down any attempt that might be made in any quarter to rally or concentrate a force in Pompey's favor. He crossed the Hellespont, and moved down the coast of Asia Minor. There was a great temple consecrated to Diana at Ephesus, which, for its wealth and magnificence, was then the wonder of the world. The authorities who had it in their charge, not aware of Caesar's approach, had concluded to withdraw the treasures from the temple and loan them to Pompey, to be repaid when he should have regained his Dower. An assembly was accordingly convened to witness the delivery of the treasures,

and take note of their value, which ceremony was to be performed with great formality and parade, when they learned that Caesar had crossed the Hellespont and was drawing near. The whole proceeding was thus arrested, and the treasures were retained. Caesar passed rapidly on through Asia Minor, examining and comparing, as he advanced, the vague rumors which were continually coming in in respect to Pompey's movements. He learned at length that he had gone to Cyprus; he presumed that his destination was Egypt, and he immediately resolved to provide himself with a fleet, and follow him thither by sea. As time passed on, and the news of Pompey's defeat and flight, and of Caesar's triumphant pursuit of him, became generally extended and confirmed, the various powers ruling in all that region of the world abandoned one after another the hopeless cause, and began to adhere to Caesar. They offered him such resources and aid as he might desire. He did not, however, stop to organize a large fleet or to collect an army. He depended, like Napoleon, in all the great movements of his life, not on grandeur of preparation, but on celerity of action. He organized at Rhodes a small but very efficient fleet of ten galleys, and, embarking his best troops in them, he made sail for the coasts of Egypt. Pompey had landed at Pelusium, on the eastern frontier, having heard that the young king and his court were there to meet and resist Cleopatra's invasion. Caesar, however, with the characteristic boldness and energy of his character, proceeded directly to Alexandria, the capital.

Egypt was, in those days, an *ally* of the Romans, as the phrase was; that is, the country, though it preserved its independent organization and its forms of royalty, was still united to the Roman people by an intimate league, so as to form an integral part of the great empire. Caesar, consequently, in appearing there with an armed

force, would naturally be received as a friend. He found only the garrison which Ptolemy's government had left in charge of the city. At first the officers of this garrison gave him an outwardly friendly reception, but they soon began to take offense at the air of authority and command which he assumed, and which seemed to them to indicate a spirit of encroachment on the sovereignty of their own king. Feelings of deeply-seated alienation and animosity sometimes find their outward expression in contests about things intrinsically of very little importance. It was so in this case. The Roman consuls were accustomed to use a certain badge of authority called the *fascēs*. It consisted of a bundle of rods, bound around the handle of an ax. Whenever a consul appeared in public, he was preceded by two officers called *lictors*, each of whom carried the fascēs as a symbol of the power which was vested in the distinguished personage who followed them.

The Egyptian officers and the people of the city quarreled with Caesar on account of his moving about among them in his imperial state, accompanied by a life guard, and preceded by the lictors. Contests occurred between his troops and those of the garrison, and many disturbances were created in the streets of the city. Although no serious collision took place, Caesar thought it prudent to strengthen his force, and he sent back to Europe for additional legions to come to Egypt and join him. The tidings of Pompey's death came to Caesar at Alexandria, and with them the head of the murdered man, which was sent by the government of Ptolemy, they supposing that it would be an acceptable gift to Caesar. Instead of being pleased with it, Caesar turned from the shocking spectacle in horror. Pompey had been, for many years now gone by, Caesar's colleague and friend. He had been his son-in-law, and thus had

sustained to him a very near and endearing relation. In the contest which had at last unfortunately arisen, Pompey had done no wrong either to Caesar or to the government at Rome. He was the injured party, so far as there was a right and a wrong to such a quarrel. And now, after being hunted through half the world by his triumphant enemy, he had been treacherously murdered by men pretending to receive him as a friend. The natural sense of justice, which formed originally so strong a trait in Caesar's character, was not yet wholly extinguished. He could not but feel some remorse at the thoughts of the long course of violence and wrong which he had pursued against his old champion and friend, and which had led at last to so dreadful an end. Instead of being pleased with the horrid trophy which the Egyptians sent him, he mourned the death of his great rival with sincere and unaffected grief, and was filled with indignation against his murderers.

Pompey had a signet ring upon his finger at the time of his assassination, which was taken off by the Egyptian officers and carried away to Ptolemy, together with the other articles of value which had been found upon his person. Ptolemy sent this seal to Caesar to complete the proof that its possessor was no more. Caesar received *this* memorial with eager though mournful pleasure, and he preserved it with great care. And in many ways, during all the remainder of his life, he manifested every outward indication of cherishing the highest respect for Pompey's memory. There stands to the present day, among the ruins of Alexandria, a beautiful column, about one hundred feet high, which has been known in all modern times as POMPEY'S PILLAR. It is formed of stone, and is in three parts. One stone forms the pedestal, another the shaft, and a third the capital. The beauty of this column, the perfection of its

workmanship, which still continues in excellent preservation, and its antiquity, so great that all distinct record of its origin is lost, have combined to make it for many ages the wonder and admiration of mankind. Although no history of its origin has come down to us, a tradition has descended that Caesar built it during his residence in Egypt, to commemorate the name of Pompey; but whether it was his own victory over Pompey, or Pompey's own character and military fame which the structure was intended to signalize to mankind, can not now be known. There is even some doubt whether it was erected by Caesar at all. While Caesar was in Alexandria, many of Pompey's officers, now that their master was dead, and there was no longer any possibility of their rallying again under his guidance and command, came in and surrendered themselves to him. He received them with great kindness, and, instead of visiting them with any penalties for having fought against him, he honored the fidelity and bravery they had evinced in the service of their own former master. Caesar had, in fact, shown the same generosity to the soldiers of Pompey's army that he had taken prisoners at the battle of Pharsalia. At the close of the battle, he issued orders that each one of his soldiers should have permission to *save* one of the enemy. Nothing could more strikingly exemplify both the generosity and the tact that marked the great conqueror's character than this incident. The hatred and revenge which had animated his victorious soldiery in the battle and in the pursuit, were changed immediately by the permission to compassion and good will. The ferocious soldiers turned at once from the pleasure of hunting their discomfited enemies to death, to that of protecting and defending them; and the way was prepared for their being received into his service, and incorporated with the rest of his army as friends and brothers. Caesar soon found himself in so strong

a position at Alexandria, that he determined to exercise his authority as Roman consul to settle the dispute in respect to the succession of the Egyptian crown. There was no difficulty in finding pretexts for interfering in the affairs of Egypt. In the first place, there was, as he contended, great anarchy and confusion at Alexandria, people taking different sides in the controversy with such fierceness as to render it impossible that good government and public order should be restored until this great question was settled. He also claimed a debt due from the Egyptian government, which Photinus, Ptolemy's minister at Alexandria, was very dilatory in paying. This led to animosities and disputes; and, finally, Caesar found, or pretended to find, evidence that Photinus was forming plots against his life. At length Caesar determined on taking decided action. He sent orders both to Ptolemy and to Cleopatra to disband their forces, to repair to Alexandria, and lay their respective claims before him for his adjudication.

Cleopatra complied with this summons, and returned to Egypt with a view to submitting her case to Caesar's arbitration. Ptolemy determined to resist. He advanced toward Egypt, but it was at the head of his army, and with a determination to drive Caesar and all his Roman followers away.

When Cleopatra arrived, she found that the avenues of approach to Caesar's quarters were all in possession of her enemies, so that, in attempting to join him, she incurred danger of falling into their hands as a prisoner. She resorted to a stratagem, as the story is, to gain a secret admission. They rolled her up in a sort of bale of bedding or carpeting, and she was carried in in this way on the back of a man, through the guards, who might otherwise have intercepted her. Caesar was very much pleased with this device, and with the successful result of it. Cleopatra, too, was young and beautiful, and

Caesar immediately conceived a strong but guilty attachment to her, which she readily returned. Caesar espoused her cause, and decided that she and Ptolemy should jointly occupy the throne. Ptolemy and his partisans were determined not to submit to this award. The consequence was, a violent and protracted war. Ptolemy was not only incensed at being deprived of what he considered his just right to the realm, he was also half distracted at the thought of his sister's disgraceful connection with Caesar. His excitement and distress, and the exertions and efforts to which they aroused him, awakened a strong sympathy in his cause among the people, and Caesar found himself involved in a very serious contest, in which his own life was brought repeatedly into the most imminent danger, and which seriously threatened the total destruction of his power. He, however, braved all the difficulty and dangers, and recklessly persisted in the course he had taken, under the influence of the infatuation in which his attachment to Cleopatra held him, as by a spell. The war in which Caesar was thus involved by his efforts to give Cleopatra a seat with her brother on the Egyptian throne, is called in history the Alexandrine war. It was marked by many strange and romantic incidents. There was a light-house, called the Pharos, on a small island opposite the harbor of Alexandria, and it was so famed, both on account of the great magnificence of the edifice itself, and also on account of its position at the entrance to the greatest commercial port in the world, that it has given its name, as a generic appellation, to all other structures of the kind — any light-house being now called a Pharos, just as any serious difficulty is called a Gordian knot. The Pharos was a lofty tower — the accounts say that it was five hundred feet in height, which would be an enormous elevation for such a structure — and in a lantern at the top a brilliant light was kept

constantly burning, which could be seen over the water for a hundred miles. The tower was built in several successive stories, each being ornamented with balustrades, galleries, and columns, so that the splendor of the architecture by day rivaled the brilliancy of the radiation which beamed from the summit by night. Far and wide over the stormy waters of the Mediterranean this meteor glowed, inviting and guiding the mariners in; and both its welcome and its guidance were doubly prized in those ancient days, when there was neither compass nor sextant on which they could rely. In the course of the contest with the Egyptians, Caesar took possession of the Pharos, and of the island on which it stood; and as the Pharos was then regarded as one of the seven wonders of the world, the fame of the exploit, though it was probably nothing remarkable in a military point of view, spread rapidly throughout the world.

And yet, though the capture of a light-house was no very extraordinary conquest, in the course of the contests on the harbor which were connected with it Caesar had a very narrow escape from death. In all such struggles he was accustomed always to take personally his full share of the exposure and the danger. This resulted in part from the natural impetuosity and ardor of his character, which were always aroused to double intensity of action by the excitement of battle, and partly from the ideas of the military duty of a commander which prevailed in those days. There was besides, in this case, an additional inducement to acquire the glory of extraordinary exploits, in Caesar's desire to be the object of Cleopatra's admiration, who watched all his movements, and who was doubly pleased with his prowess and bravery, since she saw that they were exercised for her sake and in her cause. During the progress of this Alexandrine war one great disaster occurred, which has given to the

contest a most melancholy celebrity in all subsequent ages: this disaster was the destruction of the Alexandrian library. The Egyptians were celebrated for their learning, and, under the munificent patronage of some of their kings, the learned men of Alexandria had made an enormous collection of writings, which were inscribed, as was the custom in those days, on parchment rolls. The number of the rolls or volumes was said to be seven hundred thousand; and when we consider that each one was written with great care, in beautiful characters, with a pen, and at a vast expense, it is not surprising that the collection was the admiration of the world. In fact, the whole body of ancient literature was there recorded. Caesar set fire to some Egyptian galleys, which lay so near the shore that the wind blew the sparks and flames upon the buildings on the quay. The fire spread among the palaces and other magnificent edifices of that part of the city, and one of the great buildings in which the library was stored was reached and destroyed. There was no other such collection in the world; and the consequence of this calamity has been, that it is only detached and insulated fragments of ancient literature and science that have come down to our times. The world will never cease to mourn the irreparable loss.

Notwithstanding the various untoward incidents which attended the war in Alexandria during its progress, Caesar, as usual, conquered in the end. The young king Ptolemy was defeated, and, in attempting to make his escape across a branch of the Nile, he was drowned. Caesar then finally settled the kingdom upon Cleopatra and a younger brother, and, after remaining for some time longer in Egypt, he set out on his return to Rome.

The subsequent adventures of Cleopatra were as romantic as to

have given her name a very wide celebrity. The lives of the virtuous pass smoothly and happily away, but the tale, when told to others, possesses but little interest or attraction; while those of the wicked, whose days are spent in wretchedness and despair, and are thus full of misery to the actors themselves, afford to the rest of mankind a high degree of pleasure, from the dramatic interest of the story.

CHAPTER X. CAESAR IMPERATOR.

In the mean time, Caesar's prosperity and success had greatly strengthened his cause at Rome. Rome was supported in a great measure by the contributions brought home from the provinces by the various military heroes who were sent out to govern them; and, of course, the greater and more successful was the conqueror, the better was he qualified for stations of highest authority in the estimation of the inhabitants of the city. They made Caesar dictator even while he was away, and appointed Mark Antony his master of horse. This was the same Antony whom we have already mentioned as having been connected with Cleopatra after Caesar's death. Rome, in fact, was filled with the fame of Caesar's exploits, and, as he crossed the Adriatic and advanced toward the city, he found himself the object of universal admiration and applause. But he could not yet be contented to establish himself quietly at Rome. There was a large force organized against him in Africa under Cato, a stern and indomitable man, who had long been an enemy to Caesar, and who now considered him as a usurper and an enemy of the republic, and was determined to resist him to the last extremity. There was also a large force assembled in Spain under the command of two sons of Pompey, in whose case the ordinary political hostility of contending partisans was rendered doubly intense and bitter by their desire to avenge their father's cruel fate. Caesar determined first to go to Africa, and then, after disposing of Cato's resistance, to cross the Mediterranean into Spain.

Before he could set out, however, on these expeditions, he was involved in very serious difficulties for a time, on account of a great discontent which prevailed in his army, and which ended at last in

open mutiny. The soldiers complained that they had not received the rewards and honors which Caesar had promised them. Some claimed offices, others money others lands, which, as they maintained, they had been led to expect would be conferred upon them at the end of the campaign. The fact undoubtedly was, that, elated with their success, and intoxicated with the spectacle of the boundless influence and power which their general so obviously wielded at Rome, they formed expectations and hopes for themselves altogether too wild and unreasonable to be realized by soldiers; for soldiers, however much they may be flattered by their generals in going into battle, or praised in the mass in official dispatches, are after all but slaves, and slaves, too, of the very humblest caste and character. The famous tenth legion, Cesar's favorite corps, took the most active part in fomenting these discontents, as might naturally have been expected, since the attentions and the praises which he had bestowed upon them, though at first they tended to awaken their ambition, and to inspire them with redoubled ardor and courage, ended, as such favoritism always does, in making them vain, self-important, and unreasonable. Led on thus by the tenth legion, the whole army mutinied. They broke up the camp where they had been stationed at some distance beyond the walls of Rome, and marched toward the city. Soldiers in a mutiny, even though headed by their subaltern officers, are very little under command; and these Roman troops, feeling released from their usual restraints, committed various excesses on the way, terrifying the inhabitants and spreading universal alarm. The people of the city were thrown into utter consternation at the approach of the vast horde, which was coming like a terrible avalanche to descend upon them.

The army expected some signs of resistance at the gates, which, if

offered, they were prepared to encounter and overcome. Their plan was, after entering the city, to seek Caesar and demand their discharge from his service. They knew that he was under the necessity of immediately making a campaign in Africa, and that, of course, he could not possibly, as they supposed, dispense with them. He would, consequently, if they asked their discharge, beg them to remain, and, to induce them to do it, would comply with all their expectations and desires.

Such was their plan. To tender, however, a resignation of an office as a means of bringing an opposite party to terms, is always a very hazardous experiment. We easily overrate the estimation in which our own services are held taking what is said to us in kindness or courtesy by friends as the sober and deliberate judgment of the public; and thus it often happens that persons who in such case offer to resign, are astonished to find their resignations readily accepted.

When Caesar's mutineers arrived at the gates, they found, instead of opposition, only orders from Caesar, by which they were directed to leave all their arms except their swords, and march into the city. They obeyed. They were then directed to go to the Campus Martius, a vast parade ground situated within the walls, and to await Caesar's orders there.

Caesar met them in the Campus Martius, and demanded why they had left their encampment without orders and come to the city. They stated in reply, as they had previously planned to do, that they wished to be discharged from the public service. To their great astonishment, Caesar seemed to consider this request as nothing at all extraordinary, but promised, on the other hand, very readily to grant it. He said that they should be at once discharged, and should receive faithfully all the rewards which had been promised them at

the close of the war for their long and arduous services. At the same time, he expressed his deep regret that, to obtain what he was perfectly willing and ready at any time to grant, they should have so far forgotten their duties as Romans, and violated the discipline which should always be held absolutely sacred by every soldier. He particularly regretted that the tenth legion, on which he had been long accustomed so implicitly to rely, should have taken a part in such transactions. In making this address, Caesar assumed a kind and considerate, and even respectful tone toward his men, calling them *Quirites* instead of soldiers — an honorary mode of appellation, which recognized them as constituent members of the Roman commonwealth. The effect of the whole transaction was what might have been anticipated. A universal desire was awakened throughout the whole army to return to their duty. They sent deputations to Caesar, begging not to be taken at their word, but to be retained in the service, and allowed to accompany him to Africa. After much hesitation and delay, Caesar consented to receive them again, all excepting the tenth legion, who, he said, had now irrevocably lost his confidence and regard. It is a striking illustration of the strength of the attachment which bound Caesar's soldiers to their commander, that the tenth legion *would not* be discharged, after all. They followed Caesar of their own accord into Africa, earnestly entreating him again and again to receive them. He finally did receive them in detachments, which he incorporated with the rest of his army, or sent on distant service, but he would never organize them as the tenth legion again. It was now early in the winter, a stormy season for crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Caesar, however, set off from Rome immediately, proceeded south to Sicily, and encamped on the sea-shore there till the fleet was ready to convey his forces to Africa. The

usual fortune attended him in the African campaigns His fleet was exposed to imminent dangers in crossing the sea, but, in consequence of the extreme deliberation and skill with which his arrangements were made, he escaped them all. He overcame one after another of the military difficulties which were in his way in Africa. His army endured, in the depth of winter, great exposures and fatigues, and they had to encounter a large hostile force under the charge of Cato. They were, however, successful in every undertaking. Cato retreated at last to the city of Utica, where he shut himself up with the remains of his army; but finding, at length, when Caesar drew near, that there was no hope or possibility of making good his defense, and as his stern and indomitable spirit could not endure the thought of submission to one whom he considered as an enemy to his country and a traitor he resolved upon a very effectual mode of escaping from his conqueror's power. He feigned to abandon all hope of defending the city, and began to make arrangements to facilitate the escape of his soldiers over the sea. He collected the vessels in the harbor, and allowed all to embark who were willing to take the risks of the stormy water. He took, apparently, great interest in the embarkations, and, when evening came on, he sent repeatedly down to the sea-side to inquire about the state of the wind and the progress of the operations. At length he retired to his apartment, and, when all was quiet in the house, he lay down upon his bed and stabbed himself with his sword. He fell from the bed by the blow, or else from the effect of some convulsive motion which the penetrating steel occasioned. His son and servants, hearing the fall, came rushing into the room, raised him from the floor, and attempted to bind up and stanch the wound. Cato would not permit them to do it. He resisted them violently as soon as he was conscious of what they intended.

Finding that a struggle would only aggravate the horrors of the scene, and even hasten its termination, they left the bleeding hero to his fate, and in a few minutes he died.

The character of Cato, and the circumstances under which his suicide was committed, make it, on the whole, the most conspicuous act of suicide which history records; and the events which followed show in an equally conspicuous manner the extreme folly of the deed. In respect to its wickedness, Cato, not having had the light of Christianity before him, is to be leniently judged. As to the folly of the deed, however, he is to be held strictly accountable. If he had lived and yielded to his conqueror, as he might have done gracefully and without dishonor, since all his means of resistance were exhausted, Caesar would have treated him with generosity and respect, and would have taken him to Rome; and as within a year or two of this time Caesar himself was no more, Cato's vast influence and power might have been, and undoubtedly would have been, called most effectually into action for the benefit of his country. If any one, in defending Cato, should say he could not foresee this, we reply, he *could* have foreseen it; not the precise events, indeed, which occurred, but he could have foreseen that vast changes must take place, and new aspects of affairs arise, in which his powers would be called into requisition. We can *always* foresee in the midst of any storm, however dark and gloomy, that clear skies will certainly sooner or later come again; and this is just as true metaphorically in respect to the vicissitudes of human life, as it is literally in regard to the ordinary phenomena of the skies. From Africa Caesar returned to Rome, and from Rome he went to subdue the resistance which was offered by the sons of Pompey in Spain. He was equally successful here. The oldest son was wounded in battle, and was carried off from

the field upon a litter faint and almost dying. He recovered in some degree, and, finding escape from the eager pursuit of Caesar's soldiers impossible, he concealed himself in a cave, where he lingered for a little time in destitution and misery. He was discovered at last; his head was cut off by his captors and sent to Caesar, as his father's had been. The younger son succeeded in escaping, but he became a wretched fugitive and outlaw, and all manifestations of resistance to Caesar's sway disappeared from Spain. The conqueror returned to Rome the undisputed master of the whole Roman world.

In these triumphal processions, every thing was borne in exhibition which could serve as a symbol of the conquered country or a trophy of victory, Flags and banners taken from the enemy; vessels of gold and silver, and other treasures, loaded in vans; wretched captives conveyed in open carriages or marching sorrowfully on foot, and destined, some of them, to public execution when the ceremony of the triumph was ended; displays of arms, and implements, and dresses, and all else which might serve to give the Roman crowd an idea of the customs and usages of the remote and conquered nations; the animals they used, caparisoned in the manner in which they used them: these, and a thousand other trophies and emblems, were brought into the line to excite the admiration of the crowd, and to add to the gorgeousness of the spectacle. In fact, it was always a great object of solicitude and exertion with all the Roman generals, when on distant and dangerous expeditions, to possess themselves of every possible prize in the progress of their campaign which could aid in adding splendor to the triumph which was to signalize its end.

In these triumphs of Caesar, a young sister of Cleopatra was in the line of the Egyptian procession. In that devoted to Asia Minor was a

great banner containing the words already referred to, Veni, Vidi, Vici. There were great paintings, too, borne aloft, representing battles and other striking scenes. Of course, all Rome was in the highest state of excitement during the days of the exhibition of this pageantry. The whole surrounding country flocked to the capital to witness it, and Caesar's greatness and glory were signaled in the most conspicuous manner to all mankind. All open opposition to Caesar's power and dominion now entirely disappeared. Even the Senate vied with the people in rendering him every possible honor. The supreme power had been hitherto lodged in the hands of two consuls, chosen annually, and the Roman people had been extremely jealous of any distinction for any one, higher than that of an *elective annual office*, with a return to private life again when the brief period should have expired. They now, however, made Caesar, in the first place, consul for ten years, and then Perpetual Dictator. They conferred upon him the title of the Father of his Country. The name of the month in which he was born was changed to Julius, from his praenomen, and we still retain the name. He was made, also, commander-in-chief of all the armies of the commonwealth, the title to which vast military power was expressed in the Latin language by the word IMPERATOR.

Caesar was highly elated with all these substantial proofs of the greatness and glory to which he had attained, and was also very evidently gratified with smaller, but equally expressive proofs of the general regard. Statues representing his person were placed in the public edifices, and borne in processions like those of the gods. Conspicuous and splendidly ornamented seats were constructed for him in all the places of public assembly, and on these he sat to listen to debates or witness spectacles, as if he were upon a throne. He had,

either by his influence or by his direct power, the control of all the appointments to office, and was, in fact, in every thing but the name, a sovereign and an absolute king.

He began now to form great schemes of internal improvement for the general benefit of the empire. He wished to increase still more the great obligations which the Roman people were under to him for what he had already done. They really were under vast obligations to him; for, considering Rome as a community which was to subsist by governing the world, Caesar had immensely enlarged the means of its subsistence by establishing its sway every where, and providing for an incalculable increase of its revenues from the tribute and the taxation of conquered provinces and kingdoms. Since this work of conquest was now completed, he turned his attention to the internal affairs of the empire, and made many improvements in the system of administration, looking carefully into every thing, and introducing every where those exact and systematic principles which such a mind as his seeks instinctively in every thing over which it has any control. Caesar formed a great many other vast and magnificent schemes. He planned public buildings for the city, which were going to exceed in magnitude and splendor all the edifices of the world. He commenced the collection of vast libraries, formed plans for draining the Pontine Marshes, for bringing great supplies of water into the city by an aqueduct, for cutting a new passage for the Tiber from Rome to the sea, and making an enormous artificial harbor at its mouth. He was going to make a road along the Apennines, and cut a canal through the Isthmus of Corinth, and construct other vast works, which were to make Rome the center of the commerce of the world. In a word, his head was filled with the grandest schemes, and he was gathering around him all the means and resources necessary for the

execution of them.

CHAPTER XI THE CONSPIRACY.

Caesar's greatness and glory came at last to a very sudden and violent end. He was assassinated. All the attendant circumstances of this deed, too, were of the most extraordinary character, and thus the dramatic interest which adorns all parts of the great conqueror's history marks strikingly its end. The Romans abhorred the very name of king. They had had kings in the early periods of their history, but they made themselves odious by their pride and their oppressions, and the people had deposed and expelled them. The modern nations of Europe have several times performed the same exploit, but they have generally felt unprotected and ill at ease without a personal sovereign over them and have accordingly, in most cases, after a few years, restored some branch of the expelled dynasty to the throne. The Romans were more persevering and firm. They had managed their empire now for five hundred years as a republic, and though they had had internal dissensions, conflicts, and quarrels without end, had persisted so firmly and unanimously in their detestation of all regal authority, that no one of the long line of ambitious and powerful statesmen, generals, or conquerors by which the history of the empire had been signalized, had ever dared to aspire to the name of king.

There began, however, soon to appear some indications that Caesar, who certainly now possessed regal power, would like the regal name. Ambitious men, in such cases, do not directly assume themselves the titles and symbols of royalty. Others make the claim for them, while they faintly disavow it, till they have opportunity to see what effect the idea produces on the public mind. The following incidents occurred which it was thought indicated such a design on the part of Caesar.

There were in some of the public buildings certain statues of kings; for it must be understood that the Roman dislike to kings was only a dislike to having kingly authority exercised over themselves. They respected and sometimes admired the kings of other countries, and honored their exploits, and made statues to commemorate their fame. They were willing that kings should reign elsewhere, so long as there were no king of Rome. The American feeling at the present day is much the same. If the Queen of England were to make a progress through this country, she would receive, perhaps, as many and as striking marks of attention and honor as would be rendered to her in her own realm. We venerate the antiquity of her royal line; we admire the efficiency of her government and the sublime grandeur of her empire, and have as high an idea as any, of the powers and prerogatives of her crown — and these feelings would show themselves most abundantly on any proper occasion. We are willing, nay, wish that she should continue to reign over Englishmen; and yet, after all, it would take some millions of bayonets to place a queen securely upon a throne over this land.

Regal power was accordingly, in the abstract, looked up to at Rome, as it is elsewhere, with great respect; and it was, in fact, all the more tempting as an object of ambition, from the determination felt by the people that it should not be exercised there. There were, accordingly, statues of kings at Rome. Caesar placed his own statue among them. Some approved, others murmured.

There was a public theater in the city, where the officers of the government were accustomed to sit in honorable seats prepared expressly for them, those of the Senate being higher and more distinguished than the rest. Caesar had a seat prepared for himself there, similar in form to a throne, and adorned it magnificently with

gilding and ornaments of gold, which gave it the entire pre-eminence over all the other seats.

He had a similar throne placed in the senate chamber, to be occupied by himself when attending there, like the throne of the King of England in the House of Lords. Not long after this, as he was returning in public from some great festival, the streets being full of crowds, and the populace following him in great throngs with loud acclamations, a man went up to his statue as he passed it, and placed upon the head of it a laurel crown, fastened with a white ribbon, which was a badge of royalty. Some officers ordered the ribbon to be taken down, and sent the man to prison. Caesar was very much displeased with the officers, and dismissed them from their office. He wished, he said, to have the opportunity to disavow, himself, such claims, and not to have others disavow them for him.

Caesar's disavowals were, however, so faint, and people had so little confidence in their sincerity, that the cases became more and more frequent in which the titles and symbols of royalty were connected with his name. The people who wished to gain his favor saluted him in public with the name of *Rex*, the Latin word for king. He replied that his name was Caesar, not *Rex*, showing, however, no other signs of displeasure. On one great occasion, a high public officer, a near relative of his, repeatedly placed a diadem upon his head, Caesar himself, as often as he did it, gently putting it off. At last he sent the diadem away to a temple that was near, saying that there was no king in Rome but Jupiter. In a word, all his conduct indicated that he wished to have it appear that the people were pressing the crown upon him, when he himself was steadily refusing it. This state of things produced a very strong and universal, though suppressed excitement in the city. Parties were formed. Some began

to be willing to make Caesar king; others were determined to hazard their lives to prevent it. None dared, however, openly to utter their sentiments on either side. They expressed them by mysterious looks and dark intimations. At the time when Caesar refused to rise to receive the Senate, many of the members withdrew in silence, and with looks of offended dignity. When the crown was placed upon his statue or upon his own brow, a portion of the populace would applaud with loud acclamations; and whenever he disavowed these acts, either by words or counter-actions of his own, an equally loud acclamation would arise from the other side. On the whole, however, the idea that Caesar was gradually advancing toward the kingdom steadily gained ground. And yet Caesar himself spoke frequently with great humility in respect to his pretensions and claims; and when he found public sentiment turning against the ambitious schemes he seems secretly to have cherished, he would present some excuse or explanation for his conduct plausible enough to answer the purpose of a disavowal. When he received the Senate, sitting like a king, on the occasion before referred to, when they read to him the decrees which they had passed in his favor, he replied to them that there was more need of diminishing the public honors which he received than of increasing them. When he found, too, how much excitement his conduct on that occasion had produced, he explained it by saying that he had retained his sitting posture on account of the infirmity of his health, as it made him dizzy to stand. He thought, probably, that these pretexts would tend to quiet the strong and turbulent spirits around him, from whose envy or rivalry he had most to fear, without at all interfering with the effect which the act itself would have produced upon the masses of the population. He wished, in a word, to accustom them to see him assume the position and the bearing of a

sovereign, while, by his apparent humility in his intercourse with those immediately around him, he avoided as much as possible irritating and arousing the jealous and watchful rivals who were next to him in power.

If this were his plan, it seemed to be advancing prosperously toward its accomplishment. The population of the city seemed to become more and more familiar with the idea that Caesar was about to become a king. The opposition which the idea had at first awakened appeared to subside, or, at least, the public expression of it, which daily became more and more determined and dangerous, was restrained. At length the time arrived when it appeared safe to introduce the subject to the Roman Senate. This, of course, was a hazardous experiment. It was managed, however, in a very adroit and ingenious manner. In the mean time, Caesar's enemies, though to all outward appearance quiet and calm, had not been inactive. Finding that his plans were now ripe for execution, and that they had no, open means of resisting them, they formed a conspiracy to assassinate Caesar himself, and thus bring his ambitious schemes to an effectual and final end. The name of the original leader of this conspiracy was Cassius.

Cassius had been for a long time Caesar's personal rival and enemy. He was a man of a very violent and ardent temperament, impetuous and fearless, very fond of exercising power himself, but very restless and uneasy in having it exercised over him. He had all the Roman repugnance to being under the authority of a master, with an additional personal determination of his own not to submit to Caesar. He determined to slay Caesar rather than to allow him to be made a king, and he went to work, with great caution, to bring other leading and influential men to join him in this determination. Some

of those to whom he applied said that they would unite with him in his plot provided he would get Marcus Brutus to join them.

Brutus was the praetor of the city. The praetorship of the city was a very high municipal office. The conspirators wished to have Brutus join them partly on account of his station as a magistrate, as if they supposed that by having the highest public magistrate of the city for their leader in the deed, the destruction of their victim would appear less like a murder, and would be invested, instead, in some respects, with the sanctions and with the dignity of an official execution. Then, again, they wished for the moral support which would be afforded them in their desperate enterprise by Brutus's extraordinary personal character. He was younger than Cassius, but he was grave, thoughtful, taciturn, calm — a man of inflexible integrity, of the coolest determination, and, at the same time, of the most undaunted courage. The conspirators distrusted one another, for the resolution of impetuous men is very apt to fail when the emergency arrives which puts it to the test; but as for Brutus, they knew very well that whatever he undertook he would most certainly do. There was a great deal even in his name. It was a Brutus that five centuries before had been the main instrument of the expulsion of the Roman kings. He had secretly meditated the design, and, the better to conceal it, had feigned idiocy, as the story was, that he might not be watched or suspected until the favorable hour for executing his design should arrive. He therefore ceased to speak, and seemed to lose his reason; he wandered about the city silent and gloomy, like a brute. His name had been Lucius Junius before. They added Brutus now, to designate his condition. When at last, however, the crisis arrived which he judged favorable for the expulsion of the kings, he suddenly reassumed his speech and his reason, called the astonished Romans

to arms, and triumphantly accomplished his design. His name and memory had been cherished ever since that day as of a great deliverer.

They, therefore, who looked upon Caesar as another king, naturally turned their thoughts to the Brutus of their day, hoping to find in him another deliverer. Brutus found, from time to time, inscriptions on his ancient namesake's statue expressing the wish that he were now alive. He also found each morning, as he came to the tribunal where he was accustomed to sit in the discharge of the duties of his office, brief writings, which had been left there during the night, in which few words expressed deep meaning, such as "Awake, Brutus, to thy duty;" and "Art thou indeed a Brutus?" Still it seemed hardly probable that Brutus could be led to take a decided stand against Caesar, for they had been warm personal friends ever since the conclusion of the civil wars. Brutus had, indeed, been on Pompey's side while that general lived; he fought with him at the battle of Pharsalia, but he had been taken prisoner there, and Caesar, instead of executing him as a traitor, as most victorious generals in a civil war would have done, spared his life, forgave him for his hostility, received him into his own service, and afterward raised him to very high and honorable stations. He gave him the government of the richest province, and, after his return from it, loaded with wealth and honors, he made him praetor of the city. In a word, it would seem that he had done every thing which it was possible to do to make him one of his most trustworthy and devoted friends. The men, therefore, to whom Cassius first applied, perhaps thought that they were very safe in saying that they would unite in the intended conspiracy if he would get Brutus to join them. They expected Cassius himself to make the attempt to secure the co-operation of

Brutus, as Cassius was on terms of intimacy with him on account of a family connection. Cassius's wife was the sister of Brutus. This had made the two men intimate associates and warm friends in former years, though they had been recently somewhat estranged from each other on account of having been competitors for the same offices and honors. In these contests Caesar had decided in favor of Brutus. "Cassius," said he, on one such occasion, "gives the best reasons; but I can not refuse Brutus any thing he asks for." In fact, Caesar had conceived a strong personal friendship for Brutus, and believed him to be entirely devoted to his cause.

Cassius, however, sought an interview with Brutus, with a view of engaging him in his design. He easily effected his own reconciliation with him, as he had himself been the offended party in their estrangement from each other. He asked Brutus whether he intended to be present in the Senate on the Ides of March, when the friends of Caesar, as was understood, were intending to present him with the crown. Brutus said he should not be there. "But suppose," said Cassius, "we are specially summoned." "Then," said Brutus, "I shall go, and shall be ready to die if necessary to defend the liberty of my country."

Cassius then assured Brutus that there were many other Roman citizens, of the highest rank, who were animated by the same determination, and that they all looked up to him to lead and direct them in the work which it was now very evident must be done. "Men look," said Cassius, "to other praetors to entertain them with games, spectacles, and shows, but they have very different ideas in respect to you. Your character, your name, your position, your ancestry, and the course of conduct which you have already always pursued, inspire the whole city with the hope that you are to be their deliverer. The

citizens are all ready to aid you, and to sustain you at the hazard of their lives; but they look to you to go forward, and to act in their name and in their behalf, in the crisis which is now approaching.”Men of a very calm exterior are often susceptible of the profoundest agitations within, the emotions seeming to be sometimes all the more permanent and uncontrollable from the absence of outward display. Brutus said little, but his soul was excited and fired by Cassius’s words. There was a struggle in his soul between his grateful sense of his political obligations to Caesar and his personal attachment to him on the one hand, and, on the other, a certain stern Roman conviction that every thing should be sacrificed, even friendship and gratitude, as well as fortune and life, to the welfare of his country. He acceded to the plan, and began forthwith to enter upon the necessary measures for putting it into execution.

There was a certain general, named Ligurius, who had been in Pompey’s army, and whose hostility to Caesar had never been really subdued. He was now sick. Brutus went to see him. He found him in his bed. The excitement in Rome was so intense, though the expressions of it were suppressed and restrained, that every one was expecting continually some great event, and every motion and look was interpreted to have some deep meaning. Ligurius read in the countenance of Brutus, as he approached his bedside, that he had not come on any trifling errand. “Ligurius,” said Brutus, “this is not a time for *you* to be sick.” “Brutus,” replied Ligurius, rising at once from his couch, “if you have any enterprise in mind that is worthy of you, I am well.” Brutus explained to the sick man their design, and he entered into it with ardor. In this view of the subject, they decided that the chamber of the Roman Senate was the proper place, and the Ides of March, the day on which he was appointed to be crowned,

was the propel time for Caesar to be slain.

CHAPTER XII. THE ASSASSINATION.

According to the account given by his historians, Caesar received many warnings of his approaching fate, which, however, he would not heed. Many of these warnings were strange portents and prodigies, which the philosophical writers who recorded them half believed themselves, and which they were always ready to add to their narratives even if they did not believe them, on account of the great influence which such an introduction of the supernatural and the divine had with readers in those days in enhancing the dignity and the dramatic interest of the story. These warnings were as follows:

At Capua, which was a great city at some distance south of Rome, the second, in fact, in Italy, and the one which Hannibal had proposed to make his capital, some workmen were removing certain ancient sepulchers to make room for the foundations of a splendid edifice which, among his other plans for the embellishment of the cities of Italy, Caesar was intending to have erected there. As the excavations advanced, the workmen came at last to an ancient tomb, which proved to be that of the original founder of Capua; and, in bringing out the sarcophagus, they found an inscription, worked upon a brass plate, and in the Greek character, predicting that if those remains were ever disturbed, a great member of the Julian family would be assassinated by his own friends, and his death would be followed by extended devastations throughout all Italy.

The horses, too, with which Caesar had passed the Rubicon, and which had been, ever since that time, living in honorable retirement in a splendid park which Caesar had provided for them, by some mysterious instinct, or from some divine communication, had

warning of the approach of their great benefactor's end. They refused their food, and walked about with melancholy and dejected looks, mourning apparently, and in a manner almost human, some impending grief.

There was a class of prophets in those days called by a name which has been translated *soothsayers*. These soothsayers were able, as was supposed, to look somewhat into futurity — dimly and doubtfully, it is true, but really, by means of certain appearances exhibited by the bodies of the animals offered in sacrifices. These soothsayers were consulted on all important occasions; and if the auspices proved unfavorable when any great enterprise was about to be undertaken, it was often, on that account, abandoned or postponed. One of these soothsayers, named Spurinna, came to Caesar one day, and informed him that he had found, by means of a public sacrifice which he had just been offering, that there was a great and mysterious danger impending over him, which was connected in some way with the Ides of March, and he counseled him to be particularly cautious and circumspect until that day should have passed.

The Senate were to meet on the Ides of March in a new and splendid edifice, which had been erected for their use by Pompey. There was in the interior of the building, among other decorations, a statue of Pompey. The day before the Ides of March, some birds of prey from a neighboring grove came flying into this hall, pursuing a little wren with a sprig of laurel in its mouth. The birds tore the wren to pieces, the laurel dropping from its bill to the marble pavement of the floor below. Now, as Caesar had been always accustomed to wear a crown of laurel on great occasions, and had always evinced a particular fondness for that decoration, that plant had come to be

considered his own proper badge, and the fall of the laurel, therefore, was naturally thought to portend some great calamity to him. The night before the Ides of March Caesar could not sleep. It would not seem, however, to be necessary to suppose any thing supernatural to account for his wakefulness. He lay upon his bed restless and excited, or if he fell into a momentary slumber, his thoughts, instead of finding repose, were only plunged into greater agitations, produced by strange, and, as he thought, supernatural dreams. He imagined that he ascended into the skies, and was received there by Jupiter, the supreme divinity, as an associate and equal. While shaking hands with the great father of gods and men, the sleeper was startled by a frightful sound. He awoke, and found his wife Calpurnia groaning and struggling in her sleep. He saw her by the moonlight which was shining into the room. He spoke to her, and aroused her. After staring wildly for a moment till she had recovered her thoughts, she said that she had had a dreadful dream. She had dreamed that the roof of the house had fallen in, and that, at the same instant, the doors had been burst open, and some robber or assassin had stabbed her husband as he was lying in her arms. The philosophy of those days found in these dreams mysterious and preternatural warnings of impending danger; that of ours, however, sees nothing either in the absurd sacrilegiousness of Caesar's thoughts, or his wife's incoherent and inconsistent images of terror — nothing more than the natural and proper effects, on the one hand, of the insatiable ambition of man, and, on the other, of the conjugal affection and solicitude of woman. The ancient sculptors carved out images of men, by the forms and lineaments of which we see that the physical characteristics of humanity have not changed. History seems to do the same with the affections and passions of the soul. The dreams of

Caesar and his wife on the night before the Ides of March, as thus recorded, form a sort of spiritual statue, which remains from generation to generation, to show us how precisely all the inward workings of human nature are from age to age the same.

When the morning came Caesar and Calpurnia arose, both restless and ill at ease. Caesar ordered the auspices to be consulted with reference to the intended proceedings of the day. The soothsayers came in in due time, and reported that the result was unfavorable. Calpurnia, too, earnestly entreated her husband not to go to the senate-house that day. She had a very strong presentiment that, if he did go, some great calamity would ensue. Caesar himself hesitated. He was half inclined to yield, and postpone his coronation to another occasion.

In the course of the day, while Caesar was in this state of doubt and uncertainty, one of the conspirators, named Decimus Brutus, came in. This Brutus was not a man of any extraordinary courage or energy, but he had been invited by the other conspirators to join them, on account of his having under his charge a large number of gladiators, who, being desperate and reckless men, would constitute a very suitable armed force for them to call in to their aid in case of any emergency arising which should require it.

The conspirators having thus all their plans arranged, Decimus Brutus was commissioned to call at Caesar's house when the time approached for the assembling of the Senate, both to avert suspicion from Caesar's mind, and to assure himself that nothing had been discovered. It was in the afternoon, the time for the meeting of the senators having been fixed at five o'clock. Decimus Brutus found Caesar troubled and perplexed, and uncertain what to do. After hearing what he had to say, he replied by urging him to go by all

means to the senate-house, as he had intended. "You have formally called the Senate together," said he, "and they are now assembling. They are all prepared to confer upon you the rank and title of king, not only in Parthia, while you are conducting this war but every where, by sea and land, except in Italy. And now, while they are all in their places, waiting to consummate the great act, how absurd will it be for you to send them word to go home again, and come back some other day, when Calpurnia shall have had better dreams!"

He urged, too, that, even if Caesar was determined to put off the action of the Senate to another day, he was imperiously bound to go himself and adjourn the session in person. So saying, he took the hesitating potentate by the arm, and adding to his arguments a little gentle force, conducted him along. The conspirators supposed that all was safe. The fact was, however, that all had been discovered. There was a certain Greek, a teacher of oratory, named Artemidorus. He had contrived to learn something of the plot from some of the conspirators who were his pupils. He wrote a brief statement of the leading particulars, and, having no other mode of access to Caesar, he determined to hand it to him on the way as he went to the senate-house. Of course, the occasion was one of great public interest, and crowds had assembled in the streets to see the great conqueror as he went along. As usual at such times, when powerful officers of state appear in public, many people came up to present petitions to him as he passed. These he received, and handed them, without reading, to his secretary who attended him, as if to have them preserved for future examination. Artemidorus, who was waiting for his opportunity, when he perceived what disposition Caesar made of the papers which were given to him, began to be afraid that his own communication would not be attended to until it was too late. He

accordingly pressed up near to Caesar, refusing to allow any one else to pass the paper in; and when, at last, he obtained an opportunity, he gave it directly into Caesar's hands saying to him, "Read this immediately: it concerns yourself, and is of the utmost importance"

Caesar took the paper and attempted to read it, but new petitions and other interruptions constantly prevented him; finally he gave up the attempt, and went on his way, receiving and passing to his secretary all other papers, but retaining this paper of Artemidorus in his hand.

Caesar passed Spurinna on his way to the senate-house — the soothsayer who had predicted some great danger connected with the Ides of March. As soon as he recognized him, he accosted him with the words, "Well, Spurinna, the Ides of March have come, and I am safe." "Yes," replied Spurinna, "they have come, but they are not yet over."

At length he arrived at the senate-house, with the paper of Artemidorus still unread in his hand. The senators were all convened, the leading conspirators among them. They all rose to receive Caesar as he entered. Caesar advanced to the seat provided for him, and, when he was seated, the senators themselves sat down. The moment had now arrived, and the conspirators, with pale looks and beating hearts, felt that now or never the deed was to be done.

It requires a very considerable degree of physical courage and hardihood for men to come to a calm and deliberate decision that they will kill one whom they hate, and, still more, actually to strike the blow, even when under the immediate impulse of passion. But men who are perfectly capable of either of these often find their resolution fail them as the time comes for striking a dagger into the living flesh of their victim, when he sits at ease and unconcerned

before them, unarmed and defenseless, and doing nothing to excite those feelings of irritation and anger which are generally found so necessary to nerve the human arm to such deeds. Utter defenselessness is accordingly, sometimes, a greater protection than an armor of steel.

Even Cassius himself, the originator and the soul of the whole enterprise, found his courage hardly adequate to the work now that the moment had arrived; and, in order to arouse the necessary excitement in his soul, he looked up to the statue of Pompey, Caesar's ancient and most formidable enemy, and invoked its aid. It gave him its aid. It inspired him with some portion of the enmity with which the soul of its great original had burned; and thus the soul of the living assassin was nerved to its work by a sort of sympathy with a block of stone.

Foreseeing the necessity of something like a stimulus to action when the immediate moment for action should arrive, the conspirators had agreed that, as soon as Caesar was seated, they would approach him with a petition, which he would probably refuse, and then, gathering around him, they would urge him with their importunities, so as to produce, in the confusion, a sort of excitement that would make it easier for them to strike the blow.

There was one person, a relative and friend of Caesar's, named Marcus Antonius, called commonly, however, in English narratives, Marc Antony, the same who has been already mentioned as having been subsequently connected with Cleopatra. He was a very energetic and determined man, who, they thought, might possibly attempt to defend him. To prevent this, one of the conspirators had been designated to take him aside, and occupy his attention with some pretended subject of discourse, ready, at the same time, to

resist and prevent his interference if he should show himself inclined to offer any. Things being thus arranged, the petitioner, as had been agreed, advanced to Caesar with his petition, others coming up at the same time as if to second the request. The object of the petition was to ask for the pardon of the brother of one of the conspirators. Caesar declined granting it. The others then crowded around him, urging him to grant the request with pressing importunities, all apparently reluctant to strike the first blow. Caesar began to be alarmed, and attempted to repel them. One of them then pulled down his robe from his neck to lay it bare. Caesar arose, exclaiming, "But this is violence." At the same instant, one of the conspirators struck at him with his sword, and wounded him slightly in the neck.

All was now terror, outcry, and confusion. Caesar had no time to draw his sword, but fought a moment with his style, a sharp instrument of iron with which they wrote, in those days, on waxen tablets, and which he happened then to have in his hand. With this instrument he ran one of his enemies through the arm.

In the midst of the scene Brutus made an attempt to address the senators, and to vindicate what they had done, but the confusion and excitement were so great that it was impossible that any thing could be heard. The senators were, in fact, rapidly leaving the place, going off in every direction, and spreading the tidings over the city. The event, of course, produced universal commotion. The citizens began to close their shops, and some to barricade their houses, while others hurried to and fro about the streets, anxiously inquiring for intelligence, and wondering what dreadful event was next to be expected. Antony and Lepidus, who were Caesar's two most faithful and influential friends, not knowing how extensive the conspiracy might be, nor how far the hostility to Caesar and his party might

extend, fled, and, not daring to go to their own houses, lest the assassins or their confederates might pursue them there, sought concealment in the houses of friends on whom they supposed they could rely and who were willing to receive them. In the mean time, the conspirators, glorying in the deed which they had perpetrated, and congratulating each other on the successful issue of their enterprise, sallied forth together from the senate-house, leaving the body of their victim weltering in its blood, and marched, with drawn swords in their hands, along the streets from the senate-house to the Capitol. Brutus went at the head of them, preceded by a liberty cap borne upon the point of a spear, and with his bloody dagger in his hand. The Capitol was the citadel, built magnificently upon the Capitoline Hill, and surrounded by temples, and other sacred and civil edifices, which made the spot the architectural wonder of the world. As Brutus and his company proceeded thither, they announced to the citizens, as they went along, the great deed of deliverance which they had wrought out for the country. Instead of seeking concealment, they gloried in the work which they had done, and they so far succeeded in inspiring others with a portion of their enthusiasm, that some men who had really taken no part in the deed joined Brutus and his company in their march, to obtain by stealth a share in the glory.

The body of Caesar lay for some time unheeded where it had fallen, the attention of every one being turned to the excitement, which was extending through the city, and to the expectation of other great events which might suddenly develop themselves in other quarters of Rome. There were left only three of Caesar's slaves, who gathered around the body to look at the wounds. They counted them, and found the number twenty-three. It shows, however, how

strikingly, and with what reluctance, the actors in this tragedy came up to their work at last, that of all these twenty-three wounds only one was a mortal one. In fact, it is probable that, while all of the conspirators struck the victim in their turn, to fulfill the pledge which they had given to one another that they would every one inflict a wound, each one hoped that the fatal blow would be given, after all, by some other hand than his own.

At last the slaves decided to convey the body home. They obtained a sort of chair, which was made to be borne by poles, and placed the body upon it. Then, lifting at the three handles, and allowing the fourth to hang unsupported for want of a man, they bore the ghastly remains home to the distracted Calpurnia.

The next day Brutus and his associates called an assembly of the people in the Forum, and made an address to them, explaining the motives which had led them to the commission of the deed, and vindicating the necessity and the justice of it. The people received these explanations in silence. They expressed neither approbation nor displeasure. It was not, in fact, to be expected that they would feel or evince any satisfaction at the loss of their master. He had been their champion, and, as they believed, their friend. The removal of Caesar brought no accession of power nor increase of liberty to them. It might have been a gain to ambitious senators, or powerful generals, or high officers of state, by removing a successful rival out of their way, but it seemed to promise little advantage to the community at large, other than the changing of one despotism for another. Besides, a populace who know that they must be governed, prefer generally, if they must submit to some control, to yield their submission to some one master spirit whom they can look up to as a great and acknowledged superior. They had rather have a Caesar than a Senate

to command them.

The higher authorities, however, were, at might have been expected, disposed to acquiesce in the removal of Caesar from his intended throne. The Senate met, and passed an act of indemnity, to shield the conspirators from all legal liability for the deed they had done. In order, however, to satisfy the people too, as far as possible, they decreed divine honors to Caesar, confirmed and ratified all that he had done while in the exercise of supreme power, and appointed a time for the funeral, ordering arrangements to be made for a very pompous celebration of it. A will was soon found, which Caesar, it seems, had made some time before. Calpurnia's father proposed that this will should be opened and read in public at Antony's house; and this was accordingly done. The provisions of the will were, many of them, of such a character as renewed the feelings of interest and sympathy which the people of Rome had begun to cherish for Caesar's memory. His vast estate was divided chiefly among the children of his sister, as he had no children of his own, while the very men who had been most prominent in his assassination were named as trustees and guardians of the property; and one of them, Decimus Brutus, the one who had been so urgent to conduct him to the senate-house, was a second heir. He had some splendid gardens near the Tiber, which he bequeathed to the citizens of Rome, and a large amount of money also, to be divided among them, sufficient to give every man a considerable sum. The time for the celebration of the funeral ceremonies was made known by proclamation, and, as the concourse of strangers and citizens of Rome was likely to be so great as to forbid the forming of all into one procession without consuming more than one day, the various classes of the community were invited to come, each in their own way, to the Field of Mars,

bringing with them such insignia, offerings, and oblations as they pleased. The Field of Mars was an immense parade ground, reserved for military reviews, spectacles, and shows. A funeral pile was erected here for the burning of the body. There was to be a funeral discourse pronounced, and Marc Antony had been designated to perform this duty. The body had been placed in a gilded bed, under a magnificent canopy in the form of a temple, before the rostra where the funeral discourse was to be pronounced. The bed was covered with scarlet and cloth of gold and at the head of it was laid the robe in which Caesar had been slain. It was stained with blood, and pierced with the holes that the swords and daggers of the conspirators had made. Marc Antony, instead of pronouncing a formal panegyric upon his deceased friend, ordered a crier to read the decrees of the Senate, in which all honors, human and divine, had been ascribed to Caesar. He then added a few words of his own. The bed was then taken up, with the body upon it, and borne out into the Forum, preparatory to conveying it to the pile which had been prepared for it upon the Field of Mars. A question, however, here arose among the multitude assembled in respect to the proper place for burning the body. The people seemed inclined to select the most honorable place which could be found within the limits of the city. Some proposed a beautiful temple on the Capitoline Hill. Others wished to take it to the senate-house, where he had been slain. The Senate, and those who were less inclined to pay extravagant honors to the departed hero, were in favor of some more retired spot, under pretense that the buildings of the city would be endangered by the fire. This discussion was fast becoming a dispute, when it was suddenly ended by two men, with swords at their sides and knees in their hands, forcing their way through the crowd with lighted torches, and setting the bed and

its canopy on fire where it lay.

This settled the question, and the whole company were soon in the wildest excitement with the work of building up a funeral pile upon the spot. At first they brought fagots and threw upon the fire, then benches from the neighboring courts and porticoes, and then any thing combustible which came to hand. The honor done to the memory of a deceased hero was, in some sense, in proportion to the greatness of his funeral pile, and all the populace on this occasion began soon to seize every thing they could find, appropriate and unappropriate, provided that it would increase the flame. The soldiers threw on their lances and spears, the musicians their instruments, and others stripped off the cloths and trappings from the furniture of the procession, and heaped them upon the burning pile.

So fierce and extensive was the fire, that it spread to some of the neighboring houses, and required great efforts to prevent a general conflagration. The people, too, became greatly excited by the scene. They lighted torches by the fire, and went to the houses of Brutus and Cassius, threatening vengeance upon them for the murder of Caesar. The authorities succeeded though with infinite difficulty, in protecting Brutus and Cassius from the violence of the mob, but they seized one unfortunate citizen of the name of Cinna, thinking it a certain Cinna who had been known as an enemy of Caesar. They cut off his head, notwithstanding his shrieks and cries, and carried it about the city on the tip of a pike, a dreadful symbol of their hostility to the enemies of Caesar. As frequently happens, however, in such deeds of sudden violence, these hasty and lawless avengers found afterward that they had made a mistake, and beheaded the wrong man. The Roman people erected a column to the memory of Caesar,

on which they placed the inscription, "To THE FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY." They fixed the figure of a star upon the summit of it, and some time afterward, while the people were celebrating some games in honor of his memory, a great comet blazed for seven nights in the sky, which they recognized as the mighty hero's soul reposing in heaven.


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
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
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
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
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
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Rudyard Kipling
Rumi
Rupert Brooke
Saki
Sallust
Samuel Butler
Samuel Johnson
Samuel Pepys
Samuel Richardson
Samuel Taylor Coleridge
Sandro Botticelli
Sappho
Sara Teasdale
Sax Rohmer
Seneca the Younger
Septuagint
Sextus Empiricus
Sheridan Le Fanu

Sidonius
Sigmund Freud
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
Sir Issac Newton
Sir Philip Sidney
Sir Richard Burton
Sir Thomas Malory
Sir Thomas More
Sir Thomas Wyatt
Sir Walter Raleigh
Sir Walter Scott
Sophocles
Stanley J. Weyman
Statius
Stendhal
Stephen Crane
Stephen Leacock
Strabo
Suetonius
T. S. Eliot
Tacitus
Talbot Mundy
Terence
The Brontës
The Brothers Grimm
The Harvard Classics
Theocritus
Theodore Dreiser
Thomas Babington Macaulay
Thomas Carlyle
Thomas Chatterton
Thomas De Quincey
Thomas Gainsborough
Thomas Gray
Thomas Hardy

Thomas Hardy (poetry)
Thomas Hood
Thomas Love Peacock
Thomas Middleton
Thomas Moore
Thomas Paine
Thucydides
Tibullus
Tintoretto
Titian
Tobias Smollett
Torquato Tasso
Varro
Victor Hugo
Vincent van Gogh
Virgil
Virginia Woolf
Voltaire
W. B. Yeats
W. Somerset Maugham
W. W. Jacobs
Walt Whitman
Walter Pater
Walter Savage Landor
Washington Irving
Wassily Kandinsky
Wilfred Owen
Wilkie Collins
William Blake
William Cowper
William Dean Howells
William Harrison Ainsworth
William Hazlitt
William Hope Hodgson
William James

William Makepeace Thackeray

William Morris

William Shakespeare

William Wordsworth

Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart

Xenophon

Zane Grey

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
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The Forum, the heart of Ancient Rome, where Caesar was cremated in 44BC



The ruins of the Temple of Caesar. Caesar's body was cremated on the east side of the main square of the Roman Forum and on this site a temple dedicated to the dictator was erected a few years later.



Reconstruction of the Temple of Divus Iulius